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Subject: Polity

  • Mythmaking and Article 370

    The articles talk about various myths that have been building around the issues of Jammu and Kashmir. Not only does these myths affect the political outlook towards the state but is also responsible for people’s perspective on this whole story. Go on and read to understand further..

    The myths

    Kashmir has been a favourite site of our national mythmaking; myths that have over the years assumed larger-than-life manifestations in our collective psyche.

    #Myth1

    • Article 370 is considered as the root cause of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • But there is a little material basis to it — neither Article 370 can be considered as responsible for terrorism in the Valley nor has its removal ensured a reduction in terrorism.

    #Myth2

    • Article 370 is also held responsible for ruining J&K, stalling its development, preventing proper health care and blocking industries. Once again, these arguments also lack merit and evidence.
    • J&K, as a matter of fact, has been doing much better than most other Indian States and one of the reasons for this was the land reforms carried out in the State in the early 1950s which was possible precisely because of the presence of Article 370.
    • Also, private investors do not set up shop in Kashmir due to militancy which is a product of an existing conflict; not because of Articles 370 or 35A.

    #Myth3

    • If J&K is doing better than the other Indian States, it is because of the massive amounts of funds provided by New Delhi.
    • The real argument here is not whether Kashmir received funding from New Delhi but massive funding as it is often made out to be.
    • Funds from the center can be divided as:
    • Funds to take care of J&K government’s revenue deficit: J&K, for historical reasons, has had a bloated bureaucracy in comparison to other States and their salaries and pensions have been financed by the central government. But these funds do little for the State’s economy or the general population.
    • Then there are routine transfers of funds from the Centre to J&K just as transfers take place from New Delhi to other States.
    • Finally, J&K also received funds due to its special category State status which again is a case with several other Indian States.
    • Put differently, J&K’s better performance in comparison to most other Indian States is at least partly because of Article 370, and its well-being is not necessarily a result of New Delhi’s economic packages.

    #Myth4

    • Development can defeat militancy and insurgency.
    • The reality is that development may not lead to the pacification of the conflict in Kashmir.
    • The Kashmir conflict is a function of complex historical grievances, politico-ethnic demands, increasing religious radicalisation, and Pakistan’s unrelenting interference in the Kashmir Valley.
    • It would be simplistic to imagine that such a multi-layered and complex conflict can be resolved by development alone.
    The deep impact of mythmaking
    • Changed the way how common people understand and treat Kashmir and Kashmiris.
    • Ideas like “Kashmir needs to be reunited with the rest of India” have become a powerful claim made by such representations and political articulations.
    • Yet another popular perception about ‘Kashmiris as troublemakers and sympathisers of terror’ has led to a noticeable increase in the mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims in the rest of the country.
    Conclusion

    The way forward here is not in celebrating the scrapping of Article 370. It lies in critically examining various outcomes of this process. It is essential that New Delhi work the local people and leaders to reduce the trust and legitimacy deficit that we see today.

  • Explained: What is Contempt of Court?

    Contempt of court, as a concept is back in the news after the proceeding by the Supreme Court of India, on its own motion, against a senior Delhi-based advocate-activist.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q.What is Contempt of Court? Discuss, how free speech can lead to the contempt of courts?

    What is Contempt of Court?

    • It seeks to protect judicial institutions from motivated attacks and unwarranted criticism, and as a legal mechanism to punish those who lower its authority.

    How did the concept of contempt come into being?

    • The concept of contempt of court is several centuries old.
    • In England, it is a common law principle that seeks to protect the judicial power of the king, initially exercised by him, and later by a panel of judges who acted in his name.
    • Violation of the judges’ orders was considered an affront to the king himself.
    • Over time, any kind of disobedience to judges, or obstruction of the implementation of their directives, or comments and actions that showed disrespect towards them came to be punishable.

    What is the statutory basis for contempt of court?

    • There were pre-Independence laws of contempt in India. Besides the early High Courts, the courts of some princely states also had such laws.
    • When the Constitution was adopted, contempt of court was made one of the restrictions on freedom of speech and expression.
    • Separately, Article 129 of the Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court the power to punish contempt of itself.
    • Article 215 conferred a corresponding power on the High Courts.
    • The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, gives statutory backing to the idea.

