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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • India’s new Europolitik

    The article explains the shift in India’s foreign policy in its relations with the European middle powers against the backdrop of churn in the geopolitics.

    India’s changing perception of Europe

    • Three recent developments underline India’s changing perceptions of Europe.
    • 1) India’s support for France’s membership of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).
    • 2) India’s backing for a larger European role in the Indo-Pacific.
    • Delhi has welcomed the interest of Germany and the Netherlands in building a new geopolitical architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
    • 3) Security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is also emerging as an important theme in partnership between India and the U.K.

    Reasons for India’s shift

    • India is looking beyond the bipolar geopolitical competition between the US and China.
    • Delhi also wants to insure against the inevitable volatility in the complex dynamic between Washington and Beijing.
    • To cope with the uncertain political trajectory of the US, Delhi is already supplementing its American partnership with a network of multilateral groups with other middle powers, such as the India-Australia-Japan forum and the trilateral dialogue with France and Australia.

    Rebuilding ties with Europe and challenges

    • Rebuilding ties with Europe needs a significant corrective to Delhi’s traditional strategic neglect of the continent.
    • The bipolar Cold War dynamic and the North-South framework developing world versus the developed prevented Delhi from taking a more nuanced view of Europe’s political agency after WWII.
    • Attempts to impart strategic momentum after the Cold War did not really succeed.
    • As the economic gap between China and India widened, so did the scale of European interest in both countries.
    • It is also true that the European ability to project military power into the Indo-Pacific is limited.
    • But in combination with Asian democracies, Europe can certainly make a difference.
    • It can mobilize massive economic resources, wield political influence, and leverage its significant soft power to shape the Indo-Pacific discourse.

    An exceptional relationship with Frace

    • France has been an exception in Europe in its connection with India.
    • India’s partnership with France now has a strong regional anchor — the Indo-Pacific as it has its territories in the Western Indian Ocean and the South Pacific.
    • France and Britain have lingering disputes leftover from the era of decolonization in parts of the Western Indian Ocean.
    • India will have to contribute to the amicable resolution of those problems.

    Consider the question “A strong coalition with the European middle powers should be the indispensable element of India’s foreign policy in the face of changing geopolitical circumstances. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As China transforms the Eurasian landmass as well as the Indo-Pacific, it is abundantly clear that the US alone cannot redress the imbalance. A strong coalition of Asian and European middle powers must now be an indispensable element of the geopolitics of the East. Such a coalition can’t be built overnight. But India could push for a solid start in 2021.

  • Friend and neighbour: India-Bangladesh relations

    India must strengthen ties with Bangladesh and appreciate Sheikh Hasina’s challenges

    Virtual summit between India and Bangladesh

    • The virtual summit was conducted recently between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bangladesh counterpart Sheikh Hasina.
    • There was a discussion on issues ranging from the violent border incidents to the COVID-19 fight, demonstrates their desire to reboot India-Bangladesh ties that have faced challenges in recent months.
    • PM Modi called Bangladesh a “major pillar” in India’s neighbourhood first policy, while Ms. Hasina invited him to visit Bangladesh in March for the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of its independence.
    • It is a key opportunity for India, which had played a major role in Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971, to revive the relations and address the issues adversely affecting the partnership.

    Importance of India-Bangladesh relationship

    • Bangladesh and India are at a historic juncture of diplomacy embedded in a rich matrix of history, religion, culture, language and kinship.

    (1) ‘Blue Economy’ programme’ –

    • Both countries are looking at strengthening economic cooperation through joint investments and cooperation under the ‘Blue Economy’ programme.
    • The programme entails synergized efforts of littoral states in the exploration of hydrocarbons, marine resources, deep-sea fishing, preservation of marine ecology and disaster management.
    • The industry in India needs to look for opportunities for collaboration in defence, such as in military hardware, space technology, technical assistance, exchange of experience, and development of sea infrastructure.

