💥Mains Ready By December. Smash Mains & Smash PYQ Admissions Open

Search results for: “”

  • Smash PYQ 2027 | Open Sessions Are Here!

    Smash PYQ 2027 | Open Sessions Are Here!

    Get a first-hand experience of Smash PYQ 2027 before you enroll. Join our FREE Open Sessions to understand the approach, explore how PYQs can shape your Mains preparation, clear your doubts, and see how the program can help you become Mains-ready for UPSC CSE 2027.

    📅 Open Session 1: 15th September | 5 PM
    📅 Open Session 2: 16th September | 5 PM

    Join Online & Offline — FREE for Everyone

    Experience the sessions first, understand the methodology, and then decide if Smash PYQ 2027 is the right fit for your preparation.


    Smash PYQ 2027 is CivilsDaily’s live answer-writing programme. Nine years of PYQs, 600+ questions, all solved live by Shubham Sir. Starts 15 September. You write, not just read. Five live lectures every week. Microthemes based coverage of 200+ core themes, X-Factor Notes across 15 subjects, and toppers’ answers that show you exactly what scores.

    Join online over Zoom or offline at our Delhi centre. First two classes are free. Sit in, see the method, then decide. Access runs till Mains 2027.

    Experience the sessions first, understand the methodology, and then decide if Smash PYQ 2027 is the right fit for your preparation.

  • Terror’s changing face, India’s counter-terror strategy

    Terror’s changing face, India’s counter-terror strategy

    Why in the News

    India has unveiled PRAHAAR, its first comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy, which sets a national framework for preventing and responding to terrorist activity and radicalisation through coordinated “whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches. The policy follows Operation Sindoor, the strikes of 6 and 7 May on the Pakistan based terror network launched after the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, and follows the three declarations India issued immediately after that operation. The first of those declarations ended the stated era of restraint, the second classified any future act of cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan as an “act of war”, and the third removed Pakistani nuclear blackmail as a restraining factor. The tension is that the doctrine India has hardened is built for a state sponsor with a return address, while the threat itself has fragmented into lone wolf attackers, autonomous cells and drone, cyber and artificial intelligence enabled methods that a retaliatory strike does not reach.

    What is PRAHAAR?

    1. PRAHAAR as a national policy: PRAHAAR is India’s first comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy, unveiled on 23 February 2026.
    2. Scope of the framework: It sets out a national counter terrorism framework for preventing and responding to terrorist activities and to radicalisation.
    3. Whole of government and whole of society approach: It works through coordinated “whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches, so prevention is not left to security agencies alone.

    How has the form of terrorism changed in 25 years?

    1. The organisational form has fragmented: Large terror groups run by single leaders, such as al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden or the Islamic State under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi with its call for an Islamic Caliphate, have given way to smaller and more autonomous entities.
    2. The attacker is now often solitary: Lone wolf attacks are becoming the norm, which removes the network that intelligence collection is designed to detect.
    3. Drones, cyber capability and artificial intelligence: Drones, cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence are now used to perpetrate terror.
    4. Counter terrorism use of the same technologies: Those technologies are used by the nations combating terrorism as well, so capability advantage is contested rather than assured.

    What is a lone wolf attack?

    1. The definition: A lone wolf attack is an attack planned and executed by a single individual, or by a pair acting alone, who belongs to no organisation and takes no operational direction from one.
    2. How the attacker is produced: Radicalisation runs through online propaganda rather than through recruitment by a handler, so the individual adopts a group’s cause without ever joining its structure. Eg. Self radicalised modules assembled around professionals, rather than around infiltrators, in recent hinterland cases.
    3. Why detection fails: Intelligence collection works by intercepting communication between conspirators and by penetrating networks, and an attacker who communicates with nobody generates neither signal.
    4. Why a retaliation doctrine does not reach it: A cross border response needs attribution to a sponsoring state, and an individual acting alone offers no camp, handler or command node to strike.

    Why did the early Indian response stay passive, and which attacks fell inside that period?

