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  • [9th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: India-Japan defence cooperation breaks new ground

    [9th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: India-Japan defence cooperation breaks new ground

    Question (2019, GS2 – 10 Marks): “‘The time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole.’ Comment.
    Linkage: This question directly evaluates the transition of India-Japan ties into a robust “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”. It challenges candidates to analyze whether political mechanisms (like the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues and institutional agreements) are producing meaningful regional and global security outcomes

    Mentor comment

    India and Japan have announced a new maritime cooperation framework, joint work on naval shipbuilding and design, and early implementation of the transfer of Japan’s UNICORN integrated communications antenna system. The agreements came out of a visit to India by Japan’s Defence Minister in August 2026. They follow more than a decade of institution building through annual dialogues, the 2+2 mechanism that brings the two countries’ foreign and defence ministers to a single table, joint exercises, logistics arrangements and defence technology discussions. That machinery has not produced matching operational or industrial output. The contest is whether a relationship rich in declarations of strategic convergence can now deliver usable capability.

    Why do further declarations of convergence add little?

    1. The convergence is already established: Both countries share concerns about coercive attempts to alter the status quo, the security of the maritime commons and the growing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific.
    2. Declarations now carry diminishing returns: The partnership has been more developed institutionally than operationally, so another statement of shared assessment changes nothing about what the two forces can do together.
    3. The test is joint operating capacity: The unmet task is converting shared assessments into arrangements that improve the two countries’ ability to operate together.

    What does the new maritime framework try to fix?

    1. Information sharing is the core: The framework places its emphasis on information sharing and Maritime Domain Awareness, the continuous picture of shipping, naval movement and activity in a maritime area assembled from radar, satellite, aircraft and vessel tracking inputs.
    2. The two sit at opposite ends of one theatre: Japan’s immediate security concerns are concentrated in the East China Sea and the waters surrounding Taiwan. India’s geographical position gives it a central role in the Indian Ocean maritime space.
    3. A single picture across two spaces: A closer information sharing architecture would build a more continuous strategic picture across these interconnected maritime spaces.
    4. The stated objective is operational: The aim is greater awareness, interoperability and operational familiarity between the two major maritime powers.

    What is being attempted in defence industry?

    1. Joint work on naval shipbuilding: The two sides are exploring joint development in naval shipbuilding and design, combining Japanese technological expertise with Indian production capabilities.
    2. Japanese use of Indian capacity: There was agreement to deepen discussions on Japan’s use of Indian production capabilities under the ‘Make in India’ framework.
    3. Reciprocal ship repair: The two sides agreed to move towards reciprocal arrangements for ship repair facilities.
    4. This is the weakest leg of the relationship: Defence industrial cooperation has consistently lagged behind strategic and political convergence.

    Why does the UNICORN transfer matter, and why is it not new?

    1. What the system is: UNICORN is an integrated communications antenna system that houses a warship’s antennas within a single composite mast, which reduces the ship’s radar signature.
    2. Described as a first, but already under way: Japan’s Ministry of Defence describes UNICORN as the first defence equipment transfer project between the two countries. A memorandum of understanding for the co-development of UNICORN masts, involving Bharat Electronics Limited, was signed in November 2024.
    3. The meeting advanced implementation: The August meeting represented a further step towards implementation rather than the initiation of a new project.
    4. The record it has to beat: New Delhi and Tokyo have struggled to convert their 2015 agreement on defence equipment and technology transfer into concrete outcomes.
    5. Research agencies are being linked: There are plans to deepen cooperation between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Japan’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), the Japanese Defence Ministry body that runs procurement and technology development.
    6. Credibility now rests on delivery: The commitment to early implementation reflects a recognition that credibility depends on delivering projects rather than identifying possibilities.

    What do the exercises signal?

    1. Japanese fighters are flying in India: Japan’s fighter aircraft are participating in the Veer Guardian exercise in India from 9 to 22 September 2026, for the first time.
    2. Greater complexity by agreement: The two sides agreed to increase the complexity of bilateral exercises and to integrate unmanned systems.
    3. Short notice activation: They agreed to explore exercises organised at short notice, which tests readiness rather than choreography.
    4. Beyond the navies: They discussed cooperation between special operations forces, and with India’s future integrated theatre commands.

    Why does the western seaboard visit matter?

    1. The itinerary moved west: Before travelling to New Delhi, Japan’s Defence Minister visited the Western Naval Command in Mumbai and INS Chennai.
    2. Past the usual geography: The visit extended beyond the familiar strategic geography of the Bay of Bengal and the Strait of Malacca.
    3. What the western seaboard carries: It is central to India’s wider maritime interests, encompassing critical sea lanes, energy flows and India’s growing responsibilities in the western Indian Ocean.

    Is this a China-centric partnership?

    1. The message was sent without the name: The joint statement reiterated opposition to unilateral actions that impede freedom of navigation or seek to alter the status quo through force or coercion. Neither country named China.
    2. The value lies in going past China: The significance of India-Japan cooperation lies in its ability to move beyond a China-centric agenda.
    3. A wider agenda is already forming: Maritime security, resilient supply chains, defence industrial capacity, logistics and third country cooperation are becoming components of a wider regional security architecture.
    4. The civil side moved first: The July 2026 Annual Summit expanded cooperation across economic security, critical technologies and resilient supply chains, and the defence engagement followed it.

    Challenges

    1. Transfer agreements have not produced serial equipment flows: Named projects have repeatedly stalled between agreement and production. Eg. Negotiations on the US-2 amphibious search and rescue aircraft ran for years without producing a contract.
    2. Japan’s export control framework limits what can move: Japan’s post-war pacifist constitutional settlement and its restrictive export rules keep advanced and dual-use defence technology outside most transfer categories. Eg. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, adopted in 2014, replaced a near-total export ban but still confine transfers to defined categories.
    3. Habitual joint operation is still shallow: Interoperability is built by repetition, and the bilateral exercise tempo remains thin against the range of services involved. Eg. Japan first joined the Malabar naval exercise in 2007 and became a permanent participant only in 2015.
    4. Defence industrial cooperation remains below potential: Defence industrial cooperation has consistently lagged behind strategic and political convergence.
    5. Strategic alignment is not identical: Japan’s Indo-Pacific approach is closely coordinated with the United States and the G7. India retains strategic autonomy and stays in groupings Japan is not part of. Eg. India’s participation in the Vostok exercises in Russia sits awkwardly with Tokyo’s position.

    Way Forward

    1. Convert agreements into deliverables: Attach dated production milestones and named Indian production partners to defence transfers so that agreements move from signing to implementation.
    2. Work within Japan’s export framework: Concentrate joint projects on permitted categories such as sensors, communications, surveillance and rescue platforms.
    3. Build sustained interoperability: Establish a standing annual calendar covering naval, army and air exercises, with a short-notice activation slot.
    4. Deepen defence industrial cooperation: Move from individual technology transfers towards joint development, co-production and reciprocal maintenance, combining Japanese technological expertise with Indian manufacturing capacity.
    5. Strengthen maritime information sharing: Develop a more integrated Maritime Domain Awareness architecture and improve information sharing between the two countries’ maritime forces.
    6. Institutionalise strategic consultation: Establish a standing consultation mechanism on third-country engagements so that differences arising from India’s strategic autonomy do not become unexpected diplomatic surprises.
    7. Measure the partnership by outcomes: The ultimate benchmark should be delivered equipment, operational capability and functioning industrial partnerships, rather than another round of declarations.

