💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

GS Paper: GS2

  • Freedom in the World Report, 2021

    Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy

    US-based human rights watchdog Freedom House has accused the present government of driving India toward authoritarianism with a lockdown scapegoating of minorities and a crackdown on critics, and downgraded India’s status from ‘Free’ to ‘Partly Free’, in its annual report.

    Freedom in the World Report

    • It is Freedom House’s flagship annual report, assessing the condition of political rights and civil liberties around the world.
    • It is composed of numerical ratings and supporting descriptive texts for 195 countries and 15 territories.
    • The report has been published since 1973, allowing Freedom House to track global trends in freedom over more than 40 years.
    • Freedom House, which is largely funded through U.S. government grants, has been tracking the course of democracy since 1941.

    What did the report say?

    Political and civil rights

    • India’s freedom score, calculated using indicators of political rights and civil liberties, dropped four points to 67 this year, pulling the country down into the ‘Partly Free’ category.
    • India appears to have abandoned its potential to serve as a global democratic leader, elevating narrow nationalist interests at the expense of its founding values of inclusion and equal rights for all.

    Reference to Kashmir

    • In a year when social media censorship has been hotly seated, while the government shut down Internet connectivity in Kashmir as well as on Delhi’s borders, India’s Internet freedom score dropped to just 51.

    Crackdown on protesters

    • Last year, the government intensified its crackdown on protesters opposed to a discriminatory citizenship law and arrested dozens of journalists who aired criticism of the official pandemic response.

    Judicial Independence

    • It noted that judicial independence had also come under strain.
    • It pointed to the case of a Delhi HC judge who was transferred immediately after reprimanding the police for taking no action during riots in the capital that leftover 50 people dead.

    Religious freedom

    • Minorities were disproportionately blamed for the spread of the virus and faced attacks by vigilante mobs.
    • Uttar Pradesh’s law prohibiting forced religious conversion through interfaith marriage was also listed as a concern.

    Rising Authoritarianism

    • Rather than serving as a champion of democratic practice and a counterweight to authoritarian influence from countries such as China, the government is tragically driving India itself toward authoritarianism, the report stated.

  • Ceasefire between India and Pakistan.

     

    Why it is different from the past

    • The February ceasefire has triggered widespread speculation about its durability, significance and implication for bilateral relations in general.
    • This agreement is different from the routine ceasefire assurances that the two sides made till January 2021.
    • What makes the February 2021 ceasefire different is its two distinct features:
    • First, this was a joint statement by the two DGsMO.
    • Second, unlike the previous declarations, the recent agreement mentions a specific date, i.e., the night of February 24-25, to begin the ceasefire.
    • The agreement is also path-breaking from a conflict management point of view.
    • The ceasefire is also significant because this helps India to defuse an ugly two-front situation and a feeling of being boxed in by an inimical Pakistan and an aggressive China.

    Historical background of ceasefires with Pakistan

    • The Karachi agreement of 1949, which ended the first war between newly formed India and Pakistan, was the first ceasefire agreement between the two countries that created the India Pakistan boundary in Kashmir called the Ceasefire Line or CFL.
    • The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was mandated to monitor the ceasefire along the CFL.
    • Following the India-Pakistan war of 1971, the Suchetgarh Agreement of 1972 delineated the ‘line of control’ in Jammu and Kashmir thereby renaming the CFL as the LoC.
    • The 2003 agreement between the DGsMO, communicated through a telephone call between them, was a reiteration of the December 1971 war termination ceasefire.

    Rules and norms required

    • A ceasefire requires a clearly articulated and mutually-agreed-upon set of rules and norms for effective observance along with an intent to observe them. 
    • The February ceasefire is an expression of such an intent, but without the rules and norms to enforce it.
    • The Simla Agreement or the Suchetgarh Agreement do not have those rules either.
    • The Karachi Agreement, on the other hand, has clearly laid down provisions on how to manage the CFL which, of course, was overtaken by the LoC.
    • Therefore, armed forces deployed on either side of the LoC in Kashmir often have to resort to Karachi Agreement to observe the ceasefire.
    • Now that the two DGsMO have declared a joint ceasefire, the next logical step is to arrive at a set of rules to govern that ceasefire.
    • An unwritten ceasefire, experiences from conflict zones around the world show, tend to break down easily and trigger tensions in other domains.