    1. Assassination of a former Prime Minister, 1991: The assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on 21 May 1991 at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu came while cross border terror was only beginning in Kashmir.
    2. Internal detection failed repeatedly: The March 1993 Mumbai serial blasts killed over 250 people in 13 coordinated blasts, and the synchronised blasts across Coimbatore in February 1998 exposed the inadequacy of internal security mechanisms.
    3. Pakistan’s direct role was first exposed by a hijack: The hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 on 24 December 1999 forced India to release the Pakistan based terrorists Ahmed Omar Sheikh and Masood Azhar in exchange for more than 160 civilian hostages.
    4. Operation Parakram and its outcome: The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001 triggered a large scale military mobilisation under Operation Parakram, and after almost two years of standoff the disengagement took place with no direct punishment on Pakistan.
    5. Nuclear parity was the restraint: With both countries holding nuclear weapons, the threat of escalation drew the international community in to cool tempers each time.
    6. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the absence of retaliation: The 26/11 Mumbai attacks of November 2008, which brought the world’s solidarity with India’s fight against cross border terrorism, produced no military action against Pakistan.
    7. The Red Fort attack of 2000: An Army garrison within the Red Fort was targeted on 22 December 2000 by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists, killing three soldiers.
    8. Delhi market blasts of 2005: Over 60 people were killed in serial blasts across Delhi markets including Sarojini Nagar and Paharganj in October 2005.
    9. Delhi commercial district blasts of 2008: Multiple blasts hit Connaught Place, Greater Kailash and Karol Bagh in September 2008, months before the Mumbai attacks.
    10. The Delhi High Court blast of 2011: A briefcase bomb outside the Delhi High Court on 7 September 2011 killed 15 people, claimed by Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HUJI), an al-Qaeda affiliated group largely based in Pakistan.
    11. Akshardham, Varanasi and Pune attacks: The 2002 Akshardham Temple attack, the 2006 Varanasi serial blasts and the 2010 German Bakery blast in Pune are part of the same record.
    12. Proof did not produce a response: In each of these cases India chose not to respond directly and decisively, even after conclusive proof of Pakistan’s support.

    What changed when the fight moved across the border?

    1. The Uri attack and the 2016 surgical strikes: The JeM attack on an Army camp at Uri in Kashmir on 18 September 2016 led to the first cross border surgical strikes on 28 and 29 September.
    2. Message conveyed by the surgical strikes: They sent a message and served as a statement of intent that terror would not go unpunished.
    3. The Balakot air strike of 2019: After the attack on a Central Reserve Police Force convoy at Pulwama on 14 February 2019, the Indian Air Force struck a JeM terror camp at Balakot, the first time it had crossed into Pakistani airspace to hit a terror target.
    4. Operation Sindoor, 2025: Operation Sindoor was launched on 6 and 7 May after the Pahalgam attack, and in 96 hours the leaders and headquarters of the LeT and JeM networks were destroyed and Pakistani military assets were hit.

    What is the four fold strategy proposed from here?

    1. Elimination of the residual network: Continue to hunt down and eliminate the remnants of the terror network inside the country, particularly in Kashmir.
    2. Pre emptive action across the Line of Control: Take pre emptive military action against any potential terror threat building across the Line of Control (LoC), including at terrorist launch pads, which years of experience and an embedded intelligence network make possible.
    3. The de radicalisation programme: Run an exhaustive de radicalisation programme that motivates young people towards the mainstream and makes joining or supporting a terror outfit unattractive and prohibitively costly.
    4. Terror financing: Take all necessary steps to cut off terror financing, in close coordination with friendly countries.

    What is India pressing for at the multilateral level?

    1. The charge of double standards: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Bishkek on 1 September the Prime Minister said, “We must send a strong message to countries that use terrorism as an instrument of policy and provide safe haven and support to terrorists that terrorism can never be a strategic asset for anyone.”
    2. A named attack entered a group declaration: The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi included an exclusive paragraph on the Pahalgam attack in the Delhi Declaration.
    3. Effect of a grievance carried in multilateral text: A specific Indian grievance is now carried in the text of a multi country declaration rather than only in national statements.

