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Subject: GroupingsXRegional

  • Brazil to Iran: Why you can’t put all of BRICS in the anti-West box

    Why in the News

    India presides over the BRICS summit in Delhi with a two fold task: to convey the forum’s shared objective of democratising the international system, and to dispel the widespread impression that it seeks to overthrow the United States led order. Both the forum’s champions and its detractors read it through an anti-Western lens. Supporters celebrate BRICS as a vehicle for resisting Western dominance, and critics warn that it is becoming a counter-bloc led by China and Russia. Neither reading survives contact with the membership, which is divided over whether its national aim is accommodation with the West, autonomy from it, parity within it, or direct confrontation. Delhi’s burden at this summit is to keep the forum from conflating autonomy from America with antagonism towards it.

    Why does one anti-Western label not fit eleven members?

    1. Four national aims, not one: Members differ over whether their national aim is accommodation with the West, autonomy from it, parity within it, or direct confrontation, so the forum’s political orientation is a spectrum rather than a position.
    2. The confrontational pole: Iran sits closest to an anti-Western pole, since resistance to United States power is central to its state ideology and its recent history.
    3. The other end of the spectrum: At the opposite end sit members with deep economic, security and institutional ties to the West, which they maintain while pursuing greater autonomy.
    4. Where the two largest powers sit: Russia and China lie between the extremes. Both are in strategic competition with the West, and neither can be understood apart from its desire for status, influence and a seat at the Western high table.

    Why does Brazil break the West versus Global South opposition?

    1. Its standing in the grouping: Brazil is Latin America’s largest power and a strong advocate for reforming global institutions.
    2. Its institutions are Western in origin: Its geography, language, religion, legal tradition, political institutions and elite reference points are rooted in the Iberian and Euro-Atlantic worlds.
    3. Its diplomatic tradition reinforces this: Brazil is a constitutional democracy whose diplomatic tradition privileges international law and multilateralism.
    4. What it is actually dissatisfied with: Brazil is not seeking to overthrow the West from outside. It is a Western power dissatisfied with how authority is distributed within the order it inhabits.
    5. What that produces in practice: Brasilia rejects automatic alignment with Washington, and is equally uncomfortable with systematic anti-Western mobilisation.
    6. Distance from Eurasia shapes the position: Brazil sits far from Eurasia and, unlike Delhi, is not emotionally invested in Moscow.
    7. China is an economic partner rather than a security problem: Brazil has no direct conflict with Russia or China, and does not share India’s security challenges with Beijing. Beijing is a leading economic partner of Brazil.

    What is Brazil’s position on de-dollarisation and a common currency?

    1. What it supports: Brazil supports cheaper and faster bilateral settlement mechanisms, including trade in national currencies where that is useful.
    2. What it rejects: Brazil has rejected the notion that BRICS must promote de-dollarisation or develop a common currency to displace the dollar.
    3. The stated reason: A shared currency would require political trust, economic convergence and institutional integration that BRICS does not have.
    4. What the position reveals: Brazil’s engagement with the great powers rests on national interest rather than on ideology, and its payments position is the clearest instance of that.

    How is India’s non-Western position different from an anti-Western one?

    1. The identity claim: The External Affairs Minister has consistently underlined India’s non-Western identity, which rests on India being a post-colonial state and a developing country.
    2. Where the distinction lies: India shares political values with the West. It does not want to become a geopolitical appendage to the United States and Europe.
    3. The record of Western partnership: India’s partnerships with the United States, Europe, Japan and Australia have deepened across trade, technology, defence and diaspora.
    4. Two memberships held at once: Delhi’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) sits alongside its membership of BRICS.
    5. What makes the forum useful, and what would end that: BRICS is useful to India precisely because of its diversity. It ceases to serve Indian interests if it becomes a China-led alliance against the West.
    6. Why the anti-Western framing is also poor analysis: Delhi knows that Moscow and Beijing, despite their confrontations with Washington, remain interested in negotiating a new balance with it.

    Why are Russia and China not seeking an exit from the Western order?

    1. Russia’s break is structural: Russia’s contradiction with the West is now deep and structural, shaped by the Ukraine war, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) role in European security, and sanctions.
    2. Yet Moscow wants recognition inside it: Russia is also eager for Western recognition as a great power, and for a say in managing European and global security.
    3. What China challenges: China challenges American primacy in Asia, reduces its exposure to Western technology restrictions, and presents BRICS as part of a more representative order.
    4. Why it cannot exit: China’s rise was inseparable from access to Western markets, capital and technology, and it retains strong economic interdependence with the United States.
    5. What Beijing is actually seeking: China is not seeking an exit from the United States led world. It wants to be America’s co-equal in shaping it.

    Where do the newer members and Iran sit on the spectrum?

    1. Egypt: Egypt remains tied to Washington on security.
    2. The United Arab Emirates: The UAE has extensive commercial and strategic links with the United States and Europe.
    3. Indonesia: Indonesia’s “free and active” diplomacy is designed to retain manoeuvring room among the major powers.
    4. What the three have in common: They seek autonomy, closer ties with China and a stronger voice for the Global South. None seeks membership of a unified anti-Western camp.
    5. Iran is the nearest exception: Resistance to the United States and Israel is central to the Islamic Republic’s political identity, and BRICS offers Tehran legitimacy and a means to counter the American effort to isolate it.
    6. Even Iran is not settled internally: Iran’s domestic debate continues to pit advocates of resistance against those favouring diplomacy and reconciliation with the United States.

    Challenges to India’s position that BRICS is non-Western rather than anti-Western

    1. A consensus text is attributed to every signatory: Language agreed with members at the confrontational end of the spectrum is read abroad as the position of all eleven, including the host. Eg. Tariff threats were aimed at every BRICS member over an alleged collective plan against the dollar, not only at the members proposing one.
      The Fix: Insist that any payments or currency language in a declaration name the specific mechanism and its purpose, so a settlement arrangement cannot be read as currency displacement.
    2. The forum has no charter to bound what it commits members to: BRICS has no treaty and no defined competence, so nothing limits the subjects a declaration may cover. Eg. The grouping’s declarations have expanded from development finance into positions on conflicts in West Asia and in Europe.
      The Fix: Adopt a standing framework document defining the forum’s subject areas, so an item outside them needs an explicit decision rather than a paragraph.
    3. Expansion imports the members’ own quarrels: Each admission adds a set of bilateral disputes the forum must now accommodate inside a single text. Eg. Iran and the United Arab Emirates are both members, and the UAE was attacked by Iran during the current war in West Asia.
      The Fix: Handle conflict language through a separate chair’s statement rather than the consensus declaration, so one dispute cannot hold the economic agenda hostage.
    4. Hedging is cheap only while both sides decline to price it: Simultaneous membership of the Quad and of BRICS is sustainable while neither partner charges for it, and a partner that does charge converts India’s balance into a cost. Eg. The tariff round on India last year followed disagreements in trade talks alongside its Russian oil purchases.
      The Fix: Separate India’s BRICS agenda from its security alignments in public terms, so each partner judges a defined economic programme rather than an alignment.

    Conclusion

    The anti-Western reading of BRICS is wrong as description and useful as politics, which is why it survives. It lets a critic in Washington treat eleven different national calculations as one bloc, and it lets a member at the confrontational end claim the weight of the other ten. India’s difficulty is that the second use invites the first, and the forum has no rule that stops either. What to watch is whether the Delhi declaration describes the reform of institutions its members intend to remain inside, or the displacement of an order most of them depend on.

    About BRICS

    1. How it began: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to identify four high growth emerging economies. The first meeting of their foreign ministers took place on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006.
    2. How it became a summit body: The first formal leaders’ summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009, and South Africa joined in 2011, which gave the grouping its present acronym.
    3. How it expanded: The 2023 Johannesburg summit decided on enlargement. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025, with Saudi Arabia’s formal status remaining nuanced.
    4. The partner tier: A “Partner Country” category was introduced in 2024 to engage states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria without granting full membership.

