Why in the News
X has pledged to publicly disclose government censorship and content-removal requests, while MeitY has warned that such disclosures may violate India’s Section 69A blocking framework.
What is the Section 69A blocking framework?
- Statutory basis: Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 empowers the Union government to direct an intermediary to block public access to online content on specified grounds.
- The operative rules: The Information Technology (Blocking) Rules, 2009 are the framework under which a blocking direction is issued and acted on.
- Rule 16 mandates secrecy: It requires strict confidentiality over all blocking requests and the actions taken on them.
- Non-compliance is a criminal offence: An intermediary that fails to comply attracts imprisonment up to seven years.
What exactly does the pledge collide with?
- The pledge names three disclosures: X proposes to publish that an order exists, which body issued it, and on what basis it was issued.
- Rule 16 forbids each of the three: The confidentiality mandate covers the existence of a request, its author and its stated grounds alike.
- Secrecy is what enables an unreasoned block: Confidentiality lets the executive block content without a reasoned public order and without notifying the person whose content is blocked.
- The liability lands on individuals: X’s Indian entity carries resident compliance and grievance officers, so criminal consequences attach to identifiable people inside the country.
Does the announced mechanism do what was claimed?
- The release paired two separate things: X open-sourced its “Phoenix” recommendation code alongside a pilot feature called “Under the Hood”.
- Under the Hood shows platform labels, not state orders: It gives selected users visibility labels on their own accounts, such as spam flags and reach restrictions.
- A blocking order runs on a separate track: A Section 69A order operates outside that feature entirely.
- The user still sees only the old notice: The withheld content carries a “withheld in India” label naming neither the order nor the agency.
Why does Section 69A no longer describe the whole takedown picture?
- Order volumes have roughly quadrupled: Section 69A orders rose from about 6,000 a year through 2023 to about 24,300 in 2025.
- A second route now carries a growing share: Since a 2023 MeitY memorandum, ministries, States and police issue orders under Section 79(3)(b) of the same Act.
- The Sahyog portal is the channel: Those orders are routed through the Ministry of Home Affairs portal, which X calls a censorship portal.
- An unreasoned order leaves nothing to publish: Where an order arrives without a stated basis, X has little to surface even if it intended to.
What does X’s own compliance record show about the pledge?
- The stated identity is free speech absolutism: X brands itself in those terms.
- Actual compliance runs between 83 and 99 per cent: That is the share of demands the platform acts on.
- One order covered 2,355 accounts: In July 2025 X said the government ordered that many accounts blocked, including Reuters, within an hour.
- Objection was followed by compliance: X objected loudly and then complied, restoring the Reuters account only after a public outcry.
Where does the litigation now stand?
- The Karnataka High Court dismissed the challenge: In September 2025 it rejected X’s petition against the Sahyog portal and called the portal “an instrument of public good”.
- Parallel proceedings ran in Bombay: X’s appeal and its Bombay petitions were consolidated.
- The Supreme Court stayed all four in July 2026: No court has ruled on the merits of the disclosure question.
Challenges to the Section 69A blocking framework
- Blocking orders are never published: The framework produces no public record of what was blocked or why, so its use cannot be reviewed by anyone outside the executive. Eg. Directions issued during the farmers’ protest in 2021 covering over a thousand accounts were never published in any form.
The Fix: Publish a redacted version of every blocking direction carrying the ground invoked, withholding only operational detail. - The person whose content is blocked is rarely heard: The 2009 Rules provide for notice to the originator where identifiable, and in practice the intermediary alone appears before the committee. Eg. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) the Supreme Court upheld Section 69A partly on the strength of that hearing, which originators seldom receive.
The Fix: Make service of notice on an identifiable account holder a condition of validity of a blocking direction. - Emergency powers bypass the review committee: An interim block can be ordered by the Secretary, Information Technology, before the committee that is meant to examine it has met. Eg. The 2020 ban on 59 Chinese applications was issued as an interim emergency measure under this framework.
The Fix: Cap an emergency block at 48 hours unless the committee ratifies it within that period. - Section 79(3)(b) carries none of the 69A safeguards: Safe harbour is lost on a government notification alone, with no committee, no periodic review and no defined issuing authority. Eg. Thousands of police units and State departments can issue takedown notices through a single portal.
The Fix: Extend the 2009 Rules’ committee examination and periodic review to every order issued under Section 79(3)(b). - Enforcement is aimed at individuals rather than the company: Criminal liability on a resident grievance officer converts a corporate regulatory dispute into personal jeopardy for an employee. Eg. The resident officer requirements of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 were challenged on exactly this ground.
The Fix: Confine non-compliance penalties to corporate monetary fines, and reserve imprisonment for wilful obstruction established in court.
Conclusion
A platform cannot publish what a statute makes an offence to publish, whatever it announces. The pledge and the confidentiality mandate are not two competing policies. They are a company’s stated practice set against a criminal provision, and only a court can move one of them. What remains unresolved is whether transparency about a restriction on speech is itself part of the speech that is being restricted, since no Indian judgment has answered that question. The marker to watch is the disposal of the consolidated challenge now before the Supreme Court.
Laws and Rules Governing Online Content Regulation in India
- Information Technology Act, 2000: The parent statute governing electronic records, cyber offences and the obligations of intermediaries.
- Section 69A grounds: Blocking is permitted on grounds of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, and preventing incitement to a cognisable offence relating to these.
- Section 79 safe harbour: An intermediary is not liable for third party content it hosts, provided it observes due diligence, and it loses that protection where it fails to act on a government notification.
- Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: Impose due diligence on intermediaries, require significant platforms to appoint a resident grievance officer, and fix timelines to acknowledge and resolve complaints. Amended in 2023.
- Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023: Governs the processing of digital personal data and establishes the Data Protection Board of India to adjudicate breaches.
- Telecommunications Act, 2023: Provides for interception and for suspension of telecommunication services on grounds of public emergency and public safety.
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Criminalises circulation of false information likely to cause public disorder and speech promoting enmity between groups.
- Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995: Regulates television content through a Programme Code barring material that threatens communal harmony or national security.
[2024, GS3, 10 marks] Describe the context and salient features of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