    Role of back channels

    • What is also significant to note about the ceasefire agreement between the two DGsMO is that this was preceded by weeks.
    • Interestingly, the 2003 ceasefire was also preceded by discreet parleys between the heads of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India.
    • The 2003 CFA led to a sustained period of back channel talks on Kashmir which, by mid 2007, had almost finalised a deal to resolve the Kashmir conflict.
    • Ane key reason why the CFA held at least till 2008 was because there were parallel talks, along with holding fire on the LoC, on other outstanding bilateral issues, principally Kashmir.

    Conclusion

    While whether the 2021 CFA would prompt talks in other areas is unclear as of now, the possibility of piecemeal agreements to create durable stability bilaterally unless followed by progress in other domains remains to be seen.

  • Recalibrating relations with EU

    With India about to lose preferential access to the EU, there is a need to deepen the trade and investment ties with the region. The article deals with this issue.

    Export potential to the EU

    • India has an untapped export potential of $39.9 billion in the EU and Western Europe.
    • India benefits from tariff preferences under the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for several of these products.
    • In fact, India is among the major beneficiaries of the EU’s GSP, accounting for nearly 37% of India’s merchandise exports.

    India losing EU-GSP benefits: Product graduadion

    • Product graduation applies when average imports of a product from a beneficiary country exceed 17.5% of EU-GSP imports of the same product from all beneficiary countries over three years.
    • There are several products where India has export potential in the EU, but these have “graduated” or are at the brink of “graduation” under EU GSP.
    • India’s exports of products such as textiles, inorganic and organic chemicals, gems and jewellery, iron, steel and their articles, base metals and automotives are already out of the ambit of EU-GSP benefits.
    •  In apparel, India’s exports to the EU were valued at $7 billion in 2019, of which nearly 94% was under EU-GSP, indicative of the impact that the graduation may have on apparel exports.
    • Bangladesh’s apparel exports would continue to receive tariff benefits in the EU under Everything but Arms Initiative.
    • Another competitor, Vietnam, concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU in 2019.

    Need to deepen trade and investment ties

    • In light of the declining preferential access and the plausible erosion of competitiveness in the EU market, there is clearly a need to deepen trade and investment ties with the region.
    • Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement, which commenced in 2007, is yet to materialise due to lack of concurrence in areas like automotives and dairy and marine products.
    • Therefore, a thorough assessment of the benefits from FTA for domestic producers is warranted, with due consideration to the impact on sensitive sectors, and possibility of inclusion of safeguards such as sunset clause on concessions for some items.
    • Further, there should also be provisions for aspects such as investment and non-tariff measures (NTMs).
    • India also needs to negotiate on investment-related aspects with the EU to foster stronger value chains, especially in technology-intensive sectors in which the EU has a comparative advantage.
    • As far as NTMs are concerned, India faces as many as 414 NTMs in the EU, in a wide array of sectors. FTAs have some institutional arrangements for NTMs.

    Consider the question “Forging stronger ties with the EU could pave way for the greater cooperation and stronger trade ties. Elucidate.” 

    Conclusion

    Post-Brexit EU finds itself in the midst of a growing need for recalibrating ties with its partner countries. Forging stronger ties with the region through a mutually beneficial agreement could help strengthen Indian manufacturing and revitalise the flailing exports.

  • India, Japan back in another Sri Lanka port project

    Sri Lanka has confirmed that it will develop the West Container Terminal (WCT) at the Colombo Port along with India and Japan.

    Q.The threat of Chinese presence in South Asia can be tackled more effectively if India changes course in its dealings with its neighbours and becomes more sensitive to their concerns. Critically analyse.

     Why in news?

    • The decision comes a month after the Rajapaksa government ejected the two partners from a 2019 tripartite agreement to jointly develop the East Container Terminal (ECT), citing resistance to “foreign involvement”.
    • Neither India nor Japan has officially commented on the offer, or on the said private investment from the countries.

    An alternative to ECT

    • SL has offered India and Japan the WCT as an alternative, allowing higher stakes.
    • In the ECT project agreed upon earlier, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) was to hold a majority 51%, but in the WCT proposal, India and Japan will be accorded an 85% stake.
    • The nearby Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT), where China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited holds 85%.
    • This makes it a strategically desirable spot for India, whose concerns over China’s presence in Sri Lanka are well known.

