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Subject: Judiciary

  • Amid din, LS passes Bill to set up panel to select chiefs and members of tribunals

    Why in the news

    The Lok Sabha passed the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026 by voice vote without debate, creating a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) to select chairpersons and members of various tribunals. The Bill follows the Supreme Court striking down parts of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 for violating separation of powers and judicial independence. It reopens the settled question of who controls tribunal appointments, the executive that the tribunals adjudicate against, or an independent body insulated from it.

    What is the National Tribunals Commission (NTC)?

    1. Purpose: The NTC is a proposed statutory body to conduct the selection of chairpersons and members of tribunals through a single, uniform process. It centralises appointments that were earlier run separately for each tribunal.
    2. Composition: It will have a chairperson and four members, two judicial and two technical. A retired Supreme Court judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court will be eligible to head it.
    3. Seat and scope: It will be headquartered in New Delhi and will prescribe qualifications, selection, appointment, salaries, allowances, tenure, resignation, removal, and other service conditions of tribunal members.
    4. Origin: The Supreme Court itself directed the creation of an independent commission with professional expertise, transparent selection, and an oversight mechanism for appointments.

    What is the current status of tribunal appointments in India?

    1. Statutory basis: Tribunals were introduced through the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976, which added Part XIV-A and Articles 323A and 323B. They function as specialised adjudicatory bodies outside the regular court hierarchy.
    2. Bodies covered by the Bill: The selection process applies to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Armed Forces Tribunal, National Green Tribunal, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.
    3. Rationalisation drive: The Union government began rationalising tribunals in 2015 and Parliament passed the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 to that end. Parts of that Act were struck down by the Supreme Court.
    4. Existing safeguard: Judicial review of tribunal decisions by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 remains, since the Court has held this power to be part of the basic structure.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Tribunals

    1. Article 323A: Empowers Parliament to establish administrative tribunals for service matters of public servants.
    2. Article 323B: Empowers appropriate legislatures to set up tribunals for other matters such as taxation, land reforms, and industrial disputes.
    3. 42nd Amendment, 1976: Inserted Part XIV-A and the two tribunal Articles into the Constitution.
    4. Article 226 and Article 227: Vest High Courts with writ jurisdiction and power of superintendence over tribunals, a check the Supreme Court has ruled cannot be ousted.
    5. Article 136: Retains the Supreme Court’s power to grant special leave to appeal against tribunal orders.
    6. Article 50: Directive Principle requiring separation of the judiciary from the executive, the value the appointment dispute turns on.

    Why did the Supreme Court strike down parts of the 2021 Act?

    1. Separation of powers: The Court held that several provisions were contrary to separation of powers, as they gave the executive dominant control over appointments to bodies that adjudicate against the executive.
    2. Judicial independence: Provisions were found to undermine the independence of tribunal members whose tenure and removal the executive influenced.
    3. Conflict with precedent: The provisions were inconsistent with earlier judgments laying down standards for the appointment, tenure, and functioning of tribunal members.
    4. Short tenures and search committees: Earlier versions prescribed a four-year term and search-cum-selection committees weighted towards government nominees, which the Court repeatedly rejected as diluting judicial character.

    How does the Bill respond to the Court’s concerns?

    1. Uniform process: The Law Minister stated the Bill brings uniformity to selection and appointment and improves efficiency, transparency, and independence.
    2. Judicial presence: A retired Supreme Court judge or retired High Court Chief Justice heading the commission answers the Court’s demand for professional and judicial expertise in selection.
    3. No jurisdictional change: The Minister clarified the legislation does not alter the jurisdiction of any tribunal, keeping the substantive powers of each body intact.
    4. Institutional oversight: A permanent commission replaces ad hoc, tribunal-by-tribunal appointment machinery, matching the oversight mechanism the Court directed.

    Major debates surrounding tribunalisation in India

    1. Curtailment of ordinary courts: Tribunals divert cases from High Courts, raising the concern that they curtail the jurisdiction and constitutional role of the regular judiciary.
    2. Executive control versus independence: The core dispute is whether the government, a frequent litigant before tribunals, should dominate the appointment and service conditions of members who judge it.
    3. Effectiveness versus multiplicity: Tribunals were meant to reduce pendency, yet vacancies, poor infrastructure, and appeals routed back to constitutional courts have blunted that promise.
    4. Competing rulings: The line of Madras Bar Association cases and Rojer Mathew (2019) repeatedly set standards on tenure and composition that successive laws failed to meet, driving the current Bill.
    5. Access to justice: Whether specialised, low-cost adjudication genuinely widens access, or whether weak tribunals leave litigants worse off than in ordinary courts.

