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GS Paper: GS2

  • How SC has strengthened safeguards around re-arrest

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has held that an accused released because the grounds of arrest were not communicated is not released on bail. Such a person is released from an “illegal and unconstitutional detention”. A two judge Bench held that the safeguards under Article 22(1) are “fundamental principles which are required to be followed” whenever a person’s liberty is curtailed. The ruling builds on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra (2025), which settled that the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing under all statutes. The Bench was hearing an appeal by an accused in a POCSO case in Punjab, a prosecution under the child sexual offences law. The contested point is whether an investigating agency retains any power to correct its own breach by arresting the same person again.

    What do Article 21 and Article 22 require on arrest?

    1. Right to life and personal liberty: Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty. The arrest safeguards operate at the point where that liberty is curtailed.
    2. Article 22(1), grounds of arrest: Article 22(1) requires the police to inform an arrested person of the grounds of arrest. It also provides for legal representation.
    3. Article 22(2), production before a magistrate: Article 22(2) requires that an arrested person be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest.

    How did the written grounds requirement evolve through the Court’s rulings?

    1. Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2023): The question of a written copy of the grounds of arrest first arose here. Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires a person to be informed “of the grounds of such arrest” without specifying how that information is conveyed.
    2. The reasoning in Pankaj Bansal: The Court held that the safeguard would mean little if the grounds were merely read out and not handed over. A written copy must be furnished “as a matter of course and without exception”.
    3. Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement (2023): That position was diluted. The Court held that Pankaj Bansal would apply only prospectively, so an arrest predating it was validly made by reading the grounds out without furnishing a copy.
    4. Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024): The Court reaffirmed that an arrested person must be provided the grounds of arrest in writing at the earliest.
    5. Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra (2025): The Court settled the position. Communicating the grounds of arrest in writing, in the language the arrestee understands, is mandatory for arrests under all statutes, and non-compliance renders “the arrest and subsequent remand… illegal”.
    6. The oral exception: Mihir Rajesh Shah allowed grounds to be conveyed orally in exceptional cases. A written copy must follow within a reasonable time, and at least two hours before the accused is produced for remand.

    What did the Court hold, and why is the release not bail?

    1. Violation invalidates the arrest itself: Any violation of Article 22(1) or Article 22(2) invalidates the arrest. The Court held that any breach “would entail immediate release of the arrested person because such arrest is unconstitutional.”
    2. No power to tinker with the safeguard: The Bench recorded that it cannot tinker with “the most important safeguards provided under Article 22”.
    3. Release without conditions: A release on bail is conditional. Here the arrest is invalid in law, so the accused stands in the position of a person who was never arrested.
    4. Rejection of the blanket immunity argument: The State argued that the seriousness of the offence meant Article 22(2) should not give the accused “blanket immunity” from re-arrest. The Court rejected this and held that the police cannot simply re-arrest an accused on their own where the arrest was unconstitutional.
    5. Weight of the safeguard in serious offences: The requirement of written grounds matters most in serious offences, where securing bail is often difficult. The safeguard is what allows an accused to challenge the arrest or oppose remand.

    What procedure must an agency now follow to re-arrest?

    1. Grounds furnished first: An agency that believes custody is necessary must first furnish the grounds of arrest to the accused.
    2. Prior magisterial approval: The agency must then move the jurisdictional magistrate with an application explaining the need for custody. The application must also state the reasons for the earlier non-compliance.
    3. Endorsement by a superior officer: The application requires endorsement by the officer’s immediate superior.
    4. Transfer of the investigation: The judgment requires the investigation to be transferred to a different officer. It also requires a departmental enquiry.

    What remedy does the ruling open for an unconstitutional arrest?

    1. Compensation as a public law remedy: High Courts may award compensation “as part of the public law remedy in a case of violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution”.
    2. Private civil remedy preserved: The accused retains liberty to pursue a remedy under private civil law in addition to the public law remedy.
    3. A right needs a consequence: Breach of a constitutional provision must carry a consequence, since a right without a remedy and a result is not enforced.
    4. Judicial supervision over police power: The decision places the judiciary in supervision over the State’s power to deprive a person of liberty. It does not extend to supervision over the integrity of the investigation itself.

    Challenges to the Article 22 arrest safeguards

    1. Compensation is rarely awarded: The public law remedy depends on courts using it, and courts do not award compensation often enough in cases of illegal arrest or detention. Eg. The ruling permits a High Court to award compensation and leaves the award to its discretion.
      The Fix: Require a reasoned order wherever a court finds an arrest unconstitutional and declines to award compensation.
    2. Repeated dilution of the standard: The written grounds requirement has been raised and then narrowed across successive rulings, so the content of the safeguard has depended on which judgment governed a given arrest. Eg. The “without exception” rule in Pankaj Bansal was confined to future arrests within the same year.
      The Fix: Write the written grounds requirement, its language and its timing into statutory arrest procedure, so the standard does not turn on the date of the arrest.
    3. Scope of the oral exception: Grounds may be conveyed orally in exceptional cases, and the arresting agency decides in the first instance whether a case is exceptional. Eg. The written copy is due only within a reasonable time, at least two hours before remand.
      The Fix: Require the agency to record in writing, at the time it relies on the exception, why oral communication was unavoidable.
    4. Supervision stops at the arrest: The judicial check operates on the power to detain and not on the investigation, so an unconstitutional arrest does not by itself disturb the case built around it. Eg. The remedy prescribed is transfer of the probe to another officer rather than any consequence for the material already gathered.
      The Fix: Attach the magistrate’s finding on the earlier non-compliance to the officer’s service record, so a repeated breach carries a cost beyond the single case.
    5. Pressure for offence-specific exceptions: The argument that a grave offence should narrow the safeguard will recur in every serious case, since the cost of releasing such an accused is what makes the safeguard contested. Eg. The appeal itself arose from a prosecution for a child sexual offence.
      The Fix: Treat any offence-specific exception as a matter for Parliament rather than for a case by case reading of the constitutional provision.

    Conclusion

    An arrest that fails the constitutional requirement is now void rather than curable, and the investigating agency can no longer repair it by arresting the same person again. The safeguard’s weight has shifted to two actors outside that agency. The magistrate decides whether fresh custody is justified, and the High Court decides whether an unconstitutional detention carries a monetary consequence. The measure to watch is how often compensation is actually awarded, since a remedy that exists but goes unused leaves the safeguard where it was before the ruling.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS2, 15 marks] ”The Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a constitution made for a progressive society”. Illustrate with special reference to the expanding horizons of the right to life and personal liberty.”

  • Smartphone screen protectors under BIS

    Why in the News

    The Centre has mandated compulsory Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) certification for smartphone screen protectors. An entity must now secure regulatory approval before selling such products in India. The mandate takes effect from 1 April 2027. The move answers the circulation of low-quality screen protectors in a market estimated at 400 million tempered glass pieces in 2025. The stated aim is a quality floor for consumers and a level playing field for local manufacturers and global firms. The open question is enforcement, since a pre-market approval requirement has to reach every seller in a market of that size.

    What does the compulsory certification order require?

    1. Approval before sale: Certification is a pre-market requirement, so an entity must hold BIS approval before it sells a smartphone screen protector in India.
    2. Product scope: The mandate covers smartphone screen protectors as a product category, including the tempered glass segment that dominates the market.

    How large is the market the order applies to?

    1. Retail value of the segment: The local market for tempered glass screen protectors carried a retail value of Rs 20,000 crore in 2025.
    2. Prevalence of substandard stock: The order is expected to curb sales of low-quality smartphone screen protectors.

    Who does the order affect?

    1. Domestic manufacturers: The mandate is expected to help firms that have begun manufacturing in India. Eg. Optiemus Infracom has started production of screen protectors in India.
    2. Level playing field for all sellers: The requirement applies alike to local manufacturers and global firms, according to the mobile device makers’ body ICEA. The industry position is that a common certification floor removes the advantage of uncertified stock.
    3. Consumers: The stated consumer benefit is protection from substandard products.

    Challenges to mandatory certification for screen protectors

    1. Enforcement across a dispersed retail market: Certification binds the entity selling the product, and a market of hundreds of millions of pieces is spread across a very large number of sellers. Eg. The tempered glass segment ran to 400 million pieces in 2025.
      The Fix: Require every retail and marketplace listing to display the certification number, so enforcement operates at the point of sale rather than only at the factory.
    2. Compliance cost before the effective date: Approval must be secured before a product can be sold, so a seller carries testing and certification cost ahead of any revenue from the certified line. Eg. The mandate takes effect on 1 April 2027.
      The Fix: Publish the testing protocol and the list of recognised laboratories early, so the approval queue does not concentrate immediately before the deadline.
    3. Imports outside the certification net: The level playing field the order promises depends on uncertified consignments being stopped at the border rather than after they reach the market. Eg. The order’s stated purpose includes equal treatment of local manufacturers and global firms.
      The Fix: Tie customs clearance of screen protector consignments to a verified certification record for the importing entity.

