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Subject: Polity

  • SIR’s exclusion of citizens is made possible by complicity of institutions

    Why in the News

    Tribunals in West Bengal are struggling to handle the caseload thrown up by the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, and every State running the exercise is reporting rising numbers of electors marked “absent”, “shifted”, “dead” and “duplicate”. The Supreme Court settled the legal question in Association for Democratic Reforms and Others v. Election Commission of India and Others (May 2026). That ruling upheld the Election Commission of India’s power to conduct the revision. It also recorded the Court’s satisfaction with the procedure the Commission adopted, holding the deletions to be within the parameters of that procedure. The contest is now over whether a constitutional court that declines to scrutinise an electoral authority is protecting institutional autonomy or removing the only check available to an elector who has been struck off.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls?

    1. A house to house verification, not a paper update: SIR is a time bound enumeration of the whole roll. Booth Level Officers physically visit every household to verify each entry on it.
    2. It differs from the routine revision: The annual Summary Revision works off claims and objections filed by electors. SIR re-verifies every single existing entry.
    3. Its stated objects: It removes deceased, duplicate and permanently shifted entries, registers newly eligible electors, and extends high security Electors Photo Identity Cards to full coverage.
    4. It is periodic, not novel: Intensive revisions were first run between 1952 and 1956, and India has conducted roughly fourteen such exercises, including those of 1983, 1995, 2002 and 2004.

    What did the Court actually hold in the SIR case?

    1. The power was affirmed: The judgment upholds the Commission’s authority to conduct an intensive revision of the rolls.
    2. The procedure was endorsed: The Court recorded its satisfaction with the procedure the Commission adopted, rather than testing that procedure against outcomes.
    3. The deletions were validated collectively: Deletions were held to fall within the parameters of the approved procedure, which forecloses an individual challenge on the ground that the procedure itself is defective.

    Which of the two available approaches did the Court choose?

    1. The first option was structured suspicion: The Court could have adopted scepticism towards the Commission’s claims of authority, on the view that judicial vigilance is needed to hold the balance between asserted state power and citizens’ rights.
    2. The second option was institutional trust: It could instead repose trust in another constitutional authority, on the assumption that constitutional institutions are themselves sufficiently committed to protecting citizens’ rights, making intensive scrutiny unnecessary.
    3. It took the second: The judgment rests on the premise that a constitutional body does not need to be watched, which is precisely the premise a rights challenge exists to test.
    4. Rights are lost by practice, not only by intent: An authority can undermine citizens’ rights without any explicit intention to do so, simply through unreasonable practices applied at scale.
    5. Trust tests motive, scrutiny tests effect: A court satisfied that a body means well never reaches the question of what the body’s method actually produces on the ground.
    6. The error is not isolated: It sits inside a broader contemporary judicial tendency that increasingly privileges “authority” over the citizen asserting a right against it.

    How does the ruling fail the principle of representation?

    1. Representation was the missing anchor: The judgment is not anchored in the foundational principle underlying the controversy, which is representation, so the logic of representation did not inform how the Commission’s authority was read.
    2. Inclusion is now a defining requirement of citizenship: As democracy has evolved and the idea of citizenship has expanded, full inclusion has become one of its central requirements.
    3. The requirement runs in two directions: Citizenship must not be denied or diminished on grounds such as sex, religion, race, caste or class, and political representation is not meaningful if citizens are effectively disabled from participating in elections as voters.
    4. The arithmetic follows: Leaving eligible electors out of an election inevitably produces flawed representation, whatever the quality of the procedure that excluded them.

    Can a power to purify the rolls be exercised without becoming a power to exclude?

    1. The power was accepted without its limit: Having accepted that the Commission may prepare rolls and examine whether a person is genuinely entitled to be on them, the Court did not ensure that this power of scrutiny stops short of excluding or harassing eligible voters.
    2. The default duty runs the other way: In a democratic election the Commission’s first responsibility is to include, not to exclude, and a verification drive inverts that default by design.
    3. The Commission was not seized of inclusion: Nothing in the record shows the Commission asking whether its verification drive keeps eligible electors on the roll.
    4. The instrument turns on its purpose: Without a stated inclusion duty, the revision becomes a hatchet rather than a purifying procedure.

    Who bears the cost of a documentation based test of eligibility?

    1. Exclusion is not random in practice: The state’s exclusion operates randomly as a general rule, but a documentation regime used as evidence of citizenship does not fall evenly.
    2. The exposed groups are identifiable in advance: Vast numbers of women, the poor and the marginalised are particularly vulnerable to being trapped by such regimes, both as a matter of theory and as an empirical reality.
    3. The democratic cost is the endpoint: A disproportionate exclusion of these groups undermines democratic representation itself, not merely the individual entitlements of those removed.

    What happens to a citizen after the name is deleted?

    1. The verdict routes deletions to the executive: It directs the Commission to report to the Home Ministry the names of persons whose entries have been deleted, for further adjudication of their claims.
    2. The exercise acquires a second use: That direction allows the Commission and the government to weaponise the revision, pushing individuals into a zone of doubt, suspicion and harassment.
    3. A cautious judgment produced an expansive institution: A ruling anxious not to enter the Commission’s domain has obliquely enabled the Commission to transcend that domain and become enmeshed with executive authority.
    4. The consequences run past the vote: The exercise may end by creating a class of shifted, absent and duplicate persons pushed to the margins of formal existence, with passports and claims to welfare schemes also cast into doubt.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. Booth level staff are set impossible targets: Verification of every entry within a compressed window is loaded onto officers who already hold full time teaching or clerical posts. Eg. Booth Level Officers in West Bengal reported acute duty stress during the current cycle, including cases of suicide. Fix. Cap the number of entries assigned per officer per day and pay a separate verification honorarium tied to that cap.
    2. Legacy document requirements exclude the undocumented: Asking for a birth certificate or an ancestral roll entry disqualifies people whose births were never registered. Eg. Civil registration of births was far from universal in the birth cohorts now in their fifties and sixties. Fix. Accept a widened evidence set including electricity bills, ration cards and community certificates, with a declaration by the Booth Level Officer as a residual proof.
    3. Grievance redress does not keep pace with deletions: Claims and objections pile up faster than hearing officers can dispose of them, so the roll freezes with the disputes unresolved. Eg. Only a fraction of the roughly six million claims filed in West Bengal were disposed of before the poll freeze. Fix. Constitute standing appellate tribunals for electoral rolls that sit year round rather than temporary benches raised at revision time.
    4. Field marking is subjective: A single officer decides on one visit whether an elector is “shifted” or “absent”, with no second visit and no corroboration requirement. Eg. Households locked at the time of a daytime visit are routinely marked absent. Fix. Mandate geotagged evidence of at least two visits at different times of day before any absence marking is recorded.
    5. Manual capture introduces avoidable error: Offline field data is later keyed into the database by hand, so transcription mistakes enter the roll after verification has finished. Eg. Name and age mismatches between the field form and the uploaded entry are a recurring source of objections. Fix. Issue tablets with offline forms that sync directly, removing the separate data entry step.
    6. Fear of a citizenship screen suppresses cooperation: Residents who read the exercise as a covert citizenship test refuse to produce documents, which raises the very deletion risk they fear. Eg. Households in border districts have declined to hand over papers during roll verification. Fix. Print on the enumeration form itself that the exercise determines electoral registration only and creates no finding on nationality.

    Conclusion

    The exclusions now surfacing across States are not an administrative accident sitting downstream of a sound legal position. They follow from the judicial choice set out above, and from the direction routing deleted names to the executive for further adjudication. What remains unresolved is whether a court will accept that a power to verify carries a matching duty to include, because until it does, the elector who is struck off has a procedure to follow and no forum that will ask whether the procedure was reasonable.

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] Examine the need for electoral reforms as suggested by various committees with particular reference to “one nation-one election” principle.”

  • Routine data or citizenship check? Why Census questionnaire sparked concern

    Why in the News

    The questionnaire for the population enumeration phase of Census 2027 has triggered a political controversy. The principal Opposition party has alleged that detailed questions about respondents and their parents could facilitate surveillance and serve a “deeper nefarious purpose”, and the Left has raised the same objection. The controversy follows a report of 15 August 2026 that several new or modified questions in the Census questionnaire were also part of the National Population Register (NPR) schedule notified in 2020. That schedule became contentious during protests over the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 and fears of a nationwide National Register of Citizens. Two things are now contested: whether a statistical exercise should collect identifiers that link a person across government databases, and whether a register of residents can stay separate from a register of citizens when the law connects the two.

    What is the National Population Register?

    1. A register of usual residents, not of citizens: The NPR records every person ordinarily resident in a local area, and it makes no finding on anyone’s nationality.
    2. Usual resident, defined: A usual resident is a person who has lived in a local area for at least six months, or who intends to stay there for the next six months.
    3. Foreigners can be on it: A foreign national who meets the six month residence test is a usual resident and is entered in the register.
    4. It is not a new exercise: The NPR was first prepared in 2010 alongside the houselisting phase of the 2011 Census, and it was updated through a door to door exercise in 2015.

    What is the National Register of Citizens?

    1. A register of verified citizens: The National Register of Citizens (NRC) is a list of persons established to be Indian citizens, prepared by verifying claims against documentary proof of descent or residence.
    2. It has been compiled only in one State: The single updated NRC exercise so far was the Supreme Court monitored update in Assam, completed in 2019.

    What exactly has changed in the Census 2027 questionnaire?

    1. Scale of the change: The schedule carries 40 questions, of which 14 are new or modified compared with the 2011 Census.
    2. Eight questions carried over from the 2020 NPR schedule: These are nationality as declared, father’s particulars, mother’s particulars, mobile number, Aadhaar, voter identity card, passport and driving licence.
    3. The parental fields are the most contested: The NPR schedule sought the date and place of birth of a person’s father and mother, down to the district and the State.
    4. A foreign birthplace had to be named: Where a parent was born outside India, the country of birth had to be recorded. These parental questions were at the centre of the political opposition to the NPR.

    Why is the privacy objection different from earlier Census rounds?

    1. The stated purpose has always been aggregate: Census data has traditionally been collected for population statistics and planning, not for identifying a named individual.
    2. The new schedule collects identifiers, not just attributes: It seeks a much wider range of personal information, including details that can identify a person or link that person to other government databases.
    3. The real question is downstream, not upstream: The issue is not how much data the government collects. It is how that data is stored, protected and used once collected.

    How is the Population Register linked in law to the citizens’ register?

    1. A statutory chain exists between the two: The Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003 provide for the preparation of a Population Register and for its verification for the preparation of the citizens’ register.
    2. The Rules create a category of doubt: They also provide for individuals whose citizenship is considered doubtful to be marked for further inquiry.
    3. The link is legal, not political: The connection sits in subordinate legislation, so it survives any assurance given by a government of the day.

    Why did that legal link become politically explosive in 2019-20?

    1. The sequencing was the problem: The NPR was revived soon after the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 was passed by Parliament.
    2. Assam supplied the precedent: The NRC exercise in Assam had excluded around 19 lakh people, giving a concrete picture of what a documentation based citizenship test produces.
    3. The Union executive named the sequence itself: The Union Home Minister repeatedly spoke of a nationwide NRC and asked people to understand the “chronology”. That chronology placed the Act first and the register after it.
    4. Perception overtook the instrument: A previously uncontroversial statistical exercise came to be read as one associated with the possibility of citizenship being questioned.

    What did the government say in 2020, and why did the assurance not settle the issue?

    1. The contested fields were declared optional: The government stated that the questions on parents’ date and place of birth need not be answered.
    2. The stated purpose was welfare delivery: The NPR was described as primarily a database of residents intended to improve policy formulation and the delivery of welfare schemes.
    3. The administrative case was demographic: Knowing the demographic composition of an area was said to help governments plan services and identify beneficiaries.
    4. The assurance contradicted the record: In December 2019 the Union Home Minister said NPR data would never be used for an NRC and that the two exercises were governed by different laws. Earlier government statements in Parliament had taken the opposite position, as the statutory link set out above already did.

    Does the government have a legitimate case for collecting this data?

    1. Detailed demographic data has real administrative value: A comprehensive database of residents helps the government formulate policy, plan public services, identify beneficiaries and improve national security.
    2. Linkage cuts duplication: Information drawn from different government databases reduces duplication and discrepancies in records, and cuts paperwork for citizens.
    3. The identifiers were the design, not an add on: The NPR was envisaged as a way of bringing basic demographic information together with mobile numbers and identity documents, so that government services run more efficiently.
    4. The objectives are not unreasonable in themselves: Neither the resident register nor the citizens’ register is inherently improper as an exercise in public administration.

    Is the objection to the questions themselves or to the trust deficit around them?

    1. The questions are ordinary in isolation: A field asking for a parent’s place of birth is a standard demographic variable in statistical systems worldwide.
    2. Timing converted them into a citizenship test: The 2019-20 difficulty was that the register was revived at a moment of dented public trust, and the assurances offered failed to restore it.
    3. Trust, once lost, redefines the instrument: Questions that would otherwise read as routine are now read through the prism of citizenship and surveillance.

