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GS Paper: GS2

  • India’s South Asian opportunity

    India-Pakistan relations weigh down heavily on the SAARC. This affects the economic development of the region. The highlight opportunity for India and Pakistan to separate politics from economics.

    Economic integration

    • There is a growing, but unstated, realisation that neither India nor Pakistan can wrest parts of Kashmir that each controls from the other.
    • A fair peace between India and Pakistan is not just good for the two states but for all the nations constituting the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
    • While SAARC has facilitated limited collaborations among its members, it has remained a victim of India-Pakistan posturing.
    • World Bank publication titled ‘A Glass Half Full’ conclude that there is explosive value to be derived from South Asian economic integration.
    • An economically transformed and integrated South Asian region could advantageously link up with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and even join the RCEP.

    Important role of India

    • Collectively with a population of slightly over 1.9 billion, South Asia has a GDP (PPP) of $12 trillion.
    • However, India’s enjoys an overwhelming ‘size imbalance’ in South Asia.
    • The shares of India in the total land area, population, and real GDP of South Asia in 2016 are 62%, 75%, and 83%, respectively.
    • The two other big countries in South Asia are Pakistan and Bangladesh with shares in regional GDP of only 7.6% and 5.6%, respectively.
    • Given its size and heft, only India can take the lead in transforming a grossly under-performing region like South Asia.

    Consider the question “How India-Pakistan relations affects the potential of SAARC? Examine the role both countries can play in the prosperity of the region through economic integration.”

    Conclusion

    This is the moment for India to think big and act big. But for that to happen, India needs to view peace with Pakistan not as a bilateral matter, but as essential and urgent, all the while viewing it as a chance of a lifetime, to dramatically transform South Asia for the better, no less.

  • India and the great power triangle of Russia, China and US

    Relations between Russia, China and the US have not always been the same. The changes in triangular dynamic offers lessons for India. The article deals with this issue.

    India’s changing relations with great powers

    • The recent visit of Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to Delhi and Islamabad is among multiple signs of India’s changing relations with the great powers.
    •  At the same time, Delhi’s growing strategic partnerships with the US and Europe have begun to end India’s prolonged alienation from the West.
    • Also, New Delhi’s own relative weight in the international system continues to increase and give greater breadth and depth to India’s foreign policy.

    Shifts in triangular relations between Russia, China and America

    1) Russia-China relations

    • The leaders of Russia and China — Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong — signed a formal treaty of alliance in 1950.
    •  Russia invested massively in the economic modernisation of China, and also gave it the technology to become a nuclear weapon power.
    • However, by the 1960s, their relations soured and two were arguing about ideology and a lot else.
    • The Sino-Soviet split had consequences way beyond their bilateral relations.
    • None of them more important than the efforts by both Moscow and Beijing to woo Washington.
    • The break-up between Russia and China also opened space for Delhi against Beijing after the 1962 war in the Himalayas.
    • Under intense American pressure on Russia in the 1980s, Moscow sought to normalise ties with Beijing.
    • Stepping back to the 1960s and 1970s, China strongly objected to Delhi’s partnership with Moscow.

    2) Russia-US relations

    • Russia, which today resents India’s growing strategic warmth with the US, has its own long history of collaboration with Washington.
    • Moscow and Washington laid the foundations for nuclear arms control and sought to develop a new framework for shared global leadership.
    • But Delhi was especially concerned about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty system, with all its constraints on India’s atomic options, that Moscow and Washington constructed in the late 1960s.

    3) US-China relations

    • Despite fighting Korean War with the US in the early 1950s, China normalised relations with the U.S. in 1971 to counter the perceived threat from Russia.
    • Deng Xiaoping, refused to extend the 1950 security treaty with Russia that expired in 1980.
    • China turned instead, towards building a solid economic partnership with the US and the West that helped accelerate China’s rise as a great power.

    Lessons for India

    • The twists and turns in the triangular dynamic between America, Russia and China noted above should remind us that Moscow and Beijing are not going to be “best friends forever”.
    • India has no reason to rule out important changes in the way the US, Russia and China relate to each other in the near and medium-term.
    • In the last few years, India has finally overcome its historic hesitations in partnering with the US.
    • India has also intensified its efforts to engage European powers, especially France.
    • Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s visit to India later this month promises a fresh start in India’s difficult postcolonial ties with Britain.
    • India is also expanding its ties with Asian middle powers like Japan, Korea and Australia.
    • Despite the current differences over Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific, India and Russia have no reason to throw away their mutually beneficial bilateral partnership.
    • The current troubles with China seem to be an unfortunate exception to the upswing in India’s bilateral ties with global actors.

