💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: International Relations

  • The big deal behind the ruckus over AUKUS

    The announcement of the new Australia-U.K.-U.S. (AUKUS) trilateral security pact has naturally generated animated debate in strategic circles, before the QUAD summit.

    What is the AUKUS?

    • The first major initiative of AUKUS would be to deliver a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia.
    • The nuclear-powered submarines will give Australia naval heft in the Pacific, where China has been particularly aggressive.
    • While the US and Britain have had the capability for decades, Australia has never had an n-sub.

    Motive: To counter China

    • China has nuclear-powered submarines, as well as submarines that can launch nuclear missiles.
    • The three signatories to the AUKUS deal have made it clear though, that their aim is not to arm the new subs with nuclear weapons.
    • China has been one of Australia’s biggest trading partners, but the relationship has soured over the last few years.
    • It was in consideration of Chinese sensibilities that Australia had pulled out of the Malabar Naval Exercise with the US, India, and Japan after participating in the 2007 edition (of which Singapore too, was part).
    • Australia came back to Malabar in 2020, which marked the first time in 13 years that the navies of the four Quad nations war-gamed together.

    Australia at the Centrestage

    • This is primarily because a nuclear-powered submarine gives a navy the capability to reach far out into the ocean and launch attacks.
    • A nuclear-powered submarine offers long distances dives, at a higher speed, without being detected gives a nation the ability to protect its interests far from its shores.
    • In the context of the AUKUS agreement, nuclear-powered submarines will give the Royal Australian Navy the capability to go into the South China Sea.
    • It conclusively puts to rest a long-standing domestic debate on whether it was time for Australia to assess China through the strategic lens, overcoming the purely mercantile considerations that tended to dominate its China policy.

    What makes nuclear submarines so important?

    • A nuclear-powered submarine is classified as an “SSN” under the US Navy hull classification system, wherein ‘SS’ is the symbol for submarine, and ‘N’ stands for nuclear.
    • A nuclear-powered submarine that can launch ballistic missiles is called “SSBN”.
    • Conventional diesel-engine submarines have batteries that keep and propel — though not very fast — the vessel underwater. The life of these batteries can vary from a few hours to a few days.
    • The newer Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines have additional fuel cells that allow them to stay underwater for longer and move faster than the conventional vessels.
    • However, the fuel cells are used only at strategic times, when the endurance to remain submerged is required.
    • Both conventional and AIP subs need to come to the surface to recharge their batteries using the diesel engine.
    • The diesel engine also propels the vessel on the surface. However, the fuel cells of AIP can only be charged at on-land stations, not while at sea.

    Why is France unhappy about Australia getting these submarines?

    • The deal has complicated the relations between France and Australia, and also France and the US.
    • France is upset as it has been kept out of the loop. But, with the core objective of pushing back against China’s aggression, all five countries — US, UK, Australia, France and India — are on the same track.
    • The deal between France and Australia had been marked by delays and other issues.
    • The first submarine was expected to be operational around 2034.

    Does India have nuclear-powered submarines?

    • Yes, India is among the six nations that have SSNs. The other five are the US, the UK, Russia, France and China.
    • India has had the capacity since it got the Soviet-built K-43 Charlie-class SSN in 1987.
    • Commissioned with the Red Fleet of the USSR in 1967, it was leased to the Indian Navy, and was rechristened INS Chakra. The submarine was decommissioned in 1991.

    Indo-Pacific is the core issue

    • France, which like the UK has historically been an Indo-Pacific power with territories and bases across the region.
    • It has participated in a multi-nation naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal with the four Quad nations.
    • There is no gainsaying the fact that rapid accretion in China’s economic and military capacities, but more particularly its belligerence, has led to a tectonic shift in regional security paradigms.
    • Several countries have been obliged to review their defence preparedness in response to China’s rising military power and its adverse impact on regional stability.

