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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Chabahar Rail Project

    An Iranian diplomat in an interview has said that Tehran now hopes that New Delhi will help facilitate equipment for the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line under a line of credit promised to it in 2018.

    Try this question

    Q. Discuss the strategic and economic significance of Chabahar Port and Rail Project for India.

    Recent controversy

    • The Iranian government in July had decided to proceed with the construction of this project on its own, citing delays from the Indian side in funding and starting the project.

    The Chabahar Rail Project

    • It is a 628 km Chabahar-Zahedan line, which will be extended to Zaranj across the border in Afghanistan.
    • The entire project would be completed by March 2022.
    • It was meant to be part of India’s commitment to the trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan to build an alternate trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

    Why did Iran omit India from the project?

    • Despite several site visits by engineers, and preparations by Iranian railways, India never began the work, ostensibly due to worries that these could attract U.S. sanctions.
    • The U.S. had provided a sanctions waiver for the Chabahar port and the rail line to Zahedan, but it has been difficult to find equipment suppliers and partners due to worries they could be targeted by the U.S.
    • India has already “zeroed out” its oil imports from Iran due to U.S. sanctions.

    India’s reluctance with Iran

    • Looking at the whole aspects of relations, when it comes to politics, there has been a great common understanding and shared interests.
    • But when it comes to economic and trade relations, it has been subject to some limits and restrictions, which are hampered by the various sanctions imposed.
    • The US had put pressure directly or indirectly on the relations, although that has not been the will of both sides.

    The contentious partnership with China

    • Iran and China are close to finalising a 25-year Strategic Partnership which will include Chinese involvement in Chabahar’s duty-free zone, an oil refinery nearby, and possibly a larger role in Chabahar port as well.
    • The cooperation will extend from investments in infrastructure, manufacturing and upgrading energy and transport facilities, to refurbishing ports, refineries and other installations.
    • It is also rumoured that the Chabahar port will be leased to China surpassing India.
    • Iran had proposed a tie-up between the port at Gwadar and Chabahar last year and has offered interests to China in the Bandar-e-Jask port 350km away from Chabahar, as well as in the Chabahar duty-free zone.

    Back2Basics: India-Iran Partnership over Chabahar Port

    • In 2016, India signed a deal with Iran entailing $8 billion investment in Chabahar port and industries in Chabahar Special Economic Zone.
    • The port is being developed as a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
    • India has already built a 240-km road connecting Afghanistan with Iran.
    • All this were expected to bring cargo to Bandar Abbas port and Chabahar port, and free Kabul from its dependence on Pakistan to reach the outer world.
    • Completion of this project would give India access to Afghanistan and beyond to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe via 7,200-km-long multi-modal North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

  • Sharing Indo-Pacific vision in the region

     Where do we geographically place the Indo-Pacific?

    • Term “Indo-Pacific” has come into prominence in the past decade.
    • India has used it in joint statements with a series of partner countries, including but not limited to the United States, Australia, France, Indonesia, Japan, and of course the United Kingdom.
    • It figures in meetings with our ASEAN and has helped advance the Quad consultations.
    • Indian Foreign Ministry has recently set up an Indo-Pacific Division as well as an Oceania Division a sign of India’s commitment to this critical geography.
    • This has encouraged other countries to perceive and define the region in its full extent.
    • For India, the Indo-Pacific is that vast maritime space stretching from the western coast of North America to the eastern shores of Africa.
    • Today, more and more countries are aligning their definition of the Indo-Pacific with Indias.

    Historical background

    • During the Cold War, the Indo-Pacific was divided into different spheres of influence and military theatres.
    • Whether it was the monsoon winds– or our maritime and trading history, we found it impossible to see the Horn of Africa and the Straits of Malacca on the other as disconnected.
    • The first for this is that the Indian peninsula, which thrusts into the Indian Ocean and gives us two magnificent coasts and near limitless maritime horizons to both our east and our west.
    • Monks and merchants, culture and cargo have travelled from India on those waters, to our east, west and south.
    • India’s great religious traditions, such as Buddhism, spread far and wide in the Indo-Pacific.
    • These experiences are our past and are our future; these experiences determine our concept of the Indo-Pacific.