    Consider the question “What are the lessons India can draw from the  twists and turns in the triangular dynamic between America, Russia and China.”

    Conclusion

    India has successfully managed the past flux in the great power politics; it is even better positioned today to deal with potential changes among the great powers.

  • Explaining Pakistan’s flip-flop on trade with India

    The article highlights the key takeaways from Pakistan’s vacillations on resuming the trade ties even in the face of impending economic crisis.

    U-turn on resuming trade

    • On March 31, Pakistan announced the decision to import cotton, yarn, and sugar from India.
    • However, it took a U-turn on that announcement about resuming trade ties.
    • This highlights the internal differences and the emphasis on politics over economy and trade.
    • It also signifies Pakistan cabinet’s grandstanding, linking the normalisation of ties with India to Jammu and Kashmir.

    3 takeaways from the decision

    1) Immediate economic needs

    • Pakistan’s decision was to import only three items from India, namely cotton, yarn and sugar.
    • It was based on Pakistan’s immediate economic needs and not designed as a political confidence-building measure to normalise relations with India.
    • For the textile and sugar industries in Pakistan, importing from India is imperative, practical and is the most economic.
    • This is because cotton and sugarcane production declined there by 6.9% and 0.4%, respectively.
    •  By early 2019, the sugar prices started increasing, and in 2020, there was a crisis due to shortage and cost.
    • Importing sugar from India would be cheaper for the consumer market in Pakistan.

    2) Politics first

    • The second takeaway is the supremacy of politics over trade and economy, even if the latter is beneficial to the importing country.
    • The interests of its own business community and its export potential have become secondary.
    • However, Pakistan need not be singled out; this is a curse in South Asia, where politics play supreme over trade and economy.
    • The meagre percentage of intra-South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) trade and the failure of SAARC engaging in bilateral or regional trade would underline the above.

    3) Emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir issue

    • The third takeaway is the emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan to make any meaningful start in bilateral relations.
    • This goes against what it has been telling the rest of the world that India should begin a dialogue with Pakistan.
    • There were also reports that Pakistan agreeing to re-establish the ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) was a part of this new strategy.

    Consider the question: “Trade is unlikely to triumph over politics in South Asia; especially in India-Pakistan relations. This is a curse in South Asia, where politics play supreme over trade and economy.” Critically Examine.

    Conclusion

    Pakistan has been saying that the onus is on India to normalise the process. Perhaps, it is India’s turn to tell Islamabad that it is willing, but without any preconditions, and start with trade.

  • Why the Indo-Pacific has assumed significance for Europe after the pandemic

    The article highlights Asia’s growing significance in the wake of the pandemic. This is underscored by Europe’s meaningful engagement with Asia which is based on an understanding of the region’s geopolitical and economic significance.

    Asia’s rise

    • The pandemic has upended many certainties. But it has reinforced one major trend in global politics: The rise of Asia.
    • The region’s rise has created three Asias.
    • First, there is the familiar Asia of business — open, dynamic, interconnected.
    • Second, an Asia of geopolitics, with ever-starker nationalisms, territorial conflicts, arms races and Sino-American rivalry.
    • Lastly, we have an Asia of global challenges.
    • These three Asias are also marked by 3 dynamics:
    • 1) Geopolitical rivalries that threaten free trade.
    • 2) The fight against the pandemic is mutating into a systemic competition between democracy and authoritarianism.
    • 3) And frenzied economic growth is fuelling climate change.

    European strategy for Indo-Pacific

    • Germany together with France and the Netherlands, have commenced work on a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
    • The strategy seeks cooperation with all countries of the region: For open economies and free trade; for the fight against pandemics and climate change; and for an inclusive, rules-based order.
    • Such a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific must take all three Asias into account.
    • Europe is a key trading, technology and investment partner for many countries of the region.
    •  The EU recently concluded groundbreaking free trade agreements with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam that set environmental and social standards.
    • In late 2020, the countries of East and Southeast Asia signed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, encompassing one-third of the global economy.
    • It is time for the EU to swiftly conclude the ongoing negotiations on trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand – and to move forward with negotiations with Indonesia and India.

