💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (August Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: International Relations

  • [15th October 2025 ] The Hindu Op-ed: Powering up the Australia-India clean energy partnership

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Clean energy is the order of the day. Describe briefly India’s changing policy towards climate change in various international fora in the context of geopolitics.

    Linkage: The India–Australia Renewable Energy Partnership (REP) exemplifies India’s evolving climate diplomacy — shifting from being a climate “follower” to a global clean energy collaborator. It reflects how India aligns geopolitical strategy with green transition, using partnerships like REP to ensure both sustainability and supply chain autonomy.

    Mentor’s Comment

    At a time when the world is rethinking its clean energy priorities amidst climate vulnerabilities and geopolitical flux, the Australia–India Renewable Energy Partnership (REP) emerges as a beacon of cooperative strength. This article examines how two Indo-Pacific democracies can forge a resilient, balanced, and future-ready clean energy ecosystem — turning climate ambition into implementable strategy.

    Introduction

    In a decade defined by climate urgency and energy transition, India and Australia are deepening collaboration in renewable energy to reduce carbon footprints and diversify critical supply chains. With Australia’s Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen visiting New Delhi, both nations are poised to convert their shared climate vision into tangible outcomes under the India–Australia Renewable Energy Partnership (REP). The partnership arrives at a pivotal moment when the Indo-Pacific region is reeling under frequent climate disasters and when overdependence on China for clean energy inputs threatens energy security.

    Why This Is Big News

    The India–Australia clean energy partnership represents a strategic shift from bilateral intent to operational collaboration. It marks the first large-scale joint response by the two democracies to build resilient, China-independent supply chains for renewable technologies.

    This is significant because the Indo-Pacific averages nearly 10 climate disasters per month, and projections show up to 89 million climate refugees by 2050. Both countries now aim not merely for targets but for structural autonomy in critical minerals, hydrogen, and solar ecosystems — signalling a new phase of climate diplomacy.

    A Climate-Vulnerable Region

    1. Harshest impacts: The Indo-Pacific region witnesses some of the world’s most severe climate consequences, with recurring floods, cyclones, and droughts.
    2. Alarming projections: Between 1970–2022, it averaged 10 climate-related disasters monthly; by 2050, 89 million people may be displaced.
    3. India’s leadership: India targets 500 GW of non-fossil electricity by 2030 (with 280 GW solar) and has achieved 50% non-fossil capacity already — five years ahead of schedule.
    4. Australia’s climate push: It has raised its emission-reduction ambition to 62–70% below 2005 levels by 2035, aligning with its net-zero goal.

    The Supply Chain Challenge

    1. Dependence on China: China refines 90% of rare earth elements and manufactures 80% of global solar modules, giving it near-monopoly power.
    2. India’s dilemma: Faces import dependence for rare earth magnets and battery materials, affecting EV and wind sectors.
    3. Australia’s gap: Despite being rich in lithium, cobalt, and rare earths, it lacks refining and downstream industries.
    4. Pandemic exposure: The COVID-19 crisis exposed global supply fragility; China’s export restrictions further underlined the danger of single-country dependence.
    5. Industry impact: Example, an Indian EV manufacturer’s production halved in July due to component shortages.

    What the Renewable Energy Partnership (REP) Offers

    1. Comprehensive framework: REP spans eight key areas, solar PV, green hydrogen, energy storage, circular economy, solar supply chains, two-way investments, and capacity building.
    2. Collaborative platforms: Introduces a Track 1.5 Dialogue, connecting policy, industry, and academia to translate ideas into pilot projects.
    3. Focus areas: Promotes joint R&D, investment in refining, hydrogen economy, and cross-training of skilled personnel.
    4. Strategic significance: Seeks to create an Indo-Pacific clean energy hub resilient to geopolitical shocks.

    Complementary Strengths: Why Collaboration Works

    Australia’s edge:

    1. Critical mineral base — rich in lithium, rare earths.
    2. Stable regulations and a focus on green jobs under its Net Zero Jobs Plan.

    India’s advantage:

    1. Demographic dividend — 65% population below 35 years.
    2. PLI schemes and Skill India fostering clean-tech manufacturing.
    3. Expanding domestic demand for solar, hydrogen, and battery systems.

    Synergistic model: Together, they can integrate Australia’s minerals with India’s manufacturing and labour pool, creating a regional clean energy ecosystem that is both inclusive and secure.

    Why This Partnership Matters for the Indo-Pacific

    1. Climate resilience: Joint efforts show that democracies can lead energy transitions without autocratic dependencies.
    2. Geopolitical signalling: It strengthens Quad cooperation (India–Australia–Japan–US) by aligning clean energy goals.
    3. Economic dividends: Builds green value chains that can generate jobs and diversify trade beyond fossil fuels.

