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Subject: Governance

Important aspects of Society

  • More than 40 crore Indians are caught in a healthcare gap: panel

    Why in the News

    More than 40 crore Indians, over a quarter of the population, are covered neither by government health insurance nor by private cover, a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare has found. Its report, Affordability and Accessibility of Healthcare Facilities in Public and Private Sector, was presented to Parliament last month and carries 368 recommendations. The group it identifies sits above the eligibility line for fully subsidised cover and below the income at which private care is affordable. The committee’s conclusion is that insurance alone cannot close that gap, and that the fix lies in public capacity and in regulation of private prices.

    What is the ‘missing middle’ in health coverage?

    1. It is a group defined by exclusion from both systems: These households are too well off to rely on government subsidies and not financially secure enough to absorb the rising cost of private care.
    2. Its size is over a quarter of the population: More than 40 crore people fall into it, sitting between the poorest, who hold government protection, and the affluent, who can buy private care.
    3. The risk it faces is attrition, not catastrophe: The threat is the slow erosion of household income through medicines, consultations, tests and repeated treatment, rather than a single large hospital bill.

    Where do Indians actually seek care, and at what price?

    1. The private sector delivers most of the care: Over 60 percent of inpatient care and 70 percent of outpatient care is provided by private facilities, so households without financial protection meet private prices directly.
    2. Medicines are the single largest drain: They account for nearly 30 percent of current health expenditure.
    3. Chronic illness converts a cost into a recurring one: For a person with diabetes, hypertension or cardiovascular disease, medicines, consultations and diagnostic tests become a lifelong expense, and the non-communicable disease burden is climbing steadily.
    4. Childbirth shows the gap in one comparison: Average out-of-pocket spending is Rs 37,630 in private facilities against Rs 2,299 in public ones, more than sixteen times higher.

    What does the financing record show?

    1. Public spending sits below the policy’s own target: Government health expenditure is 1.43 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) against the 2.5 percent target set by the National Health Policy, 2017.
    2. Health’s share of the budget is shrinking: It fell from 6.12 percent of total government expenditure in 2021-22 to 4.89 percent in 2022-23, below the 5.02 percent recorded in 2019-20.
    3. The shortfall lands on households: Public capacity that is not built is care that is bought privately, which is what converts a spending decision into an out-of-pocket bill.

    Why does insurance alone not close the gap?

    1. Government cover is targeted at the poorest: Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY) protects vulnerable households against hospitalisation costs, and the missing middle falls outside fully subsidised coverage.
    2. Private cover carries its own filters: A household that buys a policy still faces premiums, exclusions, waiting periods and co-payments.
    3. Both instruments insure the wrong event: Hospitalisation cover does not reach outpatient consultations, diagnostics and medicines, which is where this group’s expenditure actually accumulates.

    What has the committee recommended?

    1. A single regulatory floor for private providers: Nationwide implementation of the Clinical Establishments Act, so registration and minimum standards apply uniformly rather than State by State.
    2. Mandatory quality standards: Facilities would be held to a defined standard of services as a condition of operation rather than as a voluntary accreditation.
    3. Price transparency in private facilities: Rates for procedures, consultations and diagnostics would be published and displayed.
    4. Curbs on retail pharmacy practice: The report flags excessive trade margins and the non-prescription sale of antibiotics, and recommends stronger audits and enforcement.
    5. Stronger public healthcare infrastructure: The committee argued for building public capacity directly rather than relying on insurance to purchase care from private providers.

    Challenges to closing the missing middle

    1. A contributory product for this group has failed to launch before: The design has been proposed repeatedly and never converted into a national scheme with take-up. Eg. A NITI Aayog report in 2021 proposed extending PM-JAY to the missing middle on a contributory basis, and no national product followed it.
      The Fix: Collect the premium through an existing payment channel the household already uses, so enrolment does not depend on a separate voluntary transaction.
    2. The Clinical Establishments Act is not in force everywhere: Health is a State subject, so the central Act applies only where a State has adopted it. Eg. Large States including Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra regulate through their own statutes instead.
      The Fix: Tie a share of National Health Mission funds to adoption of a common minimum standard, whichever statute a State chooses to enforce it under.
    3. Transparency without a ceiling changes little: A published rate does not restrain a price where the patient is in no position to shop. Eg. Ceiling prices set by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority cover scheduled medicines, and non-scheduled formulations sit outside that control.
      The Fix: Extend price capping to the high volume diagnostics and consumables that make up the bulk of a private bill.
    4. Cheap medicine supply is a fraction of the retail network: A generic price ceiling reaches a household only where a generic outlet exists. Eg. Jan Aushadhi Kendras number about 15,000 against roughly nine lakh retail pharmacies.
      The Fix: Mandate prescription by generic name and stock the full essential drug list at every public facility, so the public system itself becomes the cheap outlet.
    5. Human resources, not finance, cap public capacity: Money released for a facility does not produce the specialist who has to staff it. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres run with a shortfall of roughly 80 percent against sanctioned specialist posts.
      The Fix: Create a public health management cadre so clinical posts are not consumed by administrative duty.

    Conclusion

    The committee’s finding is not that coverage is absent. It is that coverage is built around hospitalisation. The expense that erodes household income is recurring and outpatient. Closing that requires a financing instrument that pays for consultations, diagnostics and medicines, and no such instrument operates at scale today. Whether the committee’s recommendations produce one, or produce another set of standards for private providers to display, is what the government’s action taken reply will show.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010 provides for the registration and regulation of all clinical establishments, public and private, across recognised systems of medicine.
    2. Health is a State subject, so the Act operates in the Union Territories and in States that adopt it by resolution, and several States regulate under their own laws instead.
    3. It prescribes minimum standards of facilities and services as a condition of registration.
    4. It requires establishments to display their rates and to maintain and report records to the National Council for Clinical Establishments.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • ‘OBC lists were not used for Census as they featured classes, not castes’

    Why in the News

    The Union government has settled the 2027 Census on an open column method of recording caste, under which every caste outside the Presidential Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe lists is written down as the household states it. The Central and State lists of Other Backward Classes (OBCs) were considered as the alternative and rejected, on the recorded ground that the list of OBCs is a list of classes and not a list of castes. The Union Cabinet had approved the inclusion of caste in the Census forms a year after the Opposition campaigned for a caste census, and the need to enumerate the OBC population was that campaign’s main argument. The method now chosen produces no OBC count of its own, which is the point the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Congress president are contesting. This is the first Census to enumerate caste beyond the Scheduled lists since 1931.

