GS Paper: GS2

Mentor’s Comment

The debate on lunar governance has intensified due to the rapid operationalisation of the U.S.-led Artemis programme and associated Artemis Accords, which for the first time enable private extraction and ownership of lunar resources. This marks a sharp departure from earlier norms under the Outer Space Treaty (1967) that treated outer space as the “province of all humankind.” The issue gains urgency as scarce lunar resources, especially water ice at the south pole, are becoming strategically valuable for future missions.

How does current geopolitical conduct undermine credibility in space governance?

1. Selective adherence to law: Demonstrates inconsistency in upholding international norms; e.g., continued military actions despite scrutiny by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
2. Institutional bypassing: Weakens dispute resolution mechanisms; e.g., blockage of appointments to the WTO Appellate Body since 2019.
3. Due process concerns: Highlights erosion of legal safeguards; e.g., deportation policies criticised by the U.S. Supreme Court.
4. Humanitarian violations: Undermines moral authority; e.g., findings by International Commission of Jurists and Red Cross on violations in conflict zones.

What are the legal implications of the Artemis Accords on lunar resources?

The Artemis Accords, launched in 2020 and signed by over 60 nations as of April 2026, represent a significant evolution in international space law regarding lunar resources. They establish a principled framework aimed at operationalizing the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) for commercial lunar exploration, primarily focusing on the extraction and utilization of resources. 

1. Resource ownership rights: Enables private possession and sale of extracted resources; backed by U.S. domestic law (2015).
   1. Commercial Extraction: The Accords explicitly affirm that the extraction and utilization of space resources, such as water ice or regolith, does not inherently constitute “national appropriation” under Article II of the OST.
   2. Legal Standing: This allows signatories to authorize their private sector to possess, use, and sell extracted lunar resources, bridging the gap between scientific exploration and commercial mining.
   3. Backed by U.S. Law: This stance aligns with the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, which already granted American citizens rights to own, transport, and sell space resources.
2. Norm-setting mechanism: Establishes bilateral agreements outside UN framework; risks fragmentation of global norms.
   1. Soft Law Approach: The Accords are non-legally binding political commitments (“soft law”) but function as mandatory requirements for participation in NASA’s Artemis program.
   2. Counter to 1979 Moon Agreement: The Accords ignore the 1979 Moon Agreement’s requirement for an international regime to govern resource exploitation, opting instead for a “first-come, first-served” approach to mining.
3. Interpretation bias: Expands meaning of “use” under Outer Space Treaty to include commercial extraction.
   1. Redefining “Use”: The Accords interpret the OST’s allowance of the “use” of space to include commercial extraction of resources, whereas historically, this was seen as limited to scientific or operational utilization.
4. Legal precedent: Creates de facto customary norms without universal consent.
   1. Subsequent Practice: The U.S. and its partners seek to establish “subsequent practice” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which could elevate these principles into customary international law through repeated actions.

Do “safety zones” risk creating exclusionary regimes on the Moon?

Yes, safety zones on the Moon pose a significant risk of creating exclusionary regimes. While designed to prevent harmful interference, safety zones can function as a de facto means of controlling, accessing, and exploiting high-value lunar areas (such as resource-rich polar craters) without requiring formal territorial claims. 

1. Safety zones provision: Prevents harmful interference around operational sites.
2. De facto territoriality: Enables early movers to control high-value regions without formal sovereignty claims.
   1. Operational Control: These zones enable actors to restrict access, creating a, de facto sovereignty by controlling entry to scientific and economic sites.
   2. Legal Ambiguity: The “due regard” principle of the OST is used to justify these zones. But the lack of a standardized size or definition allows actors to create, large exclusion zones that inhibit the free movement of others. 
3. Resource concentration: Targets scarce locations like lunar south pole water ice.
   1. High-Value Sites: The most strategic locations, water-rich peaks of light and deep, icy craters, are limited. A safety zone around one of these sites can essentially monopolize that resource.
4. Inequitable access: Limits entry of latecomers, especially developing countries.
   1. Rise of Contested Territory: As nations plan permanent bases, the competition for these, “safe” zones could turn them into, contested, contentious territory, rather than areas for scientific collaboration. 