    A chance for the UK

    • The AUKUS pact is also an emphatic assertion of the relevance of the U.S.-Australia Security Treaty (ANZUS).
    • New Zealand, the outlier, walked away in 1984 from the treaty that ironically still bears its initials.
    • Its “nuclear-free” stance ran counter to the U.S. Navy’s non-disclosure policy in regard to nuclear weapons aboard visiting vessels.
    • Close ties notwithstanding, Australia’s future fleet of nuclear submarines will not be permitted access to New Zealand’s ports or waters, as averred by PM Jacinda Ardern.
    • AUKUS provides a fresh opportunity to the United Kingdom to reinsert itself more directly into the Indo-Pacific.
    • It is already a member of the Five Eyes (FVEY), an intelligence-sharing alliance built on Anglo-Saxon solidarity (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.).

    AUKUS is not a substitute for the Quad

    • It does not erode the Quad’s significance as a platform for consultations and coordination on broader themes of maritime security, free and open trade, health care, critical technologies, supply chains and capacity-building.
    • The AUKUS submarine deal, on the other hand, is an undiluted example of strategic defence collaboration, and a game-changer at that.

    Chinese reception of AUKUS

    • China, expectedly, has strongly criticised AUKUS and the submarine deal as promoting instability and stoking an arms race.

    The exposed double standards

    • China has the world’s fastest-growing fleet of sub-surface combatants.
    • This includes the Type 093 Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and the Type 094 nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
    • Its nuclear submarines are on the prowl in the Indo-Pacific.
    • Yet, China denies Australia and others the sovereign right to decide on their defence requirements.

    What’s in the box of AUKUS?

    Ans. Greater role for Australia

    • Australia’s proposed nuclear submarines will give quite a punch in terms of a stand-off capability.
    • The growing focus on anti-submarine warfare across a more expansive region is clearly altering calculations.
    • Australia’s nuclear submarines would help create a new balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, especially in tandem with the U.S. and the U.K.
    • It will now have a more meaningful naval deterrence of its own to protect its sovereign interests.
    • It is set to play a more robust role in ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

    Way forward

    • The setback ‘down under’ may spur France to focus afresh on partners such as India.
    • India must strike a balance between continuing imports and implementing the all-important Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence manufacturing.
    • France should take AUKUS as a business deal.
    • Its momentary reaction at the cancellation of the contract by Australia should soon subside.
    • As a major Indo-Pacific power, France is an important part of the regional security calculus.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • What is Havana Syndrome?

    A US intelligence officer traveling with CIA director William Burns has reported symptoms of Havana Syndrome.

    What is Havana Syndrome?

    • Havana Syndrome refers to a set of mental health symptoms that are said to be experienced by US intelligence and embassy officials in various countries.
    • It typically involves symptoms such as hearing certain sounds without any outside noise being present, nausea, vertigo and headaches, memory loss and issues with balance.
    • As the name suggests, it traces its roots to Cuba.
    • In late 2016, US officials in embassy began experiencing sudden bursts of pressure in their brain followed by persistent headaches, feeling of disorientation and insomnia.

    How severe is it?

    • In 2018, at least three CIA officers working under diplomatic cover in Cuba had reported troubling sensations that seemed to leave serious injuries.
    • Some officers are being compulsorily retired for their inability to coherently discharge his duty and another needing a hearing aid.

    Has Havana Syndrome been reported anywhere else?

    • Since the Cuban incident, American intelligence and foreign affairs officials posted in various countries have reported symptoms of the syndrome.
    • In early 2018, similar accusations began to be made by US diplomats in China.
    • The US media has reported around 130 such attacks across the world including at Moscow in Russia, Poland, Georgia, Taiwan, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Austria, among others.

    What are the causes of Havana Syndrome?

    • No one is entirely sure. But it is speculated to be a “sonic attack”.
    • Medical examination of the victims began to suggest that the victims may have been subjected to high-powered microwaves that either damaged or interfered with the nervous system.
    • It was said to have built a pressure inside the brain that generated the feeling of a sound being heard.
    • Greater exposure to high-powered microwaves is said not only to interfere with the body’s sense of balance but also impact memory and cause permanent brain damage.
    • It is suspected that beams of high-powered microwaves are sent through a special gadget that Americans have begun calling “microwave weapon”.

    Who is doing this in India?

    • Sources in the Indian security establishment say they are not aware of any such weapon being in the possession of an Indian agency.
    • Even if there was one, it is unlikely the government would admit to having acquired such counter-espionage technology given the sensitive nature of intelligence work.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • Is there a role for India in divided AUKUS?