    What are the kinds of contempt of court?

    The law codifying contempt classifies it as civil and criminal.

    • Civil contempt is fairly simple. It is committed when someone willfully disobeys a court order or wilfully breaches an undertaking given to the court. However, Criminal contempt is more complex.
    • It consists of three forms: (a) words, written or spoken, signs and actions that “scandalise” or “tend to scandalise” or “lower” or “tends to lower” the authority of any court (b) prejudices or interferes with any judicial proceeding and (c) interferes with or obstructs the administration of justice.
    • The rationale for this provision is that courts must be protected from tendentious attacks that lower its authority, defame its public image and make the public lose faith in its impartiality.
    • The punishment for contempt of court is simple imprisonment for a term up to six months and/or a fine of up to ₹. 2,000.

    What does not account to contempt?

    • Fair and accurate reporting of judicial proceedings will not amount to contempt of court.
    • Nor is any fair criticism on the merits of a judicial order after a case is heard and disposed of.

    Is truth a defence against a contempt charge?

    • For many years, the truth was seldom considered a defence against a charge of contempt.
    • There was an impression that the judiciary tended to hide any misconduct among its individual members in the name of protecting the image of the institution.
    • The Act was amended in 2006 to introduce truth as a valid defence if it was in the public interest and was invoked in a bonafide

  • Merger of political parties under Tenth schedule

    A political party is trying to win back its defected MLAs in Rajasthan. This has raised a new question- “Does the anti-defection law apply here?”

    Try this question for mains:

    Q.“Time and again, the courts have spoken out against the Governor acting in the capacity of an all-pervading super-constitutional authority.” Analyse.

    What does “merger” mean a/c to Tenth Schedule?

    • The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution prohibits defection to protect the stability of governments but does not prohibit mergers.
    • Paragraph 4(2) of the Tenth Schedule, dealing with mergers, says that only when two-thirds of the members agree to “merge” the party would they be exempt from disqualification.
    • The “merger” referred to in Paragraph 4(2) is seen as a legal fiction, where members are deemed to have merged for the purposes of being exempt from disqualification, rather than a merger in the true sense.

    The ‘merger’ Politics

    • The political party is arguing that a state unit of a national party cannot be merged without the party being merged at the national level.
    • However, the Tenth Schedule identifies this dichotomy between state units and national units.
    • As per Paragraph 4(2), “merger” of a party means merger of a legislative party of that House.
    • In this case, it would be the Rajasthan Legislative unit of the BSP and not the BSP at the national level.
    • Paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule which defines terms specified in the context of the anti-defection law states this clearly.
    • “Legislature Party” for the purposes of Paragraph 4 (which deals with mergers) means the group consisting of all the members of that House for the time being belonging to that political party in accordance with the said provisions.

    Role of Whip

    • Every legislative party identifies the party’s whip at the beginning of the Assembly’s term and conveys this to the Speaker.
    • A national leader’s direction cannot be considered a whip in the context of the anti-defection law.

    On what grounds is the case-based?

    • The contention is that the merger is illegal and unconstitutional because, for a national party, such merger has to take place at the national level.
    • Supporting this argument, there are two decisions of the Supreme Court: the 2006 Jagjit Singh v State of Haryana, and the 2007 ruling in Rajendra Singh Rana and Ors vs Swami Prasad Maurya.
    • In these cases, the SC ruled that the split cannot be recognised primarily because not all these MLAs split at once.
    • The key aspect is that these cases deal with splits where when one-third of the members of a legislative party split; they could not attract disqualification as per Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule.

    Row over one-third

    • In 2003, through the 91st Constitutional Amendment, Paragraph 3 was deleted from the Tenth Schedule.
    • The amendment was made as the one-third split rule was grossly misused by parties to engineer divisions and indulge in horse-trading.
    • One-third was regarded as an easy target to achieve and the law now exempts defection only when it is at two-thirds (in a merger).

    Are there any such precedents?

    • In July 2019, 10 of the 15 one party’s MLAs in Goa joined the other taking the ruling party’s tally to 27 in the 40 member House.
    • Since they formed two-thirds of the strength of the legislative party unit, they are exempt from disqualification.
    • However, the Speaker’s decision not to disqualify them is under challenge before the Supreme Court.
    • Similarly in Telangana in 2016, two years after the 12 out of 15 of MLAs joined the ruling party.
    • The Speaker recognised the defection as a merger since more than two-thirds had moved.

