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GS Paper: GS2

  • Form 7 objections in Karnataka SIR mostly against Muslim voters

    Why in the News

    In Karnataka’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR), the objection process meant for checking individual entries has become a route to bulk deletions, largely against Muslim voters. The statutory Form 10 report shows Form 7 applications seeking more than 4,000 deletions, most filed by a handful of electors a day before the claims and objections deadline, raising fears of targeted disenfranchisement.

    What is a Form 7 objection, and what changed at the deadline?

    1. What it is: Form 7 lets an elector object to a name on the roll or seek its deletion. It works like a neighbourhood check on the voter list.
    2. Public record: Form 10 consolidates every Form 7 filed, so anyone can see who objected to whom.
    3. Normal pattern: Earlier in the revision, deletions sought on the ground of shifting ran at about two or three per polling station, mostly electors removing their own names.
    4. What changed: From 22 September, bulk filings appeared against other people’s names, all citing “Absent/Permanently Shifted”.
    5. The takeaway: A tool built for self-correction was used by a few individuals to challenge thousands of voters, largely from one community.

    How concentrated were the bulk filings?

    1. Babaleshwar: Just 10 people filed 1,363 of the Form 7s received there on a single day, largely against Muslim voters outside their own polling stations.
    2. Single-filer volumes: One Babaleshwar elector filed 493 applications across 30 polling stations, far beyond his own booth.
    3. Bhalki (Bidar district): At least 30 people sought to delete more than 1,700 names on the deadline day.
    4. Single-booth targeting: In Basavakalyan and Belthangady, single electors filed 32 and 21 objections, all against Muslim voters in one polling station each.
    5. Across party lines: Congress Ministers represent Babaleshwar and Bhalki, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) holds the other two seats.

    Why are the forms themselves under question?

    1. Pre-printed forms: In some Bhalki forms, the targeted voters’ details were already printed, with only the objector’s details handwritten.
    2. Disowned objector: Several forms named an elector at Booth 129 as objector. The person contacted gave a different name, yet the Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC) details on the forms matched that elector.
    3. Repeat pattern: Another objector’s forms, over 170 of them, showed the same pre-printed pattern.
    4. Data mismatch: The disowned objector is missing from the downloadable Form 10 data. Officials said many offline forms were still to be digitised.

    How are officials and parties responding?

    1. Scrutiny promised: Officials in Bidar and Vijayapura said objections would be scrutinised so that no eligible voter is deleted. Bulk filers were warned that groundless claims, if proved, could invite punishment.
    2. Congress demand: The Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee president asked the State Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) for “suo motu action” against “large-scale fraudulent” misuse of Form 7.
    3. Civil society demand: The SIR Virodhi Okkuta sought an inquiry and criminal cases over forms found fraudulent.

    Challenges

    1. Cheap to object: Filing a Form 7 costs the objector little, but defending a name costs the voter time and documents.
    2. Deadline-eve surges: Last-day bulk filings leave Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) little time to verify each case.
    3. Community targeting: Objections aimed at one community strain Article 325, which bars exclusion from the roll on grounds of religion.

    Way Forward

    1. Mandatory field check: EROs should order a Booth Level Officer (BLO) visit for every “shifted” objection before issuing notice.
    2. Bulk flagging: The Election Commission of India (ECI) should auto-flag filers objecting beyond their own polling station.
    3. Action on false filers: The CEO should file complaints under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 where forms prove fraudulent.
    4. Real-time digitisation: Offline Form 7s should be uploaded within a day.

    Conclusion

    The SIR’s claims process can be turned against one community when filing is cheap and verification comes later. The test now is whether ERO scrutiny keeps every eligible voter on the final roll, and whether false filers face action.

    Key numbers

    1. Babaleshwar, one day: 1,373 Form 7s received.
    2. Second Babaleshwar filer: 413 applications across 33 polling stations in one day.
    3. Bhalki repeat filer: 54 applications on 22 September, 120 on 23 September.

    Back2Basics: Section 31, Representation of the People Act, 1950

    1. What it penalises: A written false statement or declaration, known or believed to be false, made in connection with preparing or revising an electoral roll.
    2. Punishment: Imprisonment up to one year, or a fine, or both.
    3. Link to Form 7: The claim and objection forms carry a declaration that a false statement is punishable under this Section.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • BLAs bypassed 10-form daily limit using EC portal, data show

    Why in the News

    The Election Commission of India (ECI)‘s daily cap on objections by booth-level agents (BLAs) exists only on paper, because its ECINET portal has no mechanism to enforce it. Data from Delhi’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls show BLAs filing more objections a day than the ECI allows, weakening the safeguard against bulk deletions.

    What is the 10-form cap, and how does the online route escape it?

    1. What a Form 7 does: Form 7 lets an elector object to a name on the roll or seek its deletion. It works like a complaint, checked before a name is struck off.
    2. Why the cap exists: BLAs, a recognised party’s booth agents, may file in bulk. After the draft roll (the provisional list open to objections) appears, a BLA “shall not submit more than” 10 forms a day.
    3. What went wrong: Online, a BLA logs in like any citizen through Aadhaar authentication. The portal has no field to declare BLA status, so the limit never applies.
    4. How it surfaced: Form 10 reports, a public list of objections, stay on ECINET for seven days and exposed the pattern.
    5. The takeaway: A limit written into guidelines but not into software lets a few people seek mass deletions unchecked.

    Who filed the objections, and on what grounds?