    Issues with a new project

    • The WCT is adjacent to the China-run CICT and just a couple of kilometres away from the China-backed Port City being built on reclaimed land.
    • The West Container Terminal, however, has to be built from scratch, requiring a much higher investment.
    • The return on investment has not been envisaged yet.

    Why is Colombo so generous this time?

    • Colombo’s alternative offer also comes at a time when Sri Lanka is seeking support at the ongoing UN Human Right Council session, where a resolution on the country’s rights record will soon be put to vote.

  • Live Telecast of Parliament Proceedings

    Lok Sabha Television (LSTV) and Rajya Sabha Television (RSTV) have been merged into a single ‘Sansad TV’.

    Live telecast of parliament

    • Lok Sabha TV is the older of the two — it started operating on July 24, 2006.
    • The channel’s vision, according to its website, is to reach the “live proceedings of the Parliament House…to every household”.
    • This is because awareness of citizens towards the working of Member of Parliament in the Parliament House helps in bringing awareness about various efforts of various stakeholders in the governance process.
    • The information empowers the citizens to utilise their democratic rights diligently and be part of the democratic ecosystem.

    Do you know?

    The Union Budget allocates funds for the running of channels.

    Inception of the idea

    • LSTV was the brainchild of former Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee.
    • People familiar with the circumstances in which the channel was set up, said that then Rajya Sabha Chairman Bhairon Singh Shekhawat was not really convinced with Chatterjee’s proposal.
    • It was during his time of Shekhawat’s successor, Hamid Ansari, that the separate channel for the Upper House materialized.

    Before the channels

    • Before LSTV started functioning as a channel, select parliamentary proceedings had been televised since December 20, 198.
    • On April 18, 1994, the entire proceedings of Lok Sabha started to be filmed.
    • And in August that year, a Low Power Transmitter (LPT) was set up and made operational in Parliament House to telecast the proceedings live.
    • From December 1994, Question Hour in both Houses was telecast live on alternate weeks on Doordarshan.
    • It was arranged in such a manner that during the telecast of the Question Hour of one House by Doordarshan, the Question Hour of the other House was broadcast by All India Radio.
    • When the DD News channel was launched, Question Hour in both Houses started getting telecast simultaneously on DD channels.

    Separate channels

    • But it was only after a decade, in December 2004, that a separate dedicated satellite channel was set up for the live telecast of the proceedings of both Houses.
    • In 2006, LSTV started airing the proceedings of the Lower House live.
    • RSTV was launched in 2011. Apart from telecasting live the proceedings in Rajya Sabha, it also brings analyses of parliamentary affairs and provides a platform for knowledge-based programmes.

  • [pib] Better Than Cash Alliance

    The Government of India, FICCI, and the Better Than Cash Alliance has come under the partnership to achieve the industry level commitment of responsible digitization of merchants.

    Make a note here that it is a BTCA is a global partnership with diverse funding, a UN office as its secretariat and Indian being its member.

    Better Than Cash Alliance

    • The Better Than Cash Alliance is a global partnership of 75 governments, companies, and international organizations that accelerates the transition from cash to digital payments in order to reduce poverty and drive inclusive growth.
    • It was created in September 2012 by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (Secretariat), the US Agency for International Development, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Visa Inc. among others.
    • Based at the UN, the Alliance has over 50 members, works closely with other global organizations, and is an implementing partner for the G20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion.
    • India became a member of the alliance in 2015 to digitize payments to achieve financial inclusion and to share success stories from PM Jan Dhan Yojana, the world’s largest financial inclusion program.

    Working method

    The Better Than Cash Alliance partners with governments, companies, and international organizations that are the key drivers behind the transition to make digital payments widely available by:

    1. Advocating for the transition from cash to digital payments in a way that advances financial inclusion and promotes responsible digital finance.
    2. Conducting research and sharing the experiences of our members to inform strategies for making the transition.
    3. Catalyzing the development of inclusive digital payments ecosystems in member countries to reduce costs, increase transparency, advance financial inclusion– particularly for women– and drive inclusive growth.

