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GS Paper: GS2

  • Trump’s Saudi nuclear gambit marks a shift

    Why in the News?

    USA’s decision to sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia marks a significant shift in Middle East geopolitics. In this context, many argue that India should accelerate its own nuclear export readiness in response.

    What is the substance of the US-Saudi agreement, and why is it controversial?

    1. The core deal: The agreement would help Saudi Arabia build a civilian nuclear energy programme and reduce dependence on hydrocarbons, with American companies building Saudi reactors to secure a long term position in the kingdom’s nuclear infrastructure.
    2. The enrichment controversy: The main point of contention is the possibility of a uranium enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia, even as Washington seeks to roll back Iran’s nuclear capabilities, creating an apparent contradiction.
    3. The strategic rationale behind the contradiction: The rise of Iran’s regional influence has pushed the UAE towards its own civilian nuclear programme; a Saudi facility built and supervised by American companies is presented as reducing proliferation risk while giving Riyadh strategic parity with Tehran.
    4. Congressional and diplomatic hurdles: The agreement faces scrutiny in the US Congress and opposition from Israel’s supporters and the non-proliferation community.

    How is the nuclear deal linked to the broader regional diplomatic picture?

    1. Tied to Israel normalisation: Washington is linking the nuclear deal to Saudi recognition of Israel, which Riyadh has so far declined under the Abraham Accords framework.
    2. A triangular negotiation: The agreement could become part of a broader negotiation among USA, Saudi Arabia, and Israel covering regional security, Palestinian statehood, and the future of Arab-Israeli relations.

    Where does India stand in this emerging nuclear industrial competition, and what does the editorial recommend?

    1. India is largely absent: This reflects decades of resistance within India’s atomic energy sector to reforms enabling export-oriented industrial participation.
    2. The editorial’s recommendation: The US-Saudi deal should accelerate implementation of India’s SHANTI Act framework to prepare Indian industry for exporting nuclear technology across the Middle East.
    3. A call for political support: India should support the US-Saudi agreement, provided it is backed by strong non-proliferation safeguards, and should offer assistance to Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme.

    Conclusion

    The US-Saudi nuclear agreement reflects USA’s use of civil nuclear cooperation as a tool of regional strategic balancing, linking energy security, non-proliferation, and Saudi-Israel normalisation. For India, it is a strategic opportunity to strengthen its civil nuclear industry and emerge as a future nuclear technology exporter.

    Back2Basics

    1. SHANTI Act, 2025: A proposed legislative reform intended to open India’s civil nuclear sector to private and foreign investment in reactor construction and technology exports, reducing the traditional state monopoly in atomic energy.
    2. Abraham Accords: The 2020 diplomatic framework under which several Arab states normalised relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia has not yet joined the framework.

    PYQ RELEVANCE

    [UPSC 2018] In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the geopolitical implications of nuclear diplomacy in West Asia and its impact on India’s strategic interests. The article analyses the proposed US-Saudi civil nuclear agreement, its implications for regional power balance, nuclear non-proliferation, and India’s strategic and nuclear diplomacy in West Asia.

  • New US tariffs leave India better off than competitors; Trump’s tariff mania is inextricable from his politics

    Why in the News?

    The Trump administration began imposing permanent tariffs under Section 301 of the US Trade Act, 1974 on 60 trading partners after its earlier International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs were struck down by the US Supreme Court. This places India in a more favorable bracket than China and Vietnam even as such tariffs function as domestic politics rather than sound economics.

    How does the new four tier tariff structure actually work, and where does India sit in it?

    1. Legal foundation shift: The administration is rebuilding the tariff regime under Section 301 of the Trade Act, 1974 (targeting alleged forced labour in imports) after its International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs were declared illegal by the US Supreme Court in February.
    2. The four tiers: The most favourable group (EU, Taiwan) faces a Section 301 tariff calculated only to bring the total to 10% where the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rate is below that; the second tier, including India and 16 others such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Canada, and Mexico, faces a flat additional 10%; the third tier (Japan, South Korea, Switzerland) faces a flat 12.5%; the least favourable tier of 38 countries, including China and Vietnam, also faces a flat 12.5%.
    3. India’s rate fell during negotiation: India’s tariff dropped from 12.5% first proposed in March to 10%, after India amended its Foreign Trade Policy on 14 June to explicitly ban imports made using forced labour.
    4. India’s export performance defied predictions: Despite tariff measures since early 2025, India’s merchandise exports to the US grew 0.9% (from US$86.5 billion to US$87.3 billion) in 2025-26, according to an ICRIER report, though this was driven entirely by products on the US exclusion list (pharmaceuticals and electronics), while non-excluded exports fell 11.2%.