    Context

    France recalled its ambassadors to the US and Australia in a diplomatic slap intended to convey its anger over a deal forged in secrecy that saw Paris lose a multi billion dollar submarine contract.

    Depth and diversity of India’s relations

    • That Delhi today is a part of a difficult conversation between the US, UK, France, Europe, and Australia points to the growing depth and diversity of India’s relations with different parts of the West.
    • Popular and academic discourse on India’s foreign policy has been obsessed with the concept of “non-alignment” —was about keeping distance from the West as a whole.
    • India’s contemporary diplomacy, in contrast, takes a nuanced view of internal dynamics in the West, and recognises the political agency of individual states, and develops wide-ranging relationships with the Western nations.

    Relations with France

    • Paris has always taken an independent view of the world, while remaining within the broad framework of the American alliance.
    •  In the 1990s, Paris championed the construction of a multipolar world to constrain American “hyperpower” but India did not join it.
    • The last few years, however, have seen an intensification of India’s strategic engagement with France.
    • For example, India has overcome the earlier reluctance to work with France on Indian Ocean security.

    Engagement as collective and sub-region

    • The government has also stepped up on the political engagement with Europe as a collective as well as its sub-regions — from Baltics to the Balkans and from Iberia to Mitteleuropa.
    •  As India discovers that every European nation, from tiny Luxembourg to a rising Poland, has something to offer, Europe has become a thriving hub of India’s international relations.

    Relations with the UK

    • Due to the bitter colonial legacy, relations between India and UK have always been underdeveloped.
    • In the last couple of years, India has made a determined effort to build a new partnership with Britain, which is the fifth-largest economy in the world, a leading financial hub, a technological powerhouse, and punches well above its weight in global affairs.

    Relations with “Anglosphere”

    • India’s neglect of London also meant Delhi had no time for the “Anglosphere” that binds the UK to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
    • Many had presumed that the Anglosphere was irrelevant — AUKUS, however, is a reminder that Anglo-Saxon political bonds endure.
    • Instead of treating the Anglosphere with scepticism, India has begun to vigorously engage with the “settler colonies” that have so much to offer India — from natural resources to higher education and critical technologies.
    • The UK and its settler colonies have long been the preferred destination for the Indian diaspora (besides the US).
    • Leveraging diaspora politics: While the diaspora tends to connect the domestic politics of the Anglosphere with that of India, Delhi is figuring out that the diaspora politics can be played both ways.

    Relations with Japan and Australia

    • The transformation of India’s relations with Australia has occurred despite entrenched scepticism in the foreign policy bureaucracy.
    • Finally, Japan has been a part of the West in the post-War era and Delhi’s relations with Tokyo have never been as rounded as they are today. They are also fellow members of the Quad.

    Way forward for India

    • This wide-ranging engagement with the West should help Delhi convey two important messages to its partners this week.
    • Not undermining the larger goal: India needs to remind France, Australia, the UK and US of the shared interests in securing the Indo-Pacific and the dangers of letting the current quarrel undermine that larger goal.
    • Effective deterrence in Indo-Pacific: The other is to highlight the region’s vast requirements for effective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific;
    • And that there is enough room for the US, UK, France, and Europe to collaborate with Indo-Pacific partners in overlapping coalitions to develop high technology and defence-industrial cooperation in all the areas highlighted by AUKUS — effective underwater capabilities to AI, quantum computing and cyber warfare.
    • Deeper cooperation: India’s interests lie in deeper strategic cooperation with France and Europe as well as the Quad and the Anglosphere.

    Conclusion

    India’s diverse relationships in the West must be deployed in full measure to prevent a split in the Indo-Pacific coalition.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • What is Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)?

    The Agreement on Agriculture at the WTO is riddled with deep imbalances, which favour the developed countries and have tilted the rules against many developing countries, a Union Minister has said.

    Agreement on Agriculture

    • The AoA is an international treaty of the World Trade Organization.
    • It was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO on January 1, 1995.

    Three pillars of AoA

    The Agreement on Agriculture consists of three pillars—domestic support, market access, and export subsidies.

