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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • India and the OIC

    India has hit out at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for making factually incorrect and unwarranted references to Jammu and Kashmir.

    What is OIC?

    • The OIC — formerly Organisation of the Islamic Conference — is the world’s second-largest inter-governmental organisation after the UN, with a membership of 57 states.
    • The OIC’s stated objective is “to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world”.
    • OIC has reserved membership for Muslim-majority countries. Russia, Thailand, and a couple of other small countries have Observer status.

    India’s relationship with OIC

    • At the 45th session of the Foreign Ministers’ Summit in 2018, Bangladesh suggested that India, where more than 10% of the world’s Muslims live, should be given Observer status.
    • In 1969, India was dis-invited from the Conference of Islamic Countries in Rabat, Morocco at Pakistan’s behest.
    • Then Agriculture Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed was dis-invited upon arrival in Morocco after Pakistan President Yahya Khan lobbied against Indian participation.

    Recent developments

    • In 2019, India made its maiden appearance at the OIC Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Abu Dhabi, as a “guest of honour”.
    • Then External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj addressed the Inaugural Plenary.
    • This first-time invitation was seen as a diplomatic victory for New Delhi, especially at a time of heightened tensions with Pakistan following the Pulwama attack.
    • Pakistan had opposed the invitation to Swaraj and it boycotted the plenary after the UAE turned down his demand to rescind the invitation.

    What is the OIC’s stand on Kashmir?

    • It has been generally supportive of Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir and has issued statements criticizing India.
    • These statements over the last three decades became an annual ritual, of little significance to India.
    • Last year, after India revoked Article 370 in Kashmir, Pakistan lobbied with the OIC for their condemnation of the move.
    • To Pakistan’s surprise, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — both top leaders among the Muslim countries — issued nuanced statements, and were not as harshly critical of New Delhi as Islamabad had hoped.
    • Since then, Islamabad has tried to rouse sentiments among the Islamic countries, but only a handful of them — Turkey and Malaysia — publicly criticised India.

    How has India been responding?

    • India has consistently underlined that J&K is an integral part of India and is a matter strictly internal to India.
    • The strength with which India has made this assertion has varied slightly at times, but never the core message.
    • It has maintained its “consistent and well known” stand that the OIC had no locus standi,
    • This time, India went a step ahead and said the grouping continues to allow itself to be used by a certain country “which has a record on religious tolerance, radicalism and persecution of minorities”.

    OIC members and India

    • Individually, India has good relations with almost all member nations. Ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, especially, have looked up significantly in recent years.
    • The OIC includes two of India’s close neighbours, Bangladesh and Maldives.
    • Indian diplomats say both countries privately admit they do not want to complicate their bilateral ties with India on Kashmir but play along with OIC.

    What lies ahead with OIC?

    • India now sees the duality of the OIC untenable, since many of these countries have good bilateral ties and convey to India to ignore OIC statements.
    • But these countries sign off on the joint statements which are largely drafted by Pakistan.
    • South Block feels it is important to challenge the double-speak since Pakistan’s campaign and currency on the Kashmir issue has hardly any takers in the international community.

  • vaccine nationalism

    Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the weaknesses in the multilateralism which is best exemplified by the race among countries for getting access to the vaccine.

    Business out of pandemic

    • It is a crime against humanity to make a profit during any human tragedy.
    • The COVID-19 pandemic is also a human tragedy and needs global solidarity.
    • However, in a liberalised economy, there is a shocking silence in the global market trying to do business out of human suffering
    • This is where organisations of the United Nations and global networks for people should come together in one voice.
    • WHO’s idea of a “voluntary pool to collect patent rights, regulatory test data for developing COVID-19 therapies, vaccines, and diagnostics” was met with criticism.

    How to ensure equitable access to vaccine

    • The advance purchase agreements that some countries have negotiated with pharmaceutical companies exemplify the rich grabbing everything first trends.
    • Such vaccine nationalism undermines equitable access to vaccines. 
    • There has to be prioritisation for high-risk groups in all countries.
    • That framework has to be accepted by the global community without dispute.
    • In this, the COVAX partnership is a mechanism for ensuring that.
    • GAVI, or the Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative, was in existence during the pre-COVID-19 period to ensure the pooled procurement and equitable supply of life-saving vaccines to low- and middle-income countries.
    • It has been roped in for the COVID-19 vaccine too.