    (2) India’s Act East Policy –

    • Connectivity offers a game-changing opportunity for India and Bangladesh. This is pivotal to India’s connectivity with its north-eastern region and with countries of ASEAN.
    • This is particularly important in the context of both the Make in India initiative as well as India’s Act East Policy.
    • The two countries also see themselves converging around a lot of commonalities, not just as neighbours battling the scourge of terrorism, but as leading economic partners.
    • In terms of diplomacy in the South Asian region, both countries have had identical views.
    • From how organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) should be going forward in promoting cooperation among its member nations to economic growth.

    Challenges in India-Bangladesh relations

    (1) Violent border incidents –

    • Despite the friendship remaining solid, the border has been sensitive.
    • At least 25 Bangladeshis were killed in the first six months of this year along the border by Indian forces, according to a rights watchdog.

    (2) Sharing of River Waters –

    • The Teesta water dispute between West Bengal and Bangladesh remains unresolved.

    (3) The Citizenship (Amendment) Act and the proposed National Register of Citizens, which Ms Hasina called “unnecessary”, have created a negative impression about India.

    (4) China’s economic footprint is growing –

    • China is making deep inroads into Bangladesh by ramping up infrastructure investments and expanding economic cooperation.
    • Bangladesh is overwhelmingly dependent on China for military hardware.
    • Since 2010, India approved three Lines of Credit to Bangladesh of $7.362 billion to finance development projects. But, just $442 million have been disbursed until December 2018.

    Way Forward

    • It is imperative for India to bolster ties with this all-weather friend, and there may not be a better time to do so than when Bangladesh is to celebrate the golden jubilee of its independence.
    • India should support Bangladesh’s fight against radical elements. India should also not allow the ideological inclinations of the ruling party to spoil the historic relationship between the two countries.
    • New Delhi should take a broader view of the changing scenario and growing competition in South Asia, and reach out to Dhaka with an open mind.
    • There is much room for course correction in Delhi and to shift the focus from legacy issues to future possibilities.

    Practice Question: Discuss the importance of India-Bangladesh relations and various challenges affecting the relations between the two countries. How they can be addressed?

  • India-UK Relations

    India and the U.K. must not allow concerns of the moment to dominate their relationship.

    Practice Question: Discuss the opportunities and the challenges in the India-UK relationships. What is the prospectus of India-UK relations after Brexit and Coronavirus pandemic?

    Secretary’s Delhi visit

    • British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab’s Delhi visit came with a declaration of immediate and longer-term goals for the India-U.K. relationship.
    • It prepares the way for PM Johnson’s India visit, as the chief guest at Republic Day and to invite PM Modi to the U.K. to the G-7 and the Climate Change (COP26) summits next year.
    • Johnson will be the first head of government to visit India after the spread of COVID-19; this will also be his first bilateral visit anywhere after Brexit signalling the importance of ties with India.

    A new page in ties

    • Upgrading the ties – Both countries up for upgrading of the 2004 India-U.K. Strategic Partnership to a “Comprehensive” Strategic Partnership.
    • This will help to envision closer military ties, cooperation in Indo-Pacific strategies, counter-terrorism and fighting climate change.
    • Hoping for FTA – Britain is on a mission to secure free trade partners after Brexit. It has wrapped up nearly 20 trade deals, including most recently with the U.S., Japan, and Vietnam and is hoping for India to sign the same.
    • Corona pandemic and cooperation for vaccine manufacturing – The highlight of India’s relations will be closer cooperation on the coronavirus vaccine.
    • India’s Serum Institute set to produce and distribute the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine in India, and then as part of the COVAX project to other developing countries.

