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  • Fewer athletes, more medals: India’s best Para games yet

    Why in the News

    Indian para sport has moved from growing by sending bigger squads to growing by winning more medals with fewer athletes. At the 2026 Asian Para Games in Aichi-Nagoya, India won a record 114 medals and finished fourth, its best ever, with a squad barely half the size of the one it sent to Hangzhou in 2022.

    What is new about India’s Aichi-Nagoya performance?

    1. What it is: The Asian Para Games are Asia’s four-yearly multi-sport event for athletes with disabilities, like the Asian Games for para athletes. The Asian Paralympic Committee sets athlete quotas across sports.
    2. Record result: The haul beat India’s previous best of 108 medals at Hangzhou. That total was revised down from 111 after medals were withdrawn over doping violations.
    3. Fewer athletes: India fielded 168 athletes, barely half of the 309 it sent to Hangzhou.
    4. Medals per athlete: India won 68 medals for every hundred athletes it sent, nearly double its rate at earlier editions.
    5. The takeaway: Indian para sport is now growing by winning more with the athletes it sends, not by sending more athletes.

    Why was the squad smaller this time?

    1. Fewer sports: India competed in 11 sports, down from 17 at Hangzhou.
    2. Quotas and programme changes: The Asian Paralympic Committee offered limited athlete quotas. Chess and canoeing were removed from the programme, and India chose not to field teams in taekwondo and rowing.
    3. Para athletics contingent: India’s biggest source of medals sent 62 athletes, down from 123 at Hangzhou.
    4. Low expectations: With fewer athletes and fewer events, even 100 medals looked uncertain before the Games.

    How has India’s record grown, and is the gain real?

    1. Rising tally: India’s medal count has risen at every edition since its debut at Guangzhou in 2010, an eightfold increase.
    2. Gold trajectory: Gold medals followed the same path, rising from a single gold at the debut to 30 this time.
    3. Medal table rank: India has climbed the medal table from 15th at its debut to fourth now.
    4. Like for like comparison: Excluding Hangzhou’s 14 medals in chess, canoeing, rowing and taekwondo, sports India did not contest this time, gives a comparable tally of 95. This haul beats it by about a fifth.

    Where did the medals come from?

    1. Para athletics: Para athletics remains the engine. Its contingent won 65 medals, 22 of them gold, which is more medals than athletes.
    2. Rising sports: Several smaller sports grew sharply:
      • swimming rose from one medal to 11;
      • table tennis rose from two medals to seven;
      • archery and shooting, with no medals in 2014, won five golds between them.
    3. Badminton dip: Badminton slipped from 21 medals to 16.
    4. Women’s medals: Women won 36 medals, 10 of them gold.
    5. Gender gap nearly closed: Women won 64 medals per hundred athletes, against 66 for men.

    Challenges

    1. Programme dependence: Medal tables reflect the programme as much as the athletes, since quotas, events and rivals change from one edition to the next.
    2. China’s lead: China remains far ahead of every other country in the medal table.
    3. Less exposure: A smaller squad means fewer athletes gain international competition experience.
    4. Narrow base: Para athletics alone delivered more than half of India’s medals, so a dip in one sport would pull down the whole tally.

    Way Forward

    1. Broader base: Sports federations should build depth in swimming, table tennis, archery and shooting, where medals are already rising.
    2. Exposure for those left out: Federations should send athletes squeezed out by quotas to other international events for experience.
    3. Paralympic preparation: The Union Sports Ministry should target support at medal winning para athletes, with the Los Angeles Paralympics two years away.
    4. Women’s participation: Federations should raise women’s share of the squad, since their medal rate now nearly matches the men’s.

    Conclusion

    India’s para sport is now measured by how much its athletes win, not by how many it sends. The Los Angeles Paralympics will test whether that efficiency holds against a stronger global field.

    Key numbers

    1. Silver and bronze, 2026: 35 silver and 49 bronze medals.
    2. Earlier editions: tally of 14 (2010), 33 (2014) and 72 (2018); intermediate medal table ranks of ninth and fifth.
    3. Gold per 100 athletes: rose from 8.7 to 18.
    4. Women in the squad: 15% (2010), a quarter (2018), 37% (Hangzhou 2022), a third, 56 women (2026).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following statements with regard to the persons with disabilities in India is/are correct? 1. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, an Act passed by the Parliament of India in 2018, mandates reservation in education and employment, places a legal duty on Governments to ensure accessibility and non-discrimination. 2. The Sugamya Bharat Abhiyan focuses on achieving universal accessibility for Persons with Disabilities across three key domains — built infrastructure, transport systems and information and communication technology. 3. The National Divyangjan Finance and Development Corporation (NDFDC) is a public sector organisation set up by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs as a not-for-profit company to promote entrepreneurship among Persons with Disabilities (PwDs). Select the answer using the code given below: (a) 1 and 2 (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 (d) 1 only ANSWER: B”

  • Several IITs have far fewer counsellors than recommended by UGC: RTI data

    Why in the News

    The University Grants Commission (UGC) asks higher education institutions to keep one mental health professional for every 500 students, but most Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) examined fall several times short. Replies under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI) reveal the gap as protests grow over a Dalit student’s suicide at IIT-Bombay, and also show faculty reservation shortfalls.

    What does the UGC counsellor norm require?