    (1) Domestic support

    • AoA divides domestic support into two categories: trade-distorting and non-trade-distorting (or minimally trade-distorting).
    • It the classification of subsidies by “boxes” depending on consequences of production and trade:
    1. Amber (most directly linked to production levels)
    2. Blue (production-limiting programs that still distort trade)
    3. Green (minimal distortion)

    (2) Market access

    • Market access refers to the reduction of tariff (or non-tariff) barriers to trade by WTO members.
    • The 1995 AoA consists of tariff reductions of:
    1. 36% average reduction – developed countries – with a minimum of 15% per-tariff line reduction in next six years.
    2. 24% average reduction – developing countries – with a minimum of 10% per-tariff line reduction in next ten years.
    • Least developed countries (LDCs) were exempt from tariff reductions, but they either had to convert non-tariff barriers to tariffs—a process called tariffication—or “bind” their tariffs, creating a ceiling that could not be increased in future.

    (3) Export subsidies

    • The AoA required developed countries to reduce export subsidies by at least 36% (by value) or by 21% (by volume) over six years.
    • For developing countries, the agreement required cuts were 24% (by value) and 14% (by volume) over ten years.

    Criticism of AoA

    • AoA has been criticized for reducing tariff protections for small farmers, a key source of income in developing countries, while simultaneously allowing rich countries to continue subsidizing agriculture at home.
    • In 2017 India and China jointly submitted a proposal to the WTO calling for the elimination – by developed countries – of the most trade-distorting form of farm subsidies,
    • They are known in WTO parlance as Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) or ‘Amber Box’ support as a prerequisite for consideration of other reforms in domestic support negotiations.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • [pib] Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

    The Prime Minister has participated virtually in the Joint SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)-CSTO Outreach Session on Afghanistan.

    What is CSTO?

    • The CSTO is a Russia-led military alliance of seven former Soviet states that was created in 2002.
    • Current CSTO members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Serbia hold observer status in the CSTO.
    • Its purpose is to ensure the collective defence of any member that faces external aggression.
    • It has been described by political scientists as the Eurasian counterpart of NATO, which has 29 member states, while the CSTO has just six.

    Outlined functions of CSTO

    • CSTO supports arms sales and manufacturing as well as military training and exercises, making the CSTO the most important multilateral defence organization in the former Soviet Union.
    • Beyond mutual defence, the CSTO also coordinates efforts in fighting the illegal circulation of weapons among member states and has developed law enforcement training for its members in pursuit of these aims.

    What does CSTO membership provide?

    • While CSTO membership means that member states are barred from joining other military alliances, limiting, for example, their relationship with NATO.
    • Its members receive discounts, subsidies, and other incentives to buy Russian arms, facilitating military cooperation.
    • Most importantly, membership presumes certain key security assurances – the most significant of which is deterring military aggression by third countries.
    • In the CSTO, aggression against one signatory is perceived as aggression against all.
    • It however remains unclear whether this feature works in practice.

    Back2Basics: NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

    • NATO was found in the aftermath of the Second World War.
    • Its purpose was to secure peace in Europe, to promote cooperation among its members and to guard their freedom – all of this in the context of countering the threat posed at the time by the Soviet Union.
    • It is a military alliance established by the North Atlantic Treaty (also called the Washington Treaty) of April 4, 1949.
    • It sought to create a counterweight to Soviet armies stationed in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II.
    • Its original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
    • NATO has spread a web of partners, namely Egypt, Israel, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Finland.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • Hardly the India-China century

    Context

    Deng Xiaoping had told then-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 that the 21st century would be “India and China’s century”, the current Chinese leadership has no patience for such pablum. They believe — indeed believe they know — that it is destined to be China’s century alone.

