“Strategy without doctrine is like a ship without a compass.”
India faces security threats that are no longer just about tanks at the border—they range from terror attacks and border stand-offs to cyber hacks and information warfare. From Kargil in 1999 to Galwan in 2020, the nature of threats has become sharper, faster, and more complex. Yet, even today, India does not have a formal National Security Doctrine (NSD)—a clear document that outlines what we see as threats, how we respond, and how we prepare.
About National Security Doctrine
A National Security Doctrine is a comprehensive framework of guiding principles, strategic beliefs, and operational postures that shape a nation’s military, diplomatic, and internal security responses. It goes beyond reactive tactics, providing predictability, strategic clarity, and inter-agency coordination. It serves as:
- A blueprint for defense and foreign policy.
- A guide to modern warfare readiness.
- A communication tool for deterrence.
- A confidence-building measure for both citizens and allies.
India’s only formal doctrinal articulation is the 2003 Nuclear Doctrine, which emphasizes “credible minimum deterrence” and a “No First Use” policy. However, in the absence of a broader doctrine, India’s responses to terrorism, cyber threats, or asymmetric warfare lack cohesive strategy.
Reasons for Avoiding a Formal NSD till now
| Reason | Explanation | Example / Impact |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Strategic Ambiguity | India prefers flexibility over fixed rules to adapt to evolving threats and maintain tactical surprise. | No declared doctrine behind surgical strikes or Balakot airstrikes, yet effective messaging. |
| 2. Political Sensitivities | A formal doctrine requires firm stances on internal conflicts, Pakistan/China policy, and preemptive action—politically risky topics. | No government has committed to codifying a doctrine since independence. |
| 3. Institutional Fragmentation | Lack of coordination among military, intelligence, foreign and home ministries hinders unified strategy-making. | Army, Navy, and Air Force have separate doctrines; no integrated national framework. |
| 4. Civil-Military Disconnect | Strategic planning is dominated by civilian bureaucracy; the military often remains outside national security doctrine-making. | NSD requires greater integration of armed forces in policy, which is still evolving post–CDS creation. |
| 5. Fear of Misinterpretation | A public doctrine may be seen as provocative or escalate tensions with neighbours, especially nuclear-armed ones. | Explicit offensive postures could alarm Pakistan or China, triggering unintended consequences. |
| 6. Changing Nature of Threats | With threats evolving rapidly—cyber, AI, grey-zone warfare—leaders may see fixed doctrines as limiting or outdated. | The absence of a doctrine allows dynamic responses to emerging hybrid threats. |
Existing Indian Steps Toward a Doctrine
- 2003 Nuclear Doctrine: Emphasised No First Use, credible minimum deterrence.
- Defence Planning Committee (2018): Tasked with formulating a national security strategy.
- Integrated Theatre Command Development: Moves toward joint force structures.
- National Cyber Security Strategy (Draft): Awaiting clearance, fits within NSD.
- Strategic Agreements: BECA (US), France-India joint doctrines, QUAD-level interoperability.
Committees & Reports on National Security Doctrine
| Year | Committee / Report | What They Recommended / Observed |
| 1999 | Kargil Review Committee (KRC) – chaired by K. Subrahmanyam | First major call for a National Security Doctrine and Strategy. It recommended better intelligence coordination, creation of a National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), and a comprehensive strategy document to avoid future surprises like Kargil. |
| 2001 | Group of Ministers (GoM) Report on Reforming the National Security System | Endorsed KRC’s call for a codified doctrine; proposed integration of intelligence and military decision-making, establishment of agencies like NSCS, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Strategic Policy Group (SPG). |
| 2012 | Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security | Recommended formulating a comprehensive National Security Strategy, clarifying roles of civil and military leadership, and streamlining civil-military synergy. |
| 2018 | Defence Planning Committee (DPC) – chaired by NSA Ajit Doval | Mandated to draft a National Security Strategy and provide guidance on defence preparedness, capability development, and strategic planning. The draft strategy was reportedly prepared but not released. |
| 2019 | N. Ramachandran Committee on Police Reforms | Indirectly linked national security to internal stability. Emphasized the need for a cohesive internal security doctrine, especially to tackle Left-Wing Extremism, insurgency, and terrorism. |
| 2021 | Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (17th Lok Sabha) | Criticized the government’s delay in formulating a National Security Strategy and demanded its early release, especially in light of threats from China and Pakistan. |
| 2023 | National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) & Strategic Community (unofficial inputs) | Various former military officials and strategic experts (e.g., Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda, Shivshankar Menon) publicly called for a codified NSD, given India’s evolving hybrid threat environment. While not formal committee reports, these have added urgency to the debate. |
Need of a National Security Doctrine
India’s threat matrix is no longer conventional—it is layered, persistent, and multidimensional. A National Security Doctrine won’t just define how India defends itself—it will shape how India thinks strategically, coordinates internally, and projects power externally.