    1. What it is: The UGC’s mental health and wellbeing guidelines for higher education institutions set a fixed ratio of counsellors or psychologists to students. It works like a minimum staffing norm for student care.
    2. Why it exists: A counsellor is often the first point of support for a student in distress, so the ratio decides whether help can be reached in time.
    3. How the gap surfaced: A former IIT-Bombay student filed detailed RTI queries. The replies disclosed counsellor numbers and suicide records for seven IITs.
    4. The takeaway: Most IITs studied fall well short of a norm meant to keep help within reach, just as student suicides have drawn public protest.

    How far short do the IITs fall?

    1. Worst ratio: IIT (BHU) Varanasi has one counsellor for every 4,750 students, nearly ten times the UGC ratio.
    2. Kharagpur and Roorkee: IIT-Kharagpur has one counsellor per 1,136 students and IIT-Roorkee one per 1,317.
    3. Only one compliant: Only IIT-Ropar reported enough counsellors under the UGC recommendation.
    4. IIT-Bombay: The website of its Student Wellness Centre is currently inaccessible, so its counselling capacity cannot be checked.

    Why has the shortfall become urgent?

    1. Suicide record: IIT-Kharagpur recorded 10 student suicides in the last five years. IIT-Roorkee and IIT (BHU) reported three each over the same period.
    2. IIT-Bombay protests: Protests are mounting in Mumbai for institutional accountability over the death by suicide of Sahil Wakode, a Dalit student at IIT-Bombay. His parents have gone on hunger strike.
    3. Overlapping gaps: Kharagpur, Roorkee and BHU, the three institutes reporting suicides, also have some of the weakest counsellor ratios.

    Do the IITs meet faculty reservation mandates?

    1. SC and ST quotas: The reservation policy reserves 15% of faculty hiring for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and 7.5% for Scheduled Tribes (STs).
    2. OBC quota: A further 27% of hiring is reserved for Other Backward Classes (OBCs).
    3. Near total non-compliance: Almost none of the seven IITs meets the faculty mandate. Only IIT-Ropar reported SC and ST shares at or above the quota, at 15% and 8.6%.
    4. Steepest gap for STs: ST representation among faculty in these institutes ranges from just 0.2% to 2.1%.

    Challenges

    1. Advisory norm: The UGC ratio is a guideline recommendation, so an institute that falls short faces no penalty.
    2. Opaque reporting: Counsellor numbers are not readily public, so students cannot easily learn what support exists.
    3. Few mentors from their communities: Thin SC and ST faculty presence leaves students from these groups with few teachers from similar backgrounds.
    4. Accountability after a death: The IIT-Bombay protests show families see no clear institutional accountability after a student’s suicide.

    Way Forward

    1. Meet the ratio: Each IIT should recruit counsellors until it meets the UGC staffing recommendation.
    2. Public disclosure: IITs should publish counsellor strength and wellness data on their websites without waiting for RTI requests.
    3. Reserved post drives: The Ministry of Education should require IITs to run time bound recruitment for vacant reserved faculty posts.
    4. Independent review: Each institute should commission an independent review after every student suicide and act on its findings.

    Conclusion

    The IITs are falling short on both student care and faculty diversity. The marker to watch is whether the IIT-Bombay protests lead to enforceable staffing and disclosure standards across the IITs.

    Key numbers

    1. IIT-Jodhpur and IIT-Patna: six counsellors and psychiatrists at Jodhpur and two counsellors at Patna, each for about 4,000 students.
    2. IIT-Tirupati: three counsellors and psychologists for about 1,700 students.
    3. IIT-Delhi: 12 counsellors for around 12,000 students.
    4. SC and OBC faculty shares: SCs 2.8% to 10.9%; OBCs 1.5% to 17.5% across the seven IITs.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12 marks] The quality of higher education in India requires major improvements to make it internationally competitive. Do you think that the entry of foreign educational institutions would help improve the quality of higher and technical education in the country? Discuss.”

  • Why inclusion is key to the RTE Act

    Why in the News

    Section 12(1)(c) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) has opened private school seats to disadvantaged children, but entry has not brought them social integration. A study of nine Delhi private schools finds that inclusion works only where a school treats it as a core value, and India has no way to measure it.

    What is the RTE quota, and what has it failed to deliver?

    1. What it is: Section 12(1)(c) makes private schools keep a mandatory 25% classroom quota of free seats for disadvantaged children. It works like a reserved lane into schools these families could not otherwise afford.
    2. Why it was introduced: The quota was meant to drive social cohesion, by placing children of different classes in the same classroom.
    3. Reach: The provision gives about 50 lakh disadvantaged students access to private schools nationwide.
    4. What went wrong: A seat does not bring acceptance. Many RTE students face low grades and class-based alienation inside the school.
    5. The takeaway: The law guarantees access, not inclusion, so the quota’s social purpose depends on what happens after the child walks in.

    How do RTE students experience the classroom?

    1. Drift to the periphery: RTE students often end up at the class’s edges and join few group tasks. The cause is organic social segregation, meaning children group themselves by class unprompted.
    2. ‘Deficit lens’: Burdened, undertrained teachers often see RTE students through a ‘deficit lens’, as children who need ‘more effort’ rather than as equal learners. They overlook the children’s emotional distress.
    3. Contrasting quota students: One girl slips into a back-row seat and is labelled ‘struggling to meet grade expectations’. A labourer’s son in another school thrives because teachers and peers draw him in.

    What makes inclusion work in some schools?