    1. Repeat filers: Several individuals breached the daily cap. Chitresh Chandoliya, a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) BLA and a sitting MP’s son, filed 35 objections in two days.
    2. Mostly self-deletions: About four in five Form 7s filed in Delhi that week were electors removing their own names.
    3. One ground for all: Every Form 7 the BLA filed in Karol Bagh cited “absent/permanently shifted”. One voter he objected to still lives at his listed address.
    4. Shared house numbers: In Patel Nagar’s Part 38, a booth’s section of the roll, one objector challenged 13 names in a day. Houses share numbers, and two brothers marked as shifted still live there.
    5. Loose offline checks: An Electoral Registration Officer (ERO), who maintains a constituency’s roll, said offline objectors can enter another person’s name as objector.

    Why do disposal and disclosure raise concerns?

    1. Deletions decided faster: In one week, EROs decided 519 objections but only 92 Form 6 claims to add names. Inclusion claims were more numerous, so the pace favoured deletions.
    2. Due process burden: Each objection needs a notice, a hearing and a speaking order (a written, reasoned decision), so fast disposal raises doubt that each step was followed.
    3. Missing disclosure: Guidelines require inclusion, objection and modification forms to be uploaded daily on the Delhi Chief Electoral Officer (CEO)‘s website. Nearly a month in, they remain unpublished.
    4. Extended timeline: The claims and objections deadline moves to 30 October, and the final roll is due on 4 December.

    Challenges

    1. Software lags rules: ECINET authenticates citizens but cannot identify party agents, so guideline limits fail online.
    2. Unverified objectors: Offline forms let one person object in another’s name, weakening accountability for false objections.
    3. Burden on voters: Genuine electors must answer notices to keep their names, hurting migrant workers most.
    4. Rushed hearings: Rapid disposal risks deletions without a real hearing. Eg. Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995).

    Way Forward

    1. Portal-level cap: The ECI should tag BLA logins on ECINET and block objections beyond the daily limit.
    2. Objector verification: EROs should match each objector’s voter ID before admitting a Form 7.
    3. Daily publication: The Delhi CEO should upload application data daily, as guidelines require.
    4. Field check first: Booth Level Officers (BLOs) should physically verify every “shifted” objection before the hearing.

    Conclusion

    A safeguard enforced only at the counter is bypassed online, turning objections into a tool for bulk deletions. Whether the ECI fixes its portal and publishes application data before the extended deadline will decide the final roll’s fairness.

    Key numbers

    1. Applications since the draft roll (Delhi): 1.54 lakh for inclusion, 3,435 for deletion.
    2. Form 7s filed in Delhi, week analysed: 1,095.
    3. Filers above the daily cap: four individuals.
    4. Other bulk filers: 12 objections in Delhi Cantonment and 15 in Tri Nagar, each in one day.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision

    1. What it is: A time-bound house-to-house enumeration in which BLOs verify every voter entry, unlike the routine annual summary revision.
    2. Legal basis: Article 324 gives the ECI control of electoral rolls. Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 allows a special revision for recorded reasons.
    3. Aim: Remove dead, duplicate and shifted voters, and enrol newly eligible citizens.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Towards a gender-just Uniform Civil Code

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Minister has said a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) will be implemented in all 21 States ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. The UCC is justified as serving equality and gender justice, but the Uttarakhand code “confuses uniformity with equality” and “conflates regulation with protection”.

    Where does the UCC push stand?

    1. What it is: A UCC replaces religion-based personal laws on marriage, divorce, maintenance and inheritance with one civil law for all citizens. It is like one rulebook replacing community rulebooks.
    2. Origin of the push: The UCC became an important BJP goal after the Shah Bano judgment (1985), but no draft existed to debate.
    3. Enacted and pending: Uttarakhand’s UCC applies from January 2025. Gujarat, Assam and Madhya Pradesh await Presidential assent, needed where a State law on a Concurrent List subject clashes with Union law.
    4. Drafting and dissent: Maharashtra, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Chhattisgarh have drafting committees. Justice R.C. Chavan quit Maharashtra’s committee, headed by Justice Ranjana Desai, over its consultative process.
    5. The takeaway: States are drafting codes on the Uttarakhand model, so its flaws will spread unless corrected.

    Why does the Uttarakhand code confuse uniformity with equality?

    1. Live-in registration: Compulsory registration of live-in relationships, with notice to police and parents, is “surveillance masquerading as protection”.
    2. Criminal penalties in civil law: Ending a marriage outside court carries three years’ punishment and a fine. Unregistered marriages, divorces or live-in relationships risk fines or jail, hurting the poor and marginalised most.
    3. Court-only divorce: Sending every divorce to a civil court will clog family courts already holding lakhs of pending cases. Customary divorces are quicker and cheaper for weaker sections.
    4. Silence on HUF: The code ignores tax benefits available only to Hindus through the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), a joint family taxed as a separate unit.
    5. Copy of the Hindu Code Bill: It reads like a “copy-paste” of the Hindu Code Bill, ignoring progressive reforms in personal laws and family codes worldwide.

    What should a gender-just UCC guarantee women?

    1. Support for deserted women: Desertion leaves women and children highly vulnerable. A UCC should provide automatic maintenance orders and bar disposal of assets.
    2. Gender-specific maintenance: Only women can claim maintenance under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and other personal laws, unlike the gender-neutral Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A UCC should keep this, given unequal power in marriage.
    3. Non-willable share: The Hindu Code Bill let Hindu men will away all property, causing the silent disinheritance of women. Like Muslim law’s protected share, a UCC should reserve wives and children a minimum share.
    4. Marital property: Women should get an equitable share of assets built during marriage, recognising unpaid care and domestic work.
    5. Second wives: Courts grant maintenance to women deceived into a void second marriage, and a UCC should codify this.