    Challenges in India-UK relations

    • Stagnancy in the relations – India-UK relations are stagnant for the past five years due to Britain’s Brexit preoccupation.
    • The relationship has failed to progress in this time, despite visits by Mr Modi and former British Prime Minister Theresa May.
    • Other less important issues gained the narrative – Issues such as visas and the fate of fugitive Indian businessmen in the U.K. have been allowed to dominate the narrative.
    • The MEA had responded sharply to protests at the Indian High Commission in London over the Article 370 move in Jammu and Kashmir, and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act.
    • Britain’s concerns about the farmers’ protests that sparked responses in New Delhi about interference in India’s internal matters.
    • Sometimes, intense interest from the British Indian diaspora makes Indian politics a factor in British politics is a reminder of how closely linked the two countries remain.
    • A new chapter in India-UK relationship would necessarily entail the K. to be more sensitive to India’s concerns, and for India to be less sensitive when Britain expresses its concerns.

  • [pib] Haldibari – Chilahati Rail Link

    Ours and Bangladeshi PM has jointly inaugurated a railway link between Haldibari in India and Chilahati in Bangladesh.

    Examine the opportunities and challenges in the adoption PPP model by the Indian Railways.

    Haldibari – Chilahati Rail Link

    • This rail link being made functional is the 5th rail link between India and Bangladesh.
    • It was operational till 1965. This was part of the Broad Gauge main route from Kolkata to Siliguri during partition.
    • Trains travelling to Assam and North Bengal continued to travel through the then East Pakistan territory even after partition.
    • For example, a train from Sealdah to Siliguri used to enter East Pakistan territory from Darshana and exit using the Haldibari – Chilahati link.
    • However, the war of 1965 effectively cut off all the railway links between India and the then East Pakistan.
    • So on the Eastern Sector of India partition of the railways thus happened in 1965.  So the importance of the reopening of this rail link can be well imagined.

    A British-era legacy

    • The railway network of India and Bangladesh are mostly inherited from British Era Indian Railways.
    • After partition in 1947, 7 rail links were operational between India and the then East Pakistan (up to 1965). Presently, there are 4 operational rail links between India and Bangladesh.
    • They are, Petrapole (India) – Benapole (Bangladesh),  Gede (India) – Darshana (Bangladesh), Singhabad (India)-Rohanpur (Bangladesh),  Radhikapur (India)–Birol (Bangladesh).

    Benefits offered by the rail

    • The rail link will be beneficial for transit into Bangladesh from Assam and West Bengal.
    • It will enhance rail network access to the main ports, dry ports, and land borders to support the growth in regional trade and to encourage economic and social development of the region.
    • Common people and businessman of both countries will be able to reap the benefit of both goods and passenger traffic, once passenger trains are planned in this route.
    • With this new link coming into operation,  tourists from Bangladesh will be able to visit places like Darjeeling, Sikkim, Dooars apart from countries like Nepal, Bhutan etc easily.
    • Economic activities of these South Asian countries will also be benefitted from this new rail link.

  • US imposes CAATSA sanctions on Turkey

    The US has imposed sanctions on NATO-ally Turkey for its purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defence system.

    Q.What is CAATSA law? Discuss how it will impact India’s ties with Russia.

    Turkey defies the US

    • Turkey decided to move ahead with the procurement and testing of the S-400, despite the availability of alternative, NATO-interoperable systems to meet its defence requirements.
    • This decision resulted in Turkey’s suspension and pending removal from the global F-35 Joint Strike Fighter partnership.

    What is CAATSA?

    • CAATSA stands for Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
    • It is a US federal law that imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
    • The bill provides sanctions for activities concerning:

    (1) cybersecurity, (2) crude oil projects, (3) financial institutions, (4) corruption, (5) human rights abuses, (6) evasion of sanctions, (7) transactions with Russian defence or intelligence sectors, (8) export pipelines, (9) privatization of state-owned assets by government officials, and (10) arms transfers to Syria.

    Why is India concerned?

    • This sanction is of particular interest to New Delhi, which is also in the process of buying the S-400 from Moscow.
    • This action has sent a clear signal that the US will fully implement CAATSA sanctions and will not tolerate significant transactions with Russia’s defence and intelligence sectors.

    What does the sanction mean?

