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Subject: International Relations

  • India should believe in the EU

    India and the EU have many things in common. And there are many areas in which both can expand the cooperation. This article explores commonalities and the areas which offer the scope for enhancing the cooperation. 

    Common interests

    • Both aim to enhance strategic autonomy and their global standing.
    • Diversifying strategic value chains is also a common interest.
    • Both seek to address the issue of climate change on an urgent basis.

    Economic ties with the EU

    • The EU is India’s largest trading partner accounting for €80 billion worth of trade in goods in 2019.
    • This is equal to 11.1% of total Indian trade.
    • The EU is also the biggest foreign investor, with €67.7 billion worth of investments made in 2018.
    • Which is equal to 22% of total FDI inflows.

    Scope for improving the economic ties

    • The EU’s investments in China amounted to €175.3 billion (2018).
    • So, India could succeed in attracting EU investment that might be moving out of China.
    • To attract this outflowing investment, India must address the mutual trust deficit.
    • Enhanced business cooperation can help both the EU and India diversify their strategic value chains.
    • Increasing people’s mobility and connectivity is another area that can create opportunities for innovation and growth.

    Talks on FTA

    • Both sides need to move further on the Free Trade Agreement.
    • A new study from the European Parliament estimates the impact of an EU-India trade agreement between €8 billion and €8.5 billion.
    • The study also mentions additional potential gains from enhanced coordination on the provision of global public goods, such as environmental standards.

    Cooperation on climate change

    • Under the new industrial strategy, the Green Deal, the EU has set an ambitious target to be carbon-emission neutral by 2050.
    • If the EU and India succeed in transforming into carbon-neutral economies by 2050, we all would gain from the investment.

    Strategic partnership with EU

    • The Indo-Pacific region is becoming contentious, so India should capitalise on its geopolitical leverage there.
    • Cooperation with like-minded, democratic powers can support this effort, especially towards assertive competitors like China.
    • The EU as a whole offers more to India than the strongest bilateral relations with individual EU member state.
    • New Delhi must learn how to maximise benefits from this strategic partnership.
    • The disruption caused by COVID-19 has been the occasion for the EU to prove its worth.
    • “Next-generation EU proposal” submitted by the European Commission has economic as well as geopolitical implications.
    • The proposal shows that the ties that bind the EU extend well beyond treaties and individual members’ self-interest.
    • The EU champions the rules-based international order, so the EU and India must act to promote sustainable reform of multilateral institutions starting from the WTO.

    Consider the question “India-EU ties with many common interests assume significance as rule-based order is being challenged by the rise of exceptionalism. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    A strong partnership would help both the EU and India become global decision-makers and tackle the challenges caused by the disruption of global order collectively.

  • Azad Pattan Hydel Project

    Pakistan and China have signed an agreement for the 700 MW Azad Pattan hydel power project on the Jhelum River in Sudhoti district of PoK.

    Try this question from CSP 2019:

    Q.What is common to the places known as Aliyar, Isapur and Kangsabati?

    (a) Recently discovered uranium deposits

    (b) Tropical rain forests

    (c) Underground cave systems

    (d) Water reservoirs

    Azad Pattan hydel project

    • The project is a run-of-the-river scheme with a reservoir located near Muslimabad village, 7 km upstream from the Azad Pattan bridge, in district Sudhnoti, one of the eight districts of PoK.
    • It is one of five hydropower schemes on the Jhelum.
    • Upstream from Azad Pattan are the Mahl, Kohala, and Chakothi Hattian projects; Karot is downstream. Like Kohala and Azad Pattan, Karot too is being developed under the CPEC framework.
    • The project will comprise a 90-metre-high dam, with a 3.8 sq km reservoir.
    • The $ 1.5-billion project is the second power project under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

    Other projects in PoK

    • Kohala project is a 1,124 MW hydel project that will come upon the Jhelum near Muzaffarabad. This project is one of the biggest investments by China in PoK.
    • The Karot Hydropower station, the third project being executed by China on the Jhelum is on the boundaries of Kotli district in PoK and Rawalpindi district in Pakistan’s Punjab province.
    • Two hydel projects are planned in Gilgit Baltistan – Phandar Hydro Power, and Gilgit KIU.
    • Most recent in the news was Diamer-Bhasha dam in the PoK.