    Challenges

    1. Patchwork of State codes: Each State enacting its own code produces different rules, which defeats uniformity itself.
    2. Minority apprehension: Communities fear a code modelled on Hindu law imposes majority practice. Eg. Meghalaya and Mizoram district councils opposing it.
    3. Religious freedom claims: Reform faces challenges under Article 25 (freedom of religion).
    4. Thin consultation: Hurried drafting loses legitimacy with affected groups.

    Way Forward

    1. Optional registration: Make registration optional and confidential, with tangible benefits such as maintenance, legitimacy of children and inheritance rights.
    2. Administrative divorce: Create an administrative mechanism for mutual-consent divorces, reserving courts for contested or complex cases.
    3. Inclusive consultation: Consult groups working for women, Adivasis, queer and transgender people and persons with disabilities.
    4. Civil, not criminal, compliance: Replace penalties with awareness drives and user-friendly procedures.

    Conclusion

    The UCC is moving from slogan to statute State by State, but the first enacted model regulates relationships more than it secures women’s economic rights. Whether pending State bills are revised toward maintenance and marital property rights before assent will show if uniformity serves gender justice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] Under the Indian Constitution, concentration of wealth violates (a) the Right to Equality (b) the Directive Principles of State Policy (c) the Right to Freedom (d) the Concept of Welfare Answer: (b)”

  • Problem is weak drug regulation, CCTV is no cure

    Why in the News

    Buying prescription drugs could move from an ordinary pharmacy counter to one under closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance across the country by early 2027. The Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has begun the process, and the camera promises an audit trail against misuse but records sensitive health choices without fixing weak enforcement of existing rules.

    What is the CCTV proposal meant to achieve?

    1. What it is: Every pharmacy sale of a prescription drug would be filmed. It works like an aircraft’s black box, keeping a record that can be checked later.
    2. What the camera shows: Footage can establish whether a prescription was presented, whether a medicine was handed over and when the sale took place.
    3. Help for inspectors: Drug inspectors could use it to probe pharmacies that repeatedly sell prescription medicines without a prescription.
    4. Audit trail for risky drugs: For Schedule H1 and Schedule X medicines (tightly controlled drugs such as newer antibiotics and narcotics), a stronger record could prevent diversion to illegal use.
    5. The takeaway: A simple technology is meant to make enforcement transparent and accountable, but it records every buyer to catch a few sellers.

    What are Schedules H, H1 and X?

    1. Schedule H: Lists drugs that may be sold only against a registered medical practitioner’s prescription.
    2. Schedule H1: Places tighter controls on the sale of certain antibiotics.
    3. Schedule X: Covers narcotic and psychotropic drugs, with stricter record keeping on every sale.

    Why is a camera a weak regulatory tool?

    1. Cannot verify prescriptions: A camera shows a piece of paper crossing the counter. It cannot tell whether the prescription is genuine.
    2. Blanket coverage: Buyers of an antibiotic, an antihypertensive (blood pressure drug) or an anti-diabetic medicine are not high-risk merely because a prescription is required.
    3. Mismatch with the aim: Filming every prescription sale overshoots the high-risk target, documenting transactions without solving the regulatory problem.

    What privacy risks does it create?

    1. Sensitive purchases on record: A camera can capture someone buying an antidepressant, an HIV medicine, a fertility drug, an abortion pill, cancer treatment or psychiatric drugs.
    2. Health profile from footage: A face, a pharmacy, a time and a medicine together reveal a person’s private life. Linked to other databases or facial recognition, three months of footage maps health behaviour.
    3. Unanswered access questions: It is unclear whether inspectors, police or other departments can obtain footage or reuse it. Citizens cannot learn whether their footage was accessed.

    What must the government prove first?

    1. Constitutional test: The Supreme Court’s privacy rulings require any restriction of a fundamental right to meet legality, necessity and proportionality.
    2. Least intrusive means: The government must show that blanket surveillance is necessary and that a less intrusive method would not work equally well.
    3. Existing regime: India already has prescription rules, registers, licensing conditions, inspections and controls on Schedules H, H1 and X. The first question is whether regulators use them against violators.
    4. Data is not regulation: Collecting more footage does not improve enforcement. It also leaves unanswered who oversees the people holding the footage.

    Challenges

    1. Thin inspection capacity: State drug regulators lack enough inspectors, so existing rules go unenforced. Eg. antibiotics sold over the counter.
    2. No access or retention limits: The proposal states no rules on who may view footage or how long it is kept.
    3. Cost for small chemists: Rural and small pharmacies must bear camera and storage costs.
    4. Function creep: Footage gathered for drug control can be reused for policing or profiling.

    Way Forward

    1. Targeted monitoring: The Health Ministry should limit recording to Schedule H1 and X sales instead of every prescription.
    2. Fill inspector posts: States should recruit drug inspectors and act against repeat violators.
    3. Access rules first: The Ministry should notify who may access footage, for what purpose and for how long, before rollout.
    4. Verifiable prescriptions: Digital prescriptions can confirm genuineness.

    Conclusion

    The proposal treats a gap in enforcement as a gap in data. Whether the Health Ministry sets out access limits and a proportionality case before rollout will decide if the plan survives privacy scrutiny.