    Back2Basic: About India-Japan Relations

    1. A Special Strategic and Global Partnership: The relationship was upgraded to this status in 2014, covering political, economic and security cooperation.
    2. Indo-Pacific convergence: India’s Act East Policy and its Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) align with Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, and the two also work together within the Quad.
    3. Economic weight: Japan is the fifth largest investor in the Indian economy, with 6.6 per cent of India’s total foreign direct investment inflows. Bilateral trade stood at USD 25.17 billion in 2024-25.
    4. Development footprint: The Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail project is the flagship connectivity work, and Japan is the only country undertaking development work in India’s Northeast, through the India-Japan Act East Forum.

    Initiatives and Agreements in India-Japan Cooperation

    1. Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), 2011: It covers trade in goods and services, investment and intellectual property rights.
    2. India-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership, 2021: It works on India’s manufacturing base and on supply chain resilience.
    3. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, 2020: It allows reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the two countries’ defence forces.
    4. Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 2017: It provides the legal basis for Japanese civil nuclear cooperation with India.
    5. Supply Chain Resilience Initiative: Run with Australia, it seeks to diversify supply chains away from dependence on a single country.
    6. Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: It aims to link East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia more closely with Africa.

    Key Facts about India-Japan Relations

    1. Joint exercises: JIMEX is the bilateral naval exercise and Dharma Guardian the army exercise. Both countries also take part in the Malabar and Milan multilateral exercises.
    2. The G4 grouping: India and Japan work with Brazil and Germany in the G4 to press for expansion of the United Nations Security Council.
    3. India Vision 2025: It frames the development of India’s Northeast as the convergence point between the Act East Policy and Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision.
  • How to appoint judges: A view from South Africa

    How to appoint judges: A view from South Africa

    Why in the News

    • The Supreme Court has held that confidentiality in judicial appointments is necessary to preserve the integrity of the appointment process.
    • The issue arose in Arvind Malhotra v. High Court of Himachal Pradesh, involving a judge who challenged the elevation of a junior judge to the Supreme Court.
    • The case brings into focus the debate between confidentiality and transparency in judicial appointments.

    Judicial Service Commission of South Africa

    • The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is a constitutional body involved in judicial appointments in South Africa.
    • It includes judges, lawyers, legal academics and political representatives.
    • Its proceedings are conducted publicly and broadcast.
    • Process involves:
      • Calling for nominations.
      • Preparing a shortlist.
      • Inviting public comments.
      • Conducting public interviews.
      • Voting where members disagree.
    • The identity of individual votes remains confidential.

    Judicial Accountability in South Africa

    • Judges do not enjoy special immunity from complaints regarding conduct.
    • The JSC can investigate allegations of improper conduct.
    • Serious cases can lead to a public enquiry and recommendations for impeachment.

    Constitutional Provisions

    • Article 124: Appointment of Supreme Court judges.
    • Article 217: Appointment of High Court judges.
    • 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014: Provided for the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC).
    • 2015: Supreme Court struck down the NJAC framework and restored the Collegium system.

    Major Concerns

    • Judges appointing judges: Concerns regarding limited external checks and accountability.
    • Transparency: Collegium resolutions are published, but detailed reasons for selection are generally not disclosed.
    • Representation: Concerns regarding social and regional diversity in higher judiciary.
    • Objective merit: Absence of a publicly stated and standardised evaluation framework.
    • Regional imbalance: Some High Courts remain unrepresented in the Supreme Court.

    Way Forward

    • Develop clear and publicly stated selection criteria.
    • Improve transparency while protecting legitimate confidentiality.
    • Consider regional and social representation alongside merit.
    • Strengthen mechanisms for addressing complaints against judicial officers.
    • Maintain the essential balance between judicial independence and public accountability.

    Prelims Pointers

    • Article 124 → Supreme Court judges.
    • Article 217 → High Court judges.
    • Collegium → Judicial appointments to higher judiciary.
    • NJAC → Created through 99th Constitutional Amendment, 2014.
    • NJAC struck down → 2015.
    • South Africa JSC → Constitutional body involved in judicial appointments.
    • TRAI vs JSC: JSC is a constitutional judicial appointments body in South Africa, while India’s Collegium is a judge-led mechanism evolved through judicial decisions.

    [2012] What is the provision to safeguard the autonomy of the supreme court of India?
    1. While appointing the Supreme Court judges, the president of India has to consult the CJI.
    2. the SC judges can be removed by the CJI only
    3. the salaries of judges are charged on the consolidated fund of India to which the legislature does not have to vote.
    4. All appointments of officers and staffs of the SC are made by the govt only after consulting the CJI
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] 1 and 3 only

    [B] 3 and 4 only

    [C] 4 only

    [D] 1, 2, 3 and 4

  • A possible G3 is casting a shadow over BRICS

    A possible G3 is casting a shadow over BRICS

    Why in the News

    BRICS leaders meet in Delhi this week to add further layers of cooperation, ranging from agriculture, health to digitalisation. The grouping’s two principal driving forces, Russia and China, are at the same time exploring separate and joint accommodations with the United States, whose domination of the world order BRICS exists to counter.

    What will the Delhi summit actually produce?

    1. More layers, slowly added: The summit will extend cooperation into agriculture, health and digitalisation.
    2. The declaration is not the draw: The last summit, at Rio de Janeiro, issued a declaration of 126 paragraphs without changing anything in the international system.
    3. The attraction is attendance: International interest is focused on the presence of the leaders of China, Russia and Iran.
    4. One bilateral carries the weight: The Chinese President is visiting India for the first time since 2019, and the two leaders are expected to stabilise the boundary situation and reset economic relations.

    Why has BRICS become less coherent?

    1. Expansion cut both ways: Enlargement added weight to the grouping and subtracted coherence from it.
    2. The Iran war split two members: The conflict opened a sharp divide between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, now fellow members of the grouping.
    3. Two incompatible asks: Iran wants BRICS to condemn American and Israeli military action. The United Arab Emirates, which suffered Iranian attacks and disruption to commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, stresses sovereignty, protection of civilian infrastructure and freedom of navigation.
    4. It has already cost an outcome: Those differences prevented the BRICS foreign ministers from issuing a consensual joint statement in Delhi in May.

    Why is a G3 conceivable now?

    1. A leader driven American approach: The US President has long held that good personal relations with the Russian and Chinese leaders could reduce global strategic tensions and produce major political and economic deals.
    2. Domestic and allied resistance: That instinct has repeatedly encountered resistance from the American foreign policy establishment, Congress and US allies.
    3. European and Asian fears differ: The Europeans worry that an accommodation with Moscow could be made at their expense. Asian allies fear that a bargain with Beijing could weaken American commitments to regional security.
    4. Nothing has been transformed yet: Neither relationship has been changed, and the preference for leader driven diplomacy keeps the possibility of movement open.
    5. The idea has been tested before: The possibility of such a meeting was explored last summer, during the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

    What does Russia bring to that table?

