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Subject: Fundamental Rights,DPSP

1. History + Evolution
2. Features
3. Amendments
4. Basic Structure

  • Explained: Article 131, on which Kerala has based its challenge to the CAA

    • The Kerala government moved the Supreme Court against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act becoming the first state to challenge the law.
    • It filed a petition under Article 131 of the Constitution and asked for the law to be declared unconstitutional and in violation of Articles 14 (equality before law), 21 (protection of life and personal liberty) and 25 (freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion).

    What is Article 131 of the Constitution?

    • The Article vests the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over disputes occurring between states or between states and the Centre.
    • The original jurisdiction of a court means the power to hear a case for the first time, as opposed to appellate jurisdiction, in which the court reviews the decision of a lower court.
    • Unlike the original jurisdiction under Article 32 (which gives the top court the power to issue writs, etc.), the jurisdiction in Article 131 is exclusive, meaning it is only the Supreme Court which has this authority.
    • Under Article 226, the High Courts too have the power to issue writs, directions etc.

    Original jurisdiction

    • Article 131 reads, “Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute —

    (a) between the Government of India and one or more States; or
    (b) between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or
    (c) between two or more States,
    if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends:

    • The said jurisdiction shall not extend to a dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad, or other similar instrument which, having been entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution.
    • However they continue in operation after such commencement, or which provides, that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to such a dispute.

    What kinds of disputes are covered under Article 131?

    • In ‘State of Rajasthan vs Union of India’, 1977, the Supreme Court ruled that the existence or extent of a legal right is a precursor before a suit under Article 131 is entertained. But mere wrangles between governments have no place in the scheme of that Article.
    • Similarly, in the 1978 case, ‘State of Karnataka vs Union of India’, which involved the Centre’s authority to order an inquiry into a state Chief Minister’s conduct, jurisdiction under Article 131 was held valid.
    • In the present case filed by Kerala, central legislation (CAA) is being challenged. In 2011, a two-judge Supreme Court Bench in ‘Madhya Pradesh v Union of India’ had held such a suit was not maintainable.
    • Later in 2013, another two-judge Bench in ‘State of Jharkhand v State of Bihar and Another’ disagreed with the previous verdict and referred the matter to a larger Bench. Kerala’s plaint relies on the 2013 verdict.

  • [op-ed snap] The warp and weft of religious liberty

    Context

    While extending the scope and extent of the freedom of religion, the SC would face the difficult question of balancing it with the other provisions and rights enshrined in the Constitution.

    What the 9-Judge bench will deliberate on?

    • The establishment of the Bench emanated out of an order of reference made on review petitions filed against the Sabarimala judgment.
    • The scope and extent of religious liberty: It will answer a series of wide-ranging questions and expound the scope and extent of the Constitution’s religious liberty clauses.
    • It will also deliberate on cases including the practice of female genital mutilation and the rights of Parsi women to enter fire temples.

    The question of balance

    • Within the Constitution of India, there are two impulses that may, at times, come into conflict with one another.
    • First impulse-Religious freedom: India is a pluralist and diverse nation, where groups and communities — whether religious or cultural — have always played an important role in society.
      • Religious freedom: Following up on this impulse, the Constitution recognises both the freedom of religion as an individual right (Article 25), as well as the right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion (Article 26).
    • The second impulse-Protection of an individual: The second impulse, recognises that while the community can be a source of solidarity at the best of times, it can also be a terrain of oppression and exclusion.
      • So, both Articles 25 and 26 are subject to public order, morality, and health.
      • Article 25 is also subject to other fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and to the state’s power to bring in social reform laws.

    Finding the middle ground

    • The middle ground involves respecting and balancing the following-
      • The autonomy of communities: It involves respecting the autonomy of cultural and religious communities.
      • Individual rights: It involves ensuring that individual rights are not entirely sacrificed at the altar of the community.
    • Essential practice doctrine: Over the years, the Supreme Court has found the middle ground by carving out a jurisprudence that virtually allows it to sit in theological judgments.
      • What is constitutionally protected? It recognising that it is only those practices that are “essential” to religion that enjoys constitutional protection.
      • Any other ritual is seen as secular and amenable to the state’s interference.
      • This doctrine was used to rule, in 2004, that the performance of the Tandava dance was not an essential tenet of the religious faith of the Ananda Margis.
      • The SC said that the “essential religious practices” test is indeed the only way it can reconcile the two impulses.