  • India’s Military Ties with Nepal

    Soldiers from Nepal form a significant part of the Indian Army’s legendary Gurkha regiment. Here is a brief explainer on the origin and evolution of these ties.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.“India has special and time-tested military ties with Nepal”. Analyse.

    India’s military ties with Nepal: The origin

    • India’s military connection with the Himalayan country goes back to the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh whose army in Lahore enlisted Nepalese soldiers called Lahure or soldiers of fortune.
    • British India raised the first battalion of the Gurkha Regiment as the Nasiri regiment on April 24, 1815.
    • By the time the First World War started, there were 10 Gurkha regiments in the British Indian Army.
    • When India got freedom, these regiments were divided between the British and Indian armies as per the Britain–India–Nepal Tripartite Agreement signed in November 1947.
    • Six Gurkha regiments with a lakh-odd soldier came to India, which went on to raise another regiment called 11 Gurkha Rifles who chose not to transfer to the British Army.

    Can Nepali citizens join the Indian Army?

    • Yes, any Nepali can join the Indian Army, both as a jawan and as an officer.
    • A citizen of Nepal can take the NDA or CDS exams and join the Indian Army as an officer.
    • Col Lalit Rai, who received a Vir Chakra for the bravery of his battalion, the 1/11 Gurkha Rifles, during the Kargil war, is one such officer of Nepalese descent.
    • The Nepalese army also sends its officers for training to India’s military academies and combat colleges.

    Do the soldiers from Nepal enjoy the same rights as the Indian troops?

    • Yes, they enjoy the same benefits as the India troops both during service and after retirement.
    • They get the same medical facilities as the Indian soldiers, and often medical teams from the Indian Army tour Nepal.
    • Unlike the British, who started giving the Nepalese soldiers pension only a few years ago, the Indian Army has never discriminated against the Nepalese soldiers, who can avail of healthcare facilities in India as well.
    • The Indian Army also runs welfare projects in Nepal villages, including small water and power projects.

    The honorary chief of the Nepalese army

    • Yes, this convention dates back to 1972 when then Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, a Gurkha regiment officer, fondly called Sam Bahadur by his troops, was made the honorary chief of the Nepalese army.
    • Ever since the Army chief of India is the honorary chief of the Nepalese army and vice-versa.

    Joint exercises

    • Joint military exercise ‘SURYA KIRAN is an annual event which is conducted alternatively in Nepal and India.
    • It is an important exercise in terms of the security challenges faced by both nations in the realm of changing facets of global terrorism.

  • Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)

    Pakistan has allowed Afghanistan to send goods to India using the Wagah border. The decision is a part of Islamabad’s commitment under the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA).

    A statement based question can be asked upon the agreement on terms like:

    1. Reciprocal trade with India

    2. Railways/Road/Air transit whether allowed

    About the agreement

    • The APTTA is a bilateral trade agreement signed in 2010 by Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    • It calls for greater facilitation in the movement of goods amongst the two countries.
    • The 2010 agreement supersedes the 1965 Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement, which granted Afghanistan the right to import duty-free goods through Pakistani seaports, mostly notably from Karachi.

    Features of the agreement

    • Trade-in goods smuggled into Pakistan once constituted a major source of revenue for Afghanistan.
    • The 2010 APTTA allows for both countries to use each other’s airports, railways, roads, and ports for transit trade along designated transit corridors.
    • The agreement does not cover road transport vehicles from any third country, be it from India or any Central Asia country.
    • However, the signed Agreement permits Afghanistan trucks access to the Wagah border with India, where Afghan goods will be offloaded onto Indian trucks.
    • This agreement does not permit Indian goods to be loaded onto trucks for transit back to Afghanistan.
    • Instead, Afghan trucks offloaded at Wagah may return to Afghanistan loaded only with Pakistani, rather than Indian goods in an attempt to prevent the formation of a black market for Indian goods in Pakistan.