    Role of the governments

    • World Health Organization Director-General exhorted member countries to treat COVID-19 technologies as a “public good”.
    • If it is a public good, governments must step in to regulate its development, innovation, manufacture, sale, and supply ultimately to the public.
    • If such an idealistic outcome does not materialise based on basic human rights then some regulation mandated by the UN General Assembly must be thought of.
    • Through the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Doha Ministerial Conference declaration 2001, the WTO made provisions for compulsory licensing. 

    Consider the question “Vaccine nationalism has consequences for cooperation on the global problem. Examine the issue of vaccine nationalism and suggest ways to ensure equitable distribution”

    Way forward

    • Compulsory licensing is an extreme step available with India if rich countries go for advance purchase and hoarding of a COVID-19 vaccine produced in India by multinational pharma companies and deny India’s supply needs.
    • COVID-19 vaccine candidates are still in Phase 3 trials; the compulsory licence clause cannot be applied.
    • So, coercion to issue “voluntary licensing” to subsidiary companies in many developing countries such as India, Egypt, Thailand and Brazil by the patent holder is another option.
    • India and South Africa jointly sent out a communication, to the IPR Council of the WTO for a waiver of the protection of copyright, design, trademarks and patent on COVID-19 related technologies including vaccines.
    • If this is decided favourably as a special case considering the unprecedented impact of the pandemic, it will set a precedent.
    • Global campaigns through the media and civil society organisations can garner enough momentum to exert pressure on TRIPS.

    Conclusion

    Having nothing less than vaccines and life-saving medicines being treated as a public good must definitely be the long-term goal.

  • India &Gulf regions

    The Gulf region offers new possibilities of cooperation to India. The article explains these possibilities.

    Context

    • External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s visit to Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates recently is a good moment to reflect on the structural changes taking place in the Gulf and the region’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean.

    Issues in approach towards the region

    • For decades, India’s mercantilism saw the Gulf as a source of oil and a destination for labour exports.
    • India’s bureaucratic approach to the Gulf was incapable of a political engagement with the region’s interests.
    • The Indian elite has long viewed the Gulf as a collection of extractive petro-states run by conservative feudatories.
    • Although the Gulf kingdoms were eager to build strong and independent political ties with India without a reference to Islamabad, India viewed them through the prism of Pakistan.

    Influence in the Indian Ocean

    • Delhi’s traditional focus in the Indian Ocean was riveted on Mauritius and the large Indian diaspora there.
    • P.M.s visit to Mauritius and Seychelles in March 2015 saw the articulation of a long-overdue Indian Ocean policy and an acknowledgement of the strategic significance of the island states.
    • Since then, India has brought Madagascar and Comoros along with Mauritius and Seychelles into the Indian Ocean Division.
    • India also unveiled a maritime strategic partnership with France, a resident and influential power in the Western Indian Ocean.
    • Earlier this year, Delhi became an observer at the Indian Ocean Commission — the regional grouping that brings France’s island territory of Reunion together with Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles.
    • India has also become an observer to the Djibouti Code of Conduct — a regional framework for cooperation against piracy between the states of the Gulf, the Horn of Africa and East Africa.

    5 Areas of new possibilities with the Gulf

    1) Protecting India’s interests

    • First is the immediate need to shield India’s interests in the post-pandemic turbulence that is enveloping the region.
    • As the Gulf considers cutting back on foreign labour, Delhi would want to make sure its workers in the region are insulated.
    • Delhi is also eager to improve the working conditions of its large labour force — close to eight million — in the Gulf.

    2) New and long-term economic cooperation

    • As the Gulf looks at a future beyond oil, they have embarked on massive economic diversification and are investing in a variety of new projects including renewable energy, higher education.
    • India must get its businesses to focus on the range of new opportunities in the Gulf.
    • India also needs to tap into the full possibilities of Gulf capital for its own economic development.

    3) Financial power translating into political influence

    • The Gulf’s financial power is increasingly translating into political influence shaping political narrative in the Middle East.
    • The influence has been manifest in their successful transformation of the debate on Arab relations with Israel.