    What is the open column method of caste enumeration?

    1. The household’s own answer is recorded: The enumerator writes the caste name as it is stated, without matching it against a list drawn up in advance.
    2. The Scheduled categories stay list based: Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities continue to be enumerated against the corresponding Presidential lists, as has always been done.
    3. Classification is a separate, later step: The raw names collected are grouped into categories after enumeration is complete, rather than at the doorstep.

    Why were the Central and State OBC lists rejected?

    1. Several entries name something other than a caste: The lists carry entries describing occupational groups, settler groups, and a specific class of labourers.
    2. The examples cited are concrete: Officials pointed to “local borns” in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and tea garden workers in Assam.
    3. Such entries are a minority of the lists: They sit among nearly 3,000 communities classified as OBC across the Central and State lists.
    4. The same community changes category across States: Several communities carried on OBC lists are classified as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe depending on the State.
    5. The State survey route was assessed on the same test: The problem surfaced when the government examined whether the methodology of State conducted caste surveys, such as those in Bihar and Telangana, could be replicated nationally.

    What is the objection to the open column?

    1. It yields no enumerated list of communities: OBC groups and Opposition leaders want the communities named, listed and counted specifically rather than written in freehand.
    2. The 2011 precedent is the stated worry: The Socio Economic and Caste Census of 2011 threw up over 46 lakh caste names, which critics expect an open column to reproduce.
    3. The government has used that same result before: It cited the 46 lakh names as its reason for not releasing the caste data from that exercise.
    4. The utility of the method is what is questioned: The objection is not that the count will not happen, but that its output will not be usable for policy.

    Does the government’s own record support the reason it gave?

    1. A statutory body concluded the opposite: A 2015 National Commission for Backward Classes document held that a caste can be, and quite often is, a social class in India.
    2. That document treated caste as the workable starting unit: It recorded that caste represents an existing, identifiable social group, and that an exercise can begin there and then extend to other groups, sections and classes.
    3. The choice was made at the top of the system: Officials involved in the methodology recorded that each option carried its own advantages and drawbacks, and that the open column was finalised only after the alternatives were considered at the highest levels.

    Challenges to caste enumeration through an open column

    1. Spelling and synonym variants inflate the count: One community is recorded under several names across districts, dialects and languages, and each variant enters the data as a separate entity. Eg. Bihar’s 2023 caste survey recorded 215 distinct castes because its enumerators worked from a fixed list rather than a blank field.
      The Fix: Publish a standardised State wise caste directory before enumeration and map every write-in entry to it during data processing.
    2. The classification authority is not named in advance: Grouping raw names into Backward Class and other categories is a decision taken after the count by a body the enumeration design does not identify. Eg. An expert group was constituted in 2015 to classify the caste data collected in the 2011 exercise, and that data was never released.
      The Fix: Notify the classifying authority, its composition and its publication timetable before the first form is filled.
    3. Self reported caste responds to incentive: A household may report the name that improves its standing or its eligibility rather than the one it ordinarily uses. Eg. Karnataka’s 2015 socio economic and educational survey drew objections from dominant communities over its recorded counts and stayed unpublished for years.
      The Fix: Verify a sample of write-in entries against household level administrative records before the totals are finalised.
    4. The quality of the answer rests on the enumerator: A caste question asked without a fixed probe sequence produces a sub-caste from one household and a broader cluster name from its neighbour. Eg. Census enumeration is carried out by roughly 30 lakh school teachers and government staff deployed for a few weeks.
      The Fix: Script the caste question with a mandatory probe sequence and test every enumerator on it before deployment.

    Conclusion

    The method of collection is now settled. What is not settled is who converts several lakh written answers into a list of communities, and by what rule. That step, and not the column on the form, is what decides whether the exercise produces a usable Backward Class number at all. It sits outside the methodology the government has announced, and it has no published owner.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Census is conducted under the Census Act, 1948 and the rules framed under it, which make participation compulsory and the individual returns confidential.
    2. It is carried out by the Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, which functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    3. It is decennial, and the last completed round was in 2011, the 2021 round having been deferred.
    4. The 2027 round runs in two phases, houselisting followed by population enumeration, with a reference date of 1 March 2027 and 1 October 2026 for snow bound areas.

    “[2023, GS1, 15 marks] Why is caste identity in India both fluid and static?

  • Quality elementary teachers are vital to lives of children, nation-building: top court

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has added teacher education institutions and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) as the sixth and seventh duty bearers of the right to free and compulsory elementary education. A Division Bench held that free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen has attained the status of an enforceable fundamental right, and that teacher education has not been given the attention it deserves. The ruling came on an appeal against a Delhi High Court order of 13 March 2023, which had held the NCTE’s Public Notice of 22 September 2019 to be arbitrary and illegal. That notice requires every teacher education institution to file an annual Performance Appraisal Report. The contest was over the source of the power: the notice was challenged on the ground that only the Council itself, and not its Executive Committee, could issue and implement it.

    What is the National Council for Teacher Education?

    1. A statutory regulator of the teacher supply chain: It is constituted under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 to achieve the planned and coordinated development of the teacher education system in the country.
    2. It regulates the institutions that train teachers: A teacher education institution is defined in Section 2(e) of that Act as an institution offering a course or training in teacher education.
    3. It sets the qualifications a teacher must hold: Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 makes it the academic authority for laying down the minimum qualifications for appointment as a teacher.

    Who are the duty bearers of the right to elementary education?

    1. Five were already recognised: Judicial precedent had identified the government, the local authority, the neighbourhood school, the parents or guardians, and the teacher.
    2. Teacher education institutions become the sixth: The institutions defined in Section 2(e) now carry a duty toward the right, rather than only a licensing relationship with their regulator.
    3. The Council becomes the seventh: It is required to ensure that those institutions function effectively and efficiently and conduct their affairs with integrity.
    4. The addition changes what is justiciable: A duty bearer’s failure is actionable, so a lapse in the training of teachers is now capable of being pleaded as a failure of the right itself.

    What did the Court hold on the power to demand appraisal reports?