  • Protesting is a fundamental right: UN

    As authorities worldwide grapple with demonstrations over issues like political rights and racial justice, a UN committee has reaffirmed that protesting peacefully, online or in person, is a fundamental human right.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.There is an urgent need for reforming the criminal justice system in India in light of rising cases of custodial torture and killings. Comment.

    What is the news?

    • The independent experts on the Human Rights Committee published a fresh interpretation of the right of peaceful assembly.
    • It offered comprehensive legal guidance about where and how it applies and also outlining governments’ obligations.
    • The committee is tasked with monitoring how countries implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which under Article 21 guarantees the right to peaceful assembly.

    About ICCPR

    • The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution on 16 December 1966, and in force from 23 March 1976.
    • The covenant commits its parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights and rights to due process and a fair trial.
    • As of September 2019, the Covenant has 173 parties and six more signatories without ratification.
    • It is part of the International Bill of Human Rights, along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
    • It is monitored by the UN Human Rights Committee (a separate body to the UN Human Rights Council).

    Back2Basics: Article 21

    • Article 21 is the protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law.
    • The Article prohibits the deprivation of the above rights except according to a procedure established by law.
    • Article 21 applies to natural persons. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien. Thus, even a foreigner can claim this right.
    • It, however, does not entitle a foreigner the right to reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e).

  • The issue of powers of Speaker and Court

    The article examines the larger issue of powers of the Speaker under 10th Schedule and the current interim order of the Rajasthan High Court.

    Context

    • The Rajasthan High Court had admitted the petition by the Congress faction group challenging the notice of the Speaker.
    • In the interim order, the High Court had ordered to maintain the status quo.

    Why Kihoto Hollohan Case matters

    • The Kihoto Hollohan decision of the Supreme Court delivered in 1992 forms the basis in such decisions.
    • The Constitution Bench which heard it was split 3:2.
    • The majority on the bench upheld the constitutionality of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
    • The High Court is not empowered to unsettle Kihota Hollohan and must apply its ratio that the Chairman/Speaker is the final arbiter on the disqualification of a member.
    • Rajasthan High Court has raised the issue about whether disqualification under Tenth Schedule is applicable in the case of “intra-party dissent”.
    • Para 2(1) a of 10th Schedule deals with disqualification of a member of a House belonging to any party “if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party”.

    Let’s look at what the Supreme Court said  in Kihoto Hollohan case:

    “paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is valid. Its provisions do not suffer from the vice of subverting democratic rights of elected members of Parliament and the legislatures of the States. It does not violate their freedom of speech, freedom of vote and conscience as contended”.

    Consider the question “Examine the issue of powers of Speaker/Chairman in the matters of disqualification of the member against the powers of the Courts in such matters. What are the reasons for frequent frictions between the two authorities on this matter?”

    Conclusion

    The high courts and the Supreme Court routinely refuse to interfere in matters where the concerned authority has merely issued a show-cause notice or granted an opportunity of being heard. So, it must fix the issue raised by the Rajasthan High Court interim order.

  • When can a Governor use his discretion, how has the SC ruled?

    Rajasthan Governor returning the fresh proposal by the state Cabinet – seeking to convene a session of the Assembly has raised fresh legal questions on the powers of the Governor.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q. “Time and again, the courts have spoken out against the Governor acting in the capacity of an all-pervading super-constitutional authority.” Analyse.

    Who has the powers to summon the House?

    • It is the Governor acting on the aid and advice of the cabinet.
    • Article 174 of the Constitution gives the Governor the power to summon from time to time “the House or each House of the Legislature of the State to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit…”
    • However, the phrase “as he thinks fit” is read as per Article 163 of the Constitution which says that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the cabinet.
    • Article 163(1) essentially limits any discretionary power of the Governor only to cases where the Constitution expressly specifies that the Governor must act on his own and apply an independent mind.

    What has the Supreme Court said in the past about the Governor’s power to summon the House?

