Mentor’s Comment

This article examines the debate on the ‘impartiality of a nominated Governor’, revived after the recent Supreme Court judgment on the powers of Governors. The discussion draws heavily from the Constituent Assembly debates, views of B.R. Ambedkar, and the political context surrounding gubernatorial discretion. For UPSC aspirants, this topic is crucial for understanding Centre-State relations, federal tensions, constitutional morality, and ongoing administrative bottlenecks.

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s recent judgment on the role of Governors, along with its advisory opinion on the 16th Presidential reference, has reopened a foundational debate: What was the intended role of a Governor in an independent India? The Constituent Assembly deliberated deeply on the Governor’s impartiality, limited discretion, and non-interfering nature. Contemporary frictions between Governors and elected State governments have made these debates sharply relevant again. The article traces the evolution, constitutional position, and recurring controversies around the Governor’s office.

Why in the News 

The Supreme Court’s latest judgment on gubernatorial powers has revived a long-standing constitutional controversy over whether Governors have exceeded their intended role. The ruling sharply contrasts past practice, where Governors often withheld assent or delayed Bills, exercising broad and ambiguous discretion. This is significant because Constituent Assembly debates categorically rejected any idea of a powerful, interfering Governor and saw him as a neutral constitutional head bound by ministerial advice. The issue has resurfaced as a major federal friction point, affecting State governance and raising concerns about constitutional morality.

What was the Constituent Assembly’s vision of a Governor?

1. Limited discretion: Members clarified that the Governor’s discretion should be minimal and specifically enumerated; not a general discretionary authority.
2. Non-interfering role: Dr. Ambedkar emphasised that the Governor must not act as an agent of the Centre nor interfere with the elected State government.
3. Neutral constitutional head: The Governor was designed to be above suspicion and must not be “remote-controlled,” especially in a parliamentary system.
4. No overriding authority: Ambedkar rejected giving Governors overriding powers (e.g., veto over Bills or control over ministries).

Why were doubts raised about the impartiality of a nominated Governor?

1. Remote-control concerns: Members felt a nominated Governor could be influenced by the central government, undermining State autonomy.
2. Fear of political bias: The Governor’s lack of electoral accountability created apprehensions regarding neutrality.
3. Past colonial experience: Residual memories of Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935, who wielded significant discretionary powers, fuelled suspicion.

How did the framers restrict discretionary powers?

1. Specific limitation: Discretion only for narrow, enumerated matters such as selecting a Chief Minister when no clear majority exists.
2. Bound by Cabinet advice: Governor must act on ministerial advice in all matters except those explicitly labelled as discretionary.
3. No independent executive authority: Ambedkar insisted the Governor is not a parallel power centre.
4. Rejection of 1935 model: The Assembly refused to revive the 1935 system that gave Governors sweeping independent powers.

Why is the Bill-assent controversy central to this debate?

1. Revival of 1935 practice: Members feared that powers like reserving Bills or withholding assent could allow Governors to obstruct State legislatures.
2. Ambedkar’s key statement: “If you give him this power, he becomes exactly that”, a reminder that excessive discretion recreates colonial-style interference.
3. Judicial scrutiny: Recent court rulings criticised Governors for delaying Bills, stating this undermines democratic functioning.
4. Legislative consequences: When Governors withhold or delay assent, elected governments face administrative paralysis.

What makes the present dispute constitutionally serious?

1. Misinterpretation risk: Courts observed that vague phrases like “as soon as possible” allow Governors to delay decisions indefinitely.
2. Threat to federal balance: Unchecked gubernatorial discretion shifts power from elected representatives to a nominated authority.
3. Growing political tensions: Several States report prolonged delays in Bill assent, appointments, and emergency decisions.
4. Return of the ‘interfering authority’: The trend contradicts the original constitutional vision and Ambedkar’s categorical warnings.

Conclusion

The ongoing friction between State governments and Governors signals a deeper constitutional challenge involving federalism, democratic accountability, and the limits of nominated authority. The Constituent Assembly clearly intended the Governor to be a neutral head bound by Cabinet advice, not an autonomous decision-maker. Reviving this original spirit is essential to restore the balance between the Centre and the States and uphold constitutional morality.

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