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Subject: Banking Regulations

  • Subhash Chandra case: why are creditors set to recover only ₹6.5 cr. against ₹22,006 cr. claims?

    Why in the News

    The NCLT approved Subhash Chandra’s personal insolvency repayment plan, allowing creditors with ₹22,006.57 crore in admitted claims to recover just ₹6.25 crore, a 99.97% haircut.

    Core issue: The case highlights how personal insolvency under the IBC, 2016 works when a guarantor’s admitted liability is much larger than the assets available in their personal estate. Dissenting creditors, including HDFC Bank, are considering an appeal.

    How does personal guarantor insolvency work under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?

    1. A personal guarantee is a promise to pay another’s debt: An individual undertakes to repay a borrower’s debt if the borrower defaults.
    2. The firm and the guarantor are separate legal persons: Proceedings against a company and against its personal guarantor are separate proceedings even when they arise from the same borrowing.
    3. The guarantor proposes, the creditors vote: In personal insolvency the first step is for the borrower to propose a repayment plan, which the creditors then vote on.
    4. Approval triggers a statutory discharge: Once the creditors and the NCLT approve the plan, Section 119 of the Code passes a discharge order giving the guarantor a fresh start.

    Why do the corporate and personal proceedings run in parallel?

    1. Section 60 sends the guarantor to the same tribunal: The IBC provides for insolvency of a personal guarantor of a corporate debtor to be dealt with by the NCLT where proceedings against the corporate debtor are pending.
    2. A guarantor’s liability is coextensive and independent: Contract law treats that liability as running alongside the principal borrower’s rather than only after it.
    3. A corporate process seeks a buyer, a personal process seeks a plan: Corporate insolvency resolves a firm’s debt by taking over its management and finding a buyer or revival plan, and failing that leads to liquidation.
    4. The personal order settles nothing for the firms: The founder’s personal insolvency does not extinguish the liabilities of the Essel linked firms that borrowed the money.

    Why does the 99.97 per cent haircut overstate what was lost?

    1. The comparison is against admitted claims, not realisable assets: The haircut measures the gap between claims admitted in the proceedings and the amount proposed for distribution.
    2. The disclosed estate was Rs 31.79 crore: The resolution professional assessed the guarantor’s disclosed personal assets at that figure.
    3. The tribunal applied a better off test: The NCLT considered whether creditors would recover more under the repayment plan than if the guarantor were pushed into bankruptcy.
    4. The guarantor disputes the claim base: His office has stated that he borrowed no money, and that the claim against him by the objectors to the plan is Rs 3,992 crore.

    How did the plan clear the creditors despite objections?

    1. The plan carried 80.814 per cent of voting share: The statutory threshold is more than three-fourths, so the requirement was met.
    2. No individual creditor holds a veto: A plan sanctioned by the tribunal binds every creditor covered by it, including those who voted against it.
    3. Five entities were alleged to be associates: Dissenting creditors argued those entities were connected to the founder and should not have been permitted to vote. The NCLT did not accept the objection.
    4. The Bench itself was divided: The original NCLT Bench differed over the plan, and a third judicial member decided the matter.

    What did the tribunal do with the net worth discrepancy?

    1. Earlier certificates showed a far larger figure: A 2017 net worth certificate furnished to RBL Bank put his net worth at about Rs 45,888 crore, and a 2018 certificate at about Rs 40,562 crore.
    2. Creditors sought a forensic audit: They asked for an examination of the gap between those certificates and the assets disclosed in the present proceedings.
    3. Suspicion was held not to be proof: The NCLT held that the creditors had not shown with evidence that specific assets were transferred, concealed or diverted to defraud them.
    4. A forensic audit is not a precondition: The tribunal held that such an audit is not mandatory before a repayment plan can be approved.

    What grounds remain if the creditors appeal?

