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GS Paper: GS2

  • Fifteenth Finance Commission

    Three years after it was constituted, the Fifteenth Finance Commission has finalised its report for fund devolution from the Centre to States for the five years from 2021-22 to 2025-26.

    Fifteenth Finance Commission

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission (XV FC) was constituted on November 27, 2017.
    • It was constituted against the backdrop of the abolition of the Planning Commission and the distinction between Plan and non-Plan expenditure, and introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST).

     What is the Finance Commission?

    • The FC was established by the President of India in 1951 under Article 280 of the Indian Constitution.
    • It was formed to define the financial relations between the central government of India and the individual state governments.
    • The Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951 additionally defines the terms of qualification, appointment and disqualification, the term, eligibility and powers of the Finance Commission.
    • As per the Constitution, the FC is appointed every five years and consists of a chairman and four other members.
    • Since the institution of the First FC, stark changes in the macroeconomic situation of the Indian economy have led to major changes in the FC’s recommendations over the years.

    Why in news now?

    • That report of the XV FC had pared the States’ share of the divisible tax pool from 42%, as recommended by the Fourteenth Finance Commission, to 41%, citing the creation of the UT of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
    • The Commission had then said that some of the key recommendations it was required to make would feature in its final report, including the viability of creating a separate defence and national security fund.
    • The panel is also expected to factor in unpaid GST compensation dues to States for this year while working out States’ revenue flow calculations for the years beyond 2022.

    Must read:

    [Burning Issue] 15th Finance Commission and its recommendations (Part I)

  • [pib] National Productivity Council (NPC)

    National Productivity Council (NPC) has been granted accreditation conforming to ISO 17020:2012 by National Accreditation Board for Certification Body (NABCB).

    National Productivity Council (NPC)

    • NPC is a national level organization to promote productivity culture in India.
    • The NPC comes under the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), Ministry of Commerce & Industry.
    • Established in 1958, it is an autonomous, multipartite, non-profit organization and has been registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860.
    • NPC is a constituent of the Tokyo-based Asian Productivity Organisation (APO), an Inter-Governmental Body, of which the Government of India is a founder member.

    Why ISO status?

    • It has been granted accreditation for undertaking inspection and audit work in the area of Food Safety Audit and Scientific Storage of Agricultural Products.
    • NPC has been conducting inspections/audit for different statutory bodies such as Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority (WDRA) and FSSAI and is already having high credentials in the area of inspections and audits.

  • The challenges of walking the Indo-Pacific talk

    The article analyses the similarity, differences and limitations of the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct and delineate the challenges India as it seeks to deal with China.

    Expectations from India in countering China

    • During the mid-2000s the world expected India to be an economic powerhouse, a decade later, those expectations remain modest, at best.
    • The international community has once again decided to court New Delhi to play a decisive role in shaping the region’s strategic future.
    • The expectation this time is more strategic and military, to lead the charge against China from within the region.

    Role of India in the Quad and similarity with Indo-Pacific construct

    • Quad is a forum for strategic and military consultations among India, the U.S., Australia and Japan.
    • Quad members are also major States in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Both the Quad and the Indo-Pacific constructs are focused on China.
    • More so, they are also in some ways centred around India’s geographic location and its policies.
    • Put differently, if you take China out of the equation, they would have little rationale for existence.
    • If you take India out of the picture, their ability to sustain as geopolitical constructs would drastically diminish.

    Differences between  Indo-Pacific Construct and Quad

    • The Indo-Pacific is a politico-economic vision and the Quad is a military-strategic vision which does not form the military or strategic nucleus of the first.
    • While the Indo-Pacific provides a complex political and economic picture with a hesitant, but growing, articulation of China as a strategic challenge.
    • The Quad is inherently more anti-China in character and intent.
    • The Indo-Pacific,will find it impossible to avoid engaging China, the Quad is mostly focused on diplomatic signalling and with little common intent let alone joint action.
    • Quad’s ability to succeed would entirely depend on China — the more aggressive China gets, the more resolute the Quad countries would be in strengthening it.

    Comparing Indio-Pacific with BRI

    • The BRI is far more advanced, much more thought-out, and enjoyes the support of Chinese state.
    • Several Indo-Pacific countries are already members of the BRI.
    • On the flip side, the BRI is already under immense stress from its inherent weaknesses, such as China’s unilateral pursuit of the BRI and the associated economic burdens on the States that sign up to it.