    1. Study finding: A study of nine mid to high cost Delhi private schools found that inclusion is rarely all or nothing. It succeeded consistently where the school treats inclusion as a core institutional value.
    2. No blueprint: Private schools have no institutional blueprint for diverse classrooms, so each school must design its own practices.
    3. ‘Invisible inclusion’: Successful schools build mixing into daily routine so no child is singled out: an empathy driven learning circle, assigned mixed seating and a ‘zero period’ for peer homework.
    4. Lived experience: Lessons use student led discussion that draws on every child’s life. Eg. A maths teacher asked an RTE student about his family’s paddy fields.
    5. Teachers and parents: Teachers co-plan support strategies. Monthly open houses let parents exchange insights.

    Why does inclusion stay undervalued?

    1. Practice, not money: Authentic inclusion needs no large material or financial resources. It depends on steady practices: equal participation, respect for each child’s background, and links among students, teachers and families.
    2. Burden on schools alone: The law leaves the job of building an inclusive classroom entirely to schools and teachers. It then depends on personal motivation, so it becomes an afterthought.
    3. No metric: Schools value what they measure, but India has no metric to track inclusion. So it never appears on a report card, though it shapes a student’s whole school life.

    Challenges

    1. Undertrained teachers: Overburdened teachers get little preparation for mixed classrooms, which keeps the ‘deficit lens’ in place.
    2. No accountability tool: Without an inclusion benchmark, neither States nor parents can hold a school to account for exclusion.
    3. Reimbursement dependence: Schools rely on State reimbursement for quota seats, so weak payment reduces their incentive to invest in RTE students.

    Way Forward

    1. Inclusion benchmarks: State governments and parent networks should jointly set and monitor inclusion benchmarks for every school.
    2. School routines: Schools should institutionalise collaborative learning, rotated leadership and dignified, equitable participation of RTE students.
    3. Teacher resources: Schools should give teachers specialised resources to support quota students.
    4. Government enablers: Governments should pay reimbursements, publicly recognise inclusive schools and build cross-state feedback loops so States learn from each other.

    Conclusion

    The RTE quota has settled the question of entry but left belonging to the goodwill of individual schools. Inclusion will improve only when it is tracked with the same rigour and daily practice as academic results.

    What is the Right to Education?

    1. Fundamental Right: Article 21A, inserted by the 86th Constitutional Amendment, makes free and compulsory education a Fundamental Right for children aged 6 to 14.
    2. Implementing law: The RTE Act, 2009 gives effect to Article 21A.
    3. Parental duty: Article 51A(k), a Fundamental Duty, requires parents or guardians to provide educational opportunities to children aged 6 to 14.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS2, 15 marks] The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 remains inadequate in promoting incentive-based system for children’s education without generating awareness about the importance of schooling. Analyse.”

  • A ready solution to tackle anaemia

    Why in the News

    Anaemia affects over half of Indian women and almost three-fourths of children, yet Double Fortified Salt (DFS), a proven preventive tool, remains underused. Its inclusion in the Public Distribution System (PDS), India’s largest food safety net, is uneven because it is left to State governments. The recently revised 7X7X7 Anaemia Mukt Bharat (AMB) strategy seeks a comprehensive response.

    What is Double Fortified Salt, and what problem does it solve?

    1. Iron-deficiency anaemia: Anaemia, driven largely by a lack of iron, causes harm across a lifetime:
      • maternal deaths;
      • malnutrition passed from one generation to the next;
      • impaired cognitive development and lost productivity.
    2. What it is: DFS is salt fortified with both iodine and iron. It is like the iodised salt households already buy, with iron added.
    3. Why salt works: Virtually every household eats salt daily in predictable amounts, whatever its income or location. So DFS solves sustained compliance, people getting iron regularly, because no one changes a habit.
    4. Ready platform: Universal Salt Iodisation, which adds iodine to edible salt, reaches around 95% of households, so the delivery chain already exists.
    5. The takeaway: India can deliver iron through a food everyone already eats, unlike supplements and diet changes that depend on regular adherence.

    What does the evidence show?

    1. Proven impact: A global review found DFS can reduce anaemia by up to 21%.
    2. Indian trials: Randomised controlled trials in Bengaluru, Darjeeling and Punjab, and large-scale use in Uttar Pradesh, showed better iron status. Consumers accepted the salt, and it proved highly cost-effective.
    3. Low cost: DFS costs about ₹14 to ₹20 per person a year.
    4. High return: Its benefit-cost ratio is 4.2:1, meaning each rupee spent returns about four rupees in better health and productivity.
    5. Manufacturing base: India has established fortification technology, centralised salt production and laboratory infrastructure, which make quality checks simpler than for many other fortified foods.

    Why has DFS not scaled nationally?

    1. AMB’s broad design: The AMB strategy covers prevention, screening, treatment, dietary diversification and behaviour change, yet leaves DFS underused within it.
    2. State-by-state reach: DFS reaches an estimated 76 million people in only four States through safety-net programmes.
    3. Partial mandates: The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has issued a DFS standard. The Centre mandates DFS in PM POSHAN, the school meal scheme, and Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), the child nutrition scheme.
    4. PDS reach: The PDS reaches around 800 million beneficiaries, which makes it the decisive channel for any national rollout.
    5. Fixable barriers: The obstacles to wider adoption lie in policy and funding decisions, not technology, and are within India’s capacity to fix.