    The policy of side-stepping contentious issues and encouraging bilateral economic relations

    • There have always been political tensions, both over each country’s territorial claims over land controlled by the other, and China’s alliance with Pakistan, and India’s hospitality to the Dalai Lama.
    • But neither country had allowed these tensions to overwhelm them:
    • China had declared that the border dispute could be left to “future generations” to resolve.
    • India had endorsed the “One China” policy, refusing to support Tibetan secessionism while limiting official reverence for the Dalai Lama to his status as a spiritual leader.
    • India actions and statements have usually been designed not to provoke, but to relegate the border problem to the back burner while enabling trade relations with China (now worth close to $100 billion) to flourish.
    • India made it clear that it was unwilling to join in any United States-led “containment” of China.
    • From negligible levels till 1991, trade with China had grown to become one of India’s largest trading relationships. 
    • India engages with China diplomatically in the BRICS  as well as conducting annual summits of RIC (Russia-India-China).
    • India is an enthusiastic partner in the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (NDB).
    • However, it has become increasingly apparent that the policy of side-stepping contentious issues and encouraging bilateral economic relations has played into Chinese hands.

    Chinese strategy in Galwan

    • In the Galwan clash, the Chinese troops seem to have been engaged in a tactical move to advance their positions along areas of the LAC that it covets, in order to threaten Indian positions and interdict patrols.
    • They are threatening India’s construction of roads, bridges and similar infrastructure on undisputed Indian territory, a belated effort to mirror similar Chinese efforts near the LAC in Tibet.
    • They have established a fixed presence in these areas well beyond China’s own ‘Claim Line’.
    • The objective seems to be to extend Chinese troop presence to the intersection of the Galwan river and the Shyok river, which would make the Galwan Valley off bounds to India.
    • The Chinese have constructed permanent structures in the area of their intrusion and issued statements claiming that sovereignty over the Galwan valley has “always belonged” to China.
    • Consolidation of LOC: China’s strategy seems to be to consolidate the LAC where it wants it, so that an eventual border settlement — that takes these new realities into account — will be in its favour.
    • Implications for India:  In the meantime, border incidents keep the Indians off-balance and demonstrate to the world that India is not capable of challenging China, let alone offering security to other nations.

    India’s options

    • India has reinforced its military assets on the LAC to prevent deeper incursions for now.
    • And hopes to press the Chinese to restore the status quo ante through either diplomatic or military means.
    • Chinese and Indian officials are currently engaged in diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue to ease tensions, but de-escalation has been stalled for months.
    • Economic options: India has responded with largely symbolic acts of economic retaliation.
    • India has also reimposed tighter limits on Chinese investment in projects such as railways, motorways, public-sector construction projects, and telecoms.

    Limits to India’s economic retaliation

    • India is far too dependent on China for vital imports — such as pharmaceuticals, and even the active ingredients to make them, automotive parts and microchips that many fear it will harm India if it acted too strongly against China.
    • Imports from China have become indispensable for India’s exports to the rest of the world.
    • Various manufacturing inputs, industrial equipment and components, and even some technological know-how come from China; eliminating them could have a seriously negative effect on India’s economic growth.
    • And there are limits to the effectiveness of any Indian retaliation: trade with China may seem substantial from an Indian perspective, but it only represents 3% of China’s exports.
    • Drastically reducing it would not be enough to deter Beijing or cause it to change its behaviour.

    Consider the question “State of India-China relationship hardly indicate the 21st Century being the “India and China’s century”. In light of this, examine the factors responsible for this and suggest the way forward for India.”

    Conclusion

    This range of considerations seems to leave only two strategic options. Playing second fiddle to an assertive China or aligning itself with a broader international coalition against Chinese ambitions. Since the first is indigestible for any democracy, is China de facto pushing India into doing something it has always resisted — allying with the West?

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • AUKUS Partnership for Indo-Pacific

    The Biden administration has announced a new trilateral security partnership for the Indo-Pacific, between Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. (AUKUS).

    What is AUKUS?

    • AUKUS, as the partnership is being called, will strive over the next 18 months to equip Australia with nuclear propulsion technology.
    • As part of this, Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines with help from the UK and the US.
    • It will also involve a new architecture of meetings and engagements between the three countries, as well as cooperation across emerging technologies (applied AI, quantum technologies and undersea capabilities).
    • Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines, when they deploy, will be armed with conventional weapons only and not nuclear weapons.

    Why such an alliance?

    • Tensions have been high between Australia and an increasingly assertive China, its largest trade partner.
    • Australia banned Chinese telecom giant Huawei in 2108 and its PM called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 last year.
    • China retaliated by imposing tariffs on or capping Australian exports.