    Challenges India face

    1) On economic front

    • There must be strong economic partnerships and linkages among its members, merely focusing on strategic talk and possible military cooperation will not work.
    • India’s recent decision not to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), could potentially complicate the country’s future engagements in the region.
    • Also worryinng is the already huge gap between India and China on trade with almost every Indo-Pacific country.
    • This growing trade gap will be a major determining factor in shaping the region’s strategic realities.
    • Institutional engagement: India does not have FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., Bangladesh and the Maldives. It has FTAs with South Korea, the Association of South East Asian Nations, or ASEAN, Japan and Sri Lanka.
    • In the case of China, it has FTAs with all these countries barring the U.S.

    2) On strategic and military front

    • India strategic and military engagements in the region also fall short.
    • Beijing is a major defence supplier to several of the region’s States including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
    • This dwarfs India’s minimal sales, defence dialogues and occasional joint military exercises in the region.

    Way forward

    • India’s role in the Indo-Pacific will remain limited if it does not prove to be a major economic partner to these States.
    • But given the economic slowdown in India today in the wake of COVID-19 and the lack of political consensus about RCEP, India’s ability to economically engage with the region remains limited.
    • On the military-strategic side too, India’s performance in the region is less than desirable.
    • The only choice, it appears then, is for some sort of a loosely structured regional strategic alliance with the U.S. and its allies in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

    Consider the question ” What are the similarities and differences in the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct? What are the challenges India faces as it increases its engagement in the both.” 

    Conclusion

    India remains caught between a deeply constrained, but unavoidable, need to rethink its strategic posture, and the recognition of its material inability to do so, at least for now.

  • Excessive optimism over a pact with election-bound US is premature

    The growing pace of India-US bilateral engagement has raised hopes in several quarters. However, there are several issues that must be considered and need to avoid excessive optimism. 

    Timing of 2+2 dialogue

    • The India-US 2+2 third meeting was held in Delhi only a week before the US presidential elections.
    • The government felt that it was important to seal the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) without delay.
    • Other reason could be government’s assessment that there is bipartisan support in the US for higher and positive bilateral ties.

    Need for caution in India’s approach

    • In India-US ties, the leading outside consideration is China.
    • A Biden presidency, should that be the choice of the American people, would seek to ensure that China’s rise is not at the cost of the US’s global pre-eminence.
    • However, the strategy and methods it employs would be different from that of its predecessor.
    • Further, even a Trump 2 administration, with the election done, may change course in its China approach.
    • Hence, caution and prudence are good diplomatic watchwords.
    • It is good that the agreements for a full defence engagement with the US are in place.
    • But it is one matter to have them done and an entirely different one insofar as the nature and intensity of cooperation.
    • So, India’s tradition of relying on its own strengths in matters of national security should not be eroded in the hope that an outside power would provide useful inputs.

    Alliance Vs. Partnership

    • India-US ties are in the framework of a partnership, not an alliance.
    • The partnership may not be based on opposition to an outside element, the alliance almost always is.
    • Alliances also demand a much higher price than partnerships, through loss of autonomy if the ally is a bigger power.

    Excessive enthusiasm on Quad may be premature

    • The 2+2 joint statement does not name China but its thrust is clear.
    • The Quad is based on a commonality of concerns on account of China’s actions.
    • India’s decision to go along with a more purposive group, including through its maritime exercises, is in keeping with its interests.
    • The real direction that the Quad will take has to await the US’s overall China strategy over the next few years.
    • Excessive enthusiasm on the Quad front may, therefore, be premature.

    Way forward

    • India has to change the nature of its economic and commercial ties with China.
    • Thus, the joint statement’s reference on the need to “enhance supply chain resilience and to seek alternatives to the current paradigm” was timely, though here, again, the future US approach is not entirely certain.
    • The areas where the bilateral partnership has the potential of evolving most positively for India relate to health, education and science and technology.
    • There should not be any reluctance in developing ties in defence industries, too, but it cannot be forgotten that no country will part with any of its critical technologies.
    • But there cannot be a substitute for developing indigenous capacity for India’s needs for weapon systems.

    Conclusion

    India-US ties will move positively forward but there will be imponderables ahead, principally arising out of US strategies towards China. But, a close embrace of another country is always problematic.

  • Annual State of Education Report (ASER) Wave 1, 2020

    The ASER Wave 1 Survey was recently released since the COVID-19 crisis interrupted this years’ trajectory.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.Discuss the efficacy of the One-Nation- One-Board System and its limitations.