    Challenges

    1. Quality risk: DFS delivers its benefits only when made to validated specifications, so weak quality control undermines it.
    2. Limited market reach: Commercial availability and consumer awareness of DFS remain too low for nationwide uptake.
    3. Blood disorders: Iron fortification must go with screening for haemoglobinopathies, inherited blood disorders such as thalassaemia and sickle cell disease.
    4. Salt reduction goals: Promoting salt as an iron carrier has to stay aligned with India’s sodium reduction goals.

    Way Forward

    1. Central flagship scheme: The Centre should take DFS to all States, especially through the PDS, under a central flagship scheme.
    2. Dedicated financing: Back the scale-up with dedicated funds and a firm policy commitment.
    3. Regulated rollout: Run DFS within a robust regulatory framework that complements AMB, borrowing monitoring systems from the rice fortification programme.

    Conclusion

    India’s anaemia response has a preventive tool ready but no national channel to deliver it at scale. Whether the Centre builds that channel through the PDS, instead of leaving uptake to each State, will decide whether DFS becomes a model for other low- and middle-income countries.

    Government Initiatives on Hunger and Malnutrition

    1. POSHAN Abhiyaan 2.0: A mission-mode approach to improve nutritional outcomes for children and mothers.
    2. Fortified rice: Rice fortified with iron, folic acid and vitamin B12 has been rolled out across all districts covered by the National Food Security Act, 2013, to combat anaemia.
    3. Food Fortification Resource Centre (FFRC): Supports scaling up fortification in staple foods.
    4. Eat Right India: An FSSAI initiative promoting safe, healthy and sustainable food.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following statements in the context of interventions being undertaken under Anaemia Mukt Bharat Strategy: 1. It provides prophylactic calcium supplementation for pre-school children, adolescents and pregnant women. 2. It runs a compaign for delayed cord clamping at the time of child-birth. 3. It provides for periodic deworming to children and adolescents. 4. It addresses non-nutritional causes of anaemia in endemic pockets with special focus on malaria, hemoglobinopathies and fluorosis. How many of the statements given above are correct? (a) Only one (b) Only two (c) Only three (d) All four ANSWER: (c)”

  • Brought in to help repopulate Buxa, T-138 is now in Assam

    Why in the News

    West Bengal’s Buxa Tiger Reserve, without a stable tiger population for decades, was meant to begin a phased recovery with its first reintroduced tigress, but she has left the reserve. Tigress T-138, airlifted from Bihar’s Valmiki Tiger Reserve, has travelled 35 km into Assam’s Raimona National Park.

    What is the Buxa reintroduction plan?

    1. What it is: Reintroduction means releasing animals into a habitat that has lost them, so that a population can rebuild. Buxa covers about 760 sq km in Alipurduar district, historically an important tiger landscape in North Bengal.
    2. Why tigers vanished: The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) cited habitat degradation, changes in land use and a decline in prey availability.
    3. A national first: T-138, a three-year-old tigress, was the first tiger successfully airlifted between States in India for such an initiative.
    4. The airlift: The tranquilised tigress was flown on a military aircraft to Hasimara Air Force Station. She was then taken to the Rajabhatkhawa forest area of Buxa.
    5. The takeaway: Her release was meant to mark the start of a phased recovery, so her departure tests the plan at its very first step.

    Where has T-138 gone, and how are authorities responding?

    1. Route to Assam: After roaming parts of Buxa, she headed towards the Sankosh river and entered Raimona, in Assam’s Kokrajhar district near the Indo-Bhutan border.
    2. Tracking: A West Bengal team is tracking the GPS-tagged tigress in Raimona, where an alert has been sounded.
    3. Wait and watch: The West Bengal Forest Minister said the tigress is being left undisturbed to explore, and will be tranquilised and brought back if required.

    Has a tiger strayed across States before?

    1. Zeenat’s journey: In December 2024, tigress Zeenat travelled 300 km from Odisha’s Similipal to the forests of Bengal.
    2. Joint capture: She was captured after 21 days on the move, in an operation run by the Odisha and West Bengal forest departments together.

    Challenges

    1. Wide roaming range: Tigers commonly cover 70 to 80 km while exploring an area, well beyond a single reserve’s edge.
    2. Conflict with residents: The tigress reportedly killed a domestic pig, and residents near Raimona, which has its own tigers, want her tranquilised and relocated.
    3. Unrestored home range: Habitat degradation and declining prey emptied Buxa, so reversing them decides whether it can hold released tigers.

    Way Forward

    1. Inter-State tracking protocol: West Bengal and Assam forest departments should run a joint tracking operation, as Odisha and West Bengal did for Zeenat.
    2. Inform residents: Assam’s forest department should keep residents near Raimona informed of the tigress’s movements while she is tracked.
    3. Habitat before releases: Restore Buxa’s habitat and prey base before the next tigers are released.

    Conclusion

    Buxa’s reintroduction has cleared its logistical first step but not yet its ecological one, a tiger that stays. Whether T-138 settles or is brought back, and whether Buxa can hold the next release, is what to watch.