    4) Influence on regional conflicts

    • The Gulf’s ability to influence regional conflicts from Afghanistan to Lebanon and from Libya to Somalia has increased.
    • The Gulf today delivers economic and security assistance to friendly states.
    • The UAE currently chairs the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and has been eager to work with India in developing joint infrastructure projects.
    • India needs to bring scale and depth to its regional initiatives on connectivity and security in the Indian Ocean.

    5) Reforms taking place in the region

    • The Gulf seek to reduce the heavy hand of religion on social life, expand the rights of women, widen religious freedoms, promote tolerance, and develop a national identity that is not tied exclusively to religion.
    • The UAE has been the leader in this regard.

    Consider the question “India’s engagement with the Gulf countries has been limited in several aspects. However, the region offers new possibilities of strategic and cooperation to India. Evaluate these possibilities.” 

    Conclusion

    As India seeks to recalibrate it’s ties with the Gulf, the real challenge for South Block is to get the rest of the Indian establishment to discard outdated perceptions of the Gulf and seize the new strategic possibilities with the region.

  • Elections for the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE)

    Over 1.3 lakh Tibetans living in exile and settled across India and other parts of the globe shall be electing their next Parliament-in-Exile, called Central Tibetan Administration, and it’s head in May 2021.

    Do you think that India’s support for the Tibetan cause is the root cause of all irritants in India-China relations?

    Electing the exiled Government

    • The Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE) has its headquarters in Dharamsala, in the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh.
    • According to the Green Book of the Tibetan government-in-exile, over 1 lakh Tibetans are settled across India.
    • The remaining are settled in United States, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Mexico, Mongolia, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland and various other countries.

    Here is how the Tibetan elections will be held:

    Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE)

    • The Speaker and a Deputy Speaker head the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile.
    • The 16th TPiE had 45 members – 10 representatives from each of the traditional provinces of Tibetan – U-Tsang, Dhotoe and Dhomey.
    • It includes two members from each of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism and the pre-Buddhist Bon religion.
    • Other representatives are from the Tibetan Communities in North America and Europe; and from Australasia and Asia (excluding India, Nepal and Bhutan).
    • Till 2006, it used to be called as Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies (ATPDs) with the chairman as its head and a vice-chairman.

    Tibetan Constitution

    • The Central Tibetan Administration exists and functions on the basis of the Constitution of the Tibetan government called the ‘The Charter of the Tibetans in Exile’.
    • In 1991, The Constitution Redrafting Committee instituted by the Dalai Lama prepared the Charter for Tibetans in exile. The Dalai Lama approved it on June 28, 1991.
    • In 2001, fundamental changes happened with the amendment of the Charter that facilitated the direct election of the Kalon Tripa by the Tibetans in exile.
    • The Kalon Tripa is called Sikyong or president of the Central Tibetan Administration.

    The Kashag (Cabinet)

    • The Kashag (Cabinet) is the Central Tibetan Administration’s highest executive office and comprise seven members.
    • It is headed by the Sikyong (political leader) who is directly elected by the exiled Tibetan population.
    • Sikyong subsequently nominates his seven Kalons (ministers) and seeks the parliament’s approval. The Kashag’s term is for five years.

    A backgrounder: Democracy for Tibet

    • The Dalai Lama began democratization soon after he came to India during the 1959 Tibetan National Uprising.
    • He reportedly asked Tibetans in exile to choose their representatives through universal adult suffrage, following which polls were held for electing Tibetan Parliamentarians in 1960.
    • Democracy for the Tibetans, thus, began in exile.
    • The Dalai Lama, however, continued to remain the supreme political leader. On March 14, 2011, he relinquished his political responsibilities, ending a 369-year-old practice.

    Is TPiE officially recognised by any country?

    • Not exactly, it is not recognised officially by any country, including India.
    • But, a number of countries including the USA and European nations deal directly with the Sikyong and other Tibetan leaders through various forums.
    • The TPiE claims its democratically-elected character helps it manage Tibetan affairs and raise the Tibetan issue across the world.
    • The incumbent Sikyong, Lobsang Sangay, was among the guests who attended the oath-taking ceremony of our PM in 2014, probably a first.

  • Places in news: Luxembourg

    Prime Minister has pitched for strengthening ties to further ramp up economic engagement between India and Luxembourg.

    Mark the location of Luxembourg. Since it is a landlocked country, there can be a question asking its bordering states.