    1. The war has not been won: Four and a half years of fighting have produced no decisive victory, and the front remains costly and difficult to move.
    2. A channel has reopened: Shuttle diplomacy by American envoys between Moscow and Kyiv has reopened the diplomatic channel, without any sign that the fundamental differences between Russia and Ukraine are narrowing.
    3. Both sides hedge: Moscow and Kyiv are supporting the American peace initiative and preparing for escalation at the same time.
    4. European security could become a chip: Russian security questions could be treated by Washington as part of a larger bargain with Beijing.

    What does China bring?

    1. It negotiates from strength: China approaches Washington from a stronger position than Russia does.
    2. A sequenced diplomatic run: Its journey from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit at Bishkek, through Cairo and Delhi, to the White House later this month presents China as the leader of the Global South and as a co-equal manager of the international order at the same time.
    3. What a second summit could yield: An extension of the trade truce, additional Chinese purchases from the United States and negotiations over technology restrictions are the available deliverables.
    4. The differences are structural: Washington accuses China of relying on subsidised exports and industrial overcapacity. Beijing uses rare earths, market access and its control of important supply chains as leverage.
    5. Taiwan is the standing ask: China will continue to press for a reduction in American support for Taiwan.

    Can anti-Western rhetoric and a seat at the American table hold together?

    1. Alignment and hedging run together: Russia and China are closer to each other than ever and share concerns about the United States. Both also seek a workable relationship with Washington.
    2. Both claim the high table: For all their anti-Western rhetoric, each claims a place at the high table with the United States.
    3. The claim has history: Russia was once part of the G8, the group of Western industrial states, and engaged directly with NATO. China now sees itself as America’s peer.
    4. What a trilateral would signify: Both lay claim to shaping the global order established after 1945, and a summit of the three leaders would mark the beginning of triangular global leadership as a successor to the Yalta System.
    5. It is not imminent: A global directorate of three is not close, and the idea remains an exploration rather than a plan.

    What are India’s three answers?

    1. Build national power first: The first answer is internal reform and accelerated economic development.
    2. Separate multipolarity from anti-American bloc politics: Russia and China use BRICS to expand their diplomatic options and to preserve the freedom to negotiate with Washington. India must approach the emerging order with the same realism.
    3. Widen the partnership base: India must intensify bilateral and minilateral cooperation with the Anglosphere, Brazil, Europe, Japan, Korea and other middle powers that have no enthusiasm for a G3 world.

    Challenges to BRICS

    1. Internal rivalry limits cohesion: Friction between the two largest Asian members prevents a common strategic position inside the grouping. Eg. The unsettled India-China boundary has kept the two from a shared security line inside the same forum.
    2. Consensus across incompatible political systems: The membership spans vibrant democracies and autocracies, which makes agreement on human rights or democratic norms unreachable in joint declarations. Eg. The entry of Iran and Ethiopia alongside Brazil and India widened that political range further.
    3. De-dollarisation is slower than the rhetoric: Local currency settlement has grown, and the US dollar still settles the overwhelming share of global trade. Eg. Rupee-rouble and rupee-dirham settlement covers only a fraction of India’s external trade.
    4. There is no permanent secretariat: The grouping has no charter and no standing institution, so continuity depends entirely on the annual chair. Eg. Each presidency resets the agenda, and commitments lapse when the chair changes.
    5. Intra-group trade stays low: Members continue to rely on G7 markets for high technology imports and services exports. Eg. Most members source advanced semiconductors and aerospace components from the United States, Europe and Japan.
    6. Expansion risks dilution: A larger BRICS+ risks becoming a discussion forum that produces no decisions. Eg. The Non-Aligned Movement grew past 120 members and lost the ability to reach operative positions.

    Way Forward

    1. Focus on areas of common interest: Confine joint positions to areas where members already agree, such as development finance and public health, rather than seeking a security consensus that does not exist.
    2. Adopt variable geometry: Move towards a variable geometry model in which subsets of members can sign issue specific instruments without binding the whole group.
    3. Strengthen payment infrastructure: Target payments infrastructure that lowers settlement cost and time, rather than focusing primarily on the displacement of the US dollar as a reserve currency.
    4. Create a permanent institutional mechanism: Establish a small standing secretariat with a limited mandate to track implementation of past declarations and maintain institutional continuity.
    5. Promote intra-BRICS supply chains: Direct the New Development Bank towards financing intra-group industrial supply chains, particularly in strategic sectors such as advanced technology and manufacturing.
    6. Formalise expansion criteria: Establish clear entry criteria for partner countries, ensuring that future expansion is based on economic complementarity rather than political alignment.

    Conclusion

    Multipolarity has always had two possible shapes: one distributes power across many capitals; the other concentrates it among a handful and calls the result a balance. BRICS rests on the first assumption; its two strongest members hedge towards the second. For India the operative question is not whether a three cornered directorate forms, which it may not, but whether Indian diplomacy is organised for a world in which its two largest partners in the grouping negotiate separately with Washington. That answer will show up in what India builds outside the room, not in what the room declares.

    About BRICS

    1. What it is: BRICS is an informal grouping of major emerging economies that coordinates political and economic positions outside Western led institutions, without a founding treaty.
    2. Membership: Its full members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with Saudi Arabia participating without having formalised its status.
    3. Its weight: The grouping accounts for over 45 per cent of the world’s population, about 37 per cent of global output measured at purchasing power parity, which exceeds the G7’s share, and roughly 42 per cent of global oil production and exports.
    4. Its stated objectives: Reform of the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for more equitable representation, a multipolar order, and reduced reliance on the US dollar and on SWIFT, the messaging network banks use to instruct cross border payments.

    Key Facts about BRICS

    1. The acronym predates the grouping: ‘BRIC’ was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to identify high growth emerging economies.
    2. From officials to leaders: The first meeting of foreign ministers was held on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. The first formal Leaders’ Summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009.
    3. How it grew: South Africa joined in 2011. Expansion was decided at the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joining in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025.
    4. A partner tier: A ‘Partner Country’ category was introduced in 2024 to engage states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria without granting full membership.

    Initiatives under BRICS

    1. New Development Bank: Headquartered in Shanghai, it has approved over USD 35 billion in infrastructure lending.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A USD 100 billion fund providing short term liquidity support to members.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross border payment system in pilot stage, intended to work around SWIFT.
    4. BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre: Set up during the pandemic for technology transfer and vaccine equity.
    5. Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation: Six satellites contributed by member states, sharing data for disaster management.
    6. Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR): Cooperation on artificial intelligence, digitalisation and green technology.
    7. BRICS Space Council: Established in 2025 to coordinate deep space exploration and lunar research.

    Back2Basics: The Yalta System

    • Why the term recurs: ‘Yalta System’ is used as shorthand for an international order settled among a small number of great powers rather than by the wider membership.f BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”
    • Where the term comes from: The Yalta Conference of February 1945 brought together the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to settle the shape of the post-war order.
    • What it settled: It fixed the occupation and reorganisation of Europe and confirmed agreement on creating the United Nations.
    • The concert it produced: It led to a Security Council with permanent seats and a veto for five powers, entrenching great power management of international peace.

    [2026, GS2, 10.0 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.

  • Why a flat map fails to accurately depict Earth

    Why a flat map fails to accurately depict Earth

    Why in the News

    • The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution encouraging a shift from the Mercator projection towards the Equal Earth projection.
    • 164 countries, including India, supported the resolution.
    • The United States voted against, while six countries abstained.
    • The resolution is non-binding.
    • The debate centres on how world maps represent the relative size of different regions, particularly Africa.