    Initiatives and Institutions under BRICS

    1. New Development Bank: Established in 2015 and headquartered in Shanghai, it lends for infrastructure and sustainable development in emerging economies, and had approved over $35 billion in infrastructure loans by 2025.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A $100 billion fund created in 2015 to provide short term liquidity support to a member under balance of payments pressure.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross-border payment system in pilot stage, intended to let members settle trade without routing instructions through SWIFT.
    4. Research and technology bodies: The grouping has set up a Vaccine Research and Development Centre for technology transfer, a Partnership on New Industrial Revolution covering artificial intelligence and green technology, and a Space Council created in 2025 to coordinate deep space and lunar research.

    Key Facts about BRICS

    1. Membership: Eleven full members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
    2. Share of population and output: The grouping represents over 45% of the world’s population and accounts for roughly 37% of global GDP measured at purchasing power parity, which is above the G7’s share.
    3. Energy weight: Members together control roughly 42% of global oil production and exports.
    4. How it is organised: BRICS works through an annually rotating chairship, with the chair hosting the leaders’ summit and setting the year’s agenda. Decisions are taken by consensus among all members.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • India and EU close to sealing trade deal, await nod from top Council in Brussels

    Why in the News

    The European Commission has forwarded its proposal for the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union (EU) and India to the European Council, the step that immediately precedes signature. The Commission is the EU’s main executive body and proposes the trade legislation. The European Council, comprising the heads of state or government of the 27 member states along with its own President and the President of the Commission, takes the final decision on authorising signature. On authorisation this becomes the largest trade agreement either side has concluded, eliminating or reducing tariffs on 96 per cent of EU goods exports to India and securing market access for more than 99 per cent of India’s exports to the EU by trade value. Signature is not conclusion, since the European Parliament’s consent and India’s own internal ratification both remain. The agreement also answers a problem neither side names in its text, which is that both import most of their industrial inputs from China.

    How does an EU trade agreement get approved?

    1. The Commission negotiates and proposes: The European Commission conducts the negotiation and then proposes the legislation for concluding the agreement.
    2. The Council authorises signature: The European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the EU, and its members take the final decision on whether the agreement is signed.
    3. Parliament’s consent follows signature: The agreement then requires the consent of the European Parliament before conclusion and entry into force.
    4. India ratifies in parallel: Indian authorities are going through their own internal ratification procedures at the same time.

    What is the existing size of the relationship?

    1. Current trade: The EU and India already trade over Euro 180 billion worth of goods and services a year, with one Euro equal to about US $1.16.
    2. Employment on the EU side: That trade supports close to 800,000 EU jobs.
    3. What the agreement would be: On authorisation it would be the largest trade agreement ever concluded by either the EU or India.

    What does the agreement give the EU?

    1. Tariff elimination on almost all its goods: Tariffs on 96 per cent of EU goods exports to India would be eliminated or reduced.
    2. The value of the duty relief: The reductions would save around Euro 4 billion a year in duties on European products.
    3. Competitive position in the Indian market: European companies would find it easier to access the Indian market and to compete on a more level playing field.
    4. The consumer side: Indian consumers would gain increased choice and more competitive prices.

    What does the agreement give India?

    1. Near total market access for goods: It would secure market access for more than 99 per cent of India’s exports to the EU by trade value.
    2. Services and the movement of professionals: It unlocks high-value commitments in services, complemented by a comprehensive mobility framework enabling the movement of skilled Indian professionals.
    3. The labour-intensive sectors it targets: Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear, marine products, gems and jewellery, handicrafts, engineering goods and automobiles are named as the gainers.
    4. The immediate tariff effect: Tariffs of up to 10 per cent on almost $33 billion of Indian exports fall to zero on the agreement’s entry into force.

    Why did the two sides restart negotiations in 2022?

    1. China’s trade surplus was the trigger: A key reason for reopening talks in 2022 was China’s growing trade surplus with both partners.
    2. Both import their industrial inputs from the same source: The EU and India each import most of their industrial requirements from China, and Beijing’s tightening grip on manufacturing supply chains is reflected in its record trade surplus, which trade friction with the United States has not reduced.
    3. Both are restricting Chinese goods in strategic sectors: Brussels imposed tariffs of up to 35 per cent on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024, and India continues to levy over 100 per cent duty on automobiles imported from China, and is opening the sector to developed countries through trade agreements.
    4. The dependence has been assessed and not removed: A 2025 report by the Delhi Policy Group found both India and the EU still significantly dependent on China.
    5. The pandemic changed the calculation: The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 exposed the vulnerability of China-centric supply chains, prompting both to reassess dependencies and to pursue diversification and de-risking.

    What pressure is the United States applying to both sides?

    1. The stated objective: India and the EU are both under US pressure to reduce dependence on Chinese products and to avoid being used as transhipment hubs.
    2. Indian manufacturing clusters named: A US report last month described several global manufacturing city clusters as “ugly sister” cities, including the Pune-Gujarat-Chennai industrial corridor, and stated that the United States loses when these hubs win.
    3. The argument it makes: The report held that the longer the system operates unchecked, the harder it becomes to restore lost industrial capacity, and that illegal transhipment hubs will continue to siphon off American manufacturing one product line at a time.

    Challenges to the India-EU free trade agreement

    1. A carbon levy sits outside the tariff schedule: The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, a charge on the embedded carbon of an imported good, applies irrespective of the tariff concessions granted. Eg. It covers iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, with the definitive charge beginning in 2026.
      The Fix: Agree mutual recognition of India’s carbon pricing under its Carbon Credit Trading Scheme, so a charge paid in India is set off at the EU border.
    2. Deforestation rules add a traceability duty to a tariff cut: The EU Deforestation Regulation requires geolocation of the plot of production for listed commodities, which a smallholder supply chain cannot document. Eg. Coffee, cocoa, rubber, soy, palm oil, cattle and wood are covered by it.
      The Fix: Fund plot-level geolocation through the commodity boards, so the compliance cost does not fall on the individual grower.
    3. Rules of origin decide who actually uses a zero duty: A concession is usable only where the product clears the value addition test, and an export assembled from imported inputs may not. Eg. Electronics assembled in India from imported components can fail a threshold that garments made from Indian fabric clear comfortably.
      The Fix: Agree cumulation, so inputs sourced from the partner count as originating and the concession reaches assembled goods.
    4. Ratification is a sequence, not a decision: Council authorisation and Parliament consent are separate steps, and an agreement classed as mixed can additionally require ratification by each member state. Eg. The EU’s agreement with Mercosur concluded negotiations in 2019 and remained outside force for years afterwards.
      The Fix: Split the text so the trade chapters enter into force on Parliament’s consent, with investment protection carried in a separate instrument.
    5. Non-tariff measures bind harder than tariffs in food trade: Sanitary and phytosanitary limits decide whether a consignment enters at all, and a zero tariff does nothing for a rejected shipment. Eg. Indian marine and food consignments face EU rejections on antibiotic residue and aflatoxin limits.
      The Fix: Agree recognition of testing by notified Indian laboratories, so a consignment is certified once at origin rather than retested at the border.

    Conclusion

    The text is settled and the decision has moved from negotiators to governments. Three gates remain in sequence: authorisation by the Council, consent of the European Parliament, and India’s internal ratification, and the concessions take effect only at entry into force. Those concessions are also the part of the agreement least likely to decide its value, since the measures that actually restrict Indian exports operate through carbon, deforestation and food safety rules that no tariff schedule touches. What to watch is the Council’s authorisation decision, and whether the agreement is classed as a mixed agreement, which would add ratification by every member state to the path.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2010] In the context of bilateral trade negotiations between India and European Union, what is the difference between European commission and European Council? 1. European Commission represents the EU in trade negotiations whereas European Council participated in the legislation of matters pertaining to economic policies of the European Union 2. European Commission comprises the heads of State of govt. of member countries whereas the European Council comprises of the persons nominated by European Parliament Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (d)”

  • 9th ASEAN India Ministerial Meeting reaffirms commitment to food security and resilient value chains [Dossier]

    PIB class: Press Release. Ministry: Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare.