    What is the real reason the USTR gives for the tariffs, and is that reason coherent?

    1. The stated aim: The US Trade Representative (USTR) says countries that import forced labour goods gain an unfair cost advantage, harming American workers.
    2. The geopolitical tell: All 60 countries under investigation were found “guilty,” with the most favourable grouping being the EU and Taiwan and the least favourable being China and Vietnam, a grouping that tracks geopolitical alignment more than measurable differences in forced labour enforcement.
    3. The stated target is explicit: The tariffs are primarily meant to force countries to reduce dependence on China, with which the US is engaged in a trade war.
    4. New textile quotas complicate India’s advantage: Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) granted to Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia for importing US cotton could divert textile and apparel sourcing away from India, despite its overall favourable tariff position.

    Why do tariffs persist as policy despite weak economic evidence for them?

    1. Tariffs function as a domestic tax, not a foreign penalty: Research by economists Mary Amiti, David Weinstein, and Stephen Redding shows tariff costs are largely borne by American businesses and consumers through higher prices, not by foreign producers.
    2. Global supply chains blunt the intended effect: More than half of global trade consists of intermediate goods; tariffs on inputs such as steel or electronics raise costs for the very domestic manufacturers they are intended to protect.
    3. Trade deficits have not shrunk: The US continues to run a record merchandise trade deficit despite successive tariff rounds, since deficits are driven by savings, investment, and consumption, not tariffs, while global supply chains have rerouted through Vietnam, Mexico, and other intermediary economies.
    4. The political logic that survives the economic failure: Every successful political narrative needs someone to blame, someone to protect, and a visible policy action signalling resolve; tariffs provide all three even when they fail economically, whereas structural reforms require patience and produce fewer immediate political gains.

    Conclusion

    India’s tariff position is more favourable than China’s or Vietnam’s largely due to geopolitical considerations presented through the language of forced labour, rather than a consistent trade policy standard. At the same time, while India may benefit in the short term from trade diversion, new textile sourcing quotas for competing countries could reduce that advantage over the longer term.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the implications of global trade wars, protectionism, WTO reforms, and India’s trade interests in the evolving international trading system. The article analyses the new US tariff regime, its geopolitical and economic motivations, its implications for the multilateral trading order, and the opportunities and challenges it creates for India’s exports and trade strategy.

  • Tracing voters in an ever evolving city

    Why in the News?

    With the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls underway, Bengaluru’s Booth Level Officers (BLOs) and voters are struggling to reconcile 2002 records against a city transformed by two decades of migration and urbanisation. This exposes gaps in the exercise’s design.

    Why is Bengaluru’s SIR harder to execute than the Election Commission’s own justification would suggest?

    1. The Commission’s stated rationale is also the source of the problem: The Election Commission of India (ECI) says SIR is needed because urbanisation and migration have altered the electoral rolls; those very factors make verification difficult.
    2. Scale of the exercise: Bengaluru has over 1.03 crore voters, about one-sixth of Karnataka’s 5.54 crore electorate, verified by 8,972 Booth Level Officers (BLOs) drawn from nearly every government department.
    3. A city transformed since the last revision: Areas such as Whitefield and Mahadevapura were not major urban corridors in 2002, and Assembly constituencies have since been redrawn.

    What specific implementation gaps are voters and BLOs facing?