    About ASER Survey

    • This is an annual survey (published by education non-profit Pratham ) that aims to provide reliable estimates of children’s enrolment and basic learning levels for each district and state in India.
    • ASER has been conducted every year since 2005 in all rural districts of India. It is the largest citizen-led survey in India.
    • It is also the only annual source of information on children’s learning outcomes available in India.

    How is the survey conducted?

    • ASER tools and procedures are designed by ASER Centre, the research and assessment arm of Pratham.
    • The survey itself is coordinated by ASER Centre and facilitated by the Pratham network. It is conducted by close to 30,000 volunteers from partner organisations in each district.
    • All kinds of institutions partner with ASER: colleges, universities, NGOs, youth groups, women’s organisations, self-help groups and others.
    • The ASER model has been adapted for use in several countries around the world: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Pakistan, Mali and Senegal.

    Assessment parameters

    • Unlike most other large-scale learning assessments, ASER is a household-based rather than school-based survey.
    • This design enables all children to be included – those who have never been to school or have dropped out, as well as those who are in government schools, private schools, religious schools or anywhere else.
    • In each rural district, 30 villages are sampled. In each village, 20 randomly selected households are surveyed.
    • Information on schooling status is collected for all children living in sampled households who are in the age group 3-16.
    • Children in the age group 5-16 are tested in basic reading and basic arithmetic. The same test is administered to all children.
    • The highest level of reading tested corresponds to what is expected in Std 2; in 2012 this test was administered in 16 regional languages.
    • In recent years, this has included household size, parental education, and some information on household assets.

    Key Findings

    1.Enrollments:

    • 5.5% of rural children are not currently enrolled for the 2020school year, up from 4% in 2018.
    • This difference is the sharpest among the youngest children (6 to 10) where 5.3% of rural children had not yet enrolled in school in 2020, in comparison to just 1.8% in 2018.
    • Due to the disruptions caused by the pandemic, families are waiting for the physical opening of schools to enrol their youngest children, with about 10% of six-year-olds not in school.
    • Among 15-16 year-olds, however, enrollment levels are slightly higher than in 2018.
    • The proportion of boys enrolled in government schools has risen from 62.8% in 2018 to 66.4% in 2020, while for girls, that number has gone up from 70% to 73% in the corresponding period.
    • Patterns show a slight shift toward government schools, with private schools seeing a drop in enrolment in all age groups.
    • The Centre has now permitted States to start reopening schools if they can follow Covid-19 safety protocols but the majority of the country’s 25 crore students are still at home.

    2.Availability of Smartphones:

    • Among enrolled children, 61.8% live in families that own at least one smartphone which was merely 36.5% in 2018.
    • About 11% of families bought a new phone after the lockdown, of which 80% were smartphones.
    • WhatsApp is by far the most popular mode of transmitting learning materialsto students, with 75% of students receiving input via this app.

    3.Availability of Learning Material:

    • Overall more than 80% of children said they had textbooks for their current grade.
    • This proportion was higher among students enrolled in government schools (84.1%) than in private ones (72.2%).
    • In Bihar, less than 8% got such materials from their schools, along with 20% in West Bengal, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
    • More than 80% of rural children in Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Kerala and Gujarat received such input.

    4.Learning Activities:

    • Most children (70.2%) did some form of a learning activity through material shared by tutors or family members themselves, with or without regular input.
    • 11% had access to live online classes, and 21% had videos or recorded classes, with much higher levels in private schools.
    • About 60% studied from their textbooks and 20% watched classes broadcast on TV.

    Suggestions

    • Fluid Situation: When schools reopen, it will be important to continue to monitor who goes back to school as well as to understand whether there is learning lossas compared to previous years.
    • Building on and Strengthening Family Support: Parents’ increasing levels of education can be integrated into planning for learning improvement, as advocated by National Education Policy, 2020. Reaching parents at the right level is essential to understand how they can help their children and older siblings also play an important role.
    • Hybrid Learning: As children do a variety of different activities at home, effective ways of hybrid learning need to be developed which combine traditional teaching-learning with newer ways of “reaching-learning”.
    • Assessment of Digital Modes and Content: In order to improve digital content and delivery for the future, an in-depth assessment of what works, how well it works, who it reaches, and who it excludes is needed.
    • Mediating the Digital Divide: Children from families who had low education and also did not have resources like smartphones had less access to learning opportunities. However, even among such households, there is evidence of effort with family members trying to help and schools trying to reach them. These children will need even more help than others when schools reopen.