    1. The appeal lies to the appellate tribunal: Creditors can challenge the order before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).
    2. The challenge must be legal or procedural: Available grounds include ineligible creditors being allowed to vote, the statutory majority being wrongly calculated, or the law being wrongly applied.
    3. A low recovery is not itself a ground: A creditor cannot overturn a plan merely because it considers the amount recovered too small.
    4. The associate votes are the strongest ground: If the appellate tribunal finds those votes were wrongly counted and the required majority was consequently not reached, it can interfere with the approval.
    5. The corporate borrowers stay exposed: Creditors can continue to pursue the principal borrowers through separate legal or insolvency proceedings.

    Is this outcome exceptional or the norm?

    1. 5,186 cases have produced 64 repayment plans: Since the personal guarantor provisions came into force, creditors have filed about that many cases and only 64 ended in a repayment plan.
    2. Recovery across those plans is about 1 per cent: Creditors recovered roughly that share of what they were owed in the cases that did reach a plan.
    3. The case is therefore representative: A near total haircut is the ordinary result of this regime rather than an outlier produced by one guarantor’s circumstances.

    Challenges to the personal guarantor insolvency regime

    1. Admitted claims bear no relation to the estate: A guarantor is admitted for the whole defaulted corporate debt, and the recovery pool is one individual’s property, so the ratio is guaranteed to look catastrophic. Eg. Guarantees securing multi-thousand crore project loans are routinely taken from promoters whose personal balance sheets are a fraction of that size.
      The Fix: Require lenders to record and periodically revalue the guarantor’s net worth against the guaranteed exposure, so the guarantee is priced as security rather than counted at face value.
    2. Voting power can sit with connected parties: The Code sets a voting threshold without a tested standard for excluding creditors related to the guarantor, so a majority can be assembled from within the group. Eg. Related party voting was the reason corporate insolvency law had to bar connected persons from the committee of creditors through Section 29A.
      The Fix: Extend a Section 29A style disqualification expressly to voting in personal guarantor repayment plans, with the burden of disclosure on the guarantor.
    3. Asset disclosure is self reported: The estate rests on what the individual declares to the resolution professional, who has limited power to trace assets held through family members or offshore structures. Eg. Benami holdings and trust structures sit outside the disclosure a resolution professional can compel.
      The Fix: Give the resolution professional statutory access to income tax, benami property and foreign asset reporting records for the guarantor and immediate family.
    4. The process is slow relative to the value at stake: A guarantor’s estate does not appreciate during the proceedings, and delay erodes the small recovery that exists. Eg. Corporate insolvency resolution has routinely overrun the 330 day outer limit the Code prescribes.
      The Fix: Set a hard outer timeline for personal guarantor cases with automatic escalation to the appellate tribunal on breach.
    5. Discharge closes the file without closing the debt: A discharge order releases the guarantor while the borrowing companies remain in default, so lenders keep the exposure and lose the security. Eg. Group structures allow the operating company, the borrower and the guarantor to fail in three separate forums on different timelines.
      The Fix: Require the corporate and personal proceedings arising from the same borrowing to be heard by a single Bench, so the two outcomes are decided against one record.

    Conclusion

    The regime was built to do two things at once. It gives an honest guarantor a fresh start, and it gives a lender a second claim on a defaulted loan. It cannot do both when the claim admitted is the whole debt and the estate is one person’s property. The marker to watch is whether the appellate tribunal treats disqualification of connected voters as a live standard, since that is the only part of this process a dissenting creditor can still reach.

    Back2Basics: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India

    1. Establishment: Set up in 2016 as the regulator created by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
    2. Regulated entities: It regulates insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies and information utilities.
    3. Powers: It carries legislative, executive and quasi-judicial functions, framing regulations under the Code and enforcing them.
    4. Data role: It publishes case level outcomes of the insolvency process through periodic newsletters.

    [2017] Which of the following statements best describes the- term ‘Scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed Assets (S4A)’, recently seen in the news?

    (a) It is a procedure for considering ecological costs of developmental schemes formulated by the Government.