    Conclusion

    Compulsory certification for this accessory category is settled in principle and open in execution. Its effect depends on how much of a very large and dispersed seller base is actually brought inside the certification net, rather than on the standard itself. The milestone to watch is the date the mandate takes effect, since uncertified stock may not lawfully be sold after it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] Consider the following statements: 1. The Standard Mark of Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) is mandatory for automotive tyres and tubes. 2. AGMARK is a quality Certification Mark issued by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 (a)”

  • SSA 5000: Sustainability assurance redefines corporate trust, greenwashing’s new checkpoint

    Why in the News

    The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has issued the Standard on Sustainability Assurance (SSA) 5000, a framework for professionals who independently verify the sustainability information a company publishes. The standard is aligned with the International Standard on Sustainability Assurance (ISSA) 5000 and carries carve-outs tailored to the Indian context. It is effective from 1 April 2027. The standard answers a reporting environment in which sustainability information is collected using multiple methods with varying levels of verification. That inconsistency has raised concerns about limited comparability and the risk of greenwashing, meaning a firm presenting its environmental record more favourably than the evidence supports. The contested point is whether independent assurance can discipline claims that the reporting firm still generates, measures and selects on its own.

    What is the Standard on Sustainability Assurance (SSA) 5000?

    1. Independent verification of published claims: SSA 5000 outlines the broad contours of principles and procedures for professionals who independently verify a company’s sustainability information. It brings audit-like discipline to sustainability reporting.
    2. Procedure the practitioner follows: The framework sets out how an assurance practitioner examines sustainability disclosures, assesses risks, collects evidence, evaluates internal controls and issues an assurance conclusion.
    3. Coverage of the standard: It encompasses sustainability information across environmental, social and governance (ESG) parameters. These include greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption, water usage, waste management, diversity, employee practices and governance indicators.
    4. Replacement of earlier standards: SSA 5000 replaces the ICAI’s earlier SSAE 3000 and SAE 3410. Those acted as the umbrella standard for sustainability assurance engagements and were applied alongside subject-specific standards such as those on greenhouse gas emissions.

    Why has sustainability reporting come to need an audit-like discipline?

    1. Shift in what a financial statement reports: Financial statements are moving beyond measuring what a firm earned to how the earnings came about. The analysis now covers growth sustainability, the management of environmental and social risks, and the alignment of governance practices with stakeholder expectations.
    2. Absence of a single verification process: Financial statements follow established accounting standards and audit processes. Sustainability information is collected using multiple methods with varying levels of verification instead.
    3. Proliferation of reporting frameworks: Firms now disclose under Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR), the Global Reporting Initiative, International Sustainability Standards Board standards and climate-related disclosure frameworks at the same time.
    4. ESG investing as the source of demand: The growth of ESG investing has raised demand for credible non-financial information. Investors rely on sustainability data to assess long-term risks from climate exposure and operational vulnerabilities.
    5. Effect of the COVID-19 pandemic: The pandemic strengthened the importance of ESG for investors. Investors increasingly hold that companies performing well on ESG are less risky and better prepared for uncertainty.

    How does SSA 5000 attack the specific forms of greenwashing?

    1. Self-prepared reports: A major reason for greenwashing is that firms themselves prepare sustainability reports and decide which achievements to highlight. SSA 5000 inserts an independent practitioner who evaluates whether the disclosures are supported by sufficient evidence.
    2. Selective disclosure: Cherry picking presents a favourable subset of performance as the whole. The standard requires the practitioner to examine whether the information provides a balanced picture, and whether the reporting scope excludes crucial operations or negative information that could influence stakeholder decisions.
    3. Value chain exclusion: Greenwashing occurs when a firm reports improvements in its own operations and ignores emissions or social issues in the wider value chain. SSA 5000 requires the practitioner to examine whether the reporting boundaries are right and whether significant activities have been excluded without justification.
    4. Management explanations are not enough: Assurance professionals cannot simply accept management explanations. They must question assumptions, weigh evidence and identify areas where sustainability claims may be overstated.
    5. Testing a carbon neutral claim: A claim of carbon neutral operations requires examination of how emissions are calculated, whether offsets are genuine and whether reductions are permanent.

    What does verification of sustainability data actually require?

    1. Material misstatement as the test: The practitioner evaluates whether there are material misstatements in the disclosures, whether caused by error or by misleading presentation.
    2. Evidence behind a reduction claim: Where an entity claims to have cut carbon emissions by a certain proportion, the practitioner examines the methodology used, the emission calculations, the energy consumption records and the supporting documentation. Reliance on management statements alone is not sufficient.
    3. Technical nature of the data: Sustainability data comprises measurements and estimates of carbon emissions, water use, waste generation and biodiversity impact. Each rests on technical calculation rather than a ledger entry.
    4. Data quality procedures: SSA 5000 requires assurance professionals to assess data quality, understand measurement processes and perform procedures to verify the information.
    5. Evidence-based disclosure: The focus shifts sustainability reporting from broad claims to evidence-based disclosures.

    What market does mandatory assurance create?

    1. Growth of sustainability consulting: The sustainability consulting market is growing fast, because companies need help preparing disclosures and making them assurance-ready. The growth followed the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) introducing BRSR requirements for listed firms.
    2. Integrated sustainability management firms: A new category of firm could emerge by combining accounting, assurance, environmental expertise, technological capability and regulatory advisory. The successful firms are likely to be those achieving multidisciplinary integration.
    3. Profit as part of a wider picture: In a setting of climate risks, resource constraints and rising stakeholder expectations, profit is one part of corporate value creation rather than the whole of it.

    Challenges to SSA 5000

    1. Competence of assurance professionals: Sustainability assurance needs knowledge of accounting, auditing, environmental science and technology together, and that combination is in short supply. Eg. Verifying biodiversity impact or waste generation data calls for technical measurement skill rather than ledger review.
      The Fix: Certify assurance practitioners against a curriculum that pairs accounting and auditing with environmental measurement, before the standard takes effect.
    2. Measurement across complex supply chains: Measuring sustainability impacts across suppliers remains difficult, so the part of the footprint most likely to be excluded is also the part hardest to verify. Eg. A firm’s own operations are metered, and its suppliers’ emissions are not.
      The Fix: Phase supplier-level data collection by sector, starting with the highest-impact tiers, rather than demanding full value chain coverage in the first cycle.
    3. Absence of standardised data: Sustainability data lacks a standardised basis, so an assurance conclusion rests on inputs that are not comparable across firms. Eg. Water usage, waste management and diversity data are gathered by separate internal systems with different levels of verification.
      The Fix: Publish sector-specific measurement protocols alongside the standard, so each disclosed metric has one accepted method of computation.
    4. Forward-looking claims: Net-zero targets and climate commitments involve assumptions about future actions, which no record can verify at the time of assurance. Eg. A dated net-zero commitment depends on capital spending decisions not yet taken.
      The Fix: Assure the stated assumptions and the interim milestones rather than the end-state target.
    5. Compliance cost on smaller firms: Investment in data systems, technology and specialised personnel raises the cost of being assured, and the burden falls hardest on smaller firms. Eg. A small listed company must build a measurement system before it has a claim worth verifying.
      The Fix: Scale the assured metric set by firm size, so a smaller company’s first cycles cover a narrower set of disclosures.
    6. Dependence on firm transparency: The practitioner examines the information a firm supplies, so a firm withholding negative information limits what assurance can detect. Eg. Negative information excluded from the reporting scope is invisible unless the practitioner knows the operation exists.
      The Fix: Require an entity to publish its full list of operations and the reason any of them sits outside the assured boundary.