    1. The Public Notice is legal and valid: The Court upheld the requirement that institutions upload an annual Performance Appraisal Report, and set aside the High Court order that had quashed it.
    2. The Executive Committee acted within jurisdiction: The Court found ample empowerment in both the Council and its Executive Committee to call for the report.
    3. The power is incidental and ancillary: A regulatory measure of this kind flows from the duties and functions of a regulator even without a specific empowerment in the statute.
    4. The regulator is itself appraised: The NCTE undergoes a performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), so requiring the same discipline from institutions it regulates follows from its own position.

    Why does the Court place teacher training at the centre of the right?

    1. No resource ranks higher than a student’s mind and character: The Court held that elementary school teachers carry the most important role in nation-building and are to be treated with respect and care.
    2. The entitlement is only as good as the person delivering it: A right to education delivered by an untrained teacher is formally satisfied and substantively empty, which is why the regulator of training is being read into the right.
    3. Accountability of institutions is the stated purpose: The Court recorded that it is necessary for the Council and its bodies to ensure accountability of educational institutions.

    Challenges to the National Council for Teacher Education

    1. Recognition ran ahead of capacity: Approval was granted to private institutions at a pace that outstripped any ability to verify what they actually taught. Eg. The Justice J.S. Verma Commission on Teacher Education reported in 2012 that a large number of private institutions were commercial rather than academic in character.
      The Fix: Tie continued recognition to a published appraisal score reviewed on a fixed cycle, so approval becomes renewable rather than permanent.
    2. Retrospective validation weakens the standard: Recognition granted after the fact rewards institutions that ran courses without approval. Eg. The National Council for Teacher Education (Amendment) Act, 2019 conferred retrospective recognition and permission on specified institutions.
      The Fix: Bar retrospective recognition outright and require approval to be in place before an academic session opens.
    3. Quality is measured only at the exit, and only by the State: The regulator holds no outcome data on the graduates its recognised institutions produce. Eg. Pass rates in teacher eligibility tests have generally stayed under a fifth of the candidates appearing.
      The Fix: Publish institution wise eligibility test pass rates, so the appraisal report carries an outcome measure rather than a compliance declaration.
    4. Enforcement rests on self reported filings: A report filed by the institution about itself carries no independent verification. Eg. The Council reaches institutions across every State through four regional committees.
      The Fix: Sample audit a fixed share of filed reports each year through State education departments, with recognition suspended on a false filing.

    Conclusion

    The Court has widened the set of actors who owe a duty under the right to elementary education. It has not created the instrument that measures whether that duty is being met. The appraisal report is now the only candidate for that role. Whether it becomes a published, comparable record of what an institution produces, or settles into an annual compliance filing, is what will decide whether the two new duty bearers carry a duty in substance.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 gives statutory effect to Article 21A, which was inserted by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002.
    2. Section 12(1)(c) requires private unaided schools to reserve 25 percent of entry level seats for children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections.
    3. It bars screening procedures and capitation fees at the point of admission.
    4. It requires a School Management Committee in every government and aided school, with three fourths of its members drawn from parents and guardians.

    “[2018] Consider the following statements:

    1. As per the Right to Education (RTE) Act, to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in a State, a person would be required to possess the minimum qualification laid down by the concerned State Council of Teacher Education.

    2. As per the RTE Act, for teaching primary classes, a candidate is required to pass a Teacher Eligibility Test conducted in accordance with the National Council of Teacher Education guidelines.

    3. In India, more than 90% of teacher education institutions are directly under the State Governments

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 3 only

  • Health Ministry strengthens allied and healthcare education standards

    Health Ministry strengthens allied and healthcare education standards

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare moved to strengthen education and professional standards for allied and healthcare professionals.

    Core Facts

    1. Governing law: Standards are set under the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professions Act, 2021.
    2. Apex body: The Act created the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professions (NCAHP), a statutory body that regulates education and practice in these fields.
    3. State tier: The Act also provides for State Allied and Healthcare Councils.
    4. Mandate: The Commission frames standards for education and curricula, and maintains a central register of practitioners.

    Static Context

    1. Enactment aim: The Act was enacted to regulate and standardise a large set of allied health professions.
    2. Coverage: The Act groups professions into defined categories such as medical laboratory science, radiology, physiotherapy and nutrition.
    3. Parent ministry: The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare administers the framework.

    Prelims Angle

    1. The governing law is the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professions Act, 2021.
    2. The apex regulator is the NCAHP, a statutory body.
    3. It works through State Allied and Healthcare Councils.

    Mains Angle

    1. GS2, issues in the health sector and human resources: A question can ask how professional regulation improves the quality of India’s health workforce.
    2. The delivery side: It can probe whether standard setting reaches the districts where allied professionals actually practise.
  • Constitutional faultlines in FCRA Bill

    Constitutional faultlines in FCRA Bill

    Why in the News

    The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 creates a statutory framework for the vesting, supervision, management and disposal of foreign contributions and the assets built from them. Where an organisation’s certificate under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 is cancelled, surrendered or ceases to exist, including through non renewal, the Central government may appoint a Designated Authority in which those contributions and assets vest provisionally.

    What is the Designated Authority?

    1. It is appointed by the Central government: The appointment is triggered where an organisation’s FCRA certificate is cancelled, surrendered or ceases to exist, including due to non renewal.
    2. Assets vest in it provisionally: The foreign contribution and the assets created from it may vest in the authority on a provisional basis.
    3. It may take possession and manage those assets: The government may, through the authority, take possession of and manage assets created from foreign contributions.
    4. It may also run the organisation’s activities: Where considered necessary or expedient in the public interest, it may undertake the management of the concerned organisation’s activities.

    How far do the consequences of losing registration now travel?

    1. The existing consequences were financial and regulatory: Registrations could be withdrawn, cancellation could follow continuing non compliance, and penalties attached to the diversion or misappropriation of foreign contributions.
    2. A vesting provision already existed: The current law already contains a provision for vesting assets created from foreign funds upon cancellation.
    3. The Bill supplies the machinery that was missing: What is added is a detailed statutory framework for provisional vesting, possession, management, restoration and ultimately permanent vesting and disposal.
    4. The end point changes in kind, not in degree: What was previously limited to the loss of eligibility to receive foreign funds can now extend to provisional management and, where registration is not restored within the prescribed period, permanent vesting and disposal of assets.