    Luxembourg

    • Luxembourg is a small European country, landlocked by Belgium, France and Germany.
    • It’s mostly rural, with dense Ardennes forest and nature parks in the north, rocky gorges of the Mullerthal region in the east and the Moselle river valley in the southeast.
    • Its capital, Luxembourg City, is famed for its fortified medieval old town perched on sheer cliffs

    Why Luxembourg?

    • Luxembourg is one of the most important financial centres globally.
    • Several Indian companies have raised capital by issuing Global Depositary Receipts at the Luxembourg Stock Exchange.
    • Luxembourg-based investment funds hold substantial banking and asset management market share in portfolio investments in India.
    • It is also the third-largest source of Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI) in India.

  • Challenges from the RCEP despite staying out of it

    India’s challenges from RCEP didn’t end by staying out of it. Remaining out of the RCEP has several implications for India. This article discusses such challenges.

    What RCEP mean for the region

    • The RCEP was finally signed by its 15 members on the sidelines of the Asean Summit last week without India.
    • This would make it a trade deal that includes the ten Asean economies, and all of Asean’s bilateral FTA partners, except India.
    • It would create new market access for China and Japan-the two largest economies of the group.
    • China, Japan and Korea were negotiating a trilateral trade pact, which now might become inconsequential following RCEP.
    • In this respect, RCEP would actually produce much greater market access outside of the Asean, among non-Asean members China, Japan and Korea.
    • Asean’s specific market access gains would be over and above those that are already available through various Asean+1 FTAs.
    • Additional market access gains would be more with respect to China, in terms of the additional tariff coverage and concessions that RCEP would provide.

    Implications for China

    • Apart from the additional preferential access it obtains, it is also able to pull off strategic dividends.
    • As the RCEP proceeds, it would establish China’s decisive say in writing the rules of trade in the region through the RCEP.
    • And this is precisely what the US would be wary of.

    Implications for the U.S.

    • President Obama had pitched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as an obvious and essential alternative for counterbalancing Chinese strategic domination of the regional trade game.
    • The US was taken out of the TPP by President Trump.
    • The remaining members managed to salvage the deal, largely due to the spirited leadership provided by Japan and Australia.
    • While the TPP survives as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
    • But CPTPP is incapable of being a strategic counterweight to China, and the RCEP.
    • Nothing other than a CPTPP that includes the US would be able to counterbalance China in economic size and strategic clout.

    Way forward

    • The Quad—a security partnership between the US, Japan, India and Australia—is looking to expand beyond defence and assume broader strategic proportions.
    • Geopolitics is contributing significantly to the construction of economic alliances, including the reorganisation of regional supply chains.
    • Due to these factros, search for an Indo-Pacific trade and economic compact is likely to hasten following the conclusion of RCEP.
    • Following RCEP, and the almost non-existent possibility of returning to its fold, India too, might find itself working actively on moving towards an Indo-Pacific trade deal.
    • The RCEP, which has a sizeable number of key Indo-Pacific economies like Japan, Australia, Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia, would need to stick to these countries to stick to the trade agreement after its ratification.

    Conclusion

    RCEP might actually force the U.S to look at returning to CPTPP much more proactively than it might have imagined. It would also, expectedly, look at India to join the bloc. That would be another challenge to navigate. India’s challenges from the RCEP might have increased in spite of staying out of it.

  • India-Canada relations

    Track 1.5 dialogue

    •  The third round of India-Canada Track 1.5 Dialogue, comprising senior diplomats, officials and independent experts, will be held on a virtual platform.
    • This promising interaction represents a major, deliberate endeavour to boost the bilateral relationship.

    Convergence on China issue

    • Common challenges of the COVID-19 era accelerated the momentum of bilateral engagement.
    • Canada’s travails with China, starting with the arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer in Canada in December 2018.
    • Later, the ‘hostage diplomacy’ practised by Beijing which arrested two Canadian nationals, has caused huge stress in Canada-China relations, turning Canadian public opinion against China.
    • This opened the door to a closer relationship with India.
    • In this backdrop, developments concerning the Indo-Pacific —  strengthening of the Quad and the growing interest of France, Netherlands and Germany to be active players in the region — are of immense relevance to Ottawa.
    • The forthcoming dialogue can deepen the India-Canada convergence on this issue.

