💥Mains Ready By December. Smash Mains & Smash PYQ Admissions Open
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Search results for: “”

  • Rs 2.5 cr as carbon credits: In a first, farmers reap harvest of good practices

    Why in the News

    Farmers in India have received carbon credit payments for improved agricultural practices for the first time. About 2,500 farmers, roughly 1,400 of them in Punjab and the rest in Haryana, were paid for practices that cut greenhouse gas emissions and retain carbon in the soil. The payment is attributed to verified credits rather than to the acreage a farmer holds, which is what separates it from an area based subsidy. The programme puts a price on practice change that regulation and penalties have tried to compel for years, and whether that price is large enough to hold the change in place is now the open question.

    How does an agricultural carbon credit work?

    1. The unit: A carbon credit represents one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent either kept out of the atmosphere or stored, and it is sold to a buyer seeking to offset its own emissions.
    2. What generates it on a farm: Credits arise from a documented change in practice that lowers emissions or raises carbon held in the soil, measured against what the farmer would otherwise have done.
    3. Payment basis: The payout follows the number of verified credits attributed to a farmer, not the area cultivated, so two farmers with the same holding can be paid differently.

    Which practices earned the credits?

    1. Direct seeded rice: Sowing paddy directly into the field instead of transplanting seedlings into puddled soil cuts water use and the methane released from flooded fields.
    2. Zero and reduced tillage: Disturbing the soil less keeps carbon stored in it rather than releasing it on ploughing.
    3. Residue management: Handling paddy straw instead of burning it removes a direct emission source and returns organic matter to the soil.
    4. Efficient fertiliser use: Applying nitrogen to soil test recommendations cuts nitrous oxide release from over application.
    5. Why these fit Punjab: All four are directly relevant to the rice and wheat based cropping system that dominates the State.

    How were the claims verified?

    1. Remote sensing: Satellite and remote sensing systems monitor fields and detect residue burning across the season.
    2. Geo-fencing: A digital boundary drawn around a registered field ties the observed activity to the specific farmer claiming the credit.
    3. Soil sampling: Sampling assesses changes in soil properties, including soil organic carbon, which is the stock the credit claims to have raised.
    4. Institutional backing: The programme runs with technical guidance from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), and the ICAR-Agricultural Technology Application Research Institute (ATARI), Ludhiana has a memorandum of understanding with the agri-technology firm operating it.
    5. The stated role of the public institution: Its function is to educate farmers and to ensure practices are documented and verified through field evidence and technology.

    What did farmers actually receive?

    1. The aggregate: Over 50,000 carbon credits were generated across thousands of acres, with payments totalling around Rs 2.50 crore.
    2. The individual range: Farmers received between about Rs 3,000 and Rs 15,000 each.
    3. Payments track practice history, not size: A farmer with about 13 acres in Bathinda who stopped burning paddy residue seven to eight years ago received Rs 5,700, while two others in the same village received Rs 19,000 and Rs 14,000.
    4. Larger holdings, moderate payouts: A farmer cultivating about 20 acres near Jagraon received Rs 6,070 and one farming about 90 acres in Sirsa using ex-situ residue management received Rs 12,000.
    5. The floor: Two farmers, in Ludhiana and in Sirsa, received Rs 3,000 each, and an 8.5 acre farmer in Bathinda using soil testing and recommended fertiliser received Rs 9,075.
    6. Design as a continuing process: The programme is structured as a recurring payment for continued adoption rather than a one time transfer.

    What is the wider policy context this sits in?

    1. Origins: The programme was initiated by an agri-technology firm in 2019, so the first payouts follow six years of building the practice and verification base.
    2. Farm fires have already fallen: Punjab recorded a decline in farm fire incidents from over 83,000 in 2020 to fewer than 5,000 in 2025, according to ICAR.
    3. A parallel State scheme exists: Punjab has paid farmers since August 2024 for raising and maintaining trees on agricultural land under an agroforestry based carbon credit programme.
    4. Its terms differ: Under that scheme farmers must maintain trees for at least five years, with the carbon benefit linked to tree growth and the subsequent use of the wood in paper, furniture and plywood.
    5. The multilateral layer: The recent BRICS Summit in New Delhi adopted a declaration establishing a BRICS Network of Centres of Excellence on Agroecology and Regenerative Agriculture for Climate Resilience and Productivity, and a BRICS Network on Digital Agriculture.

    Challenges to farm carbon credit programmes

    1. Price volatility in the voluntary market: Payments depend on voluntary market prices for credits, which move with corporate offset demand rather than with farm economics. Eg. Voluntary carbon credit prices fell sharply after 2023 as buyers questioned offset quality.
      The Fix: Contract a floor price with farmers for the full crop cycle rather than passing through spot credit prices.
    2. Additionality: A farmer already following the practice is paid for abatement that would have happened anyway, which produces no new emission reduction. Eg. Several payouts went to farmers who had not burnt paddy residue for five to eight years.
      The Fix: Set the baseline against district level practice adoption rather than against the individual farmer’s own past.
    3. Soil carbon measurement: Soil organic carbon changes slowly and varies within a single field, so the sampling design decides the credit count. Eg. Gains from zero tillage can take several seasons before they register above sampling error.
      The Fix: Fix a permanent monitoring grid per cluster and re-measure at set intervals before credits are issued.
    4. Permanence: Carbon stored in soil returns to the atmosphere the moment the farmer resumes deep tillage or burning. Eg. One season of deep ploughing can release carbon accumulated over years of zero tillage.
      The Fix: Hold back a share of each payout in a buffer pool released only after repeated years of verified compliance.
    5. Switching costs exceed the payment: The sums are small against the machinery and the yield risk that practice change requires. Eg. Direct seeded rice needs a seed drill and far tighter weed control than transplanted paddy.
      The Fix: Stack the credit payment on top of State machinery subsidy so the two together cover the cost of switching.
    6. Coverage: A few thousand farmers in two States is a fraction of the rice and wheat belt the practices are meant to change. Eg. Punjab alone has over ten lakh operational holdings.
      The Fix: Aggregate smallholders through Farmer Producer Organisations so they clear the minimum volume verification requires.

    Conclusion

    The significance of this payout is not its size but its direction. Public policy on residue burning has worked through penalties and machinery subsidy, and this is the first time the same behaviour has been rewarded through a market. What remains unsettled is whether the reward survives a bad credit price year or a season when direct seeded rice underperforms, because a farmer who switched for the money will switch back for the same reason. Watch whether the second round of payments reaches farmers outside the Punjab and Haryana pilot and whether a floor price is written into the contracts.

    Back2Basics

    1. Indian Council of Agricultural Research: An autonomous body under the Department of Agricultural Research and Education (DARE), Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare, established in 1929.
    2. Mandate: It coordinates, guides and manages agricultural research and education across horticulture, fisheries and animal sciences.
    3. Field network: It runs Krishi Vigyan Kendras at district level and the Agricultural Technology Application Research Institutes that coordinate them zonally.
    4. Scale: It is among the largest national agricultural research systems in the world, with institutes and All India Coordinated Research Projects across crops and regions.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Regarding “carbon credits’’, which one of the following statements is not correct?”