    Challenges to the Census 2027 data collection exercise

    1. No purpose limitation on identifier fields: Nothing in the notified schedule bars the linkage of Census records to other identity databases at a later date. Eg. The Aadhaar number was originally described as voluntary proof of residence and later became a precondition for a range of subsidies. Fix. Notify a purpose limitation clause under the Census Act, 1948 barring individual level linkage of Census records with any other database.
    2. Digital collection widens the breach surface: A mobile application based enumeration of over 1.4 billion people stores personally identifiable data in a way a paper schedule never did. Eg. The Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited breach of May 2024 leaked 278 gigabytes of subscriber data from a public sector network. Fix. Designate the Census data centres as Critical Information Infrastructure and mandate independent security audits before the enumeration window opens.
    3. Self enumeration depends on digital capability: The self enumeration option assumes a smartphone, connectivity and the literacy to complete a 40 question schedule unaided. Eg. Rural self response rates in comparable digital surveys run far below urban rates. Fix. Fund assisted self enumeration desks at common service centres and panchayat offices for the duration of the window.
    4. Fear of citizenship scrutiny corrupts the data: Households that suspect the schedule feeds a citizenship check give incomplete or inaccurate answers, which damages the statistics the exercise exists to produce. Eg. Enumerators in Assam faced sustained non cooperation during the NRC update. Fix. Issue a public statement in the enumeration instructions that no Census response will be used in any individual citizenship or law enforcement proceeding.
    5. Caste enumeration invites organised inflation: Recording caste for the first time since 1931 creates an incentive for groups to coordinate responses in pursuit of quota gains. Eg. The Socio Economic and Caste Census of 2011 recorded over 46 lakh distinct caste and sub caste entries, which made the data unusable for policy. Fix. Publish a pre coded, State specific list of jatis drawn from State Backward Classes Commission records before enumeration begins.
    6. State capacity is stretched across two exercises: The same district administration runs the Census and the electoral roll work in the same period, which raises error rates in both. Eg. Booth level staff across several States have been simultaneously assigned roll revision and enumeration duties. Fix. Ring fence enumeration staff from all other duty assignments for the notified Census period.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not really about how many questions the schedule carries. It rests on the statutory link set out above, which is why a statistical instrument can be read as the first step of an eligibility test. The government’s administrative case for richer data is sound on its own terms, and the downstream safeguard on that data remains unpublished. Until it is published, every additional field in the schedule will be argued over as a citizenship question rather than a statistical one.

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements:

    1. There is only one citizenship and one domicile.

    2. A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State.

    3. A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 2 and 3

  • SC trims law practice requirement to 1 year for judicial service

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has upheld the requirement of prior legal practice for entry into the judicial service. The same order cuts the mandated experience from three years to one. The decision came on review petitions filed against All India Judges Association v. Union of India (May 2025). That judgment had reintroduced a minimum practice condition for candidates applying to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division), reversing an earlier position that allowed fresh law graduates to sit the examination. The present order was passed by a majority of 2:1 in a three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India. What is contested is whether one year at the Bar can supply the courtroom exposure that the three year rule was designed to guarantee, or whether the shortfall has simply been shifted into training the judiciary itself will now have to deliver.

    What has the Court now ordered on eligibility for judicial service?

    1. The principle survives: Prior legal practice remains a precondition for applying to the judicial service, so the 2025 position that a law degree alone is insufficient is undisturbed.
    2. The quantum is cut by two thirds: The required period of active legal practice falls from three years to one year.
    3. The margin was narrow: The majority opinion was delivered by two judges of a three judge Bench, with the Chief Justice of India authoring it.
    4. The vehicle was a review: The order was passed on review petitions filed against the May 2025 verdict, so it revisits that judgment rather than deciding a fresh challenge.

    How is the shortened practice requirement compensated?

    1. A year at a judicial academy follows selection: A successful applicant carrying one year of legal practice undergoes a one year intensive training programme at the State judicial academy concerned.
    2. A clerkship year follows the academy: That training is followed by a final year of law clerkship with senior judicial officers and High Court judges.
    3. The total exposure is rebuilt to three years: One year of practice, one year of academy training and one year of clerkship together restore the three year period the 2025 judgment had demanded at the Bar alone.
    4. The locus of training shifts: Two of those three years are now delivered inside the judicial system rather than in independent practice.

    What happens to candidates who applied in the interregnum?

    1. A year has already elapsed: The majority noted that a full year has passed since the May 2025 judgment, during which recruitment continued under uncertainty.
    2. Interregnum applicants are deemed compliant: Candidates who applied for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) in that period are treated as having completed the required one year of active legal practice.
    3. No proof will be demanded from them: They will not be asked to furnish certificates of proof of practice.
    4. The rule bites from a fixed date: The one year prior practice requirement comes into force in earnest from 1 April 2027.

    Does a one year requirement still deliver what Bar experience was meant to supply?

    1. The dissent rejects the reduction: One judge on the Bench dissented from the majority view on the shortened period.
    2. The stated ground is readiness: The dissenting opinion holds that experience at the Bar is essential for students coming straight out of college, which is an argument about courtroom judgement rather than about length of service.
    3. The majority’s answer is substitution, not agreement: The majority accepts that one year of practice is by itself insufficient, and supplies the balance through the two internal years set out above.
    4. The unresolved question is equivalence: Structured training gives uniform instruction, and practice gives exposure to litigants, adversarial pressure and case failure. The order does not establish that the two are interchangeable.

    Challenges to a prior practice requirement for judicial service

    1. It delays entry and shrinks the applicant pool: A compulsory year at the Bar pushes the earliest entry age up and deters graduates who cannot fund an unpaid year. Eg. Stipends for junior advocates in district courts frequently fall below minimum wage levels in the same district. Fix. Make the practice year count only where the candidate is paid a notified minimum stipend, funded through a Bar Council administered corpus.
    2. Proof of practice invites certification abuse: Practice is usually certified by a senior advocate or a judicial officer, which turns an eligibility condition into a patronage transaction. Eg. Certificates of practice have historically been contested in service litigation over district judiciary appointments. Fix. Replace discretionary certificates with an objective test of appearances recorded on the National Judicial Data Grid.
    3. It falls unevenly on first generation and women entrants: Candidates without family in the profession lack the chambers access that makes a practice year viable. Eg. Women have been the majority of successful candidates in several State judicial service examinations, a pattern that a mandatory chambers year puts at risk. Fix. Create funded court attachment schemes at every district court reserved for first generation law graduates.
    4. Vacancies are already the binding constraint: Adding a filter at entry slows recruitment into a cadre where roughly one fourth of sanctioned posts already lie vacant. Eg. Subordinate courts carry a pendency of about 49 million cases, with over 1.8 lakh cases pending for more than thirty years. Fix. Run recruitment cycles on a fixed annual calendar so the eligibility change does not compound the delay in filling posts.
    5. Training capacity has not been sized for the new load: The academy year now required of every recruit assumes faculty and residential capacity that most academies do not have. Eg. Several State judicial academies run induction courses of a few months rather than a full year. Fix. Fund academy expansion under the Centrally Sponsored Scheme for judicial infrastructure before the rule takes effect in 2027.
    6. The reform addresses quality of entrants, not throughput: Better prepared judges do not by themselves raise disposal where procedure, adjournments and clerical load consume court time. Eg. The case clearance rate in subordinate courts stands at about 89 per cent, so pendency accumulates even with sitting judges at work. Fix. Appoint professional court managers at every district court complex to take administrative work off judicial officers.

    Conclusion

    The Court has retained the principle that a judicial officer should reach the bench with courtroom exposure. It conceded at the same time that a three year bar at the Bar was too heavy a filter for a cadre already short of judges. The compromise moves two of the three years inside the system, and defers the whole scheme so it applies in earnest from 1 April 2027. The next step is with the State High Courts and Public Service Commissions, which must align their service rules and academy capacity before that date.

    Subordinate judiciary in India

    1. Where it sits: The subordinate judiciary comprises the district and taluka level civil and criminal courts, and it is where the overwhelming majority of litigation begins and ends.
    2. The staffing position: India has roughly 21 judges per million people, against the Law Commission’s recommended benchmark of 50.
    3. Who controls it: The High Court of each State exercises administrative and disciplinary control over the subordinate courts within its jurisdiction.

    Constitutional framework governing the subordinate judiciary

    1. Article 233: Provides for the appointment of District Judges by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.
    2. Article 234: Governs the recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service, by the Governor in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
    3. Article 235: Vests administrative and disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary in the High Court.
    4. Article 236: Defines “district judge” and “judicial service” for the purposes of this Chapter.
    5. Article 312: Empowers Parliament to create an All India Judicial Service on a Rajya Sabha resolution passed by a two thirds majority.

    Government initiatives for the subordinate judiciary

    1. eCourts Mission Mode Project, Phase III: Funds digitisation of case records, virtual courts and paperless court rooms across district judiciary establishments.
    2. Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciary: Finances court halls, residential units, lawyers’ halls and digital computer rooms at the district and subordinate level.
    3. Fast Track Special Courts: Dedicated courts set up to try offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and rape cases within statutory timelines.
    4. National Judicial Data Grid: A public dashboard publishing case pendency, disposal and age of cases for every district court, which makes court level performance comparable.

    Back2Basics: Civil Judge (Junior Division)

    1. The entry post: It is the lowest rung of the State judicial service and the post through which most judicial officers enter the district judiciary.
    2. How recruitment happens: Candidates are selected under Article 234 through an examination conducted by the State Public Service Commission or the High Court, in consultation with the High Court.
    3. What the court tries: A Civil Judge (Junior Division) exercises original civil jurisdiction up to a pecuniary limit fixed by State law, and the corresponding criminal post is Judicial Magistrate First Class.
    4. Career path: Promotion runs to Civil Judge (Senior Division) and then to the cadre of District Judge, with a share of District Judge posts filled by direct recruitment from the Bar.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system on appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.”

  • Modi-ism must evolve into institution-centred nation-building

    Modi-ism must evolve into institution-centred nation-building

    Why in the News

    The political and governing order built around the Prime Minister, given the name Modi-ism, is being tested against the constitutional settlement rather than only against its delivery record. The 2024 verdict returned the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with 240 seats and made coalition partners necessary, which qualified a leader centred mandate without rejecting it.

    What is the governing order named Modi-ism?

    1. About: Modi-ism is the name given to the political and governing order built around the Prime Minister. It is a method of acquiring power, exercising authority and defining the nation.
    2. Named features: The order is built on eight elements: a commanding leader, a disciplined party organisation, civilisational assertion, centralised decision-making, technology-driven welfare, infrastructure-led development, high-energy national security and direct communication with citizens.
    3. Central promise: The promise is a strong leader, a purposeful state and a stronger India.

    What has the order actually delivered?

    1. Political transformation: The BJP moved from being a major national formation to the central axis of Indian politics. It expanded beyond its traditional geographical and social constituencies and made leadership itself the principal electoral proposition.
    2. The 2024 qualification: The BJP fell to 240 seats in 2024 and required its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) partners to form the government. The verdict chose continuity and restored the relevance of consultation, coalition and restraint.
    3. Delivery at scale: Infrastructure construction, digital public platforms, direct benefit transfers, financial inclusion, sanitation, housing, electrification and welfare delivery at scale strengthened the state’s capacity to reach citizens.
    4. Poverty measurement: NITI Aayog estimated multidimensional poverty at 11.28 per cent in 2022-23, against 29.17 per cent in 2013-14. The methodology is contested, the improvement in delivery is not.
    5. Political containment: The order contained the undue proliferation of regional politics to some degree.
    6. Source of appeal: The order speaks in the language of aspiration, national confidence and civilisational recovery. Citizens long frustrated by delay, indecision and fragmented authority respond to a government promising speed and scale.

    Why is effectiveness not a sufficient test of democratic government?

    1. The five charges: Critics allege that the order seeks to weaken pluralism, dilute socialism, replace rights with governmental charity, capture institutions and ultimately alter the Constitution.
    2. The counter position: Supporters dismiss these charges as partisan hostility or as resistance to India’s cultural resurgence. Both positions are too absolute, since constitutional character must be judged through the actual exercise of power rather than through slogans.
    3. Evidence against dismantling: Elections remain fiercely competitive, governments change in the States, Opposition parties govern substantial parts of the country, and courts continue to examine executive action and enforce fundamental rights.
    4. The Preamble ruling: In November 2024 the Supreme Court rejected petitions challenging the inclusion of the words socialist and secular in the Preamble.
    5. The real risk: A Constitution can be weakened without its words being formally deleted. Institutions may remain intact on paper as their independence, credibility and conventions erode.
    6. What sustains democracy: Democracy rests on five supports beyond periodic elections: restraints on power, respect for dissent, parliamentary accountability, federal balance and equal citizenship.

    What do the pluralism and socialism debates actually turn on?

    1. Pluralism: Religious freedom has not been legally abolished. Majoritarian mobilisation and inflammatory language make minorities feel conditionally accepted.
    2. The distinction drawn: Cultural nationalism is constitutionally legitimate. Cultural supremacy is not.
    3. Equal citizenship: The republic belongs without qualification to every citizen. Equal citizenship cannot depend on religion, political loyalty or conformity with a preferred account of national identity.
    4. What socialism does not mean: Constitutional socialism does not demand a return to the licence-permit raj, hostility to private enterprise or indiscriminate state ownership.
    5. What socialism does mean: It requires social and economic justice, equality of opportunity and protection against degrading deprivation.