    Challenges to the National Tribunals Commission

    1. Composition balance: Two technical members alongside two judicial members can still tilt selection towards executive preference if the technical members are serving or retired bureaucrats.
    2. Vacancy backlog: A new selection body does not by itself clear the large pending vacancies that have crippled tribunals such as the National Green Tribunal and Debt Recovery Tribunals.
    3. Infrastructure and funding: Tribunals depend on the parent ministry for premises, staff, and budget, which the commission does not address.
    4. Fresh litigation risk: Any residual executive dominance in the composition invites another round of constitutional challenge, extending the cycle of struck-down laws.
    5. Uniformity versus specialisation: A single commission for bodies as varied as the Armed Forces Tribunal and the consumer commission may struggle to weigh domain-specific expertise.
    6. Independence of secretariat: Day-to-day functioning still routes through executive-controlled staff, which can dilute the intended insulation.

    Conclusion

    The central question is not whether tribunals should exist but who controls the people who staff them, since executive dominance over appointments compromises the independence that specialised adjudication requires. The 2026 Bill responds to the Supreme Court’s direction by creating a judicially headed National Tribunals Commission with a uniform process. Its success depends on whether the composition genuinely insulates members from the executive they adjudicate against, and on whether vacancies and infrastructure gaps are addressed alongside the appointment reform.

    What is the Separation of Powers Doctrine?

    1. About: It is the principle that legislative, executive, and judicial functions are distributed among distinct organs so that no single organ concentrates power.
    2. Rationale: It exists to prevent tyranny and protect liberty through mutual checks, and in India it underpins judicial independence as part of the basic structure.
    3. Indian form: India follows a functional, not rigid, separation, with checks and balances rather than watertight compartments, reinforced by Article 50 and judicial review.

    Key Concerns Regarding Separation of Powers in India

    1. Executive encroachment on judiciary: Control over appointments, tenure, and funding of tribunals lets the executive influence bodies meant to be independent.
    2. Delegated legislation: Wide rule-making powers transfer effective law-making to the executive with limited legislative scrutiny.
    3. Judicial overreach: Expansive judicial activism blurs the line between adjudication and policy-making.
    4. Appointment tussles: Recurring friction between the executive and judiciary over the collegium and tribunal selections reflects an unsettled balance.

    Statutory Framework Governing Tribunals

    1. Article 323A: Basis for administrative tribunals in service matters.
    2. Article 323B: Basis for tribunals in taxation, land reforms, and other listed matters.
    3. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: Established the Central Administrative Tribunal and State Administrative Tribunals.
    4. Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021: Rationalised tribunals and set service conditions, parts of which the Supreme Court struck down.
    5. Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026: Proposes the National Tribunals Commission and repeals the 2021 Act once enacted.

    Back2Basics: Landmark rulings on tribunals

    1. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997): Held that judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 is part of the basic structure and cannot be excluded; tribunals are supplementary, not substitutes, for courts.
    2. Union of India v. R. Gandhi (Madras Bar Association, 2010): Laid down that tribunal members must have judicial character and that executive dominance in selection is unconstitutional.
    3. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019): Struck down rules on tribunal appointments and service conditions for compromising independence.
    4. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021): Reaffirmed minimum tenure and search committee composition standards, directly shaping the 2026 Bill.

    Way Forward

    1. Insulated composition: Weight the selection body towards judicial members and independent experts rather than serving bureaucrats.
    2. Fill vacancies promptly: Use the commission to clear the standing backlog of member vacancies across tribunals on a time-bound basis.
    3. Single nodal ministry: Route tribunal administration and funding through a single, arm’s-length authority to end dependence on the litigating ministry.
    4. Fixed tenure and security: Guarantee tenure, salary, and removal protections consistent with the Supreme Court’s standards to prevent renewed litigation.
    5. Periodic performance audit: Institute an independent review of tribunal pendency, disposal, and infrastructure to keep them a genuine complement to courts.

    “[2018, GS2, 15 marks] How far do you agree with the view that tribunals curtail the jurisdiction of ordinary courts? In view of the above, discuss the constitutional validity and competency of the tribunals in India.”

  • Lok Sabha clears Bankers’ Books Evidence Bill, 2026

    Why in the News

    The Lok Sabha has cleared the Bankers’ Books Evidence Bill, 2026, replacing the colonial Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891. It modernises how bank records are admitted as evidence in court, amid data-privacy concerns.