    Challenges to India’s counter terrorism strategy

    1. A retaliation doctrine has no target in a lone wolf attack: An “act of war” classification presumes an attributable state sponsor, and a self radicalised individual acting alone gives no address to strike. Eg. Self radicalised modules assembled around professionals, rather than infiltrators, in recent hinterland cases.
      The Fix: Pair the declaratory doctrine with a published attribution standard, so the threshold of evidence that triggers a cross border response is fixed in advance rather than argued after each attack.
    2. Police and public order are State subjects: A national policy has to be executed through State police forces that the Union does not control, which is where coordination breaks down. Eg. The delay in National Security Guard deployment during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
      The Fix: Route PRAHAAR’s obligations through a standing Centre State counter terrorism council with State specific implementation timelines, rather than through advisories.
    3. Intelligence remains fragmented across agencies: Multiple collection agencies without seamless real time sharing means a warning held by one is not actionable by another. Eg. Intelligence fusion is attempted through the Multi Agency Centre and the National Intelligence Grid, which depend on voluntary feeds from database holding agencies.
      The Fix: Give a single fusion centre statutory authority to task and receive feeds, on the model of a national counter terrorism centre, so sharing is an obligation rather than a courtesy.
    4. De radicalisation has no measurable output: A programme aimed at intent rather than at incidents cannot be judged by attack counts, and India runs no published evaluation of one. Eg. Online influence of the kind that drove youth radicalisation in Kashmir operates outside any programme’s reach.
      The Fix: Fix published indicators for the programme, such as recruitment attempts intercepted and cases of disengagement sustained over a stated period, and report them annually.
    5. Terror financing has moved to channels outside the banking system: Hawala, counterfeit currency and cryptocurrency route funds without touching a reportable transaction. Eg. Informal channel financing was traced in the ISIS linked Padgha module.
      The Fix: Bring virtual digital asset service providers fully under reporting obligations to the Financial Intelligence Unit India, so the fastest growing channel is monitored on the same terms as banks.
    6. There is no agreed international definition of terrorism: The absence of one lets states label selectively and refuse cooperation on legal grounds. Eg. Repeated holds placed on listings under the United Nations Security Council 1267 sanctions committee.
      The Fix: Press the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which India first proposed in 1996, to a vote rather than leaving it in open ended negotiation.

    Conclusion

    The doctrine India adopted after Operation Sindoor answers one form of the threat well and leaves the other untouched. A declared willingness to retaliate raises the cost of sponsoring an attack from across the border; it does nothing about an attacker who was recruited online and never crossed anything. PRAHAAR is the first instrument that addresses the second half, which is why its prevention and radicalisation components, rather than its enforcement components, are the part worth watching. The marker is whether the policy produces named nodal responsibilities and reported outcomes, or remains a framework document that the next attack is measured against.

    Terrorism in India

    1. Definition of terrorism: Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of violence, to instil fear and achieve political, ideological or religious goals.
    2. The statutory definition: Under Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, a terrorist act is any act intended to threaten India’s sovereignty, security or unity, or to create terror through violence, explosives or disruption of essential services.
    3. The four recognised strands in the Indian context: Cross border terrorism driven by Pakistan based groups in Jammu and Kashmir and by Khalistani networks, North East insurgencies run by ethno nationalist groups such as NSCN and ULFA, Left Wing Extremism across the Red Corridor, and hinterland terrorism by modules operating outside traditional conflict zones.
    4. The direction of change: The terror and organised crime nexus supplies funding, arms and logistics, and technology acts as a force multiplier through drones, encrypted platforms and 3D printing. Eg. The Houthi drone attack on Saudi Aramco in 2019.

    Institutional Architecture and Initiatives Against Terrorism

    1. Multi Agency Centre and Cyber Multi Agency Centre: Fuse intelligence inputs across central and State agencies.
    2. National Intelligence Grid: Networks databases held by different departments to give agencies real time access.
    3. Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre: Acts as the nodal point against cybercrime with a citizen reporting route. Eg. The 1930 helpline.
    4. Border management systems: Smart fencing under the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System plugs infiltration gaps, backed by a layered coastal security grid.
    5. Surrender and rehabilitation policies: Pull cadres out of insurgency through reintegration rather than through prosecution alone.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] Terrorism is a global scourge. How has it manifested in India? Elaborate with contemporary examples. What are the counter measures adopted by the State? Explain.”

  • CAZRI moth bean varieties show resilience in an El Niño year [MENTION]

    Why in News

    Moth bean varieties developed by the Central Arid Zone Research Institute (CAZRI) performed with resilience during an El Niño year. El Niño is the warm phase of the Pacific ocean and atmosphere cycle that often suppresses the Indian monsoon.

    Static Context

    CAZRI is an ICAR institute at Jodhpur, Rajasthan, focused on arid zone agriculture and desertification research. Moth bean is a hardy arid legume grown in the rainfed drylands of western Rajasthan and Gujarat. It tolerates drought and poor soils, which makes it valuable for climate resilient cropping. Release specific yield figures could not be verified, as the PIB detail page did not resolve this run. The exam value here is the institute and the crop, not the unverified numbers.

    Prelims angle

    Place CAZRI at Jodhpur under ICAR. Recognise moth bean as a drought tolerant arid pulse. Recall that El Niño tends to weaken the southwest monsoon.

    Mains angle

    GS3, dryland agriculture and climate resilience. A supporting example for answers on drought resistant crops and rainfed farming.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2012] Consider the following crops of India: 1. Groundnut 2. Sesamum 3. Pearl millet Which of the above is / are predominantly rainfed crop/crops?
    (a) 1 and 2 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (d)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309690&reg=3&lang=1

  • Dryland Congress 2026 concludes with the Delhi Declaration on Drylands

    Why in News

    The Dryland Congress 2026 concluded in New Delhi with the adoption of the Delhi Declaration on Dryland, also styled the 3D. The Congress ran from 10 to 12 September 2026 at the National Agricultural Science Complex, New Delhi.