    Why in News

    The 9th ASEAN India Ministerial Meeting on agriculture reaffirmed commitment to food security, sustainable agriculture and resilient value chains.

    Core facts

    1. The forum: ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a ten member regional grouping. India is a dialogue partner and a strategic partner of ASEAN.
    2. Stated themes: Food security, sustainable agriculture and resilient agricultural value chains formed the agenda of the ministerial meeting.
    3. Figures and specific deliverables: Not verifiable this run and therefore omitted.

    Static Context

    1. ASEAN was established in 1967 through the Bangkok Declaration. Its members are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
    2. India ASEAN relations run through a structured framework. India joined as a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1996. The relationship became a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022.
    3. The ASEAN India Trade in Goods Agreement is under review. Agriculture cooperation runs through a rolling plan of action agreed by the two sides.
    4. Food security cooperation links to India’s Act East Policy. It ties agriculture trade to India’s wider Indo Pacific engagement.

    Prelims angle

    ASEAN founding year 1967 and the Bangkok Declaration. The ten members. India’s status as a Comprehensive Strategic Partner since 2022. India ASEAN connectivity projects such as the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project and the India Myanmar Thailand Trilateral Highway.

    Mains angle

    GS2, regional groupings affecting India’s interests. Agriculture and food security cooperation as a pillar of the Act East Policy and of India’s Indo Pacific strategy.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following connectivity projects is/are a part of cooperation between India and the ASEAN member countries? 1. Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project 2. IMT Trilateral Highway 3. Agartala-Akhaura Rail Line (a) 1 and 2 (b) 2 and 3 (c) 1 and 3 (d) 2 only. Answer: (a)”

  • BRICS [PIB Backgrounder]

    PIB class: PIB Backgrounder. Unit: PIB feature unit.

    Why in News

    PIB published a thematic Backgrounder on BRICS, the intergovernmental grouping.

    Core facts (static, definitional)

    1. BRICS is an intergovernmental grouping. The founding members are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
    2. Origin: The term BRIC began as an economic grouping in 2006. South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS.
    3. Expansion: The grouping admitted new members from January 2024. Indonesia became a full member in January 2025 and is the first Southeast Asian state in the bloc.
    4. Institutions: The New Development Bank (NDB) finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is a currency swap framework for balance of payments support.

    Static Context

    1. The New Development Bank (NDB) was established in 2015 and is headquartered in Shanghai. Founding members subscribed equal capital, so no single member dominates its voting.
    2. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is a treaty based safety net. It lets members access foreign currency during short term liquidity pressure.
    3. BRICS positions itself as a voice of the Global South. It presses for reform of the United Nations Security Council and of the Bretton Woods institutions.
    4. The 16th BRICS Summit was held at Kazan, Russia in 2024 under the Russian chairship. Its theme concerned strengthening multilateralism for just global development and security.

    Prelims angle

    Founding versus new members. The NDB headquarters at Shanghai and its equal capital structure. The CRA as a swap arrangement. Latest summit host and chair. Indonesia as the first Southeast Asian member.

    Mains angle

    GS2, global groupings affecting India’s interests. BRICS as a counterweight in global governance and a platform for the Global South, weighed against internal divergence among members.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements with regard to BRICS: I. The 16th BRICS Summit was held under the Chairship of Russia in Kazan. II. Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS. III. The theme of the 16th BRICS Summit was Strengthening Multiculturalism for Just Global Development and Security. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) I and II (b) II and III (c) I and III (d) I only. Answer: (a)”

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South. Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • The challenges for BRICS

    Why in the News

    India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September, twenty years after the grouping was formalised in 2006. The grouping now accounts for a larger share of world output than the G7 and has grown from four members to eleven. Expansion has made agreement harder rather than easier. The foreign ministers’ meeting earlier in 2026 closed without a joint declaration after two members on opposite sides of an active conflict clashed. The economic project shows the same gap, with the idea of a single BRICS currency shelved in favour of settling bilateral trade in national currencies.

    How did BRICS grow from a four country dialogue into an eleven member bloc?

    1. Origin in a growth forecast: BRIC began in 2006 with Brazil, Russia, India and China, following a Goldman Sachs projection identifying these economies as future engines of global growth.
    2. From ministers to leaders: The format moved from a foreign ministers’ dialogue to a leaders’ forum, and the first summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009.
    3. First enlargement: South Africa joined in 2010, and the grouping took its present name.
    4. Second enlargement: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were added in 2024, and Indonesia became the eleventh full member in January 2025.

    How does BRICS now compare with the G7 in economic weight?

    1. The position in 2000: The four original members together accounted for roughly 23% of global GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, which compares economies using what a currency actually buys at home rather than at market exchange rates. The G7 held nearly 52%.
    2. The position in 2024: The eleven member grouping accounted for approximately 36.8% of global GDP (PPP), and the G7 share fell below 29%.
    3. Growth differential: BRICS economies are projected to grow by an average 3.8% in 2025 and 3.7% in 2026, more than three times the G7 average.
    4. Prosperity tells a different story: Per capita GDP averages around $53,000 in the G7 against roughly $8,200 in BRICS.
    5. What drives the aggregate: The bloc’s weight comes from population and resource scale rather than from individual prosperity.

    Why has the grouping’s original grievance survived twenty years?

    1. The founding complaint: Global institutions have not kept pace with the redistribution of economic and political power.
    2. What the first summit asked for: Reform of the international financial institutions and of the United Nations, greater energy security, and a more democratic multipolar world order.
    3. Still unmet: Those demands remain the grouping’s central agenda two decades later, which is why an economic forum has turned into a geopolitical one presenting itself as a voice of the Global South.

    What does BRICS do for India’s strategy of multi alignment?

    1. Membership without alliance: India participates simultaneously in BRICS, the G20, the Quad and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) without accepting alliance commitments.
    2. The purpose of that spread: Multi alignment rests on strategic autonomy and is about creating room for manoeuvre rather than choosing between competing power centres.
    3. The grouping is not anti Western by origin: BRICS emerged during an early phase of convergence between India and the United States on strategic questions.
    4. India’s institutional contribution: India proposed a development bank at the 2012 New Delhi summit, and that proposal became the New Development Bank (NDB).
    5. What the bank has done: By mid 2026 the NDB had approved approximately $44 billion across 141 projects.

    What divides the members over what BRICS is for?

    1. The Chinese and Russian reading: Both increasingly position the grouping as a counterweight to Western dominance and a platform to challenge United States led institutions and the dollar’s hegemony.
    2. Beijing’s stake in size: China drove the enlargement, treating a larger grouping as a vehicle to project leadership of the Global South.
    3. Moscow’s stake in survival: Excluded from the SWIFT messaging network that banks use to send cross border payment instructions, and facing sweeping sanctions, Russia treats BRICS as an economic lifeline.
    4. The Indian and Brazilian reading: Both view BRICS primarily as an economic and reform oriented grouping.
    5. Where the divergence became explicit: Russia demanded in 2023 that India pay for oil in yuan, and India refused, insisting on dollars or rupees only.

    Why has expansion made consensus harder to reach?

    1. The visible fault line: The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi in May 2026 failed to agree on a joint declaration.
    2. What caused the breakdown: Two member states on opposite sides of an active conflict, Iran and the UAE, confronted each other directly.
    3. What the chair issued instead: India recorded a chair’s statement acknowledging “differing views among some members regarding the situation in West Asia”.
    4. The structural point: BRICS operates on consensus, and every added member adds another veto on any text touching a geopolitical crisis.

    What has replaced the idea of a single BRICS currency?

