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Subject: International Relations

  • China’s new land border law and Indian concerns

    China has recently passed a new land law for the “protection and exploitation of the country’s land border areas”.

    Land Border Law: Key Takeaways

    • The law states that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China are sacred and inviolable.
    • It asks the state to take measures to safeguard territorial integrity and land boundaries and guard against and combat any act that undermines these.
    • The state can take measures to strengthen border defence, support economic and social development as well as opening-up in border areas.
    • It seeks to improve public services and infrastructure in such areas, encourage and support people’s life and work there.

    Other features

    • In effect, this suggests a push to settle civilians in the border areas.
    • The law also asks the state to follow the principles of equality, mutual trust, and friendly consultation, handle land border related-affairs with neighbouring countries.

    China’s land borders

    • China shares its 22,457-km land boundary with 14 countries including India, the third-longest after the borders with Mongolia and Russia.
    • Unlike the Indian border, however, China’s borders with these two countries are not disputed.
    • The only other country with which China has disputed land borders is Bhutan (477 km).

    Why is it significant for India?

    • China claims up to 90,000 square kilometres in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector.
    • It has illegally occupied 38,000 square kilometres of Aksai Chin in the western sector of Jammu and Kashmir.
    • While recent tensions in the western sector have been centred on Ladakh, both sides have lately clashed in Uttarakhand as well.

    A signal to India

    • The law is not meant specifically for the border with India.
    • However, this could create hurdles in the resolution of the 17-month-long military standoff at LAC.
    • There is also a clear distinction that PLA will do border management but it will make negotiations a little more difficult.

     

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  • A ‘bubbles of trust’ approach to globalisation

    Context

    An asymmetric globalisation favouring China allowed Beijing to attain power. It is now using that power to undermine liberal democratic values around the world.

    What is Globalization?

    Globalization is a process of increasing interdependence, interconnectedness and integration of economies and societies to such an extent that an event in one part of the globe affects people in other parts of the world.

    OR

     Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among the people, organizations, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology.

    Asymmetric globalisation

    • The Chinese market was never open to foreign companies in the way foreign markets are to Chinese firms.
    • This is particularly true in the information and communications technology sector: foreign media, technology and software companies have always been walled out of Chinese markets.
    • Meanwhile, Chinese firms rode on the globalisation bandwagon to secure significant market shares in open economies.

    Global retreat from globalisation and role of Quad

    • We are currently witnessing a global retreat from the free movement of goods, services, capital, people and ideas.
    • But this should not be understood as a reaction to globalisation itself, but of its skewed pattern over the past four decades.
    • The Quad countries – Japan, India, Australia and the U.S. – have an opportunity to change tack and stop seeing engagement with China through the misleading prism of free trade and globalisation.
    • It will be to their advantage to create a new form of economic cooperation consistent with their geopolitical interests.
    • Indeed, without an economic programme, the Quad’s geopolitical and security agenda stand on tenuous foundations.

    Economies inside bubbles of trust

    • Policies of self-reliance: The popular backlash against China – exacerbated by the economic disruption of the pandemic – is pushing Quad governments towards policies of self-reliance.
    • But while reorienting and de-risking global supply chains is one thing, pursuing technological sovereignty is inherently self-defeating.
    • Worse still, inward-looking policies often acquire a life of their own and contribute to geopolitical marginalisation.
    • There is a better way.
    • A convergence of values and geopolitical interests means Quad countries are uniquely placed to envelop their economies inside bubbles of trust, starting with the technology sector.
    • The idea of ‘bubbles of trust’ offers a cautious middle path between the extremes of technological sovereignty and laissez-faire globalisation.
    •  Unlike trading blocs, which tend to be insular and exclusive, bubbles tend to expand organically, attracting new partners that share values, interests and economic complementarities.
    • Such expansion will be necessary, as the Quad cannot fulfil its strategic ambitions merely by holding a defensive line against authoritarian power.

    Way forward

    • The U.S. is a global leader in intellectual property, Japan in high-value manufacturing, Australia in advanced niches such as quantum computing and cyber security, and India in human capital.
    • This configuration of values, interests and complementary capabilities offers unrivalled opportunities.
    • The Quad’s Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group, announced in March 2021, is well placed to develop the necessary ‘bubbles of trust’ framework, which could be adopted at the next Quad summit.
    • To be successful the Working Group must seek to strengthen geopolitical convergences, increase faith in each member state’s judicial systems, deepen economic ties and boost trust in one another’s citizens.
    • There are fundamental differences between authoritarian and liberal-democratic approaches to the information age.
    • The Quad cannot allow differences of approach on privacy, data governance, platform competition and the digital economy to widen.