    1. A language barrier baked into the form: Karnataka’s enumeration forms are printed only in Kannada, unlike Telangana, which provides Telugu, English, and Urdu forms in the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) area.
    2. Documentation breaks for migrants and gig workers: Migrant workers, gig workers, and residents of slum settlements face repeated form rejections, especially when they maintain permanent residence elsewhere or fear losing welfare benefits linked to voter identity documents.
    3. Uneven institutional response: The State Government’s doorstep delivery of Permanent Residence Certificates (PRCs) and caste certificates has not resolved uncertainty because election authorities have not clarified whether a PRC alone is sufficient during the claims and objections stage.
    4. A precedent that narrows, not widens, acceptance: In West Bengal’s SIR, Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) accepted only PRCs issued under the 1999 Rules, not all PRCs.

    Why do the officially reported numbers understate the exercise’s real difficulty?

    1. Distribution numbers can mislead: Additional District Election Officers noted that BLOs sometimes deliver forms to multiple addresses of suspected duplicate voters because they cannot verify the person’s actual residence, inflating the ASDDO (Absent, Shifted, Duplicate, Dead, Other) category.
    2. Digitisation, not distribution, is the real progress marker: As of 22 July, only 31.28% of forms within the Greater Bengaluru Authority had been digitised, compared with 67.23% statewide, despite 25.47 lakh voters already being flagged under the ASDDO category.
    3. BLOs report pressure to inflate completion, not accuracy: Officials stated that BLOs face pressure from Booth Level Agents (BLAs) and Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) to complete digitisation, regardless of whether the underlying data is accurate.

    Conclusion

    Bengaluru’s SIR challenges reflect a design problem, not merely a data entry problem. The same migration, urbanisation, and demographic churn cited by the Election Commission to justify the revision also make it difficult to accurately verify a mobile, multilingual, and undocumented population within a fixed timeline. The central question is whether success should be measured by timely completion or by the accuracy of electoral rolls.

    Back2Basics

    1. Special Intensive Revision (SIR): A comprehensive Election Commission of India (ECI) exercise to re-verify and update electoral rolls from the ground up, distinct from the routine summary revision.
    2. Booth Level Officer (BLO): A government employee assigned to a specific polling booth area, responsible for door to door verification, form distribution, and updating electoral rolls during revision exercises.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] Examine the need for electoral reforms as suggested by various committees with particular reference to “One Nation, One Election” principle.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the need for electoral reforms to strengthen the integrity, inclusiveness, and credibility of India’s electoral process. The article highlights implementation challenges in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, underscoring the need for voter registration and roll management reforms

  • Alongside Centre, states’ education expenditure too declined over past 12 years

    Why in the News

    Amid ongoing youth protests demanding education reform and Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation, data analysis shows the decline in education spending is not confined to the Union Budget. In fact, State Governments’ own education spending share has fallen too over the same period.

    Why does state level spending matter when education policy debates usually focus on the Centre?

    1. Concurrent subject: Education is in the Concurrent List (Seventh Schedule), so both the Union and State Governments can legislate and spend on it.
    2. The Centre’s own decline: The Education Ministry’s share of the Union Budget fell from 4.6% (2013-14) to 2.5% (2025-26).
    3. The national state average mirrors it: The average share of all States’ and Union Territories’ expenditure devoted to education fell from around 17% (2013-14), tracking the same downward trend as the Centre’s budget share.

    What does the state level data reveal about educational outcomes?

    1. Bihar versus Kerala: Bihar’s Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) at the secondary level is 45, against Kerala’s 94, confirming long held differences in educational outcomes.
    2. GER as a measure of distance to travel: Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) is the number of students enrolled in a given education level, regardless of age, divided by the official age-group population for that level and multiplied by 100; a low GER indicates how far a state is from achieving adequate educational coverage.
    3. Spending share does not track outcome: Kerala and Tamil Nadu, despite strong GER, spend a lower share of their budgets on education than the national average, while Bihar and Delhi spend higher shares, showing that budget share alone does not explain educational outcomes.

    Is there an exception that breaks the declining trend?

    1. Delhi under the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP): Between 2014-15 and 2024-25, Delhi’s education spending share increased sharply even as the national average declined, reflecting a government that prioritised health and education.
    2. Kerala and Tamil Nadu have converged toward, then fallen behind, the national average: Kerala allocated a higher than average share until 2020 (COVID-19 period) and has lagged since; Tamil Nadu broadly tracked and later fell slightly below the national average over the long term.