    Why is the Indo-Pacific crucial?

    • The interconnectedness of the Indo-Pacific is finally coming into full play.
    • A motivating factor is the region’s emergence as a driver of international trade and well-being.
    • The Indo-Pacific ocean system carries an estimated 65 per cent of world trade and contributes 60 per cent of global GDP.
    • Ninety per cent of India’s international trade travels on its waters.
    • For us, and for many others, the shift in the economic trajectory from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific has been hugely consequential.
    • The rise of China and the imperative for a global rebalancing have added to the mix.
    • A rules-based international order is achievable only with a rules-based Indo-Pacific.

    India’s Indo-Pacific strategy

    • India’s Indo-Pacific strategy was enunciated in 2018 as the SAGAR doctrine.
    •  SAGAR is an acronym for “Security and Growth for All in the Region”.
    • This aspiration depends on securing end-to-end supply chains in the region; no disproportionate dependence on a single country; and ensuring prosperity for all stakeholder nations.
    • An Indo-Pacific guided by norms and governed by rules, with freedom of navigation, open connectivity, and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states, is an article of faith for India.
    • Using this Initiative, India plans to support the building of a rules-based regional architecture resting on seven pillars. These are:1) Maritime security
      2) Maritime ecology
      3) Maritime resources
      4) Capacity building and resource sharing
      5) Disaster risk reduction and management
      6) Science, technology and academic cooperation
      7) Trade connectivity and maritime transport
    • We have sought to strengthen security and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific by becoming a net security provider – in the Gulf of Aden.
    • Sharing what we can, in equipment, training and exercises, we have built relationships with partner countries across the region.
    • In the past six years, India has provided coastal surveillance radar systems to half a dozen nations – Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
    • All of these countries also use Indian patrol boats, as do Mozambique and Tanzania.
    •  Mobile training teams have been deputed to 11 countries.
    • Located just outside New Delhi, the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region has enhanced maritime domain awareness among partner countries.
    • India has also promoted and contributed to infrastructure, connectivity, economic projects and supply chains in the region.

    Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

    • Notable humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions in the Indo-Pacific in recent years have included Operation Rahat in Yemen in 2015.
    • Whether it was the cyclone in Sri Lanka in 2016 or deaths and large-scale displacement of people that occurred in Madagascar in January this year, Indian assistance and an Indian ship have never been far away.
    • The Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI)is intrinsic to India’s regional and global commitment to taking on climate change.

    Conclusion

    Whatever the navigation map, the fact that the Indo-Pacific is the 21st century’s locus of political and security concerns and competition, of growth and development, and of technology incubation and innovation is indisputable.

  • Back in news: Kartarpur Corridor

    Pakistan has decided to transfer the management of the Kartarpur Sahib Gurudwara from a Sikh body to a separate trust, saying it runs against the religious sentiments of the Sikh community.

    Try this PYQ:

    Consider the following Bhakti Saints:

    1. Dadu Dayal
    2. Guru Nanak
    3. Tyagaraja

    Who among the above was/were preaching when the Lodi dynasty fell and Babur took over?

    (a) 1 and 3

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 2 and 3

    (d) 1 and 2

    Kartarpur Corridor

    • The Kartarpur corridor connects the Darbar Sahib Gurdwara in Narowal district of Pakistan with the Dera Baba Nanak shrine in Gurdaspur district in India’s Punjab province.
    • The first guru of Sikhism, Guru Nanak, founded Kartarpur in 1504 AD on the right bank of the Ravi River. The name Kartarpur means “Place of God”.
    • The corridor is being built to commemorate 550th birth anniversary celebrations of Guru Nanak Dev, founder of Sikhism on 12th November 2019.