    Conclusion

    This agenda cannot be about substituting China. Rather, the approach would allow Quad countries to manage their dependencies on China while simultaneously developing a new vision for the global economy.

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  • India’s Central Asian outreach

    Context

    The evolving situation in Afghanistan has thrown up renewed challenges for India’s regional and bilateral ties with Central Asia and the Caucasus, prompting India to recalibrate its rules of engagement with the region.

    Background of India’s relations with Central Asian countries

    • After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the formation of the independent republics in Central Asia, India reset its ties with the strategically critical region.
    • India provided financial aid to the region and established diplomatic relations.
    • New Delhi signed the Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPA) with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to stimulate defence cooperation and deepen trade relations.
    • In 2012, New Delhi’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy aimed at furthering India’s political, economic, historical and cultural connections with the region.
    • However, India’s efforts were stonewalled by Pakistan’s lack of willingness to allow India passage through its territory.

    Renewed engagement with Central Asia

    • The growing geostrategic and security concerns regarding the BRI’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its violation of India’s sovereignty forced New Delhi to fix its lethargic strategy.
    • Eventually, Central Asia became the link that placed Eurasia in New Delhi’s zone of interest.
    • India signed MoUs with Iran in 2015 to develop the Chabahar port in the Sistan-Baluchistan province that was in the doldrums from 2003.
    • External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was in the region earlier this month.
    • In Kyrgyzstan, Mr. Jaishankar extended a credit line of $200 million for the support of development projects and signed an memorandum of understanding (MoU) on High-Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP).
    • Kazakhstan: His next stop was the Kazakhstan capital, Nur Sultan, where he attended the 6th Foreign Ministers’ Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).
    • Armenia: Mr. Jaishankar has become the first Indian External Affairs Minister to visit Armenia.
    •  During the visit, Mr. Jaishankar also supported efforts for a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk group.

    Limits of SCO

    • The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was created in response to the threats of terrorism that sprang from Afghanistan.
    • The Taliban re-establishing its supremacy over Afghanistan has also exposed the weaknesses of coalitions such as SCO.
    • The SCO has been used by most member countries for their own regional geostrategic and security interests, increasing the trust-deficit and divergence within the forum.

    Way forward

    • Most of the Central Asian leaders view India’s Chabahar port as an opportunity to diversify their export markets and control China’s ambitions.
    • They have admitted New Delhi into the Ashgabat Agreement, allowing India access to connectivity networks to facilitate trade and commercial interactions with both Central Asia and Eurasia, and also access the natural resources of the region.
    • Rising anti-Chinese sentiments within the region and security threats from the Taliban allow New Delhi and Central Asia to reimagine their engagement.
    • Central Asian countries have been keen to have India as a partner as they have sought to diversify their strategic ties.

    Conclusion

    India cannot afford to lose any time in recalibrating its regional engagements.

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  • Crises in Pakistan is an occasion to reflect on the long-term regional consequences

    Context

    Whether it can or should make a difference to Pakistan’s internal politics, India must pay greater attention to the internal dynamics of our most difficult neighbour and more purposefully engage a diverse set of actors in that polity.

    India’s interventions in internal affairs of neighbours

    • Except for Pakistan, in most other countries of the subcontinent, India is drawn quickly into their internal political arguments.
    • Delhi has always exercised some influence on the outcomes of those contestations.
    • It is enough to note that India’s interventions are a recurring pattern in the subcontinent’s international relations.
    • Even when Delhi is reluctant to get into the weeds of these conflicts, the competing parties in the neighbourhood demand India’s intervention on their behalf.
    • All of the contestants, of course, resolutely oppose India’s meddling when it goes against them.
    • But Delhi has rarely been a decisive player in Pakistan’s internal politics.
    • Delhi’s hands-off attitude is surprising, given India’s huge stakes in the nature of Pakistan’s policies and their massive impact on regional security.