    Conclusion

    Sustainability assurance changes who certifies a claim, not who generates the data behind it. Its reach therefore depends on measurement capacity inside firms and on a supply of practitioners able to test that measurement. Both are thinner than the reporting obligation they will have to carry. The point to watch is whether that capacity is built before the standard takes effect, or whether the first assurance cycles produce conclusions as unverified as the claims they were meant to replace.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS3, 10 marks] With a consideration towards the strategy of inclusive growth, the new Companies Bill, 2013 has indirectly made CSR a mandatory obligation. Discuss the challenges expected in its implementation in right earnest. Also discuss other provisions in the Bill and their implications”

  • A Malacca-Singapore model for resolving Hormuz

    A Malacca-Singapore model for resolving Hormuz

    Question (2022, GS1 – 15 Marks): “Mention the significance of straits and isthmus in international trade.
    Linkage: This highlights how narrow bottlenecks like the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, and Singapore handle vital portions of global trade and energy flows, making the legal rights of transit passage across these straits crucial to global supply chains.
    [2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?
    1. Bahrain
    2. Syria
    3. Qatar
    4. Egypt
    Select the answer using the code given below:
    [A] 1 and 2
    [B] 1 and 3
    [C] 2 and 3
    [D] 3 and 4

    Mentor Comment

    Siege warfare continues in the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait has not reopened. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore settled a structurally similar problem in the 1970s, when the territorial sea claims of the littoral States met in the middle and left no high seas corridor through them. That settlement produced the transit passage regime in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and, in 2007, a Cooperative Mechanism funding navigation safety without any toll on shipping. Iran and Oman have apparently agreed on a framework for reopening Hormuz, and the United States has not accepted the arrangement. The tension is that the technical parallels between the two waterways are close while the conditions that made the Malacca settlement possible, a convention still being negotiated and great powers willing to trade, no longer exist.

    What is transit passage and how does it differ from innocent passage?

    1. Innocent passage: It is the right of a foreign vessel to pass through another State’s territorial sea. The coastal State may suspend it for security reasons, and it excludes submerged submarines.
    2. Transit passage: It is a right of passage through straits used for international navigation that connect areas of high seas or exclusive economic zones, in a “continuous and expeditious” manner with no stopping or loitering.
    3. Why the difference matters: Transit passage applies to warships as well, and cannot be suspended by the coastal State, so it goes beyond mere innocent passage.
    4. Where it comes from: The concept was introduced by the United Kingdom as UNCLOS entered its final phase of formulation in the 1970s, specifically to solve the problem of straits narrower than two territorial seas.

    How did the Malacca and Singapore Straits stop being treated as international waters?

    1. The geography: The Strait of Malacca runs some 800 kilometres between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, connecting the Andaman Sea to the Strait of Singapore. The Strait of Singapore, some 105 km long, connects onward to the South China Sea.
    2. Indonesia’s archipelagic claim: A newly decolonised Indonesia feared for the security of its individual islands and in 1957 declared that all waters “surrounding, between and connecting the islands” were Indonesian waters.
    3. The 12 nautical mile claims: Indonesia insisted its territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles from the outermost islands. Malaysia revised the stance it had taken at the 1958 UNCLOS conference and also announced a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, despite its 1963 armed conflict with Indonesia over Borneo.
    4. The closure of the corridor: At their narrowest points the Straits are well under 24 nautical miles wide, so once both States claimed 12 nautical mile territorial seas the zones met in the middle, leaving no strip of high seas or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between them.
    5. The consequence under the law of the time: The Straits became simply territorial seas, where foreign vessels enjoyed only innocent passage, a right Indonesia or Malaysia could suspend.
    6. The 1971 joint statement: Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore jointly challenged the older international character of the Straits and proposed a coordinating body of representatives of the three States to administer them.
    7. Singapore’s reservation: As an island nation dependent on trade and shipping, Singapore did not agree to declaring the Straits “not international”, but made common cause with Malaysia on the safety of navigation.

    How did the great powers respond to the littoral claim?

    1. Japan, cooperation over internationalisation: Japan was a major player through the Japan funded Malacca Strait Council, and offered cooperation with the three States rather than seeking an internationalised regime.
    2. The United States and the Soviet Union, aligned: Otherwise rivals, they were allies on this one issue, seeking to keep the Straits open for ships to retain the right of “continued, politically uncluttered transit”.
    3. The United Kingdom, a legal solution: It introduced the transit passage concept, which preserved great power naval mobility while conceding the littoral States’ territorial claim.
    4. Indonesia, a traded concession: It agreed to the transit passage formulation with reservations, trading its acceptance for greater security for its archipelago, which UNCLOS eventually addressed separately.
    5. Malaysia, technical conditions: Its concerns centred on environmental safety, insurance requirements and permissible vessel draught rather than on the passage right itself.

    What did the 2007 Cooperative Mechanism actually settle?

    1. What it built on: In 2007 the three States, working with the international community, arrived at a Cooperative Mechanism built on a traffic separation scheme similar to what Iran and Oman had agreed for the Strait of Hormuz in the 1960s.
    2. The core bargain: User States and industry contribute to a fund for aids to navigation, hydrographic surveys and safety projects, administered jointly with the littoral States.
    3. Who funds it: The Aids to Navigation Fund is supported by voluntary contributions from non profit organisations such as The Nippon Foundation and the International Foundation for Aids to Navigation, along with industry stakeholders and States with an interest in safe use of the Straits.
    4. How it is governed: The fund is administered on a rotation basis by a committee of representatives of the three littoral States and the contributors.
    5. The line that makes it work: These contributions do not amount to tolls, and Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore impose no fees, tolls or any other payment on ships exercising the right of transit passage.

    Where does the Hormuz geography match the Malacca case?

    1. The intersecting territorial seas: The territorial waters of Iran and Oman intersect, making sections of the Strait of Hormuz part of their territorial waters, which is the same structural condition that closed the high seas corridor through Malacca.
    2. The precedent already borrowed: The traffic separation scheme that the 2007 Cooperative Mechanism built on was itself modelled on the Iran and Oman arrangement of the 1960s, so the two waterways have shared technical machinery before.
    3. A regional sponsor exists: Qatar is among the Persian Gulf nations that have supported the Iran and Oman talks, and it had also mooted the Malacca and Singapore Straits as a model.
    4. Cooperation has precedent in the Gulf: Persian Gulf nations have a history of both conflict and cooperation, and the United Arab Emirates was among Iran’s leading trading partners.

    Why can the Malacca settlement not simply be transplanted?

    1. The convention moment has passed: The Malacca issue was resolved as UNCLOS itself was being put into effect, when trade offs were part of negotiating a convention intended to govern the world’s oceans. No comparable bargaining table exists now.
    2. One party is outside the convention: Iran has not ratified UNCLOS, so the transit passage compromise that bound the Malacca littorals does not bind it in the same way.
    3. A contrary domestic law is in force: In 1993 Iran passed a law requiring foreign warships to seek its authorisation to pass through the Strait, and this continues to be a sore point.
    4. The core issue is different: In the Malacca and Singapore Straits the key concerns were safety of navigation and the environment. In the Strait of Hormuz the key issue is Iran’s security, which no navigation fund can answer.
    5. The decisive user State may refuse: Even if the Gulf nations arrive at a framework they all agree on, the United States has shown it may not accept it, and it has not accepted the Iran and Oman framework already reached.

    Challenges to building a cooperative mechanism for the Strait of Hormuz

    1. A funding model cannot address a security demand: The Malacca fund bought navigation safety, which was what the littorals wanted. Hormuz is closed over sanctions and military pressure, which money does not purchase. Eg. The Iran and Oman framework has been agreed without the Strait reopening.
      The Fix: Pair any navigation mechanism with a separate sanctions and de escalation track, so the technical body is not asked to carry a political settlement it cannot deliver.
    2. Voluntary contributions leave the mechanism hostage to the largest funder: A body financed by user States and industry depends on the continued participation of the states with the biggest stake. Eg. The Aids to Navigation Fund for the Malacca and Singapore Straits rests on voluntary contributions from foundations and industry.
      The Fix: Fix assessed minimum contributions by volume of transiting tonnage, so the mechanism’s budget is not renegotiated every cycle.
    3. India’s exposure is concentrated and cannot be hedged quickly: A large share of India’s crude and liquefied petroleum gas moves through this one waterway, so a closure transmits directly into domestic fuel prices. Eg. Brent crude crossed $120 per barrel during the Hormuz blockade.
      The Fix: Accelerate use of the pipelines that bypass the Gulf, including the East West pipeline across Saudi Arabia and the Habshan to Fujairah line, and raise strategic petroleum reserve cover.
    4. War risk insurance can close a strait without a blockade: Premiums rise faster than any legal regime can respond, and a shipowner withdraws tonnage on commercial grounds alone. Eg. Marine war risk premiums for vessels entering the Gulf rose by over 1,000 percent during the crisis.
      The Fix: Create a sovereign backed reinsurance facility for Indian flagged and Indian chartered tonnage on the route, so freight does not stop before the diplomacy concludes.
    5. Seafarer safety has no institutional owner in a closure: Crews remain aboard commercial vessels inside a contested waterway with no flag State machinery to extract them. Eg. Nearly 700 Indian sailors were stuck on commercial ships near Hormuz during the 2026 crisis.
      The Fix: Negotiate a standing humanitarian corridor protocol with the littoral States covering crew relief and medical evacuation, activated automatically on a declared closure.