    These sanctions comprise:

    1. a ban on granting specific US export licences and authorizations for any goods or technology,
    2. a ban on loans or credits by US financial institutions totalling more than $10 million in any 12-month period
    3. a ban on US Export-Import Bank assistance for exports
    • Additionally, sanctions will include full blocking sanctions and visa restrictions as well.
    • Last year, the US had removed Turkey from its F-35 jet programme over concerns that sensitive information could be accessed by Russia if Turkey used Russian systems along with US jets.

    India may get an exemption

    • Most of India’s weapons, naval arsenal, missiles, aircraft and aircraft carriers are of Soviet/Russian origin.
    • As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database, during the period 2010-17, Russia was the top arms supplier to India.
    • The Russian share in India’s arms imports during the same period has declined to 68 per cent, from an all-time high of 74 per cent during the 2000s.
    • The combined share of the US and Israel has increased from nine to 19 per cent.
    • Accounting for about 15 per cent, the US is the second-biggest supplier of arms to India during the five year period ending 2017.
    • Hence, US officials have earlier requested for “some relief from CAATSA” for countries like India.

    China factor

    • China being more assertive and Russia finding new partners, this waiver or “carve-out” would mean India has been able to secure its interests.
    • Hence, the US has designated India as a Major Defence Partner, and both countries coming together on Indo-Pacific strategy, the newly formed Quad, are on a stable footing.

    Why is CAATSA bad?

    • CAATSA impacts Indo-US ties and dents the image of the US as a reliable partner.
    • It also makes a point on principles that, as a sovereign country, India cannot be dictated about its strategic interests by a third country.
    • It also shows the need for India to be nimble-footed in its diplomacy when it comes to its key major power relationships – and one cannot be sacrificed at the cost of another.

    Back2Basics: India-US Defence Partnership

    • India is a major market for the US defence industry.
    • In the last decade, it has grown from near zero to USD 15 billion worth of arms deals.
    • Since 2008, major deals include the C-17 Globemaster, C-130J transport planes, P-8 (I) maritime reconnaissance aircraft, M777 light-weight howitzer, Harpoon missiles, and Apache and Chinook helicopters.
    • In percentage terms, the US share of Indian arms imports total 23 per cent in terms of the number of contracts and 54 per cent by value.
    • This value is all set to increase further with the US likely accepting an Indian request for Sea Guardian drones.

     

  • Building political consensus on climate change

    With the victory of Joe Biden in the U.S. Presidential election geopolitics of the climate change is headed for a new reset. The article examines the role India could play in the changing geopolitical realities and also spells out the challenge for India.

    India’s role in geopolitics of climate change

    • India is probably better prepared than in the past when India was widely seen as part of the problem on climate issues.
    • But the urgency of addressing climate change is likely to intensify for two reasons:
    • 1) The election of Biden as US President.
    • 2) The prospect of cooperation on climate change between Washington and Beijing.
    • India’s ability to influence the new geopolitics of climate change will depend a lot on its domestic political resilience in adapting to the new imperatives.
    • While a democratic India struggles to deal with the new internal conflicts centred on climate, China has crafted a new template of “coercive environmentalism”.
    • The Chinese model of coercive environmentalism is finding an echo among some Western environmentalists.
    • Whatever the merits of authoritarian environmentalism, it has little political chance of being replicated in democracies.

    Cooperation on climate change between the US and China

    • Modernising liberal environmentalism is the essence of president-elect Biden’s commitment to integrating the climate question with the domestic policy agenda.
    • “Climate justice” is another important objective of Biden’s domestic environmental policy.
    • It is based on the recognition that pollution and other ecological problems have a greater impact on the poor and minorities.
    • Although coercive and liberal approaches to managing climate change are different, the US and China share some important objectives.
    • Both China and the US (along with the West) recognise the urgency of the challenge.
    • Beijing and Washington are also racing to develop new technologies that will constitute the foundations of the green economic future.
    • Both have zeroed in on industrial policy to achieve their climate objectives.
    • For Xi and Biden, gaining the leadership of the global movement for mitigating climate change is a strategic mission.
    • Washington and Beijing understand that climate politics is in the end about rearranging the global order.
    • Consequently, the new direction of Chinese and US policies (in partnership with Europe and Japan) will inevitably put pressure on other states for climate actions.