    What is a Map Projection?

    • A map projection converts the three-dimensional Earth into a two-dimensional map.
    • Every projection involves some form of distortion.
    • Four major properties are: Area, Shape, Distance, Direction
    • Major types include:
      • Conformal: Preserves local angles and shapes.
      • Equal-area: Preserves relative areas.
      • Equidistant: Preserves selected distances.
      • Compromise: Balances different types of distortion.

    Mercator Projection

    • Developed by Gerardus Mercator in 1569.
    • Designed mainly for navigation.
    • Meridians and parallels are represented as straight lines.
    • A constant compass bearing can be represented as a straight line.
    • It is a conformal projection.

    Major Limitation

    • Areas become increasingly exaggerated towards the poles.
    • Greenland and Antarctica therefore appear much larger than their actual relative size.
    • This can visually distort perceptions of the geographical size of regions.

    Equal Earth Projection

    • Developed in 2018.
    • It is an equal-area projection.
    • Preserves the relative area of landmasses.
    • Particularly useful for:
      • Population distribution
      • Climate data
      • Land-use mapping
      • Resource distribution
    • It sacrifices some accuracy in shape and distance.

    Which Projection for Which Purpose?

    • Navigation → Mercator or other conformal projections.
    • Statistical/thematic maps → Equal-area projections such as Equal Earth.
    • General world maps → Robinson or Winkel Tripel.
    • Polar regions → Azimuthal projections.

    Challenges

    • UN resolutions are not legally binding.
    • Digital mapping systems continue to rely heavily on Mercator-derived projections.
    • Changing a projection does not eliminate distortion; it only changes which property is prioritised.
    • Therefore, maps should clearly mention the projection and its principal purpose.

    Way Forward

    • Use projection according to purpose, rather than adopting one universal map.
    • Provide equal-area options in government statistical and mapping platforms.
    • Clearly mention the projection used on published maps.
    • Improve geographical literacy by teaching the limitations of different projections.

    Prelims Pointers

    • Compromise projections → Balance multiple distortions.
    • Mercator → Conformal projection.
    • Mercator → Developed in 1569.
    • Mercator’s major use → Navigation.
    • Equal Earth → Equal-area projection.
    • Equal-area projection → Preserves relative areas.
    • Geostationary ≠ Geosynchronous is a separate orbital concept, not a map projection.
    • No flat map → Can simultaneously preserve area, shape, distance and direction perfectly.
  • DoT panel approves TRAI suggestions on satcom spectrum

    DoT panel approves TRAI suggestions on satcom spectrum

    Why in the News

    • The Digital Communications Commission (DCC) has approved most of TRAI’s recommendations on spectrum allocation for satellite communication.
    • Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb and Jio Satellite Communications have received permission to provide satellite communication services in India.

    DoT = Department of Telecommunications.

    • It is a department under the Ministry of Communications, Government of India.
    • It is responsible for telecom policy, licensing, spectrum management and regulation-related functions.
    • The Digital Communications Commission (DCC) is the highest decision-making body within DoT.
    • TRAI is the independent statutory regulator that makes recommendations, while DoT/Government takes the final decision on matters such as licensing and spectrum assignment.

    Why Satellite Spectrum is Administratively Assigned

    • The Telecommunications Act, 2023 provides for administrative assignment of spectrum for specified satellite-based services.
    • Satellite spectrum is a shared resource, unlike spectrum used for exclusive terrestrial networks.
    • Frequencies and orbital resources require international coordination through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
    • Terrestrial telecom operators have raised concerns about competitive parity, since they acquire spectrum through auctions.

    Importance of Satellite Broadband

    • Provides connectivity in remote and difficult terrain where fibre and terrestrial backhaul are not viable.
    • LEO satellites offer lower latency than geostationary satellites.
    • Useful for:
      • Rural and remote connectivity
      • Maritime and aviation communication
      • Disaster-resilient communications
      • Areas where terrestrial networks are damaged or unavailable
    • Satellite networks are expected to complement rather than replace terrestrial networks.

    Key Challenges

    • High cost: Satellite terminals and services can be expensive compared with India’s low-cost terrestrial broadband.
    • Limited capacity: Satellite capacity is shared among users within a footprint.
    • Security requirements: Lawful interception, domestic gateways and data-routing requirements increase compliance complexity.
    • Orbital congestion: Growing satellite constellations increase collision and space-debris risks.
    • Competition concerns: Differences in spectrum assignment methods may create concerns regarding a level playing field between satellite and terrestrial operators.

    Way Forward

    • Target satellite broadband initially towards remote institutions, schools, health centres and government facilities.
    • Link authorisation with coverage obligations for underserved areas.
    • Strengthen space debris mitigation and deorbiting requirements.
    • Maintain a transparent framework for spectrum pricing, assignment and security compliance.
    • Develop a complementary model integrating satellite and terrestrial networks.

    Back to Basics: TRAI

    • TRAI: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India.
    • Established in 1997 under the TRAI Act, 1997.
    • Regulates the telecommunications sector.
    • Functions include:
      • Tariff regulation
      • Quality of service standards
      • Telecom regulations
    • Its recommendations on licensing and spectrum assignment are advisory, with the final decision resting with the government.
    • TDSAT handles telecom disputes and appeals against specified regulatory decisions.

    Prelims Pointers

    • DCC → Highest decision-making body within DoT.
    • DCC Chairperson → Telecom Secretary.
    • TRAI → Statutory telecom regulator.
    • Telecommunications Act, 2023 → Provides framework for spectrum assignment.
    • Satellite spectrum → Generally administratively assigned for specified services.
    • ITU → International coordination of radio frequencies and orbital resources.
    • LEO satellites → Lower latency than GEO satellites.
    • IS4OM → Space situational awareness and safe space operations.

    [2011] Satellites used for telecommunication relay are kept in a geostationary orbit. A satellite is said to be in such an orbit when:

    1. The orbit is geosynchronous.
    2. The orbit is circular.
    3. The orbit lies in the plane of the Earth’s equator.
    4. The orbit is at an altitude of 22,236 km.

    Select the correct answer using the codes given below:A

    [a] 1, 2 and 3 only

    [b] 1, 3 and 4 only

    [c] 2 and 4 only

    [d] 1, 2,3 and 4

  • For ISRO, expanding ecosystem is way forward

    For ISRO, expanding ecosystem is way forward

    Why in the News

    The chairman of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the nodal agency that promotes and guides private participation in space, has said that the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) would eventually not manufacture any launch vehicles, and that the work would be done by private companies. The remark widened a dispute that had begun when ISRO tightened its norms for resignation and voluntary retirement of senior scientific personnel. Employee associations wrote to the ISRO leadership asking whether the remark represented official policy. The ISRO chairman then stated categorically that there was no move to privatise the agency. The same statement welcomed an increasing role for private companies. The contest is between an agency being restructured towards exploration and science, and the commercial launch revenue it would give up to get there.

    What triggered the dispute inside ISRO?

    1. The starting point was a personnel rule: ISRO tightened its norms for resignation and voluntary retirement of senior scientific personnel, which is what opened the wider debate.
    2. The dispute then changed subject: It expanded into questions about the role of the private sector in space and about the future of the space agency itself.
    3. The staff sought a policy ruling: Employee associations asked the leadership whether a public remark by the head of the promotion agency represented official policy, which the ISRO chairman answered by ruling out privatisation.