    Conclusion

    The two waterways share a legal problem and not a political one. Malacca was settled because the littoral claim could be traded inside a larger convention that every major power wanted concluded, and Hormuz offers no equivalent prize to trade against Iran’s security demand. The two things that cannot both hold are a littoral framework built by the Gulf States themselves and a user State that reserves the right to reject it. What to watch is whether the Iran and Oman framework attracts the acceptance of the principal user States, since the Strait’s reopening now turns on that acceptance rather than on the framework’s contents.

    Maritime Choke Points and India

    1. What a choke point is: It is a narrow section of a shipping route where traffic must converge, so a disruption at that point affects a disproportionate share of global trade and cannot be routed around cheaply.
    2. India’s exposure: India imports close to 85 percent of its crude requirement, and a large majority of its liquefied petroleum gas supply moves through the Strait of Hormuz, making the waterway a direct input into domestic energy prices.
    3. The eastern approach: The Strait of Malacca is the corresponding eastern choke point, through which a reported 60 percent of India’s trade passes, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands sit at its western approach.
    4. The other two that matter: The Gulf of Aden with the Bab el Mandeb, and the Suez Canal, complete the set on India’s westward routes to Europe, Africa and the Americas.

    Government Initiatives on Maritime Security and Choke Point Resilience

    1. Information Fusion Centre, Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR): Established at Gurugram to build maritime domain awareness across the region, it hosts international liaison officers and links with partner centres including the European Union’s Maritime Security Centre for the Horn of Africa.
    2. SAGAR and MAHASAGAR: Security and Growth for All in the Region is India’s maritime cooperation doctrine for the Indian Ocean littoral, covering capacity building, hydrography, surveillance and disaster response for smaller island and coastal States.
    3. Chabahar Port: India Ports Global Limited took over operations of the Shahid Beheshti terminal under a 10 year agreement signed in 2024, giving India a sea and land route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that avoids the Pakistan corridor.
    4. India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC): A rail and shipping corridor linking India to Europe through the Gulf and Israel, intended as a land and sea bridge that reduces dependence on the Suez route.
    5. Strategic Petroleum Reserves: Underground crude storage at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur is held by Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited, with further capacity approved, to cover supply interruption at the import choke points.

    Back2Basics

    1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Adopted in 1982 and in force from 1994, it is the framework treaty setting out the rights and duties of States in the use of the oceans.
    2. The maritime zones it fixes: A 12 nautical mile territorial sea, a 24 nautical mile contiguous zone, and a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone measured from the baseline.
    3. Its dispute machinery: Disputes may go to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at Hamburg, the International Court of Justice, or arbitration under the Convention’s annexes.
    4. Membership relevant here: India ratified UNCLOS in 1995. Iran has signed but not ratified it, which is why its 1993 law on warship authorisation sits outside the Convention’s transit passage regime.
  • Greenland standoff ends. But with costs to NATO

    Greenland standoff ends. But with costs to NATO

    Why in the News

    The United States, Denmark and Greenland have announced a deal on the status of Greenland, a semiautonomous territory of Denmark. The agreement expands the American military presence on the island. It also gives Washington a veto over third party military activity and over certain sensitive investments there. The deal closes a sustained episode of coercion by the United States President over a stated desire to “own” Greenland, which had driven Denmark and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to deploy troops to Greenland only nine months ago. What is now contested is whether a settlement extracted from an ally through threats leaves the mutual trust that NATO rests on intact.

    What is the Greenland Defence Agreement, 1951?

    1. Legal basis of the American presence: The pact was signed in 1951 between the United States and Denmark against the backdrop of the emerging Soviet threat in the Arctic.
    2. Rights conferred: It gave the United States broad rights to construct and operate military facilities in Greenland.
    3. Access beyond bases: It also gave the United States access to Greenland’s airspace and waters for military purposes.

    What does the new deal actually add to the 1951 arrangement?

    1. Expanded military footprint: The agreement widens the American military presence on the island beyond what the 1951 pact already supported.
    2. Veto over third party activity: Washington gains a veto over military activity by any third country in Greenland.
    3. Veto over investment: The same veto extends to certain sensitive investments in the territory, which converts a defence pact into an economic screening instrument.
    4. “Permanent control” is largely a restatement: Much of what the United States President presents as permanent control has roots in rights the 1951 agreement already conferred.
    5. Terms are not public: The full details of the deal have not been released, so the incremental gain cannot yet be measured against the existing pact.

    Why does each party present the outcome as a win?

    1. American domestic politics: The United States President, with an approval rating well under water, can present the deal as a diplomatic victory to American voters ahead of the November midterm elections.
    2. Danish and Greenlandic relief: For Denmark and Greenland the deal removes, at least for now, the threat of an American attempt to take control of the territory.
    3. Scale of the threat removed: The value of that relief is measured by the fact that NATO allies had deployed troops to Greenland in response to the takeover threat.

    Why does a bilateral settlement bear on NATO cohesion?

    1. Alliance rests on assurance, not on bases: NATO’s value to a small member is the assurance that a larger member will not turn on it, and the Greenland episode tested exactly that assurance.
    2. Wider pattern of signals: The overtures of the United States President to Russia and his criticism of Europe over the past 18 months form the context in which allies read the Greenland outcome.
    3. Timing against a live threat: Europe is bracing for the possibility of a Russian escalation on its eastern flank, so a loss of internal confidence lands at the point of maximum need.
    4. Precedent, not incident: A settlement reached through threat, demand and concession sets a template that any member can expect to face next.

    How are allies responding to coercion within the alliance?

    1. Diversification as the default reply: No country accepts heavy dependence on an ally that can issue threats, demand negotiations and then extract concessions, so spreading risk becomes the rational response.
    2. Canada’s move to Europe: The Canadian Prime Minister has announced that Canada would seek some form of associate membership in the European Union.
    3. Trust is slow to rebuild: The immediate Greenland crisis is settled, and the trust lost in reaching that settlement will not be regained quickly.

    Challenges to the Greenland deal

    1. Opacity of the terms: An agreement whose text is not public cannot be scrutinised by the legislature of any of the three parties, so its limits are unverifiable. Eg. The scope of the American veto over “sensitive investments” has not been defined in any released document.
      The Fix: Publish the operative text and the investment screening criteria, so the veto’s reach is bounded by a stated standard rather than by discretion.
    2. Greenlandic consent is thin: An arrangement negotiated chiefly between Washington and Copenhagen can bind a territory of about 57,000 people that has its own legislature. Eg. Greenland’s self government under the 2009 Self Government Act gives it authority over most domestic matters, with Denmark retaining defence and foreign affairs.
      The Fix: Attach a periodic review requiring the assent of the Greenlandic legislature, so continued consent rather than a single signature carries the arrangement.
    3. Investment veto can bite non adversaries: A screening power drafted against one rival applies equally to allied and Arctic partner capital in mining and shipping. Eg. Greenland’s rare earth and critical mineral deposits, including the Kvanefjeld project, are the main draw for outside investors.
      The Fix: Carve out allied and European Union investment from the veto, leaving it scoped to entities from states the parties jointly designate.
    4. Arctic militarisation feeds a spiral: An enlarged American footprint in the high north invites matching deployments by Russia across its Arctic coast. Eg. Russia has reopened and expanded Soviet era Arctic bases such as the Nagurskoye airbase on Franz Josef Land.
      The Fix: Route the expansion through NATO’s own Arctic planning and restore military transparency talks in the Arctic Council framework.
    5. Damage to alliance discipline: A member that wins concessions by threatening another member weakens the case for restraint by every other member. Eg. Turkey’s prolonged block on Swedish accession to NATO showed how a single member can hold alliance business hostage.
      The Fix: Record an alliance level understanding that territorial claims between members are not negotiable subjects, enforced through the North Atlantic Council.

    Conclusion

    The Greenland dispute is settled on paper and unsettled in practice. A deal that mostly restates rights the 1951 agreement already gave has cost the alliance the assumption that members do not coerce one another. What follows is a quiet reordering of hedges, of which Canada’s approach to the European Union is the first visible instance. The marker to watch is whether other small NATO members begin seeking comparable second anchors outside the alliance.