    Anti-exclusion principle

    • What are the options with the SC?
      • Continue with the “essential practice” doctrine: One option before the nine-judge Bench would simply be to affirm existing jurisprudence, as it stands.
      • Anti-exclusion principle: The second option would be to ask whether the effect of the disputed religious practice is to cause harm to individual rights.
      • The enquiry, thus, is not whether the practice is truly religious, but whether its effect is to subordinate, exclude, or otherwise send a signal that one set of members is entitled to lesser respect and concern than others.
      • In Sabrimala case — both the concurring opinion of Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and the dissenting opinion of Justice Indu Malhotra agreed that this ought to be the test.
    • Protection of dissenters
      • Top-down nature: Many religious communities, norms, and practices are shaped and imposed from above, by community leaders, and then enforced with the force of social sanction.
      • Dissenters are then faced with an impossible choice: Either comply with discriminatory practices or make a painful exit from the community.
      • Judicial intervention: It is here that the Constitution can help by ensuring that the oppressed and excluded among communities can call upon the Court for aid.

    Conclusion

    • The nine-judge Bench will face a difficult and delicate task of constitutional interpretation. Much will ride upon its decision: the rights of women in particular and of many other vulnerable groups in general.
    • Also will depend on its decision the constitutional vision of ensuring a life of dignity and equality to all, both in the public sphere and in the sphere of community.

  • Explained: Doctrine of ‘Presumption of Constitutionality’

    Recently the Supreme Court declined urgent hearing on a plea seeking to declare the CAA as constitutional and said that there was already a “presumption of constitutionality” to a law passed by Parliament.  CJI has said that the court’s role was to examine the validity, and not declare a law constitutional.

    Doctrine of Presumption of Constitutionality

    • The term ‘presumption of constitutionality’ is a legal principle that is used by courts during statutory interpretation — the process by which courts interpret and apply a law passed by the legislature, such as Parliament.
    • In the 1992 Supreme Court case ‘ML Kamra v New India Assurance’, Justice K Ramaswamy said: “The court ought not to interpret the statutory provisions, unless compelled by their language, in such a manner as would involve its unconstitutionality.
    • The legislature of the rule making authority is presumed to enact a law which does not contravene or violate the constitutional provisions.
    • Therefore, there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of a legislation or statutory rule unless ex facie it violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.
    • If the provisions of a law or the rule is construed in such a way as would make it consistent with the Constitution and another interpretation would render the provision or the rule unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. ” (“ex facie” meaning ‘on the face’)

    When does this apply?

    • It is a cardinal principle of construction that the Statute and the Rule or the Regulation must be held to be constitutionally valid unless and until it is established they violate any specific provision of the Constitution.
    • Further it is the duty of the Court to harmoniously construe different provisions of any Act or Rule or Regulation, if possible, and to sustain the same rather than striking down the provisions out right.
    • The presumption is not absolute, however, and does not stand when there is a gross violation of the Constitution.

    Limitations to the doctrine

    • A three-judge Bench in ‘NDMC v State of Punjab’ (1996) spoke of the limitations to the doctrine.
    • The Bench observed that the Doctrine is not one of infinite application; it has recognised limitations.
    • The Court has consistently followed a policy of not putting an unnatural and forced meaning on the words that have been used by the legislature in the search for an interpretation which would save the statutory provisions.

  • Private Property is a Human Right: Supreme Court

    The right to property is a human right, the Supreme Court has recently ruled.

    What did the court say?

    • A citizen’s right to own private property is a human right. The state cannot take possession of it without following due procedure and authority of law, the Supreme Court has held in a recent judgment.
    • The state cannot trespass into the private property of a citizen and then claim ownership of the land in the name of ‘adverse possession’.
    • Grabbing private land and then claiming it as its own makes the state an encroacher.
    • Article 300A required the state to follow due procedure and authority of law to deprive a person of his or her private property, the Supreme Court reminded the government.

    Adverse possession

    • A welfare state cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years.
    • The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens.