    Why must welfare reach a citizen as a right rather than as a gift?

    1. The presentation problem: Statutory entitlements are politically presented as personal gifts from a leader. Food support, employment guarantees, housing, scholarships and social security are public obligations financed by citizens and delivered under law.
    2. The ordering principle: Rights-based governance must complement beneficiary politics rather than be displaced by it. A citizen must remain a rights-holder rather than a grateful beneficiary.
    3. What technology fixes: Technology reduces leakage and accelerates delivery.
    4. What technology creates: Citizens excluded by failed authentication, inaccurate databases or administrative discretion need accessible remedies.
    5. The four safeguards: Welfare requires enforceable standards, grievance redress, social audits and legislative scrutiny.

    What does the record on Parliament and appointments show?

    1. Speed of legislation: During the seventeenth Lok Sabha, 58 per cent of bills were passed within two weeks of introduction.
    2. Committee referral: Only 16 per cent of bills were referred to parliamentary committees.
    3. Budget scrutiny: Around 80 per cent of the Union Budget was voted without discussion between 2019 and 2023.
    4. Political funding: The Supreme Court decision striking down the electoral bond scheme established that secrecy in political funding had crossed a constitutional boundary.
    5. Election commissioner appointments: The law governing the appointment of election commissioners gives the executive a majority on the selection committee, which has raised concerns about perceived independence.
    6. The test for autonomy: Institutional autonomy depends on more than technical legality. It requires transparent appointments, procedural fairness and visible distance from partisan command, so independence is protected in public perception as well as in fact.

    What corrections would a shift to institution-centred nation-building require?

    1. Parliament: Parliament must recover serious deliberation, committee scrutiny and control over public expenditure.
    2. Federalism: Federal consultation must precede major decisions affecting the States.
    3. Appointments and agencies: Appointments to constitutional and regulatory bodies should command cross-party credibility. Investigative agencies must be demonstrably even-handed.
    4. Welfare and discourse: Welfare delivery must be joined to enforceable rights, and political discourse must replace habitual polarisation with constitutional fraternity.
    5. The next development phase: The eight stated goals are productive employment, competitive manufacturing, stronger small enterprises, higher farm incomes, quality public education, accessible healthcare, liveable cities and climate resilience.
    6. Party institutionalisation: No durable national party can remain indefinitely dependent on one personality. It needs empowered ministers, credible regional leaders, internal debate and an orderly culture of succession.

    Challenges to Institution-Centred Nation-Building

    1. Executive control of the legislative calendar: A ruling coalition can clear the chamber of dissent before a contested bill is taken up. Eg. In December 2023, 146 members were suspended across both Houses, the largest mass suspension since Independence, and the Telecommunications Bill, 2023 was passed with the near entire opposition absent.
    2. A vacant Deputy Speaker’s chair: Article 93 mandates the election of a Deputy Speaker, and the post has been left unfilled for years. Eg. The post lay vacant through the entire seventeenth Lok Sabha and into the eighteenth, so a member from the Speaker’s own panel of chairpersons presided over the no-confidence motion against the Speaker in March 2026.
    3. Discretionary gatekeeping on removal motions: Section 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 uses the word may, so the presiding officer may refuse a removal motion even when the numerical threshold is met. Eg. In April 2026 a notice signed by 193 opposition members seeking removal of the Chief Election Commissioner was refused admission in both Houses without stated reasons.
    4. The Money Bill route: Certifying a bill as a Money Bill removes the Rajya Sabha’s power to amend it and places the certification beyond ordinary challenge. Eg. The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 was passed as a Money Bill, and the correctness of that certification remains before a larger bench of the Supreme Court.
    5. Bypassed pre-legislative consultation: Draft legislation is often introduced without the public comment period the executive’s own policy prescribes. Eg. The Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy of 2014 requires draft bills to be placed in the public domain for thirty days, and this step is routinely skipped.
    6. Federal consultation deficit: Consultative federal forums exist on paper and meet rarely. Eg. The Inter-State Council, constituted under Article 263, met only once between 2016 and 2024.

    Conclusion

    Effectiveness alone cannot settle the constitutional character of a government, and a Constitution can be hollowed out without a word of its text being altered. The productive core of the order, decisive leadership, infrastructure, digital innovation, credible defence capability and measurable delivery, should continue. What must change is the shift from leader-centred mobilisation to institution-centred nation-building, carried by parliamentary deliberation, federal consultation, cross-party credibility in appointments and welfare delivered as enforceable right. The choice is between an order disciplined by the Constitution and one that seeks to rise above it.

  • Beyond blasphemy: how laws can curtail the possibility of social reform

    Why in the News

    Section 295A and the provisions that succeeded it have been turned against writers, artists and reformers, with arrest, mob campaigns and pre emptive withdrawal delivering the harm long before any verdict. India simultaneously runs statutes that direct the State to attack religious and superstitious practice, so the same legal system both punishes criticism of religion and mandates it.

    What is Section 295A?

    1. What it penalises: Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 punished deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.
    2. Successor provision: The corresponding offence is now Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
    3. What the offence turns on: Liability rests on the intent to outrage and not on the truth or falsity of what was said.
    4. How it operates in practice: The offence is cognisable, so a complaint can produce arrest and judicial custody before any court assesses whether malice existed.

    What is the heckler’s veto?

    1. Heckler’s veto: A heckler’s veto is the suppression of expression because a hostile audience threatens disruption or violence, so the objector rather than the law decides what may be said. Speech is stopped in order to keep the peace, which transfers the power of censorship to whoever protests loudest.

    What is a sacrilege law?

    1. Sacrilege law: A sacrilege law criminalises damage to or desecration of a religious text or object, as distinct from an offence aimed at outraging feelings through speech or writing. State level sacrilege provisions of this kind carry punishment extending to imprisonment for life.

    What does the law on outraging religious feelings currently cover in India?

    1. The core offence: Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 penalises deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings by insulting religion or religious beliefs, whether by words, writing, signs or visible representation.
    2. Adjacent offences: Section 298 covers injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult a religion, Section 300 covers disturbing a religious assembly and Section 302 covers uttering words with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings.
    3. Group enmity provisions: Section 196 penalises promoting enmity between groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, language or caste, and Section 197 covers imputations prejudicial to national integration.
    4. No standalone blasphemy statute: India has no offence of blasphemy as such, and the protection is assembled from provisions aimed at intent to outrage rather than at the content of any belief.
    5. State level escalation: Some States have enacted sacrilege provisions carrying punishment up to imprisonment for life, which sets the penalty far above the central provision.
    6. Judicial test applied: In Amish Devgan v Union of India (2020) the Supreme Court laid down a three part contextual test examining the content of the speech, the intent of the speaker and the harm caused or likely to be caused.
    7. Truth is not a defence: Courts have held that a wholly true statement can still outrage religious feelings, so accuracy does not absolve the speaker.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Free Speech and Religious Freedom

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression.
    2. Article 19(2): Permits reasonable restrictions on that right on enumerated grounds, including public order, decency, morality, defamation and incitement to an offence.
    3. Article 25(1): Guarantees freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health.
    4. Article 25(2)(a) and Article 25(2)(b): Permit the State to regulate secular activity associated with religious practice, and to provide for social welfare and reform including throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes.
    5. Article 26: Gives every religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, subject to public order, morality and health.
    6. Article 14: Requires that a penal classification rest on an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus to the object of the provision.
    7. Article 21: Protects life and personal liberty, which is what arrest and pre trial custody in a speech case directly curtails.
    8. Article 15(1) and Article 17: Bar discrimination on grounds of religion and caste and abolish untouchability, which are the constitutional basis for statutes attacking exploitative religious practice.
    9. Article 51A(h): Makes it a fundamental duty of every citizen to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform.
    10. Preamble: Declares India a secular republic, and secularism has been held to be part of the basic structure and therefore beyond amendment.

    How has the provision been used against writers, artists and film?

    1. Angarey, 1932: A small collection of Urdu short stories attacking obscurantist customs and the sexual hypocrisy of some religious figures was banned soon after publication, and its authors faced threats.
    2. The Satanic Verses, 1988: The government banned import of Salman Rushdie’s novel, making India one of the first countries in the world to act against it, and a secular one at that.
    3. The Da Vinci Code, 2006: Seven Indian States banned the film and the book on the ground that they offended Christian sentiment, and two States lifted the ban only after High Court intervention.
    4. The Hindus: An Alternative History, 2014: Wendy Doniger’s book was withdrawn by Penguin India after a civil suit invoking Section 295A, so the withdrawal followed a civil filing rather than any conviction.
    5. Madhorubagan, 2015 and 2016: Perumal Murugan faced a criminal complaint and a mob campaign over the novel and announced his own death as a writer in 2015; a Madras High Court judgment of 2016 quashed the case and closed with the appeal to let the author be resurrected to what he is best at, write.
    6. M.F. Husain: The painter was hounded into exile and death abroad after decades of prosecutions and threats over his nude depictions of Hindu deities.
    7. Taslima Nasrin: Her writing has met comparable treatment through bans, threats and constraints on where she may live and publish.

    Why does the harm occur before any verdict?

    1. Rehana Fathima, 2018: Weeks after the Supreme Court lifted the traditional ban on women of menstruating age entering the Sabarimala temple, the Kerala activist was arrested under Section 295A over a Facebook photograph of herself dressed as an Ayyappa devotee.
    2. Cost imposed without trial: She spent over two weeks in judicial custody and was suspended by her employer within days of the arrest, all over an image rather than an argument.
    3. Amish Devgan, 2020: The television anchor called the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti a lootera during a live debate, apologised within days for what he said was an inadvertent slip for a different historical name, and still faced seven separate first information reports across five States.
    4. Multiplicity as the punishment: The Supreme Court declined to quash any of the seven and merely clubbed them together in Ajmer, so the burden of defending across five jurisdictions was reduced rather than removed.
    5. Conviction is not the point: These cases rarely end in conviction and the prosecution more often goes nowhere, so the process itself operates as the penalty.
    6. Three channels of harm: The damage is delivered through arrest, through the heckler’s veto of an aggressive and sometimes violent audience, and through the pre emptive caution of publishers and film certifiers who calculate that no book or film is worth the trouble.

    Which laws run in the opposite direction?

    1. Constituent Assembly position, 2 December 1948: During the debate on whether personal law should be shielded from legislative reform, B.R. Ambedkar rejected the idea that religion could claim a veto over social legislation merely because a custom carried religious sanction.
    2. The reasoning he gave: He said he did not understand why religion should be given a vast, expansive jurisdiction covering the whole of life and preventing the legislature from encroaching upon that field, since this liberty exists in order to reform the social system, so personal law cannot be excluded from the jurisdiction of the State.
    3. Maharashtra, 2013: The Prevention and Eradication of Human Sacrifice and Other Inhuman, Evil and Aghori Practices and Black Magic Act was passed after the assassination of the rationalist campaigner Narendra Dabholkar.
    4. What that Act criminalises: It penalises a long list of exploitative religious practices, ranging from claiming to cure disease through faith healing to inducing self flagellation.
    5. Karnataka, 2017: The State passed a comparable law against inhuman evil practices and black magic.
    6. Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987: It criminalises not only the act of widow immolation but its glorification, treating celebratory speech about a religious practice as itself an offence.
    7. The mirror image rather than the opposite: A law punishing praise of a religious practice uses the same technique as a law punishing criticism of one, since both make speech about religion a criminal question.
    8. What the coexistence exposes: Indian law has no coherent theory of when religious sentiment deserves protection, and what governs is a case by case political calculation about which practices are currently unpopular enough, or which constituencies currently powerful enough, to tip the balance.

    Why does the reformer fall on the wrong side of a blasphemy law?

    1. The State of Mysore versus Henry Rodrigues, 1961: A Catholic editor was tried under Section 295A over an article in his Konkani language magazine Crusader, titled “Honour to Mary or Dishonour?”, which accused Catholic priests of exploiting the credulous by falsely attributing miracles to the Virgin Mary.
    2. The defence offered: He argued that since the criticised beliefs and practices were superstitious and contrary to the Bible itself, the truth of his charge ought to absolve him.
    3. The court’s answer: Following an earlier Allahabad High Court ruling, the Mysore High Court rejected this outright, holding that even a wholly true statement can outrage religious feelings and that the provision punishes the intent to outrage rather than the accuracy of what is said.
    4. The insider treated as the stranger: A believer’s sincere and internally argued complaint against his own clergy was treated exactly as the law treats a stranger’s contempt.
    5. Jyotirao Phule: He spent the 1870s attacking Brahminical religious authority as the theological scaffolding of caste oppression, recasting Hindu myth in his tract Gulamgiri to expose it as a device for keeping the lower castes subjugated.
    6. Hamid Dalwai: A century later he founded the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal explicitly on Phule’s model, marched a handful of Muslim women to the Maharashtra Assembly to demand an end to triple talaq and polygamy, and was ostracised and abused for it.
    7. The pair the law cannot separate: The offence does not distinguish a Phule or a Dalwai from a bigot baiting a rival faith for sport, since both are trying to make believers feel bad about what they believe.
    8. A line a police station cannot draw: What should separate them is whether the critic is trying to improve the community or merely humiliate it, and an officer recording a complaint is poorly placed to make that assessment.