    What does the Bill change?

    1. Digital records: It recognises electronic and digital bank records as admissible evidence, aligning with modern banking.
    2. Officer powers: It empowers a senior-rank officer to certify records and use hash values to verify integrity.

    Why do concerns remain?

    1. Data privacy: Wider access to digital bank records raises questions on safeguards for customer financial data.
    2. Certification standards: The reliability of hash-based verification depends on tamper-proof audit trails.
    3. Overlap with new codes: The Bill must sit consistently with the recently enacted evidence and criminal law framework.

    Conclusion

    The Bill updates a 19th-century evidence law for a digital banking era. The next milestone is Rajya Sabha clearance and rules on data safeguards.

  • Rajya Sabha passes the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 as a Money Bill

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026, increasing the sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court through the Money Bill route, triggering debate over the constitutional validity of bypassing the Rajya Sabha.

    What is a Money Bill?

    • Constitutional basis: Defined under Article 110 of the Constitution.
    • Scope: A Bill is a Money Bill only if it deals exclusively with matters such as:
      • Taxation, Government borrowing, Custody or withdrawal of money from the Consolidated Fund of India, Contingency Fun, and Appropriation of public money
    • Speaker’s certification: The Speaker of the Lok Sabha decides whether a Bill is a Money Bill, and the certification is endorsed on the Bill.
    • Limited role of Rajya Sabha: The Rajya Sabha can only recommend amendments within 14 days, which the Lok Sabha may accept or reject.

    What does the Bill provide?

    • Higher judicial strength: Increases the sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court from 34 to 38 judges, including the Chief Justice of India (CJI).
    • Replaces an Ordinance: Substitutes the Ordinance promulgated in May 2026.
    • Government’s objective: Reduce case pendency, improve judicial efficiency, and strengthen access to justice.

    Why is the Money Bill route controversial?

    • Constitutional issue pending: The validity of certifying certain laws as Money Bills is under consideration by a larger Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.
    • Concern over precedent: In the Aadhaar judgment (2018), the dissenting opinion described the use of the Money Bill route for substantive legislation as a “fraud on the Constitution.”
    • Reduced parliamentary scrutiny: Since the Rajya Sabha has only an advisory role, critics argue that the route weakens bicameral legislative oversight.

    “[2014] The power to increase the number of judges in the Supreme Court of India is vested in?
    (a) The President of India.
    (b) The Parliament.
    (c) The Chief Justice of India.
    (d) The Law Commission.

  • Supreme Court extends mandatory third party motor insurance and floats a no-insurance, no fuel pilot

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court extended mandatory Third-Party Motor Insurance to 4 years for new cars and 6 years for new two-wheelers. It also proposed a “No Insurance, No Fuel” pilot to improve compliance.

    What is Third-Party Motor Insurance?

    • Mandatory under Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
    • Covers compensation for injury, death, or property damage caused to a third party.
    • Does not cover damage to the insured vehicle or owner.

    Supreme Court Directions

    • Mandatory third-party cover:
      • 4 years for new cars.
      • 6 years for new two-wheelers.
    • Link Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras with:
      • Insurance Information Bureau of India (IIB)
      • VAHAN portal.
    • Enable police to verify insurance in real time through mobile applications.
    • Explore a “No Insurance, No Fuel” pilot.

    Why is Enforcement Needed?

    • Around 56% of vehicles reportedly operate without valid third-party insurance.
    • Victims face delays in compensation.
    • Insurance often lapses after the initial mandatory period.

    Challenges

    • Lack of integration among IIB, VAHAN, and police databases.
    • Low renewal rates, especially for two-wheelers.
    • Concerns over denying fuel as an essential service.
    • Weak penalties and limited rural enforcement.

    Comprehensive vs Third-Party Insurance

    • Third-Party Insurance: Mandatory; covers third-party losses only.
    • Comprehensive Insurance: Optional; covers both third-party liability and damage to the insured vehicle.

    Key Platforms

    • VAHAN: National vehicle registration database managed by Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH).
    • ANPR: Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology for vehicle identification.
    • IIB: Insurance Information Bureau of India, maintains insurance-related databases.

    Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI)

    • Established under: Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999.
    • Headquarters: Hyderabad.
    • Functions: Regulates insurance companies and intermediaries. Protects policyholders’ interests. Prescribes solvency, pricing, and disclosure norms.