    Way Forward

    • Covid-19 has left the nation with deep economic distress and uncertainty over school-reopenings and thrown open new challenges in every sector.
    • The nationally representative sample highlighted the role played by the families where everyone in the family supported children regardless of their education levels.
    • This strength needs to be leveraged by reaching out to more students and reducing the distance between schools and homes.

  •  Explained: Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) VS COMCASA VS LEMOA

    India and the United States have signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which, along with the two agreements signed earlier — the LEMOA and the COMCASA.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q. What is the troika of “foundational pacts” of India with the US? Discuss each of them. (150W)

    Completing the troika

    • The two agreements signed earlier are— the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA).
    • This completes a troika of “foundational pacts” for deep military cooperation between the two countries.

    What is BECA?

    • BECA will help India get real-time access to American geospatial intelligence that will enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles and armed drones.
    • Through the sharing of information on maps and satellite images, it will help India access topographical and aeronautical data, and advanced products that will aid in navigation and targeting.

    Benefits of BECA

    • This could be a key to Air Force-to-Air Force cooperation between India and the US.
    • BECA will provide Indian military systems with a high-quality GPS to navigate missiles with real-time intelligence to precisely target the adversary.
    • Besides the sailing of ships, flying off aircraft, fighting of wars, and location of targets, geospatial intelligence is also critical to the response to natural disasters.

    What was the LEMOA about?

    • LEMOA was the first of the three pacts to be signed in August 2016.
    • LEMOA allows the militaries of the US and India to replenish from each other’s bases, and access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and ports, which can then be reimbursed.
    • LEMOA is extremely useful for India-US Navy-to-Navy cooperation since the two countries are cooperating closely in the Indo-Pacific.

    Concretizing the mutual trust

    • The critical element that underpins LEMOA is mutual trust.
    • Without trust, no country will be willing to expose its military and strategic assets such as warships to the facilities of another country.
    • The signing of LEMOA was in itself an affirmation of the mutual trust between the two militaries, and its application will enhance the trust.
    • It took almost a decade to negotiate LEMOA, and the exercise in a sense bridged the trust deficit between India and the US and paved the way for the other two foundational pacts.

    What about the COMCASA?

    • COMCASA was signed in September 2018, after the first 2+2 dialogue during Mrs. Swarajs’ term as EAM.
    • The pact allows the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US military commanders, and the aircraft and ships of the two countries, can communicate through secure networks during times of both peace and war.
    • The signing of COMCASA paved the way for the transfer of communication security equipment from the US to India to facilitate “interoperability” between their forces.

    Specific context and practical benefit for India

    • The strengthening of the mechanisms of cooperation between the two militaries must be seen in the context of an increasingly aggressive China.
    • Amid the ongoing standoff on the LAC in Ladakh — the longest and most serious in three decades — India and the US intensified under-the-radar intelligence and military cooperation at an unprecedented level.
    • These conversations facilitated information-sharing between the two countries, including the sharing of high-end satellite images, telephone intercepts, and data on Chinese troops and weapons deployment along the LAC.

    Conclusion

    • Such agreements mark the enhancement of mutual trust and a commitment to the long-term strategic relationship.
    • The US wants India to move away from Russian equipment and platforms, as it feels this may expose its technology and information to Moscow.
    • So far, India is going ahead with the purchase of the S-400 air defence missile system from Russia, and this has been a sticking point for American interlocutors.
    • For its part, India is wary of Pakistan’s deep-rooted ties with the Pentagon, and Washington’s dependence on Rawalpindi for access to Afghanistan as well as its exit strategy.
    • But, because of the clear and present danger from China, New Delhi’s strategic embrace of Washington is the obvious outcome.

  • India-Myanmar relations

    The Foreign Secretary and Chief of the Army Staff have recently visited Myanmar reflected India’s multidimensional interests in the country.

    Try this question:

    Q.Myanmar is the key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach. Analyse.

    India-Myanmar relations

    • There are two lines of thinking that drive India’s Myanmar policy: engagement with key political actors and balancing neighbours.
    • For Myanmar, the visit would be viewed as India’s support for its efforts in strengthening democratization amidst criticisms by rights groups over the credibility of its upcoming election.

    Non-interference in internal politics

    • The political logic that has shaped India’s Myanmar policy since the 1990s has been to support democratization driven from within the country.
    • This has allowed Delhi to engage with the military that played a key role in Myanmar’s political transition and is still an important political actor.
    • A key factor behind the military regime’s decision to open the country when it initiated reforms was, in part, to reduce dependence on China.