    Major debates surrounding blasphemy and sacrilege law in India

    1. Public order against expression: A targeted law applied with judicial restraint and the safeguard of proven intent is defended as a proportionate response to sentiment that has repeatedly proved combustible, rather than as an assault on free thought.
    2. Restraint in principle against the record in practice: The historical record of Section 295A, and now of State sacrilege law, gives little confidence that restraint is what actually happens once a complaint is registered.
    3. Discussion, advocacy and incitement: Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) held that only incitement carrying a direct and proximate connection to public disorder may be criminalised, and that discussion and advocacy remain protected even where unpopular.
    4. Intent against effect: Whether liability should turn on what the speaker meant or on the disorder that followed, since the intent test is applied only after an audience has already reacted.
    5. Truth as a defence: Whether a demonstrably accurate factual claim about a religious practice should absolve the speaker, which the 1961 ruling denied outright.
    6. Proportionality of punishment: Whether imprisonment for life for an insult to a text can be reconciled with a Constitution whose secularism is held unamendable.
    7. New law against enforcement: In Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India (April 2026) the Supreme Court dismissed a batch of petitions seeking fresh hate speech legislation, holding that creating criminal offences belongs to the legislature and that the real problem is an enforcement deficit.
    8. Empirical gap: Data under these provisions is not published in a form that sets arrests, days in custody and withdrawn publications against convictions, so the argument runs on cases rather than on measured outcomes.

    Challenges to reforming laws on religious offence

    1. Cognisability delivers the punishment: An offence that permits arrest on a complaint produces custody before a magistrate examines whether malice existed. Eg. In Imran Pratapgarhi v State of Gujarat (2025) the Supreme Court extended the preliminary inquiry safeguard to first information reports in speech cases precisely to interpose a check before registration.
    2. Forum multiplicity: A single utterance can be prosecuted in every jurisdiction where a complainant chooses to file. Eg. Clubbing seven first information reports at Ajmer in 2020 consolidated the defence without removing the cost of defending in a distant State.
    3. Self censorship leaves no record: A publisher or certifier that withdraws before any order removes the work without producing a judicial decision that can be appealed. Eg. Penguin India withdrew and destroyed copies of The Hindus: An Alternative History in 2014 with no conviction and no court direction requiring it.
    4. Mob campaign as the real enforcement mechanism: The threat of disruption achieves what a prosecution cannot. Eg. Perumal Murugan withdrew from writing in 2015 after a mob campaign and a local shutdown, and resumed only after the Madras High Court judgment of 2016.
    5. State level bans without central legislation: Executive bans multiply at the State level and are reversed only through litigation. Eg. Seven States banned The Da Vinci Code in 2006 and two lifted the ban only after their High Courts intervened.
    6. Penalty escalation at the State level: A State provision can prescribe imprisonment for life for an offence against a text, which exceeds the penalty for many offences against the person. Eg. State sacrilege provisions carry punishment extending to imprisonment for life against a maximum of a few years under the central provision.
    7. Recodification carried the provision forward: The most recent opportunity to narrow the offence was not used. Eg. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 re-enacted Section 295A as Section 299 unchanged, instead of confining it to incitement to violence.

    Conclusion

    Section 295A and its successor punish the intent to outrage rather than the falsity of what is said, so a reformer criticising his own faith is caught by the same words as a bigot baiting a rival one. India runs that regime alongside statutes that direct the State to criminalise faith healing, black magic and the glorification of sati, which shows there is no settled principle about when religious sentiment deserves protection. What remains unresolved is whether these provisions will be narrowed to their original and defensible purpose of preventing incitement to actual violence, leaving criticism, satire and reform of religious practice to public argument rather than to the criminal courts.

    What is Secularism?

    1. About: Secularism is the principle that the State holds no religion of its own and treats every faith on the same footing in law and in the distribution of public benefits.
    2. Rationale: It exists to keep the coercive power of the State out of the hands of any religious majority or clergy, and to make citizenship independent of belief.
    3. Strict separation model: The State and religion operate in mutually exclusive spheres, with the State neither aiding nor interfering with any religion, which is the model associated with the United States and France.
    4. Principled distance model: The State keeps no religion of its own and retains the power to intervene in religious practice for social reform and equality, which is the model the Indian Constitution follows.
    5. Positive neutrality: Equal treatment is delivered through equal respect rather than equal indifference, so the State may fund, regulate and administer religious institutions on a non preferential basis.
    6. Constitutional location: The word secular was inserted in the Preamble by the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976, and S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994) held secularism to be part of the basic structure.
    7. Essential religious practices doctrine: Courts decide the reach of religious freedom by asking whether a practice is essential to the religion, which places the determination of religious content with the judiciary.

    Key Concerns Regarding Secularism in India

    1. State entanglement with religious administration: Endowment departments and statutory boards administer the institutions of some faiths and not others, so the State’s distance is uneven across religions.
    2. Judicial determination of religious content: The essential religious practices test requires judges to decide questions of theology, a function courts were not designed or equipped for.
    3. Asymmetric reform power: Article 25(2)(b) expressly permits the opening of Hindu religious institutions, and comparable reform in other communities has proceeded largely through litigation rather than legislation.
    4. Personal law plurality against Article 44: The directive for a uniform civil code remains unimplemented, so family law continues to differ by religion.
    5. Majoritarian capture of neutral language: A formally neutral provision protects the practices of the dominant community more effectively, since those practices attract fewer complaints and fewer prosecutions.
    6. No horizontal anti discrimination remedy: Discrimination on religious grounds by private landlords and employers has no general statutory remedy, since constitutional guarantees bind the State.

    Laws and Rules Governing Religious Offence in India

    1. Indian Penal Code, 1860: Chapter XV grouped the offences relating to religion and remained the governing law until 2024.
    2. Section 295A was inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1927 following the Rangila Rasul prosecution.
    3. Sections 295 to 298 covered defiling a place of worship, disturbing a religious assembly, trespass on burial places and wounding religious feelings by word.
    4. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Replaced the Indian Penal Code with effect from 1 July 2024 and carried this chapter forward.
    5. Section 299 corresponds to Section 295A, Section 298 to Section 295, Section 300 to Section 296 and Section 302 to Section 298.
    6. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Provides for a preliminary inquiry before registration of a first information report in specified categories of offence, and for prior government sanction before a court takes cognisance of certain offences relating to religion.
    7. Cinematograph Act, 1952: Empowers the certifying authority to refuse or condition certification of a film on grounds mirroring Article 19(2), including public order and decency.
    8. Information Technology Act, 2000: Section 69A permits blocking of online content on grounds that track the restrictions in Article 19(2).
    9. Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987: Criminalises the act of sati, its abetment and its glorification, and provides for Special Courts to try these offences.
    10. Maharashtra Prevention and Eradication of Human Sacrifice and Other Inhuman, Evil and Aghori Practices and Black Magic Act, 2013: Criminalises a listed set of exploitative practices including faith healing claims and induced self flagellation.
    11. Karnataka Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Evil Practices and Black Magic Act, 2017: Enacts a comparable prohibition in that State.
    12. Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955: Penalises the enforcement of religious disabilities arising out of untouchability, including denial of temple entry.

    Back2Basics: Jyotirao Phule

    1. Life: Born in 1827 in a family of the Mali caste in present day Maharashtra, and died in 1890 in Pune.
    2. First school: Opened a school for girls at Bhide Wada in Pune in 1848, among the earliest such schools established by an Indian.
    3. Extension to the excluded castes: Opened a school in 1851 for children of the castes then treated as untouchable.
    4. Organisation founded: Founded the Satyashodhak Samaj, the Society of Truth Seekers, on 24 September 1873 in Pune, to secure social justice for the lower castes without priestly mediation.
    5. Principal writings: Wrote Gulamgiri in 1873, which read Hindu myth as a record of the subjugation of the lower castes, and Shetkaryacha Asud in 1883 on the condition of the cultivator.
    6. Vocabulary contributed: Popularised the term Dalit for the oppressed castes, which entered later political usage.
    7. Social work: Opened a home for widows and a centre for the prevention of infanticide, and supported widow remarriage.
    8. Title conferred: Given the title Mahatma in 1888 at a public gathering in Bombay.
    9. Partnership: Worked with Savitribai Phule, who taught at the Bhide Wada school and is counted among India’s first women teachers.
    10. Later influence: His model was invoked directly by Hamid Dalwai in founding the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal in 1970.

    Way Forward

    1. Narrow the offence to incitement: Confine Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 to speech carrying a direct and proximate connection to violence, in line with the Shreya Singhal test.
    2. Make the offence non cognisable: Remove the power to arrest on a bare complaint, so that custody does not precede any judicial assessment of deliberate and malicious intent.
    3. Require prior sanction and preliminary inquiry: Make registration of a first information report conditional on a preliminary inquiry and on sanction by a designated senior officer, extending the Imran Pratapgarhi safeguard to every provision in this chapter.
    4. Consolidate multiple complaints by statute: Provide that all first information reports arising from a single publication or utterance are transferred to one jurisdiction as a matter of right, rather than case by case.
    5. Introduce a public interest defence: Allow truth combined with a reformist or scholarly purpose as a statutory defence, so an insider critic is separated from a speaker seeking only to humiliate.
    6. Cap the penalty: Bring State sacrilege provisions within a central ceiling so that an offence against a text cannot carry imprisonment for life.
    7. Protect the publisher and the certifier: Bar interim injunctions and pre publication restraints on books and films except on a judicial finding of imminent violence, so withdrawal is not the cheapest option.

    “[2014, GS2, 12.5] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • Shah hails southern states: ‘Biggest contributor to nation’s development’

    Why in the News

    The 31st meeting of the Southern Zonal Council was held at Mahabalipuram in Tamil Nadu on 20 August 2026, chaired by the Union Home Minister, who described South India as the biggest contributor to the country’s development. Every demand the southern States tabled at the same meeting asked that this contribution not cost them seats, funds or control over shared resources. The praise and the agenda therefore pointed in opposite directions.

    What are the Zonal Councils?

    1. What they are: Zonal Councils are advisory bodies that bring the States and Union Territories of a region together with the Centre to discuss matters of common interest. There are five Zonal Councils, covering the Northern, Central, Eastern, Western and Southern zones.
    2. Their legal basis: They were created by Sections 15 to 22 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, so they are statutory bodies and not constitutional ones.
    3. Who sits on them: The Union Home Minister is the chairman of each Zonal Council. The Chief Ministers of the member States are members, with the office of vice chairman rotating annually among them, and each State also nominates two other ministers.
    4. What they can do: They discuss and make recommendations on inter State disputes, economic and social planning, border and linguistic minority issues, and matters arising from State reorganisation. Their conclusions are recommendatory and carry no binding force.

    What did the Union Home Minister set out as the South’s contribution?

    1. The three pillars named: The development journey of South India was attributed to three pillars, namely a high literacy rate, trained manpower, and technical expertise in the utilisation of deep seas.
    2. The sectors credited: The region was said to have contributed across literature, research and development, space, information technology, artificial intelligence, industrial development and agriculture, with the automobile, pharmaceutical and infrastructure sectors also named.
    3. The instruction drawn from it: The rest of the country was asked to learn from South India on innovation and revenue generation.
    4. The timeframe set: The Independence Day message that what has not been achieved in the last seven decades must be accomplished in the next five to seven years was underlined, with every State asked to contribute.
    5. Water framed as the region’s constraint: Water was described as the soul of the region across four areas, namely agriculture, industry, healthy citizens and the environment.
    6. The proposal on rivers: Linking major rivers from the Brahmaputra to the Kaveri and the Godavari was put forward as a way to ensure the country faces no water shortage for the next 100 years.
    7. The nutrition point: Malnutrition and stunted growth were described as snowballing into a national problem, with the fight against malnutrition credited to Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh before it was accepted across India.

    What did each southern State place before the Council?

    1. Kerala: The State sought State specific premiums for the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana in place of a uniform national premium, eligibility aligned with the National Food Security Act, 2013 database, and a revised central share reflecting actual expenditure incurred on centrally sponsored families. It also sought a more equitable and flexible funding approach for centrally sponsored schemes and asked that auctioning of mineral blocks along the Kerala coast be put on hold.
    2. Kerala on Mullaperiyar: The State reaffirmed its willingness to supply water to Tamil Nadu from a new dam it has proposed at Mullaperiyar in Idukki district in place of the existing structure, offering to bear the construction expense while leaving construction and location to Tamil Nadu.
    3. Karnataka: The State argued that success in population control must not be allowed to diminish southern political representation, urged the Centre to reconsider the recently passed Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, and pressed for fairness in funds, voice and respect.
    4. Karnataka on delimitation: The State urged the Council to adopt a resolution calling on the Centre to honour the 1971 Census as the basis for delimitation.
    5. Tamil Nadu: The State conveyed its concerns on delimitation and pressed that the existing freeze on the number of Lok Sabha seats should continue. It asserted its position on increasing the storage height of the Mullaperiyar Dam.
    6. Tamil Nadu on the terms of the relationship: The State stated that southern States seek not preferential treatment but fair and equitable treatment that respects fiscal autonomy and rewards performance alongside equity.
    7. Andhra Pradesh: The State projected that the southern economy could reach $10 trillion by 2047, sought greater cooperation among States in the region and urged the Centre to expedite resolution of bifurcation related issues.
    8. Telangana: The State stated that established adjudicatory mechanisms on Krishna waters must be respected and reiterated that it retains lower riparian rights over surplus waters. It stated that it sought no special privilege but only its fair entitlement through the legal mechanisms already established.
    9. Telangana on the method: The State stated that cooperative federalism should provide a framework for resolving inter State issues in a fair, time bound and legally sustainable manner.
    10. The demand two States made jointly: Tamil Nadu and Karnataka both urged that the existing number of Lok Sabha seats be frozen and that women’s reservation be accommodated within the current number of seats.
    11. What the Council recorded as agreed: On the division of assets and liabilities between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, both States agreed to resolve the matters in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs. On pending water issues, the southern States agreed to early resolution through meetings involving the ministries concerned, the Inter-State Council and the respective States.