  • SIR deletions: elector numbers in 1/3 of Delhi below poll turnout

    Why in the News

    In 24 of Delhi’s 70 Assembly constituencies, the draft roll produced by the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) now carries fewer electors than the number of people who actually voted in the February 2025 Assembly election. The 2025 election was conducted by the Election Commission of India (ECI) itself on a roll of 1.56 crore electors, of whom 94.9 lakh voted. Roughly 58.5 lakh names have been removed since, leaving 97.5 lakh electors in the draft roll. The tension is arithmetical before it is legal: an electoral roll smaller than the last verified turnout implies either migration on an implausible scale or deletions that have removed electors who remain ordinarily resident.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision?

    1. What it is: It is a house-to-house re-verification of the electoral roll, conducted in phases across States and Union Territories, that rebuilds the roll rather than amending it at the margins.
    2. What an elector must do: The draft enumeration process requires electors to list their Electoral Photo Identity Card (EPIC) numbers and their eligibility to vote.
    3. Status of the output: What is published at the end of enumeration is a draft roll, not the final roll, so time remains for additions.
    4. Two routes to addition: Freshly eligible electors may be added, and electors erroneously deleted may seek restoration through claims and objections.

    What do the Delhi numbers show, and how thin is the buffer?

    1. The starting roll: The rolls carried 1.56 crore electors before the Delhi Assembly polls of February 2025, of whom 94.9 lakh voted.
    2. Two rounds of culling: Close to 11 lakh electors were deleted before the SIR, and nearly 47.6 lakh more during the draft SIR phase, a total of over 58.5 lakh names.
    3. What is left: The draft roll carries 97.5 lakh electors for the Union Territory.
    4. The buffer that remains: The 94.9 lakh who voted are 97% of the draft roll, leaving a “buffer” of only about 2.6 lakh electors, or 2.6%, to account for every ordinary resident who did not vote.
    5. The implied turnout: If every deletion since the Assembly polls is legitimate, the hypothetical turnout percentage on the draft roll works out to an implausible 97%.

    Which constituencies were cut deepest?

    1. The worst case: Tughlakabad’s draft roll carries 1,00,386 electors against 1,14,961 who actually voted in 2025, a shortfall of 14,575.
    2. How many seats are affected: 24 constituencies show fewer electors than 2025 turnout, and 15 of them carry the largest shortfalls. Eg. Sangam Vihar with 1,25,723 actual voters, Badli with 1,50,889 and Dwarka with 1,39,564.
    3. Where they cluster: The pattern is most pronounced in the eastern, central and southern parts of Delhi, and is highest in the seats beyond the Yamuna on the east.

    What would have to be true for the deletions to hold?

    1. Universal turnout among residents: Everyone deemed an “ordinary resident” in these 24 constituencies would have to have voted in 2025.
    2. Mass departure of voters: A significant share of those who did vote would have to have left the constituency since.
    3. Non-voters never resident: Those who did not vote in 2025 would have to have been non-resident then, or to have ceased to be resident since.
    4. Migration on an implausible scale: Taken together, these constituencies would have to have seen inward and outward migration of enormous scale in the 17 months between the polls and the start of the SIR, and there are no signs any of that happened.
    5. Self-declared ineligibility: Since enumeration requires electors to state their EPIC number and their eligibility, it stretches reason to assume recent voters declared themselves ineligible.

    Does the pattern extend beyond Delhi?

    1. Buffer shrinks by phase: The practice of leaving a small buffer of electors is more marked for States and Union Territories revised in Phase 3 of the SIR than in the earlier phases.
    2. Phase 3 figures: Andhra Pradesh retains a buffer of 8.8%, Karnataka 13.1% and Maharashtra 16.2%.
    3. Delhi as the outlier: Delhi’s 2.6% buffer is the narrowest recorded, making it the worst case of the phase.
    4. What a narrow buffer indicates: A thin buffer points to aggressive deletion and to the potential disenfranchisement of eligible electors, since it leaves almost no room for residents who simply did not vote.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. Burden of proof shifted to the elector: A citizen already on a roll used for a completed election must re-establish eligibility or lose the vote. Eg. Delhi’s draft roll dropped 58.5 lakh names from a roll the Commission itself used in February 2025.
      The Fix: Require a recorded, individually served reason for every deletion, with the elector’s response window running from the date of service rather than from publication of the draft.
    2. Compressed timelines: Phase-wise revision on short schedules leaves little time for claims and objections to be heard on their merits. Eg. The buffer narrowed steadily from Phase 1 to Phase 3, with Delhi the narrowest at 2.6%.
      The Fix: Fix a minimum claims-and-objections period proportionate to the number of deletions in a constituency rather than a uniform calendar window.
    3. No published audit of deletion grounds: Aggregate deletion counts are released without a category-wise break-up of death, shifting or duplication. Eg. Delhi’s 58.5 lakh removals are reported as a pre-SIR figure and an SIR-phase figure with no stated ground-wise split.
      The Fix: Publish constituency-level deletion data disaggregated by statutory ground, so the roll can be audited against civil registration and migration records.
    4. Weak field verification capacity: Booth level officers handle large workloads within short revision cycles, so verification quality varies across constituencies. Eg. Deletions clustered in the eastern, central and southern parts of Delhi rather than spreading evenly.
      The Fix: Mandate supervisory re-verification of a random sample of deletions in every constituency before the draft roll is published.
    5. Contested scope of the exercise: Whether the revision may examine questions beyond ordinary residence is disputed and unsettled. Eg. The enumeration form requires electors to state both their EPIC number and their eligibility.
      The Fix: Issue a public instruction confining the Commission’s enquiry to the statutory grounds for inclusion and deletion under the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

    Conclusion

    A roll smaller than the last verified turnout is not evidence of one wrong deletion; it is evidence that the method that produced it needs auditing. The draft stage still allows both freshly eligible electors and wrongly deleted ones to be added, so the number that matters is the final roll and not this one. The measure to watch is the size of the buffer in Delhi’s final roll against the 2.6% the draft leaves, and whether the Phase 3 States now revising show the same narrowing.

    Back2Basics: Electoral Photo Identity Card

    1. What it is: A photo identity document issued by the Election Commission of India to a registered elector, carrying a unique EPIC number.
    2. When it began: Issue of the card started in 1993 to reduce impersonation and duplicate entries in electoral rolls.
    3. What it does not prove: It is proof of enrolment on a roll and is not proof of citizenship or of residence in itself.
    4. Use in this revision: The SIR enumeration form is keyed to the EPIC number, which is how an existing elector is matched to the rebuilt roll.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Centre bans Pak-based Shahzad Bhatti terror network under UAPA

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Home Affairs has declared the Pakistan-based Shahzad Bhatti Network (SBN) a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. A gazette notification invoked Section 35 of the Act to add the network to the First Schedule, which lists banned terrorist organisations. The notification records that the network draws gullible youth and local criminals into smuggling arms, explosives and narcotics from across the border, and that it uses digital communication platforms to circulate provocative messages. The designation follows a nationwide crackdown on an alleged SBN linked network last month, in which security agencies detained 253 people across 14 States. The question it raises is what a domestic ban adds against a syndicate whose leadership, funding and handlers all sit outside Indian jurisdiction.

    How does a Section 35 designation under the UAPA work?

    1. The power: Section 35 empowers the Central Government to add an organisation to the First Schedule by notification in the Official Gazette, where it believes the organisation is involved in terrorism. The listing is what makes the organisation a terrorist organisation in law.
    2. The threshold: An organisation is treated as involved in terrorism where it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for them, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in it. The present notification records that the network has participated in various acts of terrorism in India.
    3. The consequences: Membership, support, fundraising and arranging meetings for a listed organisation become distinct punishable offences under the Act. The listing therefore reaches the domestic support structure rather than the organisation’s leadership abroad.
    4. The remedy: A listed organisation may apply to the Central Government for removal from the Schedule, and a refusal goes to a Review Committee headed by a sitting or retired High Court judge. That committee is the only statutory check on the designation.