    Drug Regulation in India

    1. Parent law: The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 governs the import, manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs. The Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 set drug classification, storage and labelling.
    2. Central regulator: The Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO), headed by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI), approves new drugs and regulates clinical trials.
    3. State regulators: State Drug Regulatory Authorities license manufacture and sale, inspect premises and act against spurious drugs.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] X’ was addressing a seminar on the meaning of the term ‘law’ as provided under Article 13, Part III of the Constitution of India. ‘X’ explained that the meaning of the term ‘law’ in the Constitution of India was very comprehensive. It included ordinances, orders and even rules and regulations. ‘Y’ pointed out that the term ‘law’ in Article 13 also included custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law, to which ‘X’ was not convinced. Based on the above, select the correct conclusion from the options given below: (a) X is correct in the interpretation of law, including the view on non-inclusion of custom (b) The view of Y that ‘law’ included custom is not correct (c) The views of both X and Y are correct (d) The view of only Y is correct Answer: D”

  • Surveillance is not the only privacy issue

    Why in the News

    Three recent developments together show surveillance spreading across the state, private firms and online networks:

    1. The Supreme Court (SC) has disposed of a public interest litigation (PIL) on doxxing (publishing a person’s private details online) and deepfakes, asking Union Ministries to take remedial measures.
    2. Rajya Sabha member A.A. Rahim has petitioned the SC against the Delhi Police’s use of facial recognition and biometric surveillance during the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protests.
    3. The SC has upheld the Election Commission’s (EC) Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, which critics warned could exclude eligible voters.

    What is diffuse surveillance?

    1. What it is: Diffuse surveillance is watching shared among states, private companies and foreign vendors, not one identifiable actor. It is like cameras run by many owners, with nobody answerable for the whole.
    2. An old impulse: State interest in identifying people predates Aadhaar by over 150 years. In 1858, British magistrate William Herschel took handprints on contracts, later developed into Bengal’s fingerprint classification system.
    3. What is new: The scale and speed differ, visible in Aadhaar, Delhi’s cameras and the SIR.
    4. The takeaway: A privacy law that checks one actor at a time cannot protect data passing through many hands.

    What are the three kinds of watching?

    1. Facial recognition by the state: Rahim’s petition alleges police used facial recognition, AI-enabled smart glasses, drones and a mobile command vehicle at Jantar Mantar. Two private firms hosted the data.
    2. Doxxing by online networks: Women at the CJP protests later had their personal details published, with reported rape and death threats.
    3. Public shaming precedent: In March 2020, Uttar Pradesh put photos and addresses of Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 protesters on Lucknow hoardings. The Allahabad High Court ordered removal as an “unwarranted interference in privacy”.
    4. Identity checks on the rolls: Under the SIR, identity checks decide who stays on the electoral roll. The SC held the EC may examine citizenship only for this purpose, not decide it.
    5. Scale of the SIR: Bihar’s roll fell from about 7.89 crore to 7.42 crore electors.

    What is doxxing?

    1. Meaning: Doxxing is publishing a person’s private details, such as a home address, online so that others can find and target them.
    2. Speed of exposure: A photo can be uploaded, identified, amplified and linked to an address within hours.
    3. Remedy so far: Disposing of the PIL, the SC left remedial measures to Union Ministries.

    Why do India’s privacy safeguards fall short?

    1. State-centred right: A nine-judge Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) held privacy a constitutionally protected right. The case was against the state, so its test targets state action.
    2. Wide exemptions: The Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 lets the Union exempt any state instrumentality by notification, on grounds including security of the state and public order.
    3. Pegasus episode: In 2022, a court-appointed expert committee found malware in some phones but could not confirm it was Pegasus, Israeli spyware. It noted the Union had not cooperated.
    4. Secrecy of findings: In 2025, the SC indicated parts of the committee’s report would stay confidential.
    5. Broken chain of protection: The constitutional test guards only the state’s step, so no one answers when a protester is filmed, doxxed and threatened at home.

    Challenges

    1. Private hosts outside safeguards: Police data held by private firms sits beyond clear constitutional or statutory duties.
    2. Self-exemption by government: The Union writes data rules and can exempt its own agencies, so no independent check applies.
    3. No law on facial recognition: Police use of facial recognition rests on executive practice, with no statute setting its limits.

    Way Forward

    1. Surveillance statute: Parliament should legislate limits on police facial recognition, including warrants and retention limits.
    2. Duties that follow data: Privacy obligations should bind private hosts and foreign vendors under rules made under the DPDP Act.
    3. Reviewed exemptions: The Union should record reasons for each exemption and allow independent review.

    Conclusion

    Privacy protection in India still assumes one watcher and one watched. The pending petition on protest surveillance will test whether courts extend the privacy right beyond direct state action.

    What is the Right to Privacy?

    1. Constitutional basis: Privacy is part of Article 21, the right to life and personal liberty.
    2. Related guarantees: It is read with Articles 14 and 19.
    3. Scope: It covers informational privacy (personal data), decisional autonomy (intimate choices) and bodily integrity.
    4. Limits on restriction: A restriction must pass legality, legitimate aim and proportionality. Eg. PUCL v. Union of India (1997) allowed phone tapping only under strict safeguards.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] X’ was addressing a seminar on the meaning of the term ‘law’ as provided under Article 13, Part III of the Constitution of India. ‘X’ explained that the meaning of the term ‘law’ in the Constitution of India was very comprehensive. It included ordinances, orders and even rules and regulations. ‘Y’ pointed out that the term ‘law’ in Article 13 also included custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law, to which ‘X’ was not convinced. Based on the above, select the correct conclusion from the options given below: (a) X is correct in the interpretation of law, including the view on non-inclusion of custom (b) The view of Y that ‘law’ included custom is not correct (c) The views of both X and Y are correct (d) The view of only Y is correct Answer: D”

  • Rare-disease drugs can be India’s next pharma frontier

    Why in the News

    Rare disease patients in India depend on crowdfunding because orphan drugs are scarce and costly, and researchers now propose that India make its own orphan drugs, medicines for rare diseases, instead. The Tata Institute for Genetics and Society notes that India has reported 1,004 rare genetic disorders.