    Core facts

    The Congress was organised by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). It gathered over 800 experts from Asia, Africa and the Americas. The event marked 50 years of the ICAR and ICRISAT partnership. It deliberated on six themes: breeding, climate resilience, nutrition and markets, farming systems, seed systems, and gender and youth inclusion. Drylands span about 45% of the world’s land surface and support over two billion people.

    Static Context

    ICRISAT is a research centre headquartered at Hyderabad, working on crops of the semi arid tropics such as sorghum, pearl millet, chickpea, pigeonpea and groundnut. ICAR is the apex body for coordinating agricultural research and education in India, under the Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare. Dryland and rainfed farming is supported through the Rainfed Area Development (RAD) programme under the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA), which promotes Integrated Farming Systems (IFS). Land degradation in drylands connects to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

    Prelims angle

    Distinguish ICAR (Indian apex research body) from ICRISAT (international centre at Hyderabad). Link RAD and IFS to the NMSA. Associate desertification with the UNCCD. Know the semi arid tropic crops.

    Mains angle

    GS3, agriculture and cropping systems. Frame dryland and rainfed agriculture as central to crop diversification, climate resilience and farmer incomes, and the value of cooperation among developing countries in seed and breeding research.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which among the following is/are the objective(s) of the Rainfed Area Development (RAD) initiative under the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA)?
    1. Encouraging monoculture in rainfed areas
    2. Increasing rice cultivation in irrigated regions
    3. Enhancing productivity and minimising climatic risks through Integrated Farming Systems (IFS)
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 1 and 2
    (c) 2 and 3
    (d) 3 only
    Answer: (d)”

    “[2021, GS3, 15 marks] What are the present challenges before crop diversification? How do emerging technologies provide an opportunity for crop diversification?”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309628&reg=3&lang=1

  • India to host the World Circular Economy Forum 2026 [MENTION]

    Why in News

    India will host the World Circular Economy Forum (WCEF) 2026 at Gandhinagar from 15 to 18 September 2026. The theme is “Circular Economy: Transition for People and Prosperity”.

    Static Context

    A circular economy keeps materials in use through reuse, repair, refurbishment and recycling, which cuts raw material inputs, waste and greenhouse gas emissions. The WCEF is convened by the Finnish Innovation Fund (Sitra) with partners. The Indian host is the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC). India’s related domestic instruments include Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) rules for plastic, electronic and battery waste, and the mission on resource efficiency. This item is a MENTION because the forum begins after this run. Its exam value is the circular economy concept and the fact that India hosts the WCEF.

    Prelims angle

    Link the circular economy to reduced raw material use, reduced waste and lower emissions. Associate EPR with waste categories. Note India as the WCEF 2026 host at Gandhinagar.

    Mains angle

    GS3, environment and resource efficiency. Frame the circular economy as a route to decoupling growth from material and emission intensity, and India’s positioning as a convening venue on sustainability.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:
    Statement I: Circular economy reduces the emissions of greenhouse gases.
    Statement II: Circular economy reduces the use of raw materials as inputs.
    Statement III: Circular economy reduces wastage in the production process.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement II and Statement III are correct and both of them explain Statement I
    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement I explains Statement II
    (c) Only one of the Statements II and III is correct and that explains Statement I
    (d) Neither Statement II nor Statement III is correct
    Answer: (a)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309702&reg=3&lang=1

  • BRICS backs an Expert Group on Traditional Medicine [Examples]

    Why in News

    BRICS members agreed to support an Expert Working Group on Traditional Medicine and called for cooperation grounded in evidence. AYUSH stands for Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy, the traditional and complementary systems of medicine promoted by the Ministry of AYUSH.

    Core facts

    The outcome advances a standing BRICS track on Traditional, Complementary and Integrative Medicine (TCIM). The proposed expert group aims to build a shared, evidence based approach to traditional medicine across member states. The nodal ministry on the Indian side is the Ministry of AYUSH.

    Static Context

    India hosts the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Traditional Medicine Centre at Jamnagar, Gujarat, established under a host country agreement with the WHO. The Ministry of AYUSH signed a project collaboration agreement with the WHO on traditional and complementary medicine. Traditional medicine cooperation is a recurring instrument of India’s health diplomacy within plurilateral groupings.

    Prelims angle

    Remember the full form of AYUSH, the location of the WHO Global Traditional Medicine Centre at Jamnagar, and that BRICS runs sectoral working groups beyond trade and finance.

