Author: Explains

Why in news

1. The Shangri-La Dialogue speech (Singapore, Jun 2018) of PM Modi is being seen as a major foreign policy shift.
2. Despite speaking at the same event, the words of India’s and US’s document were starkly different. This indicates that New Delhi and Washington are no longer on the same page.
3. Warming up of India to Russia and China is another unmistakable sign of a shift.
4. It seems the philosophy of Non-Alignment has been revived.

Evidence of changed foreign policy

Informal summits

China

1. ‘Doklam’ is an issue of the past.
2. The BRI isn’t as much a concern as before.
3. India’s non-confrontational attitude with respect to China’s presence in the Maldives and Nepal.

Russia

S-400 Deal is being negotiated.

1. The frequency of meetings with China and Russia far outnumbers those with USA
2. PM Modi will have met President Xi and President Putin four-five times each by the end of this year, if one counts informal and formal summits, as well as meetings at the SCO, BRICS and G-20
3. In contrast, nearly half the year has gone in just scheduling the upcoming 2+2 meet of Indian and U.S. Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

Shangrila Dialogue Speech

1. India referred to the Indo-Pacific as a “natural geographical region”, not a strategic one, while the USA called the Indo-Pacific a “priority theatre” and a “subset of America’s broader security strategy” for its Indo-Pacific Command.
2. While India referred to India’s good relations with the U.S., Russia and China in equal measure, US vowed to counter China’s moves in the Indo-Pacific, and referred to the U.S. National Defence Strategy released this January, which puts both China and Russia in its crosshairs as the world’s two “revisionist powers”.

The Quad has also been given short shrift.

1. India rejected an Australian request to join maritime exercises along with the U.S. and Japan this June, and said quite plainly last month that there was no plan to “militarise” the Quad.
2. This is in contrast with India’s acceptance of military exercises with countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Russia-China led grouping.

India has decided to continue energy deals with Iran and Venezuela in defiance of American sanctions.

Trade protectionism is clearly the other big point of divergence between India and the U.S.

1. Both countries have, in recent months, taken each other to the World Trade Organisation on several issues.
2. There has been a surge in disputes between the two countries:

• on the new American steel and aluminium tariffs,
• the proposed cuts in H1B professional visas and cancellation of H4 spouse visas,
• on India’s tariffs and resistance to U.S. exports of dairy and pork products, on Indian price reductions on medical devices, and
• Reserve Bank of India rules on data localisation on Indian servers for U.S. companies.
• The row over Harley-Davidson motorcycles has ended up denting the ties quite seriously.

The biggest challenges to a common India-U.S. vision are now emerging from the new U.S. law called Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal with the threat of more secondary sanctions.

1. Both actions have a direct impact on India, given its high dependence on defense hardware from Russia and its considerable energy interests in Iran.
2. India’s plans to acquire the Russian S-400 missile system will become the litmus test of whether India and the U.S. can resolve their differences.

Recent changes in Indian foreign policy – Shift towards intelligent non-alignment and cautious prudence.

India, in the Shangrila-La speech:

1. invoked the “Bandung spirit of 1955”.
2. praised Singapore for teaching the world the importance of making “free and fair choices” and “embracing diversity at home”.
3. stressed that “When nations stand on the side of principles, not behind one power or the other, they earn the respect of the world,”
4. warned the world about the possible return of “great power rivalries”, and
5. emphasised the importance and centrality of the ASEAN in the concept of the Indo-Pacific.

The complexities of dealing with the two major powers have always led India to seek out support for other intermediate powers and coalitions across the world.

1. The old G-77 was not an ideological construct. India was, in limited ways, mobilising a power source outside of the Great Powers. This strategy has its limitations; its effectiveness in confronting the hard power realities imposed by the Great Powers has always been in doubt. But India is still looking for that functional substitute: A coalition that stands a little apart from the Great Powers.
2. The rediscovered fascination for the ASEAN, Africa, and the commitment to pursue these relationships shows a shift towards the old coalition building of the 1950s.

Why India shifted its stance?

1. India’s foremost objective has been the preservation of her ‘strategic autonomy’ with respect to foreign policymaking.
2. Aligning excessively with any particular nation or group can be counterproductive to India’s long-term interests
3. The US, in recent years, has displayed the tendency to betray its allies for short-term gains.

Conclusion

1. India seems to be striving for a more balanced approach in what it increasingly sees as an uncertain world.
2. The “principled” vision India has embraced projects is a departure from the transactionalism and pragmatism espoused by her over the last few years.

Why in News

• Recently, the department of personnel and training (DoPT) has called for applications to fill 10 joint-secretary level posts in various departments.
• Lateral Entry (LE) is applicable for both private sector professions and those from state governments, Union Territories, PSUs, Autonomous bodies and others.