    Conclusion

    The decline in India’s education spending is a joint Centre-State phenomenon, not solely a Union Government decision. The exception of Delhi’s rising education expenditure under a government that made education a political priority suggests the decline reflects policy choices, not an unavoidable trend. The findings therefore distribute responsibility for India’s education outcomes across both levels of government.

    Back2Basics

    1. Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER): The total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the official age group for that level; a key indicator of the reach of the education system.
    2. Concurrent List: The list of subjects under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India on which both Parliament and State Legislatures can make laws. In case of inconsistency, Parliamentary law prevails under Article 254.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 remains inadequate in promoting incentive-based system for children’s education without generating awareness about the importance of schooling. Analyse.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines challenges in implementing the Right to Education through adequate public investment, equitable access, and improved educational outcomes. The article highlights declining education expenditure by both the Centre and States, raising concerns over financing and effective implementation of the Right to Education.

  • India has ridden out crisis of Iran war but a much bigger challenge is upon it

    Why in the News

    Donald Trump’s foreign policy has exposed a challenge for India as serious as the 1991 Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis, this time centred on commerce, critical minerals, computer chips, and AI infrastructure rather than a single macroeconomic emergency.

    How does 2026 mirror 1991, and how does it differ?

    1. Financial position is stronger, but growth is not: India’s finances in 2026 are far more robust than in 1991, yet GDP growth remains at 6%, consistent with the 30 year average but well below the 8% benchmark, as the rupee depreciated and Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) moved capital out.
    2. A Gulf war shock recurs: Just as the 1990-91 Gulf War pushed up India’s import bill in 1991, the West Asia conflict in 2026 has driven energy shortages and inflation.
    3. The security backstop has changed form, not disappeared entirely: In 1991, the Soviet collapse removed India’s counterweight to China and the US; in 2026, Washington’s retreat from alliances and interest in a “G-2” accommodation with Beijing again leaves India without a reliable security backstop.
    4. China’s lead has widened, not narrowed: China’s GDP was only slightly larger than India’s by 1991; by 2026 it stands at US$20 trillion against India’s US$4 trillion, and at current growth rates the gap will widen from US$16 trillion to US$24 trillion by 2050.

    What makes the “four Cs” challenge harder to fix than the 1991 crisis?

    1. Commerce and manufacturing: Manufacturing has stagnated despite 30 years of policy encouragement, unlike the relatively simple structural reforms that resolved the 1991 crisis.
    2. Critical minerals and rare earths: India has reserves but has not adequately mapped or mined them, and processing capacity is a separate unresolved challenge, with dependence on China ranging from 50% to nearly 100% across minerals and metals.
    3. Computer chips: NITI Aayog estimates that 90% to 95% of India’s semiconductor demand will still be met by imports until 2035.
    4. AI infrastructure: India has strengths in AI adoption and AI talent but little presence in the AI value chain itself.

    What is the deeper tension the piece does not resolve?

    1. Geopolitical alignment is unresolved: The piece poses, without answering, whether India should pursue a “hide-and-bide” strategy with both the US and China, or attempt a more ambitious reset with Beijing modelled on how China itself used American imports, investment, and innovation after 1972.
    2. Pakistan’s positioning has hardened: Pakistan is again “triumphalist,” deeply integrated with China’s military, and was a mediator between the US and Iran in 2026, echoing its 1991 alignment with the winning side of the Cold War.

    Conclusion

    India has absorbed the immediate economic shock of the Iran war, but the underlying four Cs problem (commerce, critical minerals, chips, and AI) is structurally harder than the 1991 crisis and cannot be fixed by macroeconomic reform alone. The piece calls for a coordinated national effort on the scale of a Manhattan Project, while leaving India’s broader geopolitical alignment between the US and China explicitly unresolved.

    Back2Basics

    1. India Semiconductor Mission (ISM): The Union government’s programme to build domestic semiconductor design, fabrication, and packaging capacity, aimed at reducing India’s near total reliance on imported chips.
    2. Critical Minerals Mission: The government’s initiative to secure critical mineral supply chains essential for clean energy, electronics, and defence technologies, given India’s dependence on imports, particularly China, for processing capacity.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2025] India aims to become a semiconductor manufacturing hub. What are the challenges faced by the semiconductor industry in India? Mention the salient features of the India Semiconductor Mission.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines challenges in building India’s semiconductor ecosystem and reducing dependence on strategic technology imports. The article situates semiconductors within the broader “four Cs” challenge, arguing that strengthening domestic chip manufacturing is vital for India’s long-term economic and strategic resilience.