    Not to substitute Quad or others

    • This alliance does not and will not supersede or outrank existing arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region such as the Quad, which the US and Australia form with India and Japan, and ASEAN.
    • AUKUS will complement these groups and others.

    Significance

    • There has been only one other time that the US has shared as “extremely sensitive” submarine propulsion technology — more than 60 years ago, back in 1958, with Great Britain.
    • The US is working to move past the 20-year war in Afghanistan and the chaotic U.S. exit from Kabul.
    • The Biden Administration has put countering China at the center of his economic and national security efforts, describing it as the biggest challenge of this era.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • India-Australia relations

    Context

    A few days ago, India’s Defence Minister and External Affairs Minister held the inaugural ‘2+2’ talks with their Australian counterparts.

    Transforming relations between India-Australia

    • Both are vibrant democracies which have respect for international laws and a belief in the equality of all nations irrespective of their size and strength.
    • Both draw their congruence from a rule-based international order, believe in inclusive economic integration in the Indo-Pacific region, and face challenges from a belligerent China.
    • Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison elevated their bilateral strategic partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2020.
    • Growing convergence on issues: There is a growing convergence of views on geo-strategic and geo-economic issues.
    • The convergence is backed by a robust people-to-people connection.
    • Both countries have stepped up collaborations through institutions and organisations on many issues in bilateral, trilateral, plurilateral and multilateral formats.
    • Bilateral security cooperation: Given their common security challenges and in order to enhance regional security architecture, both countries have intensified bilateral security cooperation.
    • Further, elevation of their ‘2+2’ Foreign and Defence Secretaries’ Dialogue to the ministerial level emphasises the positive trajectory of their transforming relations.
    • They have also stepped up security dialogue with key partner-countries to deepen coordination in areas where security interests are mutual.
    • The Malabar naval exercise by the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, the U.S.) is a step in this direction.
    • Partnership with like-minded countries:  Beyond bilateralism, both countries are also entering into partnerships with like-minded countries, including Indonesia, Japan and France, in a trilateral framework.
    • Trade ties: Trading between India and Australia has seen remarkable growth in recent years.
    • Two-way trade between them was valued at $24.4 billion in 2020. 
    • Trade is rapidly growing and encompasses agribusiness, infrastructure, healthcare, energy and mining, education, artificial intelligence, big data and fintech.
    • An early harvest agreement by December will pave the way for an early conclusion of a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between both countries.

    Issues in deeper economic integration

    • High tariff on agri products in India: India has a high tariff for agriculture and dairy products which makes it difficult for Australian exporters to export these items to India.
    • Non-tariff barrier in Australia: At the same time, India faces non-tariff barriers and its skilled professionals in the Australian labour market face discrimination.

    Consider the question “A growing convergence of views on geo-strategic and geo-economic issues between Indian and Australia makes it imperative to forge a partnership guided by principles with a humane approach. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    The Quad has gained momentum in recent months. The time is ripe for these countries to deliberate on a ‘Quad+’ framework. The geo-political and geo-economic churning in international affairs makes it imperative for India and Australia to forge a partnership guided by principles with a humane approach.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • Can the SCO be the regional body that stabilizes Afghanistan?

    On the face of it, the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) this week in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, is well placed to lead the stabilization of Afghanistan after the American retreat.

    About SCO

    • After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the then security and economic architecture in the Eurasian region dissolved and new structures had to come up.
    • The original Shanghai Five were China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
    • The SCO was formed in 2001, with Uzbekistan included. It expanded in 2017 to include India and Pakistan.
    • Since its formation, the SCO has focused on regional non-traditional security, with counter-terrorism as a priority.
    • The fight against the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism has become its mantra. Today, areas of cooperation include themes such as economics and culture.

    India’s and the SCO

    • India and Pakistan both were observer countries.
    • While Central Asian countries and China were not in favor of expansion initially, the main supporter — of India’s entry in particular — was Russia.
    • A widely held view is that Russia’s growing unease about an increasingly powerful China prompted it to push for its expansion.
    • From 2009 onwards, Russia officially supported India’s ambition to join the SCO. China then asked for its all-weather friend Pakistan’s entry.