    What is the network accused of doing?

    1. Cross border smuggling: The network is accused of moving arms, explosives and narcotics across the border using local conduits. The notification treats the smuggling as the resource base for the terrorist activity rather than as a separate crime.
    2. Recruitment of petty criminals: The stated method is to offer allurements to gullible youth and local criminals, motivate them for anti-national activity and mobilise resources through them. Recruitment runs through the criminal economy rather than through an ideological cadre.
    3. Online radicalisation and propaganda: The network published hateful digital content and used communication platforms to circulate provocative messages. The stated targets are India’s democratic structure and communal harmony.
    4. Espionage and reconnaissance: The network is suspected of paying local conduits to conduct reconnaissance and install CCTV cameras for surveillance of police, defence and religious sites. It is also linked to grenade, improvised explosive device and petrol bomb attacks and to targeted killings.
    5. Attribution to a named handler: Shahzad Bhatti is accused of using social media to recruit young people, and is suspected of a link to the grenade attack at the residence of a YouTuber in Jalandhar in March last year.
    6. State backing: The network is described as a Pakistan-based syndicate backed by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s military intelligence agency. That characterisation is what moves it from an organised crime case to a national security one.

    What did the crackdown recover?

    1. Scale of the operation: Security agencies detained 253 people across 14 States days before Independence Day. The geographic spread indicates a recruitment base well beyond the border States.
    2. Ordnance recovered: Recoveries included improvised explosive devices, grenades bearing Pakistan Ordnance Factory markings, pistols and live cartridges. State factory markings on recovered grenades are the material link between the network and an official supply chain.
    3. Surveillance equipment: CCTV cameras allegedly installed for espionage were among the recoveries. The presence of surveillance hardware alongside weapons indicates a network doing target development, not only delivery.

    Why does the crime and terror linkage change the security problem?

    1. Self financing structure: Narcotics trafficking funds weapons movement, so the network does not depend on transfers through the formal financial system. Financial intelligence tools built for tracing bank flows have little purchase on a cash and contraband economy.
    2. Deniable local execution: Using petty criminals rather than trained cadre gives the handlers distance from the act and makes attribution harder after an arrest. The person caught rarely knows the chain above him.
    3. Shared border infrastructure: The same tunnels, drone routes and courier networks serve both narcotics and weapons consignments. Eg. Drone borne consignments recovered along the Punjab border have carried both heroin and small arms in the same drop.
    4. Broader footprint than a conventional outfit: A syndicate built on crime scales through existing criminal markets in the interior rather than through ideological recruitment. That explains a detention footprint across 14 States for a single network.

    Challenges to the UAPA designation route

    1. No reach over handlers abroad: A domestic listing criminalises support inside India and does nothing to a leadership operating under state protection across the border. Eg. Individuals designated globally under the United Nations Security Council’s 1267 sanctions regime have continued to operate from Pakistan for years.
      The Fix: Pair every domestic listing with a dossier submitted for designation under the 1267 Committee and under partner countries’ national sanctions lists.
    2. Designation is not conviction: Proscription restricts an organisation and still requires the ordinary burden of proof in each prosecution that follows. Eg. Cases registered under the Act routinely run for years before trial concludes, and conviction rates recorded in them are low.
      The Fix: Resource the National Investigation Agency’s prosecution capacity and set internal timelines for filing charge sheets, so a listing converts into completed trials.
    3. Renaming and reconstitution: A proscribed network can resume operations under a fresh name, which requires a fresh notification each time. Eg. Front organisations of banned outfits have repeatedly reappeared under new banners after a ban.
      The Fix: Notify successor and front entities in the same instrument that lists the parent organisation, so a name change does not restart the process.
    4. Civil liberties objections to the statute: Section 43D(5) bars bail where the accusation is prima facie true, so pre-trial custody can extend for years. Eg. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) the Supreme Court held that prolonged incarceration with no prospect of an early trial permits bail despite that bar.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory outer limit for filing the charge sheet in listed organisation cases, after which the bail bar lapses.
    5. Weak seizure of assets: A ban restricts an organisation’s property in law, and the proceeds of narcotics trafficking sit in cash and in benami holdings that are hard to attach. Eg. Terror funding investigations frequently record hawala transfers with no identifiable account holder at either end.
      The Fix: Route listed organisation cases through the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 machinery in parallel, so attachment proceedings run alongside the terror prosecution.

    Conclusion

    The Shahzad Bhatti Network now sits in the First Schedule, and the immediate effect is to make support for it inside India a separate offence. The designation lands on the domestic layer of the network, which is the layer the August detentions had already reached. Whether the ban changes anything depends on what follows it: charge sheets against those detained, attachment of the assets the smuggling generated, and a listing request carried into international forums. The point to watch is the first prosecution filed against a person charged as a member, since that is where the notification is tested rather than announced.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Indian government has recently strengthened the anti-terrorism laws by amending the unlawful activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967 and the NIA Act. Analyze the changes in the context of prevailing security environment while discussing the scope and reasons for opposing the UAPA by human rights organizations.”

  • ‘Census Town’ definition is outdated: Ministry to panel

    Why in the News

    The Housing and Urban Affairs Ministry has told the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs that the four decade old criteria used to classify Census Towns cannot capture the actual scale of urbanisation in India. The Ministry deposed before the panel on a draft report titled “Census Criteria for Defining Urban Areas”. It had already flagged the same objections to the Registrar General of India in a communication in February 2024. The Registrar General has decided to continue with the existing definition, holding that it is too late to alter the framework for Census 2027, so the next Census will measure a transformed settlement pattern with a test written in 1981.

    What is a Census Town?

    1. The three part test: A Census Town is a village with a minimum population of 5,000, at least 75% of the male working population engaged in non agricultural pursuits, and a population density of at least 400 persons per square kilometre.
    2. It is a statistical category, not a legal one: A settlement meeting the test is counted as urban by the Census while continuing to be governed as a village, since municipal status is conferred separately by the State.
    3. Unchanged since 1981: The definition has not been revised in four decades, so every intervening Census has applied the same thresholds.

    What does the Ministry say is wrong with the 1981 test?

    1. Male bias: Only the male working population is used as a parameter to define a town, and the Ministry has said female workforce participation should also be used.
    2. Uniform national thresholds: A single population and density threshold applied across the country disadvantages hilly and northeastern States, where settlement sizes and densities differ structurally.
    3. Density measured on the wrong area: Density is calculated using administrative boundaries rather than built-up areas, which misclassifies settlements.
    4. The rural and urban binary: The binary classification overlooks peri-urban settlements and growth corridors that function as urban areas without qualifying as one.
    5. Stale input data: The current system works off data from the previous Census, which produces both exclusion and inclusion errors.

    What has the Ministry proposed instead?

    1. Satellite imagery: Greater use of imagery would identify built-up extent directly rather than inferring it from administrative units.
    2. A ‘transitional areas’ category: A third category between rural and urban would capture rapidly urbanising regions that neither label fits.
    3. Female workforce participation as a parameter: Adding it to the non farm employment test would measure the settlement’s economy rather than half of its workforce.

    How much urbanisation does the current definition miss?

