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GS Paper: GS2

  • What is Inner Line Permit (ILP) and what is its CAA context?

    The Supreme Court has declined to stay the operation of a Presidential order which petitioners claimed deprived Assam of the powers to implement the Inner Line system in its districts and limit the applicability of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act.

    Try this:

    Q. The NRC fails to resolve the illegal immigration issue in Assam. Critically Analyse.

    In light of the ongoing pandemic, the fumes of protests over NRC/CAA have somewhat vanished. However, one must not forget the fundamental linkages between the NPR/NRC/CAA/ILP etc.

    The Inner Line

    • A concept drawn by colonial rulers, the Inner Line separated the tribal-populated hill areas in the Northeast from the plains.
    • To enter and stay for any period in these areas, Indian citizens from other areas need an Inner Line Permit (ILP).
    • Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram are protected by the Inner Line, and lately, Manipur was added.
    • The concept originates from the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation Act (BEFR), 1873.

    Its inception

    • The policy of exclusion first came about as a response to the reckless expansion of British entrepreneurs into new lands which threatened British political relations with the hill tribes.
    • The BEFR prohibits an outsider’s — “British subject or foreign citizen” — entry into the are beyond the Inner Line without a pass and his purchase of land there.
    • On the other hand, the Inner Line also protects the commercial interests of the British from the tribal communities.
    • After Independence, the Indian government replaced “British subjects” with “Citizen of India”.
    • Today, the main aim of the ILP system is to prevent settlement of other Indian nationals in the States where the ILP regime is prevalent, in order to protect the indigenous/tribal population.

    How is it connected to the Citizenship Amendment Act?

    • The CAA, which relaxes eligibility criteria for certain categories of migrants from three countries seeking Indian citizenship, exempts certain categories of areas, including those protected by the Inner Line system.
    • Amid protests against the Act, the Adaptation of Laws (Amendment) Order, 2019, issued by the President, amended the BEFR, 1873, extending it to Manipur and parts of Nagaland that were not earlier protected by ILP.

    What is the petition now?

    • The petition was against the Presidential order. It said the order took away the Assam government’s permissive power to implement the ILP.
    • This could have made the CAA inapplicable in these areas, the petition said.
    • The CAA has given fresh legs to the demand.

  • Multilateralism in the new cold war

    The world is going through turmoil. The new world that will emerge will be different from what we have known. This provides India with some unique opportunities. This article explains the changes that are taking place and gives the outline of the changing order. So, how can India set and shape the global response? And what should be the principles on which the new multilateralism should be based? Read to know…

    Opportunity for India to set the global response

    • As chair of the Executive Board of the World Health Assembly – India can set the global response in terms of multilateralism, not just medical issues.
    • How can India set a global response in terms of multilateralism? Consider the following- a rare alignment of stars for agenda-setting.
    • 1) In September, the United Nations General Assembly will discuss the theme, “The Future We Want”.
    • 2) In 2021, India joins the UN Security Council (non-permanent seat).
    • 3) And chairs the BRICS Summit in 2021.
    • 4) Also hosts the G-20 in 2022.
    • New principles for international system: At the online summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, in May, Prime Minister Modi called for new principles for the international system.
    • His new globalisation model based on humanity, fairness and equality has wide support in a more equal world as, for the first time since 1950, everyone is experiencing the same (virus) threat.

    Changing global context

    • China is losing influence and the dynamics in its relations with the United States.
    • And Asia again is emerging as the centre of global prosperity.
    • The global governance, economy, scientific research and society are all in need of being re-invented.
    • India should use this opportunity to recover our global thought leadership.

    The US-China powerplay and its consequences for multilateralism

    • The clash between China and the U.S. at the just concluded World Health Assembly in May marks the end of the multilateralism of the past 70 years.
    • The donor-recipient relationship between developed and developing countries has ended with China’s pledge of $2-billion.
    • The agenda-setting role of the G7 over UN institutions and global rules has also been effectively challenged by WHO ignoring the reform diktat of the U.S. leading to its withdrawal, and characterisation of the G7 as “outdated”.
    • The U.S. has also implicitly rejected the G20 and UN Security Council, for an expanded G7 “to discuss the future of China”.
    • Important shift in the UN: After World War II, the newly independent states were not consulted when the U.S. imposed global institutions fostering trade, capital and technology dependence.
    • This was done ignoring the socio-economic development of these countries.
    • But social and economic rights have emerged to be as important as political and procedural rights.
    • Against this backdrop, China’s President Xi Jinping deftly endorsed the UN Resolution on equitable access to any new vaccine.