    Mains angle

    GS2, groupings and India’s soft power. Useful as an illustration of how India uses sectoral cooperation within BRICS to project traditional knowledge systems and health diplomacy.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files for traditional medicine cooperation. Closest tracked Microthemes are GroupingsXRegional (International Relations) for the BRICS dimension and SchemeXHealth (Governance) for the health systems dimension.”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309695&reg=3&lang=1

  • 18th BRICS Summit concludes in New Delhi with the New Delhi Declaration

    Why in News

    The 18th BRICS Summit was held in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026 under India’s BRICS Chairship. The grouping adopted the New Delhi Declaration on 12 September 2026.

    Core facts

    BRICS is a plurilateral grouping originally of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, now expanded to 11 members. India’s presidency theme is “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”. The PIB Backgrounder records the bloc’s weight as 49.5% of global population, 40% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 26% of global trade. Named institutional outcomes across ministerial tracks include a BRICS Centre of Excellence on Agro Ecology and a Digital Agriculture Network, a BRICS Mission for Healthy Lifestyle (2026 to 2029), BRICS CONNECT for Skilling, a Smart Grids and Energy Storage Digital Centre of Excellence, an MSME Cooperation Portal, a Startup Innovation Fund and a Logistics Supply Chain Cooperation Framework. Alongside the summit, the BRICS Bharat Innovates Exposition at Bharat Mandapam showcased 37 Indian deep technology startups.

    Static Context

    The first BRICS summit was held in 2009 at Yekaterinburg, Russia, as BRIC. South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS. The bloc runs the New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai, and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a currency swap facility for members facing balance of payments pressure. The 2014 Fortaleza Declaration established the NDB. India previously chaired the grouping in 2012, 2016 and 2021. Membership expansion has added Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia in recent cycles, with a separate partner country category.

    Prelims angle

    Track the host city and chair of each recent summit, the members added in the latest expansion, the theme wording, and the two BRICS institutions (NDB and CRA) with their headquarters and functions. Fortaleza links to the NDB.

    Mains angle

    GS2, groupings involving or affecting India. Frame BRICS as a counterweight in global governance that amplifies the Global South, its role in multilateral reform, and the friction between expansion and cohesion. India’s bilateral engagements with African and Global South leaders on the summit sidelines illustrate the outreach dimension.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements with regard to BRICS:
    I. The 16th BRICS Summit was held under the Chairship of Russia in Kazan.
    II. Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS.
    III. The theme of the 16th BRICS Summit was Strengthening Multiculturalism for Just Global Development and Security.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) I and II
    (b) II and III
    (c) I and III
    (d) I only
    Answer: (a)”

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South. Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309642&reg=3&lang=1 and the BRICS PIB Backgrounder https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=159946&ModuleId=3&reg=3&lang=1

  • Incentive Scheme for Promotion of Domestic PNG Connections

    Why in News

    The Press Information Bureau (PIB) issued a PIB Backgrounder on the Incentive Scheme for Promotion of Domestic Piped Natural Gas (PNG) Connections. Piped Natural Gas (PNG) is cooking gas supplied to homes through a pipeline network rather than in cylinders.

    Core facts

    The scheme incentivises City Gas Distribution (CGD) entities to expand domestic PNG connections. City Gas Distribution (CGD) is the network that retails natural gas to households, commercial units and vehicles in a defined geographical area. The nodal ministry is the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. Release specific outlay and connection figures could not be verified, as the PIB detail page did not resolve this run.

    Static Context

    The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) authorises and regulates CGD networks. The PNGRB was set up under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006. It regulates refining, storage, transport, distribution and marketing of petroleum products and natural gas, and grants CGD authorisations through competitive bidding rounds. Domestic PNG and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) together form the priority segment for gas supply, which receives domestic gas allocation on a priority basis. The scheme sits alongside the clean cooking access agenda pursued earlier through the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), which provided Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) connections to poor households.

    Prelims angle

    The regulator to remember is the PNGRB and the range of activities it regulates. Distinguish PNG (piped, network based) from LPG (cylinder based) and CNG (vehicle fuel). Note the priority allocation of domestic natural gas to the CGD household segment.

