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GS Paper: GS2

  • ECI releases an Atlas on General Elections 2019

    The Election Commission of India has released ‘General Elections 2019 – An Atlas’.

    Atlas on General Elections

    • The Atlas encompasses all the data and statistical figures of this monumental event. It shares interesting facts, anecdotes and legal provisions related to the Indian elections.
    • It brings out salient features such as data of the 23 States and Uts where women voting percentage was more than the male voting percentage.
    • It has information about the largest & smallest parliamentary constituency in terms of electors, candidates and performance of political parties amongst other parameters.
    • The Atlas depicts the elector’s data in different categories and through various comparison charts like Elector Gender Ratio and electors in different age categories.
    • This Atlas serves as an informative and illustrative document that brings to light the nuances of the Indian electoral process and empowers readers to analyze trends and changes.

    Data on 2019 Elections

    • The 2019 General Elections witnessed the lowest gender gap in the history of Indian elections.
    • The Elector Gender Ratio which has shown a positive trend since 1971 was 926 in the 2019 General Elections.
    • The Atlas also compares the average number of electors per polling station in different states during the 2014 & 2019 General Elections.
    • The Election Commission of India set up over 10 lakh polling stations in General Elections 2019 with the lowest number of electors per polling station (365) in Arunachal Pradesh.

    Why was such Atlas needed?

    • Since the first General Elections in 1951-52, the Commission has been publishing a compilation of electoral data in the form of narrative and statistical books.
    • 17th General Elections conducted in 2019 were the largest democratic exercise in human history which witnessed the participation of 61.468 crore voters at 10.378 lakh polling stations spread over 32 lakh sq km.

  • Time to rethink the Big Tech’s immunity

    The article discusses the need for regulation of social media and counters against placing social media on a higher pedestal for the application of reasonable restrictions. 

    Social media and its regulation

    • Social media is a commercial product that connects people all over the globe.
    • It allows people to converse with each other through profiles both known and anonymous.
    • The object is purely commercial, that is to make money.
    • The fact that a commercial product could be used for a social purpose does not make the product a social good.
    • The new Information Technology Rules, 2021 formulated by the Government of India attempts to bring in a minimum regulatory standard to social media.
    • The present amendment to the rules is to formulate a broad and soft-touch regulation mechanism for use of the product, just like one would for a good like a car or a service like chartered accountancy.

    Issues with regulation of social media

    1) Immunity from content posted on platforms

    •  Social media companies enjoy an immunity — they are not considered responsible for the contents posted on them.
    • The immunity is granted on the ground that social media is merely a platform or a sort of a glorified postbox.
    • It is incorporated under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 framed under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act.
    • This protection is itself unique as it is not extended to newspapers, magazines or even websites.
    • This protection is given by the government as an exceptional measure.
    • The present amendment to rules only tries to update and make these rules workable considering the latest global developments.

    2) Constitution allows for restriction of freedom of speech

    • The Constitution itself gives us a restricted right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2).
    • The argument that social media is entitled to some form of higher protection because it exists on the internet is an untenable argument.
    • The Constitution doesn’t recognise a hierarchy of rights depending on the medium through which the freedom of speech is exercised.

    3) Important for political and commercial speech

    • Social media has become so crucial to commercial and political speech in this country, there is an urgent need to regulate it.
    • It has effectively become a public square in which the most important conversations on politics and society are discussed.
    • The function of social media is clearly a public function at the lowest and as a public utility at the high end, and, therefore, automatically subject to regulation and the writ jurisdiction of the courts.

    Conclusion

    For all its significance and importance, social media needs to be regulated. However, the regulations should not hamper the freedom of expression and free speech.

  • A new era of partnership in social innovations that can benefit all South Asians

    Pandemic know no borders. So, dealing with it has necessited global cooperation. The article introduce us to some of the cross-country collaborations in dealing with the pandemic, igniting the hope for new era social partnership to the advantage of South Asia.