    India as an alternative

    • By engaging Myanmar, Delhi provides alternative options to Naypyidaw.
    • This driver in India’s Myanmar policy has perhaps gained greater salience in the rapidly changing regional geopolitics.

    Recent initiatives

    • Like in other neighbouring countries, India suffers from an image of being unable to get its act together in making its presence felt on the ground.
    • The inauguration of the liaison office of the Embassy of India in Naypyidaw (the capital) may seem a routine diplomatic activity.
    • However, establishing a permanent presence in the capital where only a few countries have set up such offices does matter.
    • Interestingly, China was the first country to establish a liaison office in Naypyidaw in 2017.
    • India has also proposed to build a petroleum refinery in Myanmar that would involve an investment of $6 billion.

    Strategic calculus

    • This is an indication of Myanmar’s growing significance in India’s strategic calculus.
    • It also shows India’s evolving competitive dynamic with China in the sector at a time when tensions between the two have intensified.
    • Another area of cooperation that has expanded involves the border areas.
    • Furthermore, the recent announcement that India was transferring a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar demonstrates the depth of their cooperation in the maritime domain.

    The balancing act

    • For Delhi, the balancing act between Bangladesh and Myanmar remains one of the keys to its overall approach to the Rohingya issue.
    • Delhi has reiterated its support for “ensuring the safe, sustainable and speedy return of displaced persons” to Myanmar.
    • By positioning as playing an active role in facilitating the return of Rohingya refugees, India has made it clear that it supports Myanmar’s efforts and also understands Bangladesh’s burden.
    • For Delhi, engaging rather than criticizing is the most practical approach to finding a solution.

    Conclusion

    • For India, Myanmar is key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach.
    • Delhi’s political engagement and diplomatic balancing seem to have worked so far in its ties with Myanmar.
    • Whether it has leveraged these advantages on the ground to the full is open to debate.
    • The aforementioned initiatives could be the beginning of change on the ground by establishing India’s presence in sectors where it ought to be more pronounced.

  • Outsiders can now buy land in Jammu and Kashmir

    People, as well as investors outside Jammu and Kashmir, can now purchase land in the Union Territory (UT) as the Centre has notified new land laws for the region.

    What is the new criterion?

    • Under the newly introduced J&K Development Act, the term “permanent resident of the State” as a criterion has been “omitted”, paving the way for investors outside J&K to invest in the UT.
    • Under the ‘transfer of land for the purpose of promotion of healthcare or education’, the government may now allow the transfer of land.
    • According to amendments made to “The Jammu & Kashmir Land Revenue Act, Samvat, 1996”, only agriculturists of J&K can purchase agricultural land.
    • No sale, gift, exchange, or mortgage of the land shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist.
    • No land used for agriculture purposes shall be used for any non-agricultural purposes except with the permission of the district collector.
    • Under a new provision, an Army officer not below the rank of Corps Commander can declare an area as “Strategic Area” within a local area, only for direct operational and training requirements.

    Note: These laws do not apply to the UT of Ladakh. The Centre is likely to notify separate land laws for the UT of Ladakh soon.

    Criticisms of the move

    • Political parties have opposed the move citing the sale of the state.
    • With these new laws in place, tokenism of the domicile certificate has been done away with, as purchasing non-agricultural land has been made easier.

  • New dimension to the bilateral engegement

    The article draws parallels in the past in India and China’s engagement with West Asia and contrasts it with the present approach adopted by China in dealing with the region.

    Strategic autonomy

    • According to a former Foreign Secretary of India, Vijay Gokhale, the ideation of ‘strategic autonomy’ is much different from the Nehruvian era thinking of ‘non-alignment’.
    • Speaking in January 2019, Mr. Gokhale said: “The alignment is issue based, and not ideological.”

    India’s engagement with West Asia

    • Pre-dating 2020, India’s outreach to West Asia sharpened since 2014.
    •  Oil-rich Gulf states looked at India as investment alternative away from the West to deepen their own strategic depth.
    • India also doubled down on its relations with the likes of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, giving open economic and political preference to the larger Gulf region.
    • While engagements with Israel moved steadily forward, Iran lagged behind, constrained by U.S. sanctions, which in turn significantly slowed the pace of India-Iran engagements.

    China’s engagement with West Asia

    • China’s overtures have been steadily more adventurous as it realises two major shifts that have taken place in West Asia.
    • First, the thinking in the Gulf that the American security safety net is not absolute.
    • Second, the Gulf economies such as Saudi Arabia, even though trying to shift away from petro dollar, will still need growing markets to sell oil to in the coming decade as they reform their economic systems.
    • The obvious two markets here are China and India.