    Emergence of Asia and China: Challenges for the US and the West

    • The U.S. faces an uphill task in seeking to lead a new multidimensional institution in the face of China’s re-emergence.
    • The re-emergence of China is based on technology, innovation and trade balancing U.S. military superiority.
    • At the same time, there is a clear trend of declining global trust in free-market liberalism, central to western civilisation.
    • With the West experiencing a shock comparable to the one experienced by Asia, 200 years ago, the superiority of western civilisation is also under question.
    • The novel coronavirus pandemic has accelerated the shift of global wealth to Asia suggesting an inclusive global order based on principles drawn from ancient Asian civilisations.
    • Colonised Asia played no role in shaping the Industrial Revolution.
    • But, the Digital Revolution will be shaped by different values.
    • It is really this clash that multilateralism has now to resolve.

    World is questioning both U.S. and China’s exceptionalism

    • China has come out with alternative governance mechanisms to the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization with its all-encompassing Belt and Road Initiative.
    • The U.S., European Union and Japan are re-evaluating globalisation as it pertains to China and the U.S. is unabashedly “America First”.
    • The world is questioning both U.S. and China’s exceptionalism.
    • For India, the strategic issue is neither adjustment to China’s power nor deference to U.S. leadership.

    Opportune moment for India to propose new multilateralism

    • The global vacuum, shift in relative power and its own potential, provides India the capacity to articulate a benign multilateralism.
    • It should include in its fold NAM-Plus that resonates with large parts of the world and brings both BRICS and the G7 into the tent.
    • This new multilateralism should rely on outcomes, not rules, ‘security’ downplayed for ‘comparable levels of wellbeing’ and a new P-5 that is not based on the G7.

    India in a important role

    • China, through an opinion piece by its Ambassador in India, has suggested writing “together a new chapter” with “a shared future for mankind”.
    • The U.S. wants a security partnership to contain China.
    • And the Association of Southeast Asian Nations trade bloc — with the U.S. walking out of the negotiations — is keen India joins to balance China.
    • With a new template. India does not have to choose.

    Three principles the new system should be based on-

    1. Peaceful coexistence

      • First, the Asian Century should be defined in terms of peaceful co-existence, freezing post-colonial sovereignty.
      • Non-interference in the internal affairs of others is a key lesson from the decline of the U.S. and the rise of China.
      • National security now relies on technological superiority in artificial intelligence (AI), cyber and space, and not expensive capital equipment, as India’s military has acknowledged.
      • Instead of massive arms imports, we should use the savings to enhance endogenous capacity.
      • And mould the global digital economy between state-centric (China), firm-centric (the U.S.) and public-centric (India) systems.

    2. New principles of trade

    • A global community at comparable levels of well-being requires new principles for trade, for example, rejecting the 25-year-old trade rule creating intellectual property monopolies.
    • Global public goods should include public health, crop research, renewable energy and batteries, even AI as its value comes from shared data.
    • We have the scientific capacity to support these platforms as part of foreign policy.

    3.  Civilisational values

    • Ancient civilisational values provide the conceptual underpinning, restructuring both the economic order and societal behaviour for equitable sustainable development.
    • Which is what a climate change impacted world, especially Africa, is seeking.

    Consider the question-“The global order is going through serious churn, and it provides India with an opportunity to shape the new multilateralism based on humanity, fairness and equality. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    In the new cold war, defined by technology and trade not territory, non-alignment is an uncertain option; India should craft a global triumvirate.

  • Seizing the moment at the WHO

    India has been tasked with helming the  WHO executive board at the turbulent times. The world is facing the health crisis. It is against this backdrop, India has to lead the executive board. This article suggests 5 elements that should form the part of India’s policy approach.

    Challenges for India as it heads WHO executive board

    • Minister of Health and Family Welfare is elected as the Chair of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) executive board.
    • The 34-member body is tasked with implementing the decisions of the recently concluded World Health Assembly (WHA).
    • The elevation affords India an important platform to steer the global public health response to COVID-19.
    • It also comes at a time when the WHO is being rocked politically as never before.