    Afghanistan and SCO

    • Afghanistan has been engaged with the SCO for over 15 years.
    • In 2012, Afghanistan became an observer in the SCO when then-Afghan president Hamid Karzai visited China.
    • In 2015, Kabul applied for full membership in the group.
    • Kabul sought to be a member of the SCO as it believes that it is a natural candidate.
    • Geographically, Afghanistan is a part of the SCO region.

    Limited (or No) progress made by SCO

    • For all the political hype, the SCO has not deepened regionalism in Central Asia.
    • Two decades after its formation — it was set up just weeks before the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington — the institutional promise of the SCO remains just that — a promise.
    • Seen from the subcontinent, the SCO certainly looks better than the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
    • That India and Pakistan, whose differences have prevented even regular meetings of SAARC, are actively participating in the SCO, would point to its attractiveness.
    • But then SAARC is such a low bar.

    Opportunities for role-play in Afghanistan

    The crisis in Afghanistan presents a major opportunity for the SCO to realize its regional ambitions.

    • Involvement of regional superpowers: The SCO’s importance for Afghanistan seems self-evident when you look at its sponsors and members. Its founding leaders are the two great powers of the east — Russia and China.
    • Neighborhood are members: Its other initial members were Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to the north and northeast of Afghanistan.
    • Observers vested interest: Besides Afghanistan, Iran, Belarus and Mongolia are observers. Iran is said to be on track for full membership.
    • Many dialogue partners: The SCO has a number of “dialogue partners”. They include Armenia and Azerbaijan from the neighboring Caucasus region and Turkey a step further to the West. Nepal and Sri Lanka from the subcontinent and Cambodia from southeast Asia are also dialogue partners.

    Issues with SCO

    • China centrism: For an organization that bears the name of Shanghai, but is focused on Central Asia, its associates look disparate.
    • Lack of coherence: The Central Asian members of the SCO have quarrels of their own, and have struggled to develop collective approaches to their common regional security challenges.
    • Dint go beyond dialogues: As it broadened its membership, the SCO has, unsurprisingly, struggled to deepen institutional cooperation.
    • Not comprehensive: There is also one important country missing in the mix. It is Turkmenistan, which shares an 800 km border with Afghanistan and a 1,150 km border with Iran.
    • Neutrality of members: The organizing principle of Turkmenistan rulers is absolute “neutrality” — think of it as an extreme form of “non-alignment”. It refuses to join any regional institution, political or military.
    • Individual interests: Russia’s effort to build a regional institution in its Central Asian periphery ran parallel to its plans for the so-called “strategic triangle” with China and India. India and Pakistan, needless to say, are poles apart on the Taliban.

    No common interest in Afghan Peace

    • The US military retreat from Afghanistan has brought cheer to both Moscow and Beijing, although publicly they criticize President Joe Biden’s hasty retreat.
    • The US retreat might weaken the glue that binds Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia or tightens it.
    • Although Russia and China are closer to each other than ever before, their interests are not entirely the same in Central Asia.

    Russian alternatives to SCO

    (1) Central Security Treaty Organisation

    • While military confidence-building measures have grown under the SCO banner, Russia had its own security organisation for the region, called the Central Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
    • Three of the SCO members — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan — along with Armenia and Belarus are members of the CSTO.
    • Russia sees itself as the sole protector of the former Soviet Republics and may not be ready to share that role with China — “yes” to coordination, but “no” to a Sino-Russian security dyarchy.

    (2) Eurasian Economic Union

    • Moscow also appears reluctant to back Chinese proposals to promote trade integration under the SCO banner; it prefers the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) under its own leadership.
    • China is not a member of either CSTO or EAEU. This is one reason for the weakness of SCO regionalism.

    Other deterrents

    (1) Affinity with Taliban

    • China has openly admitted to cooperating with the Taliban by restoring all formal diplomatic ties. It is the first such country to acknowledge the Taliban.
    • Turkmenistan too, which is not part of SCO, has been quite open to engaging the Taliban in sync with its principles of neutrality.
    • Some Russian analysts see Turkmenistan as the potential weak link in the defense against the Taliban’s potential threats to the region.
    • Uzbekistan seems open to a cautious engagement with the Taliban.