    Mains angle

    GS3, energy and infrastructure. A question can frame domestic gas access as a clean energy transition and last mile infrastructure issue. The scheme links to energy security, import dependence on natural gas, and household air quality gains from switching away from solid fuels.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following activities:
    I. Production of crude oil
    II. Refining, storage and distribution of petroleum
    III. Marketing and sale of petroleum products
    IV. Production of natural gas
    How many of the above activities are regulated by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board in our country?
    (a) Only one
    (b) Only two
    (c) Only three
    (d) All the four
    Answer: (b)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309647&reg=3&lang=1

  • The choice is between AI applications and AI frontiers

    Why in the News

    India has no competitive frontier artificial intelligence (AI) model and no realistic prospect of producing one without significant policy shifts, at a time when United States and Chinese firms have released a parade of increasingly capable models through the year. The advice India has received from United States industry leaders and academics, supported by sections of the Indian information technology industry, is to concentrate on applications built on foundation models rather than on the frontier itself. The position advanced against that advice is that countries falling behind in frontier AI risk the fate of those that missed the Industrial Revolution, where a small business elite found a niche and prospered while ordinary people were disempowered. The binding constraint identified is not talent or algorithms but computing power, since the IndiaAI mission’s pool of 45,000 graphics processing units (GPUs) is a fraction of what a single United States frontier laboratory controls. The proposal put forward is a compute tax requiring any data centre established in India to reserve a share of its capacity for a publicly administered national pool.

    What is a frontier AI model?

    1. Frontier model: A frontier model is a foundation model at the leading edge of capability, from which industry specific applications are then built.
    2. Scaling laws: The industry has exploited “scaling laws”, which predict how a model’s performance improves with its size and with the computing power used for its training.
    3. Compute and data as the decisive input: The algorithms underlying modern AI models are widely understood, so better algorithms improve efficiency while the basic formula for producing a frontier model remains scaling compute and data.

    What are the two channels through which AI will matter?

    1. Diffusion through the economy: AI will spread by automating some routine jobs, with each industry requiring specialised applications built on foundation models.
    2. India’s application start up ecosystem: India has an active start up ecosystem devoted to building such applications, and businesses have rapidly adopted AI tools.
    3. The strategic channel is separate: AI will also have a strategic impact on research, cybersecurity and defence, which is not reached by application building.
    4. Mathematics and cybersecurity results: AI models have been used to solve some of the most important open problems in mathematics, and Anthropic’s Mythos model has formidable cybersecurity capabilities.

    Why is access to foreign frontier models not a durable substitute?

    1. Access today is real but conditional: Consumers currently have access to other frontier models, including Chinese open weight models.
    2. The most capable model is already withheld: Mythos has not been released publicly and is available only to selected organisations.
    3. Export control has already been applied: The United States temporarily imposed export restrictions on Mythos and on a version of Mythos with guardrails called Fable.
    4. The stated direction of policy: The United States is likely to restrict and regulate AI to “achieve global dominance”, so present availability cannot be expected to continue indefinitely.

    Why is compute the binding constraint for India?

    1. The national pool is small: The IndiaAI mission has a pool of 45,000 GPUs, which is only a fraction of the capacity controlled by a single United States frontier laboratory.
    2. The flagship allocation is smaller still: The mission allocated 4,096 GPUs to Sarvam AI to train India’s flagship model.
    3. The gap is an order of magnitude: That allocation is about 50 times smaller than what is used to train frontier models.
    4. Ingenuity does not close it: No amount of ingenuity can compensate for a resource gap of that size, which is why lack of computing power has bottlenecked sovereign Indian model development.

    What do the new data centres actually deliver to India?

    1. Data centre build out across States: A number of data centres with significant computing capacity are coming up in various States.
    2. Capacity reserved for multinational clients: These will primarily serve multinational corporations, and their location in India offers no tangible benefits.
    3. The investment goes into equipment: Most of the announced capital investment will be directed to electronic equipment.
    4. The employment effect is thin: The employment they create will be limited to a few construction and maintenance jobs.
    5. The environmental cost is local: Large data centres have a significant environmental impact, and in India that impact will be borne disproportionately by local communities.

    How would a compute tax work?

    1. The obligation: Any data centre established in India would be required to reserve a stated share, suggested at 25 per cent, of its computing capacity for a publicly administered national compute pool.
    2. The hardware does not move: That capacity would remain physically within the data centre.
    3. Allocation is centralised: The reserved capacity would be allocated by a central scheduler to Indian institutions.
    4. The bargaining position favours India: Multinational corporations are likely to resist, and their bargaining position is weak given the growing hostility to these installations elsewhere.
    5. Limits of the compute tax: Such a tax would not obviate the other data centre concerns, and only together with environmental safeguards and welfare measures would it open a narrow route to building a frontier model in India.