    Principal area’s of bilateral cooperation

    • Canada-India merchandise trade exceeded C$10 billion in 2019.
    • Canada’s cumulative investment, including foreign direct investment and by Canadian pension funds, is a substantive C$55 billion.
    • Addressing virtually the ‘Invest India’ conference in Canada on  Prime Minister pointed out that mature Canadian investors have been present in India for many years and assured them that no barriers would come in their way.
    • Indian students are increasingly being educated in Canada, and a quarter million of them spent an estimated $5 billion in tuition fees and other expenses last year, a solid contribution to the Canadian economy.
    • Of 330,000 new immigrants accepted by Canada last year, 85,000 i.e. nearly 25%, were from India.
    • The Indian diaspora in Canada is now 1.6 million-strong, representing over 4% of the country’s total population.
    • The principal areas of bilateral cooperation are best defined by five Es: Economy, Energy, Education, Entertainment and Empowerment of women.
    • In particular, the digital domain holds immense potential, given Canada’s proven assets in technology — especially its large investment in Artificial Intelligence, innovation and capital resources, and India’s IT achievements, expanding digital payment architecture and policy modernisation.

    Conclusion

    Divided by geographical distance but united through clear common interests and shared values, India and Canada will begin their steady journey of progress, this time with a laser-like focus on common goals as well.

  • Unfurling India’s foreign policy concerns

    The article analyses two major concerns of India which would be influenced by the policies adopted by the next U.S. President. 

    Concern for India

    • What policy President-elect Joe Biden will adopt in its foreign policy will has bearing on India.
    • There are two foreign policy issues which are of great concern and interest — China and Iran in that order.
    • For the world, the equation between the United States and China may be the relationship of the greatest consequence.
    • For India, the most consequential relationship is not with the U.S. — as is sometimes claimed — but one with China.
    • What happens in greater West Asia will always remain of concern, but those interests will not be affected one way or the other by who is the President of the U.S.

    Quad dynamics and China

    • In the Trump years, India signed all the ‘foundational’ agreements with America.
    • India also bought billions of dollars worth of military hardware from them.
    • India resisted converting the Quad into a primarily military or strategic grouping, and is in fact aimed solely at containing China.
    • The Quad is an anti-China coalition.
    • How far it can be successful in containing the Dragon remains to be seen.
    • India’s External Affairs Minister has stated, India will not join any military alliance.
    • However, given the fact that all the other three, and perhaps five or six in future, are already in strategic alliance with one another and with the U.S., it is highly likely that India too will be forced to agree to some form of military alliance at a future date.
    • But no external power would want to get involved on our side in case of major hostilities with China.
    • On the other hand, if there is a major skirmish or worse in the South China Sea, the other members of the Quad will expect us to join them in fighting China, in an area far removed from our shores.

    Approach towards China

    • If Mr. Biden adopts a more conciliatory approach towards China, India may find ourselves in a difficult situation.
    • We do not want China to be permanently hostile to us; it will absorb huge resources, human and material.
    • The strong rhetoric employed in relation to China will need to be tempered.
    • Public opinion which has been worked up against China may make it difficult to do so immediately but the government is efficient in managing and moulding public opinion.

    Approach toward Iran

    • It may be difficult for Mr. Biden to quickly reverse Mr. Trump’s adventurist policy towards Iran.
    • It may not be possible for him given the domestic compulsions, to readopt JCPOA in its original form.
    • But he will surely, if slowly, engage Tehran in talks and negotiations through Oman or some other intermediary, to reduce tensions in the region.
    • India may be able to buy Iranian oil, and sell our pharma and other goods to that country.
    • The government may also feel less constrained in investing openly in oil and other infra projects in Iran, including the rail project in which Indian Railways Construction Ltd has been interested.

    Conclusion

    While India can’t expect the reversal of all Trump era policies, there will be certain changes in the stance adopted by the new U.S. President and India should be prepared to deal with it.

  • How a Biden’s Presidency may affect India?

    Donald Trump’s rise to the White House as well as his exit has led to a wide reactionary response in India.

    Also read:

    [Burning Issue] India US relations in the backdrop of recent hiccups

    (1) Economic Impact

    Trade

    • There are several ways in which the US economy, its health and the policy choices of its government affect India.
    • For one, the US is one of those rare big countries with which India enjoys a trade surplus. In other words, we export more goods to the US than what we import from it.
    • The trade surplus has widened from $5.2 billion in 2001-02 to $17.3 billion in 2019-20.
    • Under a Biden administration, India’s trade with the US could recover from the dip since 2017-18.