    (2) Iranian aspirations for unwarranted interference (just like Turkey does regarding Kashmir)

    • Iran, which has ethnic and linguistic links with the Persian-speaking Tajiks, appears equally worried about the Taliban’s policies towards minorities.
    • As Moscow and Beijing, Tehran was happy to see the Americans leave in humiliation and appeared hopeful of a positive engagement with the Taliban.
    • Those hopes may have been suspended for now, if not discarded.

    What can the SCO do now?

    • The Afghanistan debacle presents an opportunity for the SCO to play a constructive role in meeting the region’s burgeoning security challenge.
    • Providing humanitarian relief, tending to refugees, facilitating an inclusive dialogue and national reconciliation constitute immediate and long-term goals in which the organization can fill a role.
    • The SCO can also pressure the Taliban to share power with other domestic actors and refrain from providing sanctuary to foreign terror organizations (through foreign funds from Saudi*).
    • It can suspend Afghanistan’s observer status, curtail border traffic or withhold recognition, investments, and aid, should Kabul be found wanting.

    Way forward

    • While the SCO is not an impressive regional institution, it remains an important diplomatic forum.
    • India has sought to make full use of the SCO’s diplomatic possibilities without any illusions about its effectiveness.
    • At the SCO summit this week, PM Modi would remind other leaders of the “three evils” that the SCO set out to defeat — terrorism, extremism, and separatism.
    • Few would disagree that the Taliban embodied all the three sins in the past. Today, the Taliban and its mentor Pakistan say the sinner wants to become a saint.
    • India must focus on finding common ground with those members of the SCO who do share India’s concerns about Afghanistan.

    Conclusion

    • Given this divergence, it is unlikely that the SCO can come up with a “regional solution” for the Afghan crisis.
    • The only real Afghan convergence today is between Pakistan and China.
    • Expect them to try and nudge the SCO towards a positive engagement with the Taliban.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

  • Stand-off over North Korea reinforces the hollowness of the doctrine of deterrence

    Context

    The resumption of North Korea’s largest fissile material production reactor, has sparked speculation about its real and symbolic significance.

    Background of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development

    • In 1994, Pyongyang barred IAEA access to the Yongbyon complex amid suspicions that the country was generating plutonium from spent fuel.
    • 1994 Agreed Framework, an executive agreement signed by President Bill Clinton, required Pyongyang to freeze all nuclear activity and allow inspection of its military sites in return for the construction of two light water reactors.
    • The accord broke down in 2002.
    • In June 2008, in order to express its denuclearisation commitment to the U.S. and four other countries, Pyongyang blew up the cooling tower at the Yongbyon complex.
    • A few months in 2008, Pyongyang barred IAEA inspectors access to its reprocessing plant in the Yongbyon complex and eventually expelled them the following April.
    • In November 2010 American scientist Siegfried Hecker confirmed accounts that North Korea had rapidly built a uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon.

    Why does resumption nuclear reactor matter?

    • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has underlined that the restart of activity in Yongbyon constitutes a violation of UN Security Council resolutions.
    • Reprocessing of fuel: The reactor at the Yongbyon complex has been central to the North Korean reprocessing of spent fuel rods to generate plutonium.
    • Enrichment of fuel: Besides the production of highly enriched uranium for the development of atomic bombs.

    Way forward

    • Negotiations: The Biden administration has adopted a pragmatic path of declaring its readiness to resume negotiations with Pyongyang.
    • UN treaty on complete abolition of nuclear arms: The UN treaty on complete abolition of atomic arms, whose deliberations were boycotted by all nuclear weapons states, is the morally superior alternative.

    Conclusion

    The protracted stand-off over North Korea reinforces the hollowness of the doctrine of deterrence and begs the question whether proliferation can ever be prevented just because nuclear weapons states want to perpetuate their dominance.

    UPSC 2022 countdown has begun! Get your personal guidance plan now! (Click here)

    Back2Basics: IAEA

    • The International Atomic Energy Agency is the world’s central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the nuclear field.
    • It works for the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, contributing to international peace and security and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.
    • The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear technology.
    • The Agency’s genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953.