Judicial Reforms

The Hidayatullah exampleop-ed snap

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level : Not much.

Mains level : Paper 2- Requirement of cooling off period for accepting the government office post-retirement by the judges to ensure the independence of judiciary.


Context

It has been recently announced that the President has nominated former Chief Justice of India, Ranjan Gogoi, to the Rajya Sabha. However, the time has come for us to ask a difficult question: Should judges stop accepting post-retirement jobs offered by the government, at least for a few years after retiring, because accepting such posts could undermine the independence of the judiciary?

The issue of post-retirement employment of the judges

  • Retirement age of judges: Unlike federal judges in the US, judges in India do not hold office for life. They remain in office until they reach the retirement age — 65 for Supreme Court judges and 62 for high court judges.
  • Protection against arbitrary removal: These judges do not hold their offices at the “pleasure” of the President. In other words, they cannot be arbitrarily removed by the government once they are appointed, and can only be impeached by a supermajority of both houses of Parliament “on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity”.
  • Difficult impeachment process: The impeachment process is a very difficult one and never in the history of independent India has a judge been impeached, though attempts have sometimes been made to do so. Judges, therefore, enjoy security of tenure while holding office, which is essential for maintaining judicial independence.
  • How retirement of judges could undermine judicial independence? The retirement of judges threatens to undermine judicial independence.
    • This is because some judges — not all — are offered post-retirement employment by the government. It is often feared that a judge who is nearing retirement could decide cases in a manner that pleases the government in order to get a favourable post-retirement position.

Not an unprecedented move

  • Former CJI Gogoi is certainly not the first retired judge to be appointed to political office.
  • In 1952, Justice Fazl Ali was appointed the Governor of Orissa, shortly after retiring from the Supreme Court.
  • In 1958, Chief Justice M C Chagla resigned from the Bombay High Court in order to become India’s Ambassador to the US at Prime Minister Nehru’s invitation.
  • In April 1967, Chief Justice Subba Rao resigned from the Supreme Court to contest elections for President.
  • In 1983, Justice Baharul Islam resigned from the Supreme Court to contest as a Congress (I) candidate for a Lok Sabha seat, after ruling in favour of Bihar’s Congress (I) chief minister, Jagannath Mishra, in a controversial case where Mishra had been accused of criminal wrongdoing and misuse of office.
  • In more recent times, Chief Justice P Sathasivam was appointed the Governor of Kerala. There are many other such examples.

Why restrictions about employment were not included in the Constitution?

  • The Constitution provides that a retired Supreme Court judge cannot “plead or act in any court or before any authority within the territory of India”.
  • Constituent assembly debate: In the Constituent Assembly, K T Shah, an economist and advocate, suggested that high court and Supreme Court judges should not take up an executive office with the government, “so that no temptation should be available to a judge for greater emoluments, or greater prestige which would in any way affect his independence as a judge”.
    • However, this suggestion was rejected by B R Ambedkar because he felt that the “judiciary decides cases in which the government has, if at all, the remotest interest, in fact, no interest at all”.
  • Government is the largest litigant in the courts: In Ambedkar’s time, the judiciary was engaged in deciding private disputes and rarely did cases arise between citizens and the government. “Consequently”, said Ambedkar, “the chances of influencing the conduct of a member of the judiciary by the government are very remote”.
    • This reasoning no longer holds today because the government is one of the largest litigants in the courts.

Question of independence of the judiciary

  • The question of constitutional propriety: In the words of India’s first Attorney General, M C Setalvad, all this raises “a question of constitutional propriety” relating to the independence of the judiciary.
  • After all, could the government not use such tactics to reward judges who decide cases in its favour?
  • Public perception of compromised judiciary: Further, if a judge decides highly controversial and contested cases in favour of the government and then accepts a post-retirement job, even if there is no actual quid pro quo, would this not lead to the public perception that the independence of the judiciary is compromised?

Law Commission recommendations

  • In its 14th report in 1958, the Law Commission noted that retired Supreme Court judges used to engage in two kinds of work after retirement:
    • Firstly, “chamber practice” (a term which would, today, mean giving opinions to clients and serving as arbitrators in private disputes).
    • Secondly, “employment in important positions under the government”.
  • The Law Commission frowned upon chamber practice but did not recommend its abolition.
  • Ban on post-retirement government employment: It strongly recommended banning post-retirement government employment for Supreme Court judges because the government was a large litigant in the courts.
    • The Commission’s recommendations were never implemented.

Conclusion

It is about time that we start expecting the judges of our constitutional courts to follow CJI Hidayatullah’s excellent example in which he had accepted government job only after the cooling period of several years.

 

 

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