    1. The currency idea is shelved: The United States President has threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS nations if they created a new currency or backed another currency to replace the dollar, and a single BRICS currency has largely been dropped.
    2. Bilateral settlement instead: Members have moved to settling trade in national currencies, a decentralised route that needs no common institution. Russia and China now settle over 90% of their bilateral trade in ruble and yuan.
    3. The India cases: Roughly 90% of direct payments between Russia and India have moved to national currencies through Special Rupee Vostro Accounts, which are rupee accounts that a foreign bank holds with an Indian bank, authorised by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). India has run a rupee and dirham settlement system with the UAE since July 2023 and a rupee and rupiah framework with Indonesia since July 2026.
    4. A payments layer, not a currency: BRICS Pay, to be unveiled at the 2026 summit, links national payment rails including Russia’s SPFS, China’s CIPS, India’s UPI and Brazil’s Pix, so members can settle trade without routing through dollar correspondent banks.
    5. India’s own preference: India pushes interoperable central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), meaning sovereign digital money that can move across systems, rather than a supranational currency.

    How far has the dollar’s position actually weakened?

    1. Reserve holdings barely moved: The dollar still accounted for 57.13% of global central bank reserves in the first quarter of 2026.
    2. No member is building an alternative reserve: No BRICS member is accumulating rupee, yuan or rand reserves at meaningful scale.
    3. The Western assessment: Western countries treat the grouping not as an immediate replacement for the existing international order, but as a platform capable of gradually reshaping the distribution of geopolitical power.

    Challenges to BRICS

    1. No permanent secretariat or charter: The grouping has no treaty, no standing staff and no institutional memory, so follow up on a summit commitment depends on whichever member holds the rotating chair. Eg. Implementation is tracked through each chair’s own sherpa arrangements rather than by a standing body.
      The Fix: Create a small permanent secretariat with a published implementation review against each summit declaration.
    2. Unsettled disputes between members cap cooperation: India and China remain in an unresolved boundary dispute, which limits how far either will accept the other’s leadership of the bloc. Eg. The Galwan Valley clash of 2020 froze wider cooperation between the two for years.
      The Fix: Ring fence bilateral disputes into a separate channel so bloc business is not suspended whenever a member pair falls out.
    3. The bank depends on the market it wants to bypass: The NDB raises much of its capital in dollar markets, so lending to a sanctioned member threatens its own credit standing and funding cost. Eg. The bank suspended new transactions in Russia in 2022 to protect its market access.
      The Fix: Expand local currency lending and local currency bond issuance so project finance does not rest on dollar funding.
    4. Enlargement without an entry standard: Membership now spans oil exporters, sanctioned economies and aid recipients with little shared trade interest, which weakens any common negotiating position. Eg. Argentina abandoned its accession after being invited to join in 2023.
      The Fix: Publish objective accession criteria covering intra bloc trade share and acceptance of the reform agenda before any further enlargement.

    Conclusion

    BRICS has accumulated weight faster than it has accumulated agreement. Its economic case is largely settled and its political case is not. The marker to watch at the New Delhi summit is whether the chair closes with a text every member has signed or with a statement of its own. A second marker is whether the payments platform moves from launch to measurable settlement volume, since that is where the grouping’s stated ambition meets the actual behaviour of its members.

    Back2Basics: New Development Bank

    1. Founding instrument: The bank was established by an agreement signed at the 2014 BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, and began operations in 2015.
    2. Headquarters: It is based in Shanghai, with its first regional office in Johannesburg.
    3. Voting design: The five founding members hold equal shareholding, unlike the weighted voting used in the Bretton Woods institutions.
    4. Membership beyond the founders: Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt and Algeria have been admitted as members, so the bank’s membership is wider than the grouping itself.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • At BRICS, India’s task is to keep the Ukraine peace process moving

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister has again urged the Russian President to end the war in Ukraine, at their meeting in Bishkek on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. Two envoys of the U.S. President travelled to Moscow and Kyiv over the same weekend carrying fresh peace proposals, and the guns briefly fell silent during that visit. The U.S. President has followed with a call to the Russian President asking for a swift end to the war so that U.S.-Russia ties can be restored. After more than four and a half years, the war is edging towards the negotiation of an endgame. India chairs BRICS this year, the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa now expanded to eleven members, and hosts its summit in New Delhi this weekend. The settlement itself will be written elsewhere.

    Where does the American peace track stand?

    1. The 2025 process paused rather than ended: The Alaska process of 2025 produced the Anchorage summit, successive plans and counter-plans, and negotiating rounds at Geneva and Abu Dhabi.
    2. Six months of lost momentum: The American initiative stalled as Washington’s attention was taken up by Iran. The U.S. was drawn into the West Asian theatre as a belligerent.
    3. The file has been reopened: The U.S. President’s follow-up call to the Russian President confirms the return to Ukraine. A plan or at least a ceasefire may now emerge from a trilateral seating the U.S., Russian and Ukrainian Presidents in one room.

    Why did the last bargain collapse?

    1. The reported “3+2” formula: Circulating accounts described the Russian President reducing Moscow’s demands to Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, with Zaporizhzhia and Kherson beyond that.
    2. The Donbas is the sticking point: Russia holds Crimea and insists on the whole of the Donbas, including ground it has not taken.
    3. The trade that was offered: Russia offered to let Kyiv keep the parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia it could not capture, against an easing of sanctions.
    4. Kyiv refused: The U.S. Secretary of State has admitted that Ukraine would not agree. Washington can keep the parties in the room. It cannot make Kyiv cede the Donbas, nor make Moscow accept less than it believes it has won.

    What has India actually done, and on what reasoning?

    1. A shuttle inside the American track: The External Affairs Minister travelled from Moscow to Kyiv days before the American envoys set out, urging dialogue and diplomacy and carrying a message between the two capitals.
    2. No branded Indian plan: China, Switzerland and Turkey each proposed peace frameworks of their own and each effort stalled. India worked inside the existing U.S. peace track instead, offering to help only if both belligerents asked and keeping the Americans informed.
    3. The energy position: India holds that cutting oil imports will not stop the war, that its citizens’ energy security is not negotiable, and that sanctions for their own sake are no substitute for diplomacy.
    4. The growth argument: Conflict anywhere threatens the growth trajectory on which India expects to reach developed economy status within two decades.

    Why does the Global South claim a stake in ending this war?

    1. Energy and food costs travelled outward: The war raised energy prices and struck the security of food and fertiliser supplies well beyond the theatre.
    2. Balance sheet damage in uninvolved states: It fed inflation and sovereign debt stress in countries with no part in the fighting.
    3. Institutional erosion: It frayed the multilateral institutions that smaller states depend on for dispute settlement and finance.
    4. Peace as a global public good: Nations with no soldiers near the Dnieper have paid a heavy price, and that gives them standing to press for a settlement.

    What can a BRICS chair actually deliver?

    1. India will not be in the room: The settlement will be authored in Washington, Moscow and Kyiv, and sealed in a trilateral of the three Presidents.
    2. Representation rather than mediation: India’s nudge is an act of representation for a constituency that is watching, is affected, and wants the guns silenced. It is not a claim to a mediator’s role.
    3. The summit seats belligerents and no mediator: The New Delhi summit will seat Russia from the European war and Iran from the West Asian one, and neither the United States nor any other mediator.
    4. The deliverable is a text: India’s task is to steer a summit declaration that reflects the reality of these conflicts, does not echo the case of any single party, and carries a collective call for peace.