    Back2Basics

    Right to Property

    • The Constitution of India originally provided for the right to property under Articles 19 and 31.
    • Article 19 guaranteed to all citizens the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
    • Article 31 provided that “no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” It also provided that compensation would be paid to a person whose property has been taken for public purposes.
    • The 44th Amendment of 1978 removed the right to property from the list of fundamental rights.
    • A new provision, Article 300-A, was added to the constitution, which provided that “no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”.

    What if one is deprived of his/her properties?

    • Thus, if a legislator makes a law depriving a person of his property, there would be no obligation on the part of the state to pay anything as compensation.
    • The aggrieved person shall have no right to move the court under Article 32.
    • Thus, the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, though it is still a constitutional right. If the government appears to have acted unfairly, the action can be challenged in a court of law by aggrieved citizens.

  • [op-ed snap] Eloquently reticent: On validity of J&K curbs

    Context

    The SC verdict on the restrictions has some important takeaways.

    What the SC verdict means

    • Infinite ban on internet impermissible:  It states categorically that an indefinite ban on the internet is impermissible, but fails to direct the restoration of services. 
    • Section 144 and legitimate expression of opinion: The SC said that Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure “cannot be used as a tool to prevent the legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or exercise of any democratic rights”.
    • No ruling on the Govt. actions: The disappointing aspect of the verdict is the court’s failure to give a ruling on the validity of the government’s actions.
      • The ruling fails to hold the government to account for the manner in which it exercised its powers.
      • It states categorically that an indefinite ban on the internet is impermissible, but fails to direct the restoration of services.
      • The SC does not go beyond directing the authorities to review all their orders and restrictions forthwith.

    The key takeaways from the verdict

    • Internet use constitutionally protected: The use of the Internet as a medium for free speech as well as for trade and commerce is constitutionally protected.
    • Test of proportionality: It also lays down that any reasonable restriction on fundamental rights, be it an Internet ban or a Section 144 order, will have to survive the test of proportionality.
      • The proportionality test means that is, the restriction should be proportionate to the necessity for such a measure.
      • At the same time, it cautions against the “excessive utility” of the proportionality doctrine in matters of national security.
    • No secret orders: The government is bound to publish all orders it passes regarding such restrictions so that they can be challenged in a court of law.
      • While the government’s stand that it could not produce all the orders on the restrictions imposed the SC did not strike them down on that ground.

    Conclusion

    The SC judgment, while laying down some important principles in a fundamental rights case, appears to have the character of an advisory opinion.

     

     

  • SC order on Internet Shutdowns

    Directing the government to mandatorily publish all orders permitting Internet shutdowns, the Supreme Court has for the first time set the stage for challenging suspension orders before courts.

    What triggered the SC?

    • India tops the list of Internet shutdowns globally. According to Software Freedom Law Center’s tracker, there have been 381 shutdowns since 2012, 106 of which were in 2019.
    • The ongoing shutdown in Kashmir is the longest ever in any democratic country.

    The prime mover for Supreme Court

    • The Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Service) Rules, 2017 issued under the Telegraph Act deals with restricting Internet access.
    • It does not provide for publication or notification of the order suspending Internet, the apex court mandated that such orders must be made available to the public.
    • The court declared that it is a “settled principle of law, and of natural justice” that requires publication of such orders, “particularly one that affects lives, liberty and property of people”.
    • This allows individuals to now challenge the orders before courts in J&K and rest of India.

    Internet suspension orders are subjected to Judicial Review

    • In the wake of protests against the new citizenship law, Internet services were suspended temporarily in parts of Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Karnataka.
    • There should not be excessive burden on free speech even if complete prohibition is imposed, and the government has to justify imposition of such prohibition and explain why lesser alternatives were inadequate, the bench stated.
    • It ruled that Restrictions are to be imposed in an emergency. Hence they must be proportionate to the concern. Their objective must be legitimate rather than cavalier.
    • Authorities must necessarily consider an alternative and least restrictive mechanism before opting to restrict rights. Every decision to impose restriction should be backed by sufficient material and amenable to judicial review.

    Pacing up with technology

    • The bench also noted that the law needs to keep pace with technological development:
    • We need to note that the law should imbibe the technological development and accordingly mould its rules so as to cater to the needs of society.
    • Non-recognition of technology within the sphere of law is only a disservice to the inevitable.