    Conclusion

    The Australia–India Renewable Energy Partnership is more than a bilateral initiative, it is a climate-security compact for the Indo-Pacific. By combining Australia’s resource advantage with India’s innovation and manpower, both nations can anchor a sustainable energy future independent of geopolitical coercion. In doing so, they not only contribute to global net-zero targets but also demonstrate how democratic collaboration can address shared vulnerabilities with foresight and resilience.

  • Complacity not diplomacy-India’s engagement with Taliban

    Introduction

    The exclusion of women journalists from Taliban press conferences in New Delhi was not an accident, it was symbolic of a deeper issue: legitimizing a regime whose ideology is built on the deliberate erasure of women’s existence. As Afghan women face persecution, violence, and disappearance from every public sphere, the silence of democratic nations like India risks validating gender apartheid.

    Why is this issue in the news?

    The controversy erupted when India hosted two Taliban press conferences in New Delhi, where female journalists were initially excluded. The event coincided with a People’s Tribunal on the Women of Afghanistan in Madrid, where survivors testified to the Taliban’s gender-based persecution, recognized as a crime against humanity. The contrast between India’s engagement and the global condemnation of Taliban policies underscores a moral and diplomatic crisis.

    How has the Taliban institutionalized the erasure of women?

    1. Systematic exclusion: Since their 2021 return, the Taliban banned women from most public-sector jobs, secondary schools, and universities.
    2. Legalized oppression: The 2024 Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law formally declared women’s voices “forbidden” in public.
    3. Economic silencing: A 2025 Afghanistan Media Support Organisation survey found that 93% of women journalists lost their jobs, with more than 42% leaving journalism altogether.
    4. Violence and fear: Women activists are detained, beaten, and their husbands tortured, part of a deliberate campaign to erase their visibility and livelihood.

    Why is India’s stance seen as complicit rather than diplomatic?

    1. Normalization of misogyny: Hosting Taliban officials while Afghan women pleaded for recognition signals tacit acceptance of their regime.
    2. Moral inconsistency: While democracies like Spain and Canada host tribunals condemning Taliban atrocities, India’s diplomatic outreach stands in stark contrast.
    3. Diplomatic short-sightedness: By engaging the Taliban without human rights conditionalities, India risks legitimizing gender apartheid as a form of governance.

    What does this reveal about the global response to women’s rights?

    1. Erosion of feminist diplomacy: Nations increasingly prioritize geopolitical pragmatism over gender justice.
    2. Media complicity: Even in New Delhi, the Taliban’s media interaction mirrored their exclusionary ethos, showing that patriarchal silencing transcends borders.
    3. Selective outrage: While Western nations condemn the Taliban, many still negotiate covertly for strategic or security reasons, diluting international accountability.

    What lessons does this hold for India’s foreign policy and democracy?

    1. Moral leadership deficit: India’s silence undermines its self-image as the voice of the Global South and defender of democratic rights.
    2. Gender and diplomacy linkage: True diplomacy must integrate gender-sensitive ethics, ensuring no engagement legitimizes systemic violence.
    3. Internal reflection: A democracy’s foreign policy mirrors its domestic respect for women’s agency. India’s global credibility depends on aligning words with action.

    Conclusion 

    India’s engagement with the Taliban marks a dangerous shift from moral diplomacy to moral compromise. As Afghan women’s rights are being erased, India’s silence echoes complicity, not neutrality. True diplomacy must speak truth to power, not share its platform. Democracies cannot afford to normalize gender apartheid; silence here is not strategy, it is surrender.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2013] The proposed withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the countries of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.

    Linkage: India’s current engagement with the Taliban reflects the security vacuum created after the ISAF withdrawal, forcing New Delhi to balance strategic interests with moral responsibility. As the article shows, this has turned India’s Afghan policy from cautious realism into a test of its ethical diplomacy and regional credibility.

  • With new Great Game, India must engage with the Taliban and Kabul

    Introduction

    Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi arrived in New Delhi on an official visit, his first since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021.

    The visit represents a major recalibration in India’s Afghanistan policy, as New Delhi cautiously engages the Taliban regime without formal recognition. India’s approach blends strategic pragmatism and regional security concerns, focusing on maintaining influence in Afghanistan’s evolving geopolitical environment while avoiding premature diplomatic endorsement.

    India-Taliban Ties: A Quick Recap

    1. India never formally recognized the Taliban regime prior to or after 2021.
    2. Initial contacts date back to the late 1990s (e.g., during the IC-814 hijacking), but India’s engagement remained limited due to Pakistan’s dominance over the Taliban.
    3. Post-2021, India has maintained pragmatic engagement of humanitarian aid, infrastructure projects, and limited diplomatic outreach without providing de jure recognition.