    1. The official count: Census 2011 recorded a total population of 121 crore, of which about 83.3 crore or 68.8% lived in rural areas and 37.7 crore or 31.2% in urban areas.
    2. The satellite based estimate: The Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (EAC-PM), the advisory body reporting to the Prime Minister on economic policy, argues that India’s urbanisation level could have been as high as 63% in 2015 on satellite data.
    3. The size of the gap: The satellite based figure is more than double the official Census 2011 estimate, which is the measure of what the definition is failing to register.

    Why will Census 2027 still use the old framework?

    1. The Registrar General’s position: The framework cannot be altered at this stage of preparation for Census 2027.
    2. Field architecture is already built on it: Enumeration blocks, boundaries, enumerator training and field deployment all depend on the rural and urban classification being finalised in advance.
    3. The consequence: The classification produced by Census 2027 will be the base for scheme eligibility and urban planning through the following decade.

    Challenges to reforming the Census Town definition

    1. Classification drives governance and finance: A settlement counted as urban by the Census keeps rural governance and stays outside municipal planning and finance powers. Eg. Most Census Towns remain under panchayats and outside municipal law.
      The Fix: Tie any ‘transitional areas’ category to a statutory route for a State decision on municipal status under Article 243Q.
    2. Decadal measurement lag: A test applied once every ten years classifies settlements long after they have urbanised. Eg. Census 2027 will apply thresholds last revised in 1981.
      The Fix: Update classification against annual satellite built-up area data between Censuses rather than only at enumeration.
    3. Misclassification misdirects money: Grant devolution and scheme eligibility follow the rural or urban label, so a wrong label sends the wrong programme to a settlement. Eg. The Swachh Bharat Mission runs separate rural and urban verticals with different funding norms.
      The Fix: Allow a settlement classified as transitional to draw on both rural and urban scheme windows for one funding cycle.
    4. Satellite data measures construction, not employment: Built-up extent records buildings and cannot by itself establish the non farm economic activity the definition is meant to test. Eg. Warehousing clusters and plotted layouts register as built-up while the surrounding workforce stays agricultural.
      The Fix: Combine built-up area with workforce and night lights data rather than substituting one indicator for another.
    5. States control the next step: Creating a municipality is a State decision, and States carry fiscal and political reasons to leave urbanised settlements classified as villages. Eg. Kerala and West Bengal account for a large share of Census Towns still governed by panchayats.
      The Fix: Make a Census Town classification trigger a time bound State decision on municipal status with reasons recorded.

    Conclusion

    The Ministry and the Registrar General are not disagreeing about the facts of urbanisation. They are disagreeing about whether a measurement framework can be changed once field preparation has begun. That conflict is now settled in favour of continuity, and it settles the terms on which India will be counted as urban for another decade. The thing to watch is whether the Standing Committee’s final report converts the Ministry’s objections into a dated mandate for the Census after this one, since an objection recorded and not scheduled expires with the report.

    Back2Basics

    1. Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India: An office under the Ministry of Home Affairs, created in 1949, that conducts the decennial Census.
    2. Other functions: It maintains the Civil Registration System for births and deaths and runs the Sample Registration System, the source of India’s birth, death and infant mortality rate estimates.
    3. Statutory basis: The Census is conducted under the Census Act, 1948, which makes furnishing information compulsory and individual records confidential.
    4. Language data: The office also compiles the linguistic survey and mother tongue returns used to classify scheduled and non scheduled languages.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Which of the following are among the million-plus cities in India on the basis of data of the Census, 2001?”

  • Let’s curb misuse of a legal relic that elevates the mob over the individual

    Why in the News

    Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, re-codified as Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), is under fresh criticism for converting subjective offence into a cognisable, non-bailable criminal charge. The provision was introduced by the British in 1927 during the “Rangeela Rasool” controversy, after a provocative Urdu pamphlet satirising the Prophet Muhammad’s personal life sparked widespread communal riots. It survives in independent India under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which permits speech restrictions in the interests of public order. The tension is between a criminal provision built to preserve public order and a constitutional guarantee of expression that the provision’s procedure defeats before any court examines malice.

    What does Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita cover?

    1. The offence: It penalises deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, which was the stated purpose when Section 295A was enacted in 1927.
    2. Colonial rationale: It was born of a colonial urge to police Indian subjects deemed too volatile to handle the friction of free and provocative speech.
    3. Procedural character: The offence is cognisable and non-bailable, so the police may register a case and arrest without a magistrate’s prior direction and bail is not a matter of right.
    4. Constitutional validity: Ramji Lal Modi vs State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) upheld Section 295A, reading the words “deliberate and malicious” as the narrowing element that keeps it within Article 19(2).

    How does the provision create a heckler’s veto?

    1. Offence converted into an offence in law: Translating the subjective and volatile idea of “emotional hurt” into a criminal charge hands a permanent “heckler’s veto” to the most intolerant segments of society.
    2. Inverted hierarchy of rights: It creates a perverse incentive for outrage by elevating “the right to be offended” above the right to free speech.
    3. Low threshold to trigger the state: One aggrieved individual filing a First Information Report (FIR) in a remote corner of the country instantly triggers the machinery of the state.
    4. Who it is triggered against: Writers, filmmakers, stand-up comedians and publishers face it for speech that a court often finds, years later, was never malicious at all.
    5. Incentive for entrepreneurs of grievance: Political entrepreneurs, religious zealots and competitive vigilante groups find that claiming wounded sentiment is the easiest path to public relevance.

    What does the resulting self-censorship look like?

    1. Withdrawal of a published work: Penguin Books India withdrew distribution of Joe Sacco’s graphic novel on the Muzaffarnagar riots.
    2. Pulping of an academic work: The same publisher had earlier pulped copies of Wendy Doniger’s *The Hindus*.
    3. Pre-emptive editing: Cuts were sought to Sonia Gandhi’s memoirs that the publisher’s global arm had not considered necessary for the international edition.
    4. None of it was legally required: None of these texts was legally proscribed, so each was a pre-emptive surrender in which commercial risk aversion replaced constitutional principle.
    5. Spread beyond publishing: Galleries pull provocative paintings, studios quietly cancel scripts and academics choose safer research topics, leaving a public square reduced to bland conformity.

    Why is the process itself the punishment?

    1. Arrest precedes any finding: The law allows arrest before a trial can establish whether malice existed, so the element that makes the act criminal is tested last.
    2. Cost of defending the case: Multi-city court appearances, jail time and financial ruin break the spirit of an artist or author irrespective of the eventual verdict.
    3. Behavioural consequence: When the cost of creative expression is the potential loss of personal liberty, most creators choose to pull their punches.

    What did the 2008 Delhi High Court ruling on M F Husain establish?

    1. What the judgment did: It quashed criminal proceedings against the self-exiled painter M F Husain and set out a defence of artistic liberty against intolerance.
    2. How the charges were answered: The ruling dismantled the obscenity and blasphemy charges by placing Husain’s abstract nude depiction of Bharat Mata within India’s four-millennia-old heritage of sacred, pluralistic and erotic iconography, from Khajuraho to Konark.
    3. The warning it recorded: It critiqued the “new puritanism” pursued by self-appointed guardians of cultural purity and warned that such a society would push India backward.
    4. The principle it fixed: One disapproving viewer cannot hold the right to restrict free expression, which is the constitutional shield the ruling established for creative dissent.

    What reforms would reverse the incentive structure?