    Back2Basics: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

    1. Formation: Established by the North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949, with headquarters at Brussels.
    2. Collective defence: Article 5 treats an armed attack against one member as an attack against all members.
    3. Membership: It has 32 members following the accession of Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024.
    4. Decision making: The North Atlantic Council is its principal political decision making body and works by consensus.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2023, GS2, 15 marks] ‘The expansion and strengthening of NATO and a stronger US-Europe strategic partnership works well in India.’ What is your opinion about this statement? Give reasons and examples to support your answer.”

  • Why did the SC reject methanol rules?

    Why did the SC reject methanol rules?

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has struck down Maharashtra government rules requiring methanol to be denatured with a colourant and a bitterant before sale to non drug manufacturers. A Bench including Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran held the measures disproportionate and lacking sufficient connection with the problem they sought to address, and allowed the writ petitions filed by methanol based product manufacturers. The rules struck down are Rules 18A and 18B of the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972, introduced by a 2011 amendment after a 1991 hooch tragedy in Mumbai in which around 93 people died after consuming spurious liquor containing methanol. The tension is that the State’s regulatory power over poisons was upheld while the specific measure was voided, because the misuse the rules target happens in the unregulated field and the burden of the rules falls entirely on licensed industry.

    What did Rules 18A and 18B require?

    1. Rule 18A(1), licence verification: It required verification of a purchaser’s Form A licence before methanol could be sold.
    2. Rule 18A(2), mandatory additives: It required methanol sold to non drug manufacturers to be mixed with a colourant and a bitterant, so the substance would be identifiable and unpalatable.
    3. Rule 18B, confiscation: Any possession of methanol without a Form A licence was made liable to confiscation.
    4. The statutory source: The rules were framed under the Poisons Act, 1919, which permits State governments to make rules regulating the possession and sale of poisons.

    Why were these controls introduced in the first place?

    1. The triggering tragedy: Maharashtra tightened controls on methanol after the 1991 Mumbai hooch tragedy, in which around 93 people died from spurious liquor containing methanol.
    2. The inquiry: A committee headed by the then Additional Director General of Police P.R. Parthasarthy was constituted to examine the causes of the tragedy and suggest measures.
    3. The amendment: In 2011, Maharashtra amended its Poisons Rules and introduced Rules 18A and 18B.
    4. The dual character of the chemical: Methanol, or methyl alcohol, is a highly toxic substance and is also a widely used industrial raw material in products including formaldehyde, paraformaldehyde, paints and resins, which is why a blanket ban was never the option on the table.

    What did the two sides argue?

    1. The manufacturers on product integrity: Companies told the Court that colour contamination could make products unacceptable to the paint and pharmaceutical industries.
    2. The manufacturers on technical effect: They argued that the additives could affect catalysts and laboratory and pharmaceutical applications, so the denaturing damages legitimate use rather than merely marking the substance.
    3. The State on lethality: The State argued that the rules were necessary because methanol could be mixed with liquor and cause fatal poisoning.
    4. The State on deterrence by design: It argued that making methanol identifiable and bitter would itself help prevent misuse, so the additive was a preventive rather than a punitive measure.

    On what reasoning did the Court strike each rule down?

    1. The constitutional question: The central question was whether Rules 18A and 18B violated Article 14, whose basic tenet is fairness in action and non arbitrariness, and Article 19(1)(g), which protects the right to carry on an occupation, trade or business.
    2. Rule 18A(1) fails on fit: The Court held that merely verifying a Form A licence did not establish how the purchaser would use methanol, so the restriction on legitimate industrial users was disproportionate.
    3. Rule 18A(2) fails on nexus: The Court held the additive requirement had no reasonable and proximate nexus with preventing the misuse of methanol in illicit liquor, and that the State failed to show the additives would prevent diversion or the manufacture of spurious liquor.
    4. The Court’s own formulation: It observed that the rules prescribe a framework that “does not prevent the misuse of methanol in liquor which takes place in the unregulated field”, and that even in the best case of full compliance the sub rule cannot prevent the misuse it aims at.
    5. Rule 18B fails on internal contradiction: Confiscation for possession without a Form A licence could conflict with lawful possession under a Form B permit and effectively render that permit redundant, so it too failed the proportionality test.
    6. The framework applied: Applying the proportionality framework laid down in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the Court held that preventing loss of life from methanol adulterated liquor is a legitimate aim, while the restrictions were neither suitable nor necessary to achieve it.
    7. The governing principle recorded: The Court noted that a policy which is irrational, lacks rational justification, or violates any constitutional, statutory or other provision of law is liable to be struck down.

    What did the Court direct States to do instead?

    1. Enforcement across departments: States should work together through the prohibition, excise, police, transport, industries and health departments, along with non governmental organisations, to prevent illegal liquor.
    2. Where enforcement should sit: This includes checking State borders, stopping illegal transport, identifying places where illicit liquor is made or stored, and monitoring industrial units that may illegally supply the chemicals used.
    3. Licensing discipline: Licences should be granted only after proper verification and should be regularly reviewed, with suspension or cancellation for violations.
    4. Stock accountability: Industrial users should return unused or excess methanol and maintain proper stock and consumption records.
    5. Transport controls: Methanol should be transported in dedicated tankers under excise supervision and sealed in a way that prevents theft, diversion or tampering.
    6. Demand side and victim support: The Court called for more addiction treatment centres, support for affected families, and local counselling centres.
    7. The stated limit of the direction: The Court added that while it could issue directions, effective implementation ultimately depends on the police and enforcement machinery.

    Challenges to controlling methanol diversion in India

    1. The diversion happens outside the licensed chain: Illicit liquor is made from methanol that has already left the regulated market, so a control applied at the point of lawful sale never reaches it. Eg. Hooch deaths have recurred in Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Gujarat in years when licensed methanol sale rules were already in force.
      The Fix: Move to end to end electronic tracking of every methanol consignment from the manufacturer’s gate to the consuming unit, with reconciliation of stock against declared consumption.
    2. Rules are made State by State for a chemical that moves across States: A tight regime in one State pushes sourcing to a neighbouring State with lighter controls. Eg. Methanol used in hooch tragedies has repeatedly been traced to consignments purchased outside the State where the deaths occurred.
      The Fix: Frame a model set of Poisons Rules under the Poisons Act, 1919 for adoption by all States, so licensing thresholds and transport conditions do not diverge at the border.
    3. Prohibition raises the payoff from adulteration: Where lawful liquor is banned or heavily taxed, an illicit market grows and the incentive to substitute methanol for ethanol rises with it. Eg. Bihar has recorded repeated mass poisoning episodes since prohibition was imposed in 2016.
      The Fix: Pair any prohibition regime with a funded enforcement and surveillance budget and a public health reporting system for suspected poisoning clusters, rather than relying on the ban alone.
    4. Detection capacity is thin outside major cities: Confirming methanol poisoning requires laboratory testing that district hospitals often cannot perform in time to treat. Eg. The antidote regimen depends on early confirmation, and delays convert survivable exposure into blindness or death.
      The Fix: Stock fomepizole or ethanol antidote kits and rapid methanol assays at district hospitals in districts with a recorded history of illicit liquor production.
    5. Legitimate industrial demand is large and growing: Methanol is a bulk feedstock and a candidate transport fuel, so volumes in circulation rise faster than the licensing machinery expands. Eg. The methanol blending programme promoted by NITI Aayog envisages methanol use in transport and cooking fuel.
      The Fix: Tie licence capacity at the State drugs and excise departments to declared industrial consumption volumes, so inspection frequency scales with the quantity in circulation.

    Conclusion

    The ruling leaves the State’s power over poisons intact and removes the particular instrument it chose. What it establishes is that a restriction on a lawful trade must be shown to work against the mischief it names, and that a regulator cannot rely on the seriousness of the harm to carry a measure that cannot reach it. The next marker is whether States revise their Poisons Rules along the licensing, stock and transport lines the Court set out, or leave the existing rules untouched until the next poisoning episode.

    Back2Basics

    1. The proportionality test: Laid down in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), it is the standard for testing whether a State restriction on a fundamental right is constitutionally permissible.
    2. Legitimate aim: The measure must pursue a goal the Constitution permits the State to pursue, which the Court accepted here in the prevention of deaths from adulterated liquor.
    3. Suitability and necessity: The means chosen must be rationally connected to that aim, and there must be no less restrictive alternative that would achieve it equally well.
    4. Balancing: The extent of the restriction must be proportionate to the benefit secured, and the State carries the burden of demonstrating that it is.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.”