    WHO: caught between the US-China crossfire

    • Recently, U.S. President Donald Trump wrote a letter to the WHO Director-General.
    • In the letter, he threatened to make permanent his temporary funding freeze as well as reconsider the U.S’s membership in the organisation if the latter did not commit to major substantive reforms within 30 days.
    • By contrast, at the WHA plenary, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $2 billion to fight the virus.
    • He also promised to pair up 30 African hospitals with domestic counterparts, accelerate the building of the Africa Centers for Disease Control headquarters, and ensure that vaccine development in China, when available, would be made a global public good.

    So, as WHO executive body chair, India will have to navigate this treacherous power landscape with candour and tact. Following 5 elements should inform its policy approach.

    1. Set epidemic prevention and control as a priority

    • India must insist that epidemic prevention and control remain the international community’s foremost priority.
    • As the virus’ chain of transmission is broken, the focus should shift to identifying the animal-to-human transmission origins of SARS-CoV-2.
    • China shares an important interest in facilitating international access to investigate COVID-19’s zoonotic origins.
    • Why China shares interest? Because Wuhan and other previously infected zones could yet be susceptible to the risk of viral reintroduction.

    2. Review the early response of China and WHO to outbreak

    • India should lean on the WHO secretariat to fast-track the “impartial, independent, and comprehensive review” of the WHO’s – and China’s – early response to the outbreak.
    • The review’s findings should illuminate best practice and highlight areas for improvement, both in the WHO’s leadership and capacity as well as member states’ implementation of the International Health Regulations.
    • For those in New Delhi inclined to relish the prospect of Beijing’s comeuppance, the review’s findings may yet sorely disappoint.
    • The WHO-China Joint Mission featuring renowned global epidemiologists had termed China’s early COVID-19 response as the “most ambitious, agile and aggressive disease containment effort in history”.

    3. Ensure equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for all

    • For ensuring equitable access to COVID-19 therapeutics and vaccines for all countries, India must promote the establishment of an appropriate multilateral governance mechanism.
    • The envisaged voluntary pooling mechanism to collect patent rights and regulatory test data should be suitably tailored to the needs of crisis.
    • And the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rights provisions should be overridden as is allowed during a public health emergency to assure affordable vaccine availability.

    4. Taiwan issue at WHA: India should stay aloof

    •  India must stay aloof from the West’s campaign to re-seat Taiwan as an observer at the WHA.
    • When Taipei last attended in 2016, it did so under the explicit aegis of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, whereby the UN considers Taiwan to be an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.
    • That the independence-minded Tsai government is unwilling to concede this basis for attendance has more to do with domestic political manoeuvring than Chinese or international ostracism.

    5.Global ban on consumption of wild animals

    •  India must lead the call for a permanent global ban on the consumption and trade of wild animals.
    • This ban should be with limited exceptions built-in for scientific research, species protection and traditional livelihood interests.
    • With two-thirds of emerging infections and diseases now arising from wildlife, the destruction of natural habitats and biodiversity loss must be taken much more seriously.

    Consider the question “The WHO has been facing the credibility crisis for its response to the Covid-19. In such a difficult time for the agency, India has to lead the executive board of WHA. In light of this, suggest the policy approach that India should adopt at WHA.”

    Conclusion

    India has its work cut out. The government should seize the moment to steer the global response in addressing the shortcomings in various areas exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

  • Depsang Plain near LAC

    Reports of a heavy Chinese presence at Depsang, an area at a crucial dip (called the Bulge) on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have increased the recent tensions between Indian and Chinese troops.

    For the Depsang Plain, a prelim based question is hardly possible. However one must know all the fronts of border disputes from mains perspective.

    Depsang Plain

    • The “Depsang Plain” is one of the few places in the Western Sector where light armour (vehicles) would have ease of manoeuvre, so any Chinese buildup there is a cause for concern.
    • India controls the western portion of the plains as part of Ladakh, whereas the eastern portion is part of the Aksai Chin region, which is controlled by China and claimed by India.
    • The buildup invokes memories of both the 1962 war, when Chinese troops had occupied all of the Depsang plains.
    • More recently in April 2013, the PLA crossed the LAC and pitched tents on the Indian side for three weeks, before they agreed to pull out.