    About Guru Nanak

    • Guru Nanak Dev (1469-1539) also referred to as Baba Nanak was the founder of Sikhism and is the first of the ten Sikh Gurus.
    • He advocated the ‘Nirguna’ form of Bhakti. He rejected sacrifices, ritual baths, image worship, austerities and the scriptures of both Hindus and Muslims.
    • He appointed one of his disciples, Angad, to succeed him as the preceptor (guru), and this practice was followed for nearly 200 years.
    • The fifth preceptor, Guru Arjan, compiled his hymns along with those of his four successors and also other religious poets, like Baba Farid, Ravidas and Kabir, in the Adi Granth Sahib.

  • Importance of Gilgit-Baltistan

    Pakistan government has recently announced that it would give the Gilgit-Baltistan region “provisional provincial status”. When that happens, G-B will become the sixth official province of Pakistan.

    Tap to read more about: Reorganization of J&K

    Gilgit-Baltistan

    • Gilgit-Baltistan is the northernmost territory administered by Pakistan, providing the country’s only territorial frontier, and thus a land route, with China, where it meets the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
    • The region is an illegally occupied Indian territory as it was the part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu & Kashmir as it existed in 1947 at its accession to India.
    • To G-B’s west is Afghanistan, to its south is Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and to the east J&K.

    Its current status

    • Though Pakistan, like India, links G-B’s fate to that of Kashmir, its administrative arrangements are different from those in PoK.
    • While PoK has its own Constitution that sets out its powers and their limits vis-à-vis Pakistan, G-B has been ruled mostly by executive fiat.
    • Until 2009, the region was simply called Northern Areas.
    • It had a Northern Areas Legislative Council with the Legislative Assembly. The NALC was an elected body, but had no more than an advisory role to the Islamabad.

    Why the separate status?

    • Pakistan’s separate arrangement with G-B goes back to the circumstances under which it came to administer it. On November 1 1947, after J&K ruler Hari Singh had signed the Instrument of Accession with India.
    • Gilgit had been leased to the British by Hari Singh in 1935. The British returned it in August 1947.
    • Pakistan did not accept G-B’s accession although it took administrative control of the territory.
    • India went to the UN and a series of resolutions were passed in the Security Council on the situation in Kashmir.
    • Pakistan believed that neither G-B nor PoK should be annexed to Pakistan, as this could undermine the international case for a plebiscite in Kashmir.
    • It also reckons that in the event a plebiscite ever takes place in Kashmir, votes in G-B will be important too. This is why it is only being called “provisional” provincial status.

    Move for a status-quo?

    • The plan to grant G-B provincial status is linked to CPEC and Chinese interest as well as a response to India’s abrogation of Art. 370.
    • While India has objected to the plan to make G-B a province of Pakistan and in the recent past asserted that it will take control of G-B, there is a realization that it is impossible to change the map now.
    • In this sense, it can be argued that the merger of G-B with Pakistan is a move that could help both countries put the past behind and move forward on the Kashmir issue, sometime in the future.

    What do the people in G-B want?

    • The people of G-B have been demanding for years that it be made a part of Pakistan since there is virtual no connect with India.
    • Some have in the past demanded a merger with PoK, but the people of G-B have no real connect with Kashmir either.
    • They belong to several non-Kashmiri ethnicities and speak various languages, none of these Kashmiri.
    • A majority of the estimated 1.5 million G-B residents are Shias. There is anger against Pakistan for unleashing extremist sectarian militant groups that target Shias.
    • There is a movement for independence, but it has very little traction.

  • Consolidation of quad reflects India’s political will

    Quad as new feature of Indo-Pacific

    • Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercises marks the emergence of the Quad as a new feature of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
    • The question is India’s ability to take full advantage of the possibilities after the US elections to construct a wide range of new international coalitions.
    • Likely changes could envelop a range of old institutions like the Five Eyes and the G-7 grouping that coordinates Western policies on global economic management.
    • We could also see the creation of a new League of Democracies that will addres issues like including the defence of shared values, commerce, corruption, taxation, climate change and digital governance.