    Regionally-coordinated strategy against pandemic

    • Containing Covid pandemic has necessitated global cooperation.
    • The deadly pandemic surge in 2021 makes a regionally coordinated, evidence-driven strategy critical.
    • It is necessary to construct multi-stakeholder regional coalitions to devise new solutions and frugal innovations that can be applied across South Asia.
    • Given our shared and mostly similar social, economic and cultural contexts, local successes must be amplified across South Asia.
    • Despite wide variation in how nations have responded to the pandemic, the most successful strategies find commonality in their adherence to science and attention to local context.

    How successful interventions could be applied across the subcontinent

    • Beliefs, priorities, traditions and aversions to behavioural change are more similar across South Asia.
    • This means that interventions that are successful in changing behaviour in one place are highly likely applicable in other parts of the subcontinent.
    • For example, Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) campaigns to solve the problem of open defecation, developed by Bangladeshi NGOs in partnership with an Indian consultant is now broadly applied across South Asia and beyond.
    • The Grameen Bank microcredit model was an indigenous South Asian innovation that spread rapidly.
    • India’s digitised social protection ecosystem with Aadhaar ids and Jan Dhan accounts serves as a model for the region.

    Changing social norm around mask-wearing

    • The new pan-South Asian consortium in response to Covid-19 evolved out of an experiment conducted in Bangladesh around mask-wearing in rural communities termed as NORM.
    • It was observed that a combination of no-cost distribution, information, reinforcing the message, modeling and endorsement by community leaders (NORM) leads to large, sustained increases in mask usage.
    • NORM implementation teams based in Lahore, Ahmedabad, Peshawar, Hyderabad, Dhaka, Kathmandu and Delhi are learning from each other’s successes and failures.
    • The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) quickly implemented the model to reach over one million members in Gujarat.
    •  Additional 1.5 million masks were shipped from Bangladesh to support SEWA’s outreach to other states.
    • Lahore’s commissioner worked with the research team to adapt the NORM model to an urban setting.
    • To manage mild and moderate cases of Covid-19 in rural India, where institutional health care access is limited a host of physicians, scientists and community-based organisations created the Swasth Community Science Alliance.
    • The Masking-Treatment-Vaccine Preparation (MTV) approach offers a sensible strategy to mitigate the pandemic until universal vaccination is achieved.

    Conclusion

    We need to come together to solve problems that affect us all. Let the lasting legacy of this pandemic be a new era of partnership in social innovations that can benefit all South Asians.

  • Balancing right to be forgotten with fair criticism and accountability

    The article discusses the interplay between right to be forgotten and the right of the public to access courts of record, concepts of fair criticism and accountability.

    Context

    The Delhi High Court recently ordered the removal of one of its own judgments from easy access. The High Court recognised that the petitioner may have a right to be forgotten, which must be balanced with the right of the public to access courts of record.

    Right to be forgotten

    • In 2017, the Supreme Court recognised the right to be forgotten as being under the ambit of the right to privacy (specifically, informational privacy) under the Constitution.
    • The Supreme Court observed that a lot of personal information may serve no “legitimate interest”, was “incorrect”, or was not “necessary” or “relevant”.
    • For now, individuals may request data hosts to take down some content, and it may be taken down based on the policies of the respective hosts.
    • There is a general consensus that people should be allowed to modify or delete information uploaded by themselves.
    • However, whether this extends to information uploaded by third parties is uncertain.
    • The right to be forgotten is, generally, the right to have information about a person removed from public access.

    Balancing between right of the public

    • The Delhi High Court recognised that the petitioner may have a right to be forgotten, which must be balanced with the right of the public to access courts of record.
    • Judgments are published for good reasons.
    • Trials held under public scrutiny act as a check against judicial caprices and help in enhancing the confidence of the public in the fairness and objectivity of the administration of justice.
    • The Supreme Court has made is clear that the right to be forgotten was subject to reasonable restrictions based on countervailing rights such as free speech.

    Consider the question “What is right to be forgotten and how it is related to the right to privacy? Examine the issues related to the implementation of the right to be forgotten.”

    Way forward

    • The High Court could have ordered that the name and personal details of the petitioner be redacted while maintaining public access to the judgment itself.

    Conclusion

    The right to be forgotten needs to be studied along with the concepts of fair criticism and accountability.