    (b) It is a scheme of RBI for reworking the financial structure of big corporate entities facing genuine difficulties.

    (c) It is a disinvestment plan of the Government regarding Central Public Sector Undertakings.

    (d) It is an important provision in ‘The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code’ recently implemented by the Government.

  • Chandra’s settlement comes as IBC turns 10, with bank haircuts at five-year high

    Why in the News

    The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) has approved a personal insolvency repayment plan under which Zee Group founder Subhash Chandra will pay Rs 6.5 crore against admitted claims of Rs 22,006.57 crore. That is a 99.97 per cent haircut, one of the highest in the history of the insolvency regime. It comes as the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) completes ten years in force. Banks are considering an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The dispute is whether the Code should be judged by what creditors recover or by whether a stressed asset is resolved at all.

    What is a “haircut” under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?

    1. The term is not defined in the Code: The IBC nowhere defines a haircut. Banking practice uses the word for the percentage reduction in the value of an asset pledged as collateral, applied to protect the lender against loss.
    2. What the Code was enacted to do: The IBC was enacted in 2016 to rescue companies under financial stress or heavy debt through resolution and repayment to creditors.
    3. A creditor majority binds the minority: Once the required majority of creditors approves a repayment plan and the tribunal sanctions it, a dissenting creditor cannot walk away and demand a separate settlement.

    Why has the Chandra order revived the haircut debate?

    1. The size of the write down: The order of 25 August approved payment of Rs 6.5 crore to creditors, plus Rs 25 lakh towards the costs of the process.
    2. The liability arises from personal guarantees: Much of the admitted claim relates to personal guarantees and indemnities given for borrowings by companies associated with the Essel Group.
    3. The route is personal insolvency: The proceedings ran against the individual promoter as a personal guarantor rather than against a corporate debtor.
    4. Lenders are weighing a challenge: Banks are considering an appeal against the approval before the NCLAT.

    What does the recovery record under the Code look like?

    1. Cases resolved and value realised: Between 2021-22 and 2025-26, 1,077 cases were resolved under the IBC, with a realisation of Rs 2.47 lakh crore for creditors.
    2. The five year average: Average recovery against admitted claims across those five years was close to 29 per cent.
    3. The year wise trend: Recovery was 24 per cent in 2021-22, 39 per cent in 2022-23, 28 per cent in 2023-24 and 37 per cent in 2024-25, before falling to 20 per cent in 2025-26, the lowest in five years.
    4. What the figure means for a lender: A bank may hold claims running into thousands of crore rupees and receive only a fraction of what it is owed.

    Why do the banks contest the vote that approved the plan?

    1. The margin of approval: Twenty three creditors participated in the voting, and the plan was approved with 80.814 per cent of the votes cast in its favour.
    2. Every bank voted against: The banks that opposed the plan held a combined vote share of only 19.186 per cent.
    3. The related party allegation: Banks say at least five entities holding 61.78 per cent of the votes cast, all of which backed the plan, are linked to the debtor as associates or related parties.
    4. The exclusion sought: A trustee company argued that the votes of an investment company and its two subsidiaries should not have been counted. A resolution professional is the person appointed to manage the affairs of an entity under insolvency and to facilitate its resolution.
    5. The subsidiary argument: The debtor’s counsel argued that a parent company that is not itself an associate of the debtor cannot pass that classification to its downstream subsidiaries.
    6. The debtor’s response: Chandra’s office rejected the allegation as inaccurate. It said the entities referenced belonged to a relative whose business interests were separated in 2008-09, and that they do not qualify as associate entities under the Code.

    Is the Code meant to maximise recovery, or to resolve?

