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GS Paper: GS2

  • Deepening India’s engagement with Africa amid pandemic

    Long thought to be the backwater of the world, Africa has been successful in shading its past image and emerge on the global stage as region hard to ignore. And countries across the world are vying to increase their engagement with the region. This article examines the scope for increasing the ties with the region amid the pandemic.

    India’s association with African Union

    • Africa Day is observed every year on May 25 to commemorate the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, now known as the African Union.
    • India has been closely associated with it on account of its shared colonial past and rich contemporary ties.
    • The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses has hosted an Africa Day Round Table annually for the last four years in order to commemorate this epochal event.

    Economy and pandemic

    • The World Bank in its April report, assessed that the COVID-19 outbreak has sparked off the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region’s first recession in 25 years.
    • Growth is expected to plummet to between -2.1 and -5.1 per cent in 2020, from a modest 2.4 per cent in 2019.
    • With high rates of HIV, malaria, diabetes, hypertension and malnourishment prevalent, a large number of Africans were already faced with a health and economic crisis.
    • The steep decline in commodity prices has spelt disaster for the economies of Nigeria, Zambia and Angola.

    Need for financial support

    • Precarious fiscal positions have ruled out any major governmental stimulus.
    • Public debt has mounted.
    • According to the World Bank, the SSA region paid $35.8 billion in total debt service in 2018.
    • Which is 2.1 per cent of regional gross domestic product (GDP).
    • Together, African countries have sought a $100 billion rescue package.
    • This rescue package includes a $44 billion waiver of interest payment by the world’s 20 largest economies.
    • The IMF’s debt service relief of $500 million is meant for 25 countries of which 19 are in Africa, but that is a drop in the bucket.
    • It is clear that without outside support, Africa will find it very difficult to meet the challenge.

    Why the increased interest in engagement with Africa?

    • Africa’s rich natural resources, long-term economic potential, youthful demography and influence as a bloc of 54 countries in multi-lateral organisations is apparent.
    • Many have an eye for economic opportunities, including in energy, mining, infrastructure and connectivity. 
    • Japan hosted the 7th Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) in August 2019.
    • Russia hosted the first-ever Russia-Africa Summit last year.
    • Brazil, home to the largest population of people of African descent outside of Africa, has also sought to develop closer ties.
    • Cuba has sent medical teams to help Africa.

    Chinese Bonhomie with the region

    • China’s engagement of Africa, as elsewhere, is huge but increasingly regarded as predatory and exploitative.
    • Its annual trade with Africa in 2019 stood at $208 billion, in addition to investments and loans worth $200 billion.
    • Traditionally, China’s participation in infrastructure projects has been astonishing.
    • Having famously built the 1,860 km Tanzania-Zambia railway line in 1975, and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti and Mombasa-Nairobi lines more recently, China is now eyeing to develop the vast East Africa Master Railway Plan.
    • It is also developing the Trans-Maghreb Highway, the Mambilla Hydropower Plant in Nigeria, the Walvis Bay Container Terminal in Windhoek and the Caculo Cabaca Hydropower project in Angola.
    • At the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (COCAC) in 2018, China set aside $60 billion in developmental assistance.
    • And it was followed by a whopping $1 billion Belt and Road (BRI) Infrastructure Fund for Africa.
    • China has followed up with robust health sector diplomacy in the wake of the pandemic.
    • But its image has been tarnished by defective supplies of PPE gear and discriminatory behaviour against Africans in Guangzhou.
    • This also led to an embarrassing diplomatic row.

    India’s relations with Africa

    • In the last few years, India’s relations with Africa saw a revival.
    • India-Africa trade reached $62 billion in 2018 compared to $39 billion during 2009-10.
    • After South Asia, Africa is the second-largest recipient of Indian overseas assistance with Lines of Credit (LOC) worth nearly $10 billion (42 per cent of the total) spread over 100 projects in 41 countries.
    • Ties were boosted at the India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in 2015.
    • 40 per cent of all training and capacity building slots under the ITEC programme have traditionally been reserved for Africa.
    • Approximately 6,000 Indian soldiers are deployed in UN peace-keeping missions in five conflict zones in Africa.
    • Bilateral cooperation includes solar energy development, information technology, cyber security, maritime security, disaster relief, counter-terrorism and military training.
    • India has also launched several initiatives to develop closer relations, including the first-ever India Africa Defence Ministers conclave in February this year on the margins of the Defence Expo 2020.
    • India provides about 50,000 scholarships to African students each year.
    • The huge Indian diaspora is a major asset.
    • India had planned to host the Fourth India Africa Forum Summit in September this year.
    • However, the COVID-19 pandemic may cause it to be delayed.