Why is multilateral governance necessary for lunar resources?

1. Global commons principle: Treats Moon as shared heritage of humanity.
2. Equitable distribution: Ensures fair access to resources across nations.
3. Conflict prevention: Reduces risk of geopolitical rivalry in space.
4. Institutional legitimacy: Strengthens UN-based frameworks like Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

What role can the Moon Agreement (1979) play in future governance?

The Moon Agreement (1979), formally the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, provides a, yet largely underutilized, legal framework for the future of space governance, particularly regarding natural resource exploitation and environmental protection. Although limited by low ratification from major space-faring nations, its principles remain relevant in shaping debates on equitable space use. 

1. International regime framework: The Agreement mandates the establishment of an international regime to govern the exploitation of lunar resources “as such exploitation is about to become feasible”.
   1. This provides a mechanism for establishing rules before a free-for-all scenario occurs, ensuring orderly and safe development.
2. Collective benefit principle: Ensures benefits are shared globally.
   1. The Agreement designates the Moon and its resources as the “common heritage of mankind” (Article 11). This shifts the focus from competitive exploitation to an equitable sharing of benefits derived from resources, with special consideration for developing nations.
3. Regulatory gap filling: It fills crucial gaps in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) regarding the exploitation of celestial resources.
   1. While the OST prohibits national appropriation, it is ambiguous regarding resource extraction. The Moon Agreement clarifies this by establishing a framework for resource management.
4. Adoption challenge: Limited ratification reduces enforceability.
   1. The main challenge is its poor adoption, with only 17 or 18 states (as of 2023-2024) party to it, and none being major spacefaring powers (USA, Russia, China).
   2. The rise of non-binding “soft law,” such as the U.S.-led Artemis Accords, demonstrates a shift away from the binding multilateralism of the Moon Agreement towards commercial-friendly frameworks.

Is the emerging space order shifting towards unilateralism?

1. Power asymmetry: Dominance of technologically advanced nations.
   1. Intensifying Rivalry: The space domain is becoming a primary theater for U.S.-China strategic competition, with Russia also looking to develop asymmetric counterspace capabilities.
   2. Sovereign Constellations: China is expanding its state-directed industrial model through sovereign constellations like GuoWang and Qianfan, aiming to challenge U.S. dominance.
2. Private sector involvement: Expands corporate influence in governance.
   1. Dominance of Commercial Players: Commercial entities, particularly SpaceX, dominate the launch cadence, commercial, and constellation deployment markets, creating a “monopoly” that pushes other nations to seek sovereign alternatives.
   2. In-Space Operations: The role of private companies is growing, with initiatives like India’s IN-SPACe enabling private sector participation in satellite launches and data analytics. 
3. Bilateral agreements trend: Sidelines multilateral negotiations.
   1. Minilateralism/Bilateralism: Due to UN gridlock, countries are shifting to agile, “small table” negotiations and minilateral groupings like the QUAD to achieve faster, more flexible results.
4. Strategic Competition: U.S.-China Rivalry in Space 
   1. Weaponized Interdependence: Space is viewed as an “operational battlespace” where critical commercial infrastructure can be used as a bargaining tool.
   2. Nationalization of Space Policy: Nations are increasingly integrating their space programs with national security interests, moving from exploration to defensive-offensive capabilities.
   3. Sovereign Launch Focus: U.S. allies (e.g., Australia, Canada, Spain, Germany) are aggressively funding domestic rocket startups to avoid dependency on American commercial providers, signaling a rise in sovereign-centric space policies.

Conclusion

Unilateral frameworks risk transforming lunar governance into a power-driven regime. A treaty-based multilateral approach remains essential to ensure equity, sustainability, and legitimacy in managing extraterrestrial resources.