About ‘Joint Secretaries’

As per the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT):

• • A Joint Secretary is the head of the wing under the charge of Secretary of the Ministry/ Department and he/she reports to Additional Secretary/ Secretary.
  • Joint Secretaries are at a crucial level of senior management in the Government of India. They lead policymaking as well as the implementation of various programmes and schemes of the Department.

Experiments with LE

Through the 1960s, 1970s, and 80s, much before the age of specialisation and opening up of the economy, professionals from both the private sector and state-owned companies headed departments in several ministries.

Outside advisers and consultants have been appointed at both Central and state level. But these have been at the highest levels like RBI, Niti Aayog, PSUs etc

Given the requirements of technical expertise, lateral entry has traditionally been easier in the economic ministries and in the Departments of Space, Science and Technology, Biotechnology, Electronics, etc.

Support for Civil Service Reforms

• 1st ARC, 1965
• Surinder Nath Committee, 2003
• Hota Committee, 2004
• 2nd ARC Report, 2005

• In its 2002 report, the Civil Services Review Committee headed by Alagh, however, recommended lateral entry into other Departments as well, along the lines of countries like the US, where the administration has a mix of permanent civil servants and mid-career professionals.

Challenges / Arguments against LE

Bureaucratic resistance and institutional inertia of the civil services

• They will not willingly cooperate with the new entrants – adversarial relations
• They fear that their opportunities for career advancement and promotions will get hit.

Cherry-picking jobs/profile

• lateral entrants with the right ‘connections’ may join just to enjoy the perks and privileges by cherry-picking the post

No service motive

• the motive of lateral entrants might be to just enhance their CV

Promote private interest

• the lateral entrants may join permanently or temporarily to simply promote vested interests of their organization/field

Political will

• Civil service reforms will curtail the inordinate control that the politcal masters have at present.
• To succeed, other reforms (besides lateral entry) are needed.

Relevant experience

• The present system of ‘frequent and arbitrary transfers’ hinder gaining of the relevant experience by incumbent officers. Thus, it is unfair to brand incumbents as ‘generalists’.
• If given a fair chance, the incumbents too, can emulate private sector expertise.

Need for LE

Inefficient civil service

• The modern political economy demands a sleek and agile civil service (CS) machinery
• India’s present CS architecture dates back to the Nehruvian era when the state ruled the roost

Given today’s era of withdrawal of the State, ‘outsiders’ can bring insights of possible impacts of govt policies on diverse stakeholders – the private sector, the non-government sector and the general public 

• Best decisions can be taken based on this info

Since career IAS have experience of only govt functioning

• Their solutions/suggestions are less effective in other sectors – the pvt and the non-govt

Erroneous decisions ⇒ litigation

• Burdening the judiciary and blocking the administration

Flaws in the current IAS recruitment process

‘Type I’ and ‘Type II’ errors

• Type I error ⇒ recruiting incapable candidates
• Type II error ⇒ rejecting potential candidates

Lateral entry will give opportunity

• for promising mid-level professionals to join the elite Service

Bureaucratic inertia

• LE will inject new ideas, new energy, new competition and new performance standards in the IAS
• the ‘near-automatic career progression’ will be a thing of the past

Generalists vs. specialists

• contemporary developmental models mandate special skills for effective delivery of services

Way Forward

Recruitment process for LE

• An institutionalised system of annual recruitment (43-46 yrs age group) should be there.
• Paper qualifications should not be too prescriptive.
• UPSC should handle the entire recruitment process.
• Allocation of state cadres should be done.
• Cutting-edge level exposure (village-level) for the first 5 yrs should be mandatory.

‘Regular entry’ IAS officers

• Must be allowed to work in different sectors outside of the govt to understand the sectors’ needs
• This will also help them compete on an equal footing with the lateral entrants

Top-heavy bureaucracy

• Can be avoided by weeding out about 25% of the poorest (regular-entry) performers
• Transparent performance appraisal (of regular entrants) after 15 yrs of selection

Comprehensive not incremental reforms

• Are the need of the hour
• Incremental reforms are doomed to fail

Implement the long-pending recommendations (with respect to internal and external reforms)

• That are gathering dust in govt archives

Final Word

Do not throw the baby away with the bathwater

Young IAS (regular entry) are indispensable

• As they bring in youthful spirit, raw enthusiasm, and unspoiled enterprise into administration

yet, LE will bring the best of both youth and experience

• And take the system closer to the goal of “minimum government, maximum governance”

QUESTIONS

• Critically analyze the recent govt proposal of Lateral Entry into the Civil Services.

(Post your answers and doubts in the comments section and we will try to get mentors as well as toppers to check and resolve those respectively)