    India’s support amid covid pandemic

    • India has already despatched medical assistance to 25 African countries.
    • PM Modi has had a telephonic talk with President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa who is the current chairperson of the African Union, and separately others such as the presidents of Uganda and Ethiopia.
    • India could consider structuring a series of virtual summits in zonal groups with African leaders across the continent over the next few months.
    • That could both provide a platform for a cooperative response to the pandemic and also serve as a precursor to the actual summit in the future.
    • The Ministry of External Affairs has already extended the e-ITEC course on “COVID-19 Pandemic: Prevention and Management Guidelines for Healthcare Professionals” to healthcare workers in Africa.
    • The Aarogya Setu App and the E-Gram Swaraj App for rural areas for mapping COVID-19 are technological achievements that could be shared with Africa.
    • Since the movement of African students to India for higher education has been disrupted, India may expand the e-VidyaBharti (tele education) project to establish an India-Africa Virtual University. Agriculture and food security can also be a fulcrum for deepening ties.
    • With the locust scourge devastating the Horn of Africa and the pandemic worsening the food crisis, India could ramp up its collaboration in this sector.
    • India could also create a new fund for Africa and adapt its grant-in-aid assistance to reflect the current priorities.
    • This could include support for new investment projects by Indian entrepreneurs especially in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors in Africa.

    Time for Quad Plus to propose cooperation with African countries

    • Both India and Japan share a common interest in forging a partnership for Africa’s development.
    • It is time for the Quad Plus, in which the US, India, Japan and Australia have recently engaged other countries such as the ROK, Vietnam, New Zealand, Israel and Brazil, to exchange views and propose cooperation with select African countries abutting the Indian Ocean.
    • After all, the Indo-Pacific straddles the entire maritime space of the Indian Ocean.

    Consider the 2015 question asked by the UPSC “Increasing interest of India in Africa has its pros and cons. Critically examine”

    Conclusion

    The pandemic is a colossal challenge but it may create fresh opportunities to bring India and Africa closer together.

  • India-China confrontation: Not a standalone event

    The recent India-China standoff in Ladakh points to a larger picture of the Chinese agenda of regional dominance. The US-China tension has proved to be the backdrop against which the Ladakh standoff is playing out. This article suggests that this standoff is not a standalone event. It could well be a trigger for domino effect.

    What the intensification of tension between India-China suggests?

    1) China is feeling threatened

    • An authoritarian regime whose legitimacy rests primarily on its economic performance is faced with a situation where growth is expected to plummet.
    • It is a sign that Beijing is increasingly feeling beleaguered.
    • In response, it has embarked on a strategy of brinkmanship with several goals in mind.
    • External adventurism, when cloaked in the garb of ultra-nationalism, can shore up a regime’s legitimacy at home.

    2) It could be a move to divert the attention of the world

    • Simultaneously, it can act as a diversionary measure to escape international criticism for Beijing’s attempt to cover up the spread of the coronavirus.
    • Many countries hold China responsible for the huge cost in human lives and suffering as well as the unprecedented economic distress.
    • In the face of such criticism, the Chinese regime is increasingly using jingoistic jargon to build up domestic support.
    • President Xi Jinping’s recent speech to the PLA is an outstanding example of this strategy.
    • He exhorted the Chinese armed forces to “prepare for war” in order to “resolutely safeguard national sovereignty” and “the overall strategic stability of the country”.
    • This is a sign that the Communist Party of China (CPC) feels increasingly threatened both domestically and externally.

    Let’s look at the deterioration of the US-China relations

    • China’s relations with the U.S. have been going downhill almost since the beginning of the Donald Trump presidency.
    • Washington has periodically imposed economic sanctions on China and Beijing has retaliated in kind.
    • Trade talks have faltered because of growing protectionist sentiments in the U.S. and Chinese inability to adequately respond to them.
    • The chipping away at Hong Kong’s autonomous status by Beijing and the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has led to severe criticism by the U.S. administration and in the Congress.
    • Differences over the issue of Taiwan have added to tensions, with China viewing the U.S. as the primary impediment preventing Taiwan’s integration.
    • The Trump administration has significantly increased support to Taiwan with arms sales that have added to China’s concern.

    U.S.-China rivalry in South-China Sea

    • Above all, the U.S.-China rivalry in the South China Sea acts as the potential flashpoint that may well lead to a shooting war.
    • So far, it has been careful that these moves do not trigger a serious confrontation with the U.S.
    • Washington has a strong interest in preventing China from asserting control over the South China Sea as maintaining free access to this waterway is important to it for economic reasons.
    • It also has defence treaty obligations to the Philippines, which has vigorously contested Chinese territorial claims.
    • Further, China’s control of the South China Sea would be a major step toward replacing the U.S. as the foremost power in the Indo-Pacific region.

    India-China relation questions have been the leitmotif in the UPSC papers. Just the theme of the question changes. Consider 2017 question “China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as a tool to develop potential military power status in Asia. In light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbour.”

    Conclusion

    Increased Chinese adventurism could result in an escalation of U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea. If that happens, the India-China face-off in Ladakh could become part of a much larger “great game”, with the U.S. trying to preserve the status quo and China attempting to change it to further its objective of regional dominance at the U.S.’s expense. The current India-China crisis should, therefore, be seen in its proper context and not as an isolated event.