    What model is the government moving towards?

    1. The reference model is NASA: ISRO is being prepared to focus primarily on big-ticket space projects, scientific missions and exploration missions, with routine launches passing to private industry.
    2. The agency is also the mentor: ISRO is being asked to handhold private industry and help it reach a level of maturity.
    3. Personnel already move that way: Most private space companies carry retired ISRO scientists as advisors or mentors.
    4. Infrastructure is already shared: ISRO offers its launch pads and related services to these companies.
    5. A launch vehicle has already left the agency: ISRO developed the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) over the years and has transferred the technology to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, a public-sector undertaking.

    What does an expanded ecosystem deliver?

    1. Launch volume and revenue: A private space ecosystem can carry a large number of commercial launches and bring in much-needed revenue.
    2. People and jobs: It can develop a large talent pool and generate fresh employment opportunities.
    3. Diplomatic weight: Capabilities in space products and services are becoming a powerful diplomatic good.

    Where does the model cut against ISRO?

    1. Provider or beneficiary: The concern within sections of the ISRO staff is that the agency should not merely be a provider to the ecosystem but also a beneficiary of it.
    2. The revenue it steps away from: By moving out of commercial launches, ISRO forgoes an important source of income it currently earns.
    3. Budget dependence constrains ambition: Becoming entirely dependent on government budgets limits capability, since neither research and development nor ambitious exploration projects are cheap.
    4. Talent has a price: An agency doing frontier work has to attract and retain top-tier talent, which is also what the tightened exit norms were reaching for.

    Why is institutional independence part of the argument?

    1. Political attention has helped: Sustained interest at the highest political level in the space sector has brought ISRO steady government support for its plans and projects.
    2. The success has a stated cause: ISRO’s record is often attributed to its relative immunity from government interference.
    3. The staff concern is about that autonomy: The apprehension within the agency is that a restructuring driven from outside erodes the independence the agency has enjoyed so far, at the point when its missions become more ambitious.

    Challenges to India’s expanding space ecosystem

    1. Demand does not yet match the launch capacity being built: A commercial launch business depends on a payload pipeline that Indian startups do not control, and the global small satellite launch market is already crowded with subsidised incumbents. Eg. Skyroot Aerospace flew the Vikram-S suborbital demonstration in November 2022 and Agnikul Cosmos flew a single-stage vehicle with a 3D-printed engine in May 2024, and neither has since established a regular commercial orbital cadence.
      The Fix: Anchor private launch demand with a committed government payload order book, on the model of NASA’s block procurement of commercial launches.
    2. Deep-technology capital is scarce and short in tenure: Space hardware takes years to reach revenue, which sits badly with venture funds that need an exit inside a fund life. Eg. The Rs 1,000 crore venture capital fund for the space sector announced in 2024 is small against the capital a single launch vehicle programme absorbs.
      The Fix: Convert a share of that fund into milestone-linked, non-dilutive grants for qualification testing, which is the stage where hardware companies stall.
    3. The regulator promotes and authorises the same firms it helps: IN-SPACe both promotes private participation and authorises the activity, so the body encouraging an entrant also clears its safety and liability case. Eg. The Indian Space Policy, 2023 assigned both functions to the same agency.
      The Fix: Separate the authorisation function into a distinct decision-making arm with its own record of reasons, keeping promotion and clearance in different hands.
    4. Liability for damage rests with the government whoever launches: Under the Outer Space Treaty, 1967 and the Liability Convention, 1972, the launching State is internationally liable for damage caused by an object launched from its territory. Eg. A private Indian operator’s failure abroad becomes a claim against the Union of India, not against the company.
      The Fix: Enact a domestic space activities law fixing indemnity ceilings and compulsory third-party insurance for authorised private operators.

    Conclusion

    The two halves of the plan pull in opposite directions. An agency told to concentrate on science and exploration is also being told to release the commercial work that would part-fund it, which leaves the exploration mandate resting entirely on an annual budget line. The unresolved question is whether the government intends to replace the forgone earnings with an assured allocation, or whether the restructuring is a transfer of revenue without a transfer of cost. The marker over the next Budget cycle is the direction of the Department of Space’s allocation once commercial launch work has moved out, since a flat allocation would settle the question the agency’s staff are actually asking.

    Back2Basics: IN-SPACe

    1. What it is: The Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre is an autonomous body under the Department of Space, created in 2020 as the single-window agency for private participation in space activities.
    2. What it authorises: It grants authorisation to non-government entities for launches, satellite operations, ground stations and space-based services.
    3. What it enables: It permits private entities to use ISRO’s facilities and to obtain transfer of ISRO-developed technology.
    4. Where it sits in policy: The Indian Space Policy, 2023 assigns it the promotion and authorisation functions, keeps ISRO on research, development and exploration, and leaves NewSpace India Limited to commercialise ISRO’s technologies.

    [2026] Consider the following statements about involvement of private entities in India’s space programme:

    1. IN-SPACe is an autonomous agency formed to facilitate participation of private entities.

    2. Agnikul Cosmos launched the world’s first flight using 3D-printed rocket engine.

    3. Skyroot Aerospace has developed liquid fuel for GSLV.

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 2 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Disaster preparedness must put communities at centre

    Why in the News

    The catastrophe unfolding across Nepal is being read as a warning for the Himalaya and for mountain regions worldwide rather than as one country’s disaster. The reading rests on field research with disaster-affected communities in Nepal, including flood-affected elders, women, men and local leaders in Kharapani in the Pokhara Valley after the Seti River flood, and on separate field research on earthquake recovery in Kathmandu. Those communities reported inadequate warning, limited preparedness and delayed recovery support. They did not reject science or technology, and asked instead for warnings that function and for the equipment and training to act on them. The contest is between a preparedness system measured by its ability to detect the next hazard and one measured by whether the detection reaches a household with the authority and the means to move.

    Why does a mountain disaster become a regional problem?

    1. Mountains hold the water other regions live on: They store snow and ice, feed major rivers and sustain societies far beyond their own slopes.
    2. The physical base is changing across all mountain systems: From the Hindu Kush Himalaya to the Andes, the Alps and the Rocky Mountains, warming is altering glaciers, snowpack, permafrost and water flows.
    3. The consequences land downstream: Environmental change in the highlands cascades into social, economic and health crises in the plains that depend on those flows.

    What did flood-affected communities report?

    1. The loss was continuing rather than momentary: Residents described a long relational disaster covering the loss of relatives, homes, livestock and businesses.
    2. The damage extended past property: They described grief, disrupted livelihoods and frustration with the institutions meant to respond.
    3. Three failures were named: They reported inadequate warning, limited preparedness and delayed recovery support.

    What do affected communities ask for?

    1. Working warnings, not more instruments: Communities asked for functioning warnings, local flood-information centres, communication technologies, rescue equipment and preparedness training.
    2. An unread warning protects nobody: A warning that does not reach people, is not trusted, or is disconnected from evacuation and response plans provides no protection.
    3. The people at risk hold usable knowledge: Affected populations are knowledge holders and leaders in their own right, not recipients waiting for expert instruction.

    What five responsibilities does mountain preparedness now carry?