    Why does delimitation dominate the southern agenda?

    1. The freeze is the source of the current seat distribution: The number of Lok Sabha seats allotted to each State has been held at the 1971 Census population, so States that reduced fertility fastest have not lost seats for doing so.
    2. The freeze has an expiry: The freeze runs until the first Census taken after 2026, after which readjustment on current population becomes constitutionally due.
    3. Performance and representation move in opposite directions: States that completed the demographic transition earliest have the slowest population growth, so a population based readjustment reduces their share of the House.
    4. The demand is for the freeze to be extended, not for a new formula: Tamil Nadu and Karnataka both asked that the existing number of seats continue rather than proposing an alternative allocation rule.
    5. Women’s reservation raises the stakes: Accommodating the reserved seats within the current total, as both States asked, keeps the reservation from becoming a reason to expand the House on a population basis.

    Why do water disputes keep returning to the Council table?

    1. The rivers are inter State and the users are not: The Krishna, the Kaveri and the Godavari cross State boundaries, so every allocation decision transfers water from one electorate to another.
    2. Adjudication and negotiation run in parallel: Telangana pressed that established adjudicatory mechanisms be respected on Krishna waters, which places a tribunal award and a Council discussion on the same question at the same time.
    3. A structure can outlive its settlement: The Mullaperiyar dispute turns on the storage height of an ageing structure, with Kerala proposing a replacement dam and Tamil Nadu asserting a claim over storage in the existing one.
    4. Ownership and operation are split: Kerala offered to bear the cost of a new dam while leaving construction and location to Tamil Nadu, which separates who pays from who controls.
    5. Interlinking is offered as the way past allocation: The proposal to link the Brahmaputra to the Kaveri and the Godavari reframes a distribution dispute as a supply problem, which shifts it out of the tribunal system and into a capital project.

    Can a body without binding power settle demands of this kind?

    1. The Council can only recommend: Nothing decided at a Zonal Council binds the Centre or any State, so agreement at the table is a statement of intent rather than a settlement.
    2. The demands are not within its gift: Delimitation is fixed by the Constitution and by Parliament, mineral taxation by a central Act, and river water allocation by tribunals under a separate statute.
    3. What it did settle was procedural: The two outcomes recorded, on Andhra Pradesh and Telangana assets and on pending water issues, were agreements to hold further consultations rather than agreements on substance.
    4. The forum multiplies rather than converges: Water issues were referred onward to the ministries concerned, the Inter-State Council and the States, which adds forums to a dispute rather than closing it.
    5. The tension the meeting exposed: The southern States were praised for performance and simultaneously asked the Centre to ensure that performance does not reduce their seats, their scheme funding or their control over coastal minerals.

    Challenges to the Zonal Council as a forum for resolving these demands

    1. Meetings are irregular and agenda driven: A Council that meets once in a year or longer cannot track an issue between sittings, so items are carried forward rather than closed. Eg. The Southern Zonal Council reached only its 31st meeting in 2026, seven decades after the Councils were created in 1956.
    2. Recommendations carry no enforcement: There is no mechanism to compel a member State or the Centre to act on a resolution the Council adopts. Eg. Karnataka’s request that the Council resolve to honour the 1971 Census for delimitation would bind neither Parliament nor the Centre even if adopted.
    3. The Council has no dispute settlement power over water: Inter State river water disputes are reserved to tribunals by statute, so the Council can discuss but not decide them. Eg. The Krishna waters question was placed before the Council even as Telangana insisted that established adjudicatory mechanisms be respected.
    4. Fiscal questions sit outside its mandate: Scheme design and the central share are decided by the Union ministries and the Finance Commission, not by a regional council. Eg. Kerala’s request for State specific Ayushman Bharat premiums has to be settled by the health ministry, not by the Council.
    5. Asymmetry of the chair: The Union Home Minister chairs the Council, so the Centre presides over a forum where the principal counterparty in most disputes is the Centre itself. Eg. Karnataka used the meeting to ask the Centre to reconsider a central Act on mineral taxation.
    6. Overlapping bodies dilute accountability: The Inter-State Council, the NITI Aayog Governing Council, the Goods and Services Tax Council and the Zonal Councils all handle Centre State coordination without a clear division of subjects. Eg. The pending water issues were referred simultaneously to the concerned ministries, the Inter-State Council and the States.

    Conclusion

    The Council closed with agreement on two procedural points, namely further consultation on the division of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana assets and further meetings on pending water issues, and the next step lies with the Ministry of Home Affairs. The substantive demands raised, on delimitation, on the freeze on Lok Sabha seats, on centrally sponsored scheme funding and on coastal mineral auctions, remain with Parliament and the Union ministries. The meeting confirmed that the southern States are asking to be held harmless for the very performance they were praised for. That question cannot be answered by a body whose conclusions are recommendatory.

    What is Cooperative Federalism?

    1. About: Cooperative federalism is a working arrangement in which the Union and the States act as collaborating levels of the same government rather than as rival sovereigns, coordinating through joint institutions on subjects that neither can handle alone.
    2. Rationale: It exists because the Indian Constitution distributes powers between two levels while leaving many problems, such as river water, internal migration, public health and taxation of a single national market, indivisible across those levels.
    3. The institutional forms it takes:
    4. Constitutional coordination bodies: The Inter-State Council and the Finance Commission are created by the Constitution itself rather than by statute.
    5. Statutory coordination bodies: The Zonal Councils under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and the North Eastern Council under its own 1971 statute are created by Parliament.
    6. Executive coordination bodies: The NITI Aayog Governing Council and its Regional Councils operate through executive resolution rather than statute.
    7. Constitutionally mandated joint decision bodies: The Goods and Services Tax Council under Article 279A takes decisions binding in practice on both levels through a weighted vote.
    8. The doctrinal companion: Competitive federalism describes States competing on outcome indicators for investment and rank, and operates alongside cooperative federalism rather than replacing it.

    Key Concerns Regarding Cooperative Federalism

    1. The Governor’s office as a point of friction: Reservation of Bills for the President’s consideration and indefinite withholding of assent place an appointee of the Centre inside the State legislative process.
    2. Central agencies operating in State subjects: Police and public order are State List subjects, while central investigative agencies operate within States, and several States have withdrawn general consent for such operations.
    3. Unilateral legislation on Concurrent List subjects: Parliament can legislate on Concurrent List entries without State agreement, and central law prevails over State law under Article 254 in the event of repugnancy.
    4. Central control over the higher civil service: All India Service officers serve in the States but are governed by central cadre rules, so deputation and disciplinary control sit with the Centre.
    5. Coordination bodies meet at the Centre’s discretion: The Inter-State Council and the Zonal Councils have no fixed calendar in the Constitution or the statute, so their frequency depends on the Union executive.
    6. Reorganisation obligations remain open for years: Division of assets and liabilities after State bifurcation is left to be settled by consultation, which leaves successor States negotiating long after reorganisation.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Centre State Coordination

    1. Article 246 with the Seventh Schedule: Distributes legislative power across the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List.
    2. Article 254: Provides that central law prevails over a repugnant State law on a Concurrent List subject, subject to Presidential assent for the State law.
    3. Article 262: Empowers Parliament to provide for adjudication of disputes over the waters of inter State rivers and to bar the jurisdiction of courts, including the Supreme Court, over such disputes.
    4. Article 263: Empowers the President to establish an Inter-State Council to inquire into and advise upon inter State disputes and to investigate and discuss subjects of common interest.
    5. Article 279A: Establishes the Goods and Services Tax Council as a joint forum of the Centre and the States with a weighted voting formula.
    6. Article 280: Establishes the Finance Commission to recommend the distribution of net tax proceeds between the Union and the States and the principles governing grants in aid.
    7. Article 281 and Article 282: Require Finance Commission recommendations to be laid before Parliament, and allow the Union and the States to make grants for any public purpose, which is the constitutional basis for centrally sponsored schemes.
    8. Article 81 and Article 82: Fix the composition of the Lok Sabha and require readjustment of seat allocation among States after each Census, on the terms Parliament determines.
    9. Article 293: Places conditions on State borrowing where a State is indebted to the Union.
    10. Article 131: Confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in disputes between the Government of India and one or more States.

    Laws and Rules Governing Inter State Coordination

    1. States Reorganisation Act, 1956: Reorganised the States on a linguistic basis and created the five Zonal Councils.
    2. Sections 15 to 22 establish the Councils, fix their composition and define their advisory functions on inter State and Centre State matters.
    3. North Eastern Council Act, 1971: Created a sixth regional council for the north eastern States, later amended in 2002 to add Sikkim and to make the Council a regional planning body.
    4. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides for the constitution of a tribunal where a State complains that its interests in an inter State river are affected.
    5. The 2002 amendment fixed a one year deadline for constituting a tribunal and a three year deadline for its award, with a further two year extension permitted.
    6. Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014: Governs the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, including the division of assets, liabilities and institutions still under negotiation.
    7. Inter-State Council Order, 1990: The Presidential order that constituted the Inter-State Council on a recommendation of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre State relations, and defined its duties.
    8. It makes the Prime Minister the chairman, with the Chief Ministers of all States, the Chief Ministers of Union Territories with legislatures, administrators of other Union Territories and six Union Cabinet Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister as members.
    9. A Standing Committee chaired by the Union Home Minister handles continuous consultation, and the Council Secretariat functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    10. Its recommendations are not binding on the Centre or on any State.

    Challenges in Centre State Fiscal and Resource Relations

    1. The divisible pool is smaller than the tax collected: Cesses and surcharges are not shared with the States, so revenue can rise without the States’ share rising with it. Eg. Kerala pressed at the Council for a revised central share reflecting actual expenditure incurred on centrally sponsored families.
    2. Centrally sponsored schemes carry uniform design across unequal States: A single national parameter ignores differences in cost, disease burden and delivery capacity across States. Eg. Kerala asked for State specific premiums under the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana in place of a uniform national premium.
    3. Resource decisions on State territory are taken centrally: Auction and regulation of major minerals sit with the Centre while the resource and its social costs sit in the State. Eg. Kerala asked that auctioning of mineral blocks along its coast be put on hold, and Karnataka asked the Centre to reconsider the 2026 mineral law amendment.
    4. River water adjudication is slow enough to become a political dispute: Tribunal timelines stretch across electoral cycles, so States negotiate politically while adjudication is pending. Eg. The Krishna waters allocation between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana remained live at the Council table.
    5. Bifurcation settlements remain unfinished for years: Division of assets, liabilities and institutions is left to consultation without a deadline. Eg. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana agreed at this meeting to resolve asset and liability division in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, twelve years after reorganisation.
    6. Fiscal performance is not rewarded in the transfer formula: Devolution weights population and income distance heavily, so States with better demographic and fiscal outcomes receive a smaller share. Eg. Tamil Nadu stated at the meeting that it seeks treatment that rewards performance alongside equity.
    7. Borrowing headroom is set by the Centre: State borrowing limits are fixed centrally under Article 293 and under the fiscal responsibility framework, which caps State led capital spending. Eg. Andhra Pradesh projected a $10 trillion southern economy by 2047, a target that depends on capital expenditure the States do not independently control.

    Way Forward

    1. Fix a statutory meeting calendar for the Councils: Require the Zonal Councils and the Inter-State Council to meet at a defined minimum frequency, with published agendas and action taken reports on earlier resolutions.
    2. Create an action taken mechanism: Record each Council recommendation against a named ministry with a response deadline, so a recommendation produces a documented decision rather than a carry forward.
    3. Settle the delimitation question before the freeze lapses: Resolve the basis for readjustment through a parliamentary process now, rather than allowing the constitutional deadline to force it.
    4. Cap cesses and surcharges as a share of gross tax revenue: Limit the proportion of central tax revenue kept outside the divisible pool so that devolution tracks actual collections.
    5. Allow State specific parameters within national schemes: Permit variation in premium, unit cost and beneficiary definition within centrally sponsored schemes where a State demonstrates a different cost structure.
    6. Enforce the statutory timelines for water tribunals: Apply the one year constitution and three year award deadlines strictly, and use a single permanent tribunal with benches to prevent each dispute restarting from the beginning.
    7. Close reorganisation settlements with a deadline: Fix an outer date for completing the division of assets, liabilities and institutions under reorganisation statutes, with an arbitral mechanism where consultation fails.

    “[2025] With reference to India, consider the following:

    I. The Inter-State Council

    II. The National Security Council

    III. Zonal Councils

    How many of the above were established as per the provisions of the Constitution of India?