I. Evolving External Threat Landscape
- Volatile Geopolitical Neighborhood
Sandwiched between two nuclear-armed adversaries, India faces frequent tensions—Doklam (2017), Galwan (2020), Kargil (1999). A codified doctrine helps anticipate and manage conflict in a region where, as Kautilya’s Mandala Theory notes, “the immediate neighbor is your enemy.” - Reactive vs Proactive Posture
India largely responds after the event (e.g., Uri, Pulwama). A doctrine enables pre-emptive preparedness, much like China’s “Active Defence” doctrine. - Strategic Signaling Asymmetry
While China uses its Sun Tzu–style strategy for psychological dominance, India lacks clear messaging. A doctrine enhances geopolitical signaling and deterrence credibility. - Ambiguity in Nuclear Posture
Despite a 2003 doctrine, No First Use remains debated (e.g., Parrikar’s 2016 remark). An updated, unambiguous doctrine strengthens nuclear deterrence and diplomatic clarity.
II. Need for Internal Coherence and Integration
- Civil–Military Disjoint
Without a unified national doctrine, civilian and military leadership lack alignment. As India builds Integrated Theatre Commands, an NSD is essential for operational coherence (similar to the U.S. National Security Strategy). - Fragmented Inter-Agency Coordination
Defence, Home, MEA, and intelligence agencies operate in silos. A doctrine offers Command, Control & Communication (C3) for seamless inter-agency synergy. - Disjointed Internal Security Vision
Issues like Left-Wing Extremism, communal violence, and insurgency are treated piecemeal. A doctrine can unify internal threats under a comprehensive national security architecture.
III. Countering Hybrid and Unconventional Threats
- Cross-Border Terror and Grey-Zone Warfare
Despite Balakot and surgical strikes, terror persists. A doctrine enables a “massive but non-escalatory” retaliation framework to handle such unconventional threats. - Hybrid Warfare and Cyber Threats
India faces cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and territorial salami slicing. An NSD provides clarity on thresholds, attribution, and coordinated response.
IV. Strategic Synergy in Foreign and Defence Policy
- Lack of Diplomatic–Defence Alignment
India’s foreign and defence policies often move in parallel, not together. A doctrine would align both, akin to the Nixon–Kissinger model, where foreign policy was shaped by security realism.
Way Forward
- Institutionalize a Periodic National Security Strategy (NSS)
Draft and update a National Security Strategy every 4–5 years to assess threats, set priorities, and ensure strategic continuity across governments.
(Kargil Review Committee recommended this in 1999 — still pending) - Adopt a Tiered Doctrine Framework
Structure the NSD into layered sub-doctrines—defence, cyber, internal security, intelligence, diplomacy—under one unified doctrine.
(UK’s Integrated Review, 2021, offers a successful model) - Align NSD with Budgeting and R&D Priorities
Ensure defence allocations, capital procurement, and R&D (e.g. DRDO, iDEX) are guided by doctrinal needs—not ad hocism.
(U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review aligns strategy with defence capability planning) - Embed Cyber, AI, and Hybrid Threat Preparedness
Explicitly incorporate responses to cyberattacks, AI-led disinformation, and digital sabotage within the NSD.
(NATO’s Cyber Defence Centre addresses emerging tech threats) - Link Diplomacy with Security Strategy
Align foreign policy instruments—alliances, economic corridors, maritime presence—with national security goals.
(India’s IPOI, QUAD, IMEC exemplify strategic-diplomatic alignment)