  • Chabahar Rail Project

    The Iranian government has decided to proceed with the construction of Chabahar Rail Project on its own, citing delays from the Indian side in funding and starting the project.

    What is the issue?

    • Four years ago, India and Iran signed an agreement to construct a rail line from Chabahar port to Zahedan, along the border with Afghanistan.
    • The Iranian Railways will proceed without India’s assistance, using approximately $400 million from the Iranian National Development Fund.
    • The development comes as China finalizes a massive 25-year, $400 billion strategic partnership deal with Iran, which could cloud India’s plans.

    The Chabahar Rail Project

    • It is a 628 km Chabahar-Zahedan line, which will be extended to Zaranj across the border in Afghanistan.
    • The entire project would be completed by March 2022.
    • It was meant to be part of India’s commitment to the trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan to build an alternate trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

    Why did Iran omit India from the project?

    • Despite several site visits by engineers, and preparations by Iranian railways, India never began the work, ostensibly due to worries that these could attract U.S. sanctions.
    • The U.S. had provided a sanctions waiver for the Chabahar port and the rail line to Zahedan, but it has been difficult to find equipment suppliers and partners due to worries they could be targeted by the U.S.
    • India has already “zeroed out” its oil imports from Iran due to U.S. sanctions.

    The contentious partnership with China

    • Iran and China are close to finalising a 25-year Strategic Partnership which will include Chinese involvement in Chabahar’s duty-free zone, an oil refinery nearby, and possibly a larger role in Chabahar port as well.
    • The cooperation will extend from investments in infrastructure, manufacturing and upgrading energy and transport facilities, to refurbishing ports, refineries and other installations.
    • It is also rumoured that the Chabahar port will be leased to China surpassing India.
    • Iran had proposed a tie-up between the port at Gwadar and Chabahar last year and has offered interests to China in the Bandar-e-Jask port 350km away from Chabahar, as well as in the Chabahar duty-free zone.

    Back2Basics: India-Iran Partnership over Chabahar Port

    • In 2016, India signed a deal with Iran entailing $8 billion investment in Chabahar port and industries in Chabahar Special Economic Zone.
    • The port is being developed as a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
    • India has already built a 240-km road connecting Afghanistan with Iran.
    • All this were expected to bring cargo to Bandar Abbas port and Chabahar port, and free Kabul from its dependence on Pakistan to reach the outer world.
    • Completion of this project would give India access to Afghanistan and beyond to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe via 7,200-km-long multi-modal North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

  • In news: Bhashan Char Island

    Bangladesh has announced that it will not move the Rohingyas settled on the Bhashan char island amid Corona pandemic.

    Try this question from CSP 2018:

    Q.Which one of the following pairs of islands is separated from each other by the ‘Ten Degree Channel’?

    (a) Andaman and Nicobar

    (b) Nicobar and Sumatra

    (c) Maldives and Lakshadweep

    (d) Sumatra and Java

    Bhashan Char Island

    • Bhasan Char also known as Char Piya, is an island in Hatiya, Bangladesh.
    • The island was formed with Himalayan silt in 2006 spanning 40 square kilometres.
    • It is underwater from June to September annually because of the monsoon, and it has no flood fences.
    • In June 2015, the Bangladeshi government suggested resettling Rohingya refugees on the island under its Ashrayan Project.
    • The proposal was characterized by the UN Refugee Agency as “logistically challenging”.

  • Broader strategic challenge of dealing with China

    • Identifying the nature of the threat posed by China is important to formulate a response. This article discusses the plan of action on the diplomatic, strategic and economic front to deal with Chinese aggression.