    • It is settled law that the Governor cannot refuse the request of the Cabinet to call for a sitting of the House for legislative purposes or for the chief minister to prove his majority.
    • In fact, on numerous occasions, including in the 2016 Uttarakhand case, the court has clarified that when the majority of the ruling party is in question, a floor test must be conducted at the earliest available opportunity.
    • In 2016, the Supreme Court in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker expressly said that the power to summon the House is not solely vested in the Governor.

    What did the SC say in the Arunachal case?

    • Referring to discussions in the Constituent Assembly, the court noted that the framers of the Constitution expressly and consciously left out vesting powers to summon or dissolve the House solely with the Governor.
    • It said that the powers of the Governor were substantially altered to indicate that the framers did not want to give Governors the discretion.
    • The Governor can summon, prorogue and dissolve the House, only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (CoM) with the Chief Minister as the head and not at his own, said the Court.

    When can a Governor use his discretion?

    • Article 163(1) of the Constitution says that “there shall be a CoM with the CM at the head to aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except some conditions for discretion.
    • However, in the 2016 case, the apex court has defined the circumstances if the aid and advice of CoM are binding on the Governor.
    • When the chief minister has lost the support of the House and his strength is debatable, then the Governor need not wait for the advice of the CoM to hold a floor test.

    Novel situations are created these days

    • Generally, when doubts are cast on the chief minister that he has lost the majority, the opposition and the Governor would rally for a floor test.
    • The ruling party may attempt to stall the process to buy time and keep its flock together.
    • In a puzzling situation, in Rajasthan’s case, despite requests from CM, the Governor has returned requests to call for a session.
    • However, in the current case, the rebel MLAs have not defected from their party but have repeatedly stated before the Rajasthan HC that they are merely expressing their dissent within the party.

    Back2Basics: Governor’s Discretionary Powers

    The governor can use his/her discretionary powers:

    • When no party gets a clear majority, the governor has the discretion to choose a candidate for the chief minister who will put together a majority coalition as soon as possible.
    • He can impose president’s rule.
    • He submits reports on his own to the president or on the direction of the president regarding the affairs of the state.
    • He can withhold his assent to a bill and send it to the president for his approval.
    • During emergency rule per Article 353, he can override the advice of the council of ministers if specifically permitted by the president.

  • Issues with contempt of court

    The article discusses the issues that law for contempt of the court give rise to. The practice has monarchical origins. Its continuance conflicts with the ideals of democracy. 

    Objective

    • The objective for contempt is stated to be to safeguard the interests of the public if the authority of the Court is denigrated and public confidence in the administration of justice is weakened or eroded.
    •  Need to “respect the authority and dignity of the court” has monarchical origins.

    Issues in India

    • With adjudicatory role having been handed over to judges, showing extreme deference to judges does not sit well with the idea of a democracy.
    • But the definition of criminal contempt in India is extremely wide, and can be easily invoked.
    •  Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer famously termed the law of contempt as having a vague and wandering jurisdiction, contempt law may unwittingly trample upon civil liberties.
    • Criminal contempt is completely asynchronous with our democratic system which recognises freedom of speech and expression as a fundamental right.
    • Excessively loose use of the test of ‘loss of public confidence’, combined with a liberal exercise of suo motu powers, can be dangerous.
    •  It can amount to the Court signalling that it will not suffer any kind of critical commentary about the institution at all.

    Lessons from other democracies

    • Contempt has practically become obsolete in foreign democracies.
    • Canada ties its test for contempt to real, substantial and immediate dangers to the administration.
    • American courts also no longer use the law of contempt in response to comments on judges or legal matters.
    • In England, too, the legal position has evolved.

    Approach of Indian judiciary

    • Truth and good faith were not recognised as valid defences until 2006, when the Contempt of Courts Act was amended.
    • Indian courts have not been inclined to display the same maturity and unruffled spirit as their peers in the other democracies.

    Consider the question  “A law for criminal contempt is completely asynchronous with our democratic system which recognises freedom of speech and expression as a fundamental right. Examine the issue in India context and suggest the major to strike the balance.”

    Conclusion

    Besides needing to revisit the need for a law on criminal contempt, even the test for contempt needs to be evaluated. If such a test ought to exist at all, it should be whether the contemptuous remarks in question actually obstruct the Court from functioning. It should not be allowed to be used as a means to prevent any and all criticism of an institution.