  • Delhi High Court declines interim injunction against OpenAI in ANI copyright suit

    Why in News?

    The Delhi High Court refused to grant interim relief to ANI in its copyright infringement case against OpenAI, holding that AI training on copyrighted content is covered by the fair dealing exception under the Copyright Act.

    Key Highlights

    • Justice Amit Bansal held that using ANI’s content to train Large Language Models (LLMs) falls under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
    • The Court found that ANI failed to prove any loss to its news syndication business.
    • ANI had earlier offered OpenAI a content licence for $7.5 million, indicating any potential damages are quantifiable.
    • The Court rejected ANI’s request to delete training data, noting OpenAI’s legal obligations under US law.
    • It observed that requiring licences from every copyright holder would make AI development economically unviable and highlighted AI’s public benefits in sectors such as education, healthcare, agriculture, and finance.
    • The Federation of Indian Publishers, Digital News Publishers Association, and Indian Music Industry joined the suit.

    Fair Dealing (Section 52, Copyright Act, 1957)

    • A statutory exception permitting limited use of copyrighted works without the owner’s permission.
    • Applies to purposes such as:
      • Private or personal use (including research)
      • Criticism or review
      • Reporting current events

    Copyright vs Patent

    • Copyright: Protects original literary, artistic, musical, dramatic works, films, and software.
    • Patent: Protects new inventions, granting exclusive rights generally for 20 years.

    Copyright Act, 1957

    • Governs protection of literary, artistic, musical, dramatic works, films, sound recordings, and software.
    • Grants creators exclusive rights over reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and communication of their works.
    • Section 52 provides exceptions under the doctrine of fair dealing.

    PYQ (2014, GS3, 12.5 Marks) In a globalised world, intellectual property rights assume significance and are a source of litigation. Broadly distinguish between the terms copyrights, patents and trade secrets.

    [2026] Which of the following statements with regard to Large Language Models (LLMs) used in machine learning is/are correct?
    1. LLMs assign probabilities to the next possible words and then pick the one with the highest probability.
    2. LLMs process data through mathematical optimization to minimise prediction errors.
    3. LLMs produce unbiased outputs.
    Select the answer using the code given below :

    [A] 1 only

    [B] 1 and 2 only

    [C] 2 and 3 only

    [D] 1, 2 and 3

  • Telecom infra data can’t be shared outside India, says Govt

    Why in News?

    The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has mandated that telecom infrastructure providers store and process telecom network data only within India.

    Key Highlights

    • DoT barred telecom infrastructure providers from sharing telecom network data outside India.
    • Covers cloud-based telecom networks, mobile tower operators, and satellite gateway providers.
    • Mandates that all telecom network systems, data, logs, and related information be stored within India.
    • No copies of such data can be routed, shared, or made available outside the country.
    • Issued under the authorisation framework of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, replacing the earlier licensing regime.

    Data Localisation

    • Refers to storing and processing data within the country’s borders.
    • Benefits:
      • Strengthens national security and cyber resilience.
      • Improves regulatory oversight and law enforcement access.
      • Enhances protection of critical digital infrastructure.
    • Challenges:
      • Higher compliance costs for companies.
      • Concerns over cross-border data flows and global cloud operations.

    Telecommunications Act, 2023

    • Replaced the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.
    • Introduces an authorisation-based regime instead of licensing.
    • Aims to strengthen telecom security, spectrum management, user protection, and digital infrastructure governance.

    PYQ (2018, GS3, 15 Marks) Data security has assumed significant importance in the digitized world due to rising cyber crimes. The Justice B. N. Srikrishna Committee Report addresses issues related to data security. What, in your view, are the strengths and weaknesses of the Report relating to protection of personal data in cyberspace?

  • Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026

    Why in News?

    The Union Government introduced the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026 in the Rajya Sabha to extend statutory protection to the National Song (Vande Mataram).