    Reducing dependencies

    • Following the above policies, Europe will also reduce dependency and following the principle of diversification.
    • Together with its Indo-Pacific partners, Europe can set standards for new technologies, human-centred digitisation and sustainable connectivity. 
    • In this endeavour, Europe can draw on its innovative and economic strength as well as its regulatory power.
    • At the EU-India Summit in May, the launch of a connectivity partnership with India will further connect India’s and Europe’s digital economies.

    Rising tensions and rules-based Indo-Pacific

    • Meanwhile, tensions are rising in the Asia of geopolitics.
    • New cold wars or even hot conflicts in the Indo-Pacific would be an economic and political nightmare.
    • Europe must, therefore, take a firmer stand against polarisation and more strongly advocate an inclusive, rules-based Indo-Pacific.
    • The strategic partnership concluded between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last December connects us with like-minded middle powers.

    Asia of geopolitical challenges

    • Containing geopolitical rivalries in Asia is also a precondition for shaping the future with the Asia of global challenges.
    •  As the biggest emitters of CO2, the US, China, India and the EU will only win the fight against climate change together.
    • The Leaders Summit on Climate that will be hosted by the US next week sets the stage for cooperation.
    • Europe and the countries of the Indo-Pacific need each other also in the fight against the virus.
    • The EU is by far the biggest supporter of the international vaccine platform COVAX, and India as a leading producer of vaccines is the most important COVAX supplier.
    • We will all benefit from this as, without the worldwide vaccination rollout, mutations will keep on setting us back in the fight against the pandemic.
    • Europe will continue to stand up for human rights and democracy in the Indo-Pacific.
    • This was demonstrated with sanctions against those responsible for human rights violations in Xinjiang — and also against Myanmar’s generals.

    Conclusion

    Europe is ready for a new partnership — a partnership founded on seeking dialogue with the open Asia of business, taming geopolitical rivalry in Asia together and coming up with responses to the world of tomorrow with the Asia of global challenges. This must be the objective of European policy — for and with the Indo-Pacific

  • 7th Fleet’s patrol in India’s EEZ was an act of impropriety

    The explains the implications of a recent incident in which the US 7th fleet asserted navigation freedom and rights inside India’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

    Freedom of navigation operation in India’s EEZ

    • The US 7th fleet recently declared that on 7th April, 2021 USS John Paul Jones asserted navigational rights and freedom inside India’s EEZ, without requesting India’s prior consent.
    • The statement also said that  “India requires prior consent for military exercises or manoeuvres in its EEZ, a claim inconsistent with international law.

    Which international law the statement referred to

    • The “international law” being cited by Commander 7th Fleet is a UN Convention which resulted from the third UN Conference on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS 1982).
    • India has ratified the Convention, which came into force in 1994.
    • However, amongst the 168 nations who have either acceded to or ratified UNCLOS 1982, the US is conspicuous by its absence.

    Background of the UNCLOS

    • In 1945, the US unilaterally declared its jurisdiction over all natural resources on that nation’s continental shelf. 
    • Taking cue from the US, some states extended their sovereign rights to 200 miles, while others declared territorial limits as they pleased.
    • To bring order to a confusing situation, conferences for codifying laws of the seas were convened by the UN.
    • After negotiations, an agreement was obtained on a set of laws that formalised the following maritime zones:
    • (a) A 12-mile limit on territorial sea;
    • (b) A 24-mile contiguous zone.
    • (c) Amnewly conceived “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) extending up to 200 miles within which the state would have sole rights over natural resources.
    • The EEZ was said to be unique in that it was neither high seas nor territorial waters.

    Issues with the UNCLOS 1982

    • The signatories UNCLOS 1982 have chosen to remain silent on controversial issues with military or security implications and mandated no process for resolution of ambiguities.
    • Resort to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or a Court of Arbitration are amongst the options available.
    • However, many states have expressed a preference for “negotiating in good faith”.
    • The time has, perhaps, come for signatories of UNCLOS 1982 to convene another conference to review laws and resolve issues of contention.