    1. Prior sanction before the FIR: Government sanction should be required before an FIR under BNS 299 is registered, rather than after the accused has already endured an investigation and a chargesheet.
    2. Consolidation of parallel FIRs: Multiple FIRs on the same subject lodged in different States should be consolidated immediately into a single proceeding.
    3. Fast-tracking of quashing petitions: BNS 299 cases should be fast-tracked so that frivolous proceedings are quashed early rather than after years.
    4. Costs on vexatious complainants: Vexatious complainants should face costs or other punitive consequences, so the incentive structure of the provision is reversed rather than reinforced.

    Conclusion

    Scrutiny of intent currently arrives at the end of the process, by which point the prosecution has already imposed the cost the provision was never meant to impose. Moving that scrutiny to the point before registration is what separates a public order safeguard from a licence for organised offence-taking. The unresolved conflict is between a constitutional test that turns on deliberate malice and a procedure that reaches arrest before malice is examined at all. Until the procedure is changed, the outcome of a case will continue to matter less than the fact of one.

    What is freedom of speech and expression under the Constitution?

    1. About: Article 19(1)(a) guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression, read to include the right to receive and circulate information.
    2. Rationale: The guarantee protects the process by which citizens form and contest opinions, so it exists to shield unpopular expression rather than agreeable expression.
    3. The restriction clause: Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on eight grounds, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an offence.
    4. The reasonableness test: A restriction must fall within one of those eight grounds and must be reasonable, which is why Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 as vague and overbroad.

    Back2Basics: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

    1. What it is: The statute that replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as India’s principal criminal law.
    2. When it took effect: It came into force on 1 July 2024, alongside the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
    3. Structure: It carries 358 sections against the 511 of the Code it replaced, with several offences merged or renumbered.
    4. Relevance here: Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code is carried forward as Section 299, so the offence survives the recodification substantially unchanged.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • Currency conundrum

    Why in the News

    The BRICS New Delhi Declaration records only incremental progress on local currency trade. Its paragraph on the subject acknowledges the efforts of various task forces and committees and offers no concrete proposal. The Declaration promotes local currency trade “while respecting national priorities and acknowledging that there is no one-size-fits-all approach”, which is the language of a member that wanted its reservations placed on record. India’s rupee trade with its BRICS partners is limited to the United Arab Emirates and Russia, and even those volumes are small. The tension is that India gains from being paid in dollars as an exporter and from paying in cheaper local currencies as an importer, and it cannot hold both positions indefinitely.

    What is local currency trade settlement?

    1. Definition: Local currency trade settlement is the invoicing and payment of a cross border transaction in the currency of one of the two trading countries, rather than in a third currency such as the dollar. The exporter is paid in a currency that one of the two governments issues.
    2. Mechanism: The importing country’s bank credits the exporting country’s currency into a designated account held with a bank in the exporter’s country. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) operationalised this for India in July 2022 through Special Rupee Vostro Accounts, which hold a foreign bank’s rupee balances for settling trade.
    3. What it does not do: Settlement in a local currency changes the unit of account for a transaction and creates no new common currency and no shared central bank. The parties still have to agree an exchange rate and find uses for the balances that accumulate.

    Where does India’s rupee trade actually stand?

    1. Two partners only: Within BRICS, only the United Arab Emirates and Russia are engaged in rupee trade with India. The volumes involved are relatively small.
    2. Russia’s surplus problem: Russia struggled to dispose of the rupees it was accumulating from its exports to India. A surplus holder that cannot spend or invest a currency has no reason to keep accepting it.
    3. A partial opening: Some avenues have opened, with Russia importing petroleum products from India after Ukraine’s attacks on its refining capacity. That flow is small against the size of the bilateral trade imbalance.
    4. A third currency as ‘local’: Another option is to treat any BRICS currency as local. India has already been using the UAE Dirham to pay for Russian oil, which sidesteps the dollar without using the rupee.

    Why is this not a simple choice for India?

    1. The exporter’s interest: India would prefer to continue being paid for its exports in dollars. A depreciating rupee means every dollar received converts into a larger rupee amount, and a country pushing exports wants to retain that advantage.
    2. The importer’s interest: India is also a major importer, and it would prefer to pay in relatively cheaper local currencies. The two preferences point in opposite directions on the same policy.
    3. The choice is deferred, not avoided: A country cannot indefinitely invoice its exports in one currency and its imports in another without its partners noticing the asymmetry. India will eventually have to settle which of the two interests governs.

    Why does China’s share turn this into a question about the yuan?

    1. Concentration of BRICS trade: China accounts for about two-thirds of all BRICS exports. Local currency trade across the grouping will therefore largely be trade in the yuan.
    2. Political reluctance: Relations with China are thawing, and India would still be reluctant to conduct its business in the yuan. A settlement currency creates a standing dependence on the issuing country’s banking system and payment rails.
    3. Why the general language matters: A grouping whose largest exporter issues the default settlement currency cannot offer a single formula that suits every member. The Declaration’s rejection of a one-size-fits-all approach is the recorded consequence of that arithmetic.

    How does local currency trade differ from a BRICS currency?

    1. Local currency trade: This is a bilateral settlement arrangement between two members, with no common issuer. India has been cautiously supportive of it.
    2. A BRICS currency: This would be a shared unit requiring a common issuer, a reserve pool and agreed rules of issuance. India has been vocal in opposing it, largely because China would likely dominate such a currency.
    3. The external cost: The United States President has threatened 100% tariffs on countries adopting a BRICS currency. India has taken a pragmatic approach in dealing with the United States and will not court such tariff threats lightly.
    4. Different motivations across members: Countries such as Iran and Russia have pressing reasons to move away from the dollar, both being under extensive sanctions. India does not have a comparable compulsion, and the Declaration reflects that difference.

    Challenges to local currency trade in BRICS

    1. Limited convertibility of the rupee: The rupee is not fully convertible on the capital account, so a partner accumulating rupee balances has few assets to park them in. Eg. Russian banks accumulated rupee balances in Special Rupee Vostro Accounts that they could not deploy at scale.
      The Fix: Widen the permitted investment avenues for vostro balances, including government securities and corporate debt, so a surplus holder has a yield bearing use for them.
    2. Structural trade imbalance: Settlement currency follows the direction of the surplus, and a partner running a persistent surplus with India will not accept rupees indefinitely. Eg. India’s oil imports from Russia are far larger than its exports to Russia.
      The Fix: Pair settlement arrangements with targeted market access for the partner’s goods, so the imbalance narrows rather than being financed.
    3. Thin currency markets and hedging costs: Direct rupee to partner currency markets are shallow, so exchange rates are volatile and forward cover is expensive. Eg. Exporters settling in a partner currency carry a risk that a dollar contract would have passed to the market.
      The Fix: Build reference rate mechanisms and a bank led forward market for the main partner currency pairs before volumes are scaled up.
    4. Secondary sanctions and payment channel risk: Banks handling settlement for a sanctioned partner risk losing access to dollar clearing, so large lenders stay out and the business shifts to small institutions. Eg. Several Indian banks limited Russia related settlement business rather than risk their correspondent relationships.
      The Fix: Route sanctioned trade through designated institutions with no dollar clearing exposure, keeping the wider banking system insulated.
    5. Domestic monetary consequences: A widening use of the rupee abroad transmits offshore demand into the domestic money market and complicates exchange rate management. Eg. The RBI has intervened repeatedly to contain rupee volatility during periods of capital outflow.
      The Fix: Sequence internationalisation against clearly stated convertibility milestones, so the external use of the rupee grows with the depth of the domestic market rather than ahead of it.