    1. The government’s position: The Ministry of Corporate Affairs holds that the primary objective of the Code is resolution and not recovery.
    2. Why claims are treated as the wrong benchmark: The Ministry told the standing committee on finance in December 2025 that the assets available on the ground are the better measure, since the market values what a company brings to the table and not what it owes.
    3. What an admitted claim contains: A claim often includes a non performing asset (NPA) that may be fully written off, the interest on that asset, and both a loan and the guarantee given against it.
    4. The value that is not counted: Realisation figures exclude the value that may come from equity holdings after a resolution.
    5. The indirect gain claimed: The Code is credited with creating credit discipline, which has contributed to reducing the gross non performing assets of banks.
    6. The banks’ counter: Banks argue that the problem lies in the valuation of stressed companies, that all assets should be included and properly valued, and that the process is opaque.
    7. The valuation mechanism in dispute: At least two valuers are appointed to give a fair value and a liquidation value, based on records and physical examination of the assets. The Chairman of the State Bank of India told the standing committee that valuation should reflect enterprise value instead of liquidation value.

    Challenges to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

    1. Delay erodes the value a resolution can fetch: A stressed company loses value for every year it stays unresolved, so the price a resolution applicant will pay falls with time. Eg. Videocon Industries was resolved in 2021 at about five per cent of admitted claims, and the NCLAT stayed the approved plan on that ground. Fix. Tie admission to a fixed outer date from the default so the asset reaches the market before it is stripped of value.
    2. Liquidation remains a more common outcome than rescue: A large share of admitted cases ends in liquidation rather than in an approved resolution plan, which inverts the Code’s stated purpose. Eg. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India’s quarterly newsletters have consistently reported more closures by liquidation than by resolution. Fix. Extend the pre-packaged insolvency route, available to micro, small and medium enterprises since 2021, to larger firms so a rescue is negotiated before value is lost.
    3. The individual insolvency framework is only partly in force: Part III of the Code was notified in December 2019 for personal guarantors to corporate debtors alone, and the remaining provisions for individuals and partnership firms have not been brought into force. Eg. A defaulting individual who is not a personal guarantor has no route under the Code at all. Fix. Notify the remaining Part III provisions along with a designated adjudicating forum for individual cases.

    Conclusion

    The appeal now being prepared will decide whether the disputed votes were correctly counted, and that is the next milestone in this case. Valuation is the point on which the recovery and resolution positions turn, and shifting stressed asset valuation to enterprise value is still only a suggestion before the committee.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] Which of the following statements best describes the- term ‘Scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed Assets (S4A)’, recently seen in the news? (a) It is a procedure for considering ecological costs of developmental schemes formulated by the Government. (b) It is a scheme of RBI for reworking the financial structure of big corporate entities facing genuine difficulties. (c) It is a disinvestment plan of the Government regarding Central Public Sector Undertakings. (d) It is an important provision in ‘The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code’ recently implemented by the Government. ANSWER: (b)”

  • PSU banks more efficient than private peers: EAC-PM

    PSU banks more efficient than private peers: EAC-PM

    Why in the News

    A paper by two economists for the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (EAC-PM), a body that advises the Prime Minister on economic policy questions, found that public sector banks (PSBs) are more efficient than private and foreign banks.

    Titled “Reforms, Efficiency, and Productivity of Indian Banking Sector in the Last Decade: DEA Approach”, the paper used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a method that measures how far a unit could shrink its inputs while producing the same output, to compare 47 banks.

    What does the study find?

    1. PSBs improved significantly: During 2014-15 to 2025-26, PSBs recorded average efficiency of 88.53%, compared with 85.62% for private banks. Foreign banks led over the full period: Foreign banks had the highest 12-year average of 88.98%, but their efficiency declined from 95.86% in 2014-15. Most efficient banks:
    2. HSBC and JPMorgan Chase: 100% efficiency in all 12 years.
    3. HDFC Bank: 97.54% average efficiency among private banks.
    4. State Bank of India (SBI): 97.49%, highest among PSBs.
    5. DBS Bank India: Lowest single-year efficiency of 40.12% in 2021-22, linked to its merger with Lakshmi Vilas Bank.
    6. Impact of PSB mergers: PSBs were relatively less efficient than private banks during FY2019 to FY2022, partly due to the merger and rationalisation of branches, employees and business operations.

    Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

    1. DEA is a method for measuring the relative efficiency of units, here banks, that produce the same kind of output from different combinations of inputs.
    2. An efficiency score below 100% means the unit could reduce its inputs by that shortfall and still produce the same output. Eg. A score of 85% means the unit could cut inputs by 15% without any loss of output.

    “[2024] Consider the following statements:
    Statement-I: Syndicated lending spreads the risk of borrower default across multiple lenders.
    Statement-II: The syndicated loan can be a fixed amount/lump sum of funds, but cannot be a credit line.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II explains Statement-I
    (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct, but Statement-II does not explain Statement-I
    (c) Statement-I is correct, but Statement-II is incorrect
    (d) Statement-I is incorrect, but Statement-II is correct

  • Relief to digital fraud victims: How losses upto 50K can be recovered

    Why in the News?

    The RBI notified a revised compensation framework for victims of digital payment fraud, effective 1 January 2027. Under the scheme, victims can recover part of losses up to ₹50,000 through a state-supported fund. The move follows a sharp rise in fraud value despite fewer reported cases.

    Why did the RBI intervene now, and what does the scale of digital fraud reveal about the existing liability framework?

    1. Rising fraud value: Fraud cases fell to 10,114 in FY26, but the amount involved increased 46% to ₹48,021 crore, indicating fewer but larger frauds.
    2. Consumer liability gap: The earlier framework placed the burden of proof and recovery on customers. Banks faced limited liability unless negligence was established
    3. Electronic Banking Transactions (EBTs) as the primary vector: EBT are a digitally initiated banking transaction, including NEFT, RTGS, UPI, and card-based payments. They became the primary fraud channel, exposing a liability gap.
    4. State absorption of residual risk: The new framework makes the RBI the majority loss-bearer for unrecovered fraud amounts. This signals that the regulator treats digital fraud loss as a systemic risk requiring regulatory underwriting, not merely a bilateral consumer-bank dispute.

    What is the consumer entitlement under the new framework, and what conditions govern eligibility?

    1. Maximum compensation ceiling: A victim is eligible for compensation of up to 85% of net loss amount or ₹25,000, whichever is less. This applies to gross fraudulent EBT losses up to ₹50,000.
    2. Lifetime cap: The compensation is available once during the lifetime of the account holder. Repeat claims for subsequent fraud events are not covered under this mechanism.
    3. Complaint filing window: Victims must lodge a complaint regarding the fraud within five calendar days of the event. Claims filed beyond this window are ineligible regardless of the loss amount.
    4. Loss verification standard: The loss must be established in accordance with the internal processes set out in the victim’s bank’s policy. The framework does not prescribe a uniform evidentiary standard across banks, leaving verification to individual bank procedures.
    5. Threshold-based compensation rate: For losses below ₹29,412, the victim receives 85% of the amount lost. For losses between ₹29,412 and ₹50,000, the victim receives a flat ₹25,000 (the ceiling).

    How is the cost of compensation shared between the RBI, the victim’s bank, and the beneficiary bank?

    1. Domestic fraud (below ₹29,412): RBI bears 65% of compensation. The victim’s bank and beneficiary bank contribute 10% each.
    2. Domestic EBT fraud between ₹29,412 and ₹50,000 (₹25,000 flat compensation): The RBI contributes ₹19,118 (76.5%). The victim’s bank and the beneficiary bank each contribute ₹2,941 (approximately 12% each).
    3. Cross-border EBT fraud (elevated bank contribution): In cross-border cases, the victim’s bank’s contribution rises to 20% for frauds below ₹29,412, and to ₹5,882 for frauds in the ₹29,412-₹50,000 band.
    4. Multiple beneficiary banks (proportionate allocation): Where more than one beneficiary bank receives the fraudulent amount, each bank’s share of the compensation is proportionate to the amount credited to its accounts.
    5. Numerical illustration (official example): If fraud loss is ₹40,000 and ₹15,000 is recovered, the net compensable loss is ₹25,000. The victim receives 85% of ₹25,000 = ₹21,250. The RBI contributes ₹16,250; victim’s bank and beneficiary bank contribute ₹2,500 each. If nothing is recovered, the victim receives ₹25,000 (ceiling), distributed in the same proportion.