    What are orphan drugs, and why are they out of reach?

    1. What they are: Each rare disease affects very few people, so firms saw little profit in treating it. Its medicines became orphan drugs, like products no company wants to adopt.
    2. Collective scale: Around 8,000 rare diseases together affect hundreds of millions, yet drugs exist for only about 5% of them.
    3. High prices: A small market leads firms to charge around $100,000 (Rs 1 crore) a year, unaffordable without insurance or state cover.
    4. Support falls short: Government support of up to Rs 50 lakh per patient rarely covers a year, so almost 4,000 children are on a government crowdfunding platform.
    5. The takeaway: Rare diseases are rare one by one but common together, so India needs its own route to affordable orphan drugs.

    How did the US Orphan Drug Act change incentives?

    1. Orphan Drug Act, 1983: The United States gave the first approved product seven years of market exclusivity, meaning no rival could sell it. Firms also got tax incentives, grants and fee waivers.
    2. Approvals surge: Lower costs and assured profit raised US orphan drug approvals about thirtyfold.
    3. Laws elsewhere: Japan, Australia and the European Union passed similar laws.

    Why is India suited to run orphan drug trials, and on what terms?

    1. Large patient pool: India has over 1.4 billion people, and endogamy (marriage within a closed community) makes some rare diseases commoner. Its diaspora gene pool also carries unique mutations. Eg. Beta-thalassemia affects 10.5% of some groups.
    2. Organised patients: One study tracks 70 people with GNE myopathy, and Rett syndrome groups keep a registry of over 400 patients.
    3. Missing from global trials: Indian patients rarely join international trials. The government could broker foreign tie-ups, as in chip manufacturing, and invite drug development centres.
    4. Access in return: Patients will help only if they benefit, so India should set prices for India and the Global South, leaving developers free elsewhere. This is the benefit-sharing idea debated for the World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Agreement.

    Can India make orphan drugs, and how should the state help?

    1. Pharmacy of the world: Indian generics fill 47% of US generic prescriptions, and India has the most US-approved plants outside the US.
    2. Advanced and small-batch capacity: Indian firms supply 15% of US biosimilars (near copies of biological drugs), make chimeric antigen receptor T-cell (CAR-T) therapy, a cancer cell therapy, and will make small volumes cheaply.
    3. Rule 101 pathway: Under Rule 101, New Drugs and Clinical Trials Rules, 2019, a drug approved in one of six countries named by the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) needs no fresh Indian trial. It lacks guidance for applicants.
    4. Incentives and purchase: The state should offer Production Linked Incentive (PLI) style rewards for output, investment, exports and patient access. It should add advance market commitments, a promise to buy set volumes at set prices.
    5. De-risked supply: Purchases would flow through Centres of Excellence on Rare Diseases (designated treatment hospitals), the Central Government Health Scheme and Jan Aushadhi Kendras. The aim is to de-risk the first investment, not subsidise firms.

    Challenges

    1. Trial design: Small numbers make it hard to find a patient cohort and fix trial endpoints, the outcomes proving a drug works.
    2. Affordable small-scale supply: Making tiny volumes cheaply at high quality stays hard even after approval.
    3. Chinese competition: Chinese firms, racing US firms, already have patients and low-cost manufacturing.

    Way Forward

    1. Registries for trials: The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) should turn rare disease registries into a trial recruitment network.
    2. Newborn screening: States should widen newborn screening to catch treatable rare diseases early.
    3. Clear Rule 101 guidance: CDSCO should base such approvals on bioequivalence (the copy acts like the original) and pharmacovigilance (tracking harm after launch).
    4. Cost-linked support: The Health Ministry should revise the per patient cap for the costliest therapies.

    Conclusion

    India already makes medicines cheaply for the world, but orphan drug prices and supply are still decided elsewhere. Watch for published approval guidance and a firm government purchase commitment.

    Key numbers

    1. US orphan drug approvals: 38 before the Act; 1,122 by 2022.
    2. Crowdfunding: Listed children’s annual treatment cost over Rs 9,000 crore; Rs 9 crore raised for one Kolkata toddler (mid-2025).
    3. Beta-thalassemia: 3.7% in India’s general population (2023 review).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • In US-China AI race, India’s place will depend on capabilities built at home

    Why in the News

    The summit between the Chinese President and the US President in Washington produced only a modest package on artificial intelligence (AI). The two powers could not even agree on what to call the technology, and their rivalry now shapes the AI rules India must live under.

    What did the summit deliver on AI?

    1. Groundwork in New York: At the first AI talks under the two countries’ trade mechanism, on 20 September, Washington proposed a channel to notify AI incidents, meaning AI events with national security consequences.
    2. Modest package: The summit confirmed a dialogue on risks and benefits, a channel for incidents and a next meeting by November.
    3. Dispute over the name: The White House says the leaders agreed to use the term “super intelligence”. China’s list speaks of a “China-US dialogue on artificial intelligence”.
    4. Nuclear control dropped: At Lima (November 2024), the two sides affirmed human control over nuclear-use decisions. Neither fact sheet repeats it, and only China’s list has a military crisis communication memorandum.
    5. The takeaway: The two powers agreed to talk about AI risk without agreeing on what it is, so the channel can handle incidents but not set rules.