    India’s Post-2021 Approach- Diplomatic Balancing and Western Response:

    1. India adopted a “cautious engagement” policy: restoring a technical mission in Kabul, resuming aid delivery, and holding diplomatic contacts.
    2. In 2025, India announced plans to reopen its embassy in Kabul, initially with a Chargé d’affaires, avoiding formal recognition.
    3. India’s silence on human rights and women’s issues during diplomatic talks reflects strategic restraint, balancing ideological concerns with geopolitical necessity.
    4. The Western response is ambivalent. India’s engagement is scrutinized to ensure it does not inadvertently legitimize the Taliban or dilute India’s democratic credentials.

    Taliban and Its Geopolitical Realignments (2024–2025):

    1. China: First major power to exchange ambassadors with the Taliban (2024); deepening economic, mining, and infrastructure ties.
    2. Russia: Moving to delist Taliban as a terrorist group; promoting counterterror cooperation.
    3. Iran: Accepts Taliban rule pragmatically, balancing internal crises with regional influence.
    4. Pakistan: Relations strained — Taliban criticism of Pakistani interference; cross-border tensions with TTP.
    5. United States: Under Trump 2.0, US policy is transactionally disengaged; leaves India more space to engage diplomatically.

    India’s Strategic Objectives in Engaging the Taliban:

    1. Maintain influence in Afghanistan to protect long-term investments (infrastructure, education, healthcare).
    2. Prevent Afghan territory from being used for anti-India terrorism.
    3. Counter Pakistan–China influence by remaining a relevant actor in Afghan affairs.
    4. Enable connectivity and trade, via Chabahar port and regional transit routes.
    5. Promote soft power through development cooperation, scholarships, and cultural engagement.

    Challenges and Diplomatic Constraints:

    1. Non-recognition dilemma: Engagement without recognition may be seen as de facto endorsement by critics.
    2. Human rights dissonance: Taliban’s restrictions on women’s rights conflict with India’s democratic values.
    3. Visa and mobility barriers: Lack of operational consular services hampers people-to-people ties and educational exchanges.
    4. Aid delivery limitations: Security, monitoring, and distribution bottlenecks constrain effective humanitarian impact.
    5. Geopolitical competition: Pakistan and China retain deeper leverage in Afghan affairs; India must navigate their influence.

    Way Forward:

    1. Engagement without endorsement: Maintain diplomatic contact while tying cooperation to counterterror assurances.
    2. Humanitarian focus: Channel aid for women and children through UN/trusted NGOs to avoid legitimizing Taliban governance.
    3. Regional coalition building: Leverage multilateral forums (SAARC, SCO, QUAD) to strengthen India’s Afghan policy.
    4. Expand economic roles: Prioritize mining, power, and infrastructure projects to anchor Indian presence.
    5. Broaden diplomatic contacts: Engage Afghan civil society, minorities, and regional stakeholders for balanced outreach.

    PYQ Relevance:

    [UPSC 2013] The proposed withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the countries of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.

    Linkage: The instability in Kabul, coupled with the influence of external state and non-state actors, directly impacts India’s internal security landscape, especially concerning terrorism, border security challenges, and the potential linkage between organized crime and drug trafficking. Therefore, questions may assess India’s strategic autonomy, humanitarian diplomacy, connectivity projects (like Chabahar), and counter-terrorism strategies, requiring candidates to demonstrate applied knowledge linking foreign policy decisions with internal stability.

     

  • UN to cut 25% of its global Peacekeeping Force   

    Why in the News?

    The UN will cut peacekeeping personnel by 25% across nine missions after U.S. funding dropped from $1 billion to $680 million under President Trump’s “America First” policy.

    US and Peacekeeping Funding Dynamics:

    • The US and China together contribute nearly 50% of the UN’s peacekeeping budget.
    • The U.S. outlined its new commitment of $680 million, marking a 32% decrease from last year’s payment.
    • A senior UN official confirmed that China has pledged to pay its full contribution by the end of 2025, offsetting some of the financial shortfall.

    Implications of Funding Cut:

    • The withdrawal of peacekeepers will leave several fragile regions exposed to renewed instability, especially in Africa and the Middle East.
    • The cuts signal a shift toward selective, donor-driven peacekeeping, prioritising geopolitical interests over collective international responsibility.
    • For the UN, the challenge lies in maintaining operational credibility and protecting civilian populations amid reduced resources.