  • Lok Sabha passes the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill 2026

    Why in the news?

    The Lok Sabha passed the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026, increasing the sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court of India from 34 to 38 judges (including the Chief Justice of India (CJI)) to address rising case pendency.

    Key Provisions

    • Increased Strength: Raises the sanctioned strength from 34 to 38 judges.
    • Replaces Ordinance: Converts the earlier ordinance into permanent law.
    • Objective: Improve disposal of cases and reduce judicial backlog.

    Constitutional Basis

    • Article 124: Empowers Parliament to determine the number of Supreme Court judges by law.
    • Governing Law: Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956.

    Why is the Amendment Needed?

    • Over 92,000 cases were pending in the Supreme Court (as of 1 January 2026).
    • Growing gap between institution and disposal of cases.
    • Increasing litigation has added pressure on the Court.

    Challenges

    • Sanctioned posts must be filled promptly.
    • Delays in the Collegium appointment process.
    • More judges require additional infrastructure and staff.
    • Procedural delays and frequent adjournments remain unresolved.

    Back2Basics

    • Article 124: Establishes the Supreme Court and empowers Parliament to fix its strength.
    • Original Strength (1950): Chief Justice + 7 judges.
    • Appointment: By the President of India under the Collegium System.
    • Retirement Age: 65 years.
    • Evolution: Three Judges Cases
      • First Judges Case (1981): Executive had primacy in appointments.
      • Second Judges Case (1993): Introduced the Collegium System; judiciary gained primacy.
      • Third Judges Case (1998): Expanded the Collegium to the CJI plus four senior-most Supreme Court judges.

    [2014] The power to increase the number of judges in the Supreme Court of India is vested in?

    (a) The President of India

    (b) The Parliament

    (c) The Chief Justice of India

    (d) The Law Commission

  • How should cities reclaim footpaths?

    Why in the News?

    Following the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to walk on safe, obstruction-free footpaths as a Fundamental Right, Bengaluru Development Minister directed a 10-day “Safe Footpath” drive across the five corporations under the Greater Bengaluru Authority, removing thousands of street vendors from pavements. The drive enforced the pedestrian right the court recognised but bypassed the process the Street Vendors Act, 2014 requires before vendors can be removed, exposing a gap between enforcing one right and protecting another.

    Why was the Street Vendors Act, 2014 enacted?

    1. Vending recognised as legitimate occupation: The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that street vending is a legitimate occupation protected under Article 19 of the Constitution, regulable in the public interest but not prohibitable outright.
    2. Response to arbitrary evictions: Municipal bodies and police had a recurring pattern of evicting vendors without notice, reducing years of livelihood to rubble overnight, which the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 was enacted to end.
    3. Not an anti-encroachment law: The Act does not give vendors an unrestricted right over public space, nor does it function as an anti-encroachment statute.
    4. Balancing two rights: It balances the public’s right to safe, obstruction-free footpaths against a vendor’s right to livelihood, laying down who can vend, where they can vend, and when they can be removed or relocated.

    What process must cities follow before removing vendors?

    1. Town Vending Committee (TVC): Every city must constitute a TVC comprising officials, police, planning authorities, resident representatives and street vendors, who must hold at least 40% of the seats, with representation for women and other marginalised communities.
    2. Survey requirement: Once constituted, the TVC must survey all existing vendors before authorities decide who can continue vending and under what conditions.
    3. Protection during the process: No vendor can be evicted or relocated until the survey is completed and Certificates of Vending are issued.
    4. Certificate of Vending: The certificate gives official permission to vend at a specified location under specified conditions and confers no ownership over public land.
    5. Removal remains conditional, not barred: The Act does not prohibit the removal of vendors; it only requires that removal follow this sequence.

    Why has Bengaluru’s drive come under scrutiny?

    1. No Town Vending Committee in place: Bengaluru’s corporations began removing vendors before constituting a TVC, the body the Act requires to identify vending and no-vending zones.
    2. Relocation promised only after the fact: Karnataka Chief Minister promised relocation only after the drive had already removed vendors.
    3. Sequence reversed: The government acted on the Supreme Court’s recognition of the pedestrian’s right to walk without first completing the survey and certification process the Street Vendors Act requires.
    4. Foundation of the law is balance: The Act’s foundation is the balance between the two rights, not the primacy of one over the other.