    Why will rivalry, not dialogue, shape the AI order?

    1. Race to be won: The US President calls the case for slowing AI a “hoax”. He prefers prosecutors to police AI harms afterwards over regulators acting in advance.
    2. Language of control: The Chinese President wants AI “always under human control”. His call for both sides to “play to their strengths” criticised US export controls.
    3. Safety as containment: Beijing reads US safety talk as a cover for holding back China. State media accused a US firm of calling distillation (training a cheap model on a stronger model’s outputs) a threat.
    4. Regime security first: China’s security minister calls AI “the main battlefield” of rivalry. Party control of labs limits what models may say, not how fast they grow more capable.
    5. Tools of competition: The US relies on chip controls and Pax Silica, a US-led network of trusted chip suppliers. China pushes chip self-reliance and open-weight models, which anyone can download and adapt.

    What concerns does this raise for India?

    1. G2 overlay (a US-China duopoly): The two powers hold most frontier compute, the computing power behind top models, so they can set the rules. In the nuclear order, such deals justified discriminatory controls on others.
    2. Two AI systems, two sets of standards: India faces pressure from both camps:
      • Washington expects trusted partners to keep China out of their AI ecosystems;
      • Beijing proposed a BRICS open-source AI community at the New Delhi summit;
      • India is unlikely to join China’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO), a China-centric initiative like the Belt and Road Initiative.
    3. Pull of cheap Chinese models: Chinese open-weight models are competitive, cheap and adaptable. Eg. Alibaba’s Qwen has spawned more than 150,000 derivative models.

    Challenges

    1. Private adoption: Stopping private firms building low-risk apps on Chinese models is hard, as low cost attracts Western and Indian companies. Eg. Singapore, Malaysia and Brazil use them.
    2. American dependence: Access to US models can vanish quickly. Eg. June’s brief cut-off of foreign access to top American models.
    3. No rival offer in BRICS: India has no alternative yet to the Chinese AI offering in the grouping.

    Way Forward

    1. Multilateral norms: Welcome US-China risk reduction, but insist on multilateral frontier AI norms and a place in incident-notification arrangements.
    2. Nuclear human control: Make human control over nuclear-use decisions part of India’s nuclear discourse, and press all nuclear powers to affirm it.
    3. Dual and differentiated de-risking: Bar Chinese models from government systems, critical infrastructure and sensitive data; require security testing and local hosting for private use.
    4. Capability at home: Build compute, chips, models, datasets, talent and the ability to test frontier systems independently.
    5. Shape BRICS: Insist that BRICS AI initiatives be consensus-based and technology-neutral, rather than cede the space.

    Conclusion

    The new channel manages incidents between two rivals but leaves the rules for everyone else unsettled. What to watch is whether India is admitted to incident notification, and on what terms the BRICS AI community takes shape.

    Government Initiatives for AI capability in India

    1. IndiaAI Mission (2024): Treats AI as a public good, built on shared compute, open datasets and decentralised talent development.
    2. Shared compute: More than 38,000 graphics processing units (GPUs), the chips that train AI models, form a national compute grid for startups and researchers.
    3. AI Kosh: Offers over 360 curated non-personal datasets across sectors such as agriculture, health and climate.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 10 marks] With the waning of globalization, post-Cold War world is becoming a site of sovereign nationalism. Elucidate.”

  • Few judicial officers make it to High Courts despite training and decades of experience

    Why in the News

    Career judges from the subordinate judiciary fill only 233 of the High Courts’ 1,114 sanctioned posts, far below the one-third share convention leaves them in most States. It resurfaced as seven district judges’ elevation lifted the Delhi High Court to 50 working judges of a sanctioned 60.

    How do judges reach a High Court?

    1. Two streams under Article 217: Article 217 of the Constitution lets High Court judges come from the Bar (advocates) or from judicial officers of the State service. It fixes no ratio between them.
    2. The one-third convention: By convention, two-thirds of vacancies go to the Bar and one-third to the service cadre. It works like an informal quota that no law enforces.
    3. Colonial origin: Under British rule, magistrates’ courts were run by Indian Civil Service officers, who were executive officials. They mainly heard faujdari (criminal) cases, not deewani (civil) disputes.
    4. Separation of powers: The Constitution separated the judiciary from the executive. Trial courts therefore passed to independent State Judicial Services, with a career ladder of their own.
    5. The takeaway: The Constitution names both streams without a ratio, so an unwritten convention decides, and it leaves career judges only a minority of seats.

    How far short of the norm do High Courts fall?

    1. Delhi’s intake: After the latest elevations, 19 of the Delhi High Court’s 50 working judges came from the subordinate courts.
    2. National shortfall: Only 233 judges in office came from the district judiciary, against 1,114 sanctioned High Court posts. That is roughly one in five.
    3. Near the norm: Tripura, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi exceed or near the one-third share. Eg. Tripura at 40%.
    4. Far behind: Service judges make up just 9.09% in Uttarakhand and Chhattisgarh, and Sikkim has no judge from its State Judicial Service.

    Why do service judges arrive too late to matter?

    1. Slow climb: Most law graduates join as civil judges in their late twenties. Reaching senior civil judge takes about 10 years, and district and sessions judge another decade.
    2. Late zone of consideration: Officers enter the zone of consideration (the pool screened for elevation) in their late fifties, leaving a few years before the retirement age of 62.
    3. Supreme Court gap: No sitting Supreme Court judge began in the trial courts. The last was Justice Bela M. Trivedi, appointed in August 2021. She retired in June 2025.
    4. Talent deterrent: A former Principal District and Sessions Judge warns that unclear career progression deters top law graduates from the lower judiciary.