    Conclusion

    India supports settlement in local currencies and opposes a common BRICS currency, and the New Delhi Declaration carries both positions without reconciling them. The reason is not drafting: the grouping’s trade runs through one member, and a shared settlement currency would hand that member the instrument. What India lacks is the compulsion its partners have, so its de-dollarisation is a hedge rather than a strategy. The unresolved point is whether India can keep collecting export receipts in dollars while asking its partners to accept rupees for the goods it buys.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    ““BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • Hog in the limelight

    Why in the News

    The Assam government has praised a captive breeding programme for lifting the State’s pygmy hog population over the last three decades. The species was believed extinct by the mid twentieth century, and a few individuals rediscovered in 1971 prompted the conservation effort that the Pygmy Hog Conservation Programme formalised in 1995. The recovery in captivity has outpaced the recovery of the habitat. Numbers held in breeding centres can be raised on a schedule, while the alluvial floodplain grasslands the species needs in the wild continue to fragment, which is what decides whether released animals survive.

    What is the pygmy hog?

    1. Sole surviving species of its genus: The pygmy hog is the only living species of the genus Porcula and the world’s smallest wild suid (a member of the pig family).
    2. Grassland dependence: It relies on dense grassland to feed, to conceal itself and to reproduce, so it cannot persist where tall cover is removed.
    3. Range: Its surviving distribution is confined to the alluvial floodplain grasslands of Assam.

    Why does the pygmy hog work as an indicator species?

    1. Distress signals habitat degradation: Decline in an animal that lives inside dense grassland is read directly as degradation of the floodplain that produces that grassland.
    2. Protection carries other species with it: Securing the grassland the pygmy hog needs also extends protection to the Bengal florican, the hispid hare, the hog deer and the greater one horned rhinoceros.
    3. The unit of conservation is the ecosystem: Survival in the wild depends on the survival of a specific ecosystem rather than on the numbers held in any one facility.

    How was the species brought back from presumed extinction?

    1. The original cause of decline: Floodplains were converted for farms, tea plantations and flood control infrastructure, then degraded by invasive plants and altered flood cycles, with unscientific burning of grasslands fragmenting what remained.
    2. Rediscovery and programme: A few individuals found in 1971 prompted an early conservation effort, and the current work descends from the Pygmy Hog Conservation Programme begun in 1995.
    3. The measured gain: Captive breeding raised the pygmy hog population in Assam 32-fold over the last three decades.
    4. What breeding from a small stock demands: Conservationists must track pedigree, follow biosafety protocols because suids are highly susceptible to swine diseases, and condition individuals before release.

    Why is the recovery still not secure?

    1. Numbers remain small: The Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust records some 250 individuals in early 2025.
    2. Counting is unreliable: The animals are difficult to spot and count, so how many exist in the wild cannot be stated with confidence.
    3. One natural population is left: The last surviving natural population sits in the Panbari grasslands area of Manas National Park.
    4. Insurance is not a guarantee: Captive individuals form the insurance group against loss in the wild, and the long term evolutionary fitness of that group is not assured.

    Challenges to pygmy hog recovery

    1. Genetic bottleneck: Breeding from a small founder stock accumulates harmful gene variants and holds genetic diversity low. Eg. Researchers working on the programme flag both as limits on the captive group’s long term fitness.
      The Fix: Manage the captive population as a single studbook with planned pairings and periodic exchange between breeding centres.
    2. Disease susceptibility: Pigs carry high susceptibility to swine diseases, so one outbreak can erase decades of breeding in a single season. Eg. African swine fever outbreaks in Assam from 2020 killed domestic pigs across multiple districts.
      The Fix: Hold breeding stock at physically separated centres under enforced biosafety protocols rather than at one site.
    3. Fire used as grassland management: Widespread dry season burning carried out to ‘save’ grasslands destroys the dense cover the species feeds and breeds in. Eg. Fires set across whole grassland blocks remove the tall cover in a single sweep.
      The Fix: Move to mosaic burning on a rotation that leaves unburnt refuge patches in every season.
    4. Woody encroachment: Suppressing ecological processes altogether allows trees and shrubs to convert grassland into woodland. Eg. Embankments and flood control works on the Brahmaputra floodplain have cut the natural flooding that renews grassland.
      The Fix: Restore periodic flooding and controlled disturbance so grassland succession is held in check.
    5. Habitat fragmentation: Protected grasslands survive as disconnected blocks, so released animals cannot disperse or recolonise adjoining areas. Eg. Fragmentation of protected grassland in Rupahi and Kanchanbari separates the sites Assam is relying on for release.
      The Fix: Reconnect the fragments and restore buffer zones around Manas and Orang National Parks and the Sonai Rupai Wildlife Sanctuary.
    6. Invasive plants: Introduced species change grassland structure and displace the native grasses the species depends on. Eg. Invasive growth has spread through degraded floodplain grassland alongside altered flood cycles.
      The Fix: Fund sustained mechanical removal at release sites as a recurring operation rather than a one time clearance drive.

    Conclusion

    Assam plans to raise the wild pygmy hog population to 300 by 2040. That target is a grassland target rather than a breeding target. Captive numbers can be scaled inside a facility, and the constraint sits outside it, in whether protected grassland is reconnected and buffer zones around the northern Assam parks are restored fast enough to receive the animals. Watch whether grassland restoration is funded as a standing operation, because the breeding side of the programme has already shown what it can deliver on its own.

    Back2Basics

    1. Manas National Park: Located in Assam along the foothills of the Bhutan Himalaya, on the Manas river, a tributary of the Brahmaputra.
    2. Designations: It is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, a tiger reserve, an elephant reserve and a biosphere reserve.
    3. Contiguity: It adjoins the Royal Manas National Park in Bhutan, forming a transboundary conservation landscape.
    4. Species: It holds the last natural pygmy hog population and is also known for the Bengal florican, the hispid hare and the golden langur.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Consider the following : 1.Star tortoise 2.Monitor lizard 3.Pygmy hog 4.Spider monkey Which of the above are naturally found in India?”

  • ‘Has no legal basis’: India rejects Pakistan-China ‘boundary commission’

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of External Affairs has rejected the boundary joint commission constituted by Pakistan and China. Its stated ground is that the body has no legal basis to decide on arrangements related to Indian territory under illegal occupation. The rejection followed the first meeting of the Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission in Islamabad. India holds that it has never recognised the China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963, under which Pakistan handed over the Shaksgam Valley to China, and treats that agreement as illegal and invalid. The Ministry restated that the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh are integral and inalienable parts of India, and called on Pakistan to vacate the areas under its illegal occupation. The tension is that a standing commission gives institutional form to a transfer India treats as void, while India’s non-recognition changes nothing about who administers the ground.

    What is the 1963 China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement?

    1. What it did: The agreement demarcated a boundary between China and the part of Kashmir under Pakistan’s control. Pakistan ceded about 5,180 sq km of the Shaksgam Valley, north of the Siachen region, to China.
    2. India’s legal objection: India holds that Pakistan has no sovereignty over the territory and therefore no capacity to transfer any part of it. On that reasoning there is no boundary between Pakistan and China at all.
    3. The agreement’s own provisional clause: The 1963 text itself records that the boundary is provisional, and provides for renegotiation with the sovereign authority once the Kashmir dispute is settled. Both signatories therefore acknowledged on the face of the document that the question of title was open.