    Challenges to a compute tax on data centres

    1. Reserved capacity is not the same as usable capacity: Frontier training needs thousands of GPUs interconnected as one cluster, and a quarter of each site’s capacity scattered across many sites does not assemble into that. Eg. The flagship national allocation of 4,096 GPUs already sits far below frontier training scale despite being a single block.
      The Fix: Write the reservation as a contiguous interconnected block within each site, with a minimum cluster size, rather than as a percentage of total capacity.
    2. A capacity levy raises the cost of hosting in India: An operator prices the reserved share into its India investment case and can site the facility in a neighbouring jurisdiction instead. Eg. Data centre investment is mobile across countries in a way that manufacturing capacity is not.
      The Fix: Offset the reservation against power tariff and land concessions already given to data centres, so the obligation is priced as a condition of the incentive rather than as an additional charge.
    3. A public pool needs an allocation rule it does not yet have: Deciding which institution gets scarce compute, for how long and on what merit is a governance problem that no existing Indian body performs. Eg. The single largest allocation so far went to one start up for the flagship model.
      The Fix: Publish the scheduler’s allocation criteria and a usage register, so grants of compute are contestable in the way research grants are.
    4. Compute alone does not produce a model: Frontier training also needs large curated datasets and a small pool of researchers who have trained models at scale, both of which are internationally mobile. Eg. Indian language data is thin compared with the English language corpora frontier models are trained on.
      The Fix: Tie the compute grant to a data contribution obligation, so a recipient returns curated Indian language datasets into the national repository as a condition of access.
    5. The environmental burden stays where it was: Reserving capacity changes who uses the machines and not their power draw, water use or siting. Eg. The impact of large installations falls disproportionately on the communities around them.
      The Fix: Attach site level water and power disclosure and a local benefit sharing requirement to the same instrument that creates the reservation.

    Conclusion

    The question the argument forces is not whether India should build applications, which it already does well, but whether an applications only position is a strategy or a description of the constraint. The claim on the other side is that capability at the frontier has a strategic use in research, security and defence that no amount of downstream product building substitutes for. The compute tax is the first concrete instrument proposed to convert privately owned capacity sited in India into publicly directed capacity, and it is testable against a single question: whether the reserved share can be assembled into a cluster large enough to train anything. The marker to watch is whether any Indian allocation moves from the thousands of GPUs to the tens of thousands, since that is the threshold the gap is actually measured at.

    Artificial Intelligence in India

    1. AI as a public good: India treats AI as a public good rather than a proprietary luxury, anchored in shared compute infrastructure, open and locally relevant datasets and decentralised talent development.
    2. The scale of the ecosystem: Over 6 million people are employed in the technology and AI ecosystem, with more than 1,800 Global Capability Centres of which over 500 are AI focused.
    3. Adoption is broad: 87 per cent of enterprises are actively deploying AI solutions, led by industrial and automotive, consumer goods and retail, banking and financial services, and healthcare.
    4. The projected economic weight: AI is projected to contribute USD 500 to 600 billion to India’s Gross Domestic Product by 2030.

    Government Initiatives for Artificial Intelligence

    1. IndiaAI Mission, 2024: Implemented by IndiaAI under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology with an outlay of Rs 10,371 crore, on the stated vision of making AI in India and making AI work for India.
    2. AIKosh: The national AI dataset repository, carrying over 3,000 datasets and 243 models across 20 sectors.
    3. BharatGen: A government funded multimodal large language model initiative designed for AI powered public services and Indian use cases.
    4. Digital India Bhashini and Project Vaani: Speech and translation tools across the 22 Scheduled Languages, supported by a 150,000 hour Indian speech dataset.
    5. IndiaAI FutureSkills and YUVAi: Fellowships and AI labs concentrated in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, and an AI skills initiative for school students in Classes 8 to 12.
    6. IndiaAI Safety Institute: The national trust framework covering bias mitigation, privacy, explainability and AI governance.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 15 marks] What is agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI)? Explain its working. Describe its applications with suitable examples. Discuss the advantages, risks and challenges associated with agentic AI systems.”

  • There is no such thing as a ‘UN map with borders’: UN Secretary-General

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Secretary General has stated that the United Nations has not published any map with borders and that it is not for the United Nations to define borders. The statement answers India’s objection to “anomalies” in a “Map of the World” published by UN Geospatial on 1 July and used during the consultation process for the “Correct the Map” resolution. That map showed the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a dotted line with an explanatory note attached, and omitted the Indian and Chinese “claim lines” in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin that previous United Nations maps carried, with no note explaining the omission. India voted in favour of the resolution, which the United Nations General Assembly passed on 3 September to replace the Mercator map with maps following the “equal area” principle. The contest is that a map disowned as unofficial has stayed on the United Nations website and circulated as the artefact accompanying a resolution India supported.

    What is the “Correct the Map” resolution?