    Why does management control matter more than formal ownership?

    1. The ownership and custody distinction has limited practical force: The legal separation between owning an asset and holding custody of it does not change the practical consequence for the institution.
    2. Institutions run on continuity of management: An entity whose success depends on continuous administration places greater weight on control than on ownership.
    3. The relationship with the state changes: Ownership may remain formally undisturbed, and a change in management control still alters the relationship between the institution and the state.
    4. The affected entities are operating institutions: A hospital, a school or a laboratory is not made effective by ownership alone, and depends on its independence to administer for charitable ends what it owns.

    Does the Bill satisfy constitutional proportionality?

    1. A legitimate objective is not sufficient by itself: The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the state pursuing a legitimate objective does not settle the constitutional question.
    2. The means must fit the end: The means adopted must bear a reasonable connection to that objective and must maintain an appropriate balance between the public purpose and the burden imposed on rights.
    3. A heavier consequence demands heavier safeguards: Where losing registration can lead to provisional vesting and government appointed management, the safeguards attending that transfer must be commensurately robust.
    4. The Bill does provide safeguards: It provides for the restoration of assets where registration is obtained, renewed or restored within the prescribed period, and for mechanisms of revision and judicial appeal.
    5. The open question is their quality: What remains contested is whether those safeguards are sufficiently clear, timely and effective, and what standards govern decisions on possession, management and permanent vesting.

    Why does the regulatory backdrop raise the stakes?

    1. Registrations have lapsed at scale: Over the past decade thousands of FCRA registrations have ceased to operate, for reasons ranging from non renewal to alleged statutory violations.
    2. An administrative lapse and a proven violation converge: Non renewal is not a finding of wrongdoing, and under the proposed framework it can attract the same asset consequence as a violation.
    3. The Bill has drawn parliamentary opposition: Opposition members of Parliament have protested in New Delhi demanding the withdrawal of the Bill.

    Challenges to the FCRA Amendment Bill, 2026

    1. Renewal is a recurring administrative cliff: FCRA registration must be renewed every five years, and a delay in deciding a renewal application would now carry asset consequences rather than only a pause in funding. Eg. The Ministry of Home Affairs has repeatedly issued blanket extensions of FCRA validity as renewal deadlines approached, which shows the decision backlog is routine rather than exceptional.
      The Fix: Provide by statute that registration continues in force until a renewal application is decided, so a pending file cannot trigger vesting.
    2. The receiving channel is already a single point of failure: The 2020 amendment required every recipient to receive foreign contribution only in a designated account at one specified bank branch in New Delhi. Eg. Organisations working in every State had to open and operate that one account irrespective of where they function.
      The Fix: Allow any scheduled bank branch to host the designated account with the same automated reporting feed to the Ministry.
    3. The bar on onward granting cuts off the smallest organisations: The 2020 amendment prohibited the transfer of foreign contribution to any other person, ending the model in which a registered body funded unregistered grassroots groups. Eg. Community organisations that never held registration of their own lost their funding route entirely.
      The Fix: Restore sub granting to registered entities under a reporting requirement rather than a blanket prohibition.
    4. The administrative expense cap squeezes research and advocacy work: The 2020 amendment cut the share of foreign contribution usable for administrative expenses from 50 percent to 20 percent, and staff salaries are the principal cost of such work. Eg. A research institute’s main expenditure is staff time, which the cap treats as overhead rather than as programme cost.
      The Fix: Define programme staff costs as programme expenditure rather than as administrative expenditure.
    5. Remedies move slower than an operating institution can survive: Restoration and appeal run through the Ministry and then the courts, and a hospital or school under government appointed management cannot suspend operations while that runs. Eg. Writ challenges to FCRA cancellations have taken years to reach a hearing on merits.
      The Fix: Fix an outer statutory time limit for deciding restoration, with automatic revesting in the organisation once that limit expires.
    6. Freedom of association is engaged, not only property: Article 19(1)(c) protects the right to form associations, and control over an association’s assets and management directly affects its capacity to function. Eg. In Noel Harper v. Union of India (2022) the Supreme Court upheld the 2020 amendments and held that receiving foreign contribution is not an absolute right, which leaves the associational effect of asset control unsettled.
      The Fix: Write into the Bill an express requirement that the least restrictive measure available be recorded in writing before management is assumed.

    Conclusion

    The Bill moves FCRA from policing money to holding institutions. That shift is not by itself unconstitutional, and it is what makes the safeguards the whole of the question. The unresolved tension is that the trigger for the heaviest consequence can be an expired file rather than a proved diversion, and the remedy for a wrong trigger runs slower than the institution it applies to. Whether the Bill survives a proportionality challenge will turn on how tightly Parliament defines the Designated Authority’s discretion, and on how fast restoration actually works in practice.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it regulates: The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 governs the acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution and foreign hospitality by individuals, associations and companies in India.
    2. Who administers it: It is administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and it replaced the earlier Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976.
    3. How access is granted: An association must hold either registration, valid for five years and renewable, or prior permission tied to a specific purpose and a specific foreign source.
    4. Who is barred outright: Election candidates, judges, government servants, members of the legislature, journalists and political parties are prohibited from accepting foreign contribution.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12 marks] Examine critically the recent changes in the rules governing foreign funding of NGOs under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), 1976.”

  • NTA looks for exam centres, seeks help from technical education body

    NTA looks for exam centres, seeks help from technical education body

    Why in the News

    The National Testing Agency (NTA) has begun assembling a network of government owned computer laboratories to run the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test, Undergraduate (NEET-UG) as a computer based examination. It has asked the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) to collect information from government institutions on their information technology infrastructure and available space. The move follows the government’s decision to shift NEET-UG out of pen and paper mode from next year, taken after a question paper leak forced the cancellation of the examination and a nationwide protest. The constraint the request exposes is physical rather than procedural. A nationwide computer based test needs a geographically distributed network of secure, connected centres, and that network does not yet exist in public hands.

    What is a Standard Testing Centre?