    Current crises in Pakistan

    • Internal crises: Among the many challenges confronting Pakistan is the fresh breakdown in civil-military relations.
    • Pakistan’s economy is in a tailspin as it struggles to negotiate a stabilisation package with the International Monetary Fund.
    • The militant religious movement Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) has mounted a fresh march against the capital demanding the release of its arrested leader.
    • External crises: The internal crises are sharpened by worsening external conditions.
    • In Afghanistan, Pakistan has succeeded in restoring the Taliban to power.
    • The celebrations have not lasted too long; the long-awaited victory is turning sour.
    • The Arab Gulf states that have been fast friends of Pakistan are now tilting towards India.
    • Once a favourite partner of the West, Pakistan today faces tensions in its ties with the US and Europe.
    • More broadly, nuclear weapons and a powerful army seem unable to stop Pakistan’s relative decline in relation to not just India but also Bangladesh.
    • Pakistan’s economy is now 10 times smaller than that of India and is well behind Bangladesh.

    Suggestions

    • Whether it can or should make a difference to Pakistan’s internal politics, India must pay greater attention to the internal dynamics of our most difficult neighbour and more purposefully engage a diverse set of actors in that polity.
    • For Delhi, it is always about narrow political arguments with Rawalpindi and Islamabad; it is as if the people of Pakistan do not exist.
    • For India, the crises in Pakistan should be an occasion to reflect on the long-term regional consequences of Pakistan’s internal turbulence.
    • It might be argued that that unlike elsewhere in the neighbourhood, Delhi’s leverage in Pakistan’s politics is limited. But it is by no means negligible.

    Consider the question “For Delhi, it is always about narrow political arguments with Rawalpindi and Islamabad; it is as if the people of Pakistan do not exist. The depth of the current crises in Pakistan, however, should nudge India into overcoming this entrenched indifference. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    India looms so large in Pakistan’s mind space. For Delhi, it may be worth trying to turn that into influence over Pakistan’s policies if only at the tactical level and at the margins.

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  • G7 Trade Ministers’ Digital Trade Principles

    The Group of Seven wealthy nations agreed on a joint set of principles to govern cross-border data use and digital trade.

    What are the Digital Trade Principles?

    • Open digital markets: Digital and telecommunications markets should be competitive, transparent, fair, and accessible to international trade and investment.
    • Cross-border data flows: To harness the opportunities of the digital economy and support the trade of goods and services, data should be able to flow freely across borders with trust.
    • Safeguards for workers, consumers, and businesses: Labour protections must be in place for workers who are directly engaged in or support digital trade, providing decent conditions of work.
    • Digital trading systems: To cut red tape and enable more businesses to trade, governments and industries should drive forward the digitization of trade-related documents.
    • Fair and inclusive global governance: Common rules for digital trade should be agreed and upheld at the World Trade Organization.

    About Group of Seven

    • The G-7 or ‘Group of Seven’ includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
    • It is an intergovernmental organization that was formed in 1975 by the top economies of the time as an informal forum to discuss pressing world issues.
    • Initially, it was formed as an effort by the US and its allies to discuss economic issues.
    • The G-7 forum now discusses several challenges such as oil prices and many pressing issues such as financial crises, terrorism, arms control, and drug trafficking.
    • It does not have a formal constitution or a fixed headquarters. The decisions taken by leaders during annual summits are non-binding.
    • Canada joined the group in 1976, and the European Union began attending in 1977.

    Evolution of the G-7

    • When it started in 1975—with six members, Canada joining a year later—it represented about 70% of the world economy.
    • And it was a cosy club for tackling issues such as the response to oil shocks.
    • Now it accounts for about 40% of global gdp.
    • Since the global financial crisis of 2007-09 it has sometimes been overshadowed by the broader g20.
    • The G-7 became the G-8 in 1997 when Russia was invited to join.
    • In 2014, Russia was debarred after it took over Crimea.

     

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  • Why India needs an international development cooperation agency

    Context

    Enhancing the efficacy of India’s development cooperation endeavours has been a challenging issue for the past several decades. The country, therefore, needs to expedite work on a specialised agency for proficient delivery of outcomes.

    Development assistance and lack of institutional foundation

    • In the last couple of years, India’s assistance to other developing countries has multiplied several times.
    • India’s development cooperation has converged to an all-encompassing integrated framework, a development compact that has five modalities — capacity building, concessional finance, technology sharing, grant and trade wherein duty-free and quota-free access to the Indian market is provided.
    •  India’s benevolent image does yield tremendous goodwill globally, but quality project delivery is yet to become the country’s USP.
    • On average, India provides development assistance of $6.48 billion and receives assistance of $6.09 billion annually from key partners as Official Development Assistance (ODA).
    • Under Indian Cooperation Mission (ICM) — India partners for development cooperation and does not give aid like OECD members.
    • India has been supporting the developmental endeavours of several partner countries in Africa and Asia, even before Independence.
    • However, this process lacks a firm institutional foundation.