    Similarity in India and China’s approach to West Asia

    • Both India and China employed similar versions of ‘non-alignment’ thinking is in West Asia based on equitable engagement with the three poles of power in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.
    • Both countries did it without getting involved into the region’s multi-layered conflicts and political fissures.
    • However, deteriorating U.S.-China ties, the COVID-19 pandemic that started in China, followed by the Ladakh crisis, is forcing a drastic change in the geopolitical playbooks of the two Asian giants, and, by association, global security architectures as well.

    Changing approach of China

    •  A report in September shone a light on a $400 billion, 25-year understanding between Iran and China, with Beijing taking advantage of abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal.
    • China is no longer happy with a passive role in West Asia, and through concepts such as “negative peace” and “peace through development”.
    • In concert with tools such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is now ready to offer an alternative model for “investment and influence”.
    •  It remains to be seen, however, how China balances itself between the poles of power while backing one so aggressively.

    Stability of the region and opportunity for India

    • From India’s perspective, the overt outreach to the Gulf and the ensuing announcements of multi-billion-dollar investments on Indian shores by entities from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is only New Delhi recognising the economic realities of the region. 
    • Despite entanglements in the Yemen war and general tensions between the Gulf states and Iran, the likes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and so on have maintained relatively strong and stable economic progression.
    • Israel’s recent peace accords with the UAE and Bahrain add much further weight towards a more stable Gulf region — the caveats withstanding that the operationalisation of the accords is smooth and long-lasting.

    Consider the question “Despite turbulence in the region, India’s engagement with West Asia has always been characterised by non-alignment and ethos of equitable engagement. In light of this, elaborate on India’s approach to the region and region’s importance for India.”

    Conclusion

    While in the recent past, the Indo-Pacific, with the development of the Quad, has taken centre stage, other geographies such as West Asia have also started to showcase bolder examples of New Delhi and Beijing’s metamorphosing approaches towards the international arena.

  • Incentives for furthering the India-US partnership are stronger than ever

    Changing geopolitical factors have accelerated further the deepening of India-US ties. The article analyses the current circumstances and evolution of the bilateral relations.

    Background against which 2+2 dialogue taking place

    • The 2+2 dialogue between India and the United States in Delhi this week marks an important moment in bilateral relations.
    • The 2+2 dialogue comes just three weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad — or the Quadrilateral Security Framework — met in Tokyo.
    • It also takes place amidst a profound structural shift in great power politics as well as turbulence in the international economic order intensified by the coronavirus pandemic.
    • The dialogue follows India’s first-ever participation in a meeting of the exclusive Five Eyes grouping that facilitates intelligence-sharing among the US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand.
    • A few days ago, Delhi announced the much-awaited expansion of the annual Malabar exercises to include Australia.

    Background of the past engagements

    • Signing the historic civil nuclear initiative ended India’s prolonged atomic isolation in the world laid the outline of a broader framework for security cooperation.
    • Due to the deep divisions within the national security establishment, the leadership and some political constraints faced by the government, the coalition broke up.
    •  The focus was on keeping visible distance from the US in the name of non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and the quest for a multipolar world.
    • The relationship survived those years, thanks to the US’s perseverance.

    3 Factors responsible for rapid progress in the US-India ties

    1) Chines aggression on northern border

    • The huge military crisis on the northern borders with China that is well into the sixth month is the first factor.
    • In the past, India avoided closer security ties with the US in deference to Beijing’s sensitivities.
    • In contrast, the government now has refused to pay heed to Chinese sensitivities over its policy on security cooperation with the US.

    2) Disruption caused by the corona pandemic

    • The coronavirus has sharpened the US debate on the dangers of excessive economic interdependence on China.
    • Meanwhile, India has begun to reduce its commercial ties to Beijing in response to the PLA’s Ladakh aggression.
    • This has created the conditions for a new conversation between India and the US on rearranging global supply chains away from China.
    • So, the Quad Plus conversations have drawn in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam with a view to rearrange the global supply chain.

    3) Focus on critical technologies

    • Third factor is critical technologies like artificial intelligence that promise to transform most aspects of modern life — including security, political economy and social order.
    • Delhi and Washington are now focused on finding ways to collaborate on the critical technologies of the 21st century and work with their partners in setting new global rules for managing them.

    Conclusion

    As the regional and global order faces multiple transitions, the incentives for Delhi and Washington to sustain and advance India-US partnership are stronger than ever before and will continue into the next administration.