    About the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission:

    • Overview: UN Peacekeeping is a collective international mechanism established to maintain peace and security in conflict-affected regions under the leadership of the United Nations.
    • Personnel: Peacekeepers, known as Blue Berets or Blue Helmets, include military, police, and civilian members from contributing nations.
    • Origin: The idea arose after World War II with the formation of the UN in 1945, marking a new era in global conflict resolution.
    • First Mission (1948): The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was deployed after the Arab–Israeli War to monitor ceasefires, setting the template for future operations.
    • Evolution: Over time, missions expanded to cover civil wars, humanitarian crises, and post-conflict reconstruction across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.
    • Core Principles:
      1. Consent of the Parties
      2. Impartiality
      3. Non-use of Force (except in self-defence or mandate defence)
    • Deployment: Missions require the consent of key conflict parties and are authorised by the UN Security Council.
    • Functions: Include monitoring ceasefires, disarmament, protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, promotion of human rights, and support for democratic governance.
    • Finance: United States (26.95%)> China (18.69%)> Japan (8.03%) > Germany (6.11%) > United Kingdom (5.36%) > France (5.29%).
    • India’s Contribution:
      • Major Contributor: India ranks among the largest troop contributors since the inception of UN peacekeeping.
      • Participation Record: Contributed over 1.95 lakh troops, served in 49 missions, and made 168 supreme sacrifices in service.
    [UPSC 2024] Consider the following pairs:
    Country Reason for being in the news
    1. Argentina: Worst economic crisis
    2. Sudan: War between the country’s regular army and
    paramilitary forces
    3. Turkey: Rescinded its membership of NATO
    How many of the pairs given above are correctly matched?
    (a) Only one pair (b) Only two pairs* (c) All three pairs (d) None of the pairs

     

  • [9th October 2025] The Hindu Op-ed: An anchor for India-U.K. ties, their economic partnership

    Introduction:

    1. The signing of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in July 2025 marks a major milestone in India–UK relations, cementing their partnership in trade, technology, defence, and climate cooperation.
    2. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit to Mumbai further signals mutual intent to deepen collaboration under the evolving Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) framework of Roadmap 2030 (2021).
    3. The agreement reflects a broader trend i.e. India’s calibrated engagement with post-Brexit Britain and the European continent, aligning trade liberalisation with strategic convergence.

    India–UK Relations: A Quick Recap

    • Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2021): Anchored in Roadmap 2030, covering trade, climate, defence, technology, and health.
    • Economic Ties: The UK contributes nearly 5% of India’s total FDI; bilateral trade exceeded USD 20 billion in FY 2024–25.
    • Defence Cooperation: Exercises such as Ajeya Warrior and Konkan Shakti, and collaboration in aerospace and propulsion systems strengthen military interoperability.
    • Technology Partnership: The Technology Security Initiative (TSI) focuses on AI, semiconductors, quantum technology, and critical minerals.
    • People-to-People Linkages: Over 1.7 million Indian-origin residents and 150,000 students in the UK reinforce socio-economic ties.
    • Global Convergence: Shared democratic values underpin cooperation on climate action, maritime security, and UN Security Council reform.
    • Trajectory: The relationship is transitioning from historical ties to a modern, technology-driven alliance, embedded in the emerging multipolar global order.

    India–UK Economic Partnership under CETA:

    1. Framework: The CETA (2025) combines tariff reduction, regulatory alignment, and investment facilitation, aiming to double bilateral trade by 2030.
    2. Benefits for India:
      • Tariff cuts on pharmaceuticals, textiles, and agricultural exports.
      • Enhanced access for IT, green tech, and digital services.
    3. Implications for the UK:
      • Lower duties on automobiles, Scotch whisky, and high-end machinery.
      • Post-Brexit diversification into South Asian markets.
    4. Double Contributions Convention (DCC): Exempts Indian professionals in the UK from dual social security payments for up to three years.
    5. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT): Ensures investor protection and promotes sustainable FDI in manufacturing, renewables, and infrastructure.
    6. Defence Industrial Partnership (2025): Facilitates joint R&D, co-production, and defence manufacturing, aligned with Atmanirbhar Bharat.
    7. Technology Security Initiative (TSI, 2024): Coordinates semiconductors, quantum computing, AI, and critical minerals cooperation at the national security adviser level.

    Parallel European Engagements:

    1. India’s UK outreach complements its broader European diversification strategy:
      • EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA): In effect from October 2025, ensuring USD 100 billion investment over 15 years.
      • EU Negotiations: Trade with the European Union reached USD 136.5 billion (FY 2024–25) with sustained dialogue on an FTA.
    2. This multi-vector diplomacy balances India’s engagement between continental Europe and post-Brexit Britain.
    3. Europe’s emphasis on technological sovereignty, climate neutrality, and Indo-Pacific cooperation aligns with India’s maritime and sustainability interests.
    4. The combined outreach enhances India’s access to capital, innovation, and strategic technologies, consolidating its role as a balancing power in global governance.