  • India-Pak cooperation against Locusts Attack

    As another locust swarm comes from Pakistan, the spotlight is again on the India-Pakistan dynamic that has come into play.

    Do you know?

    The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) believes locusts have decimated close to 70,000 hectares of crops in Kenya, 30,000 hectares in Ethiopia and 42,000 hectares of crops in the state of Rajasthan.
    Just so you can perhaps assess the kind of damage we are talking about here. A large swarm can eat as much as about 35,000 people in one day 😀 !

    What are Locusts?

    • The desert locust (Schistocerca gregaria) is a short-horned grasshopper that is innocuous while it is in a “solitary phase” and moving about independently.
    • These winged insects differ from normal hoppers and become dangerous only when their populations build up rapidly and the close physical contact in crowded conditions triggers behavioural changes.
    • They, then, enter the “gregarious phase”, by grouping into bands and forming swarms that can travel great distances (up to 150 km daily), while eating up every bit of vegetation on the way.
    • If not controlled at the right time, these insect swarms can threaten the food security of countries.

    India reaches out to Pak

    • The Ministry of External Affairs said that it has reached out to Pakistan for cooperation, and is awaiting their response.
    • Despite the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, cooperation on the locust warning system has survived the wars, terrorist attacks, and political turmoil.

    History of outbreaks in India

    • Records suggest that since the beginning of the 19th century, there have been at least eight “outbreaks” in India from 1812 to 1889, and a ninth in 1896-1897.
    • According to the history of the Locust Warning Office published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), there were “serious invasions” of locusts in India every few years during the 1900s.
    • A “five-year invasion” from 1926 to 1931 is estimated to have damaged crops worth Rs 2 crore (about $100 million at today’s prices).
    • The princely states and provinces had their own structures to deal with this, but there was no coordination.

    The Locust Warning Organization (LWO)

    • After the 1926-32 “invasion”, the British Indian government-sponsored a research scheme, starting in 1931, which led to the permanent Locust Warning Organization (LWO) in 1939.
    • It had its headquarters in New Delhi and a substation in Karachi.
    • In 1941, a conference of princely states in desert areas and provinces affected by locusts was held.
    • Its role was expanded in 1942, and in 1946 a bureaucratic structure was put in place.

    Beginning of cooperation

    • Iran too suffered locust attacks, in 1876, and in 1926-1932.
    • Apparently the first case of collaboration between countries in the region occurred in 1942 when a delegation from India helped with locust control work in southwest Persia.
    • Over the next two years, Indian help was also provided to Oman and Persia.
    • This was followed by the first conference within the region on Desert Locust, which was held in Tehran in 1945 and involved Iran, India, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
    • A second conference took place in 1950 also in Tehran with Pakistan participating.

    Bringing in Pakistan

    • In the 1950s, India and Iran cooperated and Pakistan provided two aircraft for locust surveys in Saudi Arabia.
    • Following another attack during 1958-61, a decision was taken to group Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India together and the FAO Desert Locust commission was formed in 1964.
    • The commission held annual sessions skipped in 1965 and 1999 but held in 1971.
    • Even in the last six years when the relationship between India and Pakistan has deteriorated, it has been held in 2014, 2016 and 2018.
    • The meetings are attended by locust control experts, with no diplomats.

    India and Pakistan

    • In 1977, the two countries began to meet on the border.
    • From 1991 to 2003, special border surveys took place during the summer, undertaken by locust control officers in their respective countries.
    • Joint border meetings have taken place every year since 2005 till 2019, except in 2011. This has been despite every diplomatic strain; including the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
    • Arrangements are made in advance and protocols are followed for crossing the border.
    • While politics and diplomacy is kept out of the technical discussions, locust control authorities feel that one of the more difficult challenges faced by the commission is that of “insecurity and sensitivities” in the region.

    Also read:

    Risk of Early Locusts Attacks: A new concern

    Try this:

    Q. Time and again normal ocean cycles got more pronounced or disrupted, resulting in all kinds of unintended consequences, like an ever-increasing domino effect of locust attacks in Asia and the Indian Sub Continent. We need to understand these links if we are to plan effectively for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Discuss. (250W)

  • [pib] Instant PAN through Aadhaar based e-KYC

    The Union Finance Ministry has launched the facility for instant allotment of (Permanent Account Number) PAN.

    Try this question from CSP 2018:

    Q.) Consider the following gatemen.

    1. Aadhaar card can be used as a proof of citizenship or domicile.

    2. Once issued, the Aadhaar number cannot be deactivated or omitted by the Issuing Authority.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

    Can’t you expect a similar question based on PAN card? If not , go through this newscard.

    What is a Permanent Account Number?