    Back2Basics: Buxa Tiger Reserve

    1. Transboundary corridor: Buxa is part of an international wildlife corridor, contiguous with Phibsoo in Bhutan to the north and Manas in Assam to the east.
    2. Human pressure: It is dotted with settlements and ringed by revenue villages and tea estates, and commercial traffic on the Bhutan to West Bengal road runs through it.
    3. Empty by 2018: The National Tiger Conservation Authority (NTCA) found no tigers in Buxa by 2018.
    4. Plan scale: The programme plans to relocate seven tigers to Buxa over two years.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] The term ‘M-STrIPES’ is sometimes seen in the news in the context of (a) Captive breeding of Wild Fauna (b) Maintenance of Tiger Reserves (c) Indigenous Satellite Navigation System (d) Security of National Highways ANSWER: (b)”

  • Govt. amends rules to enable use of E100 in compliant vehicles

    Why in the News

    India’s vehicle rules have moved from recognising ethanol fuels of up to 85% (E85) to also permitting E100, fuel made entirely of ethanol, in compliant vehicles. The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) has amended the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, paving the way for flex-fuel vehicles.

    What do the amended rules allow?

    1. What it is: A flex-fuel vehicle runs on petrol, on ethanol blends of any proportion, or on pure ethanol, much like a dual-SIM phone that works on either network.
    2. Rules amended: The changes modify Rule 115, on emission standards, and Rule 115E, on emission testing. Several Rule 115 tables now list E100 alongside E85.
    3. Fuel definitions: E85 contains up to 85% ethanol. E100 is fuel of 100% ethanol, subject to the applicable fuel specification.
    4. Who may use it: An explanatory note says E85 or E100 may be used only in vehicles that original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), the vehicle makers, design as flex-fuel vehicles.
    5. The takeaway: Pure ethanol now has a legal place in India’s emission rules, but only in vehicles built for it.

    What did MoRTH tell existing vehicle owners?

    1. Compatibility limit: A vehicle that runs on E10 or E20, petrol with 10% or 20% ethanol, is not thereby suitable for E85.
    2. No forced switch: The notification does not require owners of existing vehicles to switch to E85 or modify their vehicles, now or in future.
    3. Check the sticker: Motorists should check the fuel compatibility sticker on their vehicle and follow the owner’s manual when choosing fuel.
    4. Corrected classification: Fuel classifications now name E20, the standard blend, where an earlier notation wrongly referred to E10.

    Why does the change matter for India’s ethanol path?

    1. E20 default: E20 has been the default fuel since April 2025.
    2. Higher blends: In May 2026, the government notified specifications for E22, E25, E27 and E30.
    3. Certification pathway: OEMs can now design, certify and type-approve dedicated flex-fuel vehicles, meaning they can obtain official approval that a model meets the standards.
    4. Enabling, not a market: The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) calls the change “an enabling step, not a market outcome”, meaning the rule permits such vehicles but does not put them on the road.

    Challenges

    1. Food-fuel competition: Ethanol drawn from sugarcane, maize and rice competes with food. Eg. In 2024-25, the Food Corporation of India sold 5.2 million tonnes of rice for ethanol.
    2. Grain dependence: Grain-based ethanol now supplies nearly 72% of blending, so many sugar-mill distilleries stay underused.
    3. Land pressure: Meeting the 2025-26 ethanol target could use up to 7 million hectares of cropland, competing with food crops.

    Way Forward

    1. Demand certainty for automakers: Encourage the auto industry to develop flex-fuel vehicles by creating demand certainty, backed by Biofuel Technology Parks for testing and scaling.
    2. Non-food feedstock: Shift to crop residues, municipal waste and microalgae. Eg. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited’s Panipat second-generation ethanol plant uses crop stubble.
    3. Grain only in surplus: Restrict grain-based ethanol to surplus periods, in line with NITI Aayog‘s 2021 Ethanol Roadmap.

    Conclusion

    The rule change is complete, so the next step lies with vehicle makers, who must now design and certify dedicated flex-fuel models. Whether that happens without ethanol drawing further on food grain is the tension to watch.

    Back2Basics: Ethanol blending

    1. Ethanol Blended Petrol (EBP) Programme: Under the National Policy on Biofuels, sugar mills are encouraged to divert sugarcane juice, syrup and molasses to ethanol, giving them a second revenue stream.
    2. Blending progress: Ethanol blending rose from 1.53% in 2014 to the E20 target in 2025.
    3. Distillery support: The Ethanol Interest Subvention Scheme gives new and expanded distilleries soft loans with a 6% interest subvention.
    4. Four generations: The policy recognises 1G (edible feedstocks), 2G (non-edible crop residues), 3G (algae-based) and 4G (advanced synthetic) biofuels.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020] According to India’s National Policy on Biofuels, which of the following can be used as raw materials for the production of biofuels? 1. Cassava 2. Damaged wheat grains 3. Groundnut seeds 4. Horse gram 5. Rotten potatoes 6. Sugar beet Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1, 2, 5 and 6 only (b) 1, 3, 4 and 6 only (c) 2, 3, 4 and 5 only (d) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 ANSWER: (a)”

  • From climate targets to energy justice

    Why in the News

    A former United Nations (UN) diplomat argues that India should reframe climate change as national crises arising from unequal energy use, not as a global temperature goal driven by emissions. Global policy, he argues, must shift from production to consumption.

    What does reframing climate change around energy justice mean?

    1. Symptom and cause: Global carbon dioxide emissions are the symptom and national energy use the root cause, much as a fever is a symptom of an infection.
    2. Electricity and well-being: Countries will electrify differently, so debate should judge electricity’s role in national well-being by national actions, not global models.
    3. Agenda setting: The G7, a club of seven rich economies, should not set the agenda the way the Paris Agreement did 10 years ago.
    4. The takeaway: Climate action would be judged by how each country uses energy for well-being, not by its share of one global emissions target.