    What standard of bank negligence triggers full bank liability, and what are the banks’ procedural obligations?

    1. Full bank liability for own negligence: Where fraud arises from the bank’s own negligence, the bank must compensate the victim entirely. The RBI cost-sharing mechanism does not apply in such cases.
    2. Safety and security failures: Failing to ensure proper safety and security mechanisms for EBTs constitutes negligence. This includes system malfunctions and security breaches.
    3. Alert failures: Failing to send mandatory transaction alerts for EBTs above ₹500 is classified as negligence. The alert obligation is non-discretionary.
    4. Complaint handling failures: Failing to provide 24×7 channels for customer complaints and failing to act diligently on received complaints both constitute negligence. Banks cannot limit complaint access to business hours.
    5. Complaint resolution timelines: Banks must resolve fraudulent EBT complaints within 45 calendar days for domestic EBTs and within 60 calendar days for cross-border EBTs. Breach of these timelines has implications for bank liability assessment.
    6. Post-complaint containment obligation: On receipt of any fraudulent EBT complaint, a bank must take prompt steps to prevent further unauthorised EBTs in the customer’s account. This is a proactive duty, not a passive acknowledgment obligation.

    Does the framework resolve the consumer’s structural vulnerability to digital fraud, or does it shift the problem without eliminating it?

    1. Consumer protection: The framework guarantees time-bound compensation and imposes liability for proven bank negligence.
    2. Limited bank incentives: RBI bears most compensation costs. Banks usually contribute only 10-20%, reducing incentives to strengthen fraud prevention.
    3. Procedural burden: Victims must report fraud within five days and satisfy bank-specific verification standards.
    4. Source of fraud: The framework compensates losses but does not strengthen EBT security standards or regulate payment intermediaries.
    5. Residual reporting: Victims must also report fraud to the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal or Cyber Crime Helpline. This supports record-keeping, not recovery.
    6. Coverage mismatch: The compensation cap is ₹25,000, whereas average fraud value in FY26 was about ₹4.75 crore per case, limiting relevance to small-value consumer fraud.

    Conclusion

    The RBI framework introduces the first regulatory mechanism for sharing consumer losses from digital fraud. It reduces immediate customer losses but leaves banks with limited financial incentives to prevent fraud. Large-value frauds, security standards and accountability of payment intermediaries remain unresolved.

  • Consider the following pairs

    Consider the following pairs :
    1. ABN Amro Bank :USA
    2. Barclays Bank :UK
    3. Kookmin Bank :Japan
    Which of the above pairs is/are correctly matched ?

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements:
    Statement-I: Syndicated lending spreads the risk of borrower default across multiple lenders.
    Statement-II: The syndicated loan can be a fixed amount/lump sum of funds, but cannot be a credit line.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

  • Why higher interest rates may be need to bring in NRI deposits

    Why in the News?

    The RBI has allowed banks to raise fresh 3-5 year Foreign Currency Non-Resident (Bank) [FCNR(B)] deposits from NRIs and deposit the money with the RBI under a special scheme until September 2026. The RBI will bear the cost of protecting banks from exchange rate fluctuations (hedging cost), making it cheaper and more profitable for banks to attract foreign currency deposits. The objective is to encourage more NRI dollars to flow into India and strengthen foreign exchange inflows.

    What are FCNR(B) deposits?

    1. They are fixed-term foreign currency deposits offered by Indian banks to Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs). 
    2. They allow depositors to maintain savings in designated foreign currencies without converting funds into Indian rupees
    3. The RBI’s latest swap facility seeks to strengthen the attractiveness of these deposits and support India’s external financing requirements.