    (a) Only one

    (b) Only two

    (c) All the three

    (d) None

  • Union Cabinet clears HC bench for Ladakh

    Why in the News

    The Union Cabinet has decided to establish a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ladakh, aimed at improving access to justice in the Union Territory. The decision answers a long-standing demand on judicial access at a point when the agitation in Ladakh is pressing a different set of demands on statehood, Sixth Schedule protection and an empowered legislature.

    What is a High Court bench?

    1. About: A High Court bench is a permanent sitting of a High Court at a place other than its principal seat, where judges hear cases arising from a defined territory.
    2. Purpose: A bench reduces the distance and cost of approaching the higher judiciary for litigants living far from the principal seat, without creating a separate High Court.
    3. How it is established: The place of the principal seat and of any other place of sitting is fixed by the President by notification, and the establishment of a bench ordinarily follows a proposal from the State or Union Territory government with the concurrence of the High Court’s Chief Justice and the Union Law Ministry.
    4. The court concerned: The Jammu and Kashmir High Court, renamed the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, is the common High Court for the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.

    What is the Leh Apex Body?

    1. About: The Leh Apex Body is the umbrella platform of political, religious and social organisations from Leh district, formed to press Ladakh’s demands for constitutional safeguards.
    2. Role: It leads the Ladakh agitation jointly with the Kargil Democratic Alliance and negotiates with the Ministry of Home Affairs.

    What is the Kargil Democratic Alliance?

    1. About: The Kargil Democratic Alliance is the corresponding umbrella platform of political, religious and social organisations from Kargil district.
    2. Role: It negotiates alongside the Leh Apex Body, so the two districts present a single set of demands to the Centre.

    What does the decision do?

    1. The decision: The Union Cabinet decided to establish a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ladakh, announced by the Union Home Minister on 20 August 2026.
    2. Stated effect: The bench will enhance access to justice for citizens living in remote areas of Ladakh by reducing the time required to avail the legal services they are entitled to.
    3. Framing by the Centre: The announcement reaffirmed the Centre’s commitment to ensuring constitutional safeguards and the all-round development of the region.
    4. Response from the Union Territory: The Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh welcomed it as a historic decision and said it would ensure speedy justice and reaffirm commitment to the region’s development.
    5. The demand it answers: Officials said the bench is expected to address a long-standing demand for easier and faster access to the higher judiciary for people in Ladakh.

    Does a High Court bench answer what the Ladakh agitation is asking for?

    1. What the agitation seeks: Local stakeholders are seeking stronger safeguards in four areas: land, employment, culture and political representation.
    2. The non-negotiable demands: The Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance submitted a memorandum listing three non-negotiable demands: financial powers for the proposed elected Ladakh Legislative Assembly, a separate Public Service Commission for jobs in the Union Territory, and unconditional withdrawal of all cases against those affected by the violence of 24 September last year.
    3. The gap: A judicial bench addresses the distance to the higher judiciary and does not touch legislative powers, recruitment autonomy or constitutional protection of land and culture.
    4. Why the timing matters: The announcement comes against the backdrop of continuing discussions over the political, administrative and constitutional future of Ladakh.
    5. What the Centre is offering instead: The Centre is exploring a Union Territory level legislative body under certain provisions of Article 371, rather than the Sixth Schedule extension the agitation has demanded.

    What happened in Leh on 24 September last year and what has followed?

    1. The incident: Four persons were killed and at least 50 injured in Leh when a protest demanding statehood and extension of Sixth Schedule protections turned violent and police opened fire on protesters.
    2. Cases registered: About 87 people were booked following the violence, of whom about nine were chargesheeted.
    3. Withdrawal of cases: The Ladakh administration announced that cases against 25 people will be withdrawn, with closure reports to be filed in court in due course.
    4. Further review: The Chief Secretary said the Director General of Police has been directed to review the cases of the remaining persons still under investigation, to identify others who did not have an active role.
    5. Official characterisation: The Chief Secretary termed the incident a blot on the pages of India’s history.
    6. Detention of the activist: Climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, who was on a hunger strike for nearly 35 days in support of Ladakh’s demands, called off his fast, and was booked under the National Security Act, 1980 and lodged in Jodhpur jail for six months.

    What is the Article 371 route being explored?

    1. The proposal: A Union Territory level legislative body is being envisaged for Ladakh under certain provisions of Article 371.
    2. Work in progress: The Ministry of Home Affairs is working with the Law Ministry to prepare a framework for the arrangement.
    3. Questions the framework must settle: The framework has to decide how the body will be elected, what powers it will hold and the shape of the executive.
    4. Next step: The discussions will be taken further in a formal structured meeting of the sub-committee, expected in the first week of September.
    5. The stated horizon: The Chief Secretary said these things will not happen overnight and that a new model will be established for Ladakh.

    Challenges to Ladakh’s Demand for Constitutional Safeguards

    1. Sixth Schedule applicability: The Sixth Schedule as it stands applies to tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, so extending it to a Union Territory requires a constitutional amendment. Eg. The National Commission for Scheduled Tribes recommended Sixth Schedule inclusion for Ladakh in 2019, and the recommendation has not been acted upon.
    2. Union Territory without a legislature: Ladakh was constituted as a Union Territory without a legislature on 31 October 2019, so all law-making for it rests with Parliament and the administrator. Eg. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 gave a legislature to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and none to Ladakh.
    3. Employment and recruitment: Without a separate Public Service Commission, recruitment for Ladakh runs through arrangements that local stakeholders say do not reserve posts for residents. Eg. The demand for a dedicated Ladakh Public Service Commission is one of the three non-negotiable demands submitted to the Chief Secretary.
    4. Land and demographic protection: Absence of domicile-linked land restrictions is the core anxiety behind the safeguards demand. Eg. Leh and Kargil bodies have sought protection of land and culture alongside political representation in every round of talks.
    5. Trust deficit after the firing: Criminal proceedings against protesters continue during the talks, which constrains negotiation. Eg. Of about 87 people booked after the 24 September violence, cases against 25 are being withdrawn and the rest remain under review.
    6. Ecological limits on development: Ladakh is a cold desert with acute water stress, so development promises collide with carrying capacity. Eg. Leh town’s groundwater and spring-fed supply has come under strain from tourism growth and construction.
    7. Continuity of dialogue: Negotiations depend on periodic meetings without a statutory framework or timeline. Eg. The next round of talks with the Ministry of Home Affairs team is scheduled for the following month, with a sub-committee meeting expected in the first week of September.

    Conclusion

    The Union Cabinet has cleared a bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court for Ladakh, and the Lieutenant Governor has welcomed it as answering a long-standing demand on judicial access. The demands driving the agitation, statehood, Sixth Schedule protection, financial powers for an elected assembly and a separate Public Service Commission, remain unresolved. The Centre is preparing a framework for a Union Territory level legislative body under provisions of Article 371, with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Law Ministry deciding its election method, powers and executive structure. The next milestone is a formal structured sub-committee meeting expected in the first week of September, ahead of the next round of talks with the Ministry of Home Affairs team.

    “[2025, GS2, 10] Discuss the nature of Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly after the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019. Briefly describe the powers and functions of the Assembly of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • Former SC judge-led panel to probe ‘police excesses’ against protesters

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has constituted a five member High-Powered Enquiry Committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge to examine alleged excesses and disproportionate use of force by police and security personnel at Jantar Mantar and other locations during last month’s protests over the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (Undergraduate) paper leak. The Court framed twelve issues for the inquiry, covering both police conduct and violence by protesters. The order therefore turns a policing controversy into an examination of the constitutional limits on how the State may respond to assembly.

    What is the High-Powered Enquiry Committee?

    1. What it is: The High-Powered Enquiry Committee (HPEC) is a fact finding body constituted by the Supreme Court to examine allegations of excessive force by police and security personnel during the protests, and to report back to the Court.
    2. Who heads it and who sits on it: It is headed by former Supreme Court judge R Subhash Reddy. Its members are former Punjab and Haryana High Court Chief Justice Ravi Shankar Jha, former Delhi High Court judge Justice Shalinder Kaur, former Central Bureau of Investigation Director Rishi Kumar Shukla, and retired Director General of Police of Meghalaya L R Bishnoi.
    3. How it must function: The inquiry is not to be a one time exercise. The Committee is to undertake a continuous and periodic assessment of the enumerated issues and submit interim findings periodically, so the Court can issue directions as warranted.
    4. What it does not displace: The Court clarified that the constitution of the Committee shall in no way deter or debar police authorities or security forces from taking administrative or disciplinary action against officers found in contravention of the rules governing their conduct.

    What is the current status of the right to protest in India?

    1. The right itself: The right to protest is drawn from Article 19(1)(a), the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, read together.
    2. The condition built into the text: The assembly must be peaceable and without arms, so the protection falls away for an assembly that turns violent or armed.
    3. The limits on the right: Restrictions may be imposed under Article 19(2) on speech and Article 19(3) on assembly, and the restriction must be reasonable and imposed by law rather than by executive discretion alone.
    4. No right to occupy a public space indefinitely: The Supreme Court in Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police (2020) held that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely, and that demonstrations must take place in designated areas.
    5. A blanket ban on a protest site is not permissible: In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India (2018) the Court set aside an absolute prohibition on demonstrations at Jantar Mantar and directed that guidelines be framed regulating rather than eliminating protest there.
    6. Force must be proportionate and compensable: In Anita Thakur v State of Jammu and Kashmir (2016) the Court held that use of excessive force by police against demonstrators violates Article 21 and awarded compensation to the injured.
    7. The operative statutory levers: Prohibitory orders are issued under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and speech and assembly prosecutions have been brought under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to the Right to Protest and Police Accountability

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees to all citizens the freedom of speech and expression, from which the right to voice dissent is drawn.
    2. Article 19(1)(b): Guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    3. Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees the right to form associations or unions, under which protest organisations operate.
    4. Article 19(2): Permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression on enumerated grounds.
    5. Article 19(3): Permits reasonable restrictions on the right of assembly in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order.
    6. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, the provision under which bodily harm caused by disproportionate force is examined.
    7. Article 22: Provides safeguards on arrest and detention, including the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest and to consult a legal practitioner.
    8. Article 20(3): Protects a person accused of an offence against being compelled to be a witness against himself.
    9. Article 32 and Article 226: Provide the remedies before the Supreme Court and the High Courts through which protest related grievances and monitored inquiries are brought.
    10. Seventh Schedule, State List Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place public order and police within the legislative and executive competence of the States, which is why a national inquiry into police conduct proceeds through the Court rather than through a central department.

    What is Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it does: Section 163 empowers a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate to issue a written order directing a person or the public generally to abstain from a specified act, where there is an apprehension of obstruction, annoyance, danger to human life or a disturbance of public tranquillity.
    2. Its limits: An order under the section is temporary and cannot ordinarily remain in force beyond two months, and it corresponds to the power earlier exercised under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

    What is Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it criminalises: Section 152 punishes acts that excite secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities or separatist feelings, or that endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, with punishment extending to life imprisonment or seven years with fine.
    2. What it replaced: It came into force on 1 July 2024 in place of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the sedition provision inserted in 1870, and its constitutional validity is under challenge on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.

    What are metallic kinetic projectiles?

    1. What they are: Metallic kinetic projectiles, commonly called pellets, are small metal shot fired in a scattering pattern from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, used as a crowd control weapon.
    2. Why they are contested: The scatter pattern makes the point of impact uncontrollable, so injuries to the eyes and upper body are common and the resulting harm is often irreversible.

    What are the twelve issues the Committee will examine?

    1. Issue 1, excessive force: Alleged use of excessive force and violence against protesters by police authorities and other agencies, including deployment of pellet guns, electric batons, lathi charges and tear gas without adequate warning or proportionality, resulting in severe bodily harm and injuries, some alleged to be of a grievous and lasting nature.
    2. Issue 2, proportionality of response: Ensuring a proportionate and measured police response during protests, public gatherings and peaceful assemblies, so as to strike an appropriate balance between maintaining public order and exercising the constitutional right to peaceful dissent.
    3. Issue 3, banning pellets: The desirability of banning the use of metallic kinetic projectiles or pellets fired from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, having regard to the grave and at times irreversible bodily harm they cause.
    4. Issue 4, identification of officers: The necessity of ensuring that police and security personnel wear proper uniforms and visible nameplates while effecting arrests or using force during crowd control operations, to secure accountability and enable identification of individual officers.
    5. Issue 5, surveillance: Allegations of monitoring and surveillance of protesters by police personnel, and the extent to which such measures were consistent with the protesters’ constitutional rights to privacy and free assembly.
    6. Issue 6, female protesters: Alleged incidents of targeted violence, harassment, molestation and secondary victimisation directed against female protesters, which warrant a focused and expeditious enquiry.
    7. Issue 7, medical support and compensation: The provision of medical and other requisite support, including award of compensation, to victims of alleged police abuse, and the manner and adequacy of the support extended so far.
    8. Issue 8, prohibitory orders: Regulation of the issuance of blanket prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to prevent their use as a routine or pre-emptive measure that forecloses peaceful assembly rather than as a proportionate response to a real and imminent threat to public order.
    9. Issue 9, thresholds for Section 152: The establishment of strict constitutional thresholds and safeguards to prevent Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 from being invoked to stifle political dissent and peaceful protest, so that it is not permitted to operate as a chilling restraint on constitutionally protected speech and assembly.
    10. Issue 10, violence by protesters: Alleged use of force and violence by protesters against police officers and other security personnel.
    11. Issue 11, damage to property: Damage to public property caused by the actions of protesters, including destruction of and injury to government installations, vehicles and other assets belonging to the State and to private citizens alike.
    12. Issue 12, injuries to police: The injuries sustained by police forces in the course of discharging their duties, and the consequent mental and emotional trauma borne by their families.