    FDI and FPI

    • The US is the fifth-biggest source for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into India. Of the total $476 billion FDI that has come in since April 2000, the US accounted for $30.4 billion — roughly 6.5 per cent — directly.
    • Only Mauritius, Singapore, Netherlands, and Japan have invested more FDI since 2000.
    • Apart from FDI the US also accounts for one-third of all Foreign Portfolio Investments (that is, investment in financial assets) into India.

    Ending protectionism

    • A Biden presidency may also see a renewed push towards a rules-based trading system across the world.
    • Instead of outright ad-hocism as was the case under Trump — as well as a move away from the protectionist approach that has been getting strong across the world.

    (2) Visa

    • For instance, how a US President looks at the H1-B visa issue, affects the prospects of Indian youth far more than the youth of any other country.
    • Under Trump, who severely curtailed the visa regime, thanks to his policy of “America First”, India had suffered the most.
    • That could change under Biden, who is unlikely to view immigrants and workers from India with Trump-like suspicion.

    (3) Technology

    • Other points of contention between India and the US are the tricky issue of data localisation or capping prices of medicines and medical devices.
    • These have a better chance of getting towards a resolution as we move away from the radical approach of President Trump to the pragmatism of a Biden presidency.

    (4) Diplomacy

    • Further, under the Trump administration, the US sanctions on Iran severely limited India’s sourcing of cheap crude oil.
    • For an economy such as India, which needs a regular supply of cheap oil to grow fast, a normalization of US-Iran relationship (and lifting of sanctions) would be more than useful.
    • On China, too, while the US apprehensions are unlikely to be fewer. It is more likely that a Biden administration will help India against China, instead of clubbing the two together.

    (5) Climate Action

    • Biden has promised to rejoin the Paris Climate Accord, and this may help countries such as India in dealing with the massive challenges — both technical and financial — on this front.

  • India-Maldives relations

    The Soleh government’s ‘India First Policy’ provides respite to India when contrasted with the approach of the predecessors.

    India-Maldives relations

    • India and the Maldives have had bilateral relations for centuries.
    • Maldivian students attend educational institutions in India.
    • Patients from the Maldives come here for super speciality healthcare.
    •  A liberal visa-free regime extended by India has aided the patients.
    • The Maldives is now a major tourist destination for some Indians and a job destination for others.
    • Given the geographical limitations imposed on the Maldives, India has exempted the nation from export curbs on essential commodities.

    Assistance to the Maldives

    • In 1988, under Operation Cactus when a coup was attempted against President, India sent paratroopers and Navy vessels and restored the legitimate leadership.
    • The 2004 tsunami and the drinking water crisis in Male a decade later were other occasions when India rushed assistance.
    • In COVID-19 disruption, India rushed $250 million aid in quick time and also rushed medical supplies to the Maldives, started a new cargo ferry and also opened an air travel bubble, the first such in South Asia.

    Strategic comfort to India

    • Abdulla Yameen was President when the water crisis occurred.
    • Now, the Yameen camp has launched an ‘India Out’ campaign against New Delhi’s massive developmental funding.
    • Maldivian protesters recently demanded the Solih administration to ‘stop selling national assets to foreigners’, implying India.
    • Mr. Yameen’s tilt towards China and bias against India when in power was evident.
    • It is against this background that the Solih administration’s no-nonsense approach towards trilateral equations provide ‘strategic comfort’ to India.

    Concerns for India

    • India should be concerned about the protests as well as the occasional protest within the ruling Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) of Mr. Solih.
    • There are apparent strains between Mohamed Nasheed, who was the nation’s first President elected under a multiparty democracy and Mr. Yameen.
    • This strain could affect the MDP during the run-up to the 2023 presidential polls.
    • Also, Mr. Nasheed’s on-again-off-again call for a changeover to a ‘parliamentary form of government’ can polarise the overpoliticised nation even more.

    Conclusion

    Given this background and India’s increasing geostrategic concerns in the shared seas, taking forward the multifaceted cooperation to the next stage quickly could also be at the focus of relations of the two countries.