    What is the US Dollar-Rupee Forex Swap Facility for FCNR(B) Deposits?

    The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced a special US Dollar-Rupee Forex Swap Facility to help banks mobilize fresh Foreign Currency Non-Resident, or FCNR(B) deposits. By bearing the hedging costs, the RBI enables banks to offer higher interest rates to NRIs without the currency risk. 

    Key details of the scheme include:

    1. Eligible Depositors: Available to Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs).
    2. Deposit Tenure: 3 to 5 years. 
    3. Deposit Currency: Mobilized in any freely convertible currency, but the swap must be done in US Dollars.
      1. Foreign Currency Denomination: Maintains deposits in: US Dollar (USD), Pound Sterling (GBP), Euro (EUR), Japanese Yen (JPY), Australian Dollar (AUD), and Canadian Dollar (CAD)
    4. Swap Rate: Undertaken “at par” (the RBI will buy USD at the FBIL Reference Rate and later sell it back at the same rate). 
    5. Timeline: Valid for deposits mobilized between June 8, 2026, and September 30, 2026. The swap window remains open to banks until October 16, 2026.
    6. Lock-in Period: Underlying deposits are subject to a 1-year lock-in period; however, the swaps undertaken with the RBI cannot be canceled. 
    7. Availability: Authorised Dealer Category-I banks can avail of this facility once a week.
    8. Exchange Rate Protection: Eliminates currency conversion risk associated with rupee deposits.
    9. Tax Benefit: Interest income remains exempt from Indian income tax while the depositor qualifies as a non-resident.
    10. Benchmark-Based Pricing: Interest rates are linked to internationally accepted benchmark rates.

    Why Has the RBI Reintroduced the FCNR(B) Swap Facility?

    1. External Sector Support: Facilitates mobilisation of stable foreign currency resources for the banking system.
    2. Concessional Swap Facility: Allows banks to swap FCNR(B) deposits with RBI at favourable rates.
    3. Hedging Cost Absorption: Transfers the foreign exchange hedging burden from banks to RBI.
    4. Capital Inflow Potential: Estimates suggest potential mobilisation of an additional $50-70 billion.
    5. Historical Policy Tool: Revives a mechanism previously used during periods of external vulnerability to strengthen foreign exchange inflows.

    Why Have FCNR(B) Deposit Inflows Declined Sharply?

    1. Collapse in Inflows: FY26 inflows declined by 86%, from $7.1 billion in FY25 to only $946 million.
    2. Global Interest Rate Differential: US and other developed market interest rates remain above 4%, offering attractive alternatives.
    3. Lower Domestic Offerings: FCNR(B) deposit rates remain significantly below comparable foreign currency investment products.
    4. Competition from Foreign Banks: NRI investors can earn higher returns without country-specific risks in advanced economies.
    5. Reduced Relative Attractiveness: Regulatory incentives alone may not offset yield differentials.
    6. Outstanding Stock Pressure: Total FCNR(B) deposits stood at $33.8 billion by March-end.

    Why Can Indian Banks Potentially Offer Higher FCNR(B) Rates Now?

    1. Hedging Cost Relief: RBI absorbs the cost of managing exchange rate risk.
    2. Margin Protection: Banks can increase deposit rates without significantly affecting profitability.
    3. Funding Diversification: Expands access to overseas funding sources.
    4. Improved Deposit Economics: Enhances viability of mobilising foreign currency deposits.
    5. Reduced Foreign Exchange Exposure: Minimises direct hedging obligations for banks.

    Why Are Banks Expected to Increase FCNR(B) Deposit Rates?