  • India, Pak, China must build on de-escalation

    Three power, India, Pakistan and China need to take a new look at the factors underlying their relationship with each other. The article deals with this issue.

    Hope for regional politics to turn a new leaf

    • The announcement by India and Pakistan of strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing along the Line of Control is a welcome step.
    • It is premature to conclude what all this will amount to in the long term.
    • But if all three powers, China, Pakistan and India, can draw the appropriate lessons in humility, there is hope for regional politics to turn over a new leaf.

    Lessons for India

    • First, the belligerent use of foreign policy in domestic politics has unintended effects on your international standing.
    • In 2019, the official rhetoric was promising India retaking PoK and putting more military pressure on Pakistan.
    • In contrast, the discourse on foreign policy since the Chinese pressure on the LAC has been one of marked sobriety scaling back all expectations of a flippant militarism.
    • Second, the standoff with China has brought home some stark realities. We can speculate on Chinese motives.
    •  The LAC standoff considerably released the pressure on Pakistan.
    • We were reminded that the LAC and LoC can be linked; that the zone around Kashmir was a trilateral and not a bilateral contest, and that India will need significant resources to deal with China.
    • In the matter of the CAA the talk of evicting Bangladeshis has been starkly checkmated by the need to placate Bangladesh, which is vital to our strategic interests.

    Lessons for Pakistan

    • First, India now has enough weight in the international system that any attempts to internationalise Kashmir are a non-starter.
    • Second, the revocation of Article 370 did not unleash the kinds of fissures and cycle of violence within the Valley that Pakistan might have been hoping to exploit.
    • Third, the pandemic is a great opportunity for Pakistan to recognise that opening up to the South Asian region is in its interest in the long term than acting on the coattails of China.

    Lessons for China

    • India may not have, in a literal sense, restored the status quo ante on the LAC, the fact of the matter is that it has stood up with enough firmness to send the signal that it will not be a pushover.
    • India signalled a resolve that Chinese military and economic hegemony can be resisted.
    • China cannot wish away considerable Indian power.
    • In fact, by concentrating India’s mind on the China challenge, it may have unwittingly done India a favour.

    Way forward

    • So this moment can be a constructive one if everyone understands the one lesson in world politics: There are diminishing returns to belligerence.
    • With Pakistan, India should seize the moment and build on the de-escalation.
    • The pandemic offers an opportunity for greater economic cooperation.
    • Political establishments of both countries will have to think of what is a win-win political narrative they can legitimately offer their citizens.

    Consider the question “If all three powers, China, Pakistan and India, can draw the appropriate lessons in humility, there is hope for regional politics to turn over a new leaf. Comment.“

    Conclusion

    The region will be better off with a humility that tries to align them, rather than a hubris that exults in unilateral triumphalism.

  • Issues with Master of the Roaster power of CJI

    CJI’s power as Master of Roaster and issues with it

    • The Supreme Court recently closed the proceedings enquiring into a conspiracy to threaten the independence of the judiciary on the basis of sexual harassment allegations against the former CJI.
    • The singular power of the CJI as the Master of the Roster – i.e., the vests exclusive discretion in the Chief Justice to constitute benches and allocate cases.
    • While the CJI’s other powers such as recommending appointments to constitutional courts are shared with other senior judges, the power of Master of the Roster is enjoyed without scrutiny.
    • This power enabled Justice Gogoi to institute suo motu proceedings despite being an accused; label the case as a matter of judicial independence; and preside over it.
    • This power lay at the heart of the controversy surrounding the proceedings the Court has now closed.

    Implications for independence of judiciary

    • From the standpoint of judicial independence, the Master of the Roster power makes the CJI’s office a high stakes one.
    • It makes the CJI the sole point of defence of the Court against executive interference.
    • However, this has a flip side.
    • With the CJI as the sole Master of the Roster, any executive seeking to influence the Supreme Court needs only a pliant CJI.
    • Yet, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to dilute this power.
    • In Asok Pande v. Supreme Court of India (2018), a three-judge bench of the Court held that Master of the Roster is the CJI’s exclusive power.
    • Thereafter, a two-judge bench in Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India (2018) rejected the plea that the Master of the Roster should be interpreted as the collegium.