  • Governor’s Discretionary Powers in Assembly Deadlock

    A Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court has held that a Governor is bound to convene a meeting of the Assembly for a floor test on the recommendation of the Cabinet.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q. “Time and again, the courts have spoken out against the Governor acting in the capacity of an all-pervading super-constitutional authority.” Analyse.

    Resolving the deadlock

    • The judgment is significant in the present deadlock between the CM and the Governor over the summoning of an Assembly session for a floor test.
    • The Governor can summon, prorogue and dissolve the House only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head.

    The Nabam Rebia Case

    • The five-judge Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court cited the Nabam Rebia versus Deputy Speaker on July 13, 2016.
    • It held that a Governor cannot employ his ‘discretion’, and should strictly abide by the “aid and advice” of the Cabinet to summon the House.
    • It held that the discretionary power of the Governor is extremely limited and entirely liable to judicial review.
    • The judgment was a consequence of then Arunachal Pradesh Governor J.P. Rajkhowa’s decision to advance the Assembly session, a move which led to unrest in the State and resulted in the President’s rule.
    • The Constitution Bench held Mr. Rajkhowa’s decision to be a violation of the Constitution.

    Governor’s discretion: Limited to specified areas

    • The Supreme Court highlighted that Article 163 of the Constitution does not give the Governor a “general discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his Council of Ministers.
    • The court said the Governor’s discretionary powers are limited to specified areas like giving assent or withholding/referring a Bill to the President or appointment of a CM or dismissal of a government which has lost of confidence but refuses to quit, etc.

    Back2Basics: Governor’s Discretionary Powers

    The governor can use his/her discretionary powers:

    • When no party gets a clear majority, the governor has the discretion to choose a candidate for the chief minister who will put together a majority coalition as soon as possible.
    • He can impose president’s rule.
    • He submits reports on his own to the president or on the direction of the president regarding the affairs of the state.
    • He can withhold his assent to a bill and send it to the president for his approval.
    • During emergency rule per Article 353, he can override the advice of the council of ministers if specifically permitted by the president.

  • Case for presidential system

    The article brings out the flaws in the parliamentary system of government in India and makes the case for the parliamentary system.

    Problems with our parliamentary system

    • Our parliamentary system has created a unique breed of legislator, largely unqualified to legislate.
    • Those legislators has sought election only in order to wield executive power.
    • It has produced governments dependent on a fickle legislative majority.
    • Fickle majority leads the government to focus more on politics than on policy or performance.
    • Current system has distorted the voting preferences of an electorate that knows which individuals it wants to vote for but not necessarily which parties.
    • It has given rise to parties that are shifting alliances of selfish individual interests, not vehicles of coherent sets of ideas.
    • It has forced governments to concentrate less on governing than on staying in office, and obliged them to cater to the lowest common denominator of their coalitions.

    Problems with party system in India

    •  Parliamentary system, devised in Britain — is based on traditions which simply do not exist in India.
    • The parties in England are clearly defined, each with a coherent set of policies and preferences that distinguish it from the next.
    • In India, a party is all-too-often a label of convenience which a politician adopts and discards frequently.
    • So, a politician changing a party is not treated as an unusual event in India.
    • In the absence of a real party system, the voter chooses not between parties but between individuals.
    • The candidates are usually chosen on the basis of their caste, their public image or other personal qualities.
    • So, voters vote for a legislature not to legislate but in order to form the executive.

    4 Problems with choosing executive from Parliament

    • 1) It limits executive posts to those who are electable rather than to those who are able.
    • Though he can bring some members in through the Rajya Sabha, but it too has been largely the preserve of full-time politicians, so the talent pool has not been significantly widened.
    • 2) It puts a premium on defections and horse-trading. The anti-defection Act of 1985 has failed to cure the problem.
    • 3) Legislation suffers. Most laws are drafted by the executive — in practice by the bureaucracy.
    • The ruling party inevitably issues a whip to its members in order to ensure unimpeded passage of a bill.
    • The parliamentary system does not permit the existence of a legislature distinct from the executive.
    • Accountability of the government to the people, through their elected representatives, is weakened.
    • 4) For those parties who do not get into government Parliament or Assembly serves as a theatre for the demonstration of their power to disrupt.