    Phases of India’s international aspiration

    • The consolidation of the Quad reflects the political will in Delhi to break free from old shibboleths and respond to security imperatives.
    • The post-Quad era opens a new phase in which India, for the first time, can help shape global institutions.
    • First phase: Idealism was the hallmark of India’s internationalism in the 1950s, the harsh politics of the Cold War quickly dampened it.
    • Second phase: In the 1970s, India embraced the radical agenda of a New International Economic Order, as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. The results were meagre.
    • Third phase began with the end of the Cold War.
    • And as India’s own economic model collapsed, India had to focus on economic reform and prevent the world from intruding too much into its internal affairs.
    • The fear of the US activism on Kashmir and nuclear issues saw Delhi turn to Russia and China in search of a “multipolar world” that could constrain American power.
    • The BRICS forum with Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa became emblematic of this strategy.
    • Delhi also figured out that it was not possible for BRICS to constrain Beijing, since China was so much bigger than the other four members put together.
    • Fourth phase in India’s multilateralism is marked by three features — the relative rise in Delhi’s international standing, the breakdown of the great power consensus on economic globalisation, and the breakout of the US-China rivalry.

    Efforts to tackle China

    • The Trump administration has already sought to imagine the Quad’s possibilities beyond the defence domain.
    • The invitation to India to join a Five Eyes meeting came amidst the bipartisan calls in the US Congress for the expansion of the forum and the inclusion of India.
    • The “Quad Plus” dialogue has variously drawn in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam for consultations with the Quad members on coordinating the responses to the pandemic.
    • India is also engaged with Japan and Australia in developing resilient supply chains to reduce the reliance on China.
    • President Trump has proposed the expansion of G-7 grouping to include Australia, India, Russia and South Korea.
    • The last few months has seen the Trump administration promote a “Clean Network” that eliminates untrustworthy vendors from telecom systems, digital apps, trans-oceanic cables and cloud infrastructure.
    • Clean Network is now a broader effort to build secure technology ecosystems among like-minded countries.
    • Britain is said to be developing plans to convene a coalition of 10 democracies, including India, that can contribute to the construction of secure 5G networks and reduce the current dependence on China.
    • France and Canada have invited India to join the Global Partnership on artificial intelligence that now includes 15 countries.
    • The objective is to promote responsible development of AI that is consistent with shared democratic values.

    Conclusion

    Delhi’s participation in the sweeping rearrangement of the global structures will have major consequences for India’s economic prosperity and technological future. Unlike in the past, Delhi now has the resources, leverage and political will to make a difference to the global order

  • [pib] Mission Sagar – II

    As part of ‘Mission Sagar-II’, Indian Naval Ship Airavat had entered Port Sudan.

    Mission SAGAR, unlike other missions, can create confusion with the name and its purpose. Make note of such special cases. UPSC can ask such questions as one liner MCQs.

    Mission Sagar – II

    • Mission Sagar-II, follows the first ‘Mission Sagar’ undertaken in May-June 2020, wherein India reached out to Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and Comoros, and provided food aid and medicines.
    • As part of Mission Sagar-II, Indian Naval Ship Airavat will deliver food aid to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea.
    • This mission is in line with the Prime Minister’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region ‘SAGAR’ and highlights the importance accorded by India to relations with her maritime neighbours.

    Back2Basics

    SAGAR Programme (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    • SAGAR is a term coined by PM Modi in 2015 during his Mauritius visit with a focus on the blue economy.
    • It is a maritime initiative which gives priority to the Indian Ocean region for ensuring peace, stability and prosperity of India in the Indian Ocean region.
    • The goal is to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other`s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.
    • It is in line with the principles of the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

    IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)

    • Established in 1997 in Ebene Cyber City, Mauritius.
    • First established as Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in Mauritius on March 1995 and formally launched in 1997 by the conclusion of a multilateral treaty known as the Charter of the IORA for Regional Cooperation.
    • It is based on the principles of Open Regionalism for strengthening Economic Cooperation particularly on Trade Facilitation and Investment, Promotion as well as Social Development of the region.

  • The challenges of walking the Indo-Pacific talk

    The article analyses the similarity, differences and limitations of the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct and delineate the challenges India as it seeks to deal with China.