    Efforts to form an institutional framework

    • The first effort by India to shape a framework was in 2003 with the announcement of the India Development Initiative (IDI).
    • Subsequently, the Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) was launched in 2005 for managing credit lines.
    • The IDI was suspended in 2007 and the announcement about the setting up of the India International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA), which never took off.
    • Meanwhile, in 2018, China founded its international development cooperation agency.

    Changes in concessional financing

    • At this point, concessional financing in India’s development cooperation portfolio is close to 70 per cent.
    • So any major change would require alterations in the way LOCs (Line of Credit) have been working.
    • In 2015, the government made efforts to bring in operational changes in the way credit lines work.
    •  As of now, the EXIM Bank raises global resources and the Government of India absorbs the interest differential.

    Way forward

    • Countries have sovereign and non-sovereign windows for promoting infrastructure financing abroad — both have their own place.
    • A non-sovereign window would provide greater flexibility and bandwidth.
    • To become a leading strategic investor in commercially viable and financially attractive public-private partnership infrastructure projects, the fund may build an investment ecosystem in Africa with support from leading Indian firms.
    • The proposed new entity may also provide handholding to select performing Indian social enterprises to operate in other countries as well.
    • Besides making an immediate economic impact, these enterprises can facilitate development partnerships between India and other countries.
    • Post-pandemic, countries worldwide are exploring ways to reinvigorate their development cooperation efforts.
    • India’s own development experience is also evolving with programmes like the JAM trinity, Ayushman Bharat and other initiatives like Gati Shakti — the learnings from which should be absorbed in the portfolio to be shared with fellow developing countries.

    Conclusion

    It is high time India restructures its development finance apparatus for deeper and effective engagement and to address the rapidly evolving newer competitive development financing landscape.

  • Is the Indian foreign-policy ship changing course?

    Context

    India plans to host an international conference on Afghanistan in the second week of November.

    Is the Indian foreign policy changing course?

    • All signs point towards a major calibration of the foreign-policy compass in recent weeks since the tumultuous events in Kabul two months ago culminated in the formation of an interim government by the Taliban.
    • As regards the way forward in Afghanistan, India has opted to align with the Anglo-American camp in the international line-up arrayed against the Eurasian axis of Russia, China and Iran.
    • While the US has an attitude of “You’re either with us, or against us”, vis-a-vis the Taliban, Russia, China, Iran and other neighbouring states give primacy to stability and security of Afghanistan.
    • Being a discontented party, unsurprisingly, India would have more in common with the revisionist powers — the US and the UK.
    • While the stated purpose of the participating countries is marking Afghanistan, it is the future that matters, being an epochal one that would transform the geopolitics of the region.
    • Thus, Delhi has moved up to the centrestage of the Quad.
    • In turn, the US accepts that the Quad ought to be “inclusive”. Global Britain is knocking at the door.
    • On its part, Delhi has displayed its comfort level with the AUKUS.
    • The historical Western experience of the EU and NATO moving in tandem to weaken a common enemy is being replicated with Asian characteristics.
    • A dual containment strategy is unfolding against China and Russia.
    • Thus, its short-lived dalliance with Iran is losing its gravitas and India has swung to the other extreme to identify with a new quadrilateral platform in West Asia, with Israel, UAE and the US.
    • India shrugs its shoulders as its “time-tested” friend, Moscow, bemoans the Quad and AUKUS.
    • This astonishing zigzagging in India’s regional policy takes the breath away.

    Challenges for India

    • India lives in its region and the Quad and AUKUS are of no help when it comes to Afghanistan.
    • Pakistan and China are riding high in the Hindu Kush; Moscow and Beijing have moved close in Central Asia which Washington is having a hard time in dealing with.
    • India’s much-touted “influence” in Kabul has turned out to be delusional.
    • Its own capacity to shape future events is virtually nil. These are the hard realities.

    Conclusion

    With the conference where India hopes to create an equivalent of the vajrayudha of the ancient Vedas which would allow India to reclaim its rightful place in the Afghan pantheon of gods and demi-gods.