    Why US refused to ratify UNCLOS

    • It was accepted that the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was not subject to national sovereignty but would be “the common heritage of mankind” .
    • This seems to have been at the root of the US opposition to UNCLOS.
    • It was felt in the US that this concept favoured the under-developed countries thereby denying America the fruits of its technological superiority.
    • The US Senate, therefore, refused to ratify UNCLOS.
    • Amongst the areas of major contention or sharp divergence in the interpretation of rules are:
    • 1) Applicability of the EEZ concept to rocks and islets.
    • 2) The right of innocent passage for foreign warships through territorial seas.
    • 3) Conduct of naval activities in the EEZ and the pursuit of marine scientific research in territorial waters and EEZ.

    Containing China

    • China has insulated itself against US intervention, through the progressive development of its “anti-access, area-denial” or A2AD capability.
    • China has accelerated its campaign to achieve control of the South China Sea (SCS).
    • In 2013, China commenced on an intense campaign to build artificial islands in the SCS on top of reefs in the Spratly and Paracel groups.
    • In 2016, China disdainfully rejected the verdict of the UN Court of Arbitration in its dispute with the Philippines.
    • So far, none of the US initiatives including Obama’s abortive US Pivot/Re-balance to Asia, Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, seem to have had the slightest impact on China’s aggressive intent
    • Therefore, it seems pointless for the US Navy to frighten the Maldives or friendly India and it needs to focus on China instead.

    Consider the question “What are the different types of maritime zones under the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea 1982? What are the flaws in the convention?

    Conclusion

    In this fraught environment, the ever-expanding, worldwide FONOP campaign needs a careful reappraisal by US policy-makers for effectiveness — lest it alienates friends instead of deterring adversaries.

  • Film Certification Appellate Tribunal (FCAT)

    The Government of India’s decision to abolish the Film Certification Appellate Tribunal (FCAT), under the Tribunal Reforms Ordinance, 2021, has triggered a wave of criticism with filmmakers.

    The FCAT was the place filmmakers walked into as a penultimate resort to challenging edits suggested to their films by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC).

    Plunging into crisis

    • FCAT is only one of many tribunals in the country that were either abolished or amalgamated under the Ordinance.
    • Earlier, if a filmmaker fails to clear the Examining Committee (EC) and Revising Committee (RC) hurdles of the CBFC, the FCAT was the next step of recourse, but that is no longer the case.
    • FCAT only charged a nominal fee to hold the screening for its members, and it would pass its judgment immediately.

    Fighting the system

    • FCAT’s panel is predominantly made up of members from industry veterans who arrive at a judgment after balancing both CBFC and the filmmaker’s points of view.
    • Most of CBFC’s decisions were overruled by the Tribunal and that has reassured constitutional rights under Article 19 to filmmakers to express themselves freely.
    • A judge will only look at the issue from a legal perspective, not whether a particular edit will constrict the flow of the movie.

    Re-classifying certification

    • To avoid such issues, the Government constituted the ‘Shyam Benegal Committee’ in January 2016.
    • The committee recommended regulations for film certification — a move away from the current practice adopted by CBFC, and submitted its report in April 2016.
    • According to many, a revamp of the certification system that doesn’t require censoring or cuts is the need of the hour.

  • India’s refugee Policy & Issues with it

    The article highlights the issue of the lack of refugee protection framework in India and suggests enacting domestic law to deal with the issue. 

    India’s record on refugee protection

    • India, for the most part, has had a stellar record on the issue of refugee protection.
    • But this moral tradition has come under great stress of late.
    • New Delhi has been one of the largest recipients of refugees in the world in spite of not being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

    Confusion in policies for immigrants and refugees

    • Much of the debate in India is about illegal immigrants, not refugees, the two categories tend to get bunched together.
    • Our policies towards illegal immigrants and refugees is confused is because as per Indian law, both categories of people are viewed as one and the same and are covered under the Foreigners Act, 1946.
    • The act offers a simple definition of a foreigner — “foreigner” means “a person who is not a citizen of India”.
    • There are fundamental differences between illegal immigrants and refugees, but India is legally ill-equipped to deal with them separately due to a lack of legal provisions.
    • Also, India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the key legal documents pertaining to refugee protection.