    Challenges to the Ukraine peace process

    1. A ceasefire needs monitoring that nobody has agreed to provide: A line of contact running over a thousand kilometres cannot be policed by a declaration. Eg. The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 were monitored by an unarmed Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission that logged violations without being able to stop them.
      The Fix: Settle the verification mechanism, its mandate and its funding in the same document that fixes the ceasefire line.
    2. Security guarantees for Kyiv have no agreed form: A guarantee that is political rather than legal collapses at the moment it is needed. Eg. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 gave Ukraine assurances in exchange for surrendering Soviet-era nuclear weapons, and those assurances carried no enforcement obligation.
      The Fix: Write any guarantee as a treaty with named guarantors and a stated trigger for action.
    3. Sanctions relief and territory move on different clocks: Sanctions can be reimposed and ceded territory cannot be recovered, so the sequencing decides who carries the risk. Eg. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015, relief was staged against verified nuclear steps, and the U.S. exit in 2018 showed how fast staged relief reverses.
      The Fix: Tie each stage of relief to a verified and reversible step, with a dispute mechanism agreed before the first stage begins.
    4. Europe funds the outcome without negotiating it: The party carrying reconstruction and refugee costs has no seat in the trilateral that would settle them. Eg. European Union states have hosted over four million Ukrainians under temporary protection since 2022.
      The Fix: Seat the parties that will fund reconstruction and enforce sanctions in the negotiation that creates those obligations.

    Conclusion

    Wars end at a table, and the immediate question is whether one is kept standing. The chair of a plurilateral grouping cannot summon belligerents, and India has not claimed that it can. What a chair can do is put the cost borne by uninvolved states on the record of a summit that both a European and a West Asian belligerent will attend. Watch whether the New Delhi text speaks for the affected rather than for a party.

    About BRICS

    1. What it is: BRICS is a plurilateral grouping of major emerging economies that coordinates positions on global governance. It began as an investment category and became a geopolitical bloc.
    2. Origin and evolution: The acronym “BRIC” was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist. Foreign Ministers first met on the margins of the UN General Assembly in 2006, and the first Leaders’ Summit was held at Yekaterinburg in 2009.
    3. Membership: South Africa joined in 2011. Expansion was agreed at the Johannesburg summit of 2023, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joining in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025, taking full membership to eleven. Saudi Arabia participates with its formal status left nuanced, and a “Partner Country” category was introduced in 2024 for states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria.
    4. Weight: The grouping holds over 45 percent of the world’s population, about 37 percent of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms, ahead of the G7’s share, and roughly 42 percent of global oil production and exports.

    Institutional Initiatives of BRICS

    1. New Development Bank: Headquartered in Shanghai, it lends for infrastructure and sustainable development in member and partner states, and has approved over $35 billion in loans.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A $100 billion facility that provides short-term liquidity support to a member under balance of payments pressure.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross-border payment system in pilot stage, intended to settle trade outside the SWIFT messaging network.
    4. Partnership on New Industrial Revolution: A cooperation track on artificial intelligence, digitalisation and green technology. A BRICS Space Council was added in 2025 to coordinate deep-space and lunar research.
    5. BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre: Set up during the pandemic to support technology transfer and vaccine access across members.

    Challenges in BRICS

    1. Internal rivalries block strategic cohesion: Two of the largest members carry an unresolved bilateral dispute into every common position. Eg. The India-China boundary dispute has kept security cooperation within the grouping nominal.
      The Fix: Prioritise health, space and education cooperation, where a common position is available without settling the political disputes first.
    2. Members run incompatible political systems: Joint declarations cannot carry a common position on human rights or democratic norms. Eg. India and Brazil sit as electoral democracies alongside Russia, China and Iran.
      The Fix: Confine declarations to areas where a shared position genuinely exists, and record differences rather than negotiating the text down to nothing.
    3. Slow de-dollarisation: The shift to local currency trade is far behind the rhetoric around it. Eg. The U.S. dollar still settles over 80 percent of global trade.
      The Fix: Deepen bilateral local currency settlement in trade flows that are already balanced, such as rupee-rouble and rupee-dirham arrangements, before attempting a common unit.
    4. Expansion risks a talk shop: A wider membership lowers the common denominator of any agreed text. Eg. The Non-Aligned Movement widened steadily and lost the ability to produce decisions.
      The Fix: Formalise admission criteria for Partner Countries, so entry follows economic synergy rather than geopolitical alignment.
    5. No charter and no permanent secretariat: The grouping runs on an annual rotating chair and its summit declarations, with nothing tracking implementation between them. Eg. The European Union operates through standing institutions and binding instruments, and BRICS has neither.
      The Fix: Create a small standing secretariat to carry implementation of declarations across chairs.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10.0 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • A possible G3 is casting a shadow over BRICS

    A possible G3 is casting a shadow over BRICS

    Why in the News

    BRICS leaders meet in Delhi this week to add further layers of cooperation, ranging from agriculture, health to digitalisation. The grouping’s two principal driving forces, Russia and China, are at the same time exploring separate and joint accommodations with the United States, whose domination of the world order BRICS exists to counter.

    What will the Delhi summit actually produce?

    1. More layers, slowly added: The summit will extend cooperation into agriculture, health and digitalisation.
    2. The declaration is not the draw: The last summit, at Rio de Janeiro, issued a declaration of 126 paragraphs without changing anything in the international system.
    3. The attraction is attendance: International interest is focused on the presence of the leaders of China, Russia and Iran.
    4. One bilateral carries the weight: The Chinese President is visiting India for the first time since 2019, and the two leaders are expected to stabilise the boundary situation and reset economic relations.

    Why has BRICS become less coherent?

    1. Expansion cut both ways: Enlargement added weight to the grouping and subtracted coherence from it.
    2. The Iran war split two members: The conflict opened a sharp divide between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, now fellow members of the grouping.
    3. Two incompatible asks: Iran wants BRICS to condemn American and Israeli military action. The United Arab Emirates, which suffered Iranian attacks and disruption to commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, stresses sovereignty, protection of civilian infrastructure and freedom of navigation.
    4. It has already cost an outcome: Those differences prevented the BRICS foreign ministers from issuing a consensual joint statement in Delhi in May.

    Why is a G3 conceivable now?

    1. A leader driven American approach: The US President has long held that good personal relations with the Russian and Chinese leaders could reduce global strategic tensions and produce major political and economic deals.
    2. Domestic and allied resistance: That instinct has repeatedly encountered resistance from the American foreign policy establishment, Congress and US allies.
    3. European and Asian fears differ: The Europeans worry that an accommodation with Moscow could be made at their expense. Asian allies fear that a bargain with Beijing could weaken American commitments to regional security.
    4. Nothing has been transformed yet: Neither relationship has been changed, and the preference for leader driven diplomacy keeps the possibility of movement open.
    5. The idea has been tested before: The possibility of such a meeting was explored last summer, during the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

    What does Russia bring to that table?

    1. The war has not been won: Four and a half years of fighting have produced no decisive victory, and the front remains costly and difficult to move.
    2. A channel has reopened: Shuttle diplomacy by American envoys between Moscow and Kyiv has reopened the diplomatic channel, without any sign that the fundamental differences between Russia and Ukraine are narrowing.
    3. Both sides hedge: Moscow and Kyiv are supporting the American peace initiative and preparing for escalation at the same time.
    4. European security could become a chip: Russian security questions could be treated by Washington as part of a larger bargain with Beijing.

    What does China bring?

    1. It negotiates from strength: China approaches Washington from a stronger position than Russia does.
    2. A sequenced diplomatic run: Its journey from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit at Bishkek, through Cairo and Delhi, to the White House later this month presents China as the leader of the Global South and as a co-equal manager of the international order at the same time.
    3. What a second summit could yield: An extension of the trade truce, additional Chinese purchases from the United States and negotiations over technology restrictions are the available deliverables.
    4. The differences are structural: Washington accuses China of relying on subsidised exports and industrial overcapacity. Beijing uses rare earths, market access and its control of important supply chains as leverage.
    5. Taiwan is the standing ask: China will continue to press for a reduction in American support for Taiwan.

    Can anti-Western rhetoric and a seat at the American table hold together?

    1. Alignment and hedging run together: Russia and China are closer to each other than ever and share concerns about the United States. Both also seek a workable relationship with Washington.
    2. Both claim the high table: For all their anti-Western rhetoric, each claims a place at the high table with the United States.
    3. The claim has history: Russia was once part of the G8, the group of Western industrial states, and engaged directly with NATO. China now sees itself as America’s peer.
    4. What a trilateral would signify: Both lay claim to shaping the global order established after 1945, and a summit of the three leaders would mark the beginning of triangular global leadership as a successor to the Yalta System.
    5. It is not imminent: A global directorate of three is not close, and the idea remains an exploration rather than a plan.