    Also read:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

  • Fortifying the African outreach: Contrast in the approach adopted by China and India

    As both India and China try and vie for increasing the influence in the African continent, the difference in the approach they adopted become evident. Both countries have been providing assistance in Africa amid the COVID pandemic. This article analyses the difference in the approach of the two countries.

    Impact of covid pandemic in Africa

    • Although African countries moved quickly to curb the initial spread, they are still woefully ill-equipped to cope with a public health emergency.
    • They are facing shortages of masks, ventilators, and even basic necessities such as soap and water.
    • Such conditions have meant that Africa’s cycle of chronic external aid dependence continues.
    • Africa needs medical protective equipment and gear to support its front line public health workers.
    • India and China have increased their outreach to Africa through medical assistance.
    • Their efforts are directed to fill a part of the growing African need at a time when not many others have stepped in to help.

    China’s donation diplomacy in Africa

    • China, being Africa’s largest trading partner, was quick to signal its intent to help Africa cope with the pandemic.
    • It despatched medical protective equipment, testing kits, ventilators, and medical masks to several African countries.
    • The primary motive of such donations has been to raise Beijing’s profile as a leading provider of humanitarian assistance and “public goods” in the global public health sector.
    • China’s billionaire philanthropy was also in full display when tech founder Jack Ma donated three rounds of anti-coronavirus supplies.
    • Chinese embassies across Africa have taken the lead by coordinating both public and private donations to local stakeholders.
    • However, the sub-optimal quality of China’s medical supplies and its deputing of medical experts have been a major cause for concern.

    Let’s understand the objectives of China’s donation diplomacy

    • Beijing’s ‘donation diplomacy’ in Africa aims to achieve three immediate objectives:
    • 1) Shift the focus away from talking about the origins of the virus in Wuhan.
    • 2) Build goodwill overseas.
    • 3) Establish an image makeover.
    • For the most part, it succeeded in achieving these ends until China faced widespread backlash over the ill-treatment of African nationals in Guangzhou city.
    • The issue quickly grew into a full-blown political crisis for Beijing.

    Let’s analyse the depth of China’s political influence in Africa

    • For the most part, China has been successful in controlling the Guangzhou narrative due to the depth of its political influence in Africa.
    • It is no secret that China relies heavily on diplomatic support and cooperation from African countries on key issues in multilateral fora.
    • For example, Beijing used African support for securing a win for Chinese candidates as the head of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and in the World Health Organization (WHO).
    • On Africa’s part, the problem lies in the deep disjuncture and credibility gap between Africa’s governing class, the people, the media and civil society.
    • Even when criticisms have been levelled against Chinese indiscretions, it has hardly ever surfaced at the elite level.
    • Overall, China’s donation diplomacy towards Africa during COVID-19 has received mixed reactions, but Beijing’s advantage lies in its economic heft and political influence in Africa.

    Understanding India’s diplomacy in Africa: Responsible and reliable global stakeholder

    • For India, the pandemic presents an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to shoulder more responsibility.
    • The fact that even with limited resources, India can fight the virus at home while reaching out to developing countries in need is testament to India’s status as a responsible and reliable global stakeholder.
    • Nowhere has India’s developmental outreach been more evident than in Africa with the continent occupying a central place in Indian government’s foreign and economic policy in the last six years.
    • Africa has been the focus of India’s development assistance and also diplomatic outreach, as evident in plans to open 18 new embassies.
    • These efforts have been supplemented by an improved record of Indian project implementation in Africa.

    Trade ties and cooperation amid pandemic

    • India’s role as ‘the pharmacy of the world’, as the supplier of low-cost, generic medicines is widely acknowledged.
    • Pharmaceutical products along with refined petroleum products account for 40% of India’s total exports to African markets.
    • India is sending consignments of essential medicines, including hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) and paracetamol, to 25 African countries in addition to doctors and paramedics at a total cost of around ₹600 million ($7.9 million) on a commercial and grant basis.
    • The initial beneficiaries were the African Indian Ocean island nations of Mauritius, the Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar under India’s ‘Mission Sagar’.
    • While transportation and logistics remain a concern, most of the consignments have already reached various African states.
    • A timely initiative has been the e-ITEC COVID-19 management strategies training webinars exclusively aimed at training health-care professionals from Africa and the SAARC nations and sharing of best practices by Indian health experts.
    • Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius, and Namibia have been beneficiaries.
    • Across Africa, there is a keen interest to understand the developments and best practices in India because the two share similar socioeconomic and developmental challenges.
    • There is also growing interest in research and development in drugs and vaccines.
    • A few African countries such as Mauritius are pushing for health-care partnerships in traditional medicines and Ayurveda for boosting immunity.
    • The Indian community, especially in East African countries, has also been playing a crucial role in helping spread awareness.
    • Prominent Indian businessmen and companies in Nigeria and Kenya have donated money to the respective national emergency response funds.
    • Country-specific chapters of gurdwaras and temples have fed thousands of families by setting up community kitchens, helplines for seniors and distributing disinfectants and sanitisers.