    • A PAN is a ten-character alphanumeric identifier, issued in the form of a laminated “PAN card”, by the Income Tax Department.
    • It is issued to any “person” who applies for it or to whom the department allots the number without an application.
    • A PAN is a unique identifier issued to all judicial entities identifiable under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961.
    • The income tax PAN and its linked card are issued under Section 139A of the Income Tax Act.
    • It is issued by the Indian Department under the supervision of the Central Board for Direct Taxes (CBDT) and it also serves as an important proof of identification.
    • It is also issued to foreign nationals (such as investors) subject to a valid visa, and hence a PAN card is not acceptable as proof of Indian citizenship.

    Uses of PAN

    • The primary purpose of the PAN is to bring a universal identification to all financial transactions and to prevent tax evasion by keeping track of monetary transactions.
    • The PAN is mandatory when filing income tax returns, tax deduction at source, or any other communication with the IT Department.
    • PAN is also steadily becoming a mandatory document for opening a new bank account, a new landline telephone connection / a mobile phone connection, purchase of foreign currency, bank deposits above ₹50,000, purchase and sale of immovable properties, vehicles etc.

    Why it is in the news?

    • A PAN is necessary for filing income tax returns.
    • This facility is now available for those PAN applicants who possess a valid Aadhaar number and have a mobile number registered with Aadhaar.
    • The allotment process is paperless and an electronic PAN (e-PAN) is issued to the applicants free of cost.

  • What is the Korean Armistice Agreement?

    A United Nations investigation into a recent exchange of gunfire between North Korea and South Korea inside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has determined that both countries violated the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. What is the Korean Armstice Agreement? Discuss the concept of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)?

    The Korean Armstice Agreement

    • The Korean Armstice Agreement signed on 27 July 1953 is the armistice that brought about a complete cessation of hostilities of the Korean War.
    • It was not the end of a war, but only a cessation of hostilities in an attempt to negotiate a lasting peace.
    • Military commanders from China and North Korea signed the agreement on one side, with the US-led United Nations Command signing on behalf of the international community.

    What is the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)?

    • The DMZ marks where the 1950-53 Korean War — when China and North Korea battled UN forces led by the United States — ended with an armistice, not a treaty.
    • It is a 2 km-wide buffer, stretching coast to coast across the peninsula, lined by both sides with razor wire, heavy armaments and tank traps.
    • It is 60 km from Seoul and 210 km from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. Inside the DMZ is a Joint Security Area (JSA).
    • The so-called ‘peace village’ of Panmunjom, where the armistice that halted the Korean War was signed in 1953, is located in the 800-metre-wide and 400-metre-long JSA zone.
    • A Military Demarcation Line (MDL) marks the boundary between the two Koreas.

    Why it is significant?

    • Vast stretches of the DMZ have been no man’s land for more than 60 years, where wildlife has flourished undisturbed.
    • Last year, US President Donald Trump met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, in Panmunjom.

  • What is the doctrine of Force Majeure?

    The recent spread of the Coronavirus has triggered a global slowdown and has rendered ongoing business operations of several organisations to almost a standstill. This has resorted them to invoking the ‘force majeure’ clause to seek some relief.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q) What is the doctrine of Force Majeure and Frustration of a Contract? Discuss how it can worsen the NPA crisis in India.

    What is Force Majeure?

    • Force majeure is purely a contractual remedy available to an affected party under a contract and for seeking relief, the reference would be to the express terms of the contract.
    • It is a contractual provision allocating the risk of loss if performance becomes impossible or impracticable, especially as a result of an event that the parties could not have anticipated or controlled.
    • While force majeure has neither been defined nor specifically dealt with, in Indian statutes, some reference can be found in Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (the “Contract Act”).
    • It envisages that if a contract is contingent on the happening of an event which event becomes impossible, then the contract becomes void.

    Where are such clauses found?

    • Force majeure clauses can usually be found in various contracts such as power purchase agreements, supply contracts, manufacturing contracts, distribution agreements, project finance agreements, agreements between real estate developers and home buyers, etc.

    Circumstances qualified for force majeure

    • A force majeure clause typically spells out specific circumstances or events, which would qualify as force majeure events, conditions which would have be fulfilled for such clause to apply.
    • As such, for a force majeure clause to become applicable the occurrence of such events should be beyond the control of the parties.
    • The parties will be required to demonstrate that they have made attempts to mitigate the impact of such force majeure event.
    • If an event or circumstance qualifies, the consequence would be that parties would be relieved from performing their respective obligations to be undertaken by them under the contract.

    Why it is in news, now?

    • Due to the lockdown restrictions placed by the government, the parties’ ability to perform and fulfil their contractual obligations is affected.
    • Where the contract does not specifically cover the current situation is a matter of debate.
    • The Indian Contract Act, 1872 is more than a century old and does not have any specific provisions relating to suspension of contracts or termination of contracts in cases of a pandemic.
    • The Act clearly provides that an agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void (Section 56).
    • After a contract is made, if any act becomes impossible or unlawful by reason of some event, such a contract becomes void.

    What is the difference between force majeure and frustration of a contract?