    Economic angle of China’s expansionism

    • The Chinese growth model needed to find subservient emerging markets.
    • In these markets, China can park huge debts and make investments to keep feeding China’s high growth rates.
    • Friendly foreign debt-investment markets were needed to compensate for over-investment at home.
    • The Belt and Road Initiative was rolled out as a meeting point for China’s geo-strategic and geo-economic interests.
    • China has expanded its global footprint by signing on about 100 countries to the BRI.
    • China has made aggressive moves on most of its non-submissive neighbours in the South China Sea.
    • China has also made moves against its traditional rivals like Japan and Taiwan to independent-minded nations like South Korea and Australia.
    • China sees itself as a global power whose time has come.

    India needs to play clearer role

    • Rise of China is shaking up global alignments and shaping new world order.
    • The Trump administration is increasingly being criticised for not providing global leadership.
    • India could afford to be largely non-aligned during the 20th century Cold War.
    • Our size and economic momentum necessitate that we play a clearer role in the Cold War’s 21st-century sequel.
    • India’s foreign policy has lacked a clear vision about China.
    • India has been deepening our strategic relationship with the US but without wanting to alarm China.

    India’s relation with neighbours

    • India’s relations with other neighbouring nations have also become a cause of concern.
    • Pakistan has practically become a minion state for the Chinese – the $62-billion CPEC is a case in the point.
    • Nepal is no longer on our list of all-weather friends.
    • Chinese influence is growing in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh — both signatories to the BRI.
    • And just last week, Beijing, sent another appallingly stern message to our loyal friend, Bhutan, by making ridiculous territorial claims.

    What should be India’s plan of action

    • Dealing with China will require conviction and exercising a range of military, diplomatic and economic options.
    • One forum we need to build on and provide leadership to is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
    •  India should now propose the expansion of the Quad’s scope with a possible exploration of a collective defence architecture like NATO.
    • The membership of the Quad should be expanded to include Vietnam, South Korea, New Zealand, and Malaysia.
    • On the economic front, India must welcome the US proposal to expand G7 to include India, Russia, Australia and South Korea without China as a member.
    • Next area of focus should be strengthening ties with our neighbourhood.
    • Effort must be made to regain the relationship with Russia.

    Conclusion

    China must be made to choose: Is it willing to push the equally proud, equally numerous, equally historical and glorious civilisation to the south in this long-term direction for a few square kilometres of territory and a round of chest-thumping?

  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

    United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs have made public their third communication forwarded to India expressing concern over alleged excessive use of force, ill-treatment during arrests and detentions.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.There is an urgent need for reforming the criminal justice system in India in light of rising cases of custodial torture and killings. Comment.

    What is the issue?

    The UN urged the Indian government to conduct a prompt and impartial investigation into the allegations of arbitrary killings, torture and ill-treatment and to prosecute suspected perpetrators under articles 6 and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and articles 7 and 12 of the Committee Against Torture (CAT).

    What are the conventions cited by the UN?

    1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

    • The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution on 16 December 1966, and in force from 23 March 1976.
    • The covenant commits its parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights and rights to due process and a fair trial.
    • As of September 2019, the Covenant has 173 parties and six more signatories without ratification.
    • It is part of the International Bill of Human Rights, along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
    • It is monitored by the UN Human Rights Committee (a separate body to the UN Human Rights Council).

    2) United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT)

    • The UNCAT is an international human rights treaty, under the review of the UN and was adopted in 1984.
    • It aims to prevent torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment around the world.
    • The convention requires states to take effective measures to prevent torture in any territory under their jurisdiction and forbids states to transport people to any country where there is reason to believe they will be tortured.
    • Since the convention’s entry into force, the absolute prohibition against torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment has become accepted as a principle of customary international law.

    3) The Committee against Torture (CAT)

    • It is a body of human rights experts that monitors implementation of the Convention by State parties.
    • The Committee is one of eight UN-linked human rights treaty bodies.
    • All state parties are obliged under the Convention to submit regular reports to the CAT on how rights are being implemented.
    • Upon ratifying the Convention, states must submit a report within one year, after which they are obliged to report every four years.
    • The Committee examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of “concluding observations.”
    • Under certain circumstances, the CAT may consider complaints or communications from individuals claiming that their rights under the Convention have been violated.