    The contrast between approaches adopted by India and China

    • Both India and China, through their respective health and donation diplomacy, are vying to carve a space and position for themselves as reliable partners of Africa in its time of need.
    • Burnishing their credentials as humanitarian champions is the name of the game.
    • But there are significant differences in the approaches.
    • For China, three aspects are critical:
    • 1) Money, political influence and elite level wealth creation.
    • 2) Strong state-to-state relations as opposed to people-to-people ties.
    • 3) Hard-infrastructure projects and resource extraction.
    • India’s approach, on the other hand, is one that focuses on building local capacities and an equal partnership with Africans and not merely with African elites concerned.

    Consider the question “Both India and China have been playing an active role in the African continent and vying for the outreach there. But there is a fundamental difference in their approach. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As these two powers rise in Africa, their two distinct models will come under even greater scrutiny. And both New Delhi and Beijing might find that they need to adapt to the rising aspirations of the African continent.

  • Time to revisit the special relationship with Nepal

    A new map released by Nepal delivered a blow to the India-Nepal relations. But this is hardly the first time this has happened. The article clears some cobwebs about Nepal’s foreign policy. First, it throws light on the past trend set by Nepal. And drawing on the past experience, it suggests the changes India should adopt in new framework to deal with Nepal.

    Nepal’s new map: Yet another knock on India-Nepal relations

    • As the parliament in Nepal gets ready to approve a new map that will include parts of Indian territory in Uttarakhand, Delhi is bracing for yet another knock to a bilateral relationship.
    • Many in the Indian strategic community believe that the train wreck was avoidable.
    • But others view the collision between Delhi and Kathmandu as both inevitable and imminent.
    • Even if the territorial issue had been finessed, something else would have triggered the breakdown.

    Bigger fissures in relation

    • A closer look suggests that the territorial dispute is merely a symptom of the structural changes.
    • These structural changes are unfolding in the external and internal context of the bilateral relationship.
    • The question, then, is not what Delhi could have done to prevent the current crisis.
    • It should be about looking ahead to build more sustainable ties with Kathmandu.

    2 factors India must consider and depart from

    • Any new framework for engaging Kathmandu must involve two important departures from the past in Delhi.
    • 1) First is coming to terms with Nepal’s natural politics of balance.
    • 2) The other is the recognition that Delhi’s much-vaunted “special relationship” with Kathmandu is part of the problem.

    Let’s look at the history of Nepal’s geopolitics

    • The founder of the modern Nepali state, Prithvi Narayan Shah, described Nepal as a “yam between two rocks”.
    • He was pointing to the essence of Nepal’s geographic condition between the dominant power in the Gangetic plains on the one hand and Tibet and the Qing empire on the other.
    • Contrary to the conventional wisdom in India, China has long been part of Kathmandu’s international relations.
    • As the East India Company gained ground at the turn of the 19th century, Nepal’s rulers made continuous offers to Beijing to act as China’s frontline against Calcutta’s expansion into the Himalayas.
    • Kathmandu also sought to build a coalition of Indian princes to counter the Company.
    • Even after it lost the first Anglo-Nepal war in 1816, Kathmandu kept up a continuous play between Calcutta and Beijing.
    • As the scales tilted in the Company’s favour after the First Opium War (1839-42), Nepal’s rulers warmed up to Calcutta.
    • When the 1857 Mutiny shook the Company, Kathmandu backed it and regained some of the territories it lost when the Raj replaced the Company.
    • As the fortunes of the Raj rose, Kathmandu rulers enjoyed the benefits of being Calcutta’s protectorate.
    • India inherited this framework but has found it impossible to sustain.

    Why the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) lost its appeal?