    Why have 35 years of consensus diplomacy failed the Global South?

    1. Western expert networks: Western academics, as epistemic communities (expert groups shaping policy), built climate policy on universal ‘global values’, models and rules set by science and diplomacy.
    2. UN as legitimiser: UN technical reports lent these policies legitimacy, and international law then enforced the ‘consensus’ within countries.
    3. Unequal bargain: Pressure, not agreement, settled the clash between ecological limits and urbanising countries’ energy needs. No one committed to transfer finance as ‘means of implementation’.
    4. Empty resolutions: The vaguely worded treaty produced workshops, and the developing Global South gained only empty resolutions. Technology transfer was treated as a ‘scientific’ issue, not an ‘implementation’ issue.

    What has shifted in global climate politics?

    1. United States reversal: The US now echoes Global South reservations, through its January 2025 Executive Order “Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements”.
    2. Carbonising before decarbonising: As Global South energy use grows, emissions will rise before they fall. The UN’s new call for stabilisation, rather than reduction, of emissions only partly recognises this.
    3. Energy for well-being: Negotiations have never discussed how much energy well-being needs. China, the second-largest economy, matches Western well-being with much lower energy use.
    4. China’s missed path: UN reports have missed China’s nationally driven path to stabilisation, even as US emissions rose by 133 megatons in 2025.
    5. Consumption limits: China and India limit consumption as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), replace the internal combustion engine (ICE), and meet new demand with solar, wind and hydropower.

    What do China’s transition and global trends show?

    1. Cheap power is not enough: Cheaper solar and wind will not drive the transition alone. Their power is decentralised, intermittent and costs nothing per extra unit (zero marginal cost), so it needs state planning.
    2. China’s scale: China installed more wind and solar capacity in 2025 than all other nations combined, about ten times the US addition.
    3. Non-fossil share: Half of China’s electricity generation could be non-fossil by 2030.
    4. Electric vehicles: About 5.62 million new energy vehicles, China’s term for electric and other alternative-fuel cars, were registered in China in the first half of 2025.
    5. Trends models miss: UN emissions models miss that emerging countries use far less energy for urban well-being than the West once did, and are ageing.

    Challenges

    1. Uninsured climate risk: Extreme events are growing more intense and frequent in the Global South, where insurance coverage is limited.
    2. Western overuse: The West, about one-fifth of the world’s population, still uses a disproportionate share of energy, so the crisis is a few national crises, not one global one.
    3. Coalition gap: India has yet to build international support for a new agenda centred on climate justice.

    Way Forward

    1. Climate finance review: Review the token climate finance developed countries now provide.
    2. Global early warning: Build a global early warning system for extreme weather.
    3. Regional disaster cooperation: Expand regional technical cooperation in disaster relief.

    Conclusion

    Climate diplomacy is drifting from one global emissions target towards differentiated national energy paths, and India’s case rests on well-being per unit of energy. The test is whether India can build a climate justice coalition around it.

    Back2Basics: Paris Agreement

    1. Temperature goal: The Agreement aims to limit warming to below 2°C, preferably to 1.5°C.
    2. Negotiating forum: Countries negotiate under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body.
    3. Target cycle: COP30 began the third cycle of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), national climate pledges, with targets for 2035.
    4. Carbon markets: COP30 terminated the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), making Article 6.4 the sole UN carbon-crediting mechanism.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: Statement I: Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on climate change is frequently discussed in global discussions on sustainable development and climate change. Statement II: Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on climate change sets out the principles of carbon markets. Statement III: Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on climate change intends to promote inter-country non-market strategies to reach their climate targets. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both Statement II and Statement III are correct and both of them explain Statement I (b) Both Statement II and Statement III are correct but only one of them explains Statement I (c) Only one of the Statements II and III is correct and that explains Statement I (d) Neither Statement II nor Statement III is correct ANSWER: (a)”

  • Climate justice needs quicker compensation

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Fund for Loss and Damage (FLD) has, for the first time, earmarked a grant for a disaster-affected nation, allocating $21.6 million to Nepal after devastating floods. Developed countries agreed only as an exception, so the Fund still lacks a quick route to disaster relief as COP31 (the 31st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC) approaches.

    What is the FLD, and why does its design matter?

    1. What it is: The FLD pays vulnerable countries for climate harm they have already suffered. It works like compensation from those who caused the harm, not like disaster charity.
    2. Origins: It was established at the UNFCCC’s COP27 in 2022 and operationalised a year later, after a nearly three-decade campaign by the nations most vulnerable to global warming.
    3. Question of responsibility: Humanitarian aid from the Global North (the rich industrialised countries) admits no blame. A loss and damage fund raises who is responsible for climate change, which keeps it contentious.
    4. The takeaway: Nepal’s grant, though far short of its needs, is the first step in turning the commitment of climate reparation into action.

    What did Nepal lose, and why did it claim climate justice?

    1. The disaster: An ice-and-rock avalanche triggered flash floods in the Bhotekoshi and Trishuli river systems, killing more than 1,400 people and sweeping away several villages.
    2. Hydropower loss: Nepal lost at least 10% of its hydropower facilities.
    3. Scale of need: Conservative estimates put recovery and reconstruction needs at $5 billion.
    4. Climate justice claim: Nepal accounts for barely 0.1% of global emissions yet sits on the frontline of climate change in the Himalaya, so it bears harm it did little to cause.