    Expectations from India in countering China

    • During the mid-2000s the world expected India to be an economic powerhouse, a decade later, those expectations remain modest, at best.
    • The international community has once again decided to court New Delhi to play a decisive role in shaping the region’s strategic future.
    • The expectation this time is more strategic and military, to lead the charge against China from within the region.

    Role of India in the Quad and similarity with Indo-Pacific construct

    • Quad is a forum for strategic and military consultations among India, the U.S., Australia and Japan.
    • Quad members are also major States in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Both the Quad and the Indo-Pacific constructs are focused on China.
    • More so, they are also in some ways centred around India’s geographic location and its policies.
    • Put differently, if you take China out of the equation, they would have little rationale for existence.
    • If you take India out of the picture, their ability to sustain as geopolitical constructs would drastically diminish.

    Differences between  Indo-Pacific Construct and Quad

    • The Indo-Pacific is a politico-economic vision and the Quad is a military-strategic vision which does not form the military or strategic nucleus of the first.
    • While the Indo-Pacific provides a complex political and economic picture with a hesitant, but growing, articulation of China as a strategic challenge.
    • The Quad is inherently more anti-China in character and intent.
    • The Indo-Pacific,will find it impossible to avoid engaging China, the Quad is mostly focused on diplomatic signalling and with little common intent let alone joint action.
    • Quad’s ability to succeed would entirely depend on China — the more aggressive China gets, the more resolute the Quad countries would be in strengthening it.

    Comparing Indio-Pacific with BRI

    • The BRI is far more advanced, much more thought-out, and enjoyes the support of Chinese state.
    • Several Indo-Pacific countries are already members of the BRI.
    • On the flip side, the BRI is already under immense stress from its inherent weaknesses, such as China’s unilateral pursuit of the BRI and the associated economic burdens on the States that sign up to it.

    Challenges India face

    1) On economic front

    • There must be strong economic partnerships and linkages among its members, merely focusing on strategic talk and possible military cooperation will not work.
    • India’s recent decision not to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), could potentially complicate the country’s future engagements in the region.
    • Also worryinng is the already huge gap between India and China on trade with almost every Indo-Pacific country.
    • This growing trade gap will be a major determining factor in shaping the region’s strategic realities.
    • Institutional engagement: India does not have FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., Bangladesh and the Maldives. It has FTAs with South Korea, the Association of South East Asian Nations, or ASEAN, Japan and Sri Lanka.
    • In the case of China, it has FTAs with all these countries barring the U.S.

    2) On strategic and military front

    • India strategic and military engagements in the region also fall short.
    • Beijing is a major defence supplier to several of the region’s States including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
    • This dwarfs India’s minimal sales, defence dialogues and occasional joint military exercises in the region.

    Way forward

    • India’s role in the Indo-Pacific will remain limited if it does not prove to be a major economic partner to these States.
    • But given the economic slowdown in India today in the wake of COVID-19 and the lack of political consensus about RCEP, India’s ability to economically engage with the region remains limited.
    • On the military-strategic side too, India’s performance in the region is less than desirable.
    • The only choice, it appears then, is for some sort of a loosely structured regional strategic alliance with the U.S. and its allies in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

    Consider the question ” What are the similarities and differences in the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct? What are the challenges India faces as it increases its engagement in the both.” 

    Conclusion

    India remains caught between a deeply constrained, but unavoidable, need to rethink its strategic posture, and the recognition of its material inability to do so, at least for now.

  • Excessive optimism over a pact with election-bound US is premature

    The growing pace of India-US bilateral engagement has raised hopes in several quarters. However, there are several issues that must be considered and need to avoid excessive optimism. 

    Timing of 2+2 dialogue

    • The India-US 2+2 third meeting was held in Delhi only a week before the US presidential elections.
    • The government felt that it was important to seal the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) without delay.
    • Other reason could be government’s assessment that there is bipartisan support in the US for higher and positive bilateral ties.