    • The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship gave the illusion of continuity in Nepal’s protectorate relationship with the Raj and its successor, independent India.
    • That illusion was continuously chipped away amid the rise of mass politics in Nepal, growing Nepali nationalism, and Kathmandu’s acquisition of an international personality.
    • The 1950 Treaty, which proclaims an “everlasting friendship” between the two nations, has become the symbol of Indian hegemony in Nepal.
    • In a paradox, its security value for India has long been hollowed out.
    • It is a political millstone around India’s neck that Delhi is unwilling to shed for the fear of losing the “special relationship”.
    • Delhi has been trapped into a perennial political play among Kathmandu’s different factions and responding to Nepal’s China card.

    Weakening of “special relationship”: Essence of Nepal’s foreign policy

    • Once the Chinese Communist Party consolidated its power in Tibet and offered assurances to Nepal, Kathmandu’s balancing impulses were back in play.
    • At the risk of oversimplification, Nepal’s foreign policy since the 1950s has, in essence, been about weakening the “special relationship” with India and building more cooperation with China.
    • Kathmandu has used different labels to package its desire for greater room for manoeuvre between its two giant neighbours — non-alignment, diversification, “zone of peace”, equidistance, and a Himalayan bridge between India and China.
    • The stronger China has become, the wider have Kathmandu’s options with India become.

    Way forward

    • It makes no sense for Delhi to hanker after a “special relationship” that a large section of Kathmandu does not want.
    • If Delhi wants a normal and good neighbourly relationship with Kathmandu, it should put all major bilateral issues on the table for renegotiation.
    • Such issues should include the 1950 treaty, national treatment to Nepali citizens in India, trade and transit arrangements, the open border and visa-free travel.
    • Delhi should make it a priority to begin talks with Nepal on revising, replacing, or simply discarding the 1950 treaty.
    • It should negotiate a new set of mutually satisfactory arrangements.
    • India had conducted a similar exercise with Bhutan to replace the 1949 treaty during 2006-07.
    • The issues and political context are certainly more complicated in the case of Nepal.
    • It is better that Delhi bites the bullet and makes a fresh beginning with Kathmandu rather than let the relationship deteriorate.
    • No bilateral relationship between nations can be built on sentiment — whether it is based on faith, ideology or inheritance.
    • Only those rooted in shared interests will endure.
    • Rather than object to Kathmandu’s China ties, Delhi must focus on how to advance India’s relations with Nepal.
    • It should bet that the logic of Nepal’s economic geography, its pursuit of enlightened self-interest, and Kathmandu’s natural balancing politics, will continue to provide a strong framework for India’s future engagement with Nepal.

    Conclusion

    Discarding the appearances of the “special relationship” might, in fact, make it easier for Delhi to construct a more durable and interest-based partnership with Kathmandu that is rooted in realism and has strong popular support on both sides.

  • PM Swanidhi Scheme for street vendors

    The Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs has launched a micro-credit facility for street vendors under the Swanidhi Scheme.

    Try this question from CSP 2016:

    Q.Rashtriya Garima Abhiyaan’ is a national campaign to

    (a) rehabilitate the homeless and destitute persons and provide then with suitable sources of livelihood

    (b) release the sex workers from the practice and provide them with alternative sources of livelihood

    (c) eradicate the practice of manual scavenging and rehabilitate the manual scavenger

    (d) release the bonded labourers free their bondage and rehabilitate them

    PM Swanidhi Scheme

    • The Pradhan Mantri Street Vendor’s Atmanirbhar Nidhi Scheme is aimed at benefiting over 50 lakh vendors who had their businesses operational on or before March 24.
    • The scheme was announced by Finance Minister as a part of the economic package for those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown.
    • The loans are meant to help kick-start activity for vendors who have been left without any income since the lockdown was implemented on March 25.
    • The scheme is valid until March 2022.

    Expected beneficiaries

    • This loan will be given to those who run shops on the roadside, handcart or streetcar.
    • Fruit-vegetable, laundry, saloon and paan shops are also included in this category.

    Facilities provided under the scheme

    • The vendors will be able to apply for a working capital loan of up to ₹10,000, which is repayable in monthly instalments within a year.
    • On timely/early repayment of the loan, an interest subsidy of 7% per annum will be credited to the bank accounts of beneficiaries through direct benefit transfer on a six-monthly basis.
    • The loans would be without collateral. There will be no penalty on early repayment of the loan.