    Economic and Strategic Significance:

    1. Complementarity: India offers scale and skilled labour, while the UK contributes technology, capital, and innovation ecosystems.
    2. Co-Development: Collaboration in green energy, fintech, advanced manufacturing, higher education, and sustainable finance.
    3. Geostrategic Convergence:
      • UK’s support for India’s UNSC seat and NSG membership.
      • Joint naval and maritime initiatives under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI).
      • Partnership on Electric Propulsion Capability Initiative in naval systems.
    4. Diaspora Role: The Indian diaspora serves as a connective economic and cultural bridge, amplifying trade and investment flows.
    5. The relationship now transcends transactional trade, emerging as a multi-domain strategic alliance integrating security, sustainability, and innovation.

    Challenges and Negotiation Frictions:

    1. Political Sensitivities: Colonial legacy and diaspora-linked protests periodically affect diplomatic optics.
    2. Negotiation Hurdles: Differences on tariff schedules, rules of origin, and intellectual property.
    3. TRIPS-Plus Provisions: India’s resistance to stronger IP norms preserves its pharmaceutical flexibility.
    4. Immigration and Data Divergences: Require harmonised frameworks for professional mobility and digital governance.
    5. FTA Ratification Delays: Absence of fixed timelines for CETA and BIT create investor uncertainty.

    Despite frictions, both sides perceive these accords as long-term strategic enablers, not mere commercial instruments.

    Conclusion:

    The next phase of engagement should focus on joint innovation, co-production, and sustainability-based partnerships, moving beyond conventional tariff-based frameworks.  Strengthening defence R&D and technology transfer mechanisms will foster greater self-reliance and industrial growth in both nations.

  • India to boost solar pumps scheme in Africa, Island nations

    Why in the News?

    The Union Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) plans to showcase India’s PM-KUSUM and PM Surya Ghar schemes to several African and island nations through the International Solar Alliance (ISA) platform.

    India’s Global Outreach via International Solar Alliance (ISA):

    • Founded: 2015, jointly by India and France, headquartered in Gurugram (Haryana, India).
    • Membership (2025): 98 countries, focused on promoting solar energy deployment in developing and tropical nations.
    • Mandate: Facilitate affordable solar technology, finance mobilization, and policy support to achieve global energy access and climate goals.
    • Strategic Focus Areas (2025):
      • Catalytic Finance Hub: Mobilising global investments in solar infrastructure.
      • Global Capability Centre: Providing technical training, digital tools, and policy frameworks.
      • Technology Roadmap: Driving innovation in floating solar, AI-based grid management, green hydrogen, and One Sun, One World, One Grid (OSOWOG) connectivity.
      • Country Engagement: Strengthening regional partnerships for implementation and capacity-building.
    • Global Showcasing of Indian Models:
      • India plans to export the PM-KUSUM and PM Surya Ghar models to Africa and island nations facing low electrification and irrigation coverage.
      • Only 4% of Africa’s arable land is irrigated, creating a vast opportunity for solar-powered irrigation and energy access.
    • Significance: ISA serves as the primary vehicle for India’s renewable diplomacy, promoting clean energy cooperation, technology transfer, and South–South collaboration for sustainable development.

    Back2Basics:

    [1] PM-KUSUM Scheme:

    • Full Name: Pradhan Mantri Kisan Urja Suraksha evam Utthaan Mahabhiyan (PM-KUSUM) launched in 2019 by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE).
    • Objective: To promote solar energy use in agriculture, enabling farmers to generate clean electricity, replace diesel pumps, and earn additional income through sale of surplus solar power.
    • Targets:
      • Add 34,800 MW of decentralized solar capacity by March 2026.
      • Total outlay of ₹34,422 crore in Central financial assistance.
    • Structure: Three key components –
      1. Component A: 10,000 MW of decentralized grid-connected solar/renewable plants on barren land.
      2. Component B: 14 lakh standalone solar pumps for irrigation.
      3. Component C: Solarization of 35 lakh existing grid-connected pumps (including feeder-level solarisation).
    • Financial Support: Farmers receive 60% subsidy, 30% institutional loan, and contribute 10% cost.
    • Achievements (as of 2025):
      • 70% completion in standalone solar pumps.
      • Limited progress in grid-connected plants (6%) and pump solarization (16–25%).
      • Scheme likely to be extended beyond 2026 due to delayed infrastructure readiness.
    • Benefits: Reduces input costs, ensures energy self-reliance, lowers carbon emissions, and generates sustainable farmer income through surplus power sales.