  • UAE in support of Open Skies Agreement with India

    The UAE is keen to have an open sky agreement with India.

    Open Skies Agreement! Look how confusing does it sound compared to the Open Skies Treaty between the US and Russia.

    What is the Open Skies Agreement?

    • The National Civil Aviation Policy, 2016, allows the government to enter into an ‘open sky’ air services agreement on a reciprocal basis with SAARC nations as well as countries beyond a 5,000-kilometre radius from New Delhi.
    • This implies that nations within this distance need to enter into a bilateral agreement and mutually determine the number of flights that their airlines can operate between the two countries.
    • India has open sky agreements with Japan, Greece, Jamaica, Guyana, Czech Republic, Finland, Spain and Sri Lanka.
    • India also has an open sky agreement with the US, among other countries.

    Why UAE wants such an agreement with India?

    • There are about 1,068 flights a week between India and the UAE operated by the airlines of the two countries under the bilateral Air Service Agreement.
    • India has open skies policy with SAARC countries and those beyond the 5,000-km radius.
    • UAE wants India to revisit this policy.

    Must read:

    U.S. set to exit the ‘Open Skies Treaty’ Copy

  • Patrolling Points along LAC

    The standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where initial steps towards disengagement have taken place, are around a number of patrolling points or PPs in Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra areas.

    Do you know?

    The Galwan River flows from the Aksai Chin region occupied by China in the UT of Ladakh.  It originates in the area of Samzungling on the eastern side of the Karakoram Range and flows west to join the Shyok River.  It is one of the upstream tributaries of the Indus River.

    What exactly are Patrolling Points?

    • PPs are patrolling points identified and marked on the LAC, which are patrolled with a stipulated frequency by the security forces.
    • They serve as a guide to the location of the LAC for the soldiers, acting as indicators of the extent of ‘actual control’ exercised on the territory by India.
    • By regularly patrolling up to these PPs, the Indian side is able to establish and assert its physical claim about the LAC.

    Are all the Patrolling Points numbered?

    • Some of the PPs are prominent and identifiable geographical features, such as a pass, or a nala junction where no numerals are given.
    • Only those PPs, where there are no prominent features, are numbered as in the case of PP14 in Galwan Valley.

    Do all Patrolling Points fall on the LAC?

    • Mostly, yes. Except for the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh, where PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13 – from Raki Nala to Jivan Nala – do not fall on the LAC.
    • These are short of the LAC, on the Indian side.

    Are these Patrolling Points not manned?

    • The PPs are not posts and thus not manned. Unlike on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the border with China is not physically held by the Army all along.
    • They are just physical markers on the ground, chosen for their location and have no defensive potential or tactical importance for the Army.

    How is the claim asserted on LAC?

    • The claim is asserted by the Army or joint Army-ITBP patrols as they show more visible presence in these areas.
    • This is done by physically visiting PPs with a higher frequency, as the deployment has moved closer to the LAC and due to improved infrastructure.
    • As the Chinese may not see when the Indian patrols visit these PPs, they will leave come cigarette packets or food tins with Indian markings behind.
    • That lets the Chinese know that Indian soldiers had visited the place, which indicates that India was in control of these areas.

    Who has given these Patrolling Points?

    • These PPs have been identified by the high-powered China Study Group, starting from 1975 when patrolling limits for Indian forces were specified.
    • It is based on the LAC after the government accepted the concept in 1993, which is also marked on the maps with the Army in the border areas.
    • But the frequency of patrolling to PPs is not specified by the CSG – it is finalised by the Army Headquarters in New Delhi, based on the recommendations made by the Army and ITBP.

    PP under dispute

    • PPs 10 to 13 in Depsang sector, PP14 in Galwan, PP15 in Hot Spring, and PP17 and PP17A in Gogra are currently being disputed by both sides, where the standoffs have taken place in the past nine weeks.