    Conclusion

    The Street Vendors Act, 2014, requires cities to constitute a Town Vending Committee, survey existing vendors and issue Certificates of Vending before removal or relocation, precisely to prevent the arbitrary evictions that predate the law. Bengaluru’s drive enforced the Supreme Court’s recognition of the pedestrian’s right to walk without first completing this sequence, showing that reclaiming footpaths lawfully requires following the Act’s process rather than invoking one right to bypass the other.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] “The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.” Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the effectiveness of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in urban governance, particularly their institutional capacity, devolution of powers, and ability to manage public spaces and civic services. The article highlights that effective implementation of the Street Vendors Act, 2014 depends on empowered municipal institutions such as Town Vending Committees (TVCs). Bengaluru’s failure to constitute a TVC before undertaking evictions reflects the governance and institutional weaknesses of ULBs

  • Fast-track courts: When they can be established, where they lag

    Why in the News

    Indian Prime Minister assured to set up fast-track courts (FTCs) to try exam paper-leak cases, announced after protests by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) at Jantar Mantar. A draft Bill on paper leaks was taken to Cabinet on Friday, but existing fast-track courts show that speed depends on constitutional limits, infrastructure and investigation quality.

    What are fast-track courts, and what legal basis funds them?

    1. No single governing law: There is no central legislation that governs fast-track courts as a category.
    2. 14th Finance Commission origin: The 14th Finance Commission (2015-2020) recommended FTCs to expedite trials of heinous crimes such as murder, kidnapping and property disputes pending over five years, and for cases involving vulnerable groups such as women and children.
    3. 2019 fast-track special courts (FTSCs) scheme: In 2019, following a Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 and a Supreme Court directive, the Union Government launched a centrally sponsored scheme for fast-track special courts (FTSCs), funded partly by the Nirbhaya Fund, exclusively for rape cases and offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. (Nirbhaya Fund: Following the Nirbhaya case of 16th December, 2012, the Government has set up a dedicated fund , Nirbhaya Fund, which can be utilized for projects specifically designed to improve the safety and security of women. It is a non-lapsable corpus fund, being administered by Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Women and Child Development (M/o WCD) is the nodal Ministry to appraise/recommend proposals and Schemes to be funded under Nirbhaya Fund.)

    Can a Special Court be created for a single case?

    1. Article 14: Creation of special courts must satisfy the Right to Equality under Article 14.
    2. Anwar Ali Sarkar precedent: In State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), the Supreme Court struck down a law letting the government arbitrarily pick cases for special courts for the “object of speedier trial” alone, calling “speed” too vague a criterion.
    3. Reasonable Classification: Cases assigned to special courts must be based on an objective and rational classification, such as the nature of the offence or vulnerability of victims.
    4. A precedent for public-demand cases: The Supreme Court directed the Centre to establish a special court for the 2G case to ensure a day-to-day trial, even amid public demand.
    5. NEET’s uncertain path: It remains to be seen whether the NEET case, being heard in a Delhi court, will be sent to a special court by the government or through a court order.

    How quickly are Fast-Track Courts expected to dispose of cases?

    1. No statutory deadline: There is no fixed legal time limit for completing trials.
    2. Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) recommended timelines: Recommends completing criminal trials within two years and sexual offence trials within two months.
    3. FTSC Performance Target: Each Fast-Track Special Court (FTSC) is expected to dispose of 41-42 cases per quarter or at least 165 cases annually.
    4. No judicially prescribed outer limit: In P. Rama Chandra Rao vs State of Karnataka (2002), a seven-judge Constitution Bench ruled it is “neither advisable or feasible, nor judicially permissible” to prescribe an outer limit for concluding all criminal proceedings.

    What do current Fast-Track Court statistics show?

    1. Current strength: As of January, 862 regular FTCs were functioning across 21 states and Union Territories, alongside 774 FTSCs, including 398 exclusive POCSO courts, across 29 states and UTs.
    2. Disposal rates: The disposal rate for special courts stands around 96%, with an FTSC disposing of about 9.5 cases a month compared with 3.3 cases by a regular trial court of similar jurisdiction.
    3. Persistent pendency: More than 2.4 lakh cases remained pending in FTSCs by the end of 2023.
    4. Government’s own explanation: A 2026 Lok Sabha reply from the Ministry of Law and Justice attributed disposal delays to factors including physical infrastructure availability, quality of investigation, and cooperation of the bar, investigation agencies and forensic support.

    Will Fast-Track Courts solve the paper leak problem?