    What are India’s three answers?

    1. Build national power first: The first answer is internal reform and accelerated economic development.
    2. Separate multipolarity from anti-American bloc politics: Russia and China use BRICS to expand their diplomatic options and to preserve the freedom to negotiate with Washington. India must approach the emerging order with the same realism.
    3. Widen the partnership base: India must intensify bilateral and minilateral cooperation with the Anglosphere, Brazil, Europe, Japan, Korea and other middle powers that have no enthusiasm for a G3 world.

    Challenges to BRICS

    1. Internal rivalry limits cohesion: Friction between the two largest Asian members prevents a common strategic position inside the grouping. Eg. The unsettled India-China boundary has kept the two from a shared security line inside the same forum.
    2. Consensus across incompatible political systems: The membership spans vibrant democracies and autocracies, which makes agreement on human rights or democratic norms unreachable in joint declarations. Eg. The entry of Iran and Ethiopia alongside Brazil and India widened that political range further.
    3. De-dollarisation is slower than the rhetoric: Local currency settlement has grown, and the US dollar still settles the overwhelming share of global trade. Eg. Rupee-rouble and rupee-dirham settlement covers only a fraction of India’s external trade.
    4. There is no permanent secretariat: The grouping has no charter and no standing institution, so continuity depends entirely on the annual chair. Eg. Each presidency resets the agenda, and commitments lapse when the chair changes.
    5. Intra-group trade stays low: Members continue to rely on G7 markets for high technology imports and services exports. Eg. Most members source advanced semiconductors and aerospace components from the United States, Europe and Japan.
    6. Expansion risks dilution: A larger BRICS+ risks becoming a discussion forum that produces no decisions. Eg. The Non-Aligned Movement grew past 120 members and lost the ability to reach operative positions.

    Way Forward

    1. Focus on areas of common interest: Confine joint positions to areas where members already agree, such as development finance and public health, rather than seeking a security consensus that does not exist.
    2. Adopt variable geometry: Move towards a variable geometry model in which subsets of members can sign issue specific instruments without binding the whole group.
    3. Strengthen payment infrastructure: Target payments infrastructure that lowers settlement cost and time, rather than focusing primarily on the displacement of the US dollar as a reserve currency.
    4. Create a permanent institutional mechanism: Establish a small standing secretariat with a limited mandate to track implementation of past declarations and maintain institutional continuity.
    5. Promote intra-BRICS supply chains: Direct the New Development Bank towards financing intra-group industrial supply chains, particularly in strategic sectors such as advanced technology and manufacturing.
    6. Formalise expansion criteria: Establish clear entry criteria for partner countries, ensuring that future expansion is based on economic complementarity rather than political alignment.

    Conclusion

    Multipolarity has always had two possible shapes: one distributes power across many capitals; the other concentrates it among a handful and calls the result a balance. BRICS rests on the first assumption; its two strongest members hedge towards the second. For India the operative question is not whether a three cornered directorate forms, which it may not, but whether Indian diplomacy is organised for a world in which its two largest partners in the grouping negotiate separately with Washington. That answer will show up in what India builds outside the room, not in what the room declares.

    About BRICS

    1. What it is: BRICS is an informal grouping of major emerging economies that coordinates political and economic positions outside Western led institutions, without a founding treaty.
    2. Membership: Its full members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with Saudi Arabia participating without having formalised its status.
    3. Its weight: The grouping accounts for over 45 per cent of the world’s population, about 37 per cent of global output measured at purchasing power parity, which exceeds the G7’s share, and roughly 42 per cent of global oil production and exports.
    4. Its stated objectives: Reform of the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for more equitable representation, a multipolar order, and reduced reliance on the US dollar and on SWIFT, the messaging network banks use to instruct cross border payments.

    Key Facts about BRICS

    1. The acronym predates the grouping: ‘BRIC’ was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to identify high growth emerging economies.
    2. From officials to leaders: The first meeting of foreign ministers was held on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. The first formal Leaders’ Summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009.
    3. How it grew: South Africa joined in 2011. Expansion was decided at the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joining in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025.
    4. A partner tier: A ‘Partner Country’ category was introduced in 2024 to engage states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria without granting full membership.

    Initiatives under BRICS

    1. New Development Bank: Headquartered in Shanghai, it has approved over USD 35 billion in infrastructure lending.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A USD 100 billion fund providing short term liquidity support to members.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross border payment system in pilot stage, intended to work around SWIFT.
    4. BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre: Set up during the pandemic for technology transfer and vaccine equity.
    5. Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation: Six satellites contributed by member states, sharing data for disaster management.
    6. Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR): Cooperation on artificial intelligence, digitalisation and green technology.
    7. BRICS Space Council: Established in 2025 to coordinate deep space exploration and lunar research.

    Back2Basics: The Yalta System

    • Why the term recurs: ‘Yalta System’ is used as shorthand for an international order settled among a small number of great powers rather than by the wider membership.f BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”
    • Where the term comes from: The Yalta Conference of February 1945 brought together the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to settle the shape of the post-war order.
    • What it settled: It fixed the occupation and reorganisation of Europe and confirmed agreement on creating the United Nations.
    • The concert it produced: It led to a Security Council with permanent seats and a veto for five powers, entrenching great power management of international peace.

    [2026, GS2, 10.0 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.

  • India’s opportunity to put BRICS back together

    Why in the News

    The 18th BRICS Summit is to be held in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026 under India’s chairship. The grouping now carries 11 members and 10 partner countries after an expansion India and Brazil both resisted. Its founding practice of adopting documents only by consensus has been bypassed more than once since 2020, most recently at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting held in New Delhi in May 2026. The contest is over what the group is for: a reform coalition of emerging economies working inside existing institutions, or a bloc defined by opposition to the West. The summit is the point at which the chair can push that choice one way or the other.

    What is BRICS?

    1. What it is: BRICS is a grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, formed to give the emerging economies a greater voice in global governance and institutions, particularly financial and economic ones, and to work towards a more equitable multilateral order.
    2. How it works: It has no treaty and no binding decision procedure. It operates by consensus, and its output is a summit declaration adopted by all members.
    3. What it has built: Its principal institution is the New Development Bank, the multilateral development bank established by the members to lend for infrastructure and sustainable development.

    What did India originally want from BRICS?

    1. A vehicle for reform: India was an enthusiastic early participant, treating the group as a means of securing genuine reform of multilateral institutions.
    2. The first Indian-hosted summit: The fourth BRICS summit, held in India in 2012, took the theme “Global Stability, Security and Prosperity”, which tacitly reflected a much broader geopolitical canvas than economics alone.
    3. What the Indian presidency produced: It helped lead to the establishment of the New Development Bank. Other Indian initiatives followed, including the integration of a counter-terrorism architecture into the group’s work.
    4. The current chairship’s framing: This year’s theme rests on four pillars, Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability, and draws on the Prime Minister’s “Humanity First” vision and a “people-centric” approach to BRICS cooperation.

    How did China’s use of BRICS diverge from the reform agenda?

    1. A different purpose from the start: China saw the group as a counterpoise to Western domination, a view India also shared initially in the specific context of reform.
    2. Why China needed the platform: A group of emerging economies accounting for nearly 20 per cent of world GDP in 2010 could amplify Chinese global ambitions in a way China could not do alone.
    3. The outreach mechanisms carried the design: BRICS-Plus and BRICS Outreach were used to reach the Global South and consolidate its profile as a second pole in a future bipolar world.
    4. Reform support proved selective: China resisted supporting the bids of India, Brazil and South Africa for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. India then shifted its own effort towards consolidation and intra-BRICS matters to resist Chinese grandstanding.