    1. A vetted venue rather than a hired hall: A Standard Testing Centre is a facility identified and developed in advance for computer based testing, instead of being arranged afresh for each examination cycle.
    2. The infrastructure it must carry: Institutions have been asked to report the number of functional computers and computer systems, their information technology systems, networking and internet connectivity, availability of power backup, and CCTV and related facilities.
    3. It must have usable spare capacity: Institutions have also been asked to report vacant space, since a centre needs room that is not already committed to teaching.
    4. Only government institutions qualify at this stage: The information has been sought only in respect of government colleges and institutions approved by AICTE.

    Why is NTA routing the search through the technical education regulator?

    1. AICTE approved institutions are the largest pool of public computer laboratories: Engineering colleges, polytechnic institutes, government university departments and other state run technical or management institutions all sit inside its approval network.
    2. The requirement is geographic spread, not raw seat count: The stated reason is the progressive migration of examinations to computer based mode and the need for a wider geographically distributed network of testing centres.
    3. The request travelled down the institutional chain: NTA wrote to AICTE on 5 August, and AICTE then wrote to Vice Chancellors of state run technical universities and to directors and principals of approved government institutions.
    4. The returns are dated and must be certified: Institutions must submit details that are accurate, complete and duly verified by the competent authority of the institution, by 15 September.

    What forced the shift to computer based testing?

    1. A paper leak invalidated the examination: The Union Education Ministry cancelled the NEET-UG entrance examination held on 3 May after the question paper leaked.
    2. The scale of the disruption: Around 22 lakh candidates had appeared in that examination.
    3. The political cost: The cancellation sparked nationwide protests and the Union Education Minister resigned.
    4. The stated remedy: The government has said NEET-UG will move from pen and paper mode to computer based testing from next year.
    5. The agency itself is being restructured: The search for centres runs alongside an ongoing overhaul of NTA, the nodal autonomous body that conducts NEET-UG and other entrance tests for higher educational institutions.

    Challenges to migrating NEET-UG to computer based testing

    1. The scale has no precedent in computer based testing: No Indian examination has run a computer based test for a cohort of this size in a single sitting, so the centre requirement is a multiple of anything currently operated. Eg. The Joint Entrance Examination (Main) already runs on computer, and it is spread across multiple sessions and days rather than one day.
      The Fix: Publish the shift and session design alongside the centre inventory, so candidates know in advance whether scores will be compared across papers.
    2. Multiple shifts require score normalisation, which is itself contested: Candidates sitting different question papers must be compared through a statistical adjustment rather than through raw marks. Eg. Percentile normalisation in the Joint Entrance Examination (Main) has repeatedly been challenged for producing rank differences between shifts.
      The Fix: Release the normalisation formula and shift wise difficulty data with the result, rather than only the final percentile.
    3. Rural and small town candidates face a familiarity gap: A test taken on a keyboard and screen advantages candidates with routine computer access, and NEET-UG draws heavily from districts where school computer laboratories are shared or non functional. Eg. The very shortage of government computer infrastructure that NTA is now mapping is the same shortage those candidates study under.
      The Fix: Fund a compulsory mock test on the actual examination software at the allotted centre before the examination day.
    4. The centre, not the press, is the historic weak point: Leaks and impersonation cases have originated at the examination venue, and a computer based test moves that risk to local network access and administrator privileges. Eg. The compromise that led to the May cancellation happened before candidates ever reached the hall.
      The Fix: Log and audit every administrator level action at a centre, with the log held by the agency rather than by the host institution.
    5. Host institutions are being asked to supply capacity without a funding line: A college that lends its laboratory absorbs power, staff time and lost teaching hours on examination days. Eg. The AICTE communication seeks an inventory of infrastructure and states nothing about what a host institution receives in return.
      The Fix: Attach a per candidate hosting grant to the Standard Testing Centre designation, paid against certified compliance with the infrastructure norms.

    Conclusion

    The decision to move NEET-UG onto computers has already been announced. The capacity to run it has not yet been counted. The agency is conducting an inventory now, which means the size of the network will be known only after the mode has been committed to. The point to watch is what those returns show. If the public system cannot supply enough certified centres, the test either returns to private venues, which is where the security problem originated, or it splits across shifts and sessions, which substitutes a scoring dispute for a leak.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: The All India Council for Technical Education is the national body for the planning and coordinated development of technical education in India.
    2. Statutory basis: It was set up in 1945 as an advisory body and given statutory status by the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987.
    3. Where it sits: It functions under the Department of Higher Education in the Ministry of Education.
    4. What it does: It grants approval to technical institutions and prescribes norms and standards for courses and infrastructure, across fields including engineering, technology, management, architecture, pharmacy and hotel management.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Closest microtheme: Domestic Bodies/Agencies.”

  • Note on meeting over caste census rewritten after Ministry pushback

    Note on meeting over caste census rewritten after Ministry pushback

    Why in the News

    The Office of the Registrar General of India has rewritten its record of a meeting on caste enumeration after the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment objected to how its position had been minuted.

    What is the open ended caste question, and how does it differ from a drop down?

    1. An open ended question records what the respondent says: The enumerator writes down the caste name as reported, without matching it to any approved list at the point of collection.
    2. A drop down constrains the answer to a fixed list: The Census already uses drop down lists for the notified Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, where a legally settled list exists.
    3. The stated reason for the choice: The government’s position is that an open ended response is the only way to run the exercise without the state itself becoming an arbiter of caste identities.
    4. The cost is deferred, not avoided: The work of converting millions of individual responses into reliable, standardised caste data moves from the field to the stage after enumeration.

    How was the record of the June meeting rewritten?

    1. The Ministry offered the OBC list at the meeting: Ministry officials expressed willingness to share the list of Other Backward Classes (OBCs) maintained by the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC) for the caste enumeration exercise.
    2. The first draft minutes did not carry the offer: The initial draft of the minutes prepared by the Registrar General’s office did not reflect that offer accurately.
    3. The circulated note recorded a flat denial instead: A four paragraph note circulated on 8 June stated that Ministry officials had informed the meeting that there is no constitutional mandate for the Ministry to maintain a caste list, and that no such list is available with it.
    4. The note then drew the operative conclusion: It recorded that in view of the absence of any list of castes, enumeration of castes in Census 2027 may not be possible using any pre defined list in the Census question.
    5. The Ministry read the wording as a trap: Ministry officials said the onus for not going forward with a pre defined list was being shifted onto them.
    6. The amended note was accepted: The Ministry sent a revised version on 11 June, and the Registrar General’s office accepted the revised notes on 30 June.