    How absence of policy framework creates problems

    • The absence of legal framework for refugees leads to policy ambiguity whereby India’s refugee policy is guided primarily by ad hocism and ‘political utility’.
    • At the same time, the absence of a legal framework increases the possibility of the domestic politicisation of refugee protection and complicates its geopolitical faultlines.
    • The absence of a clearly laid down refugee protection law also opens the door for geopolitical considerations while deciding to admit refugees or not.
    • For example, India’s decision in the recent case of admitting Myanmarese refugees fleeing to India was influence by the possibility of irking the Generals in Naypyitaw.
    • However, hypothetically speaking, if New Delhi had domestic legislation regarding refugees it could have tempered the expectations of the junta to return the fleeing Myanmarese.

    Why India has not signed convention and protocol on refugee protection

    • The definition of refugees in the 1951 convention only pertains to the violation of civil and political rights, but not economic rights, of individuals.
    • If the violation of economic rights were to be included in the definition of a refugee, it would clearly pose a major burden on the developed world.
    • This argument, if used in the South Asian context, could be a problematic proposition for India too.
    • India also need to argue that the North is violating the convention in both letter and spirit, and make its accession conditional on the Western States rolling back the non-entrée (no entry) regime.
    • The non-entrée regime is constituted by a range of legal and administrative measures that include visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, interdictions, third safe-country rule, restrictive interpretations of the definition of ‘refugee’, withdrawal of social welfare benefits to asylum seekers, and widespread practices of detention.”
    • In other words, India must use its exemplary, though less than perfect, history of refugee protection to begin a global conversation on the issue.

    Way forward

    • What other options do we have to respond to the refugee situation we are faced with?
    • The answer perhaps lies in a new domestic law aimed at refugees.
    • The CAA, however, is not the answer to this problem primarily because of its deeply discriminatory nature.
    • What is perhaps equally important is that such a domestic refugee law should allow for temporary shelter and work permit for refugees.
    • India must also make a distinction between temporary migrant workers, illegal immigrants and refugees and deal with each of them differently through proper legal and institutional mechanisms.

    Consider the question “What are the reasons for India’s not singing 1951 Refugee Convention? What are the options India can explore for refugee protection? 

    Conclusion

    Our traditional practice of managing these issues with ambiguity and political expediency has become deeply counterproductive: It neither protects the refugees nor helps stop illegal immigration into the country.

  • Freedom of Navigation Operations

    The US Navy has had “asserted navigational rights and freedoms approximately 130 nautical miles west of Lakshadweep Islands, inside India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), without requesting India’s prior consent, consistent with international law”.

    Try this question:

    Q.What do you mean by Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)? What are its legal backings?  Discuss its significance.

    Freedom of Navigation Operations

    • FONOPs are closely linked to the concept of freedom of navigation, and in particular to the enforcement of relevant international law and customs regarding freedom of navigation.
    • It involves passage conducted by the US Navy through waters claimed by coastal nations as their exclusive territory.
    • It is carried under the US policy of exercising and asserting its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms around the world”.
    • It says these “assertions communicate that the US does not acquiesce to the excessive maritime claims of other nations, and thus prevents those claims from becoming accepted in international law”.

    Significance of FONOPs

    • FONOPs are a method of enforcing UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and avoiding these negative outcomes by reinforcing freedom of navigation through practice.
    • It is exercised by sailing through all areas of the sea permitted under UNCLOS, and particularly those areas that states have attempted to close off to free navigation as defined under UNCLOS.

    What about EEZs?

    • An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    • It is an area of the sea in which a sovereign state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind.
    • It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles from the coast of the state in question.
    • It is also referred to as a maritime continental margin and, in colloquial usage, may include the continental shelf.
    • The term does not include either the territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.
    • The difference between the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone is that the first confers full sovereignty over the waters, whereas the second is merely a “sovereign right” which refers to the coastal state’s rights below the surface of the sea.
    • The surface waters, as can be seen on the map, are international waters.

    Is FONOP violative of India’s EEZ?

    • As per India’s Territorial Waters Act, 1976, the EEZ of India “is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial waters, and the limit of such zone is two hundred nautical miles from the baseline”.
    • India’s “limit of the territorial waters is the line every point of which is at a distance of twelve nautical miles from the nearest point of the appropriate baseline”.
    • Under the 1976 law, “all foreign ships (other than warships including submarines and other underwater vehicles) shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters”.