  • PM-CARES is not a public authority under RTI Act

    The PMO has refused to disclose details on the creation and operation of the PM-CARES Fund, telling a Right to Information applicant that the fund is “not a public authority” under the ambit of the RTI Act, 2005.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. The PM-CARES fund is an old wine in a new bottle. Discuss its feasibility and how it is different in context to the PMNRF.

    About PM-CARES Fund

    • The fund will be a public charitable trust under the name of ‘Prime Minister’s Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations Fund’.
    • The PM is Chairman of this trust and members include the Defence Minister, Home Minister and Finance Minister.
    • Contributions to the fund will qualify as corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending that companies are mandated to make.
    • The Fund accepts micro-donations as well.

    Not a public authority

    • The PMO cited a Supreme Court observation that indiscriminate and impractical demands under RTI Act for disclosure of all and sundry information would be counterproductive.
    • PM-CARES Fund is not a Public Authority under the ambit of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005.
    • However, relevant information in respect of PM-CARES Fund may be seen on its website.

    Then, what makes an authority, Public?

    The relevant section of the RTI Act defines a “public authority” as “any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted —

    • by or under the Constitution;
    • by any other law made by Parliament;
    • by any other law made by State Legislature;
    • by the notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government — and includes any (i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; (ii) NGO substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate govt.

    Arguments against PM-CARES

    • The fund carries a public name, the composition of the trust, control, usage of an emblem, government domain name etc. that signifies it as a public authority.
    • PM is the ex-officio chairman of the Trust, while three cabinet ministers are ex-officio trustees.
    • The composition of the trust is enough to show that Government exercises substantive control over the trust, making it a public authority.

  • What is Antifa Movement?

    As massive protests following the death of a person in racial discrimination continued to rock the US, President Donald Trump has announced that the alleged far-left group Antifa would be designated as a terrorist organisation by his government.

    One can expect a similar prelims question:

    Q. The Antifa movement recently seen in news is an: Free trade movement/Anti-terror movement etc.

    Why the US seeks to ban Antifa?

    • Trump has blamed for the protests that have convulsed cities across the US,
    • Antifa is considered the loosely affiliated group of far-left anti-fascist activists.

    Antifa: The group

    • Antifa is an acronym for ‘Anti-Fascist’. It is not an organisation with a leader nor does it have a defined structure or membership roles.
    • Antifa has been around for several decades, though accounts vary on its exact beginnings.
    • The term dates the term as far back as Nazi Germany, describing the etymology of ‘Antifa’ as “borrowed from German Antifa, short for antifaschistische ‘anti-fascist’.
    • Rather, Antifa is more of a movement of activists whose followers share a philosophy and tactics.
    • They have made their presence known at protests, including the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017.

    Its members

    • It is impossible to know how many people count themselves as members.
    • Its followers acknowledge that the movement is secretive, has no official leaders and is organised into autonomous local cells.
    • It is also only one in a constellation of activist movements that have come together in the past few years to oppose the far right.
    • Antifa members campaign against actions they view as authoritarian, homophobic, racist or xenophobic.

    Activism over years

    • Antifa members typically dress in black and often wear a mask at their demonstrations, and follow far-left ideologies such as anti-capitalism.
    • The movement has been known to have a presence in the US in the 1980s.
    • It shot into prominence following the election of President Trump in 2016, with violence marking some of its protests and demonstrations.
    • Criticizing mainstream liberal politicians for not doing enough, Antifa members have often physically confronted their conservative opponents on the streets.
    • The group also participates in non-violent protests. Apart from public counter-protests, Antifa members run websites that track white extremist and ultra-right groups.

    Criticisms

    • The movement has been widely criticised among the mainstream left and right.
    • Conservative publications and politicians routinely rail against supporters of Antifa, who they say are seeking to shut down peaceful expression of conservative views.

  • A phantom called the Line of Actual Control with China

    Yet again, India and China are engaged in a standoff on the border. But why the issues persist even after four agreements with a view to solve the boundary problem? This article explains the problem in wording of the agreement. And also explains the lack of intent from China’s part.

    Four agreements: vision of progress or strategic illusion?