    What lists does the Ministry actually maintain?

    1. Two statutory lists, not a general caste list: The revised note recorded that the Ministry maintains the List of Scheduled Castes and the Central List of Other Backward Classes as mandated by the Constitution, and that no separate list of castes is required to be maintained.
    2. The Scheduled Caste list: It comprises 1,258 entries and had already been shared with the Registrar General’s office by a letter dated 25 September 2025.
    3. The Central OBC list: It comprises nearly 2,483 entries, and the Ministry said it would be provided to the Registrar General’s office if required.
    4. Where the assistance stopped: The note recorded that officials of the Department of Social Justice and Empowerment were unable to assist further, given the absence of any mandate to maintain a list of castes beyond those two.

    Why does the 2011 experience shape this decision?

    1. The last attempt produced unusable variety: Respondents in the 2011 Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC) reported 46.7 lakh distinct caste names, against 4,147 recorded in 1931.
    2. The cost: That exercise cost about ₹4,900 crore.
    3. The caste data was never released: The SECC data was published by the Ministries of Rural Development and Urban Development in 2016, and the dataset on caste was excluded.
    4. Classification was outsourced and never completed: The raw caste data went to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, which formed a group of experts under the then Vice Chairperson of NITI Aayog for classification and categorisation, and that data is yet to be made public.
    5. The government told the Supreme Court the data was unusable: Affidavits filed on 21 September and 14 December 2021 said the SECC 2011 data was inaccurate and marked by technical flaws.
    6. The Court recorded that position: On 15 December 2021 the Supreme Court noted that the affidavit before it states that the data as collated “is not accurate and is unusable for any purpose whatsoever”.
    7. The same failure is expected to recur: The assessment recorded inside the Ministry is that the 2027 count is set to repeat the failure of the previous exercise.

    How did the 2027 caste count come about?

    1. Cabinet approval reversed a standing position: The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs approved caste enumeration in Census 2027 on 30 April 2025, conceding a long pending demand and reversing the government’s earlier position.
    2. The demand was first conceded in 2010: The then government promised caste enumeration alongside Census 2011 in May 2010 and referred the question to a Group of Ministers.
    3. It was then diverted out of the Census: Acting on that Group’s recommendations, the Union Cabinet decided in September 2010 to conduct a separate SECC instead of counting caste in the Census itself.
    4. The field timetable is already running: Population enumeration together with the caste census is scheduled across the country in February 2027, and it began on 1 September 2026 in hilly and snow bound areas to avoid winter difficulties.
    5. The Opposition objection is about usability, not about counting: The Leaders of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha argued that social justice policies cannot be effectively implemented without accurate data.

    Challenges to caste enumeration in Census 2027

    1. Open responses multiply into synonyms, sub castes and surnames: One community reports itself under several names across districts, and no field rule decides which of those names denote the same group. Eg. The Bihar caste survey of 2023 enumerated against a pre defined list of castes rather than an open field, precisely to avoid that outcome.
      The Fix: Publish the standardisation methodology and the mapping rules before enumeration begins, so the conversion is auditable rather than discretionary.
    2. The classification stage carries no statutory deadline: Raw responses become policy relevant only after grouping, and nothing fixes when that grouping must be completed or released. Eg. The Census Act, 1948 and its rules set the enumeration schedule and say nothing about publishing a caste classification.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory deadline for publishing classified caste tables, as already exists for the primary Census abstracts.
    3. Self reported caste can be reported strategically: Where a count is known to feed benefit eligibility, a respondent has an incentive to report the category that maximises entitlement. Eg. Reservation litigation regularly turns on disputed community claims to Other Backward Class or Scheduled Tribe status.
      The Fix: Delink the enumeration record from individual entitlement, using it only for aggregate policy design.
    4. Numbers alone do not satisfy the constitutional test: Population share does not establish that a group is socially and educationally backward, which is what the Constitution requires before reservation follows. Eg. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) fixed a ceiling on reservation and required backwardness to be demonstrated rather than assumed.
      The Fix: Collect the socio educational indicators the constitutional test needs in the same schedule as the caste question.
    5. Two arms of government own different halves of the exercise: The Registrar General’s office runs the enumeration and the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment holds the statutory lists, and neither is answerable for the output the other needs. Eg. The rewriting of the meeting note turned entirely on which of the two would be recorded as having ruled out a pre defined list.
      The Fix: Name a single accountable authority for the caste module, with the other body’s inputs recorded as statutory obligations rather than as offers.

    Conclusion

    The design of the caste question has been settled by default rather than by decision. Neither arm of government was willing to own the list a closed format needs, and the open format was what remained. The methodological problem that broke the last attempt is therefore untouched: responses will be collected freely and must still be grouped afterwards by someone. What to watch is whether the standardisation rules are published before enumerators go into the field, or arrive only after the data is already in.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: The National Commission for Backward Classes examines requests for inclusion in and exclusion from the Central List of Other Backward Classes and advises the Central government on them.
    2. Constitutional status: The Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) Act, 2018 inserted Article 338B and gave the Commission constitutional status, replacing its earlier statutory basis.
    3. Composition: It consists of a Chairperson, a Vice Chairperson and three other members appointed by the President.
    4. States retain their own lists: The Constitution (One Hundred and Fifth Amendment) Act, 2021 restored the power of States and Union Territories to prepare and maintain their own lists of socially and educationally backward classes.
  • Mental health must anchor public health

    Mental health must anchor public health

    Why in the News

    Mental health has been placed at the centre of India’s public health agenda as a determinant of every other health goal rather than as a separate specialty. India’s Viksit Bharat 2047 vision carries a Healthcare for All pillar built on strengthening Ayushman Bharat, expanding primary healthcare, reducing out of pocket expenditure and promoting preventive care.

    How wide is the gap between mental illness and mental healthcare?

    1. Prevalence: Mental illness affects one in seven Indians, with nearly 200 million people living with a diagnosable mental health condition.
    2. A rising share of total disease burden: The contribution of mental disorders to India’s total disease burden has doubled over the past three decades.
    3. The treatment gap: The national treatment gap stands at 84.5%, so more than four out of five people who need care do not receive it.
    4. Specialist density: India has 0.3 psychiatrists per 1,00,000 population.
    5. The shortage runs across the whole care team: Clinical psychologists, psychiatric social workers and psychiatric nurses are all in significant short supply, the result of decades of insufficient attention to the field.