    What has happened to the consensus principle?

    1. Consensus is what held the group together: It is the practice that prevents a majority from binding the rest, and its erosion changes what membership is worth.
    2. The 2019 summit was the high point of restraint: The Brasilia summit was held with no invited guest countries at all, only the five original members.
    3. The first breach came in 2020: Under the Russian presidency a chair’s statement on COVID-19 was issued without consensus, probably the first such document in the group’s history.
    4. It has become routine: Non-consensus documents were resorted to again at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in May 2026, because the new members could not agree.
    5. The failure model already exists: The danger is that BRICS goes the way of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where a majority can bulldoze its view through.

    What has expansion done to the group’s cohesion?

    1. China pushed it and India resisted: China pressed first for expansion of the New Development Bank and then for expansion of BRICS itself. India and Brazil both resisted and were overruled.
    2. The size now: The group has 11 members following the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia, along with 10 partner countries.
    3. The original five manage their differences: Some of those differences are serious, and the five handle them with the maturity that keeping the group intact requires.
    4. The new members do not: They carry their bilateral conflicts into the group and are subverting it through them.
    5. The regional precedent: The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the case of a grouping paralysed by the bilateral disputes of its own members.

    Is BRICS non-West or anti-West?

    1. India’s line is “non-West”: India has worked to keep the group non-West against pressure from some members to turn it explicitly anti-West.
    2. Events push the other way: China is competing with the United States for global leadership, Russia is at war with Ukraine with the full backing of Europe, and Iran is being bombarded by the United States and Israel.
    3. Two members are under direct pressure: Brazil and India have both been subjected to punitive tariffs by the U.S. President, and the U.S. Congress is considering legislation empowering the President to levy punitive tariffs on countries importing Russian oil.
    4. India’s other options are weakening at the same time: The Quad is being emasculated by the United States, India-U.S. relations are under great pressure, Pakistan is being courted by the United States at India’s expense, and global institutions are being made dysfunctional by the West.
    5. The restraint has support inside the group: Many members share India’s effort to prevent an anti-Western drift, since they gain from engaging actors in different camps in their own national interest. They want change without geopolitical realignment behind China and Russia.

    Why is de-dollarisation not moving as China wants?

    1. The parallel currency proposal has stalled: The push for de-dollarisation through the establishment of a BRICS currency is receiving a lukewarm response.
    2. The reason is who would dominate it: Members are uncomfortable with a currency dominated by the renminbi.
    3. What they will accept instead: The preference is for interlinking payment systems, central bank digital currencies and transactions settled in national currencies.
    4. China is proceeding on its own track: After a successful pilot, it is formally launching mBridge, an alternative cross-border financial payment system.
    5. What India is guarding against: An alternative Bretton Woods system dominated by China is the outcome India least wants.

    What parallel orders are being built outside BRICS?

    1. Both major powers are writing their own rules: The United States and China are enunciating parallel visions of the world and playing by rules of their own rather than internationally negotiated ones.
    2. The contested areas are new ones: Parallel structures and standards are being set in artificial intelligence, digital and Internet governance, data ownership, state control, 5G and 6G telecom, satellite navigation and electric vehicles.
    3. China has added an institution: It has set up a World AI Cooperation Organisation in Shanghai.
    4. The financial architecture already has a rival: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road challenge the Bretton Woods institutions and their governance and financing models.
    5. Neither power wants reform: Both are building around the existing institutions rather than seeking to change them, and both see BRICS as one vehicle for those broader goals.

    What is “reformed multilateralism” and why does India want it back?

    1. Where it came from: The Prime Minister first articulated the vision of “reformed multilateralism” at the leaders’ retreat of the 2018 BRICS Summit in South Africa.
    2. How it became group language: By 2019 it had found its way into the summit document at Brasilia, with India, Brazil and South Africa pushing for it.
    3. What it commits the group to: Changing the governance of existing institutions rather than replacing them, which is the opposite of building parallel structures.
    4. Why it matters now: Reviving it makes BRICS a strong voice for the non-West middle powers and, by extension, for the Global South.

    Can BRICS be an organisation of Global South middle powers?

    1. A Global South middle power is a different thing: The middle powers described at Davos by the Canadian Prime Minister are broadly West-centric, and a Global South middle power does not share that anchoring.
    2. BRICS is the only credible platform: If there is a credible organisation of Global South middle powers, it is BRICS.
    3. Its largest member does not fit the description: China is hardly a middle power and holds disproportionate influence within the group.
    4. The India-China relationship is the constraint: The two need greater synergy on emerging global issues even as their bilateral differences are being contained.
    5. The composition is incomplete: Some middle powers that ought to be in the group are not represented in it, which limits what it can claim to speak for.

    Challenges to BRICS

    1. De-dollarisation is rhetorical rather than operational: The share of world trade actually settled outside the dollar has barely moved despite a decade of declarations. Eg. The US dollar is still used in over 80 per cent of global trade settlement.
      The Fix: Set a measurable target for local-currency settlement of intra-group trade and report performance against it at each summit.
    2. Intra-group trade is thin: Members trade far more with the G7 than with each other, so the group’s combined economic weight does not convert into bargaining leverage. Eg. Most members still rely on G7 markets for high-technology imports and services exports.
      The Fix: Negotiate a tariff-preference arrangement covering a limited list of goods, rather than a full trade agreement the membership cannot agree on.
    3. There is no permanent secretariat or charter: Work does not carry between summits, so each chair restarts the agenda and commitments lapse without anyone recording that they have. Eg. The New Development Bank remains the only permanent institution the group has built since its first summit.
      The Fix: Create a small standing secretariat with the single mandate of tracking summit commitments and reporting compliance.
    4. Sanctions constrain the group’s own bank: Western sanctions on Russia limit the New Development Bank’s ability to lend for certain projects, which weakens the alternative it was built to be. Eg. The bank put new transactions in Russia on hold in 2022.
      The Fix: Raise the share of local-currency lending and widen the capital base to more Global South members, so exposure to one jurisdiction’s sanctions falls.
    5. The political systems diverge too far for common positions on norms: The membership spans established democracies and autocracies, so joint declarations cannot carry commitments on rights or governance standards. Eg. Group declarations avoid the language on domestic governance that G7 communiqués routinely carry.
      The Fix: Confine collective positions to the areas where interests genuinely converge, namely institutional reform, development finance and technology standards.

    Conclusion

    BRICS is now being asked to do two jobs that pull against each other. One is to press for reform of institutions that its largest member has no interest in reforming. The other is to hold an enlarged membership carrying live bilateral quarrels inside a body that can only decide unanimously. The Delhi outcome will indicate which job the group has chosen. The specific marker is whether the summit closes on a declaration adopted by every member or on a chair’s statement issued over the heads of some.

    Global South Plurilateral Groupings in India’s Foreign Policy

    1. About: A plurilateral grouping is a small, issue-focused coalition of states that operates outside a formal treaty organisation. Its instruments are summit declarations and working groups rather than binding law.
    2. Why India uses them: They allow India to pursue different interests with different partners at the same time, which is what multi-alignment means in operation.
    3. The spread in practice: India sits in BRICS and the SCO alongside Russia and China, and in the Quad and the I2U2 grouping alongside the United States, without either set of memberships cancelling the other.
    4. What they are measured by: Their output is agenda-setting and coalition building, not enforceable commitment, so their value lies in shifting what larger institutions are willing to discuss.