    Conclusion

    India’s real test on climate change is on building a new domestic consensus that can address the economic and political costs associated with an internal adjustment to the prospect of a great global reset.

  • Geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East and consequences for Indian subcontinent

    Three broad trends emerging from the Middle East and its implication for the region have been discussed here.

    Growing vulnerability of Iran and implications for subcontinent

    • The brazen murder of a top Iranian nuclear scientist highlights the Islamic Republic of Iran’s growing strategic vulnerabilities.
    • This geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East has major consequences for the subcontinent.
    • Whether they want to or not, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh must deal with three broad trends that define the new Middle East.

    3 Trends in the Middle East

    1) Iran’s growing isolation

    •  The Trump administration and the Republicans, Israel and the Gulf Arabs have a shared interest in preventing the next US President from renewing nuclear diplomacy with Iran and ending Tehran’s isolation.
    • The assassination of Fakhrizadeh is about achieving that political objective.
    • If Iran retaliates vigorously, it will invite an all-out confrontation with Israel and the US.
    • Holding back will expose Iran’s weakness and sharpen internal divisions between pragmatists who want to engage the US and the hardliners.
    • The frequent attacks on high-profile Iranian targets indicate hostile penetration of its society such that domestic opponents of the regime are now willing to collaborate with foreign security agencies, including Israel’s Mossad.
    •  Iran’s internal political weakness is compounded by the massive economic pain imposed by the Trump administration through sanctions.
    • Iran has much goodwill in South Asia, but India and its neighbours have no desire to get sucked into Tehran’s conflicts with the Arabs or the US.

    2)  Transformation of Arab relations with Israel

    • The fear of Iran has been driving Gulf Arabs to embrace Israel.
    • In the last few months, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have normalised ties with Israel.
    • There is speculation of an impending normalisation of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
    • Pakistan’s Prime Minister has talked of pressure, apparently from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on recognising Israel.
    • If Pakistan recognises Israel, Bangladesh would not want to be left behind.
    • Economic and technological collaboration with Israel will give Bangladesh’s economy and foreign policy a big boost.
    • For Israel, having Bangladesh and Pakistan, two of the world’s largest Islamic nations, recognise it would be a great ideological and political bonus
    • An India that proclaims the virtues of engaging all sides in the Middle East can’t grudge the same privilege for Israel in South Asia.

    3) Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Turkey

    • While Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE want to return the Middle East towards political and religious moderation, the once secular Turkey has become the new champion of political Islam.
    • Turkey’s contestation with Saudi Arabia is already having an impact on India and Pakistan.
    • Turkey is now hostile to India and has joined Pakistan in taking up the Kashmir question at international forums.
    • For Pakistan, this seemed a useful counter to the Gulf Arabs, who were ramping up strategic ties with India.
    • However, UAE and Saudi Arabia have the option to put massive costs on the Pakistani economy that can’t be plugged by Turkey or Malaysia.

    Conclusion

    Although India has made some important adjustments to its engagement with the Middle East in recent years, Delhi can’t take its eyes off the rapid changes in the region.

  • Recalibrating India-Nepal ties

    The article suggests the need for a relook at the India-Nepal ties in the changing geopolitical circumstances. 

    Unchanging perspective on of each other

    • Many in Nepal continue to equate being anti-India with being nationalistic.
    • Politicians and political parties whip up such sentiment especially before an election.
    • Prime Minister K.P. Oli won the 2017 election partly because he projected himself as someone who stood up to India during the blockade.
    • He again whipped up nationalistic sentiments when he got the Nepal map amended to add new territory.
    • India continues to think that by providing aid and development projects in Nepal, it can win Nepali hearts.
    • But despite pouring billions of rupees into Nepal over decades, it has still not been able to do so.
    • Therefore, it needs to reflect on what it is not doing right.