    What exactly did India object to?

    1. Denial of a boundary: India’s position is that no boundary exists between Pakistan and China, so no commission can be constituted to administer one. The objection goes to the existence of the subject matter, not to the commission’s composition or procedure.
    2. Rejection of legitimisation attempts: India stated that it resolutely opposes attempts to alter the status of the occupied territories or to legitimise illegal occupation. Any so-called boundary cooperation between China and Pakistan concerning Indian territories would have no bearing whatsoever on India’s sovereignty.
    3. Demand for vacation: India called on Pakistan to immediately vacate the areas under its illegal and forcible occupation, rather than engage in such proceedings. The demand converts the rejection from a protest into a stated precondition.
    4. Consistency as the argument: India framed its position as clear and consistent rather than as a new response. Consistency is itself the legal point, since acquiescence over time is what would weaken a non-recognition claim.

    Why does the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor feature in this objection?

    1. Route through occupied territory: India has opposed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship connectivity and energy project linking Xinjiang to Gwadar port, because part of it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The objection is territorial rather than commercial.
    2. Infrastructure as evidence of control: Roads, power projects and administrative arrangements built along a disputed alignment create facts on the ground and a record of undisturbed use. A boundary commission performs the same function in legal form that the corridor performs in physical form.
    3. Link to the wider connectivity initiative: CPEC is the leading component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which India has declined to join on sovereignty grounds. India stayed away from the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May 2017 for that reason.

    Challenges to India’s non-recognition position

    1. Non-recognition does not alter control: China has administered the Shaksgam Valley since 1963 and India’s objection has produced no change in possession. Eg. India’s sustained objection to CPEC since 2017 has not slowed construction along the corridor.
      The Fix: Pair the legal position with continued infrastructure and force posture development on the Indian side of the Siachen and Karakoram sector, so the claim is backed by presence.
    2. Institutional practice accumulates over time: A commission that meets periodically builds a documented record of bilateral practice that third parties may treat as settled. Eg. The 1963 agreement itself has been treated as operative for over six decades despite its own provisional clause.
      The Fix: Record a formal protest after each meeting of the commission, so the record shows continuous objection rather than a single statement.
    3. No forum adjudicates the claim: No international court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the question without the consent of all parties, and neither China nor Pakistan will give it. Eg. India has consistently treated Jammu and Kashmir as a bilateral matter and declined third party adjudication.
      The Fix: Build the position into bilateral and plurilateral documents India signs, so partners record the Indian claim rather than staying silent on it.
    4. Two front linkage in the same sector: The valley sits adjacent to the Siachen region, so Chinese presence there connects the Pakistan front and the China front in one theatre. Eg. The Siachen Glacier has been held by Indian forces since Operation Meghdoot in April 1984, at high cost in men and logistics.
      The Fix: Treat the northern Ladakh sector as a single operational theatre in planning, rather than as two separate bilateral borders.

    Conclusion

    India’s rejection restates a position of long standing, and it is the institutional form of the Pakistan-China arrangement that is new. A commission that sits, meets and records outcomes is an attempt to convert a contested transfer into ordinary bilateral administration. The next marker is whether the commission acquires a schedule of meetings and published outcomes, since a body that meets once is a statement and a body that meets regularly is a practice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed as a cardinal subset of China’s larger ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. Give a brief description of CPEC and enumerate the reasons why India has distanced itself from the same.”

  • What lies beyond India’s E20 push

    Why in the News

    India has scaled up the E20 petrol blend this year as crude prices rose following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A written reply to the Lok Sabha by the Road Transport and Highways Minister has conceded that E20 reduces fuel economy by “2% to 6% depending on vehicle category and vintage”, citing a joint study by the Automotive Research Association of India, the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers and Indian Oil Corporation Limited. The blend was introduced in 2023 on three stated claims: savings for the consumer, lower carbon emissions, and foreign exchange savings. All three rest on mileage holding steady, and the admitted loss in mileage puts each of them in question.

    What is the E20 blend?

    1. Composition: A litre of E20 petrol is 80% motor gasoline and 20% anhydrous ethanol (ethanol with water removed, so it mixes with petrol without separating).
    2. Rollout: Public sector oil marketing companies began selling E20 at select outlets in February 2023, and supply has since widened across the country.
    3. Energy content: Ethanol releases less energy per litre burnt than pure gasoline, so a litre of E20 carries a vehicle a shorter distance than a litre of the earlier E10 blend.

    Why has E20 been pushed now, and on what claims?

    1. Crude price trigger: The scale up followed rising crude prices after American action against Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in response.
    2. Three stated benefits: The case for the blend rests on cheaper fuel for households, lower carbon emissions per kilometre, and a smaller oil import bill.
    3. The admitted qualifier: The government’s own position records a fuel economy loss of 2% to 6%, varying with vehicle category and vintage.
    4. Engine damage is unquantified: Owners of vehicles of 2022 vintage and earlier report mileage loss beyond 6% along with damage to engines and fuel tanks, and the scale of that damage cannot be measured from available data.

    Has E20 saved Indian households money?

    1. The savings claim: A higher ethanol share substitutes a cheaper input for expensive crude, which is argued to lower the household fuel bill and hold inflation down.
    2. What the claim omits: The claim prices the input and ignores the distance travelled per litre, which is what a household actually pays for.
    3. The arithmetic at the pump: E20 was introduced while keeping the pump price unchanged from E10. A car averaging 15 km per litre on E10 with a 6% mileage loss needs 1.06 litres for the same 15 km, so Rs 106 buys what Rs 100 previously covered.
    4. The aggregate burden: An investigation by The Reporters Collective estimates that Indian consumers spent an additional Rs 88,234 crore over three years because of the mileage loss, with the burden rising every year.
    5. Alternative price instruments exist: Holding pump prices down when crude rises can be done through indirect tax policy in the short run, without shifting the cost onto mileage.

    Do carbon emissions actually fall with E20?

    1. Lower carbon per litre: E20 embodies less carbon per litre than E10, at 2.23 kgCO2 per litre against 2.32 kgCO2 per litre, drawn from United States Environmental Protection Agency figures.
    2. Mileage cancels the gain: More litres burnt for the same distance offsets the lower carbon content of each litre.
    3. The break even point is 4%: Emissions fall only where the mileage loss is under 4%. Across the 4% to 6% range the Minister himself stated, emissions rise rather than fall.
    4. The excess at 6%: A 6% mileage loss produces 2.37 kgCO2 against 2.32 kgCO2 for 15 km travelled, an excess of about 50 gCO2.
    5. The fleet mix decides the average: Newer vehicles built for E20 lose less mileage and emit less, older vehicles emit more, so emissions per kilometre across the country depend on the weight of each vintage on the road.

    What does ethanol blending do to foreign exchange and to crops?

    1. The forex logic: Oil is a large share of the import bill, so any substitution away from crude does save foreign exchange.
    2. Mileage offsets part of it: A fall in mileage raises the volume of fuel consumed, which cancels part of the import saving.
    3. Feedstock is diverted from food: Sugarcane and maize are the two main sources of ethanol, so blending targets translate into crop diversion and into a long term adjustment in what is grown.
    4. The sugar consequence: Exports were banned in 2023 and again this year as ethanol diversion pushed up domestic demand, cutting dollar earnings from sugar exports.
    5. The maize consequence: Maize export earnings fell sharply over the last two years as its share in ethanol production rose, and India became a net importer of maize last year.
    6. The trade channel closes the loop: A demand and production mismatch in an agricultural commodity is settled through higher prices, through trade management, or both. Lower exports and higher imports are themselves a loss of foreign exchange.