  • Annual Review of State Laws Report, 2020

    The COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent lockdown had a huge impact on the working of the state legislatures in India.  The PRS Legislative Research’s “Annual review of state laws 2020” shows that the productivity and efficacy of State legislatures are poor.

    Annual Review of State Laws

    • This report focuses on the legislative work performed by states in the calendar year 2020.
    • It is based on data compiled from state legislature websites and state gazettes.
    • It covers 19 state legislatures, including the union territory of Delhi, which together accounts for 90% of the population of the country.

    Highlights of the report

    (1) Sittings of states

    • Compared with its average number of sitting days of 32 from 2016 to 2019, the Karnataka legislature, which is bicameral, met on 31 days last year, the highest for any State in 2020.
    • The southern State was followed by Rajasthan (29 days) and Himachal Pradesh (25 days). For comparison, Parliament met for 33 days last year.
    • In 2020, the average number of sitting days for the 19 States was 18, which was 11 less than the four-year (2016-19) average of 29.
    • Kerala, which had the distinction of remaining at the top in the four years with an average of 53 days, had only 20 days of sittings of the legislature last year.

    (2) Number of bills

    • As for the number of Bills passed last year, Karnataka again topped the list with 61 Bills, followed by Tamil Nadu (42) and Uttar Pradesh (37). For this purpose, Appropriation Bills were excluded.
    • Among poor performers under this category, Delhi passed only one Bill; West Bengal passed two Bills and Kerala three Bills.

    (3) Time taken for passing bills

    • On the duration of time taken to pass Bills, the previous year saw 59% of the Bills being passed by the legislature of the States on the day of introduction.
    • A further 14% was adopted within a day of being introduced.
    • Only 9% of the Bills were passed more than five days after introduction, some of which were referred to committees for further examination.

  • Electoral bonds

    The article highlights the issues with the political funding through electoral bonds.

    Changes made for the electoral bond and issues with them

    • Earlier, only profit-making domestic companies could contribute to political parties; now loss-making companies can too.
    • Earlier, foreign companies or companies where the controlling stake was held by a foreign company couldn’t contribute; now they can. 
    • India’s political parties could theoretically be fully funded by a foreign company operating in India or by a foreign entity through a shell company.
    • Only the ruling party via the State Bank of India (SBI) has a full account of all donations being made via electoral bonds, to itself and to Opposition parties.

    Issues in the Supreme Court verdict

    • In March 2021, the Supreme Court refused to stay the sale of electoral bonds before the West Bengal elections.
    • Instead, the judgment listed several documents which supposedly establish a paper trail on donations and do some ‘match the following’.
    • This is impractical and plainly incorrect.
    • The Right to Information (RTI) Act of 2005 enables easier access to information held by public authorities.
    • Suggesting a “match the following” is incorrect for three reasons.

    1) Full scale of registered entities in unknown

    • If we set aside individual donors and focus just on registered entities, we will find that the full scale of registered entities is unknown. 
    • According to back-of-the-envelope calculations, there are close to 25 lakh potential donors comprising just companies and firms.
    • This includes about 12.6 lakh active private limited companies as of January 31, 2021.
    • Firms, unlike companies, have no regulatory mandate to submit their annual reports except for filing their annual tax returns, since their functioning is regulated by Acts other than the Companies Act of 2013.

    2) No disclosure by companies about donation to political parties

    • Even if registered companies filed annual financial statements, many do not disclose political donations.
    • Conveniently, the Finance Bill of 2017 amended Section 182 of the Companies Act of 2013 to remove the requirement for declaring disaggregated donations to political parties.
    • Even if registered companies filed annual financial statements, many do not disclose political donations.

    3) Political parties do not need to disclose their donor

    • Crucially, political parties do not need to disclose their electoral bond donors either.
    • Strictly speaking, political parties are not even supposed to know their electoral bond donors.
    • The only requirement is the annual audit reports with a total of all donations received via electoral bonds.
    • These reports are submitted with great delays.
    • Even if these reports are submitted on time, there is no way to match a donation of a company to that received by a political party as only aggregate amounts are available.