    What has the Supreme Court said, and what do former judges want?

    1. Plea for a 50% quota: In 2023 the Judicial Service Association of Delhi asked the Supreme Court to direct that half of High Court seats be filled from the service quota.
    2. Plea declined: A three judge Bench declined the prayer on 25 April 2023. It left the applicants to seek remedies before a forum “permissible in law”.
    3. Advance recommendations: The Bench directed High Courts to recommend service cadre names before vacancies arise, noting that service judges often got only a few years of tenure.
    4. Case for a larger share: A retired Delhi High Court judge from the service cadre argues seats “ought to have been divided equally if not more” for the service.
    5. Faster filling: Appraisals, integrity reports and judgment records already exist for officers, so their names can be processed months before a vacancy.

    Challenges

    1. No written ratio: Article 217 fixes no proportion, so each High Court’s service share depends on the discretion of its selectors.
    2. Short tenures: Officers elevated late rarely gain the seniority needed to become a Chief Justice or reach the Supreme Court.
    3. Collegium opacity: The collegium (the panel of senior judges that recommends appointments) publishes no criteria for choosing between the two streams.

    Way Forward

    1. Minimum service share: The Supreme Court collegium should fix a published minimum service share for every High Court.
    2. Earlier promotion: High Courts should widen accelerated promotion through limited competitive examinations, in-service tests that let able officers move up ahead of seniority, so they reach district judge rank younger.
    3. Vacancy calendar: Each High Court should publish expected vacancies in advance, so service names are ready on time.

    Conclusion

    The two constitutional streams into the High Courts have narrowed in practice into a small and late share for career judges. Whether any minimum share is written down will decide if trial court experience reaches the higher Bench.

    Key numbers

    1. Telangana and Odisha: 11.90% and 15.15% of High Court judges drawn from the service.
    2. Bombay High Court: 17.02% drawn from the service.
    3. Himachal Pradesh and Delhi: 35.29% and 31.67% drawn from the service.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] Consider the following statements : 1. Pursuant to the report of H.N. Sanyal Committee, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was passed. 2. The Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court and the High Courts to punish for contempt of themselves. 3. The Constitution of India defines Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt. 4. In India, the Parliament is vested with the powers to make laws on Contempt of Court. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?4 (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 1, 2 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 only (d) 3 only Answer: B”

  • As J&K House passes resolution on statehood, CM Omar asks, ‘what does uchit samay mean?’

    Why in the News

    The Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly has turned the Centre’s open ended promise of statehood at an “uchit samay” (opportune moment) into a formal legislative demand that the Union Territory (UT) be made a State again. The resolution passed by voice vote as Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) members walked out, and the Chief Minister asked what that timeline means when the Supreme Court had sought restoration “at the earliest”.

    What is J&K’s present status, and what did the Supreme Court say?

    1. What it is: The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two UTs: Jammu and Kashmir, with a legislature, and Ladakh, without one.
    2. How a UT works: Like Delhi or Puducherry, an elected government works alongside a Lieutenant Governor (LG) representing the Centre.
    3. Court’s position: In In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution (2023), a five judge Constitution Bench upheld ending J&K’s special status. It recorded the Centre’s assurance of restored statehood.
    4. The takeaway: Until statehood returns, the elected government lacks powers a State holds, so the timing is contested.

    What did the Chief Minister argue?

    1. Long wait: Chief Minister Omar Abdullah said J&K has waited two years for the Centre to keep its word, with no clarity on when statehood will return.
    2. Link to militancy: He asked whether the Centre’s promise is linked to militancy, meaning statehood would wait until “guns fall silent”.
    3. Decision left to Pakistan: The Centre says militancy is instigated from Pakistan. Linking statehood to it, he argued, leaves the decision to Islamabad rather than New Delhi.

    How does the UT set-up limit the elected government?

    1. Sub judice opinion: The Law Department told the Speaker the debate was sub judice (pending in court). The Chief Minister, also Law Minister, said he never saw that opinion.
    2. Chief Secretary’s letter: He said the Chief Secretary had also written to the Speaker, and asked on whose directions this was done.
    3. Limited domain of the LG: The Act reserves only security and law and order for the LG, he said, yet the revenue department sits outside the elected government.
    4. Universities and reservation: Control of the Islamic University of Science and Technology and Baba Ghulam Shah Badshah University, and rationalisation of reservation, are other areas where UT status “affects us daily”.

    Where do the parties differ on the resolution?

    1. BJP’s stand: The Leader of the Opposition said the BJP favours restoring statehood but called the resolution’s language unacceptable.
    2. “Pre-1953 position”: He called the resolution’s reference to J&K’s pre-1953 position unconstitutional.
    3. Demands from allies and rivals: At least eight Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), including from the ruling National Conference, the Congress and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), sought amendments naming Articles 370 and 35A.
    4. Condemnation sought: The same members wanted the resolution to condemn “the events of August 5, 2019”, the day J&K’s special status was ended.

    Challenges

    1. No timeline: The Centre’s promise names no date, leaving restoration to its discretion without any enforceable deadline.
    2. Dual power centres: Split control between the LG and the elected government blurs accountability for administration.
    3. Security linkage: Tying statehood to the end of militancy makes a constitutional decision depend on events outside India’s control.
    4. Parliamentary route: Restoration needs Parliament to amend the Reorganisation Act under Articles 3 and 4, and the Assembly’s resolution carries no binding force.