    1. Replacement of the Mercator map: The resolution, passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 3 September, seeks to replace the Mercator map with maps that follow the “equal area” principle.
    2. Distortion of landmass sizes: The Secretary General’s stated position is that there are distortions in the landmasses relative to their real sizes, that these come from power relations of the past, and that those distortions should be corrected.
    3. Scope of the resolution: The resolution is not a map, and the approval of a resolution in the General Assembly does not amount to the adoption of any cartographic depiction.

    What did the disputed map actually show?

    1. “Map of the World”, published 1 July: The artefact is titled the “Map of the World”, was published by UN Geospatial on 1 July, and was later taken up for discussion at the General Assembly.
    2. The Line of Control was marked and explained: The map showed the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a dotted line, with a note stating that the dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control agreed upon by India and Pakistan and that the final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
    3. The claim lines were dropped without explanation: It depicted Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin without the Indian and Chinese “claim lines” that previous United Nations maps used, and carried no note explaining that omission.
    4. Continued hosting on the United Nations website: The map published by UN Geospatial has remained on the United Nations website.

    What is the United Nations position on maps and borders?

    1. No map with borders exists: The Secretary General’s position is that there is no such thing as a United Nations map with borders and that it is not for the United Nations to define borders.
    2. The artefact is attributed elsewhere: The map on the website is described as not an official United Nations map and as the contribution of a non governmental organisation.
    3. Indicative status of the depiction: The map is treated as indicative, with no definition by the United Nations of what borders should be.

    What position has India taken?

    1. The vote was on the principle: The Ministry of External Affairs stated on 8 September that India’s vote for the resolution was in support of the underlying principle of “equal area representation”.
    2. The map question was separated from the vote: The Ministry’s stated position is that the United Nations does not endorse any map and does not issue any map, and that maps may exist for reasons of consultation.
    3. The omission has been formally raised: The Ministry stated that India has taken note of the anomaly and is taking it up with the United Nations.

    Challenges in the depiction of disputed boundaries on international maps

    1. An unofficial map acquires official standing by association: A map circulated during a General Assembly process is read as carrying institutional authority whatever its disclaimer says. Eg. The “Map of the World” was used during the consultation process for a resolution and has remained on the United Nations website.
      The Fix: Require any cartographic material circulated in a General Assembly process to carry the producing entity’s name and the standard territorial disclaimer on the artefact itself.
    2. Disclaimers are applied inconsistently across disputes: Explaining one disputed line and silently dropping another creates an asymmetry that reads as a position. Eg. The same map annotated the Line of Control and carried no note on the omitted claim lines in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin.
      The Fix: Apply a single annotation standard to every disputed boundary on a map, so a line is either shown with its note or its absence is explained.
    3. Correction has no procedural route: A member state that objects to a depiction can raise it bilaterally with the Secretariat, and there is no mechanism that compels a revision or a withdrawal. Eg. India has taken note of the anomaly and is taking it up with the United Nations.
      The Fix: Create a published register of member state objections to circulated maps, with a stated time limit for the producing entity to respond.
    4. Domestic law and international depiction diverge: India’s own legal position on depicting its external boundaries binds publishers within India and has no effect on material produced abroad. Eg. Indian law requires the depiction of Indian territory as claimed, which the circulated map did not follow.
      The Fix: Route the objection through the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names and the regional cartographic conferences, where standards are set rather than only contested after publication.

    Conclusion

    The resolution and the map are two different objects and the Secretary General’s answer rests entirely on that separation. It resolves the legal question, since no cartographic depiction was adopted by anyone, and leaves the practical one open, because the artefact that dropped the claim lines is still hosted where a reader will find it. The status is that India’s vote stands on the equal area principle, the objection has been raised with the United Nations, and the map has not been altered. The marker to watch is whether UN Geospatial reissues the map with the claim line annotation restored or withdraws it from the website.

    Back2Basics: UN Geospatial

    1. UN Geospatial: UN Geospatial, formerly the United Nations Cartographic Section, is the Secretariat unit that produces maps and geospatial products for United Nations use.
    2. Map products supplied: It supplies general reference maps, maps for peace operations and thematic maps requested by United Nations bodies.
    3. The status of its maps: Its maps carry a disclaimer that the designations used and the presentation of material do not imply any official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
    4. Relevance to the disputed artefact: The artefact at issue was produced by this unit yet has been described as not an official United Nations map.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following with reference to Indian States is/are NOT correct? 1. Uttar Pradesh shares its boundary with the highest number of other Indian States. 2. Rajasthan shares the longest international border among all Indian States. 3. Sikkim is the only State that shares its boundary with just one other Indian State. (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 (c) 2 and 3 (d) 3 only ANSWER: C”