    [2] PM Surya Ghar Scheme:

    • Full Name: PM Surya Ghar: Muft Bijli Yojana launched in 2025 as a flagship rooftop solar initiative for residential households.
    • Implementing Agency: Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE).
    • Objective: To promote rooftop solar installations for one crore households, especially middle-class and economically weaker sections, providing affordable or free electricity.
    • Budget: ₹75,021 crore for implementation till FY 2026–27.
    • Features:
      • Subsidy up to 40% of total installation cost.
      • Annual household savings of up to ₹18,000 through self-generation.
      • Net metering enables sale of surplus power to the grid.
      • Simplified application via national portal; eligibility limited to one household per residence.
    • Impact: Reduces power bills, promotes decentralized renewable energy generation, and contributes to India’s target of 500 GW non-fossil energy capacity by 2030.
    [UPSC 2016] Consider the following statements:

    1. The International Solar Alliance was launched at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2015.

    2. The Alliance includes all the member countries of the United Nations.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    Options: (a) 1 only* (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

     

  • In a multi-polar West, India’s opportunity

    Introduction

    British PM Keir Starmer’s visit to Mumbai, the new EFTA trade pact, and ongoing EU-India trade talks in Brussels reflect Europe’s growing weight in India’s foreign policy. After years of limited engagement, Europe is emerging as a central partner in Delhi’s strategic calculus, just as the continent itself begins to assert geopolitical autonomy beyond its traditional dependence on the United States.

    This marks a structural transformation in world politics, the emergence of a “multipolar West”, where Europe, North America, and Asia’s democratic powers pursue convergent but independent strategic agendas.

    Historical Background: From Western Unity to Strategic Pluralism:

    • Post-War Western Unity: After World War II, the “West” became synonymous with political unity under US leadership, reinforced through NATO and Cold War alliances against the Soviet bloc.
    • Unipolar Moment after USSR Collapse: The collapse of the USSR in 1991 strengthened this unity, briefly creating a unipolar world centred on US dominance and Western liberal values.
    • Emergence of New Power Centres: As Russia reasserted its power and China rose to global prominence, the old Western consensus began to fracture.
    • India’s Advocacy for Multipolarity: Emerging powers like India called for a multipolar world — initially to balance US hegemony, but increasingly to acknowledge growing diversity within the West itself.

    Shifting Dynamics: The Rise of a Multipolar West

    • Erosion of Transatlantic Dependence: Donald Trump’s “America First” policy disrupted long-standing alliances, forcing Europe and Asia to reconsider their strategic dependence on Washington.
    • Deepening Intra-Western Differences: Differences within the West have widened over Russia, China, trade policy, digital sovereignty, and technological standards.
    • Transactional Nature of US Power: European capitals now recognise that the US may increasingly act as a transactional power — pursuing self-interest rather than collective leadership.
    • Europe’s Strategic Reorientation: In response, Europe is embracing strategic autonomy to reduce vulnerability to shifting US politics and develop independent capacities in defence, technology, and industrial production.

    Europe’s Quest for Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy:

    • Leadership from Paris and Berlin: Leaders like Emmanuel Macron (France) and Olaf Scholz (Germany) are spearheading efforts to build a self-reliant Europe capable of defending its own interests.
    • Institutional Assertion of Autonomy: In her 2025 State of the Union address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared that Europe must “stand on its own feet, economically, technologically, and militarily.”
    • Defence and Security Cooperation: The EU is expanding defence collaboration through joint industrial initiatives and deeper coordination with partners such as the UK, Japan, South Korea, and Canada.
    • Persistent Internal Divides: Despite enduring divides between East and West over Russia, and North and South over fiscal policy Europe’s trajectory is unmistakably toward a more unified and assertive role within a plural Western order.

    India’s Engagement with Europe’s Strategic Evolution:

    • EU–India Partnership Framework: The EU’s Joint Communication on India (September 2025) positions Delhi as a key partner in Europe’s Indo-Pacific and economic diversification strategy.
    • Priority Areas of Cooperation:
      • Trade and Technology: Collaboration in semiconductors, clean energy, and digital infrastructure.
      • Connectivity: Engagement through the Global Gateway initiative, aligning with India’s infrastructure ambitions.
      • Defence and Security: Cooperation on maritime domain awareness and joint naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
      • Political Dialogue: Recognition of differences on Russia, but convergence on multilateralism and democratic resilience.
    • Shift Beyond China-Centric Policy: Europe is moving beyond its earlier China-centric worldview, placing India at the centre of its Indo-Pacific engagement and supply-chain diversification efforts.

    Implications of a Multipolar West for India

    • Expanded Diplomatic Flexibility: A loosely knit Western order provides India with greater strategic freedom to engage multiple Western poles — the US, EU, and UK — without rigid alignment.
    • Opportunity for Issue-Based Coalitions: The new order enables collaboration on shared priorities like climate action, digital governance, and critical technologies.
    • Risks of Fragmentation: However, a fragmented West may weaken collective responses to authoritarian aggression and reduce coherence in global governance.
    • Balancing Opportunity and Stability: India must simultaneously exploit Western pluralism and safeguard against the erosion of strategic stability that could undermine democratic solidarity.