    1. Competitive Necessity: Requires matching global deposit opportunities available to NRIs.
    2. Yield-Based Decision Making: NRI investors are likely to compare returns across jurisdictions.
    3. US Market Competition: Higher yields available in US dollar-denominated products.
    4. Historical Evidence: FCNR(B) inflows have weakened significantly when global rate differentials widened.
    5. Deposit Mobilisation Objective: Higher rates remain essential for attracting meaningful inflows.

    What Are the Broader Macroeconomic Implications?

    1. Foreign Exchange Reserve Support: Strengthens reserve adequacy through stable foreign currency inflows.
    2. Balance of Payments Stability: Supports financing of current account requirements.
    3. Exchange Rate Management: Enhances RBI’s ability to manage rupee volatility.
    4. Banking Sector Liquidity: Expands long-term foreign currency funding.
    5. External Vulnerability Reduction: Reduces dependence on volatile portfolio flows.

    Conclusion

    The RBI’s decision to revive the FCNR(B) swap window reflects its proactive approach to strengthening India’s external sector amid a challenging global interest rate environment. While the facility reduces costs for banks and can potentially attract additional foreign currency inflows, its success will ultimately depend on whether banks offer sufficiently competitive returns to NRIs. Sustained mobilisation of FCNR(B) deposits can enhance foreign exchange reserves, support balance of payments stability, and reduce vulnerability to volatile capital flows, thereby reinforcing India’s macroeconomic resilience.

    Value Addition

    FCNR(B) Deposits vs NRE Deposits vs NRO Deposits

    FeatureFCNR(B)NRENRO
    Full FormForeign Currency Non-Resident (Bank) AccountNon-Resident External AccountNon-Resident Ordinary Account
    CurrencyForeign CurrencyIndian RupeeIndian Rupee
    Exchange Rate RiskNoYesYes
    RepatriabilityFully RepatriableFully RepatriableLimited Repatriability
    Tax on InterestTax ExemptTax ExemptTaxable
    Depositor EligibilityNRI/OCINRINRI

    Importance of NRI Deposits for India

    1. Stable Capital Source: Less volatile than Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) and other short-term capital flows.
    2. Foreign Exchange Augmentation: Supports accumulation of Foreign Exchange (Forex) Reserves.
    3. Banking Sector Funding: Provides long-term foreign currency liabilities to banks.
    4. External Financing: Supports financing of the Current Account Deficit (CAD) and other external sector requirements.
    5. Crisis Buffer: Acts as a source of foreign capital during periods of external stress and global financial uncertainty.

    RBI Instruments for Managing External Sector Stability

    1. FCNR(B) Swap Window: Mobilises foreign currency deposits from NRIs while reducing hedging costs for banks.
    2. Foreign Exchange (Forex) Market Intervention: Stabilises excessive exchange rate volatility in the rupee.
    3. Foreign Exchange Reserves: Provides a buffer against external shocks and capital outflows.
    4. Monetary Policy Operations: Influences liquidity conditions, interest rates, and capital flows.
    5. Macroprudential Measures: Manages systemic risks arising from volatile capital movements and financial market disruptions.
  • With reference to the institution of Banking Ombudsman in India, which one of the statement is not correct

    With reference to the institution of Banking Ombudsman in India, which one of the statement is not correct?

  • Microfinance is the provision of financial services to people of low-income groups. This includes both the consumers and the self-employed. The service/services rendered under microfinance is/are: 1. Credit facilities 2. Savings facilities 3. Insurance facilities 4. Fund Transfer facilities

    Microfinance is the provision of financial services to people of low-income groups. This includes both the consumers and the self-employed. The service/services rendered under microfinance is/are: 1. Credit facilities 2. Savings facilities 3. Insurance facilities 4. Fund Transfer facilities

  • Why is the offering of “teaser loans” by commercial banks a cause of economic concern

    Why is the offering of “teaser loans” by commercial banks a cause of economic concern?
    1. The teaser loans are considered to be an aspect of subprime lending and banks may be exposed to the risk of defaulters in future.
    2. In India, the teaser loans are mostly given to inexperienced entrepreneurs to set up manufacturing or export units.