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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-China: the making of a border

Introduction

The India–China boundary, stretching for about 3,488 km, is one of the longest disputed borders in the world. Unlike clearly demarcated international frontiers, this boundary runs through the Himalayas and remains unsettled in large parts. The two major areas of dispute are Aksai Chin in the western sector, occupied by China but claimed by India, and Arunachal Pradesh (particularly the Tawang tract) in the eastern sector, claimed by China but under Indian control. Rooted in the legacies of the British and Manchu empires, the boundary was never precisely defined. After independence, India relied on British-era maps while China pressed for historical and strategic claims. This divergence led to the 1962 war and continues to shape relations between the two Asian powers.

Why the India–China border issue matters

The unresolved India–China border remains a major geopolitical challenge in Asia. Unlike other international boundaries, this border runs through inhospitable Himalayan terrain where neither country historically maintained a permanent presence. The 1962 war, following India’s rejection of Chinese proposals, left scars of mistrust. Later attempts, such as Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 Beijing visit, restored engagement but not resolution. The dispute is about sovereignty, strategy, and national prestige, making it a flashpoint with global implications.

The imperial legacy and a contested border

  1. Colonial inheritance: The India–China border was a product of the British and Manchu empires, drawn imprecisely through the Himalayas.
  2. Absence of settlement: After independence, India relied on colonial maps and dismissed Chinese calls for negotiations.
  3. Strategic miscalculation: India’s faith in maps was not supported by control on the ground, leaving space for China’s proactive steps in Aksai Chin.

The emergence of conflict in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh

  1. Chinese presence in Aksai Chin: China constructed a highway from Xinjiang to Tibet through Aksai Chin, asserting de facto control.
  2. Indian assertion in Tawang: India occupied Tawang citing the 1914 Simla Convention and the McMahon Line signed with an independent Tibet.
  3. Proposals for compromise: In 1959, Beijing suggested a Line of Actual Control (LAC) with a 20 km troop pullback; in 1960, Zhou Enlai proposed a swap—Aksai Chin for Arunachal recognition.
  4. Breakdown and war: India rejected these offers; attempts to reclaim Aksai Chin triggered the 1962 war, where India lost ground in Ladakh but retained the McMahon Line in the east.

Post-war developments and early engagement

  1. Dormancy period: After 1962, both sides avoided border contact for more than a decade.
  2. China Study Group: In 1975, India formed this high-level body to map the border with satellite imagery and direct patrolling.
  3. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s outreach: In 1979, Vajpayee visited Beijing, the first senior Indian leader to do so since 1962, initiating cautious normalisation.
  4. Revival of Chinese proposals: Deng Xiaoping in 1980 reiterated Zhou’s swap idea, but India, led by Indira Gandhi, rejected it due to mistrust.

The stalemate in negotiations during the 1980s

  1. Unproductive talks: From 1981, both sides engaged in negotiations—India sought sector-wise talks, while China insisted on a package deal.
  2. Demand for Tawang: By 1985, Beijing linked concessions in Ladakh with Indian concessions over Tawang, central to China’s Tibet policy.
  3. Operation Falcon: In 1986, India forward-deployed troops at Namka Chu, displaying improved military preparedness since 1962.
  4. De-escalation: Both sides eventually pulled back, but the demand for Tawang revealed fundamental divergence.

Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit and a new framework

  1. Strategic reset: Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing marked a shift from linking normalisation to border resolution.
  2. Framework for dialogue: Both sides agreed to restore relations while deferring the border issue to a Joint Working Group (JWG).
  3. Principle of accommodation: Premier Li Peng emphasised “mutual understanding and mutual accommodation (MUMA),” while Gandhi sought a “fair and reasonable” settlement.
  4. Peace as priority: Peace and tranquillity were prioritised, enabling cooperation in other fields despite the unsettled boundary.

Conclusion

The India–China border dispute is a story of missed chances, mistrust, and strategic recalibration. From Aksai Chin to Tawang, an imperial legacy evolved into a sovereignty dilemma. While Deng Xiaoping and Rajiv Gandhi shifted the relationship towards peace, fundamental differences endure. History shows that strategic patience, military preparedness, and calibrated diplomacy remain the keys to managing this difficult relationship.

Value Addition

Institutional Mechanisms

  1. China Study Group (1975): Established by India to monitor the border with satellite mapping and patrolling points.
  2. Joint Working Group (1988): Created after Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to sustain structured dialogue on the boundary issue.
  3. Later confidence-building agreements (1993, 1996, 2005): Though not in this article, they flowed from this trajectory and institutionalised border management.

Policy Evolution

  1. Jawaharlal Nehru: Over-reliance on colonial maps and dismissal of negotiations.
  2. Atal Bihari Vajpayee: Cautious outreach to normalise ties in 1979 despite tensions.
  3. Indira Gandhi: Strong mistrust post-1962, refusal to accept “territorial swaps.”
  4. Rajiv Gandhi: Pragmatic reset in 1988, separating normalisation from boundary resolution.

Line of Actual Control (LAC)

  1. Definition: The de facto boundary separating Indian and Chinese forces, first formally acknowledged in 1959 by China.
  2. Nature: Not mutually agreed or demarcated on the ground, leading to “differing perceptions.”
  3. Relevance: Key to understanding recurring standoffs such as Galwan (2020), though beyond this article’s timeframe.

Case Study Relevance

  1. Aksai Chin: Illustrates how geography and strategic imperatives (road connectivity to Tibet) drive China’s claims.
  2. Tawang: Demonstrates cultural and religious dimensions (Tibetan Buddhism, Dalai Lama’s birthplace links).
  3. Operation Falcon (1986): A case study in how improved military readiness altered China’s calculus.
  4. Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit: A model of pragmatic diplomacy—normalisation without immediate resolution.

Way Forward

  1. Institutional strengthening: Reviving and empowering mechanisms like the Joint Working Group and Special Representatives dialogue.
  2. Confidence-building: Expanding agreements on patrolling norms, hotlines, and disengagement to avoid clashes.
  3. Strategic balance: Maintaining military preparedness (as shown in Operation Falcon) while keeping diplomacy open.
  4. Engagement beyond the border: Deepening cooperation in trade, technology, and multilateral forums to build trust.
  5. Mutual accommodation: Drawing from Deng Xiaoping and Rajiv Gandhi’s vision of a “fair, reasonable, mutually acceptable” settlement to guide long-term resolution.

PYQ Relevance

[UPSC 2017] ‘China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia’, In the light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbor.

Linkage: China’s occupation of Aksai Chin and insistence on Tawang show how strategic control is tied to economic leverage, such as road connectivity and infrastructure. Its trade surplus with India fuels military modernisation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). For India, this creates a dual challenge of managing unresolved borders while countering China’s economic–military power projection in Asia.

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