    Implications

    • Electoral bonds give political power to companies, wealthy individual donors, and foreign entities, thus diluting the universal franchise of one voter-one vote.
    •  Every vote is not equally valuable if companies can influence policies through hidden donations.
    •  The winner of this arrangement is the ruling party, whether at the Centre or in a State, and the loser is the average voter.

    Way forward

    • Companies and political parties could exercise moral leadership and voluntarily disclose the identity of recipients and donors, as the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha recently did.

    Conclusion

    Opacity in political funding goes against the basic tenets of democracy. What we need is a system of political funding which is transparent and fair.

  • G7 Open Societies Pact on Universal Rights

    India has signed off on a joint statement by G-7 and guest countries on “open societies” that reaffirm and encourage the values of “freedom of expression, both online and offline, as a freedom that safeguards democracy and helps people live free from fear and oppression”.

    What is the Open Societies Pact?

    • The ‘Open Societies Statement’ was adopted at the end of an outreach session titled ‘Building Back Together—Open Societies and Economies’, where PM Modi was invited as a lead speaker.
    • The joint statement was signed by the G-7 countries, and India, South Korea, Australia and South Africa, with host British Prime Minister Boris Johnson calling them “Democracies 11”.
    • It refers to “politically motivated internet shutdowns” as one of the threats to freedom and democracy.
    • It affirms “human rights for all, both online and offline, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other HR instruments, and opposition to any form of discrimination, so that everyone can participate fully and equally in society”.

    Why needs such a pact?

    • Democracy and freedom were a part of India’s civilizational ethos”.
    • However, the common concern is that open societies are particularly vulnerable to disinformation and cyber-attacks.

    Impact of the pact

    • While the statement is directed at China and Russia, India has been under scrutiny over Internet curbs in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Moreover, the center is locked in a face-off over its new IT rules with tech giants such as Twitter, which described a police search at its offices in India last month as a “potential threat to freedom of expression”.

  • The road from Galwan, a year later

    What happened in Galwan?

    • The Indian and Chinese armies are engaged in the standoff in Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie in eastern Ladakh.
      • A sizable number of Chinese Army personnel even transgressed into the Indian side of the de-facto border in several areas including Pangong Tso.
      • The actions on the northern bank of Pangong Tso are not just for territorial gains on land, but enhanced domination of the resource-rich lake.
    • The stand-off at Ladakh’s Galwan Valley has escalated in June 2020 due to the infrastructure projects that India has undertaken in the recent years. India is building a strategic road through the Galwan Valley – close to China – connecting the region to an airstrip.
      • China is opposed to any Indian construction in the area. In 1962, a stand-off in the Galwan area was one of the biggest flashpoints of the 1962 war.
    • The border, or Line of Actual Control, is not demarcated, and China and India have differing ideas of where it should be located, leading to regular border “transgressions.” Often these don’t escalate tensions; a serious border standoff like the current one is less frequent, though this is the fourth since 2013.
      • Both countries’ troops have patrolled this region for decades, as the contested 2,200-mile border is a long-standing subject of competing claims and tensions, including a brief war in 1962.
    • Reasons: The violent clash happened when the Chinese side departed from the consensus to respect the LAC and attempted to unilaterally change the status quo.
      • It is part of China’s ‘nibble and negotiate policy’. Their aim is to ensure that India does not build infrastructure along the LAC. It is their way of attaining a political goal with military might, while gaining more territory in the process.

    The current situation in Ladakh

    •  With a continued deployment of 50,000-60,000 soldiers, the Indian Army has been able to hold the line to prevent any further ingress by the PLA.
    • There has been no progress in talks after the disengagement at Pangong lake and Kailash range in February.
    • Outside of Ladakh, the Indian Army remains in an alert mode all along the LAC to prevent any Chinese misadventure but the bigger change has been its reorientation of certain forces from Pakistan border towards the China border.
    • The Ladakh crisis has also exposed India’s military weakness to tackle a collusive threat from China and Pakistan.