    Why does neglecting mental health weaken physical health programmes?

    1. The risk runs both ways: Mental disorders significantly raise the risk of chronic disease, and chronic disease in turn raises the risk of mental illness.
    2. Most primary care patients are already affected: More than 60% of people attending primary care facilities have a diagnosable mental disorder.
    3. Specific comorbidities are worse: Rates of anxiety and depression are substantially higher among people living with diabetes, hypertension, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.
    4. The cost falls on disease control programmes: Ignoring mental health undermines efforts to control non communicable diseases and to reduce healthcare expenditure.

    What is the economic case for universal screening?

    1. The study: A 2025 modelling study by researchers from the Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research (PGIMER) and the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS) examined integrating universal depression screening into India’s primary healthcare system.
    2. The estimated saving: It put net savings at ₹291 billion to ₹482 billion annually.
    3. The scale relative to the economy: That is equivalent to as much as 0.32% of GDP.
    4. The framing that follows: On those numbers mental health is a human capital investment and an economic growth strategy, not a social welfare issue alone.

    What delivery foundation already exists?

    1. Primary care conversion: More than 1.73 lakh sub centres and primary health centres have been converted into Ayushman Bharat Arogya Mandirs.
    2. Mental health sits inside the service package: Mental healthcare is included among the essential service packages those centres are meant to deliver.
    3. District coverage: The District Mental Health Programme now covers more than 90% of districts.
    4. A national tele service: Tele-MANAS (Tele Mental Health Assistance and Networking Across States), launched in 2022, has expanded across all States and Union Territories.

    What three priorities does scaling this foundation require?

    1. Make frontline workers the backbone of community mental healthcare: India’s one million Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) form the world’s largest community health workforce, and with training and supervision they can identify, support and refer individuals with common mental disorders. Validated screening tools, digital learning platforms and performance linked incentives are the levers that would scale the model. Eg. Evidence from Madhya Pradesh and other States shows ASHAs already performing that role.
    2. Invest systematically in community based care: Trained community workers bridge the gap between awareness and treatment, particularly in rural and underserved populations, and these approaches improve access while reducing costs. Eg. Zimbabwe’s Friendship Bench, Atmiyata in India and programmes run by The Live Love Laugh Foundation all operate on this model.
    3. Complete the promise of financial protection: Extending outpatient mental health benefits under the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana would cover the continuous care that mental illness actually needs. Strengthening implementation of insurance parity under the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 would make that care affordable for people currently going without it.

    Challenges to integrating mental health into primary care

    1. Stigma stops care seeking before any service is reached: A diagnosis treated as a family reputational risk rather than as an illness keeps the patient out of the system entirely. Eg. Tele-MANAS was built as an anonymous telephone service precisely because anonymity lowers a barrier that in person help seeking raises.
      The Fix: Fund sustained district level anti stigma communication through the same channels that already carry immunisation and tuberculosis messaging.
    2. District coverage is counted in districts, not in staff: Sanctioned psychiatrist, psychologist and psychiatric social worker posts at district level frequently remain vacant, so a covered district may still have no functioning team. Eg. District hospitals must recruit specialists against private practice pay, which is why the posts stay open.
      The Fix: Allow districts to contract trained mid level providers against unfilled specialist posts rather than carry the vacancy.
    3. The rights framework depends on authorities that were slow to appear: The Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 requires every State to constitute a State Mental Health Authority and to register mental health establishments, and several States were late in doing so. Eg. The Act’s advance directive and nominated representative provisions cannot be exercised without a functioning State authority.
      The Fix: Tie a State’s central mental health funding to a constituted and staffed State Mental Health Authority.
    4. Psychotropic medicines are not reliably stocked below district level: Treatment breaks when a patient stabilised at a district hospital cannot refill medication at the primary health centre. Eg. Antipsychotics and mood stabilisers sit outside the routine stock lists many sub district facilities actually maintain.
      The Fix: Place the core psychotropic list on the essential drug list procured for every Ayushman Bharat Arogya Mandir.
    5. Suicide prevention has no single accountable owner: Prevention needs police, education, agriculture and health departments to act together, and none of them is answerable for the outcome. Eg. The National Suicide Prevention Strategy, released in 2022, set a target of reducing suicide mortality by 10% by 2030 and relies on voluntary departmental convergence.
      The Fix: Give the strategy a named nodal authority in each State reporting against annual targets.

    Conclusion

    Mental health is not a missing programme in India. It is a programme that exists at scale and does not reach people. The binding constraint is who delivers care at the point a person first presents, and that is a workforce question before it is a financing question. Closing the gap therefore turns on whether frontline and community workers are trained, supervised and paid to do the work, and on whether the payment system follows the patient out of the hospital. Until those two move together, coverage will keep expanding without treatment expanding with it.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: Tele-MANAS is a national round the clock tele mental health service providing free counselling and psychiatric support by telephone, run under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    2. Origin: It was announced in the Union Budget for 2022-23 as the National Tele Mental Health Programme and launched in October 2022.
    3. How it is organised: It works in two tiers, with State level cells staffed by trained counsellors and a second tier of specialists and district programme resources for escalation.
    4. Nodal institution: NIMHANS is the nodal centre for the programme, with technical support from the International Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore.

    [2024] With reference to the ‘Pradhan Mantri Surakshit Matritva Abhiyan’, consider the following statements:

    1. This scheme guarantees a minimum package of antenatal care services to women in their second and third trimesters of pregnancy and six months post-delivery health care service in any government health facility.

    2. Under this scheme, private sector health care providers of certain specialities can volunteer to provide services at nearby government health facilities.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Over 7,200 CBI cases under Prevention of Corruption Act pending trial, says CVC report

    Over 7,200 CBI cases under Prevention of Corruption Act pending trial, says CVC report

    Why in the News

    The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has reported in its annual report that over 7,200 cases investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 were awaiting completion of trial at the end of 2025.

    Where does the anti-corruption pipeline stall?