  • SC raises bar on re-arrests, stresses Art 22

    SC raises bar on re-arrests, stresses Art 22

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has held that the safeguards provided under Article 22 cannot be “tinkered with”, and has laid down strict guidelines for arresting a person again after an earlier release for failure to supply the grounds of arrest. A Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar held in a 69 page ruling that an accused released for a violation of fundamental rights is not “enlarged on bail” but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention. The ruling answers Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra (November 2025), which had settled that written grounds of arrest must be furnished across all offences and statutes in a language the arrestee understands. That judgment made the failure fatal to the arrest; this one decides what the State may do next. The tension is that the police now need a Magistrate’s prior sanction to correct their own constitutional lapse, in cases the State argues are too serious for the police to “face fetters”.

    What does Article 22 guarantee an arrested person?

    1. Production before a Magistrate: Article 22 requires an accused to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest.
    2. Grounds of arrest: Article 22(1) requires the accused to be informed of the grounds of arrest, and the settled position is that those grounds must be in writing and in a language the arrestee understands.
    3. Access to counsel: It provides the right to legal representation, meaning consultation with and defence by a legal practitioner of the person’s choice.
    4. The consequence of breach: Any breach or non compliance entails immediate release of the arrested person, because such an arrest is unconstitutional.

    Why did the Court treat the safeguard as constitutional rather than procedural?

    1. Not a formality: The Court held that Article 22(1) is not a mere formality or a matter of procedure, but a mandatory binding constitutional safeguard.
    2. No prejudice test: Where there is a violation of the Constitution, the question of prejudice or demonstrable prejudice does not arise, so an accused need not show that the lapse harmed the defence.
    3. Not statute specific: Article 22(1) applies across the spectrum, including offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and under special enactments, and is not tied to any one statute.
    4. Gravity is irrelevant: The Court held that a violation of the Constitution cannot be countenanced and has to be dealt with strictly, and that the obligation does not depend on the nature or gravity of the offence.

    What procedure must the police now follow to arrest the person again?

    1. Written grounds first: The accused must first be provided written grounds of arrest, curing the original defect before any fresh step is taken.
    2. An application to the Magistrate: An application must be filed before a Magistrate explaining why a fresh arrest is necessary and why the grounds were not furnished the first time.
    3. Endorsement by the superior officer: To rule out foul play or collusion, the application must carry the endorsement of the immediate superior authority, so that authority knows the officer violated a constitutional provision.
    4. The Magistrate’s test: The Magistrate may allow a fresh arrest only on being satisfied that “for bona fide reasons” the grounds could not be furnished at the first instance but were furnished after release, and that the accused needs to be arrested again.
    5. A fixed decision window: The Magistrate must decide such an application within a week.
    6. The investigation changes hands: The superior officer giving the endorsement must hand over the investigation to another officer and direct a departmental enquiry into the lapse.
    7. Consequences for the officer: An adverse finding in that enquiry entails departmental action with an entry in the officer’s service book.
    8. Compensation as a remedy: High Courts across the country have been directed to grant “suitable mandatory compensation” where arrests violate procedural safeguards.

    Why did the Court refuse to leave the decision with the police?

    1. The violator cannot cure its own violation: The Court held that the power to arrest again must not be “left to the discretion of the very same authority who had violated the said provision of the Constitution”.
    2. Judicial sanction as the test: It held that the decision must have “the judicial imprimatur”, which converts an internal police call into an order a court records and can be reviewed against.
    3. Separating remedy from punishment: The release for breach and the departmental enquiry run together, so the individual’s liberty is restored while the officer’s conduct is examined separately.
    4. The State’s contrary case: The Punjab government argued that given the serious nature of the allegations the police “should not face fetters” while arresting an accused, and the Court rejected that as a ground for relaxing the safeguard.

    How did this case reach the Supreme Court?

    1. The underlying matter: The Bench was hearing an appeal by an accused in a case under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) in Punjab.
    2. The first release: The local Magistrate released the accused on the ground that he was not provided the reasons for his arrest, and then allowed the police to arrest him again on complying with procedural safeguards.
    3. The High Court stage: The accused challenged that permission before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which on 29 May allowed the police to arrest him again.
    4. The appeal: The accused then moved the Supreme Court against that High Court order, which is the appeal this ruling decides.

    How has the Court’s position on grounds of arrest evolved?

    1. Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, October 2023: The Court held that all arrests under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) require a written copy of the grounds of arrest to be furnished “as a matter of course and without exception”.
    2. Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement, December 2023: A later order diluted the rule, holding that grounds need not always be supplied in writing, and treated the Pankaj Bansal ruling as prospective in nature.
    3. Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), May 2024: The Court reaffirmed that an arrested person must be provided the grounds of arrest in writing.
    4. Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, November 2025: The position was settled, with written grounds required across all offences and statutes in a language the arrestee understands, and failure rendering both the arrest and the subsequent remand illegal.

    Challenges to enforcing the Article 22 safeguards

    1. The remedy depends on the arrested person reaching a court: A safeguard enforced only on application benefits those who can retain counsel within the first 24 hours. Eg. Undertrials form the large majority of India’s prison population, and most are represented through legal aid rather than counsel of choice.
      The Fix: Make the legal services authority’s duty counsel present at the first remand hearing mandatory, so the grounds of arrest are checked by a lawyer before remand is granted.
    2. Written grounds can be reduced to a printed template: A requirement met by handing over a pre printed form with the section numbers filled in satisfies the letter of the rule and tells the arrestee nothing. Eg. Arrest memos under the D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) directions became standardised forms within a few years of that judgment.
      The Fix: Require the grounds to state the specific allegation and the material relied on, and make the remand court record that it read them before authorising custody.
    3. Departmental enquiry rarely reaches an adverse finding: An enquiry ordered and conducted within the same force has weak incentives to record a finding that damages a colleague’s service record. Eg. Police complaints authorities recommended under Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006) remain unconstituted or non functional in several States.
      The Fix: Route the enquiry into a constitutional lapse to the State Police Complaints Authority rather than the officer’s own superior, so the finding is recorded outside the chain of command.
    4. Compensation has no fixed measure: A direction to award mandatory compensation without a scale produces widely different awards for the same violation across High Courts. Eg. Compensation in custodial violation matters has ranged from token sums to several lakh rupees with no stated basis.
      The Fix: Notify a statutory schedule of minimum compensation by duration of unlawful detention, recoverable from the State with a right of recovery against the erring officer.
    5. The rule bites hardest where evidence is time sensitive: In offences against children and in organised crime, a week’s delay for a Magistrate’s sanction can allow interference with witnesses. Eg. The case that produced this ruling arose under POCSO, where the complainant is a child.
      The Fix: Allow the Magistrate to impose interim protective conditions on the released accused while the application for a fresh arrest is pending, so witness safety does not depend on custody.

    Conclusion

    The judgment shifts the cost of a defective arrest from the accused to the State and to the individual officer. Its practical weight rests on the Magistrate, who now decides whether a constitutional lapse was in good faith and whether custody should resume, on a record that can be tested on appeal. The marker to watch is whether High Courts settle a common scale for the mandatory compensation the ruling directs, since an unquantified remedy is the part of this line of cases that has consistently failed to hold.

    Back2Basics

    1. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS): It is the general criminal code of India, replacing the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and it came into force on 1 July 2024.
    2. The companion statutes: It was enacted alongside the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
    3. Ministry and route: The three laws were piloted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and passed by Parliament in December 2023.
    4. Why it appears here: The Court held that the Article 22(1) obligation is not statute specific, so it binds arrests under the BNS and under special enactments alike.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following statements:

    1. According to the Constitution of India, the Central Government has a duty to protect States from internal disturbances.

    2. The Constitution of India exempts the States from providing legal counsel to person being held for preventive detention

    3. According to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, confession of the accused before the police cannot be used as evidence.

    How many of the above statements are correct?

    (a) Only one (b) Only two (c) All three (d) None

  • Exercise NOMADIC ELEPHANT 2026

    Exercise NOMADIC ELEPHANT 2026

    Why in the News?

    • The 18th edition of India-Mongolia Joint Military Exercise NOMADIC ELEPHANT commenced on 21 September 2026 at the Foreign Training Node, Pithoragarh, Uttarakhand.
    • The exercise will continue till 03 October 2026.

    Key Highlights

    • Participants: Indian Army and Mongolian Armed Forces.
    • Strength: 45 personnel each.
    • Nature: Annual platoon-level military exercise.
    • Conducted alternately in India and Mongolia.
    • 17th edition: Held at Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, in May-June 2025.
    • Focus: Enhancing joint military capability for Counter-Insurgency Operations.
    • Terrain: Semi-urban and mountainous terrain.
    • Operations conducted under a United Nations Mandate.

    India-Mongolia Defence Cooperation

    • Strengthens defence cooperation between India and Mongolia.
    • Enhances interoperability and joint operational capability.
    • Reinforces bilateral friendship and mutual trust.