    Justifying the Kashmir shutdown

    • Lastly, the court mandated that all orders regarding the Kashmir case be made public, and to provide essential services such as e-banking and hospitals immediately.
    • What the centre was arguing in this case was that this is a matter of national security given that it pertains to Kashmir with a history of militancy.

  • [op-ed snap] Eloquently reticent: On validity of J&K curbs

    Context

    The SC verdict on the restrictions has some important takeaways.

    What the SC verdict means

    • Infinite ban on internet impermissible:  It states categorically that an indefinite ban on the internet is impermissible, but fails to direct the restoration of services. 
    • Section 144 and legitimate expression of opinion: The SC said that Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure “cannot be used as a tool to prevent the legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or exercise of any democratic rights”.
    • No ruling on the Govt. actions: The SC stops short of ruling on the validity of the government’s actions.
      • The ruling fails to hold the government to account for the manner in which it exercised its powers.
      • It states categorically that an indefinite ban on the internet is impermissible, but fails to direct the restoration of services.
      • The SC does not go beyond directing the authorities to review all their orders and restrictions forthwith.

    The key takeaways from the verdict

    • Internet use constitutionally protected: The use of the Internet as a medium for free speech as well as for trade and commerce is constitutionally protected.
    • Test of proportionality: It also lays down that any reasonable restriction on fundamental rights, be it an Internet ban or a Section 144 order, will have to survive the test of proportionality.
      • The proportionality test means that is, the restriction should be proportionate to the necessity for such a measure.
      • At the same time, it cautions against the “excessive utility” of the proportionality doctrine in matters of national security.
    • No secret orders: The government is bound to publish all orders it passes regarding such restrictions so that they can be challenged in a court of law.
      • While the government’s stand that it could not produce all the orders on the restrictions imposed the SC did not strike them down on that ground.

    Conclusion

    The SC judgment, while laying down some important principles in a fundamental rights case, appears to have the character of an advisory opinion.

  • [op-ed snap]A case for inclusion of Tulu language in the Eighth Schedule.

    Context

    With numerous languages in the country, placing all deserving languages on an equal footing will promote social inclusion and national solidarity.

    Figures and facts

    • According to the 2001 Census, India has 30 languages that are spoken by more than a million people each.
    • It also has 122 languages that are spoken by at least 10,000 people each.
    • It also has 1,599 languages, most of which are dialects.
    • These are restricted to specific regions and many of them are on the verge of extinction.
    • Article 29 provides every citizens of India with a distinct culture, language, and script, the right to conserve the same.
    • It is the responsibility of both the state and the citizens of this distinct language, script or culture to preserve the same.

    Eighth schedule and Tulu language

    • Sanskrit has 24,821 speakers and it is in the Eighth Schedule according to the 2011 Census.
    • However, many languages with sizeable speakers are not in the schedule.
    • Bhili/Bhilodi has 1,04,13,637 speakers. Garo has 11,45,323 speakers, Ho has 14,31,344 speakers.
    • Tulu is a Dravidian language whose speakers are concentrated in two coastal districts of Karnataka and in Kasaragod district of Kerala.
    • The Tulu language speakers are larger in numbers than Sanskrit and Manipuri which included in the Eighth Schedule.
    • The cities of Mangaluru, Udupi, and Kasaragod are the epicenter of Tulu culture.

    What are the benefits of being on the Eighth Schedule

    • Tulu would get recognition from Sahitya Academy.
    • The book in Tulu would get translated into other recognised Indian languages.
    • The MP’s and MLA’s could speak in Tulu in the Parliament and Assemblies.
    • Candidates could write all-India competitive examination like the Civil Services exam in Tulu.

    Yuelu Proclamation

    • It was made by UNESCO at Changsha, The People’s Republic of China, in 2018.
    • It says the protection and promotion of linguistic diversity help to improve social inclusion and partnerships.
    • It helps reduce the gender and social inequality between different native speakers.
    • It guarantee the rights for native speakers of endangered, minority, indigenous languages, as well as non-official languages and dialects to receive education, enhance the social inclusion level and social decision-making ability by encouraging them to participate in a series of actions to promote cultural diversity, endangered language protection, and the protection of intangible cultural heritage.