    Way Forward

    1. Dated roadmap: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs should publish a time-bound roadmap for statehood.
    2. Interim transfer: The Centre should move departments such as revenue to the elected government under the Act’s business rules before full statehood.
    3. Legislative step: The Centre should introduce a Bill in Parliament amending the Reorganisation Act.
    4. Separate tracks: J&K’s parties should keep statehood distinct from the Article 370 dispute to build consensus.

    Conclusion

    The resolution shows that an elected government in a UT answers to voters without holding the powers they expect it to use. What to watch is whether the Centre turns its promise into a dated plan or a Bill in Parliament.

    Back2Basics: Articles 370 and 35A

    1. Article 370: A “temporary provision” that gave J&K special status. Most Union laws applied there only with the State government’s concurrence.
    2. Article 35A: Added by a 1954 Presidential Order, it let J&K’s legislature define permanent residents and reserve rights such as land ownership and State jobs for them.
    3. Pre-1953 arrangement: Until 1953, J&K had its own Prime Minister and a Sadr-i-Riyasat (head of state), and the Union’s role centred on defence, external affairs and communications.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] Which one of the following in Indian polity is an essential feature that indicates that it is federal in character? (a) The independence of the judiciary is safeguarded. (b) The Union Legislature has elected representatives from constituent units. (c) The Union Cabinet can have elected representatives from regional parties. (d) The Fundamental Rights are enforceable by Courts of Law. Answer: A”

  • Maharashtra top poll officer wants ECINet discretion for local staff, a demand the two ECs had flagged

    Why in the News

    Decisions the law leaves to local Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) are now fixed centrally by ECINet, the Election Commission of India (ECI)‘s software, and Maharashtra’s Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) has asked for that discretion back in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) notice phase. He sought four changes, a concern two Election Commissioners had already flagged, and the Commission has partly responded.

    Who controls the voters’ list, and how has ECINet changed that?

    1. What the law says: The Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 make one Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) per Assembly seat responsible for the roll.
    2. Why it is decentralised: The ERO, usually a sub-divisional magistrate, decides which names stay, so no single person controls the list. The ECI has long cited this against manipulation allegations.
    3. What went wrong: In practice an ERO can pick only options ECINet offers, set centrally by the Director General of Information Technology (DG(IT)). The officer holds the power, but Delhi controls its use.
    4. The takeaway: When software fixes an officer’s choices, legal responsibility and practical control come apart.

    What is a “logical discrepancy”, and why does it matter?

    1. Meaning: A “logical discrepancy” is a mismatch ECINet flags when linking an elector to a parent on the last SIR roll. It is not a finding that someone is not a voter.
    2. Triggers: A mismatched parent’s name, a parent and child age gap under 15 or over 50 years, or no document or only Aadhaar.
    3. Scale in Maharashtra: It is the largest State now in the SIR notice phase, when flagged electors get notices. Its 31 August draft roll left out 21.1 per cent of electors.

    What four changes did the Maharashtra CEO seek?

    1. Hearings: The rules let the ERO decide whether a hearing is needed, but ECINet’s “Take Action” menu cannot skip one. The CEO sought an “Exempted from Hearing” option for electors with valid documents.
    2. Documents: The 13 documents listed are “indicative and not exhaustive”. The CEO sought an “Other/Other Equivalent Document” option for tribal, homeless and sex-worker electors.
    3. Who decides: A Booth Level Officer (BLO) statement or panchnama (witnessed local record) settles only name mismatches. The CEO wants EROs to settle all cases this way, referring the rest to the District Election Officer.
    4. Mandatory upload: ECINet requires an “Extract of Last SIR” in every case. The CEO proposed it only where records differ from the elector’s claim.
    5. Written instructions: Calling oral instructions insufficient, the CEO also sought frequently asked questions (FAQs). Four of the five requests seek a button for a judgement the law already gives EROs.

    Why do the requests echo the two Election Commissioners, and how has the ECI responded?

    1. Commissioners on record: Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi had recorded that the software curtailed EROs’ powers. Sandhu’s 14 August note blamed “centralised control of ERONet at DG(IT) level”.
    2. Timing: The CEO wrote on 24 September, a day after an investigation revealed these objections. The ECI’s first reply cited its platforms’ strict data security protocols.
    3. Partial concession: On 26 September the full Commission let EROs exempt logical discrepancy cases from hearings, promising more flexibility.
    4. Internal reforms: Among eight other decisions, agendas and minutes will be issued, and an ECINet review committee will include an independent Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) expert.
    5. Link to dissent: The decisions track concerns the two Commissioners filed over 10 months.

    Challenges

    1. Burden on the vulnerable: Rigid document lists and default hearings weigh most on elderly, disabled and undocumented electors.
    2. Opaque automated flags: Age-gap rules can flag genuine voters without a reviewable reason.
    3. Internal trust deficit: Months of recorded dissent signal weak collective functioning inside the ECI.

    Way Forward

    1. Configurable ERO options: ECINet should offer every choice the Registration of Electors Rules allow.
    2. Published audit: The review committee should audit the roll database and publish findings.
    3. Written procedures: The ECI should issue FAQs for every SIR stage.
    4. Transparent flags: Electors should be told which rule flagged them.

    Conclusion

    Statutory discretion means little when central software withholds the tools to use it. Whether EROs get real flexibility before the final roll on 16 November will decide how many excluded electors return.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision

    1. What it is: A time-bound, house-to-house re-verification of every roll entry by BLOs, unlike the routine summary revision.
    2. Legal basis: Section 21 of the 1950 Act lets the ECI order a special revision at any time, for recorded reasons.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”