    • Under the doctrine of frustration, the impossibility of a party to perform its obligations under a contract is linked to the occurrence of an event/circumstance subsequent to the execution of a contract and which was not contemplated at the time of execution of the contract.
    • However, under in case of a force majeure, parties typically identify, prior to the execution of a contract, an exhaustive list of events, which would attract the applicability of the force majeure clause.
    • The doctrine of Frustration renders the contract void and consequently, all contractual obligations of the parties cease to exist.

    What did the Supreme Court say?

    • Recently, the Supreme Court observed that the doctrine of frustration as enumerated in the Act would apply only where the parties have not specified the consequences of an event which renders the performance of the contract impossible.
    • Termination of a frustrated contract would be possible only in cases where the contract becomes impossible to perform which means the damage to the contract should be of permanent nature and not something which can be performed with the passage of time.
    • Hence a temporary inability or force majeure event would not qualify under the doctrine.

    What lies ahead?

    • The force majeure clause in contracts should not be misconstrued as an event of frustration covered under the Act.
    • Force majeure is purely a contractual remedy available to an affected party under a contract and for seeking relief; the reference would be to the express terms of the contract.
    • However, a party claiming frustration of contract and seeking to escape liability or other obligation under a contract will necessarily have to approach an appropriate judicial forum.
    • It is likely that ‘force majeure’ clauses in contracts need to be more heavily negotiated to include references to epidemics or pandemics, in addition to other situations.

  • Online education must supplement, not replace, physical sites of learning

    Left with no choice, many education institutions turned to online mode. But could that be a new normal? This article analyses the indispensable role of online education. However, online education cannot be a substitute for traditional education institutes. WHY? Read the article to know about the vital role of traditional educational institutions…

    Online education (OE): Supplement not the substitute

    • The incredible synergy unleashed by information and communications technology (ICT) is the best thing to have happened to education since the printing press.
    • Indeed, higher education today is unthinkable without some form of the computer and some mode of digitised data transmission.
    • OE can use content and methods that are hard to include in the normal curriculum.
    • OE can put pressure on lazy or incompetent teachers.
    • OE can provide hands-on experience in many technical fields where simulations are possible.
    • And OE can, of course, be a powerful accessory for affluent students able to afford expensive aids.
    • As products of this revolution, online methods of teaching and learning deserve our highest praise — but only when cast in their proper role.
    • This proper role is to supplement, support and amplify the techniques of face-to-face education.
    • The moment they are proposed as a substitute for the physical sites of learning we have long known — brick-and-cement schools, colleges, and universities — online modes must be resolutely resisted.

    So, what are the vested interests involved?

    • Resistance to OE is often dismissed as the self-serving response of vested interests, notably obstructive, technophobic teachers unwilling to upgrade their skills.
    • But these are not the only vested interests involved.
    • Authoritarian administrators are attracted by the centralised control and scaling-at-will that OE offers.
    • Educational entrepreneurs have been trying to harvest the billions promised by massive open online courses (MOOCs) — think of Udacity, Coursera, or EdX.
    • Pundits are now predicting post-pandemic tie-ups between ICT giants like Google and Amazon and premium education brands like Harvard and Oxford that will launch a new era of vertically-integrated hybrid OE platforms.

    Is OE a viable alternative to traditional educational institutions (TEI) for the typical Indian student?

    • No one with access to an elite TEI chooses OE.
    • Instead, we know that OE always loses in best-to-best comparisons.
    • Favourable impressions about OE are created mostly by comparing the best of OE with average or worse TEIs.

    But is it true that the best OE is better than the average college or university?

    • OE claims that neither the campus nor face-to-face interaction are integral to education.
    • Since the comparative evaluation of virtual versus face-to-face pedagogic interaction needs more space, the campus question is considered here.
    • How does the typical student’s home compare with a typical TEI campus?
    • Census 2011 tells us that 71 per cent of households with three or more members have dwellings with two rooms or less.
    • According to National Sample Survey data for 2017-18, only 42 per cent of urban and 15 per cent of rural households had internet access.
    • Only 34 per cent of urban and 11 per cent of rural persons had used the internet in the past 30 days.
    • It is true that many TEIs (both public and private) have substandard infrastructure.
    • But these data suggest that the majority (roughly two-thirds) of students are likely to be worse off at home compared to any campus.
    • The impact of smartphone capabilities and stability of net connectivity on OE pedagogy also needs to be examined.

    Importance of college as a social space

    • It is as a social rather than physical space that the college or university campus plays a critical role.
    • Public educational institutions play a vital role as exemplary sites of social inclusion and relative equality.
    • In Indian conditions, this role is arguably even more important than the scholastic role.
    • The public educational institution is still the only space where people of all genders, classes, castes, and communities can meet without one group being forced to bow to others.
    • Whatever its impact on academics, this is critical learning for life.
    • Women students, in particular, will be much worse off if confined to their homes by OE.