    Way Forward

    • Evolving Maturity in Foreign Policy: India’s diplomacy now shows increasing sophistication — evident in renewed engagement with Europe, balanced ties with the US, Russia, and China, and pragmatic participation in both Western and non-Western coalitions such as the Quad, BRICS, and IPEF.
    • Domestic Readiness as a Constraint: Despite external agility, institutional inertia, slow structural reforms, and uneven economic modernisation continue to limit India’s ability to leverage emerging global openings.
    • Aligning Internal and External Transformation: To fully benefit from a multipolar West, India must synchronise domestic transformation with external ambitions, ensuring that internal capacity and policy agility match the demands of an evolving global order.
    [UPSC 2024] The West is fostering India as an alternative to reduce dependence on China’s supply chain and as a strategic ally to counter China’s political and economic dominance.’ Explain this statement with examples.

     

    Linkage: “Multipolar World” theme involves focusing heavily on India’s strategic responses to new global and regional alliances (e.g., QUAD, AUKUS, I2U2), the shifting economic dominance of powers like China, and the resulting geopolitical instability.

     

  • US-Russia to extend the New START Treaty

    Why in the News?

    U.S. President Donald Trump has indicated a willingness to extend the New START Treaty with Russia by one year, until February 2027, as the treaty is due to expire next February.

    About the New START Treaty:

    • About: New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START); Bilateral nuclear arms control pact between the United States and Russia.
    • Signed: April 8, 2010, in Prague by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev; Came into Force: February 5, 2011.
    • Initial Duration: 10 years, set to  be expired in February 2021; extended by 5 years to February 2026.
    • Proposed Further Extension: To February 2027, as hinted by U.S. President Donald Trump.
    • Objective: Limit and verify the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to ensure predictability and strategic stability between the two nuclear superpowers.
    • Ceilings:
      • 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
      • 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.
      • 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers combined.
    • Verification Regime:
      • Regular on-site inspections.
      • Biannual data exchanges.
      • Notifications of movement or deployment of nuclear assets.
      • Telemetry sharing for missile tests.
    • Administering Authority: U.S. Department of State and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a joint commission.
    • Scope: Applies only to strategic (long-range) nuclear forces, not tactical nuclear weapons.
    • Historical Context:
      • Successor to START I (1991) and START II (1993).
      • Last remaining arms control treaty after the collapse of the INF Treaty (2019) and U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (2001).
    • Significance: Serves as the final legal constraint on the two largest nuclear arsenals, reducing risk of an unconstrained arms race.

    Implications of Extending the New START

    • Maintains Strategic Stability: Retains verifiable limits on the world’s two largest nuclear stockpiles, reducing risk of escalation or miscalculation.
    • Prevents Arms Race: Avoids a strategic vacuum that could lead to rapid weapon modernization and expansion by both nations.
    • Diplomatic Leverage: Provides a diplomatic window for future multilateral disarmament talks, possibly involving China and other nuclear powers.
    • Global Signalling: Reinforces commitment to nuclear restraint and non-proliferation under the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
    • Risks of Non-Extension:
      • Collapse of all bilateral arms control between the U.S. and Russia.
      • Accelerated nuclear modernization programs.
      • Weakened global disarmament norms and potential CTBT irrelevance.

  • Why Trump’s proposed stabilization force in Gaza will not find things easy

    Introduction

    With the Gaza conflict entering its third year, US President Donald Trump’s “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” , a 20-point roadmap, has reignited global discussion on Palestine’s future. While both Israel and Hamas have agreed to an immediate ceasefire and prisoner exchange, the second, more ambitious part, a long-term peace framework and deployment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF), faces deep geopolitical and operational challenges. The ISF, envisioned as a temporary yet long-term internal security mechanism under a “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump, is supposed to oversee “terror-free areas” handed over from Israel’s Defence Forces (IDF). But historical evidence from Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq shows why such an effort may fail before it even begins.

    What is the International Stabilisation Force (ISF)?

    1. Temporary but long-term mechanism: The ISF is designed to act as a “temporary” yet enduring internal security arrangement, forming part of a larger apolitical Palestinian committee.
    2. Trump’s oversight: It would be supervised by a “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump, tasked with ensuring security transition in Gaza.
    3. Mandate confusion: The ISF’s deployment is proposed “immediately” after Israeli Defence Forces withdraw from designated “terror-free zones.”
    4. Not UN-mandated: Unlike traditional UN peacekeeping forces, the ISF would lack international legitimacy and neutrality, as it is not under the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) authorisation.