    Which issues has the Court told the Committee to take up first?

    1. The two priority issues: The Committee is to address Issue 1 on excessive force and Issue 6 on targeted violence against female protesters on a priority basis, bearing in mind the sensitivity attendant on them.
    2. The first deliverable: The Committee has been asked to complete its inquiry and deliberations on those two issues and submit its First Interim Report at the earliest.
    3. The additional head opened: The Committee may also examine the grant of interim compensation to those injured on either side, whether police personnel or protesters.
    4. The reporting design: Interim findings are to be submitted periodically rather than a single report at the end, so the Court can issue directions while the inquiry continues.
    5. When the order was made: The order is dated 19 August 2026 and was released on 20 August 2026.

    Why does the Court’s framing place police conduct and protester conduct on the same list?

    1. The list is symmetrical by design: Nine issues concern police and State conduct and three concern protester conduct, so the inquiry is not framed solely as an investigation of the police.
    2. The compensation head runs both ways: Interim compensation is opened for those injured on either side, which places an injured constable and an injured student within the same remedial frame.
    3. Trauma is recognised on the police side: Issue 12 extends to the mental and emotional trauma borne by the families of injured police personnel, a head rarely written into an inquiry mandate.
    4. Symmetry is not equivalence: The two issues marked for priority treatment are both allegations against the police, so the sequencing signals which set of allegations the Court treats as most urgent.
    5. The disciplinary channel stays open in parallel: The Court expressly preserved the power of police authorities to take administrative or disciplinary action against their own officers, so the inquiry does not become a reason to suspend departmental accountability.
    6. The tension the design carries: A committee asked simultaneously to judge police excess and protester violence must apply one standard of proportionality to an armed disciplined force and another to an unorganised crowd, without a settled test for either.

    Major debates surrounding the right to protest and the use of force

    1. Regulation against prohibition: One position holds that designated protest sites and prior permission are reasonable regulation of a public space, and the other holds that permission requirements convert a right into a licence.
    2. Two rulings pulling in opposite directions: Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (2018) struck down a blanket prohibition at a protest site, and Amit Sahni (2020) held that public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely, so the boundary between the two remains contested.
    3. The proportionality standard for lethal and less lethal weapons: There is no settled judicial test fixing when tear gas, water cannon, batons or pellets may be used, so proportionality is assessed after the event rather than fixed in advance.
    4. Whether pellet weapons can be regulated or must be banned: One position accepts them as a less lethal alternative to firearms, and the other holds that an uncontrollable scatter pattern makes proportionate use impossible in principle.
    5. Prohibitory orders as prevention against pre-emption: Section 163 is defended as a preventive power against imminent threats and contested as a routine instrument that forecloses assembly before any threat materialises.
    6. Whether the narrowing of sedition survives its replacement: The Kedar Nath Singh (1962) requirement of incitement to violence narrowed the old sedition provision, and whether that narrowing automatically transfers to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is unsettled.
    7. Command responsibility against individual liability: Accountability for crowd control failures is contested between the individual officer who used force and the supervising officer who ordered the deployment.
    8. The evidentiary gap the dispute turns on: Without uniforms carrying visible identification, body worn cameras and a contemporaneous record of orders, allegations on both sides rest on competing testimony rather than on documented fact.

    Challenges to the inquiry delivering accountability

    1. A fact finding committee is not a prosecuting authority: The Committee reports to the Court and cannot itself frame charges or convict, so accountability depends on what follows the report. Eg. The Court has separately preserved the departmental power to take disciplinary action, which sits outside the Committee’s control.
    2. Evidence degrades with time in crowd control cases: Injury records, video footage, control room logs and deployment orders have to be secured early or they cease to be reliable. Eg. Issue 4 arises precisely because officers using force were allegedly not identifiable by uniform or nameplate.
    3. Prosecution of police officers requires sanction: Proceeding against a public servant for acts done in the discharge of official duty depends on prior sanction from the government that employs him. Eg. The requirement of prior sanction has historically been the reason many custodial and encounter cases do not reach trial.
    4. Police is a State subject and the incidents spanned States: The Committee’s findings must be implemented by multiple State governments, each of which controls its own force. Eg. The mandate covers Jantar Mantar and other locations across the country during the same protest wave.
    5. Compensation without a fixed scale invites disparity: Interim compensation awarded case by case, on both sides, has no published scale to anchor it. Eg. In Anita Thakur (2016) compensation was fixed by the Court itself in the absence of any statutory schedule for excessive force.
    6. Monitored inquiries lose momentum once attention moves: A periodic assessment mandate depends on the Court continuing to list and act on interim reports over years. Eg. The Prakash Singh directions on police reform were issued in 2006 and remain incompletely implemented across States two decades later.
    7. The unresolved statutory questions sit outside the Committee’s power: Issues 8 and 9 ask for constitutional thresholds on Section 163 and Section 152, which only the Court or Parliament can settle. Eg. The constitutional challenge to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is pending separately before the Supreme Court.

    Conclusion

    The Committee stands constituted with five members under an order dated 19 August 2026, and its immediate task is a First Interim Report on excessive force and on targeted violence against female protesters. The mandate is unusually wide, covering not only what the police did but also the statutory instruments through which protest was restricted, namely prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and prosecutions under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The constitutional question the order raises is whether the State can be held to a proportionality standard in crowd control when no such standard exists in written form. Until that standard is fixed in advance, each episode will continue to be judged after the fact by a fresh committee.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.”

  • Collectors empowered to grant citizenship under CAA

    Why in the News

    The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has transferred the processing of pending citizenship applications under the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 from centrally staffed Empowered Committees to District Collectors in eight States and Union Territories. The transfer reverses a centralising arrangement built two years earlier specifically to keep State machinery out of the process. It arrives after the political composition of the State that had resisted the law most strongly changed.

    What is the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019?

    1. What it does: It amends the Citizenship Act, 1955 to create a route to Indian citizenship for members of six communities from three neighbouring countries who entered India before a fixed cut off date.
    2. Who it covers: It applies to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 without documents or illegally.
    3. How it operates: It inserts Section 6B into the Citizenship Act, 1955, under which such persons may be granted citizenship by registration or naturalisation, and it exempts them from being treated as illegal migrants.
    4. When it became operational: The Act was passed in December 2019, and the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules that made it operational came into effect on 11 March 2024, days before the 2024 General Election.

    What is Section 6B of the Citizenship Act, 1955?

    1. The provision: Section 6B is the enabling clause inserted by the 2019 amendment, under which the Central Government or an authority specified by it may grant a certificate of registration or naturalisation to a person covered by the Act.
    2. What it removes: It provides that proceedings pending against such a person in respect of illegal migration or citizenship stand abated on grant of citizenship, and that the person is deemed a citizen from the date of entry into India.

    What were the Empowered Committees?

    1. Composition: Each Empowered Committee was made up of Central Government officials, drawn from bodies including the Census organisation, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the postal department.
    2. Purpose: They were created to receive and clear citizenship applications without routing them through State government machinery, with at least four constituted, two of them at the district level.

    What does the 19 August order change in the processing chain?

    1. The transfer of pending cases: All applications pending before the Empowered Committees and the District Level Committees in the eight jurisdictions stand transferred to the concerned Collector.
    2. The jurisdictions covered: Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam except tribal areas, Tripura except tribal areas, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.
    3. The instrument used: The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026, notified on 19 August 2026, empower Collectors in these jurisdictions to receive, scrutinise and dispose of applications for registration or naturalisation under Section 6B.
    4. What the Collector must now do: The Collector is required to verify the documents submitted by an applicant and determine whether the applicant meets the eligibility requirements.
    5. The earlier notification is displaced: The order makes the MHA notification of 11 March 2024 implementing the Citizenship Amendment Rules inapplicable to these jurisdictions.
    6. The committee route is spent: The order renders the earlier multi agency committee arrangement redundant in the eight jurisdictions.

    Why was the power centralised in the first place?

    1. State opposition to the law: The Citizenship Amendment Act was strongly opposed by the then Trinamool Congress government in West Bengal.
    2. The design was built to bypass the State: Empowered Committees headed by Central Government officials were constituted specifically to keep the State government out of the processing of applications.
    3. The timing tracked the electoral calendar: The committees were created days before the Assembly polls in West Bengal in April 2026, and the amendment now decentralising the process was notified after the Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in that State.
    4. The first grants preceded the committees: The Home Ministry handed the first set of citizenship certificates to 14 applicants in May 2024.

    Why does a Union List subject still need the States?

    1. The subject is central: Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens fall under the Union List of the Seventh Schedule, so legislative and executive competence rests with the Centre.
    2. The delivery is district level: Receiving applications, verifying documents and issuing certificates are field functions that need offices, staff and records located in the district.
    3. Police verification sits with the State: Police is a State List subject, so verification of an applicant’s antecedents runs through the State police machinery whatever the processing authority.
    4. The State’s role was reduced to logistics: Under the centralised arrangement the State’s contribution was limited to providing office space and police verification of applicants.
    5. The Collector belongs to both systems: A District Collector is an officer of the State administration and simultaneously the Centre’s principal field functionary in the district, which is why the transfer restores State machinery without transferring the subject.

    What are the other major changes the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 made?

    1. Shortened naturalisation period: For the covered communities the residence requirement in the qualifying period for naturalisation was reduced from eleven years to five years, a change made to the Third Schedule of the Citizenship Act, 1955.
    2. Exemption from illegal migrant status: Covered persons were exempted from the operation of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Foreigners Act, 1946, so their entry without documents no longer bars citizenship.
    3. Abatement of pending proceedings: Proceedings pending against a covered person in respect of illegal migration or citizenship abate on grant of citizenship.
    4. Geographic carve outs: The Act does not apply to the tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura covered by the Sixth Schedule, nor to areas under the Inner Line Permit regime in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur.
    5. Effect on Overseas Citizen of India registration: The Act added a ground for cancellation of Overseas Citizen of India registration where the holder violates any law notified by the Central Government, with an opportunity of being heard.

    Major debates surrounding the Citizenship Amendment Act

    1. Religion as a statutory classification: The Act identifies its beneficiaries by naming six religious communities, which is contested as a classification that fails the reasonable classification test under Article 14.
    2. The defence of the classification: The stated basis is that the three named countries have a State religion and that the six communities are religious minorities there facing persecution, which is offered as an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus.
    3. The excluded groups: Persecuted groups outside the classification, including Ahmadis and Shias in Pakistan, Rohingya from Myanmar and Tamils from Sri Lanka, fall outside the Act’s coverage.
    4. The cut off date and the Assam Accord: The 31 December 2014 cut off for the covered communities sits against the 24 March 1971 cut off fixed for Assam by Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, inserted after the Assam Accord of 1985 to regularise migrants in that State. The gap between the two dates is the source of the objection in Assam.
    5. Section 6A itself has been upheld: A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 6A in 2024, confirming the 1971 cut off for Assam as constitutionally valid.
    6. The link with a national register: The objection that the Act operates as a filter alongside a nationwide citizens register turns on whether the two exercises are read together, since the Act creates a route to citizenship but no obligation to prove it.
    7. The federal objection: Several State legislatures passed resolutions seeking repeal of the Act, and Kerala filed an original suit in the Supreme Court under Article 131, raising the question whether a State can sue over a Union List subject.

    Challenges to implementing the CAA framework

    1. Documentary proof of origin is the binding constraint: An applicant who entered without documents has to establish nationality of the country of origin and the date of entry, which is precisely what the flight left behind. Eg. The Home Ministry issued its first set of certificates to only 14 applicants in May 2024, years after the Act was passed.
    2. Eligibility determination sits with a generalist officer: The Collector must now assess questions of foreign nationality, religious identity and date of entry alongside a full district administration workload. Eg. The function was earlier assigned to committees staffed by Census, Intelligence Bureau and postal officials specifically for that expertise.
    3. Verification depends on a machinery the Centre does not control: Police verification of applicants runs through the State police, a State List subject, so the pace of processing depends on State cooperation. Eg. The centralised committee design was itself adopted because the West Bengal government opposed the law.
    4. Applicants risk exposure by applying: Filing an application is an admission of having entered India without valid documents, which deters applicants where the outcome is uncertain. Eg. The Act exempts covered persons from the Foreigners Act, 1946 only on grant of citizenship, not on filing.
    5. Uniformity across eight jurisdictions is hard to hold: Decentralising to district officers across eight States and Union Territories creates as many decision practices as there are districts. Eg. The 19 August order applies to Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, each with a different administrative history on migration.
    6. The carve outs cut through the areas of highest migrant density: Excluding Sixth Schedule areas and Inner Line Permit States removes from coverage several districts where the affected population actually lives. Eg. Tribal areas of Assam and Tripura are expressly excluded from the 19 August transfer as well.
    7. The constitutional challenge remains live: A framework operating while its parent Act is under challenge risks decisions being unsettled later. Eg. More than 200 petitions challenging the Act were filed before the Supreme Court after its enactment.