    UPSC Prelims Trap

    • NOMADIC ELEPHANT is an India-Mongolia exercise, not an India-Nepal or India-Bhutan exercise.
    • It is conducted alternately in India and Mongolia.
    • It is a platoon-level exercise, not a tri-service exercise.
    • The 2026 edition is being held at Pithoragarh, Uttarakhand, while the previous edition was held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
  • Why does Article 371 exist in so many different forms?

    Why does Article 371 exist in so many different forms?

    Why in the News

    The Centre has proposed inserting a new provision, Article 371K, in the Constitution to give special constitutional safeguards to Ladakh. The proposal follows an “in-principle understanding” reached between the Ministry of Home Affairs and representatives of the Apex Body, Leh (ABL) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA). That understanding is to create a directly elected Union Territory level body carrying legislative, executive, financial and planning powers. The tension is that every existing Article 371 provision was written for a State, while Ladakh is a Union Territory with no legislature at all, so the proposed clause has to create the institution before it can protect it.

    What is Article 371?

    1. The original purpose: Article 371 was not written to protect the Northeast or tribal regions. It was a transitional provision for Central supervision over the Part B States, the former princely territories that acceded to India under different historical and administrative circumstances.
    2. The Part B classification: The Constitution classified Hyderabad, Mysore, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan and others separately as Part B States, because the framers were concerned about newly integrated territories functioning immediately within the same framework as the former British provinces.
    3. What it actually did: Adopted in 1950, it placed the governments of the Part B States under the general control of the President for 10 years, or for such longer or shorter period as Parliament might prescribe.
    4. How it disappeared: The States Reorganisation Act and the Seventh Constitutional Amendment of 1956 abolished the Part A, Part B and Part C classification. The original Article 371 vanished with it, and Parliament replaced it with a provision for equitable development of Vidarbha, Marathwada, Saurashtra and Kutch in Maharashtra and Gujarat.

    Why did a transitional clause become the constitutional home for special protection?

    1. Flexibility as a design choice: India’s constitutional system was built to accommodate regions whose historical circumstances, social structures or political demands differed from the rest of the country.
    2. Bespoke rather than uniform: Parliament repeatedly created individually negotiated arrangements under the same Article number, so the 371 series is a set of separate bargains and not a single doctrine of autonomy.
    3. The trigger is always political settlement: Each insertion followed an accord, a formula or a reorganisation, which is why no two clauses protect the same thing or work the same way.
    4. The number is a container, not a principle: A clause under Article 371 can mean customary law protection in one State and a minimum Assembly size in another, so the label carries no fixed content.

    What does each State specific provision actually protect?

    1. Nagaland, Article 371A: Inserted by the 13th Amendment Act, 1962 following the 16-Point Agreement of 1960. It protects Naga religious and social practices, customary law and procedure, and ownership and transfer of land and its resources.
    2. Assam, Article 371B: Inserted by the 22nd Amendment Act, 1969. It allows the President to create a committee within the Assam Legislative Assembly of members elected from the tribal areas covered by the Sixth Schedule, giving protected tribal areas a distinct voice.
    3. Manipur, Article 371C: Inserted by the 27th Amendment Act, 1971, ahead of Manipur becoming a full State in 1972. It provides a special Assembly committee of members elected from the hill areas, with the Governor responsible for reporting to the President on their administration.
    4. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, Article 371D: Inserted by the 32nd Amendment Act, 1973 after the Six-Point Formula of 1973, and substituted by the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014. It provides equitable opportunities in education and public employment across regions of the State.
    5. Sikkim, Article 371F: Inserted by the 36th Amendment Act, 1975. It was essentially a transition instrument for the integration of the erstwhile independent State, which became India’s 22nd State after a referendum.
    6. Mizoram, Article 371G: Inserted by the 53rd Amendment Act, 1986 following the 1986 Mizo Peace Accord. Parliamentary laws on Mizo religious and social practices, customary law and procedure, customary administration of justice, and land ownership do not apply unless the Mizoram Assembly agrees.
    7. Arunachal Pradesh, Article 371H: Inserted by the 55th Amendment Act, 1986 ahead of statehood in 1987. It gives the Governor a special responsibility for law and order, which is the opposite of the autonomy model used elsewhere.
    8. Goa, Article 371I: Inserted by the 56th Amendment Act, 1987. It is comparatively modest and simply requires the Goa Legislative Assembly to have at least 30 members.
    9. Karnataka, Article 371J: Inserted by the 98th Amendment Act, 2012 for the Hyderabad-Karnataka region, now Kalyana Karnataka. It addresses regional backwardness through a development board, equitable allocation of funds, and opportunities in public employment and education.

    Why does Ladakh’s demand not fit any existing 371 provision?

    1. A Union Territory without a legislature: Every existing clause operates on a State that already has an Assembly. The proposed Article 371K would apply to a Union Territory that has none, so it has to create the elected body rather than qualify one.
    2. The subject list sought: The Ministry of Home Affairs has said the body would have legislative powers over land, culture and language, forests, environment and natural resources, along with other subjects reserved for the Union Territory under Article 240.
    3. Law and order runs the other way: Article 371H gives the Governor special responsibility for law and order in Arunachal Pradesh. Ladakh’s leaders are seeking the opposite, which is control over law and order by the elected body.
    4. Land protection borrows a different model: The land protection sought resembles the design of Articles 371A and 371G, under which certain Parliamentary laws on land and customary practices do not apply automatically.

    What will decide whether Article 371K is strong or symbolic?

    1. The weak version: A provision that merely creates an elected body and lists the subjects it may legislate on would offer relatively limited protection.
    2. The demonstrated failure case: Hill tribes in Manipur have argued that Article 371C has failed to deliver on its promise of meaningful autonomy and protection, so a committee based design is not evidence that protection follows.
    3. The strong version: A clause protecting the elected body’s control over land, natural resources, recruitment and administration would be considerably stronger.
    4. The strongest version: Placing law and order and the bureaucracy under the elected executive would make the Ladakh head of government more powerful than the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister.

    Challenges to the proposed Article 371K

    1. Special provisions are read down by courts over time: A protective clause survives on paper while its practical scope narrows through litigation on which Parliamentary laws it actually excludes. Eg. Article 371A’s protection over land and resources has been repeatedly tested against Central directives in the petroleum and mining sectors in Nagaland.
      The Fix: Enumerate in the clause itself the Union List and Concurrent List entries that will not apply automatically, rather than leaving the exclusion to interpretation.
    2. Legislative power without fiscal capacity is nominal: An elected body can legislate on land and forests and still depend entirely on Central transfers for every scheme it runs. Eg. The Hyderabad-Karnataka development board under Article 371J operates on annual State allocations rather than an assured statutory share.
      The Fix: Attach a statutory minimum devolution to the Ladakh body, computed on a formula, so its legislative competence is matched by a predictable resource base.
    3. A committee model can be captured by the majority region: Where a special committee sits inside a larger Assembly, the protected region can be outvoted on everything the committee does not exclusively own. Eg. The hill areas committee under Article 371C in Manipur has been the standing grievance of the hill districts against the Imphal Valley.
      The Fix: Give the Ladakh body exclusive rather than advisory competence over the named subjects, so its decisions do not require ratification by a wider chamber.
    4. Two subregions with divergent demands: Leh and Kargil have historically sought different constitutional outcomes, and a single body can reproduce that contest instead of settling it. Eg. The Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils were created separately for Leh in 1995 and Kargil in 2003.
      The Fix: Fix a seat and revenue sharing formula between the two districts inside the constitutional provision, rather than leaving it to the body’s own rules of business.
    5. Law and order transfer is the hardest concession to obtain: The Centre has consistently retained police and public order in Union Territories, and Ladakh sits on a live boundary with China. Eg. Delhi’s elected government has no control over the police despite having a legislature since 1993.
      The Fix: Create a staged transfer, with a Ladakh police service raised under the elected executive for civil policing while border and internal security remain with the Centre.

    Conclusion

    Article 371 has never been a single guarantee, and its nine surviving clauses were each written to close a specific political settlement. The Ladakh proposal is the first attempt to use that Article to build a legislature where none exists, which makes it a constitutional innovation rather than an extension. What to watch is whether the final text of Article 371K lists exclusive subjects and places law and order under the elected executive, or stops at creating a body and naming what it may discuss.