    Consider the question- “Covid-19 pandemic forced many educational institute to explore the online more of education. And this also brought to the fore the potential of the online mode of education. In light of this, examine the issues with substituting the online mode of education for the traditional educational mode.”

    Conclusion

    Though an indispensable supplement for traditional education, there are certain aspects of education and a social life that online learning cannot substitute. So, the government should not divert its attention from the traditional educational institution and look at online education as its substitute.

  • Aarogya Setu app is now open source

    Amid concerns over privacy of data being collected by its COVID-19 contact tracing app, the union government has open-sourced the Aarogya Setu app.

    Right to Privacy is an important topic for GS. The Aarogya Setu app which has a lot more to offer is under the radar due to the underlying vacuum of Privacy Law in India. To tackle this, the government has launched a bug bounty programme (a sort of hackathon).

    About  AarogyaSetu App

    • The App enables people to assess themselves the risk of their catching the Corona Virus infection.
    • It is designed to keep track of other AarogyaSetu users that a person came in contact with and alert him or her if any of the contacts tests positive for COVID-19.
    • It achieves this using the phone’s Bluetooth and GPS capabilities.
    • Once installed in a smartphone through an easy and user-friendly process, the app detects other devices with AarogyaSetu installed that come in the proximity of that phone.
    • The app can then calculate the risk of infection based on sophisticated parameters if any of these contacts have tested positive.
    • The personal data collected by the App is encrypted using state-of-the-art technology and stays secure on the phone until it is needed for facilitating medical intervention.

    Issues with the app

    • The AarogyaSetu app faces the same issue as every other contact tracing technology that has come up during the pandemic period — it is people dependent.
    • It needs widespread usage and self-reporting to be effective.
    • Given that any number of total users will be a subset of smartphone owners in India, and there are bound to be variations in the levels of self-reporting, the efficacy is not bulletproof.
    • The terms of use of the app also say as much, distancing the government from any failure on the part of the app incorrectly identifying COVID-19 patients.

    1) Privacy concerns

    • First of all, the app exists in the privacy law vacuum that is India.
    • With no legislation that spells out in detail how the online privacy of Indians is to be protected, AarogyaSetu users have little choice but to accept the privacy policy provided by the government.
    • The policy goes into some detail on where and how long the data will be retained, but it leaves the language around who will have access to it vague.
    • As per the policy persons carrying out medical and administrative interventions necessary in relation to COVID-19” will have access to the data.
    • This suggests interdepartmental exchanges of people’s personal information and is more excessive than countries like Singapore and even Israel.

    2) Technical issue

    • Beyond the legal loopholes, there are technical loopholes as well.
    • The unique digital identity in AarogyaSetu is a static number, which increases the probability of identity breaches.
    • The abundance of data collected is also potentially problematic.
    • AarogyaSetu uses both Bluetooth as well as GPS reference points, which could be seen as overkill whereas other apps such as TraceTogether make do with Bluetooth.

    3) Other issues

    • Experts emphasise that automated contact tracing is not a panacea.
    • They caution against an over-reliance on technology where a competent human-in-the-loop system with sufficient capacity exists.

    Back2Basics: What is Open Source?

    • The term open source refers to something people can modify and share because its design is publicly accessible.
    • The term originated in the context of software development to designate a specific approach to creating computer programs.
    • Today, however, “open source” designates a broader set of values—what we call “the open source way.”
    • Open source projects, products, or initiatives embrace and celebrate principles of open exchange, collaborative participation, rapid prototyping, transparency, meritocracy, and community-oriented development.

    The source code

    • “Source code” is the part of the software that most computer users don’t ever see; it’s the code computer programmers can manipulate to change how a piece of software—a “program” or “application”—works.
    • Programmers who have access to a computer program’s source code can improve that program by adding features to it or fixing parts that don’t always work correctly.

    What is Open Source Software?

    • At the simplest level, open-source programming is merely writing code that other people can freely use and modify.
    • Open source is a term that originally referred to open source software (OSS).
    • OSS is a code that is designed to be publicly accessible—anyone can see, modify, and distribute the code as they see fit.
    • An open-source development model is a process used by an open-source community project to develop open-source software.
    • The software is then released under an open-source license, so anyone can view or modify the source code.

  • Analysing three-pronged strategy of China in Ladakh

    The article gives an in-depth analysis of the current border dispute between India and China in Ladakh. But the present dispute follows the pattern. China has been encroaching and gaining control over the disputed territory since the 1980s. And this dispute also fits into that pattern.

    China acting strategically in Ladakh

    • While India has pursued its core national interests in J&K, China’s response was strategic — a shift that may have a lasting imprint on geopolitics.
    • We have been harping on the “differing perception” theory of the LAC for decades.
    • But in reality China has been gaining control over a massive “disputed territory” in Eastern Ladakh since the 1980s.