    Need for caution in India’s approach

    • In India-US ties, the leading outside consideration is China.
    • A Biden presidency, should that be the choice of the American people, would seek to ensure that China’s rise is not at the cost of the US’s global pre-eminence.
    • However, the strategy and methods it employs would be different from that of its predecessor.
    • Further, even a Trump 2 administration, with the election done, may change course in its China approach.
    • Hence, caution and prudence are good diplomatic watchwords.
    • It is good that the agreements for a full defence engagement with the US are in place.
    • But it is one matter to have them done and an entirely different one insofar as the nature and intensity of cooperation.
    • So, India’s tradition of relying on its own strengths in matters of national security should not be eroded in the hope that an outside power would provide useful inputs.

    Alliance Vs. Partnership

    • India-US ties are in the framework of a partnership, not an alliance.
    • The partnership may not be based on opposition to an outside element, the alliance almost always is.
    • Alliances also demand a much higher price than partnerships, through loss of autonomy if the ally is a bigger power.

    Excessive enthusiasm on Quad may be premature

    • The 2+2 joint statement does not name China but its thrust is clear.
    • The Quad is based on a commonality of concerns on account of China’s actions.
    • India’s decision to go along with a more purposive group, including through its maritime exercises, is in keeping with its interests.
    • The real direction that the Quad will take has to await the US’s overall China strategy over the next few years.
    • Excessive enthusiasm on the Quad front may, therefore, be premature.

    Way forward

    • India has to change the nature of its economic and commercial ties with China.
    • Thus, the joint statement’s reference on the need to “enhance supply chain resilience and to seek alternatives to the current paradigm” was timely, though here, again, the future US approach is not entirely certain.
    • The areas where the bilateral partnership has the potential of evolving most positively for India relate to health, education and science and technology.
    • There should not be any reluctance in developing ties in defence industries, too, but it cannot be forgotten that no country will part with any of its critical technologies.
    • But there cannot be a substitute for developing indigenous capacity for India’s needs for weapon systems.

    Conclusion

    India-US ties will move positively forward but there will be imponderables ahead, principally arising out of US strategies towards China. But, a close embrace of another country is always problematic.

  • India-Myanmar relations

    The Foreign Secretary and Chief of the Army Staff have recently visited Myanmar reflected India’s multidimensional interests in the country.

    Try this question:

    Q.Myanmar is the key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach. Analyse.

    India-Myanmar relations

    • There are two lines of thinking that drive India’s Myanmar policy: engagement with key political actors and balancing neighbours.
    • For Myanmar, the visit would be viewed as India’s support for its efforts in strengthening democratization amidst criticisms by rights groups over the credibility of its upcoming election.

    Non-interference in internal politics

    • The political logic that has shaped India’s Myanmar policy since the 1990s has been to support democratization driven from within the country.
    • This has allowed Delhi to engage with the military that played a key role in Myanmar’s political transition and is still an important political actor.
    • A key factor behind the military regime’s decision to open the country when it initiated reforms was, in part, to reduce dependence on China.

    India as an alternative

    • By engaging Myanmar, Delhi provides alternative options to Naypyidaw.
    • This driver in India’s Myanmar policy has perhaps gained greater salience in the rapidly changing regional geopolitics.

    Recent initiatives

    • Like in other neighbouring countries, India suffers from an image of being unable to get its act together in making its presence felt on the ground.
    • The inauguration of the liaison office of the Embassy of India in Naypyidaw (the capital) may seem a routine diplomatic activity.
    • However, establishing a permanent presence in the capital where only a few countries have set up such offices does matter.
    • Interestingly, China was the first country to establish a liaison office in Naypyidaw in 2017.
    • India has also proposed to build a petroleum refinery in Myanmar that would involve an investment of $6 billion.

    Strategic calculus

    • This is an indication of Myanmar’s growing significance in India’s strategic calculus.
    • It also shows India’s evolving competitive dynamic with China in the sector at a time when tensions between the two have intensified.
    • Another area of cooperation that has expanded involves the border areas.
    • Furthermore, the recent announcement that India was transferring a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar demonstrates the depth of their cooperation in the maritime domain.