    Key Facts about BRICS and Global South Groupings

    1. The name: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to group high-growth emerging economies. The first Foreign Ministers’ meeting was held on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006.
    2. The first summit: The first leaders’ summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009, and South Africa joined in 2011 to make the grouping BRICS.
    3. Current weight: The enlarged grouping accounts for over 45 per cent of the world’s population, about 3.6 billion people, and roughly 37 per cent of global GDP measured at purchasing power parity, ahead of the G7 share.
    4. Energy: It controls roughly 42 per cent of global oil production and exports.
    5. New Development Bank: Headquartered at Shanghai, it has approved over $35 billion in infrastructure lending since it began operations.
    6. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A $100 billion pool providing short-term liquidity support to members facing balance of payments pressure.
    7. Other Global South platforms: IBSA, the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, was formed in 2003. The G-77 was formed at the United Nations in 1964 with 77 founding members and now carries over 130.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • At SCO, Modi seeks dismantling of terror infra as Pak’s Shehbaz listens

    At SCO, Modi seeks dismantling of terror infra as Pak’s Shehbaz listens

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister told the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (the ten member Eurasian security grouping that includes India, Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran) that the crisis in West Asia demonstrates that a conflict in one region does not remain confined there. He said it impacts global energy security, maritime trade and supply chains, and that the Global South bears the brunt of the consequences.

    Why did India put the West Asia war at the centre of its SCO message?

    1. Security has widened: In an interconnected world the scope of security has expanded significantly, so a regional war becomes an energy, shipping and supply chain problem for every member.
    2. The meeting with Iran: Iran’s President was among the leaders at the summit. The Prime Minister met him on Monday, their first meeting since the start of the war.

    What did India demand on terrorism, and what gives the demand its weight?

    1. Beyond action and reaction: With Pakistan’s Prime Minister listening, the Prime Minister said terrorism remains a grave challenge for all of humanity and that the fight cannot be limited to a mere “action-reaction” mindset.
    2. Dismantle the whole ecosystem: He called for dismantling the entire ecosystem of terror financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens, and for members to speak in one voice that there is no room for double standards.
    3. Terrorism as state policy: Countries that use terrorism as an instrument of state policy and shelter terrorists must be sent a strong message that terrorism cannot be a strategic asset for anyone.
    4. The Operation Sindoor antecedent: In May 2025, days after the Pahalgam terror attack, India launched Operation Sindoor, striking terror targets in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan. Four days of hostilities followed and ended with Pakistan seeking a ceasefire.
    5. The Tianjin precedent: At the SCO summit in Tianjin on August 31 and September 1 last year, the Prime Minister called the Pahalgam attack the “most heinous face of terrorism” and an open challenge to every nation, and said double standards on terrorism are unacceptable.

    What are the three pillars India set out for the SCO’s next 25 years?

    1. The framework: India’s vision for the SCO rests on three pillars, S for Security, C for Connectivity and O for Opportunity. Over 25 years the grouping built a tradition of dialogue across Eurasia, and the goal for the next 25 is to translate that cooperation into tangible results.
    2. Security: This pillar is the terrorism agenda set out above, carried as a demand on the grouping rather than as a bilateral grievance.
    3. Connectivity: Its scope must expand beyond roads, railways and air corridors to simplifying customs procedures, promoting digital documentation and enhancing the efficiency of logistics networks.
    4. Opportunity: The benefits of cooperation must directly reach people, with people-to-people ties at the heart of the next 25 years. The yardstick of success is new opportunities for youth, new markets for entrepreneurs, farmers benefiting from technology and improvement in citizens’ lives.
    5. Shared geography: As the world navigates uncertainty and instability, the task is to transform shared geography into shared opportunities.

    Why is connectivity the pillar that divides the members?

    1. Sovereignty as the condition: India supports all initiatives that connect markets, facilitate trade and open growth avenues, on the condition that respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations is paramount, which it described as the core spirit of the SCO Charter.
    2. The Iran route: India wants to access Central Asia through Iran, since Pakistan has denied India overland transit to the region.
    3. The corridor objection: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is an irritant for India because it runs through territory India claims and so violates its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

    What follows the summit?

    1. The Delhi BRICS summit: The Chinese President and the Russian President attended, and the Prime Minister met them informally during the leaders’ group photograph. Both are expected at the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13.
    2. A Pakistan-hosted summit: Pakistan hosts the next SCO summit in 2027, and India’s participation will be watched closely by members of the grouping.

    Conclusion

    India has made no double standards on terrorism the price of its engagement with the SCO. The grouping’s next chair is the country that demand is aimed at. Two dates now test the position: the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13, where the same Chinese and Russian leaders reconvene, and the next SCO summit under the Pakistani chair, where India must decide whether and at what level to attend.

    [2026] Which of the following countries are members of the European Union?

    1. Belarus

    2. Poland

    3. Germany

    4. Switzerland

    (a) 1, 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 4 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 2 and 4 only

  • Take Bishkek to BRICS

    Take Bishkek to BRICS

    Why in the News

    The Bishkek SCO summit offered India a preview of the challenges awaiting BRICS: balancing strategic autonomy, geopolitical rivalry, institutional cooperation and an increasingly diverse, difficult-to-align membership.

    Why is Central Asia’s diversification an opening for India?

    1. A region loosening one dependence: Central Asia was shaped by its Soviet past and still maintains economic links with Russia, but its five countries no longer treat Moscow as their sole partner.
    2. China, Iran and the Gulf as alternatives: The region now looks to China for trade, investment and infrastructure, and to Iran and the Gulf for access to the south. The ongoing conflict complicates the southern route.
    3. Shared security concerns: The region’s growing strategic importance and shared concerns, including terrorism, are what led India and all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan to establish strategic partnerships, which gives India standing before the summit began.

    How can India build connectivity without a land route?

    1. Geography blocks the direct routes: There is no overland access through Pakistan, and Afghanistan’s airspace remains beset by security risks. The absence of direct land access has constrained trade and wider economic and cultural engagement.
    2. Connectivity as strategic geography: Connectivity goes beyond roads and railways. It shapes the economic and strategic geography of Eurasia, so India must expand engagement in ways that overcome the limits geography imposes.
    3. Start with what does not travel by road: The starting point is products and services that do not depend on roads, namely services, digital systems and technological investments.

    Why is the SCO a weak platform for India’s terrorism agenda?

    1. What India asked for: The Prime Minister called on the international community to collectively dismantle the ecosystem of terror, including its financing and recruitment networks.
    2. The will has weakened: International political will against terrorism has weakened over the past year, and the forum reflects that shift.
    3. Pakistan’s recovered standing: Over the past year Pakistan has largely overcome its diplomatic isolation, and it is set to assume the SCO’s rotational chairmanship.
    4. A forum that could not agree on words: In June last year the SCO defence ministers could not agree on the references to terrorism in their joint statement.
    5. China’s financial weight: China possesses greater financial resources than any other member and is heavily investing in Central Asian infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative, which sets the forum’s centre of gravity.

    Why should bilateral ties be the objective inside a multilateral forum?

    1. Weight on individual partnerships: Given the forum’s limits, Delhi should place greater weight on its individual partnerships with member states.
    2. The Uzbekistan uranium agreement: The agreement with Uzbekistan on the long-term supply of uranium is a step in that direction.
    3. Multi-vector actors want options: Central Asian countries are emerging as multi-vector actors. They seek multiple options to improve market access rather than choosing between competing powers, and India should become one of those options.
    4. The forum as a venue: A multilateral forum like the SCO is best used to advance bilateral relationships, and that is the strategy to carry forward to BRICS as India prepares to host its 18th summit.

    Conclusion

    The SCO no longer delivers on India’s terrorism agenda, and geography limits what it can deliver on connectivity. What remains useful is the room the summit gives India to sign with individual member states. The test of that approach is whether the BRICS summit in New Delhi produces bilateral agreements of the Uzbekistan uranium kind rather than only a joint declaration.

    Back2Basics: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

    1. Origin: Founded in 2001 in Shanghai, growing out of the Shanghai Five grouping of 1996 that settled border issues between China, Russia and three Central Asian states.
    2. Membership: Ten members, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus. India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.
    3. Structure: The Secretariat is in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is in Tashkent. The chairmanship rotates annually among members, and the chair hosts the next summit.

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) bridges the gap between India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Quad’s collective Indo-Pacific strategy.” Make a critical assessment of the statement focusing on IPMDA.”