Why in the News
India has banned exports of lithium-ion battery black mass, and the Union Cabinet has approved a Rs 2,814-crore scheme for four domestic lithium and nickel processing plants. Both steps recognise that the clean energy transition is creating new centres of industrial and strategic power, with China at the forefront.
Why is the green transition a strategic question?
- Beyond military power: Indian strategic debate has long focused on troops, fighter jets and blue-water naval strength. Control over clean energy supply chains is now an equally consequential source of power.
- Black mass: Black mass is the material recovered from spent batteries, containing lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese. Banning its export keeps it for domestic refining, like keeping crude oil at home to refine.
- Processing scheme: The new capital-support scheme targets gaps in upstream production, the stage where raw minerals become battery materials.
- The takeaway: Advantage in the clean energy era belongs to countries that can turn critical minerals into the materials of the future, not to those that merely assemble finished products.
How dominant is China in clean energy supply chains?
- Solar manufacturing: China controls 82% of global solar-module manufacturing capacity and 91% of solar cells.
- Wafers and batteries: It holds 95% of wafers, the silicon slices from which solar cells are made, and around 80% of lithium-ion battery capacity.
- Mineral processing: It handles over 70% of cobalt and lithium processing. This dominance comes from decades of state-directed industrial policy and extends to inverters, grid equipment and energy-storage systems.
- Technology as coercion: Beijing’s proposed export curbs on advanced photovoltaic (PV) technologies, including silicon-wafer manufacturing, show how control of technology becomes economic coercion, pressure exerted through supply.
Why can’t India rely on current schemes and alliances?
- Incentive gaps: Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, which reward firms in proportion to what they produce in India, support solar modules and advanced chemistry cells, a class of advanced batteries. Gaps persist in upstream production and domestic value addition.
- Assembly without inputs: India’s solar-module capacity far outstrips its solar-cell and wafer output. Its electric-vehicle and battery industries depend on Chinese cells, components and critical-mineral processing.
- Limits of partnerships: Neither Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) cooperation nor security ties with the United States can substitute for domestic technological and manufacturing capability.
- Autonomy, not autarky: Strategic autonomy, freedom to act without leaning on one power, needs state-backed capability in critical segments and diversified supply. It does not need autarky, making everything at home.
- Dependency swap: The Ukraine crisis turned the pipelines that made Western Europe prosperous into sources of vulnerability. Without a resilient clean-tech base, India risks swapping West Asian oil dependence for dependence on Chinese supply chains.
Challenges
- Scheme delivery: The processing scheme’s success depends on timely commissioning, access to mineral feedstock and domestic technical expertise.
- Slow overseas assets: Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL), which acquires mineral assets abroad, holds five lithium brine blocks in Argentina still at the exploration stage.
- Resource nationalism: Chile, Argentina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Zambia and Zimbabwe increasingly seek more value from their own minerals.
- Lab to factory: Research becomes production at scale only with patient capital, skilled manpower and predictable domestic demand.
Way Forward
- Upstream investment: Sustain investment in chemistry, metallurgy and materials science to close upstream gaps.
- Global South partnerships: Use the National Critical Mineral Mission (2025) and missions abroad to partner resource-rich countries in processing and manufacturing, not just extraction.
- “Technological multi-alignment”: Develop sodium-ion and solid-state batteries and green hydrogen alongside lithium-based batteries, using public procurement to create demand.
- Recycling at scale: Scale up recycling of batteries, solar panels and e-waste to recover critical minerals and build refining capacity.
- Standards cooperation: Work with technologically advanced partners on research, manufacturing and common standards for green technologies.
Conclusion
India’s clean energy security now turns on who refines minerals and makes cells, not on how many panels it installs. Whether the new processing plants start on time and retained black mass actually reaches domestic refiners is the test to watch.
Government Initiatives for Clean Energy Manufacturing
- Approved List of Models and Manufacturers (ALMM): A list of approved solar models and makers that government-backed projects must buy from. Its List II, covering solar cells, became mandatory from June 2026.
- ALMM for ingots and wafers: The ALMM framework has been extended to solar ingots and wafers, pushing protected domestic demand further upstream.
- Domestic Content Requirement (DCR): A long-running purchase mandate that reserves government-backed solar demand for domestically made equipment, with no fiscal support attached.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2025, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the rationale of the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme. What are its achievements? In what way can the functioning and outcomes of the scheme be improved?”