    External balancing

    • To deal with the threat of combined China and Pakistan, the Government opened backchannel talks with Pakistan which led to the reiteration of the ceasefire on the Line of Control.
    • The Ladakh crisis has also led the Government to relook external partnerships, particularly with the United States.
    • The U.S. military officials have earlier spoken of the intelligence and logistics support provided to the Indian forces in Ladakh.
    • The military importance of the Quad remains moot, with India reportedly refusing to do joint naval patrolling with the U.S. in the South China Sea, the two treaty allies of the U.S., Japan and Australia, also refused.

    Challenges for India

    • India attempts to counter the growing Chinese influence in the neighbourhood have faltered, exacerbated by the mishandling of the second wave of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
    • With the widening power gap between New Delhi and Beijing, the challenge is as much economic as it is geopolitical.
    • Despite the border crisis and the Indian restrictions on Chinese technology companies, China displaced the U.S. to be India’s biggest trade partner in 2020-21, up to nearly 13% of India’s total trade compared to 10.4% a year ago.
    • For the past few decades, Indian planners operated on the premise that their diplomats will be able to manage the Chinese problem without it developing into a full-blown military crisis.
    • Militarily, Chinese incursions in Ladakh have shown that the idea of deterrence has failed.
    • India has learnt that it can no longer have simultaneous competition and cooperation with China.
    • A new reset in bilateral ties, àla the early 1990s, is difficult because China is now in a different league, competing with the U.S.

    Conclusion

    The events of the past one year have significantly altered India’s thinking towards China. The relationship is at the crossroads now. The choices made will have a significant impact on the future of global geopolitics.

    B2BASICS

    Line of Actual Control

    • Demarcation Line: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
    • LAC is different from the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan:
      • The LoC emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the United Nations (UN) after the Kashmir War.
      • It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. It is delineated on a map signed by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement.
      • The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground.
    • Length of the LAC: India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.

  • A template for Indian engagement with the West

    The article highlights the significance of the recent G-7 summit for India.

    India’s engagement with the West

    • Two important messages emerge from India’s participation in G-7 with the members of the G-7 and three other invited guests — Australia, South Africa and South Korea.
    • First is that India is a “natural ally” of the G-7 and its partners.
    • The other is the emphasis on shared democratic values that bind India with the West.
    • The two ideas are certainly not new to India’s foreign policy, but they acquire special importance at the current juncture.
    • In the last few years, India embarked on an expansive engagement with Europe.
    • This G-7 summit can be seen as the beginning of an institutionalisation of India’s cooperation with the West.

    What makes this G-7 Summit different from the past Summits?

    • China factor: After the 2008 financial crisis, the more representative G-20, which includes China, Russia, India and many others, seemed to supersede the G-7.
    • But amidst the growing sense that China has gamed the global economic order to America’s disadvantage, there has been renewed interest in like-minded coalitions like the G-7.
    • Widening the base of G-7: There is also the recognition of the case for widening the base of institutions like the G-7 beyond the geographic West to include large democracies like India.
    • Coalition of democracies: The case for a “coalition of democracies” was certainly gaining ground over the last two decades within American academia and the political class.
    • But economic globalisation and the absence of great power rivalry meant there was no compelling policy urgency to construct an “alliance of democracies”.
    • That condition has altered radically in the last few years amidst the growing US tensions with China and Russia. 

    Dealing with the challenges presented by China

    • U.S. President Biden declared his main objective as rallying democracies to meet the great challenges of our time, especially those presented by China.
    • G-7 summit has responded to Biden’s call in the following forms:
    • 1) By offering the outline of a potential alternative to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.
    • 2)By calling for a reorientation of global supply chains away from China.
    • 3) By demanding a fresh inquiry into the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic in China.
    • 4) By reprimanding Beijing policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
    • 5) By raising concerns about the conflict across the Taiwan Strait.
    • However, there is a strong view that the door must be kept open for engagement with China on issues like climate change while calling out its unacceptable policies.

    India’s relations with China: New context for engagement with West

    • The rupture in the US engagement with China coincides with the rapid deterioration in India’s relations with China.
    • This also sets up a new context for India’s partnership with the West.
    • If the Indo-Pacific provides a regional basis for India’s engagement with the US and Europe, mitigating climate change and the management of the Covid-19 pandemic provides a global template for India’s engagement with the West.