    Case for presidential system

    • A directly elected chief executive at Centre and State would be free from vulnerabilities of coalition support politics, would have the stability of tenure free from a legislative whim.
    • He/she will be able to appoint a cabinet of talents, be able to devote his or her energies to governance, and not just to government.
    • The Indian voter will be able to vote directly for the individual he or she wants to be ruled by.
    • The president will truly be able to claim to speak for a majority of Indians rather than a majority of MPs.

    The risk of dictatorship

    • The only serious objection to the presidential system is that it carries with it the risk of dictatorship.
    • The fear is of an imperious president, immune to parliamentary defeat and impervious to public opinion, ruling the country by fiat.
    • But under the current parliamentary system, a leader with absolute majority and subservient legislature could act in the same manner.

    Consider the question “Examine the differences between the presidential system and the parliamentary system of government. Do you think that the parliamentary system has served well in the Indian context?”

    Conclusion

    With the needs and challenges of one-sixth of humanity before our leaders, we must have a democracy that delivers progress to our people.

  • Relations between judiciary and legislature

    The article discusses the relation between the judiciary and the legislature. Recent development in Rajasthan assembly serves as the backdrop.

    Context

    • The political tussle in Rajasthan entered the High Court and the Supreme Court.
    • The Supreme Court itself proposed to rule on the larger question of the jurisdiction of courts to entertain such pleas.

    Historical background

    • The President of India made a presidential reference to the Supreme Court on the relative powers of legislative assemblies and constitutional courts.
    • The Supreme Court held that there is a broad separation of essential powers of each organ of the State.
    • However, the Court went on to hold that a judge who entertains a petition challenging any order of the legislature does not commit contempt of the said legislature.
    • Since then court have restrained themselves from interfering in the workings of legislative assemblies or Parliament is concerned.
    • The sole exception is under the anti-defection law-after a final order of disqualification has been passed.

    Let’s look into Kihoto Hollohan’s case

    • Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in 1992 held that the Speaker acting in a disqualification matter acts as a tribunal and is subject to judicial review.
    • However, the same judgment makes it clear that the Court will not intervene at an interim stage.
    • The same judgment further holds the Speakers/Chairmen hold a pivotal position in the scheme of Parliamentary democracy and are guardians of the rights and privileges of the House.

    Let’s now look into Rajasthan episode

    • In this case, issuance of a possible disqualification notice by the Speaker, has been contested in constitutional courts.
    •  Even in routine petitions against notices of proposed administrative actions, the petitioner is told to answer the show cause notice and to challenge the final action only.
    • The Rajasthan High Court, however, entertained a petition to challenge the Speaker’s authority to decide, if MLAs had committed an act of defection.
    • The Rajasthan High Court reserved its judgment, requested the Speaker to defer further proceedings and proceeded to direct him to await judgment.

    Co-equality of Constitutional authorities

    • Rajasthan assembly Speaker moved the Supreme Court, questioning the court’s power to direct a Constitutional authority.
    • The principle of law applied is that Constitutional authorities cannot issue directions to each other.
    • They can, at best, make a polite request.
    • The single judge in Calcutta, recorded in his judgment that the Supreme Court was only co-equal with the High Court, as a Constitutional Court.
    • Appellate powers of the Supreme Court did not make it a superior authority to which the High Court was subordinate.
    • Ever since, the Supreme Court has been careful to couch its orders as requests to any High Court, or Constitutional authority.
    • Constitutional courts have followed the same principle, in addressing other Constitutional authorities.

    Role of judiciary in maintaining the balance

    • Unnecessary conflict between organs of state may well invite some Speaker, backed by a solid majority at State and Centre, to defy the courts.
    • Courts are apolitical but keep getting pulled into political thickets, especially in matters of mass defections resulting in regime change.
    • The walls of separation between constitutional organs, once breached, cannot be then repaired against future intrusions.

    Consider the question “Analyse fine balance Indian Consitution strikes between the various Constitutional authorities. Also examine how role of judiciary in dealing with the anti-defection law.”

    Conclusion

    Even under a sovereign Constitution, parliamentary and legislative supremacy in their areas of working must be respected.