    1. Poor Conviction Record: Out of 45 major exam paper leaks (2002-2025) involving at least one lakh candidates, only two cases resulted in convictions.
    2. Investigation is the Real Bottleneck: Weak investigations and the absence of stringent bail provisions remain the major challenges.
    3. Limited Impact: Experts argue that FTCs alone cannot solve issues such as judicial vacancies, heavy case pendency, and procedural delays.
    4. Mixed Performance: FTSCs have shown limited success in POCSO and Indian Penal Code (IPC) cases because of heavy caseloads, while performing relatively better in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

    Conclusion

    Fast-track courts can expedite trials only within the constitutional limits set in Anwar Ali Sarkar case(1952) and cases must rest on a rational classification, not speed or public demand alone. Even then, the FTSC record shows disposal depends on infrastructure and investigative quality that a court’s “fast-track” label does not create. With 2.4 lakh cases still pending in FTSCs and only two convictions among 45 major exam leaks since 2002, the paper-leak Bill will resolve little unless it also addresses investigation quality and bail conditions.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the legal and institutional framework for ensuring the integrity of public examinations. The article builds directly on this theme by evaluating whether fast-track courts can effectively enforce accountability under the proposed paper-leak framework.

  • A Checklist for a New-Age Courtroom

    Why in the News:

    The Supreme Court released Draft Regulations on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Judiciary in June 2026 for public consultation. While the draft establishes several AI governance committees, it leaves key questions regarding institutional design, accountability, and AI standards unresolved before AI systems are deployed in courts.

    Why do successive waves of court technology each create new oversight committees, and why is that a concern?

    1. Committee proliferation: Every phase of judicial technology reform has created new committees. AI governance now proposes an Apex AI Body, five Standing Committees, High Court AI Committees, District AI Secretariats, and a Centre of Research and Excellence on AI (CoRE-AI).
    2. Fragmented accountability: AI applications such as case scheduling simultaneously involve case management, digital infrastructure, court administration, and AI governance. Multiple committees dilute ownership, coordination, and decision making.

    What institutional design would address this challenge, and what are the Indian precedents?

    1. Need for a permanent institution: Instead of creating separate committees for every technological innovation, the judiciary requires one permanent technology institution that integrates the functions of the existing e-Committee, AI governance, and future digital initiatives.
    2. Precedent – Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation (TNMSC): TNMSC institutionalised professional procurement of medicines, becoming a model adopted by several states.
    3. Precedent – Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI): UIDAI serves as a permanent institution responsible for developing and maintaining the Aadhaar ecosystem.
    4. Importance of permanence: Long term technology governance requires institutional continuity, technical expertise, and clear accountability, which rotating committees cannot consistently provide.

    Why should AI standard setting be separated from procurement?

    1. UPI model: The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) developed the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) standards, while private companies such as PhonePe and Google Pay built competing applications based on those standards.
    2. Role of CoRE-AI: The proposed Centre of Research and Excellence on AI (CoRE-AI) should function as a neutral standard setting body, without financial or commercial interests in selecting AI vendors.
    3. Separation of functions: A sound governance framework requires:
      • A permanent technical institution to develop AI standards.
      • A separate procurement authority to acquire AI systems.
      • A judicial oversight committee to approve AI applications for court use.

    What happens if AI standards remain undefined?

    1. Key unanswered questions: The draft regulations do not specify:
      • Explainability requirements for AI decisions.
      • Acceptable error rates for different judicial functions such as bail decisions versus case scheduling.
      • Standards governing training data, transparency, and validation.
    2. Risk of inconsistent implementation: Without common national standards, each of India’s 25 High Courts may independently determine what constitutes an acceptable AI system, resulting in uneven adoption and inconsistent judicial practices.
    3. Regulatory comparison: Just as pharmaceutical products must comply with uniform quality standards before approval, judicial AI requires national technical standards to ensure reliability, fairness, and public trust.

    Conclusion:

    The Supreme Court’s Draft AI Regulations represent an important step towards integrating Artificial Intelligence into India’s judicial system. However, effective implementation requires a permanent institutional framework, a clear separation between standard setting and procurement, and uniform national AI standards. Without these safeguards, differences in technical capacity across High Courts could result in unequal AI governance and inconsistent standards of justice, undermining the objective of technology enabled judicial reform.

  • Is Yashwant Varma still a judge?

    Why in the News?

    Parliament is set to take up, in the Monsoon Session, the report of the Judges (Inquiry) Act committee that investigated misbehaviour charges against former judge Yashwant Varma, who resigned in April 2026 after burnt currency notes were found at his residence. Three months later, he is still listed as a sitting judge by the Allahabad High Court and the Union Department of Justice, exposing a gap between judicial independence and judicial accountability.