    The balancing act

    • For Delhi, the balancing act between Bangladesh and Myanmar remains one of the keys to its overall approach to the Rohingya issue.
    • Delhi has reiterated its support for “ensuring the safe, sustainable and speedy return of displaced persons” to Myanmar.
    • By positioning as playing an active role in facilitating the return of Rohingya refugees, India has made it clear that it supports Myanmar’s efforts and also understands Bangladesh’s burden.
    • For Delhi, engaging rather than criticizing is the most practical approach to finding a solution.

    Conclusion

    • For India, Myanmar is key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach.
    • Delhi’s political engagement and diplomatic balancing seem to have worked so far in its ties with Myanmar.
    • Whether it has leveraged these advantages on the ground to the full is open to debate.
    • The aforementioned initiatives could be the beginning of change on the ground by establishing India’s presence in sectors where it ought to be more pronounced.

  • New dimension to the bilateral engegement

    The article draws parallels in the past in India and China’s engagement with West Asia and contrasts it with the present approach adopted by China in dealing with the region.

    Strategic autonomy

    • According to a former Foreign Secretary of India, Vijay Gokhale, the ideation of ‘strategic autonomy’ is much different from the Nehruvian era thinking of ‘non-alignment’.
    • Speaking in January 2019, Mr. Gokhale said: “The alignment is issue based, and not ideological.”

    India’s engagement with West Asia

    • Pre-dating 2020, India’s outreach to West Asia sharpened since 2014.
    •  Oil-rich Gulf states looked at India as investment alternative away from the West to deepen their own strategic depth.
    • India also doubled down on its relations with the likes of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, giving open economic and political preference to the larger Gulf region.
    • While engagements with Israel moved steadily forward, Iran lagged behind, constrained by U.S. sanctions, which in turn significantly slowed the pace of India-Iran engagements.

    China’s engagement with West Asia

    • China’s overtures have been steadily more adventurous as it realises two major shifts that have taken place in West Asia.
    • First, the thinking in the Gulf that the American security safety net is not absolute.
    • Second, the Gulf economies such as Saudi Arabia, even though trying to shift away from petro dollar, will still need growing markets to sell oil to in the coming decade as they reform their economic systems.
    • The obvious two markets here are China and India.

    Similarity in India and China’s approach to West Asia

    • Both India and China employed similar versions of ‘non-alignment’ thinking is in West Asia based on equitable engagement with the three poles of power in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.
    • Both countries did it without getting involved into the region’s multi-layered conflicts and political fissures.
    • However, deteriorating U.S.-China ties, the COVID-19 pandemic that started in China, followed by the Ladakh crisis, is forcing a drastic change in the geopolitical playbooks of the two Asian giants, and, by association, global security architectures as well.

    Changing approach of China

    •  A report in September shone a light on a $400 billion, 25-year understanding between Iran and China, with Beijing taking advantage of abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal.
    • China is no longer happy with a passive role in West Asia, and through concepts such as “negative peace” and “peace through development”.
    • In concert with tools such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is now ready to offer an alternative model for “investment and influence”.
    •  It remains to be seen, however, how China balances itself between the poles of power while backing one so aggressively.

    Stability of the region and opportunity for India

    • From India’s perspective, the overt outreach to the Gulf and the ensuing announcements of multi-billion-dollar investments on Indian shores by entities from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is only New Delhi recognising the economic realities of the region. 
    • Despite entanglements in the Yemen war and general tensions between the Gulf states and Iran, the likes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and so on have maintained relatively strong and stable economic progression.
    • Israel’s recent peace accords with the UAE and Bahrain add much further weight towards a more stable Gulf region — the caveats withstanding that the operationalisation of the accords is smooth and long-lasting.

    Consider the question “Despite turbulence in the region, India’s engagement with West Asia has always been characterised by non-alignment and ethos of equitable engagement. In light of this, elaborate on India’s approach to the region and region’s importance for India.”

    Conclusion

    While in the recent past, the Indo-Pacific, with the development of the Quad, has taken centre stage, other geographies such as West Asia have also started to showcase bolder examples of New Delhi and Beijing’s metamorphosing approaches towards the international arena.