    India’s aid Vs Chines aid to Nepal

    • Two issues are important to understand here.
    • First, all aid to Nepal from countries other than India and China go through the Plans of the Government of Nepal.
    • Indian aid is seen in Nepal as a favour bestowed on a constituency it wants to garner support from rather than a contribution to Nepal’s planned development.
    • Second, India competes with China in providing aid outside government budgets.
    • And China picks up projects of visibility and strategic location.
    • Chinese involvement in Nepal has increased since the April 2015 earthquake and Nepal is surely an area of strategic influence in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

    People-to-people ties

    •  In the past two decades, two significant changes have happened.
    • 1)  Indian workers in Nepal constitute a big part of the workforce and send about $3 billion to India every year.
    • In terms of remittances to India, Nepal ranks eighth.
    • So, the Government of India needs to keep in mind that many households in India are being run with remittances from Nepal.
    • 2) Nepalis have migrated in the past 20 years to more than a hundred countries; India is not the only country that Nepalis rely on for jobs or education.
    • This is a new Nepal comprising young people with global aspirations.
    • Meanwhile, Nepal needs to plan how it engages with the youth in mainland India for whom Nepal is just like Bangladesh or Myanmar.

    Consider the question “The unchanging perspective of each other in both countries calls for the recalibration of India-Nepal ties. Examine the factors that India should consider while having a relook at its ties with Nepal”

    Conclusion

    There are some fundamentals that we simply cannot forget: geography will not change, the border will remain open as millions of livelihoods on both sides depend on it, and China is going to be a big global player with varied interests in the neighbourhood. Therefore, the India-Nepal relationship has to be recalibrated.

  • India and the OIC

    India has hit out at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for making factually incorrect and unwarranted references to Jammu and Kashmir.

    What is OIC?

    • The OIC — formerly Organisation of the Islamic Conference — is the world’s second-largest inter-governmental organisation after the UN, with a membership of 57 states.
    • The OIC’s stated objective is “to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world”.
    • OIC has reserved membership for Muslim-majority countries. Russia, Thailand, and a couple of other small countries have Observer status.

    India’s relationship with OIC

    • At the 45th session of the Foreign Ministers’ Summit in 2018, Bangladesh suggested that India, where more than 10% of the world’s Muslims live, should be given Observer status.
    • In 1969, India was dis-invited from the Conference of Islamic Countries in Rabat, Morocco at Pakistan’s behest.
    • Then Agriculture Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed was dis-invited upon arrival in Morocco after Pakistan President Yahya Khan lobbied against Indian participation.

    Recent developments

    • In 2019, India made its maiden appearance at the OIC Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Abu Dhabi, as a “guest of honour”.
    • Then External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj addressed the Inaugural Plenary.
    • This first-time invitation was seen as a diplomatic victory for New Delhi, especially at a time of heightened tensions with Pakistan following the Pulwama attack.
    • Pakistan had opposed the invitation to Swaraj and it boycotted the plenary after the UAE turned down his demand to rescind the invitation.

    What is the OIC’s stand on Kashmir?

    • It has been generally supportive of Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir and has issued statements criticizing India.
    • These statements over the last three decades became an annual ritual, of little significance to India.
    • Last year, after India revoked Article 370 in Kashmir, Pakistan lobbied with the OIC for their condemnation of the move.
    • To Pakistan’s surprise, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — both top leaders among the Muslim countries — issued nuanced statements, and were not as harshly critical of New Delhi as Islamabad had hoped.
    • Since then, Islamabad has tried to rouse sentiments among the Islamic countries, but only a handful of them — Turkey and Malaysia — publicly criticised India.

    How has India been responding?