    1. Transboundary monitoring and data sharing: Glaciers, rivers, landslides and flood pathways cross political borders, so Nepal, India, China, Bhutan and other Himalayan countries need faster exchange of upstream observations, satellite information, river conditions and warnings. Scientific cooperation of this kind is life-saving regional infrastructure.
    2. Community-centred warnings: Information must reach people in trusted languages and forms, warnings must be tested, communities must know where to go, and women, elders, youth and marginalised groups must hold meaningful authority in preparedness decisions.
    3. Preparedness as a permanent public responsibility: Local information centres, evacuation plans, shelters, community response teams, health-system continuity and rescue equipment all require sustained investment rather than post-disaster allocation.
    4. Ecosystem-sensitive mountain development: Roads, tourism, hydropower and mining bring benefits, and poorly planned versions of each amplify exposure to the hazard.
    5. International climate responsibility: Nepal has contributed a tiny share of historical emissions and faces profound risk from a changing cryosphere, so climate finance, loss and damage support, scientific capacity and locally controlled adaptation are questions of justice rather than charity.

    Challenges to community-centred disaster preparedness

    1. The first responder tier is the least resourced: Panchayati Raj Institutions and urban local bodies carry the immediate response duty without matching funds, trained staff or defined roles. Eg. Relief work and maintenance of community assets sit with panchayats under the Eleventh Schedule, and States have devolved neither dedicated disaster staff nor untied funds against that entry.
      The Fix: Earmark a fixed share of the State Disaster Response Fund for village-level preparedness and train elected representatives through the National Disaster Management Authority and National Institute of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj modules.
    2. Spending is tilted towards relief rather than prevention: The disaster fund architecture keeps response funds far larger than mitigation funds, so preparedness competes for the smaller pool every year. Eg. India’s mitigation funds were created only after the response funds had been operating for years, and the tilt towards relief persists.
      The Fix: Move early warning systems, retrofitting and nature-based works into the National and State Disaster Mitigation Funds with a published annual drawdown target.
    3. Warnings fail at the last mile: Alerts are generated centrally and lose their audience before reaching the household, which is where the decision to move is actually taken. Eg. Real-time disaster information systems and last-mile dissemination remain uneven between States.
      The Fix: Test each warning chain through a drill that measures how many households received and acted on an alert, rather than how many messages were dispatched.
    4. Himalayan hazard data stops at the border: Glacial lakes, landslide dams and river surges form upstream of national boundaries, where the agencies that will face the flood have no observation rights. Eg. The South Lhonak lake outburst flood in Sikkim in October 2023 destroyed the Teesta III dam downstream and killed dozens of people.
      The Fix: Convert existing bilateral hydrological exchanges into a standing Himalayan hazard data protocol with fixed transmission times and a named receiving authority in each country.

    Conclusion

    Preparedness is being judged by the wrong instrument. Detection capacity has improved across the Himalaya; the authority to act on a detection still sits several administrative tiers above the people who must move. The unresolved tension is that the tier holding the legal duty to respond holds neither the money nor the staff to prepare, and the tier holding both is too distant to run an evacuation. Whether that changes is visible in one measurable thing over the next monsoon: whether any Himalayan State publishes household-level reach data for its warning system, instead of counting alerts issued.

    Disaster Management in India

    1. Where the mandate sits: The Ministry of Home Affairs oversees disaster management through its Disaster Management Division, which coordinates response, relief and preparedness for natural and human-made disasters, excluding drought and epidemics.
    2. A four-tier institutional structure: The National Disaster Management Authority is chaired by the Prime Minister, State Disaster Management Authorities by Chief Ministers and District Disaster Management Authorities by District Collectors, with primary responsibility resting on State governments.
    3. A fund architecture with four pillars: The National and State Disaster Response Funds finance relief, and the National and State Disaster Mitigation Funds finance risk-reduction projects.
    4. How resilience is defined: The Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005, defines disaster resilience as the capacity of a system or community exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing, so as to maintain an acceptable level of functioning.

    Laws and Rules Governing Disaster Management

    1. Disaster Management Act, 2005: It establishes structures and processes for disaster management at national, State, district and local levels, and mandates the creation of the National, State and District Disaster Management Authorities.
    2. Disaster Management (Amendment) Act, 2025: It modernises the 2005 framework for urban risk, climate extremes and data-driven response.
    3. It allows States to set up Urban Disaster Management Authorities in State capitals and Municipal Corporation cities. Eg. Karnataka’s authority for the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike.
    4. It mandates national and State disaster databases covering risk assessments and real-time disaster data.
    5. It gives statutory status to the National Crisis Management Committee and the High-Level Committee.
    6. Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992: Article 243G empowers Panchayati Raj Institutions to prepare plans and implement schemes, and the Eleventh Schedule places relief work and maintenance of community assets among their functions.

    Government Initiatives for Disaster Preparedness

    1. National Disaster Management Plan: Issued in 2016 and revised in 2019, it is India’s first all-hazard plan aligned to the Sendai Framework.
    2. Disaster Management Plan of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj: Framed under Section 37 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, it builds community-based planning from the village to the district panchayat.
    3. Aapda Mitra: It trains community volunteers in first response, search and rescue in disaster-prone districts.
    4. SACHET and the Common Alerting Protocol: They push multi-hazard alerts to every phone in an affected geography from one standardised feed.
    5. Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure: Launched by India in 2019, it is an international organisation of over 50 countries working on disaster-proofing critical infrastructure.

    Key Facts about Disaster Risk Reduction

    1. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-2030: Adopted at Sendai in Japan, it carries four priorities for action and seven global targets.
    2. The United Nations custodian: The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction anchors global disaster risk reduction and runs the Sendai Framework Monitor for reporting against the seven targets.
    3. India’s stated vision: The Prime Minister’s Ten-Point Agenda on Disaster Risk Reduction was announced in 2016 at the Asian Ministerial Conference.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 15.0 marks] What is disaster resilience? How is it determined? Describe various elements of a resilience framework. Also mention the global targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).”

  • Minister subsidy row: Horticulture board pauses fresh scheme applications

    Why in the News

    The National Horticulture Board has suspended acceptance of fresh applications for grant of clearance under two of its subsidy schemes for one month, with effect from 4 September 2026. The suspension follows an investigation reporting that a Minister of State in the Union Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare, and the wife, mother and son of a serving Secretary in the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, had availed subsidy for cucumber farms under one of those schemes. The minister returned Rs 99 lakh of subsidy to the board. The government then revised the scheme guidelines, barring holders of public office from assistance and widening the definition of a family. The contest is between a subsidy designed for open, credit-linked access and an eligibility filter that was written only after the beneficiaries became public.

    What is the Scheme for Development of Commercial Horticulture through Production and Post-Harvest Management of Horticulture Produce?

    1. Purpose: The scheme promotes commercial farming of horticultural crops on a large scale, run for profit rather than for subsistence.
    2. Crops covered: It covers capsicum, cucumber and tomato, along with eight varieties of flowers including rose, lilium and chrysanthemum.
    3. Subsidy design: It offers a maximum subsidy of 50 per cent of the project cost, capped at Rs 1 crore per family.
    4. The clearance gate: A grant of clearance (GoC) from the board is mandatory before an applicant can draw the credit-linked back-ended subsidy for a project, meaning the money is released against a bank-financed project after it is completed.

    What did the investigation find?