    Why did the grant take so long?

    1. Closed window: The FLD’s application window had closed in June when Nepal sought emergency funding.
    2. Long queue: Claims from 119 countries were awaiting approval at the time.
    3. Queue-jumping objection: Developed countries first argued that granting Kathmandu’s request would let it jump the queue.
    4. Exception, not precedent: They relented only after insisting the grant be treated as an exception, not as a precedent for a permanent rapid-response mechanism (a standing route to pay soon after a disaster).

    Why must the Fund be reformed?

    1. Cost of delay: Slow grants deepen hardship, delay the restoration of essential services and raise rebuilding costs.
    2. Poorer countries hit hardest: Their budgets have less room to absorb sudden losses, so speed matters most for them.
    3. Funding shortfall: Pledges of $822 million cover only about a third of the claims pending before the Fund.
    4. COP31 agenda: Compensation for the countries hardest hit by warming will be discussed at COP31, which opens on November 9 in Antalya, Turkey.

    Challenges

    1. Fixed application cycle: A queue built around closed windows cannot respond to sudden disasters.
    2. Responsibility politics: Developed countries resist steps that imply responsibility for climate change, which slows the Fund’s decisions.
    3. Rising disaster frequency: More frequent and intense extreme weather will add to the claims queue.

    Way Forward

    1. Permanent rapid-response window: Parties at COP31 should create a standing emergency route outside the regular application cycle.
    2. Larger pledges: Developed countries should raise pledges to close the gap with pending claims.
    3. Faster disbursal: The FLD should cut approval times so grants reach communities before rebuilding costs rise.

    Conclusion

    Nepal’s grant shows the Fund can pay, but only as a one-off concession won against donor objections. Whether negotiators turn that exception into a standing mechanism will show if climate justice survives as the central principle of UN climate talks.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS3, 12 marks] Should the pursuit of carbon credit and clean development mechanism set up under UNFCCC be maintained even through there has been a massive slide in the value of carbon credit? Discuss with respect to India’s energy needs for economic growth.”

  • Beyond Kudankulam’s fence, a cybersecurity challenge

    Why in the News

    A breach of Kudankulam nuclear power project files in Tamil Nadu shows that cyber risk to critical infrastructure now lies with contractors and data centres beyond the plant’s perimeter. India’s rules bind only the operator, so data shared across the supply chain falls into an accountability gap.

    What happened in the Kudankulam breach?

    1. The leak: In mid-July, the group World Leaks posted parts of nearly 19,000 allegedly leaked Kudankulam files, including engineering drawings and supplier information, on its dark web portal.
    2. Contractor’s server: Reliance Infrastructure, the construction contractor for Units 3 and 4, confirmed the breach. The data sat on a server at its third-party data centre, Yotta.
    3. Ransomware attack: Yotta confirmed ransomware (malicious software that locks or steals data to extort payment) activity on May 29. By June the attackers were demanding a ransom.
    4. Operator’s position: The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) said the files concerned only non-nuclear infrastructure. Nothing public shows the Internet-isolated reactors or safety systems were accessed.
    5. The takeaway: The reactors were not reached, so the real issue is how much operationally useful information about sensitive facilities sits outside them.

    Why is this a repeat of 2019?

    1. Dtrack malware: In 2019, malware that researchers link to North Korea’s Lazarus Group was found on a computer on the plant’s Internet-facing administrative network.
    2. NPCIL’s response then: It dismissed the reports, then confirmed the infection, stressing that the critical internal network stayed isolated.
    3. Common pattern: In both cases the core held and the exposure came at the periphery. The 2019 lesson was never applied systematically to contractors and suppliers.

    Why does the supply chain create a cyber blind spot?

    1. Many hands on sensitive data: A nuclear plant or power grid involves builders, suppliers, cloud providers, insurers, certifiers and subcontractors, many of them foreign partners.
    2. Safeguards stop at the gate: Data held by these firms lacks the plant’s network segmentation (walling network parts off), air-gapped control systems (cut off from outside networks) and physical security.
    3. Attacker’s roadmap: Such documents help an attacker pick phishing targets (staff to trick with fake messages) and the weakest subcontractor. They can also reveal how systems are accessed.
    4. Expanding exposure: Private access is widening as Kudankulam expands to 6,000 MW, smart grids spread, Atmanirbhar Bharat opens defence and space to private firms, and government data moves to commercial clouds.

    Where does India’s cyber governance fall short?

    1. Existing institutions: The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), the national incident response agency, made prompt incident reporting mandatory in 2022. The National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) protects critical systems.
    2. Operator-only obligations: NCIIPC works under Section 70A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Its “protected system” status places duties on the operator alone, so data passed to a contractor is protected only by contracts.
    3. Data law gap: The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 does not generally cover engineering drawings and technical data that carry no personal data.
    4. Accountability gap: The operator says its systems held, the contractor blames its host, and the host blames the malware, yet documents still reach the dark web.

    Challenges

    1. Supply chain attacks: Attackers exploit trusted vendors to enter many organisations at once. Eg. The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) OnMark portal.
    2. State-sponsored threats: Foreign state-linked groups target critical sectors. Eg. APT41, a China-linked group, targeted Indian telecom and power grids.
    3. Ransomware extortion: Criminal groups steal or lock data and demand payment, often inflating what they hold.