    Why does the Constitution let judges resign without anyone’s acceptance?

    1. Resign at will power: Thirteen constitutional functionaries, including Supreme Court and High Court judges, may resign merely by writing to the specified authority, with no acceptance required.
    2. Contrast with legislators: Article 101(3)(b) and Article 190(3)(b) make resignation of MPs and MLAs subject to acceptance by the Speaker or Chairman, unlike judges.
    3. Judicial precedent: A five judge Constitution Bench in Union of India vs Gopal Chandra Misra (1978) unanimously held that a judge’s resignation takes effect ex proprio vigore, automatically, without needing acceptance.
    4. Purpose: The power shields judges from being coerced to continue in office, protecting judicial independence.
    5. Track record: At least 12 High Court judges have resigned since 2017, and one Supreme Court judge, Justice Dalveer Bhandari, resigned in 2012; these resignations were reportedly handled in compliance with the law.

    Is Varma still officially a judge on paper?

    1. Legal status: Varma ceased to be a judge on April 9, 2026, making any later listing of him as a sitting judge incorrect.
    2. Administrative lapse: The Allahabad High Court and the Department of Justice have continued to list him as a sitting judge for over three months.
    3. Bar record: His status at the Bar was reportedly changed to “active” and some dues and benefits as a sitting judge have reportedly stopped, showing the system elsewhere treats him as having exited office.
    4. Correction needed: It would be illegal for him to draw any salary or benefit as a sitting judge, and his name should be deleted from official lists.

    Does judicial accountability survive when the judge quits before removal?

    1. Statutory duty: The report concerns Varma’s conduct before resignation, so it must still be laid before both Houses and made public under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
    2. Public interest: Citizens have a legitimate right to know whether the committee found proven misbehaviour against a judge of a constitutional court.
    3. If exonerated: If the report finds no misbehaviour, the matter ends there.
    4. If found guilty: The removal motion can no longer be moved because Varma no longer holds the office he would be removed from.
    5. Procedural gap: Under Section 6, the report is to be discussed together with the removal motion; since the motion lapses, the report itself cannot be discussed by Parliament under the Act.

    Can the resignation loophole be closed without amending the Constitution?

    1. Nature of the gap: Judges may resign at will before Parliament even takes up the removal motion, halting the entire accountability process.
    2. Preferred fix: The loophole should be closed through constitutional amendment, not executive or judicial reinterpretation.
    3. Design of fix: The amendment could make a judge’s resignation subject to acceptance during the pendency of removal proceedings.
    4. Who accepts: To protect judicial independence, that acceptance power should vest in the Chief Justice of India, not the President.
    5. Separate remedy for debate: If Parliament wants to discuss the report despite resignation, the 1968 Act itself would need to be amended to enable this.
    6. Rule of law caution: Interpreting constitutional or statutory silences to suit Parliament’s or the executive’s convenience would be against the rule of law.

    Conclusion:

    The resign at will power, designed to protect judicial independence, can be exploited to halt removal proceedings once they are underway, leaving accountability incomplete even when misconduct is established. Varma’s continued listing as a sitting judge is a correctable administrative error, but the deeper gap is structural: the Inquiry Committee report must still be tabled even though the removal motion has lapsed. Closing this requires a constitutional amendment vesting the CJI, not the President, with the power to accept a judge’s resignation while removal proceedings are pending

  • Can Courts Restrain a Film Cleared by the CBFC?

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court declined to permit the release of the CBFC-certified animated film Mahaprabhu Jagannath on its scheduled date, directing the producer to postpone release until after the Rath Yatra in Puri concludes, following an Orissa High Court stay over the film’s depiction of Lord Jagannath. The episode brings into focus the tension between the settled judicial position that certification by an expert statutory body carries a strong presumption of validity immune from apprehensions of public disorder, and the recurring judicial practice of restraining certified films precisely on such grounds.

    What triggered the dispute, and what exactly did the Supreme Court decide?