    Back2Basics

    1. Article 240: It empowers the President to make regulations for the peace, progress and good government of certain Union Territories, including Ladakh.
    2. Force of law: A regulation made under Article 240 has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, and may repeal or amend a law made by Parliament as it applies to that Union Territory.
    3. Why it matters here: The subjects reserved to Ladakh under Article 240 are the pool from which the proposed elected body’s legislative competence would be drawn.
    4. Its limit: The power belongs to the President, so a Union Territory governed under it has no democratic legislature of its own unless one is separately created.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Recent directives from Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas are perceived by the `Nagas’ as a threat to override the exceptional status enjoyed by the State. Discuss in light of Article 371A of the Indian Constitution.”

  • When the House ceases to hold power to account

    When the House ceases to hold power to account

    Why in the News

    India’s legislatures now meet for a fraction of the time they once did, and the instruments through which they hold the executive to account have contracted with the calendar. The two Houses of Parliament averaged 127 sitting days a year in the 1950s and 138 in the following decade. The average fell to 55 days during the 17th Lok Sabha (2019 to 2024), with over 25 percent of available time lost to disruptions. State assemblies have fallen from about 80 days a year six decades ago to under 25, against the bar in Article 174(1) on a gap of more than six months between two sittings. The tension is that the constitutional floor is being treated as the target, so a House can be fully compliant with the Constitution and still not scrutinise the government at all.

    How far has the legislative calendar contracted?

    1. Parliament’s decline: The two Houses averaged 127 days a year in the 1950s and 138 in the 1960s. The 17th Lok Sabha averaged 55 days.
    2. Time lost within the sitting days: The share of available time lost to disruptions has risen past 25 percent, so the effective working calendar is smaller than the sitting day count suggests.
    3. The State picture is worse: Assemblies averaged around 80 days or more six decades ago and now sit for fewer than 25 days a year.
    4. The constitutional minimum as a ceiling: Article 174(1) requires that six months not elapse between two sittings of a State legislature. Sessions are scheduled to satisfy that formality rather than to a calendar of business.

    What does the State assembly record show?

    1. Uttar Pradesh: From 45 to 50 days a year six decades ago to 15 to 20 days now.
    2. Karnataka: From around 75 to 80 days in the 1970s to an average of 25 to 33 days.
    3. Tamil Nadu: From 64 days a year to 32 days.
    4. Punjab and Haryana: From 40 days to 10 to 15 days.
    5. Bihar: From 60 days a year to 30 days.
    6. Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tripura: Sitting days in all three have fallen by 50 percent.

    How does a shorter calendar disable the scrutiny instruments?

    1. Question Hour loses its slots: Fewer sitting days mean fewer occasions on which ministers face direct questioning, and the instrument’s deterrent value rests on its frequency rather than on any single answer.
    2. Call Attention Motions and Demands for Grants: Both compete for the same shrinking floor time, so departmental spending is approved with progressively less examination.
    3. The anticipatory effect is gone: Ministers once prepared for a session expecting to be pinned down, and presiding officers pulled up those who came unprepared or misled the House. A House that hardly meets removes that expectation.
    4. Committees are not compensating: Attendance in parliamentary committees runs at about 50 percent, so the forum meant to substitute for floor scrutiny is itself half attended.

    What does the speed of law making reveal?

    1. A hospital network in ninety seconds: On 30 August 2012 the Lok Sabha passed the AIIMS (Amendment) Bill, providing for six such hospitals at a cost of Rs 4,900 crore, in a minute and a half.
    2. Three bills without debate: On 3 September 2012 the Lok Sabha passed three bills without debate, among them the Protection of Women Against Sexual Harassment at Workplace Bill, which governs the conditions of work of millions of women.
    3. Two minute statutes: A bill creating three new High Courts in the Northeast was moved at 12:03 and passed at 12:05. The NIMHANS Bill was passed the following day in two minutes.
    4. The pattern is current, not historic: In this year’s Monsoon Session two bills were cleared in three minutes each and three others in four minutes each.

    What do the perquisites and the running cost say about the institution’s return?

    1. Firearms through the Customs route: Parliament was informed four decades ago that 38 Members of Parliament had been allotted guns seized by the Customs Department over a period of 15 months.
    2. The practice continued: A Right to Information application established that 82 MPs were allotted weapons between 2001 and 2012, including 13 who were facing criminal charges such as murder, attempt to murder and kidnapping.
    3. The cost curve: Running Parliament cost Rs 36,000 a day in the 1950s, Rs 1.23 crore a day in 2004 and Rs 2 crore in 2012. PRS Legislative Research now estimates it at about Rs 9 crore a day.
    4. Cost against output: The daily cost has risen by orders of magnitude while sitting days have fallen by more than half, so the expenditure per unit of scrutiny has risen on both sides of the ratio at once.

    Challenges to legislative scrutiny of the executive

    1. Disruption is a cross party incentive: Whichever parties occupy the opposition benches gain more visibility from an adjournment than from a debate, so obstruction is rational for the side that is supposed to scrutinise. Eg. Slogan shouting that ends in adjournment recurs irrespective of which alliance holds office at the Centre or in the States.
      The Fix: Transfer control of the sitting calendar and a fixed quota of opposition days to a Business Advisory Committee decision the government cannot override.
    2. The executive controls when the House meets: Summoning is done on the advice of the Council of Ministers, so the body being scrutinised decides the scrutiny calendar. Eg. State governments schedule sessions to clear the six month bar in Article 174(1) and no further.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory minimum of sitting days a year, along the lines of the 110 day floor recommended by the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, 2002.
    3. The anti defection law suppresses independent scrutiny: A member voting against the party line on a government bill risks disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, which removes the incentive to examine legislation on merit. Eg. Party whips are routinely issued on ordinary legislation and not only on confidence motions.
      The Fix: Restrict the whip to confidence and money votes, as the Venkatachaliah Committee, 2002 recommended, so a vote against a clause is not a vote against the party.
    4. Committee referral is discretionary: A presiding officer decides whether a bill goes to a Departmentally Related Standing Committee, so a government can pass a bill without any clause by clause examination. Eg. Only about 17 percent of bills in the 17th Lok Sabha were referred to the relevant standing committee, against 71 percent in the 15th.
      The Fix: Make committee referral mandatory for every bill other than a money bill, with a fixed reporting deadline after which the House may proceed regardless.
    5. Members lack independent research capacity: A legislator without research staff cannot interrogate a ministry’s own numbers, so scrutiny depends on what the executive chooses to disclose. Eg. The United Kingdom Parliament maintains a dedicated Research Service for its members, which has no Indian equivalent inside the institution.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated legislative research unit attached to each standing committee, staffed independently of the ministries it examines.
    6. Financial scrutiny happens after the money is voted: The Public Accounts Committee examines expenditure once the Comptroller and Auditor General has reported on it, so the examination is retrospective. Eg. Between 2019 and 2023 about 80 percent of the Budget was passed without discussion, and in 2023 the entire Budget was approved without debate.
      The Fix: Fix a minimum number of days for discussion of the Demands for Grants of a rotating set of ministries before the guillotine is applied.

    Conclusion

    A legislature can satisfy every constitutional requirement on sittings and still stop scrutinising the government, which is what the sitting day and disruption record shows. Cutting members’ salaries and allowances treats remuneration as the lever, when the levers that actually decide scrutiny are who controls the calendar, whether committee referral is compulsory, and whether a whip can be issued on ordinary legislation. The forum to watch is the next conference of presiding officers, since a statutory floor on sitting days and a mandatory referral rule are decisions that body can place on its agenda.

    What is executive accountability to the legislature?

    1. About: It is the principle that the political executive holds office only so long as it retains the confidence of the popularly elected House, and must answer to that House for its decisions and its spending.
    2. Rationale: India adopted a parliamentary system to secure harmony between legislature and executive and to make the government continuously answerable rather than answerable only at an election. Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha.
    3. The questioning instruments: Zero Hour lets members raise urgent issues without notice, and Half Hour Discussions seek ministerial statements on matters already raised. Motions of no confidence, censure and adjournment express disapproval, and a passed no confidence motion requires the government to resign. Eg. The censure motion of 2012 against the policy on foreign direct investment in retail.
    4. Financial and committee control: Cut Motions allow the House to reduce or reject specific budget allocations. The Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee and the Departmentally Related Standing Committees carry the detailed financial and policy oversight. Eg. The Public Accounts Committee’s 2011 report on the 2G spectrum case.

    Back2Basics: PRS Legislative Research

    1. What it is: PRS Legislative Research is an independent, non profit research initiative based in New Delhi that tracks the functioning of Parliament and the State legislatures.
    2. What it produces: It publishes sitting day counts, session productivity, bill summaries, budget analyses and voting records, and provides legislative briefs to members across parties.
    3. Its standing: It is not a government body and has no statutory role, so its figures are cited precisely because they are compiled outside the institutions they measure.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”