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  • EU, India and the Indo-Pacific

    Context

    Last month, the EU released it “EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”. This document is very rich and needs to be analysed in the context of the rapprochement between the EU and India, which culminated in the June EU-India summit, a “turning point” according to some analysts.

    Important takeaways from EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy

    • The EU strategy in the Indo-Pacific appears to be over-determined by China’s expansionism.
    • “The display of force and increasing tensions in regional hotspots such as in the South and East China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity,” the document says.
    • If security interests are highlighted in the beginning, they are rather low in the list of the objectives of the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, which are listed as: “Sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transition; ocean governance; digital governance and partnerships; connectivity; security and defence; human security”.
    • Many paragraphs of the document are dedicated to values, including human rights.

    India does not figure prominently in the policy document

    • In terms of partnerships, India does not figure very prominently.
    • By contrast, ASEAN is presented as “an increasingly important partner for the EU”.
    • However, India appears in the list of the countries which already have an Indo-Pacific strategy and with which the EU is interested in a deeper “engagement”, a list made of ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the UK and US.
    • However, the document does not mention the role India could play in value-chain diversification, a top priority of the EU since the Covid-19 pandemic in particular.
    • Yet, India is mentioned few pages later in a similar perspective when it is said that the EU will help “low and middle-income Indo-Pacific partners to secure access to the Covid-19 vaccine through the Covax facility and through other means”.
    • What the French see as India’s main asset, its strategic dimension, is not central in the EU document.
    •  India is listed as the EU’s first partner only in one area: “under the project Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA), which covers counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, maritime security and crisis management.
    • The pilot partners are India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Vietnam, with EU military experts already operating in Indonesia and in Vietnam.”

    Understanding the German influence on the policy document

    • Thus, the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is more in tune with the German vision of the Indo-Pacific than with the French one.
    • The fact that the German approach prevails in the EU document is a reflection of the influence of Berlin’s weltanschauung (worldview) in Europe — something Brexit has accentuated, Great Britain’s Indo-Pacific strategy being similar to France’s.
    • But China’s attitude may force Germany — and the EU — to change their mind in the near future.

    Conclusion

    By and large, the Indo-Pacific strategy of the EU remains driven by economic considerations and India, whose main asset is geopolitical and even geostrategic, does not figure prominently in it.

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  • Suggestions on alternative foreign policy

    Context

    A document has emerged from the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) in the nature of an alternative to the present foreign and defence policies named ‘India’s Path to Power: Strategy in a world adrift’. It is authored by eight well-known strategists and thinkers.

    Background of the document

    • In 2012, many of the same authors had produced another document, ‘Non-alignment 2.0’, in the light of the global changes at that time, as a contribution to policymaking, without criticising the policies of the government.
    • The present document, however, is in the nature of an alternative to the foreign and defence policies of the government, as some of its tenets are not considered conducive to finding a path to power for India in the post-pandemic world.

    Change in foreign policy

    • The first term of the Modi government was remarkable for its innovative, bold and assertive foreign policy, which received general approbation.
    • After his unconventional peace initiatives with Pakistan failed, he took a firm stand and gained popularity at home.
    • His wish to have close relations with the other neighbours did not materialise, but his helpful attitude to them even in difficult situations averted any crisis.
    • He brought a new symphony into India-U.S. relations and engaged China continuously to find a new equation with it. India’s relations with Israel and the Arab countries became productive.
    • In its second term, the government dealt with some of the sensitive matters, which were essentially of a domestic nature such as Article 370, citizenship issues and farming regulation.
    • The external dimensions of these matters led to a challenge to the government’s foreign policy.

    Suggestions in the Centre for Policy Research report

    • Impact of domestic issues on foreign policy: The finding of the report is that domestic issues have impacted foreign policy and, therefore, India should set its house in order to stem the tide of international reaction.
    • This assertion at the beginning of the report is the heart of the report and it is repeated in different forms.
    • Importance of globalisation: The report rightly points out that “it would be incorrect and counterproductive for India to turn its back on globalisation…”
    • Revival of SAARC: The report also suggests that SAARC should be revived and that India should rejoin the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and continue its long-standing quest for membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
    • Strategic autonomy: The report also stresses the importance of strategic autonomy in today’s world where change is the only certainty.
    • Relations with the US and China: As for the India-U.S.- China triangle, the report makes the unusual suggestion that India should have better relations individually with both the U.S. and China than they have with each other.
    • The report concludes that since China will influence India’s external environment politically, economically and infrastructurally, there is no feasible alternative to a combination of engagement and competition with China.
    • Pakistan policy: The report asserts, “as long as our objectives of policy towards Pakistan are modest, resumption of dialogue and a gradual revival of trade, transport and other links are worth pursuing.”