    Conclusion

    The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026 stand notified with effect from 19 August 2026, and pending applications in the eight named jurisdictions have been transferred to District Collectors, who will now verify documents and determine eligibility. The 11 March 2024 notification no longer applies in those jurisdictions and the Empowered Committee route is spent there. The source names no further date or milestone for the disposal of the transferred applications. The change is administrative in form, and it records that the reason for centralising the process, namely State government opposition, is no longer present in the State it was designed for.

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements:

    1. There is only one citizenship and one domicile.

    2. A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State.

    3. A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 2 and 3

  • Dignity in death: Supreme Court upholds hanging under Article 21

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has dismissed a public interest litigation arguing that death by hanging is scientifically unreliable and violates the right to a dignified death under Article 21 of the Constitution. The ruling holds that a method of execution devised in colonial India still satisfies the constitutional promise of dignity, while leaving the question open to a future challenge built on fresh scientific material.

    What is the long drop method of hanging?

    1. The colonial inheritance: Hanging is the prescribed method of executing death sentences in India and derives from British Common Law.
    2. The older short drop method: Historically, hanging was carried out through a short drop, which causes death by asphyxiation.
    3. What the long drop is meant to do: A longer drop is calibrated to snap the second and third cervical vertebrae, the C2 and C3, and with them the spinal cord, rendering the person immediately unconscious.
    4. Why calibration decides the outcome: The drop must be matched to the individual’s weight and height, since a drop that is too short causes prolonged strangulation and one that is too long risks decapitation.
    5. The protocol afterwards: Standard prison protocols require the body to be left hanging for 30 minutes after the trap door opens.

    What is the current status of capital punishment and the right to die with dignity in India?

    1. Executions carried out: 971 executions have taken place in India between 1947 and 2025.
    2. Executions in this century: Only six executions have taken place since 2001, the most recent in 2020, of the four convicts in the Delhi gang rape and murder case.
    3. Sentences imposed: 1,281 convicts were sentenced to death between 2016 and 2025, which is far larger than the number of executions carried out.
    4. The sentencing threshold: The death penalty may be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases, the standard laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980).
    5. The statutory command: Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 provides that where a person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
    6. How old the clause is: The clause has barely changed since it was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1861 and has survived multiple amendments.
    7. The recognised right: The Supreme Court in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab (1996) held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live with dignity and consequently to die with dignity.
    8. The limits on that right: The right to die with dignity does not extend to a right to take one’s own life, and its recognised application is to end of life decisions rather than to the manner of a lawful execution.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Capital Punishment

    1. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and this procedure must be fair, just and reasonable.
    2. Article 14: Requires that the classification of offences and offenders attracting the death penalty be reasonable and non arbitrary.
    3. Article 20(1): Bars the imposition of a penalty greater than that prescribed by the law in force at the time the offence was committed.
    4. Article 22: Provides procedural protections on arrest and detention, including the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner.
    5. Article 72: Empowers the President to grant pardon, reprieve, respite or remission of punishment, and to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death.
    6. Article 161: Empowers the Governor to grant pardon and to commute sentences, though the power to pardon a death sentence rests with the President.
    7. Article 134: Provides an appeal to the Supreme Court in a criminal proceeding where a High Court has reversed an acquittal and imposed a death sentence.
    8. Article 136: Provides for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against any judgment or order in any cause or matter.
    9. Article 137: Provides the power of review, under which death row convicts are entitled to an open court hearing of a review petition.
    10. Concurrent List, Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place criminal law and criminal procedure in the Concurrent List, so both Parliament and State legislatures may legislate on them.

    What did the petition argue?

    1. The relief sought: A declaration that the provision prescribing hanging is unconstitutional, on the ground that Article 21 includes a right to die through a dignified procedure.
    2. The characterisation of the method: The method was described as accompanied by intense physical torture and pain, and as inherently unpredictable.
    3. The scientific material relied on: A 1992 study of the remains of 34 people hanged in England between 1882 and 1945.
    4. What the study found: Fractures at C2 and C3 were common, but the hangman’s fracture, assumed to cause near instant death, appeared in only three of the 34 cases, and six died of asphyxiation instead.
    5. The inference drawn: Hanging is therefore neither quick nor controllable in the way the law assumes it to be.
    6. The intervenor’s evidence: The Executive Director of a university death penalty clinic that intervened in the proceedings stated that researchers examining the remains of executed prisoners found that people had not died by an instant breaking of the neck, and that a range of painful and long drawn causes had produced their deaths.

    Why did the Court decline to revisit the 1983 precedent?

    1. The binding precedent: A three judge bench in Deena vs Union of India (1983) had upheld hanging as a constitutional mode of execution.
    2. What Deena examined: That bench considered medical evidence, expert opinion and comparative execution methods before ruling.
    3. What Deena held: Hanging, when properly administered, is a quick and certain method, causes no greater pain than any other known method, and avoids barbarity, torture and degradation.
    4. The legislative hurdle: Parliament chose to retain hanging while enacting the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, which is a recent legislative reaffirmation of the method.
    5. The evidentiary finding: The new scientific material did not displace the basis on which Deena was decided.
    6. The comparative finding: The material did not establish that lethal injection, electrocution, lethal gas or shooting offered any advantage over hanging.
    7. The constitutional conclusion: The existing method continues to satisfy the State’s obligation to carry out a death sentence with decency and decorum and without degradation or brutality.

    What is the Union government’s position?

    1. The claim made: Hanging remains the safest and quickest available method of execution.
    2. The domestic record cited: No botched execution has ever been recorded in India.
    3. The comparative argument: Lethal injection in the United States carries a well documented history of failures.
    4. What this position implies: The burden of demonstrating that an alternative is measurably less painful and more reliable rests on the challenger, not on the State.

    What did the Court leave open?

    1. No permanent closure: The bench stopped short of treating the question as settled forever.
    2. The ground for a future challenge: Constitutional law evolves, and a future challenge may succeed if new scientific, medical or empirical material fundamentally alters the assumptions on which Deena was decided.
    3. The executive route: The Court left it open to the Union government to examine alternative methods of execution should it choose to do so.
    4. What this means in practice: The method now depends on the state of the evidence rather than on the age of the precedent.

    What do other countries’ execution methods show about the search for a humane method?

    1. Hanging’s reach: A 2012 Cornell Law School database identified 60 countries that authorised hanging as a method of execution, concentrated in jurisdictions influenced by British Common Law, including India, Singapore and Japan.
    2. Lethal injection: The primary method in several United States states where the death penalty is allowed and heavily used in China, administering an anaesthetic, then a paralytic, then potassium chloride, and frequently botched where venous access is compromised.
    3. Shooting: Used in China, North Korea, Somalia and parts of West Asia, visually violent and traumatic for executioners, with proponents citing near instantaneous cardiac or neurological destruction.
    4. Beheading: Carried out with a sword in Saudi Arabia, and reliant entirely on the executioner’s precision.
    5. Nitrogen hypoxia: Recently introduced in the United States, using inhalation of pure nitrogen to cause asphyxiation without triggering the hypercapnic alarm response, the panicked sensation of suffocation, and criticised as insufficiently vetted and amounting to human experimentation.
    6. The abolition trend: More than two thirds of the world’s nations, around 113, have ended the death penalty in law or in practice, according to Amnesty International.
    7. The countervailing trend: A 2025 Amnesty International report recorded a 12 percent increase in executions over the previous year, so fewer states execute while those that do execute more.
    8. The 2025 concentration: The countries recording the most executions in 2025 were Iran at 2,159 or more, Saudi Arabia at 356 or more and Yemen at 51 or more, with China’s total running into the thousands and not published.
    9. What the comparison establishes: Every available method carries its own scientific and ethical controversy, which is why no alternative could be shown to be superior to hanging.

    Major debates surrounding capital punishment and the method of execution

    1. Retribution against reform: The claim that the gravest offences require the ultimate sanction stands against the claim that the state’s own conduct must not replicate the violence it punishes.
    2. Deterrence unproven: The deterrent effect of capital punishment has not been empirically established, which weakens the principal utilitarian justification offered for it.
    3. Two rulings in tension: Gian Kaur (1996) recognises a right to die with dignity within Article 21, while Deena (1983) holds that a method causing potential asphyxiation satisfies the same Article, and the present ruling resolves that tension in favour of the earlier precedent.
    4. Judge centric sentencing: The rarest of rare test is applied unevenly across benches, which makes the sentence depend in part on the composition of the court.
    5. Delay as cruelty: Prolonged delay in deciding mercy petitions has been held to be a ground for commutation, which converts the length of the process itself into a constitutional question.
    6. Socio economic profile of death row: A disproportionate share of death row prisoners come from poor and marginalised backgrounds with inadequate legal representation, which raises an equality question under Article 14.
    7. Irreversibility and wrongful conviction: The penalty cannot be corrected after execution, and acquittals in appeal after years on death row demonstrate that error occurs.
    8. The evidence gap the present dispute turns on: No systematic post mortem study of executions in India exists, so both the State’s claim of no botched execution and the petitioner’s claim of prolonged suffering rest on foreign data.
    9. Legislative expansion against judicial restriction: Parliament has extended the death penalty to more offences while the courts have narrowed the circumstances in which it may be imposed.

    Challenges to ensuring a constitutional mode of execution

    1. No Indian evidence base: India has no published forensic study of executions, so the constitutional question is argued on English data from 1882 to 1945. e.g. the 1992 study relied on by the petitioners examined 34 remains from England, not from any Indian prison.
    2. Calibration depends on execution skill: The drop length must be computed for each individual, so the outcome varies with the competence of prison staff. e.g. the official drop tables in use derive from colonial era manuals rather than from contemporary biomechanical evidence.
    3. Every alternative carries its own failure mode: No method has been shown to be reliably painless. e.g. lethal injection executions in the United States have taken over an hour where venous access failed.
    4. Absence of monitoring: No independent medical observation or record of the execution process is published. e.g. prison protocols require the body to hang for 30 minutes without any requirement to record the time or cause of death.
    5. Delay converts the sentence into a separate punishment: Prisoners spend years under sentence while appeals and mercy petitions are pending. e.g. the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v Union of India (2014) commuted 15 death sentences on the ground of inordinate delay in deciding mercy petitions.
    6. Unequal access to competent defence: The quality of representation at the sentencing stage decides who receives the sentence. e.g. mitigating circumstances are often not placed on record at all in trial courts, which the Supreme Court addressed in Manoj v State of Madhya Pradesh (2022).
    7. Legislative expansion without sentencing guidance: New offences attract the death penalty without any accompanying sentencing framework. e.g. the death penalty was extended to the rape of a child below twelve years by the amendment to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act in 2019.

    Conclusion

    The Court has held that hanging under Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 remains constitutional, on the twin grounds that Deena (1983) has not been displaced and that Parliament reaffirmed the method when it enacted the new Sanhita. The scientific material placed before it was found insufficient to dislodge the assumptions on which the 1983 ruling rests, and no alternative method was shown to be superior. The petition is dismissed, but the question is not closed, since a future challenge may succeed on fresh scientific, medical or empirical material. The Union government has also been left free to examine alternative methods of execution should it choose to do so.

    What is the rarest of rare doctrine?

    1. About: The rarest of rare doctrine is the sentencing standard under which the death penalty may be imposed only where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.
    2. Rationale: It exists because the Constitution permits capital punishment while Article 21 requires that its imposition be exceptional, reasoned and non arbitrary, so life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception.
    3. Where it comes from: Laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980), which upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty by a majority while confining it to the rarest of rare cases.
    4. The named typology it rests on:
      • Aggravating circumstances: Factors relating to the crime, such as extreme brutality, premeditation and the vulnerability of the victim, which weigh in favour of the maximum sentence.
      • Mitigating circumstances: Factors relating to the offender, such as age, mental condition, socio economic background and the probability of reform, which weigh against it.
      • The five categories in Machhi Singh v State of Punjab (1983): Manner of commission, motive, anti social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude of the crime, and personality of the victim.
      • The balancing requirement: The court must weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances and record why life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.

    Laws Governing Capital Punishment in India

    1. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023: The procedural code governing trial, sentencing, confirmation and execution of the death sentence, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    2. Section 393(5): Directs that a person sentenced to death be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
    3. Confirmation requirement: A death sentence passed by a Sessions Court has no effect until it is confirmed by the High Court.
    4. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023: The substantive penal code listing the offences that carry the death penalty, including murder, waging war against the Government of India, and certain aggravated forms of rape.
    5. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Provides the death penalty for a terrorist act resulting in death.
    6. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985: Provides the death penalty for repeat offences involving specified commercial quantities, made discretionary rather than mandatory after judicial challenge.
    7. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012: As amended in 2019, provides the death penalty for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child.
    8. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018: Extended the death penalty to repeat rape offences and to the rape of a child below twelve years respectively.
    9. Army Act, 1950, Navy Act, 1957 and Air Force Act, 1950: Provide the death penalty for specified offences under military law, where the alternative method of shooting is available.
    10. Prisons Act, 1894 and State prison manuals: Govern the conditions of confinement of death row prisoners and the procedure at the place of execution.

    “[2023, GS2, 15 marks] “The Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a constitution made for a progressive society”. Illustrate with special reference to the expanding horizons of the right to life and personal liberty.”