    Way Forward

    1. Obligations follow the data: Bind every contractor and cloud provider handling critical infrastructure data to defined standards, with liability and audit terms in procurement contracts.
    2. Data classification: Let a contractor hold only the data it needs, and only for as long as needed.
    3. Third-party risk assessment: Replace annual compliance certificates with vendor assessments, including red-team exercises (simulated attacks).
    4. Zero-trust architecture: Treat no network as safe and verify every access point on projects of national importance.
    5. Single national framework: CERT-In, NCIIPC, sectoral regulators and operators should agree one supply chain security framework that fixes responsibility before a breach.

    Conclusion

    Critical infrastructure now has many access points outside the operator’s control, yet India’s rules still guard only the operator. The test is whether every organisation holding a facility’s secrets is held to the standard those secrets deserve.

    Government Initiatives for Cyber Security

    1. National Cyber Security Coordinator: Coordinates cyber agencies and advises the Prime Minister’s Office on cyber strategy.
    2. Cyber Swachhta Kendra: Cleans botnets (networks of infected devices) and offers free malware removal tools.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS3, 10 marks] What are the different elements of cyber security? Keeping in view the challenges in cyber security, examine the extent to which India has successfully developed a comprehensive National Cyber Security Strategy.”

  • Media association challenges govt.’s data privacy law in Supreme Court

    Why in the News

    The Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023, framed to protect personal data, is now challenged as a law that treats journalism like any other data processing, with no exemption. The Digital News Publishers Association (DNPA) has challenged provisions of the Act and the DPDP Rules, 2025 in the Supreme Court as a violation of journalistic freedom. A three-judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India is to hear the batch of petitions.

    What is the DPDP Act, and who has challenged it?

    1. What the law does: The DPDP Act and its 2025 Rules form India’s comprehensive data protection law. It works like a permission slip: an organisation needs a person’s consent to use their data.
    2. Duties and enforcement: It places duties on data fiduciaries (entities that decide how personal data is used) and requires them to report data breaches. The Data Protection Board of India decides breach cases.
    3. Petitioner: The DNPA’s members span the media spectrum, including outlets owned by the Ambani and Adani Groups. The Hindu is a DNPA member.
    4. Wider litigation: Activists have filed a batch of petitions against the law, and the DNPA petition is listed with them before the same Bench.
    5. The takeaway: The case will test whether a law built to protect personal data can apply to journalism without restricting free speech.

    Why do publishers say journalism is exposed?

    1. No journalistic exemption: The law gives no exemption to journalistic activity as a distinct class of data processing.
    2. Consent and erasure regime: Publishers, editors, reporters and correspondents must give notice and obtain prior, verifiable consent before using a person’s data. They can also be compelled to erase it.
    3. Who is affected: The petition says this threatens journalistic work by journalists, ground reporters, citizens, whistleblowers and Right to Information (RTI) activists.
    4. Constitutional grounds: The provisions are said to restrict the right to information and free speech protected under Articles 14 and 19(1)(a).
    5. Conflict with Puttaswamy: The petition says the law contravenes the Supreme Court’s Puttaswamy privacy judgment. That judgment held privacy inviolable and fundamental to human dignity and life.

    What do the State’s powers and the RTI change mean for the press?

    1. Section 36 requisition power: Section 36, read with Rule 23 and the Seventh Schedule of the Rules, lets the Centre demand any information from any data fiduciary or intermediary (a platform carrying others’ content).
    2. Missing safeguards: The power carries no judicial oversight, no necessity or proportionality requirement, and no notice to the affected data principal (the person the data is about).
    3. Risk to sources: The petition says such a power can be turned to identifying and targeting journalistic sources, which makes it constitutionally infirm.
    4. Change to the RTI Act: Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act amends Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. As a result, no category of “personal information” can now be disclosed under the RTI Act.

    Challenges

    1. Privacy versus press freedom: Privacy often clashes with transparency and freedom of the press, leaving courts to balance competing fundamental rights.
    2. Wide government exemptions: Critics argue the Act gives the government excessive exemptions on grounds such as sovereignty and public order.
    3. Weaker RTI: The blanket bar on personal information has weakened the RTI Act as a tool of transparency.
    4. Uncertainty for newsrooms: Until the Court rules, publishers face open questions over consent and erasure duties for their reporting.

    Way Forward

    1. Journalistic exemption: Parliament should define journalistic processing as a distinct class with limited, tailored obligations.
    2. Judicial check on requisitions: Section 36 demands should need prior judicial approval and meet the tests of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality.
    3. Public interest override: The Rules should be amended so that public interest remains the overriding factor in RTI disclosure.

    Conclusion

    The case turns on whether privacy and press freedom can be reconciled inside one data protection law. What to watch is whether the Bench reads in a journalistic exemption or demands judicial oversight of the Centre’s requisitions.

    Back2Basics: K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

    1. What it held: The Supreme Court recognised the right to privacy as intrinsic to personal liberty under Article 21.
    2. Wider anchoring: Privacy also draws protection from Articles 14 and 19, read together with Article 21.
    3. Proportionality test: A restriction on privacy must have the backing of law, serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim.
    4. Informational privacy: Its scope covers personal data, Aadhaar details, medical records and online footprints.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024] Under which of the following Articles of the Constitution of India, has the Supreme Court of India placed the Right to Privacy? (a) Article 15 (b) Article 16 (c) Article 19 (d) Article 21* ANSWER: (d)”

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