    •  At the heart of India’s and China’s continued inability to make meaningful progress on the boundary issue are four agreements.
    • Those agreements were signed in September 1993, November 1996, April 2005 and October 2013 — between the two countries.
    • Ironically, India and China keep referring to these agreements as the bedrock of the vision of progress on the boundary question.
    • Unfortunately, these are deeply flawed agreements.
    • And also make the quest for settlement of the boundary question at best a strategic illusion and at worst a cynical diplomatic parlour trick.

    Let’s look into LAC provision in 1993 and 1996 agreements

    • According to the 1993 agreement, “pending an ultimate solution”, “the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides… No activities of either side shall overstep the LAC”.
    • Further, both the 1993 and the 1996 agreement—on confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC— say they “will reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the LAC.”
    • This was to apply to major categories of armaments and cover various other aspects as well, including air intrusions “within ten kilometres along the LAC”.

    Okay, but where is the LAC?

    • The specification of this phantom LAC as the starting point and the central focus has made several key stipulations and articles of the four agreements effectively inoperable for more than a quarter of a century.
    • In fact, many of the articles have no bearing on the ground reality.
    • Article XII of the 1996 agreement, for instance, says, “This agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.”
    • It is not clear if and when that happened.
    • Nowhere in the 1993 agreement is there the provision to recognise the existing lines of deployment of the respective armies, as they were in 1993.
    • The agreement does not reflect any attempt to have each side recognise the other’s line of deployment of troops at the time it was signed.
    • That would have been the logical starting point.
    • If both armies are to respect the LAC, where is the line?
    • The ambiguity over the LAC has brought a prolonged sense of unease and uncertainty and thus exponentially contributed to the military build-up in those areas.
    • The absence of a definition of this line allows ever new and surreptitious advances on the ground.

    What could have been done?

    • Had the 1993 agreement begun the exercise with the phrase “pending an ultimate solution, each side shall strictly respect and observe the line of existing control/deployment” instead of the “LAC”, it would have been more possible to keep the peace.
    • In such a case there would have been two existing lines of control on the map — one for the physical deployment of the Chinese troops and the other for the physical deployment of the Indian troops.
    • This would have rendered the areas between the two lines no man’s land, and would have ensured that the two armies were frozen in their positions.

    The issue of two LAC in the eastern and western sector

    • The LAC is two hypothetical lines in the following two sectors-
    • 1) In the eastern sector, where the Chinese have not accepted the loosely defined McMahon line which follows the principle of watershed.
    • 2) The western sector, which is witnessing another episodic stand-off.
    • The first is what Indian troops consider the extent to which they can dominate through patrols, which is well beyond the point where they are actually deployed and present.
    • The second is what the Chinese think they effectively control, which is well south of the line they were positioned at in 1993.

    Why map exchange didn’t happen for the western sector?

    • It is in this theatre of the militarily absurd that we should look at the outcome of the attempted exchange of maps in the western sector.
    • It is the sector where this round of confrontation continues between India and China.
    • This came after the exchange of maps in the middle sector.
    • In the middle sector, divergences were the least, i.e., the existing line and the Chinese and Indian idea of the LAC were more or less the same (in 2002).
    • The Foreign Secretary India and the head of the Chinese delegation, met in New Delhi in 2003 for sharing the map of the western sector.
    • It had been agreed that both sides would exchange maps to an agreed scale on each side’s perceptions of the location of the LAC in the western sector.
    • The idea was to superimpose the maps to see where the perceptions converged and, crucially, where they diverged.
    • Due to the contentious nature of the sector, it would provide a starting point, not the end point, to discuss how to reconcile divergences presumed to be significant, given Chinese military behaviour on the ground there.
    • Each side handed over its map to the other.
    • But, head of the Chinese delegation gave it a long, hard look, and wordlessly returned it.
    • They provided no reason for their action.
    • The meeting effectively ended there.

    Consider the question “Examine the reasons for the persistent nature of the India-China border issue.”

    Conclusion

    By disregarding the map, China is not bound in any way by New Delhi’s perception of the LAC, and therefore does not have to limit liberty of action. This was evident then and is especially evident now. Because the nature of the terrain, deployment, and infrastructure and connectivity asymmetries in the border areas continue to be so starkly in China’s favour that it is clear that the Chinese are in no hurry to settle the boundary question. They see that the cost to India in keeping this question open suits them more than settling the issue.