    Conclusion

    The significance of the report is that it reveals the end of the era of consensus foreign policy and presents a shadow foreign policy for the first time in India. It remains to be seen whether any of the opposition parties will adopt it and fight the next election on the platform provided by the report.

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  • Indo-Abrahamic Accord: A new QUAD

     

    The first-ever meeting between the foreign ministers of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States is being widely perceived as a new QUAD group.

    What is Abraham Accord?

    • The Israel–UAE normalization agreement is officially called the Abraham Accords Peace Agreement.
    • It was initially agreed to in a joint statement by the United States, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on August 13, 2020.
    • The UAE thus became the third Arab country, after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, to agree to formally normalize its relationship with Israel as well as the first Persian Gulf country to do so.
    • Concurrently, Israel agreed to suspend plans for annexing parts of the West Bank.
    • The agreement normalized what had long been informal but robust foreign relations between the two countries.

    The idea of the Indo-Abrahamic Accord

    • The idea of an accord between India, the UAE and Israel was first suggested by Mohammed Soliman, an Egyptian scholar based in Washington.
    • The focus, then, was on India taking full advantage of the normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arabs.

    Prospects of India joining the accord

    • Adding “Indo” to the Abrahamic Accords — from think tank level to the policy domain underlines the extraordinary churn in the geopolitics of the Middle East.
    • It also points to new openings for India in the region and ever-widening possibilities for Delhi’s strategic cooperation with Washington.

    Significance for India

    The new minilateral consultation with the US, Israel and the UAE should started breaking that political taboo by:

    (1) Creating a minilateral in the Middle-East:

    • Such events mark an important turning point in Delhi’s engagement with the Middle East.
    • It suggests India is now ready to move from bilateral relations conducted in separate silos towards an integrated regional policy.
    • As in the Indo-Pacific, so in the Middle East, regional coalitions are bound to widen Delhi’s reach and deepen its impact.

    (2) India bridging the Arab-Israeli rift:

    • Often the Arab nations and Israel are divided over Palestine.
    • The simultaneous expansion of Delhi’s cooperation with Israel and the Arab world was considered impossible.
    • However, India’s new foreign policy broke from that assessment and demonstrated the feasibility of a non-ideological engagement with the Middle East.
    • This diplomatic pragmatism allows Delhi to reimagine its policies towards the Middle East.

    (3) Extension of cooperation with the US:

    • Thinking of the US as a partner in the Middle East is part of the reimagination.
    • For long, India defined the US, and more broadly the West, as part of the problem in the Middle East.
    • As a result, Delhi kept a reasonable political distance from the US in the region.

    (4) Miscellaneous:

    • India’s scale with Israeli innovation and Emirati capital could produce immense benefits to all three countries.
    • Add American strategic support and you would see a powerful dynamic unfolding in the region.

    Is it a new Quad in making?

    • It is perhaps too early to call the new minilateral with the US, UAE and Israel the “new Quad” for the Middle East.
    • It will be a while before this grouping will find its feet and evolve.
    • After all, it took quite some effort to build the Quad in the east with Australia, India, Japan and the United States.

    What is the kind of agenda that this group can develop?

    Economic Cooperation: Like the eastern Quad, it would make sense for the new Middle Eastern minilateral to focus on non-military issues like trade, energy, and environment and focus on promoting public goods.

    Technology cooperation: Beyond trade, there is potential for India, UAE and Israel to collaborate on many areas — from semiconductor design and fabrication to space technology.

    A new geopolitical entity: The new “Quad” in the Middle East is likely to be India’s only new coalition in the region. It provides a thrust to new regionalism to the west involving India.

    ‘Extended’ neighborhood: This engagement will open the door for extending the collaboration with other common regional partners like Egypt (better call it Suez Canal), who will lend great strategic depth to the Indo-Abrahamic accords.

    Conclusion

    • This engagement has thus opened up a new opportunity for India to go for deeper engagement with Israel without risking its relations with the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf.
    • In the evolving scenario, there seems much scope for a profitable trilateral synergy, but India cannot take its preponderance as a given.
    • There is much to be done in realizing the full potential of the “Indo-Abrahamic Accords”.

     

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