    Way forward

    • The case for renewal and reform of democratic institutions is urgent in both the US and India.
    • So is the need for sustained consultations between India and its Western partners on a range of new challenges presented by digital technologies, including radicalisation, disinformation, electoral interference, cyber-attacks and the role of large social media companies. 
    • The statement on open societies provides a sound basis for such an engagement.

    Conclusion

    India must begin institutionalisation of its relationship with the West and increase its engagement on various common issues including the China challenge.

  • Explained: SC move to quash OBC quota in Maharashtra Local Bodies

    The Supreme Court last month quashed Maharashtra’s review petition challenging its earlier verdict that scrapped a quota for OBCs in the state’s local bodies, triggering a war of words between the ruling and opposition parties.

    What is the OBC reservation in local bodies?

    • The Maharashtra government set up a 27 percent quota in local bodies for OBCs in 1994.
    • The 27 percent reservation was applicable to all urban (Municipal Corporations, Councils and Nagar Panchayat) and rural bodies (Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti and Gram Panchayat) across the state.
    • In Maharashtra, the OBCs include the Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category.
    • This quota for OBCs increased their representation in rural and urban local bodies.

    What is the history of the demand for an OBC census in Maharashtra?

    • As per the Mandal Commission report, the last caste-wise census was conducted in 1931 and it was later discontinued.
    • Based on the data from the 1931 census, the Mandal commission worked out the OBC population to be 52 per cent and recommended a 27 per cent reservation for OBCs in view of the SC judgment limiting reservation up to 50 per cent.
    • There was already a 22.5 per cent reservation for SC and ST categories.
    • The Mandal Commission report recommended 27 per cent reservation in government jobs and promotions along with others.
    • The report gave momentum to OBC leaders and the community’s demand for a caste-wise census of OBC.

    Need for a caste-wise census

    • The 2011 census included data about the socio-economic caste census but has not released the data citing the errors in it.
    • In 2018, ahead of the Lok Sabha polls the following year, the Centre announced that OBC enumeration will be done in the 2021 census.
    • But this promise could not be tested with the onset of the pandemic and the indefinite delay in population enumeration.
    • OBC leaders fear the OBC enumeration may never actually happen.

    How did the matter reach the SC?

    • The quota was exceeding the 50 per cent limit which is contrary to SC 2010 judgment of K Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and Ors. vs. Union of India and others.
    • The court granted the status quo and the elections were delayed.
    • On March 4 this year, The SC read it down in stating that it may be invoked only upon complying with the triple conditions before notifying the seats reserved for OBC category in the concerned local bodies.
    • The triple conditions included setting up “a dedicated Commission to conduct a contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry into the nature and implications of the backwardness qua local bodies, within the State”.
    • This was to specify the proportion of reservations required to be provisioned local body-wise in light of recommendations of the commission.
    • It also stated that such reservation, in any case, shall not exceed the aggregate of 50 per cent of the total seats reserved in favour of SCs, STs and OBCs taken together.
    • The apex court observed the reservation for OBCs is only “statutory”, to be provided by the state legislations, unlike the “constitutional” reservation regarding SCs/STs which is linked to the proportion of the population.

    What do OBC leaders say now?

    • There has been a mixed response from the OBC leaders to the SC verdict, with some welcoming it while others lamenting on losing reservation.
    • Some say it will pave the way for conducting the OBC census in the state.
    • So far, there was no data about the OBC population and our demand for the OBC census for the last 30 years have fallen on deaf ears.
    • With this SC order, the state has to conduct the census now.
    • Else, there will be no OBC reservation in the local bodies polls and the ruling parties will have to pay a huge price for it.

    What lies ahead?

    • The SC judgment is applicable to the elections of all local bodies — rural and urban.
    • As per a statement from the CM’s office, the SC verdict is likely to impact around 56,000 seats in all local bodies in the state.
    • This includes polls pending due to Covid and the upcoming elections.
    • So, the state election commission will consult with the state government whenever the local bodies’ polls are held and will decide on the OBC reservation as per the SC order.