    Back2Basics: UNCLOS

    • The Law of the Sea Treaty formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It entered into force in 1994.
    • The convention establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing the oceans and replaces previous U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea
    • The convention defines the distance of 12 nautical miles from the baseline as Territorial Sea limit and a distance of 200 nautical miles distance as Exclusive Economic Zone limit.

  • SARTHAQ Plan

    Union Education Minister has launched ‘Students’ and Teachers’ Holistic Advancement through Quality Education (SARTHAQ), the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 implementation plan for school education.

    SARTHAQ

    • SARTHAQ keeps in mind the concurrent nature of education and adheres to the spirit of federalism.
    • The plan delineates the roadmap for the implementation of NEP 2020 for the next 10 years.
    • States and Union Territories have been given the flexibility to adapt the plan with “local contextualization”.
    • They have been allowed to modify the plan as per their needs and requirements.

    Envisaged outcomes

    • Increase in Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER), Net Enrolment Ratio (NER), transition rate and retention rate at all levels and reduction in dropouts and out of school children.
    • Access to quality ECCE and Universal Acquisition of Foundational Literacy and Numeracy by Grade 3.
    • Improvement in Learning Outcomes at all stages with an emphasis on teaching and learning through mother tongue/local/regional languages in the early years.
    • Integration of vocational education, sports, arts, knowledge of India, 21st-century skills, values of citizenship, awareness of environment conservation, etc. in the curriculum at all stages.
    • Introduction of Experiential learning at all stages and adoption of innovative pedagogies by teachers in classroom transaction.
    • Integration of technology in educational planning and governance and availability of ICT and quality e-content in classrooms.

  • What is Durbar Move?

    A tradition of a century and a half is set to be broken in Jammu and Kashmir, with only “sensitive records” being taken from Jammu to Srinagar this summer during the “Durbar Move”.

    Discuss the feasibility, benefits and constraints caused by multiple administrative capitals in Indian states with special context to Jammu and Kashmir and the state of Andhra Pradesh. (250W)

    Durbar Move

    • Durbar Move is a bi-annual shifting of the Civil Secretariat and other offices of the state government from Jammu to Srinagar in summer, and vice versa in winter.
    • This is done as Jammu & Kashmir has two capitals: Kashmir during summer and Jammu during winter.
    • In Jammu, offices shut on the last Friday and Saturday of April and reopen in Srinagar on the first Monday after a gap of a week.
    • In Kashmir, offices shut on the last Friday and Saturday of October, to reopen in Jammu on the first Monday after a week’s gap, in November.

    The reasons why

    • Durbar Move is a tradition started 149 years ago started by the erstwhile Dogra rulers who hailed from Jammu but had expanded their boundaries to Kashmir including what is now Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and Ladakh.
    • Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh are very different from one another geographically, linguistically and culturally, and in those days were poorly connected by road.
    • It is generally understood that the Durbar Move was started to take the administration to the doorstep of the people of Kashmir which is closer to Ladakh.
    • During summer, ruling from Kashmir also helped in ensuring adequate supplies to Ladakh, which is closer to Kashmir than Jammu, before the winter snowfall would cut off Ladakh.
    • The practice also enabled greater interaction and bonding among the people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.

    The effort

    • Until 2019, the administration used to engage hundreds of trucks and buses for carrying office records and officials from one capital city to another.
    • For safe transportation, the Jammu & Kashmir police and paramilitary forces would dominate the entire Jammu-Srinagar national highway.
    • Apart from the expenses incurred on hiring trucks and buses, the moving staff also used to be paid TA and DA, besides arrangements for their accommodation.

    The criticism

    • Voices of protest started during the late 1980s, over the amount of money and time spent on the exercise.
    • However, the practice also enjoyed public support.
    • In recent years, many criticised the government for spending nearly Rs 200 crore on this exercise every year when it did not have enough funds even to pay salary to its employees.
    • Last year, the Jammu & Kashmir High Court observed that there was no legal justification or constitutional basis for the Darbar Move tradition.
    • The court recommended that in case the practice was rationalized, the resources and time saved could be utilized towards the welfare and development of the UT.
    • The money saved could also be used to address Covid-related issues like food shortage, unemployment and healthcare.

    What next?

    • The UT government has decided to switch to e-governance, will all office records converted into digital format.
    • As a result, while the Secretariat employees and some offices will move from Jammu to Srinagar, as usual, this year, only sensitive records will be shifted from one place to another.