    1. Trials run past two decades: More than 400 of the 7,229 pending Prevention of Corruption Act trials have been open for over 20 years.
    2. Appeals add a second backlog: 14,083 appeals, revisions and writ petitions under the Act were pending in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
    3. Over a third of those are more than a decade old: 3,161 were 10 to 15 years old, 1,347 were 15 to 20 years old and 739 were over 20 years old.
    4. The wider trial load is larger still: Counting cases outside the Act, 11,510 CBI court cases were pending trial at the end of the year.

    What do the investigation and conviction figures show?

    1. Convictions improved: The conviction rate in CBI cases was 71.71 percent in 2025 against 69.14 percent in 2024.
    2. Investigation pendency is small by comparison: 755 corruption related cases were pending investigation, made up of 679 regular cases, 63 preliminary enquiries and 13 Lokpal references (cases the Lokpal has referred to the CBI for investigation).
    3. A year is the usual limit, and 274 cases crossed it: Of the 679 regular cases, 274 had been pending for over one year.
    4. The intake in 2025: The CBI registered 797 regular cases, 177 preliminary enquiries and recorded 31 Lokpal references during the year.

    What capacity does the vigilance system have?

    1. One in seven CBI posts is vacant: Against a sanctioned strength of 7,300, 1,088 posts were vacant, with the largest gap of 672 in the executive ranks.
    2. Departmental inquiries under the Commission: For officers under CVC jurisdiction, 1,460 departmental inquiries were in process during 2025 and 731 were completed.
    3. Inquiries outside its purview: For employees outside its jurisdiction, 9,883 inquiries were in process and 5,561 were completed.
    4. Complaint disposal kept pace: The Commission received 34,153 complaints in 2025 in addition to 1,260 carried forward from 2024, and disposed of 35,193.

    Challenges to prosecuting corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act

    1. Sanction is a gate the executive controls: Section 19 requires the government’s sanction before a court can take cognisance against a public servant, and Section 17A, added by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, requires prior approval even to begin an inquiry into a decision taken in official capacity. Eg. In Vineet Narain v Union of India (1997) the Supreme Court fixed a three month limit for sanction decisions, and the 2018 amendment wrote that limit, extendable by one month, into Section 19 itself.
      The Fix: Treat sanction as deemed granted when the statutory period lapses without a decision.
    2. Special courts are too few for the load: Section 3 of the Act requires trials before special judges, and the same judges carry other criminal work, so a corruption trial waits behind the general docket. Eg. In Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India the Supreme Court in 2021 recorded 4,984 pending criminal cases against legislators and directed special courts to prioritise them.
      The Fix: Designate exclusive special judges for Prevention of Corruption Act trials in every district with a CBI court, with a monthly disposal target monitored by the High Court.
    3. State consent limits where the CBI can act: Under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 the CBI needs a State’s consent to investigate within it, and a growing list of States has withdrawn general consent so every case needs a fresh order. Eg. West Bengal withdrew general consent in November 2018, and in 2024 the Supreme Court allowed the State’s suit against the Union over CBI investigations to proceed to trial.
      The Fix: Enact a standalone CBI statute defining its jurisdiction, as the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice recommended in 2023.
    4. Deputation, not a cadre, staffs the agency: The CBI fills most executive posts by deputation from State police and central forces, so vacancies persist when States decline to release officers. Eg. In May 2013, during the coal block allocation hearing, the Supreme Court described the CBI as a “caged parrot” after the agency’s status report had been shared with the Law Minister.
      The Fix: Expand direct recruitment at the sub inspector and deputy superintendent levels and offer fixed tenure with cadre security to reduce reliance on deputation.

    Conclusion

    The Commission’s numbers show the agency’s work improving at the stages it controls and stalling at the stages it does not. The pendency now sits with the courts and the sanctioning authorities rather than with the investigators. The marker to watch is whether the next annual report shows the oldest trials closing rather than the backlog growing.

    Back2Basics: Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

    1. Origin: Set up in 1964 on the recommendation of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption, and made a statutory body by the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
    2. Composition: A Central Vigilance Commissioner and up to two Vigilance Commissioners, appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Union Home Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha.
    3. Powers over the CBI: It exercises superintendence over the CBI’s investigations of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act by virtue of Section 4 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and reviews the progress of those investigations.
    4. Reporting: It submits an annual report to the President, and the report is laid before both Houses of Parliament.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] “Transparency and accountability in governance are not about controlling corruption but about creating the trust of stakeholders in the policy process by following the Rule of Law and Participatory Governance.” Comment.”

  • Consumer Affairs notifies Legal Metrology (Indian Standard Time) Rules, 2026

    Consumer Affairs notifies Legal Metrology (Indian Standard Time) Rules, 2026

    Why in the News

    The Department of Consumer Affairs notified the Legal Metrology (Indian Standard Time) Rules, 2026.

    Core facts

    1. Notifying body: The Department of Consumer Affairs, under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, issued the notification.
    2. Instrument: The rules are framed under the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, the parent law governing weights, measures and units of measurement.
    3. Purpose: The rules set Indian Standard Time (IST) as the single reference time for official, legal, commercial and administrative use.
    4. Unverified detail: The compliance timeline, exempted sectors and penalty provisions stated in the release body could not be verified this run. PRID 2304613.

    Static Context

    1. Legal Metrology Act, 2009: It replaced the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 and the enforcement Act of 1985. It standardises units, mandates verification of weighing and measuring instruments, and regulates packaged commodity declarations.
    2. Indian Standard Time: IST is fixed at the 82 degrees 30 minutes East standard meridian passing near Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh. It runs 5 hours 30 minutes ahead of Coordinated Universal Time.
    3. Time keeping authority: The National Physical Laboratory (NPL), under the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), maintains and disseminates IST.
    4. Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS): BIS is the national standards body under the BIS Act, 2016. Standardisation of time complements product and quality standardisation functions.

    Prelims angle

    The parent Act (Legal Metrology Act, 2009), the standard meridian (82 degrees 30 minutes East), the IST offset (UTC plus 5:30), and the custodian of IST (NPL under CSIR) are the testable static hooks.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2 (Governance, regulation of standards) and GS Paper 3 (standardisation and the economy). A question can frame the costs and benefits of a single legal time reference for a country of India’s longitudinal span.

    [2017] Consider the following statements:

    1. The Standard Mark of Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) is mandatory for automotive tyres and tubes.

    2. AGMARK is a quality Certification Mark issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

    Which of the above statements is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2