    1. Origin of the restraint: The Orissa High Court, on July 15, stayed the film’s release over concerns about its depiction of Lord Jagannath and the possible impact of screening it during the Rath Yatra.
    2. Nature of the Supreme Court’s order: The Court did not permit release on the original date. It also did not uphold an indefinite restraint. It directed postponement until after July 27, when the Rath Yatra concludes.
    3. Scope of challenge: The producer contested the High Court’s power to restrain a certified film, and the extent to which such restraint can rest on apprehensions of public disorder rather than an actual legal violation.
    4. High Court’s stated reasoning: The film’s depiction of Lord Jagannath’s childhood and adventures was held “not in tune with the religious texts,” and its release during the Rath Yatra was called “counterproductive.”
    5. Certification status of the film: The film held three separate ‘U’ (universal) certificates from the CBFC for its Hindi, Telugu, and Odia versions, dated May, June, and July respectively.
    6. Territorial overreach in the stay: The restraint stalled the certified Hindi and Telugu versions even in states “where no cause of action existed and no relief was ever sought.

    Why does CBFC certification carry a strong presumption of validity against restraint by apprehension of disorder?

    1. Petitioner’s core argument: Once an expert statutory body certifies a film for unrestricted public exhibition, there is a strong legal presumption of validity. Courts should not substitute their own view for the CBFC’s expert judgment based on unverified apprehensions.
    2. Union of India v K M Shankarappa (2000): The Supreme Court struck down a provision letting the government revise a tribunal’s decision on a certified film. It held that once an expert statutory body certifies a film, that decision cannot be revisited by the executive on the grounds of objections or apprehensions about public reaction.
    3. Allocation of responsibility for law and order: The Court in Shankarappa held that once an expert body clears a film, apprehension of a law-and-order situation is no excuse to restrain it. Maintaining law and order is the concerned state government’s responsibility, not a ground to withhold the certified film.
    4. S Rangarajan v P Jagjivan Ram (1989): The Supreme Court held that if a film is otherwise unobjectionable under Article 19(2), freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threatened demonstrations, processions, or violence.
    5. The anti-heckler’s-veto principle: Yielding to such threats amounts to a “negation of the rule of law.” The state cannot plead inability to handle a hostile audience; it has an obligatory duty to prevent disruption and protect the freedom of expression. Heckler’s veto, suppression of lawful expression to avoid a violent or disruptive reaction from its opponents, rather than because the expression itself is unlawful.

    Does the outcome in this case match the doctrine it invokes, or does it concede ground to the apprehension the doctrine forbids?

    1. Re-adjudication of content already cleared: The High Court’s finding that the depiction was “not in tune with the religious texts” evaluates content on the same grounds the CBFC had already cleared, which the Shankarappa doctrine holds courts should not revisit.
    2. A calibrated restraint, not a vacated one: The Supreme Court did not fully restore the certified release. It replaced an indefinite block with a postponement timed to the Rath Yatra, a decision still shaped by public-sensitivity considerations rather than a finding of unlawful certification.
    3. Restraint exceeding the specific dispute: The stay affected certified versions in states where no cause of action existed and no relief was sought, extending the restraint beyond what the underlying grievance covered.
    4. Net effect on the doctrine: The anti-heckler’s-veto principle is reaffirmed in language but diluted in practice. This is because the timing of a certified film’s release is still being shaped by apprehension of disruption during a religious event.

    Is certification actually beyond interference, or does the law retain other levers over a cleared film?

    1. Certification is not immune from judicial scrutiny: Courts retain the power to examine whether certification was granted in accordance with law, including whether the CBFC relied on statutory grounds, issued reasons, or followed fair procedure.
    2. Deference is conditional: Where the CBFC acts within the framework of the Cinematograph Act, courts usually defer to it. This deference is tied to lawful process, not to certification as such.
    3. Executive power to suspend or revoke: Under the Cinematograph Act, the government may suspend or revoke a certification even after approval.
    4. Power to restrict without prior hearing: The government may, in some cases, temporarily restrict a certified film’s screening without a prior hearing.
    5. Enforcement mechanisms beyond certification: The Act allows criminal liability for violations, and authorities are empowered to enter theatres and seize materials.

    Conclusion

    The doctrine from Shankarappa and Rangarajan holds that CBFC certification is final, and that neither the executive nor the courts may let apprehension of public disorder override a cleared film’s freedom of expression. In practice, both the Orissa High Court’s stay and the Supreme Court’s own decision to postpone release until after the Rath Yatra show that religious and public-order sensitivities continue to shape when and how a certified film is actually screened. Certification functions as a strong but not absolute shield: courts retain review over the legality of the certification process. Also, the executive retains statutory power to suspend, revoke, or temporarily restrict a cleared film. The unresolved question is where deference to apprehension, which the doctrine forbids, ends and legitimate statutory or procedural oversight, which the doctrine permits, begins.