    1. A serving minister drew the subsidy: A Minister of State in the Union Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare availed subsidy under the scheme for cucumber farms.
    2. A serving secretary’s relatives drew it too: The wife, mother and son of the officer currently serving as Secretary, Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, availed subsidy under the same scheme.
    3. The money went back: The minister returned Rs 99 lakh of subsidy to the National Horticulture Board after the report was published.

    What did the revised guidelines change?

    1. A bar on public office holders: With effect from 21 August 2026, holders of constitutional posts, serving ministers, MPs, MLAs, mayors, district panchayat chiefs and government employees cannot avail financial assistance under National Horticulture Board schemes.
    2. A wider definition of family: The term now covers the applicant’s spouse, father, mother, sons and daughters.
    3. What the old definition left open: The earlier definition covered the husband, wife and dependent minor children, so adult children and parents of the same applicant fell outside the family cap and could apply separately.

    Why has the board stopped taking fresh applications?

    1. Two schemes are covered: The suspension applies to the Scheme for Development of Commercial Horticulture through Production and Post-Harvest Management of Horticulture Produce, and to the Capital Investment Subsidy Scheme for Construction, Expansion and Modernization of Cold Storages.
    2. The stated ground is verification and system repair: The circular records that the pause is meant to allow orderly implementation of the revised guidelines, verification of pending cases and updating of the online application system.
    3. The online window is shut: The facility for submitting fresh grant of clearance applications under both schemes remains unavailable for the period of suspension.
    4. Pending cases continue: Applications submitted before the suspension began are dealt with under the revised guidelines and the board’s standing instructions.
    5. No resumption date is fixed: The board will notify the date on which receipt of fresh applications resumes.

    Challenges to the National Horticulture Board’s subsidy schemes

    1. A credit-linked back-ended subsidy favours the bankable applicant: Assistance is released only after a bank finances the project and the project is completed, which excludes an applicant with no collateral and no lending relationship. Eg. Small and marginal farmers operate more than 86 per cent of India’s holdings and receive a far smaller share of institutional agricultural credit.
      The Fix: Route a defined share of the scheme’s outlay through Farmer Producer Organisations, so smallholders reach the credit-linked component collectively.
    2. Cold storage capacity built under capital subsidy is concentrated: Capital assistance has produced capacity skewed towards a few States and towards a single commodity, leaving fruit and vegetable growers elsewhere without storage. Eg. Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal hold a large share of India’s cold storage capacity, and most of it serves potato.
      The Fix: Weight the capital subsidy towards multi-commodity chambers and ripening units in districts with an identified storage deficit.
    3. Production assistance runs ahead of post-harvest capacity: Subsidy that funds cultivation without a linked pack house, grading line or refrigerated transport leaves the added output exposed to the same losses. Eg. Fruits and vegetables record the highest post-harvest losses among agricultural commodities in the loss assessment studies commissioned for the Ministry of Food Processing Industries.
      The Fix: Make clearance for a production project conditional on a linked post-harvest component within the same sanction.

    Conclusion

    The status is a subsidy window closed by its own administrator as the eligibility test behind it is rewritten. The board has bought a month to align its online system with a definition of family and a bar on office holders that did not exist when the disputed sanctions were made. What decides whether the episode produced a repair or only a pause is the resumption notification. The test is whether the reopened application form carries an automated eligibility check against the new definition, or whether it returns to accepting a declaration and verifying it afterwards.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS3, 15.0 marks] Assess the role of National Horticulture Mission (NHM) in boosting the production, productivity and income of horticulture farms. How far has it succeeded in increasing the income of farmers?”

  • Government could have foreseen the spike in sugar prices

    Why in the News

    Retail sugar prices surged to unprecedented levels in August, and the Union government has responded by allowing duty-free imports of 10 lakh metric tonnes of raw sugar until 31 October 2026, the first such window in a decade. The retail price rose 41 per cent, from Rs 46.27 per kilogram on 26 August 2025 to a high of Rs 65.05 on the same date this year. The government attributed the rise to festive season demand, hoarding, lower than expected production, tightening global supplies and weather related crop damage. An examination of the monthly price series and of the season’s production estimates shows that the tightening was signalled well in advance, which moves the question from what caused the spike to why it was not anticipated.

    Why does the government’s own explanation not hold?

    1. Five factors were cited: The rise was attributed to increased demand ahead of the festive season, hoarding, lower than expected production, tightening global supplies and weather related crop damage.
    2. The festive season argument fails on the data: Monthly all-India average retail prices since January 2016 show this year’s increase as an outlier, unseen ahead of or during any earlier festive season.
    3. The remaining factors were monitorable: Global supply pressure and the gap between estimated and actual production are variables the government tracks continuously.

    What warnings were available before August?

    1. A global price signal: In the first week of August, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations reported that its Sugar Price Index, which tracks international export prices for sugar, had increased by 5.6 per cent in July, indicating the possibility of a further rise.
    2. The FAO named the causes: It attributed the increase to concerns over crop yields in the European Union from hot weather, and to El Nino related weather conditions affecting production in key Asian countries.
    3. Brazil was the larger signal: Expectations of lower sugar production in Brazil, the world’s largest sugar producer, pointed to pressure on global supplies.
    4. The assessment: On these indications, the tightening of domestic sugar availability was not entirely unforeseeable.

    Where did the production estimates go wrong?

    1. A large estimation gap: Initial estimates for 2025-26 sugar production were around 343 lakh tonnes, against a current estimate of around 306 lakh tonnes.
    2. Policy was set on the higher number: Exports were allowed and ethanol diversion targets were fixed on the basis of those initial estimates.
    3. The consequence: When actual production turned out lower, domestic availability became tighter than anticipated.
    4. The estimates ignored the State level trend: They were set high against a production trend that was declining or fluctuating in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra, which together account for 71 per cent of cane and 65 per cent of sugar production.

    What does the longer production trend show?

    1. The peak is four years old: All-India sugarcane production has declined since 2022-23, when it reached its highest level of 490.5 million metric tonnes.
    2. The decline was acknowledged: A reply to the Rajya Sabha in March 2025 recorded the fall, and held that production was still sufficient to cater to domestic needs.
    3. There is little export cushion: Of all sugar produced, 83 per cent is used for domestic consumption.
    4. Import dependence has one address: India’s sugar imports have predominantly come from Brazil.

    Is ethanol diversion the cause?

    1. The allegation: The Opposition attributed the price rise to the diversion of cane for ethanol production.
    2. The short term assessment: Ethanol diversion is not identified as a key reason for the current spike, and its weight over the longer term is a separate question.
    3. The feedstock has shifted: In recent years maize has occupied a major share of the feedstock for India’s ethanol blending, a change from the earlier heavy dependence on sugarcane.
    4. The historical test: No comparable price surge occurred in the years when ethanol production relied heavily on sugarcane.