    Conclusion

    • Tulu, along with other deserving languages, should be included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution in order to substantially materialise the promise of equality of status and opportunity mentioned in the Preamble.

  • State can regulate minority institutions, says Supreme Court

    The Supreme Court has held that the state is well within its rights to introduce a regulatory regime in the “national interest” to provide minority educational institutions with well-qualified teachers in order for them to “achieve excellence in education.”

    Article 30 is not absolute

    • The verdict said that Article 30(1) (right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice) was neither absolute nor above the law.
    • The regulatory law should however balance the dual objectives of ensuring standard of excellence as well as preserving the right of the minorities to establish and administer their educational institutions.
    • Regulations that embrace and reconcile the two objectives should be reasonable.
    • The managements of minority institutions cannot ignore such a legal regime by saying that it is their fundamental right under Article 30.

    Serving the national interest

    • A regulation framed in the national interest must necessarily apply to all institutions regardless whether they are run by majority or minority as the essence of Article 30(1) is to ensure equal treatment between the majority and minority institutions.
    • An objection can certainly be raised if an unfavorable treatment is meted out to an educational institution established and administered by minority.
    • But if ensuring of excellence in educational institutions is the underlying principle behind a regulatory regime and the mechanism of selection of teachers is so designed to achieve excellence in institutions, the matter may stand on a completely different footing.

    Striking a balance

    • The court explains how to strike a “balance” between the two objectives of excellence in education and the preservation of the minorities’ right to run their educational institutions.
    • For this, the court broadly divides education into two categories – secular education and education “directly aimed at or dealing with preservation and protection of the heritage, culture, script and special characteristics of a religious or a linguistic minority.”
    • When it comes to the latter, the court advocated “maximum latitude” to be given to the management to appoint teachers.
    • The court reasons that only “teachers who believe in the religious ideology or in the special characteristics of the concerned minority would alone be able to imbibe in the students admitted in such educational institutions, what the minorities would like to preserve, profess and propagate.”
    • However, minority institutions where the curriculum was “purely secular”, the intent must be to impart education availing the best possible teachers.

  • A case for including Tulu in the Eighth Schedule

    According to the 2001 Census, India has 30 languages that are spoken by more than a million people each. Additionally, it has 122 languages that are spoken by at least 10,000 people each. It also has 1,599 languages, most of which are dialects. Tulu is one such language with considerable number of speakers.

    Speakers of Tulu

    • Tulu is a Dravidian language whose speakers are concentrated in two coastal districts of Karnataka and in Kasaragod district of Kerala.
    • Kasaragod district is called ‘Sapta bhasha Samgama Bhumi (the confluence of seven languages)’, and Tulu is among the seven.
    • The Census reports 18,46,427 native speakers of Tulu in India.
    • The Tulu-speaking people are larger in number than speakers of Manipuri and Sanskrit, which have the Eighth Schedule status.

    Schedule VIII languages

    • Among the legion of languages in India, the Constitution has 22 languages. They are protected in Schedule VIII of the Constitution.
    • But many languages that are kept out of this favoured position are in some ways more deserving to be included in the Eighth Schedule.
    • For example, Sanskrit, an Eighth Schedule language, has only 24,821 speakers (2011 Census).
    • Manipuri, another scheduled language, has only 17,61,079 speakers. However, many unscheduled languages have a sizeable number of speakers.

    Why does Tulu deserve a place in the Schedule?

    • At present, Tulu is not an official language in India or any other country. Efforts are being made to include Tulu in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution.
    • If included in the Eighth Schedule, Tulu would get recognition from the Sahitya Akademi. Tulu books would be translated into other recognised Indian languages.
    • The Yuelu Proclamation, made by the UNESCO at Changsha, The People’s Republic of China, in 2018 calls for protection and promotion of linguistic diversity.

    Conclusion 

    • India must accommodate this plethora of languages in its cultural discourse and administrative apparatus.
    • Article 29 of the Constitution provides that a section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture have the right to conserve the same.
    • Placing of all the deserving languages on equal footing will promote social inclusion and national solidarity. It will reduce the inequalities within the country to a great extent.