    Need for the reforms

    • The collegium system has failed to keep executive interferences at bay from the Supreme Court.
    • This is for two reasons:
    • First, as Justice Gogoi’s case shows, there is an attractive lure of post-retirement jobs.
    • Second, as the privilege of Master of the Roster shows, the CJI’s allocation of cases is an unchecked power.
    • The continuing project of judicial reforms should then address these two issues.

    Way forward

    • A cooling-off period between retirement and a post-retirement appointment has often been suggested as a way to deal with the first problem.
    • For the second, the power of Master of the Roster needs to be diversified beyond the CJI’s exclusive and untrammelled discretion.

    Consider the question “What are the issues with the Master of the Roaster power of the Chief Justice of India? Suggest the ways to deal with the issue.” 

    Conclusion

    We need to carry out these reforms make the judiciary less prone to interference from the executive.

  • Swiss Neutrality in World Affairs

    Switzerland’s traditional foreign policy of neutrality has become attractive again because of the changing political reality in the world, said its Ambassador recently.

    Q.In context to foreign policy, discuss the relevance, benefits and limitations of Swiss Neutrality.(150 W)

    What is Swiss Neutrality?

    • Swiss neutrality is one of the main principles of Switzerland’s foreign policy which dictates that Switzerland is not to be involved in armed or political conflicts between other states.
    • This policy is self-imposed, permanent, and armed, designed to ensure external security and promote peace.
    • Under this, Switzerland pursues an active foreign policy and is frequently involved in peace-building processes around the world.

    Historic significance

    • Switzerland has the oldest policy of military neutrality in the world; it has not participated in a foreign war since its neutrality was established by the Treaty of Paris in 1815.
    • The European powers (Austria, France, the UK, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain and Sweden) agreed at the Congress of Vienna in May 1815 that Switzerland should be neutral.
    • But final ratification was delayed until after Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated so that some coalition forces could invade France via Swiss territory.

    Swiss moves for the status

    • Since World War II, Switzerland has taken a more active role in international affairs by aiding with humanitarian initiatives, but it remains fiercely neutral with regard to military affairs.
    • It has never joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union, and only joined the United Nations in 2002.

    Relevance today

    • Neutrality has become necessary as a foreign policy tool as the phase of power politics has returned in world affairs.
    • Now with big power politics, Switzerland’s neutrality and Switzerland as a place to meet is much more attractive again.

  • The IT Act new rules and the challenge of Big Tech

    The article discusses the issues with the new rules issues under the IT Act.

    Issues with the new rules

    1) No discussion

    • Last week, the Union Government issued a set of rules under the Information Technology Act, superseding rules issued under Section 79 of that statute in 2011. 
    • This has happened in the absence of open and public discussion and without any parliamentary study and scrutiny.

    2) Concerns over legal basis

    • The Union Government has chosen to pass these rules under the requirement to outline the due diligence that Internet intermediaries have to follow in order to be able to claim their qualified legal immunity under Section 79 of the IT Act.
    • These rules at the outset appear unlawful even with respect to whether they could have been issued under the Information Technology Act in the manner chosen by the government, leave alone their constitutionality with respect to fundamental rights.
    • The government’s gazette notification has further claimed that the rules were also issued under the legal authority to specific procedure for blocking web content under Section 69A of the IT Act.
    • However,  rules overseeing government web content blocking powers have already been issued for that section in 2009, and not superseded.

    3) Using rule making power to issue primary legislation

    • The ability to issue rules under a statute — i.e. to frame subordinate legislation — is by its nature a limited, constrained power.
    • The executive branch is subordinate to what Parliament has permitted it and cannot use its rule-making power to seek to issue primary legislation by itself.
    • With the present Internet content and social media rules, the Union Government has done precisely that.
    • The executive branch has created new rules that apply only to “significant social media intermediaries” — a term that appears nowhere in the Information Technology Act.
    • The rules have grown to include a chapter on how digital news sites have to be registered before the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
    • However, digital news service registration is not required under the IT Act and streaming video content has not been included under the ambit of the Cinematograph Act.

    Consider the question “What are the challenges in the regulation of Big Tech to democracies? Suggest the measures to deal with these challenges.”

    Conclusion

    Instead of advancing Internet content control, India needs to advancing surveillance law reform or enacting a strong statutory data protection framework.