    • India has consistently underlined that J&K is an integral part of India and is a matter strictly internal to India.
    • The strength with which India has made this assertion has varied slightly at times, but never the core message.
    • It has maintained its “consistent and well known” stand that the OIC had no locus standi,
    • This time, India went a step ahead and said the grouping continues to allow itself to be used by a certain country “which has a record on religious tolerance, radicalism and persecution of minorities”.

    OIC members and India

    • Individually, India has good relations with almost all member nations. Ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, especially, have looked up significantly in recent years.
    • The OIC includes two of India’s close neighbours, Bangladesh and Maldives.
    • Indian diplomats say both countries privately admit they do not want to complicate their bilateral ties with India on Kashmir but play along with OIC.

    What lies ahead with OIC?

    • India now sees the duality of the OIC untenable, since many of these countries have good bilateral ties and convey to India to ignore OIC statements.
    • But these countries sign off on the joint statements which are largely drafted by Pakistan.
    • South Block feels it is important to challenge the double-speak since Pakistan’s campaign and currency on the Kashmir issue has hardly any takers in the international community.

  • vaccine nationalism

    Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the weaknesses in the multilateralism which is best exemplified by the race among countries for getting access to the vaccine.

    Business out of pandemic

    • It is a crime against humanity to make a profit during any human tragedy.
    • The COVID-19 pandemic is also a human tragedy and needs global solidarity.
    • However, in a liberalised economy, there is a shocking silence in the global market trying to do business out of human suffering
    • This is where organisations of the United Nations and global networks for people should come together in one voice.
    • WHO’s idea of a “voluntary pool to collect patent rights, regulatory test data for developing COVID-19 therapies, vaccines, and diagnostics” was met with criticism.

    How to ensure equitable access to vaccine

    • The advance purchase agreements that some countries have negotiated with pharmaceutical companies exemplify the rich grabbing everything first trends.
    • Such vaccine nationalism undermines equitable access to vaccines. 
    • There has to be prioritisation for high-risk groups in all countries.
    • That framework has to be accepted by the global community without dispute.
    • In this, the COVAX partnership is a mechanism for ensuring that.
    • GAVI, or the Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative, was in existence during the pre-COVID-19 period to ensure the pooled procurement and equitable supply of life-saving vaccines to low- and middle-income countries.
    • It has been roped in for the COVID-19 vaccine too.

    Role of the governments

    • World Health Organization Director-General exhorted member countries to treat COVID-19 technologies as a “public good”.
    • If it is a public good, governments must step in to regulate its development, innovation, manufacture, sale, and supply ultimately to the public.
    • If such an idealistic outcome does not materialise based on basic human rights then some regulation mandated by the UN General Assembly must be thought of.
    • Through the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Doha Ministerial Conference declaration 2001, the WTO made provisions for compulsory licensing. 

    Consider the question “Vaccine nationalism has consequences for cooperation on the global problem. Examine the issue of vaccine nationalism and suggest ways to ensure equitable distribution”

    Way forward

    • Compulsory licensing is an extreme step available with India if rich countries go for advance purchase and hoarding of a COVID-19 vaccine produced in India by multinational pharma companies and deny India’s supply needs.
    • COVID-19 vaccine candidates are still in Phase 3 trials; the compulsory licence clause cannot be applied.
    • So, coercion to issue “voluntary licensing” to subsidiary companies in many developing countries such as India, Egypt, Thailand and Brazil by the patent holder is another option.
    • India and South Africa jointly sent out a communication, to the IPR Council of the WTO for a waiver of the protection of copyright, design, trademarks and patent on COVID-19 related technologies including vaccines.
    • If this is decided favourably as a special case considering the unprecedented impact of the pandemic, it will set a precedent.
    • Global campaigns through the media and civil society organisations can garner enough momentum to exert pressure on TRIPS.

    Conclusion

    Having nothing less than vaccines and life-saving medicines being treated as a public good must definitely be the long-term goal.