    Major Chinese encroachment events

    • The Chinese first made encroachments into the 45-km long Skakjung pastureland in Demchok-Kuyul sector.
    • This resulted in local Changpas of Chushul, Tsaga, Nidar, Nyoma, Mud, Dungti, Kuyul, Loma villages gradually losing their winter grazing.
    • Ladakh’s earlier border lay at Kegu Naro — a day-long march from Dumchele.
    • Starting from the loss of Nagtsang in 1984, followed by Nakung (1991) and Lungma-Serding (1992), the last bit of Skakjung was lost in 2008.
    • The PLA followed the nomadic Rebo routes for patrolling in contrast to Indian authorities restricting Rebo movements that led to the massive shrinking of pastureland and border defence.
    • By the 2000s, the PLA’s focus shifted to desolate, inhospitable Chip Chap which remains inaccessible until end-March.
    • After mid-May, water streams impede vehicles moving across Shyok, Galwan, and Chang-Chenmo rivers leaving only a month and a half for effective patrolling by the Indian side.
    • No human beings inhabit here, a 1962 war site, an entry point into Ladakh for the Uyghurs and Tibetans.
    • Local Ladakhi personnel manned the posts here, but patrolling in the 972 sq km Trig Height area has been lax.
    • Easier accessibility allowed the PLA to intrude into Chip Chap with impunity during July-August — its regulars usually spent a few hours before crossing back.
    • But, during the 21-day Depsang stand-off in 2013, when Burtse became a flashpoint, the PLA set up remote camps 18-19 km inside Indian territory.
    • Chinese soldiers virtually prevented Indian troops from getting access to Rakinala near Daulat Beg-Olde (DBO) where the IAF reactivated the world’s highest landing strips in 2008.
    2008 Daulat Beg Oldi Stand-off
    • This plus the reopening of Fukche and Nyoma airbases perhaps provoked the PLA’s intrusion in Depsang.

    So, what is the current stand-off about?

    • Despite topographical challenges, the BRO has lately fast-tracked the 260 km long Shayok-DBO road construction.
    • That road construction probably triggered the PLA intrusion in early May sparking the current Galwan stand-off.
    • Towards the south at Pangong Tso, forces had physical scuffles over area-denial for patrolling at Sirijap on May 5-6 and on May 11.
    • The situation remains tense at Sirijap’s cliff spurs and also at the Tso, where troops are chasing each other in high-speed patrol boats.
    • Clearly, intrusions are part of China’s never-ending effort to push Indian troops westward of the Indus and Shyok rivers and reach the 1960 claimed line.

    Details of the disputed border in Ladakh

    • Out of the 857 sq km long border in Ladakh only 368 sq km is the International Border, and the rest of the 489 sq km is the LAC.
    • The two traditional disputed points included Trig Heights and Demchok.
    • At eight points, the two sides have differing perceptions.
    • But lately, China has raised two fresh dispute points at Pangong Tso 83 sq km and at Chumur where it claims 80 sq km.
    • The old dispute sites were at the end point of Pangong Tso and at Chushul — the 1962 battle-site.

    Three-pronged strategy

    • 1) The Sirijap range on the northern bank of the lake remains most contested, from which several cliff spurs jut out — the “finger series” 1 to 8.
    • India’s LAC claim line is at Finger-8, but the actual position is only up to Finger-4.
    • The Chinese are asserting further west to claim 83 sq km here.
    • The PLA has built a 4.5 km long road to prevent patrolling by Indian troops.
    • The PLA’s road network from here extends to Huangyangtan base located near National Highway G219.
    • 2) Further south in Demchok, China claims some 150 sq km.
    • The PLA has built massive infrastructure on its side, moved armoured troops into Charding Nalla since 2009.
    • Tibetan nomads pitch tents on Hemis Monastery’s land throughout 2018-2019.
    • 3)In Chumur, China claims 80 sq km and probably wants a straight border from PT-4925 to PT-5318 to bring Tible Mane (stupa) area under its control.
    • For India, holding of Chumur is critical for the safety of the Manali-Leh route.
    • PLA demanded removal of India’s fortified positions in Burtse (2013) and Demchok and Chumur (2014) for its retreat.

    What could be the implications for India?

    • Overall, the pattern shows the PLA’s desperate design to snatch the lake at Lukung through a three-pronged strategy of attacking from Sirijap in the north, Chuchul in the south and through the lake water from middle.
    • This is the key chokepoint from where the Chinese can cut off Indian access to the entire flank of Chip Chap plains, Aksai Chin in the east and Shayok Valley to the north.
    •  Which means that Indian control is pushed to the west of the Shyok river and south of the Indus river, forcing India to accept both rivers as natural boundaries.
    • And once China gets control of the southern side of the Karakoram it can easily approach Siachen Glacier from the Depsang corridor.
    • And meet at Tashkurgan junction from where the CPEC crosses into Gilgit-Baltistan.
    • That would be disastrous for Indian defence, leaving the strategic Nubra vulnerable, possibly impacting even India’s hold over Siachen.
    • China’s access to Changla-pass through Lukung and Tangtse would threaten the entire Indus Valley.
    • It is quite possible that China is eyeing the waters of the Shyok, Galwan and Chang-Chenmo rivers, to divert them to the arid Aksai Chin and its Ali region.