    Key Highlights

    • Introduced by Minister of State for Home Nityanand Rai.
    • Seeks to amend the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971.
    • Extends penalties for insulting the National Flag, Constitution, and National Anthem to the National Song.
    • Opposition members argued that the Constituent Assembly intentionally did not accord the National Song the same constitutional status as the National Anthem.
    • The government cited Dr. Rajendra Prasad’s statement (24 January 1950) that both should enjoy equal respect.

    National Anthem

    • Jana Gana Mana, composed by Rabindranath Tagore.
    • Adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 24 January 1950.
    • Full rendition duration: 52 seconds.

    National Song

    • Vande Mataram, composed by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay.
    • Taken from the novel Anandamath (1882).
    • Only the first two stanzas enjoy official status as the National Song.

    Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971

    • Prohibits insults to the National Flag, Constitution, and National Anthem.
    • Prescribes imprisonment up to 3 years, or fine, or both.
    • The 2026 Amendment Bill seeks to include the National Song within its ambit.

    [2023] Consider the following statements in respect of the National Flag of India according to the Flag Code of India, 2002:
    Statement-I: One of the standard sizes of the National Flag of India is 600 mm x 400 mm.
    Statement-II: The ratio of the length to the height (width) of the Flag shall be 3:2.
    Which one of the following is correcti in respect of the above statements?

    [A] Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is the correct explanation for Statement-l.

    [B] Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I.

    [C] Statement-l is correct but Statement-II is incorrect is incorrect.

    [D] Statement-l is incorrect Statement-II is correct.

  • Zomato’s platform fee, delivery levy no abuse of dominance: CCI

    Why in News?

    The Competition Commission of India (CCI) ruled that Zomato’s platform fee, delivery charges, and commissions do not amount to abuse of dominant position or anti-competitive conduct.

    Key Highlights

    • CCI dismissed a consumer complaint against Zomato/Eternal over platform fees and price differences.
    • The higher online price was attributed to delivery charges, platform fee, and GST.
    • Restaurants stated that Zomato charges around 33% commission, leading some to increase online menu prices.
    • CCI held that online food delivery and in-person dining are distinct markets, making price differences commercially justifiable.
    • Mere price variation does not constitute an abuse of dominant position under competition law.

    Abuse of Dominant Position (Competition Act, 2002)

    • Dominance itself is not prohibited; only its abuse is.
    • Examples include:
      • Imposing unfair or discriminatory prices.
      • Limiting production or technical development.
      • Denying market access.
      • Leveraging dominance in one market to enter another.

    Competition Commission of India (CCI)

    • Statutory body established under the Competition Act, 2002.
    • Came into effect in 2009.
    • Objective: Prevent anti-competitive practices, prohibit abuse of dominant position, regulate combinations (mergers and acquisitions), and promote fair competition.

    PYQ (2023, GS2, 10 Marks) Discuss the role of the Competition Commission of India in containing the abuse of dominant position by the Multi-National Corporations in India. Refer to the recent decisions.

    [2022] With reference to foreign-owned e-commerce firms operating in India, which of the following statements is/are correct?
    1. They can sell their own goods in addition to offering their platforms as market-places.
    2. The degree to which they can own big sellers on their platforms is limited.
    Select the correct answer using the code given below:

    [A] 1 only

    [B] 2 only

    [C] Both 1 and 2

    [D] Neither 1 nor 2

    [D] 1, 2, 3 and 4

  • Warning signals for India from NATO’s Ankara Summit

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2023] The expansion and strengthening of NATO and a stronger US-Europe strategic partnership works well in India.” What is your opinion about this statement? Give reasons and examples to support your answer.
    Linkage: Examines the strategic implications of NATO’s evolving role and the US-Europe security partnership for India’s foreign and security policy. The article analyses the Ankara Summit’s defence commitments, Europe’s defence-industrial constraints, and how NATO’s expansion and military spending directly affect India’s defence preparedness and strategic autonomy.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The 32 heads of state or government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met at the Ankara Summit on July 7-8, 2026, to review progress since the 2025 Hague Summit and set out a roadmap for implementation. The summit locked in a fivefold rise in the defence-spending pledge and a commitment to build a Europe-wide Defence Industrial Base (DIB), even as Europe’s existing industry struggles to meet current demand.