    Challenges to sugar price management

    1. Cane pricing is administered and delinked from sugar realisation: The Centre fixes a Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) for cane and several States announce a higher State Advised Price, so mills accumulate cane arrears whenever sugar prices fall. Eg. Uttar Pradesh has for years announced a State Advised Price above the central FRP.
      The Fix: Move to a revenue sharing formula that links the cane price to realisation from sugar and its by-products, as the Rangarajan Committee recommended in 2012.
    2. Trade controls swing between extremes: Export permissions and stock limits are switched on and off in reaction to price, which destroys planning certainty for mills and for farmers. Eg. India restricted sugar exports from the 2023-24 season after two seasons of large shipments.
      The Fix: Publish a rule based trigger that ties export and import decisions to a stated closing stock norm rather than to the price of the month.
    3. The crop concentrates water use in stressed basins: Sugarcane is among the most water intensive crops grown in India and takes a disproportionate share of irrigation where it is dominant. Eg. Cane cultivation in Maharashtra’s Marathwada region draws heavily on irrigation in years of deficient rainfall.
      The Fix: Make drip irrigation a condition for new mill licences and for cane area expansion in water deficit districts.

    Conclusion

    Prices have eased from the August peak and the import window is still open. The unresolved problem is not the import decision but the estimate that preceded it. What would change the outcome is a mid-season revision point at which export and diversion permissions are re-set against actual crushing data rather than pre-season projections. Without it, the next surprise in the cane crop will again be discovered at the retail counter.

    Back2Basics: Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme

    1. What it is: A programme of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas under which oil marketing companies blend ethanol into petrol before sale.
    2. Launch and target: It was launched in 2003 and was later given a target of 20 per cent blending, which the government advanced from 2030 to the 2025-26 ethanol supply year.
    3. Permitted feedstocks: Ethanol is procured from sugarcane juice and syrup, B-heavy and C-heavy molasses, damaged food grains, surplus rice and maize.
    4. Why it interacts with sugar: Procurement prices are fixed administratively for each feedstock, and the quantity of cane and molasses that may be diverted to ethanol in a season is regulated by the Department of Food and Public Distribution.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: Statement I: Of the two major ethanol producers in the world, i.e., Brazil and the United States of America, the former produces more ethanol than the latter. Statement II: Unlike in the United States of America, where corn is the principal feedstock for ethanol production, sugarcane is the principal feedstock for ethanol production in Brazil. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct ANSWER: (d)”

  • Behind Nepal’s compensation demand for devastating flood

    Why in the News

    Nepal has written to the United Nations fund for responding to loss and damage after a catastrophic flash flood killed more than 1,000 people. The country had already decided to shift its diplomatic position, seeking ‘compensation’ for natural disasters in place of aid. Its Foreign Minister framed the claim as a matter of legal and moral liability rather than charity, and named China, the United States and India as major industrial emitters carrying a historical responsibility to compensate vulnerable nations. The contest is over what a country with negligible emissions is owed and by whom. Aid is discretionary and can be refused; compensation asserts a liability that the international climate regime has never accepted.

    What is the loss and damage fund?

    1. What it does: The fund was set up in 2022 to help countries respond to the economic hits from extreme events, in addition to financing mitigation and adaptation.
    2. What has been promised: Around USD 822 million has been pledged to it.
    3. What is actually available: Around USD 350 million is allotted for disbursement.
    4. How it is financed: Contributions are voluntary. The United Arab Emirates has provided USD 100 million, and much of the remaining contribution has come from Europe.

    What happened in Nepal?

    1. The scale: More than 1,000 people are dead and thousands remain missing nearly ten days later, with whole villages, bridges and roads swept away.
    2. Two amplifiers: The impact was heightened by heavy infrastructure development by China in Tibet, which has affected the Himalayas, and by climate change.
    3. The range as a water store: The Himalayas are referred to as the third pole, given their huge reservoirs of ice and water.
    4. A long flagged risk: Melting of Himalayan glaciers has been observed for years, with climatologists warning of severe consequences.

    Who has actually caused the accumulated emissions?

    1. The United States leads: It is the leading contributor at 25 per cent of the CO2 accumulated in the atmosphere, which is the key cause of climate change.
    2. Europe and China follow: Europe is next at around 20 per cent, with China now fast catching up at 15 per cent of the global stock.
    3. India’s share of the stock is small: India’s contribution is under 4 per cent.
    4. India’s per capita emissions are half the average: India emits around 2 tonnes of CO2 per person a year, against a global average of 4.5 tonnes.

    Why has Nepal replaced aid with compensation?

    1. The stated ground: Nepal’s greenhouse gas emissions are negligible, and its position is that it is bearing the consequences of a problem it did not create.
    2. The causal claim: The rapid melting of glaciers and the resulting mountain floods are presented as direct consequences of global climate change.
    3. The legal framing: The Foreign Minister described the claim as a matter of legal and moral liability rather than charity.
    4. The practical driver: The size of the rehabilitation requirement makes access to international funding necessary, and seeking solidarity in place of aid suits a young and globally aware government.

    Why did the demand name India?

    1. The three named emitters: The Foreign Minister named China as the world’s top emitter, the United States as second and India as third.
    2. Current output, not accumulated stock: That ranking rests on current annual emissions, which places India very differently from where its share of the accumulated stock places it.
    3. A balancing act: The inclusion of India alongside the two largest emitters is read as Nepal’s practice of balancing its two neighbours.
    4. The walk back: Nepal’s Prime Minister thanked India and China for their assistance after the floods. The Foreign Minister later said the issue was not about shifting blame to one country or another but about working together.

    Does the shift from aid to compensation gain anything?

    1. The two words carry different obligations: Aid is offered at the giver’s discretion. Compensation asserts a claim the payer is obliged to meet.
    2. The fund is built on the first: Contributions to the loss and damage fund are voluntary, so a liability framing has no forum inside the fund that could compel a payment.
    3. The diplomatic cost is immediate: The claim was softened within days, once the neighbours it named turned out to be the ones supplying relief.
    4. The gain is agenda setting: A liability framing raises the political price of underfunding the mechanism. It does not create a right to be paid.

    Challenges to the loss and damage fund

    1. The regime expressly excludes liability: Loss and damage is recognised under Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, and the decision adopting the agreement records that Article 8 does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation. Eg. Small island states pressed for a liability provision in 2015 and accepted its exclusion in order to secure the agreement.
      The Fix: Negotiate an agreed needs based replenishment cycle, so predictable funding substitutes for a legal claim that will not be conceded.
    2. The hosting arrangement is contested: The fund was operationalised at the 2023 Conference of the Parties in Dubai with the World Bank as interim host for four years, over developing country objections about the Bank’s governance and its fees. Eg. Developing country negotiators sought an independent secretariat outside the Bank’s board structure.
      The Fix: Fix a firm date for the review of the hosting arrangement and publish the fee and governance terms against which it will be judged.
    3. Access is slowest where need is highest: Climate funds require accreditation of a national entity and detailed project proposals, which the least developed countries take years to complete. Eg. National implementing entities in several least developed countries have waited years for Green Climate Fund accreditation.
      The Fix: Create a rapid disbursement window that releases a fixed sum on a declared national disaster, without a project proposal.

    Conclusion

    The claim Nepal made and then softened will outlast the flood that produced it. The climate regime has built a fund for loss and damage without the liability that would make any claim on it enforceable, and a country facing a rehabilitation bill it cannot carry will keep pressing at that gap. What is worth watching is not whether the demand is repeated but whether the next replenishment round ties contributions to assessed need rather than to donor discretion. Until it does, a small mountain state’s only real leverage is the moral argument it was persuaded to withdraw.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS2, 15.0 marks] Clean energy is the order of the day. Describe briefly India’s changing policy towards climate change in various international fora in the context of geopolitics.”

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