    Why is the ISF Not Comparable to UN Peacekeeping?

    1. Absence of neutrality: International peacekeeping has always required UN-mandated neutrality; the ISF, dominated by US and allied interests, lacks this legitimacy.
    2. Hostility in the region: Due to Arab hostility towards the US and Israel’s disregard for UN mandates, any non-UN force would face rejection from regional actors.
    3. UN precedent: Since 2004, UNSC resolutions have repeatedly called for peacekeeping only under UN authority, especially within occupied Palestinian territories until a two-state solution is achieved.
    4. Contradiction with global norms: Past experiences, from NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan to multinational forces in Lebanon, show that non-UN interventions invite political opposition and legitimacy crises.

    Why is Implementation Difficult in Palestine?

    1. Israel’s selective compliance: Israel has historically undermined UN peacekeeping mandates (e.g., UNIFIL in Lebanon) and is unlikely to cooperate fully with an externally led force.
    2. Hamas’ rejection of disarmament: Hamas has refused to disarm without Israel’s full withdrawal, a non-negotiable precondition.
    3. Political vacuum: There are no strong Palestinian institutions capable of ensuring political control and governance in post-conflict Gaza.
    4. UNSC resolutions ignored: While resolutions call for a two-state solution and prohibit occupation, Israel’s actions, including settlements and security zones, contravene these commitments.
    5. Lack of Arab consensus: Arab states remain divided on participation in any force seen as legitimising Israeli occupation.

    What Lessons Do Historical Precedents Offer?

    1. Afghanistan (2001–2021): The NATO-led ISAF mission initially succeeded in stabilising Kabul but failed to create self-sustaining security institutions; the Taliban returned to power in 2021.
    2. Lebanon (1982–2000): The Multinational Force (MNF), dominated by the US and UK, withdrew amid heavy local opposition and attacks, transferring responsibility to the UN’s UNIFIL.
    3. Iraq (post-2003): The absence of a UN framework led to severe legitimacy deficits, insurgency, and long-term instability.
    4. These precedents underscore that external interventions without inclusive local ownership often end in strategic failure.

    What Are the Broader Challenges in Trump’s Plan?

    1. Contradictory goals: Trump’s plan envisions Israel’s partial withdrawal but simultaneously retains security control, an inherent contradiction.
    2. Palestinian exclusion: The proposal does not recognise any Palestinian political institutions or grant them meaningful authority.
    3. Legal limitations: Without UNSC authorisation, the ISF would lack the legal basis to operate or enforce peace.
    4. Regional optics: Arab and Islamic states would perceive this as another Western attempt to militarise peace under the guise of “stabilisation.”

    Conclusion

    Trump’s proposed International Stabilisation Force may appear bold on paper, but it suffers from a crisis of legitimacy, political trust, and historical amnesia. Without a UN mandate, regional consensus, or Palestinian participation, the plan risks deepening divisions rather than healing them. As history shows, no external force can impose peace where sovereignty and justice remain unresolved.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] ‘Terrorism has become a significant threat to global peace and security.’ Evaluate the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its associated bodies in addressing and mitigating this threat at the international level.

    Linkage: Trump’s proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF), lacking a UN mandate, underscores the limits of ad-hoc coalitions in tackling terrorism, contrasting with the UNSC-CTC’s institutional approach to coordinated, legitimate counter-terrorism efforts. It highlights the need for UN-backed, multilateral mechanisms over unilateral interventions for sustainable global peace.

  • NATO Pipeline System (NPS)

    Why in the News?

    Poland announced its long-awaited entry into the NATO Pipeline System (NPS) — a strategic move coming 25 years after joining NATO.

    About the NATO Pipeline System (NPS): 

    • Origin: 1950s, Cold War-era logistics backbone, upgraded over decades.
    • Purpose: Ensures continuous supply of aviation fuel, diesel, kerosene & lubricants to NATO forces.
    • Scale: ~10,000 km network across 12 NATO countries; storage ≈ 4.1 million m³.
    • Structure: Connects refineries, depots, airbases, airports & pumping stations.
    • Funding & Oversight: Through NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP); managed by NATO Support & Procurement Agency (NSPA) under the NATO Petroleum Committee.
    • Member Countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Norway and Denmark; Poland will become the 13th member after integration.
    • Main System: Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) – 5,300 km, est. 1958; moves ≈ 12 million m³ fuel/yr.
    • Other Networks: North European, Turkish, Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Norwegian & Danish systems.
    [UPSC 2025] Consider the following countries:

    I. Austria II. Bulgaria III. Croatia IV. Serbia V. Sweden VI. North Macedonia.

    How many of the above are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

    (a) Only three (b) Only four* (c) Only five (d) All the six