    What four commitments came out of the Ankara Summit?

    1. Collective defence reaffirmed: All 32 allies affirmed an “ironclad commitment” to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond.
    2. Five per cent spending pledge: Allies unanimously endorsed “The Hague defence commitment,” under which every NATO member undertook to allocate at least five per cent of GDP to defence by 2035, up from the earlier two per cent pledge.
    3. Support for Ukraine: NATO declared “unwavering support” for Ukraine’s freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
    4. European defence industrial base: Members committed to building a high-technology, high-capacity, Europe-wide Defence Industrial Base (DIB), the network of firms, factories, laboratories and skilled workers needed to build and sustain military power.
    5. Focus on implementation: Discussions at Ankara centred on converting these political commitments into military capability through investment, industrial capacity and innovation.

    Can Europe’s defence industry deliver on the pledge?

    1. Pre-existing shortages: European defence giants MBDA and Rheinmetall had warned of ammunition production shortages even before The Hague’s five per cent pledge.
    2. Evidence from the Iran campaign: Operation Epic Fury, the U.S.-Israel bombing campaign against Iran, saw the U.S. fire more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles; at the current production rate of 85 a year, replacing them would take a decade.
    3. Coordination gap: Many NATO members have capable Defence Industrial Bases (DIBs) individually, but there is little coordination of alliance-wide priorities.
    4. Concentrated mismatch: The resulting strategic mismatch found during the Ukraine war has clustered in air defence missiles and interceptors, precision-guided munitions, and artillery rockets.
    5. Deepening dependency, not reducing it: The U.S. supplied half of Europe’s defence spending between 2022-2024, up from 28% in 2019-2021, and without a major revitalisation of Europe’s own industry, the five per cent pledge will only deepen dependence on the U.S.
    6. Rising U.S. sales to Europe: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) notifications to the U.S. Congress for European customers have quadrupled since 2008, to $76 billion in 2024.

    How does NATO’s spending surge affect global arms buyers like India?

    1. Buyer’s market turning seller’s market: As NATO spends more, the international arms market is shifting from a buyers’ market to a sellers’ market for the world’s big arms buyers, including India.
    2. First warning sign: U.S. firm General Electric Aerospace has delayed supplying F-404 fighter jet engines, critically needed for the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme.
    3. Competing demand: Asian allies’ rising demand for U.S. weaponry is competing directly with ongoing European needs for the same suppliers.

    What must India do in response?

    1. Growing reliance on new-age technology: India’s defence increasingly depends on drones, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and resilient networks.
    2. Self-reliance as the necessary response: India’s defence industry must achieve self-reliance in these technology areas rather than depend on suppliers who are themselves overstretched fighting their own battles.
    3. Mitigating Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Avoid over-reliance on single-source western suppliers like General Electric who face competing allied demands. Push local aerospace and defense firms (such as HAL and private sector partners) to prioritize delayed components like fighter jet engines.
    4. Giving a big push to the private sector: Funding and orders should be increased for domestic defense startups working in the fields of drones, artificial intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity.
    5. Further expansion of the ‘Negative Import List’: The scope of the existing ‘Positive Indigenisation List‘ should be further expanded. There should be further expansion of the ‘Negative Import List‘. India’s Positive Indigenisation Lists (PIL) ban military imports, forcing procurement strictly from domestic makers. Managed via the Srijan Portal, key tracks include the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) lists for major platforms and the Department of Defence Production (DDP) lists for components.

    Conclusion

    NATO’s Ankara Summit converted last year’s spending pledge into a five per cent-of-GDP commitment and a mandate to build a European Defence Industrial Base (DIB), but ammunition and missile shortages already visible in the Ukraine war show capacity, not political will, is now the binding constraint. Because higher NATO spending is shifting the global arms market from a buyers’ to a sellers’ market, without a rapid European industrial build-out the pledge will deepen dependence on the U.S. rather than reduce it, and it is squeezing supply for outside buyers like India, making self-reliance in new-age defence technologies the necessary Indian response.