    Consider the question “What could be the strategic and security implications of China’s claim in Pangong Tso region for India?”

    Conclusion

    India should resist the Chinese design which could have disastrous consequences for India’s defence and strategic interests. This should involve diplomatic channels rather than skirmishes on the borders.

  • Looking beyond Taliban: Focus on the Pashtun Question

    The US-Taliban peace deal signals growing heft of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute nearly 42 per cent population of Afghanistan and the Taliban is essentially a Pashtun formation. Also,  remember Pakistan: just like the kid who is always up to something. The ethnic fragmentation and Pakistan’s meddling is a recipe for perpetual conflict zone in the region.

    The question of India’s engagement with Taliban

    • Taliban’s effective control of territory in Afghanistan expanded in recent years.
    • This led to the question of India’s direct dialogue with the Taliban gain some relevance.
    • It has acquired some immediacy after the US announced plans for a significant draw down of its forces from Afghanistan and signed a peace deal with the Taliban earlier this year.
    • Also, recently the US Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, called on India to open a political conversation with the Taliban.
    • The interest was further amplified by a signal from the Taliban that it is eager for a productive relationship with India.

    So, what should India do?

    • Those calling for direct engagement with the Taliban say that Delhi can’t ignore such an important force in Afghan politics.
    • Opponents say there is no reason for Delhi to join the international stampede to embrace the Taliban.
    • If and when the Taliban becomes a peaceful entity and joins the quest for a political settlement with Kabul, they argue, Delhi should have no objection to direct talks.
    • So, opening a dialogue with the Taliban is a tactical issue focused on when, how and on what terms.

    Pashtun question and India’s enduring interest in Afghanistan

    • The Taliban remains an important sub-set of the larger and more strategic Pashtun question.
    • The Pashtun question holds the key to India’s enduring interest in Afghanistan: Promoting a peaceful, independent and a sovereign Afghanistan that is not a subaltern to the Pakistan army.

    2 Basic issues that will define the Pashtun question

    1. Forming unity among multiple ethnic groups

    • First is the problem of reconciling the interests of multiple ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
    • The Pashtuns constitute nearly 42 per cent of the population.
    • The sizeable Afghan minorities include 27 per cent Tajiks, 9 per cent each of Hazaras and Uzbeks.
    • Irrespective of the nature of the regimes in Kabul over the last four decades— constructing a stable internal balance has been hard.
    • That problem will acquire a new intensity as the Taliban stakes claim for a dominant role in Kabul.

    But has the Taliban learnt to live in peace with the minorities?

    • The Taliban, an essentially Pashtun formation, had brutally crushed the minorities during its brief rule in the late 1990s.
    • There are some indications that the Taliban is now reaching out to the minorities but it is some distance away from winning their trust.

    2. Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan

    • The problem of constructing internal balance in Afghanistan has been complicated by Pakistan’s meddling.
    • Pakistan would like to have the kind of hegemony that the British Raj exercised over Afghanistan.
    • Neither can Pakistan replicate that dominance nor are the Afghans willing concede it to the Pakistan army.

    What about the Pashtun minority in Pakistan?

    • There are more than twice as many Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.
    • The Pashtun population is estimated to be around 15 million in Afghanistan and 35 million in Pakistan.
    • And as mentioned above, the Taliban is essentially Pashtun formation.
    • Although Pashtun separatism has long ceased to be a force in Pakistan, Islamabad finds the Pashtun question re-emerge in a different form.
    • Pakistan can’t really bet that the Taliban will not put Pashtun nationalism above the interests of the Pakistani state.
    • The Taliban, for example, has never endorsed the Durand Line as the legitimate border with Pakistan.
    • It is by no means clear if Pakistan’s construction of the Taliban as a conservative religious force has obliterated the group’s ethnic character.
    • Sufferings of Pakistani Pashtun People: Islamabad’s quest for control over Afghanistan over the last four decades has heaped extraordinary suffering on the Pashtun people on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line.
    • As the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement seeks a peaceful redressal of its demands for basic human rights, Pakistan has unleashed massive repression.

    India’s importance in Afghanistan

    • That the Taliban wants to talk to India and Pakistan brands Pashtun leaders as Indian agents only underlines Delhi’s enduring salience in Afghanistan.

    Consider the question “After the US-Taliban peace deal, India is forced with a difficult prospect of opening the dialogue with the Taliban. Examine the implications of the return of Taliban in Afghanistan for India. What is your opinion on India starting the dialogue with Afghanistan?”

    Conclusion

    Pakistan’s expansive military and political investments in Afghanistan have not really resolved Islamabad’s security challenges on its western frontier. If an Afghan triumph eludes Pakistan, Delhi can’t escape the complex geopolitics of the Pashtun lands.