    Challenges to the E20 blend

    1. Legacy fleet incompatibility: Vehicles built before E20 compatibility norms carry the sharpest mileage loss and face corrosion risk in fuel lines and seals. Eg. Cars and motorcycles of 2022 vintage and earlier run on the same blend with no alternative offered at the pump.
      The Fix: Keep E10 available at fuel outlets so owners of older vehicles can buy the blend their engine was built for.
    2. Feedstock concentration: Ethanol supply rests on two water and land intensive crops, so a blending target transmits directly into cropping choices. Eg. Sugarcane in Maharashtra draws heavily on irrigation in water stressed districts.
      The Fix: Scale second generation ethanol from crop residue and other non food feedstock so blending stops competing with the food chain.
    3. Absence of consumer choice: A single blend at the pump removes the buyer’s ability to weigh a mileage loss against a price. Eg. The Chief Economic Adviser has argued that consumers should at least be given a choice between E10 and E20.
      The Fix: Require outlets above a set throughput to dispense both blends.
    4. Unused fiscal instrument: Excise duty on petrol can absorb a crude price spike, which is the task the blend has instead been asked to perform. Eg. Central duty relief was used to hold pump prices down until recent State elections were over.
      The Fix: Set a rule based countercyclical excise band so duty falls automatically once crude crosses a stated threshold.
    5. Transport demand left untouched: Blending changes what a vehicle burns and not how many vehicle kilometres are travelled, so total fuel use and pollution keep rising. Eg. Vehicle registrations in large Indian cities continue to grow faster than public transport capacity.
      The Fix: Build reliable subsidised public transport with last mile connectivity, alongside cycling and walking infrastructure.

    Conclusion

    The blend is settled policy and the fleet running on it is not. Two questions remain open. The first is whether a household gets to choose the blend its engine was designed for, rather than absorbing the mileage loss silently at an unchanged pump price. The second is whether ethanol demand can be met without pulling sugarcane and maize out of the food and export chain. Watch the feedstock mix reported for the next Ethanol Supply Year (the twelve month period over which ethanol supply contracts to oil marketing companies are counted) and whether E10 stays on sale.

    Back2Basics

    1. Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme: Administered by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, it requires oil marketing companies to sell petrol blended with ethanol to cut crude imports and support sugar and grain producers.
    2. National Policy on Biofuels, 2018: It set the blending pathway and was amended in 2022 to advance the 20% ethanol blending target to the Ethanol Supply Year 2025-26 from 2030.
    3. Permitted feedstock: The policy widened eligible raw material beyond sugarcane molasses to sugarcane juice, damaged foodgrain, surplus rice and maize.
    4. Second generation ethanol: Produced from crop residue and other lignocellulosic waste rather than from food crops, it is supported through the Pradhan Mantri JI-VAN Yojana.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Consider the following statements: Statement I: Of the two major ethanol producers in the world, i.e., Brazil and the United States of America, the former produces more ethanol than the latter. Statement II: Unlike in the United States of America, where corn is the principal feedstock for ethanol production, sugarcane is the principal feedstock for ethanol production in Brazil. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?”

  • The 1991 treaty violated by Pak ship that collided with Indian vessel

    Why in the News

    A Pakistani ship closed on an Indian Navy vessel and collided with it in international waters. India has summoned Pakistan’s Charge d’Affaires over the conduct and placed it in direct contravention of Article 10 of the 1991 Agreement between India and Pakistan on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements. Article 10 bars naval ships and submarines of the two countries from closing within three nautical miles of each other while operating in international waters. The last comparable episode was in 2011, when the Pakistan Navy ship PNS Babur brushed past the Indian Navy frigate INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden and damaged the frigate’s helicopter safety net. The contested point is whether a set of confidence building measures written in the late 1980s and early 1990s still restrains conduct at sea, when the only consequence of a breach is a diplomatic protest.

    What is the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements?

    1. Purpose: The agreement establishes a standing mechanism for the two countries to inform each other about military exercises and troop movements. Its stated object is to prevent a crisis arising from a misreading of the other side’s intentions.
    2. Scope: It lays down rules for the land, naval and air forces of both countries. Major exercises close to the other’s territory are to be avoided, and where they take place the other party is to be informed.
    3. Naval threshold: A major naval exercise is defined as one involving six or more ships of destroyer or frigate size and above, exercising in company and crossing into the other country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (the maritime belt extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline, over which a coastal State holds resource rights).
    4. Article 10: Naval ships and submarines of the two countries are not to close less than three nautical miles from each other in international waters, so as to avoid an accident. One nautical mile is about 1.85 km.

    Why did the two countries build this agreement when they did?

    1. Nuclear weapons programmes: Accelerating weapons work on both sides through the 1980s raised the cost of any war to a level neither government could absorb. That escalation is what made a standing notification mechanism attractive to both.
    2. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: The December 1979 invasion made Pakistan and the United States keen to avoid disturbance on Pakistan’s eastern border with India. Pakistan’s western commitment created the space for an eastern arrangement.
    3. Exercise Brass Tacks IV: India carried out a massive military exercise in Punjab and Rajasthan along the India-Pakistan border in January 1987, mobilising some 150,000 troops. The scale of the exercise alarmed Pakistan and produced the specific demand for advance notice that the 1991 treaty answers.
    4. Clarification rights: The agreement allows either side to seek clarification on the assembly of forces, and on the direction, extent and duration of an exercise. That right is the operative response to the uncertainty Brass Tacks IV created.

    What else does the confidence building architecture of this period contain?

    1. Joint commission, 1983: The Agreement for the establishment of a joint commission between India and Pakistan was signed on 10 March 1983. It was the first of the structured bilateral mechanisms of this phase.
    2. Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, 1988: Finalised on 31 December 1988, it bars each country from attacking the other’s nuclear installations. The two sides exchange lists of their nuclear installations every 1 January, and that exchange has continued without a break since 1992.
    3. Cultural Cooperation Agreement, 1988: Signed on the same day as the nuclear installations agreement. It shows the period’s approach of pairing a military restraint measure with a civilian one.
    4. Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations, 1991: Signed on 6 April 1991, the same day as the advance notice agreement, it also permits over flights and landings by military aircraft. Air and land restraint were therefore settled together, and the naval rule sits inside the same package.

    What does the recurrence of naval incidents show about the agreement’s reach?

    1. Long gap between incidents: The previous close quarters episode was in 2011 in the Gulf of Aden, far from either country’s coast. The rule has held for long stretches, which is why each breach is treated as a signal rather than as routine.
    2. Distance from the exercise framework: Both incidents occurred during ordinary deployments, not during a notified major exercise. The agreement’s notification machinery is built for planned exercises and does not reach the day to day operations where contact actually happens.
    3. Response limited to protest: India’s recorded response in both cases was a diplomatic communication. No joint inquiry, shared navigational record or agreed finding of fault follows a breach.

    Challenges to the 1991 Agreement

    1. No verification or monitoring machinery: The agreement provides for notification and for clarification on request, and creates no inspection body or joint verification procedure. Eg. Neither side produced an agreed account of the 2011 PNS Babur and INS Godavari incident, which closed without a finding.
      The Fix: Attach a standing naval point of contact on each side with a fixed timeline for exchanging navigational data after a close quarters incident.
    2. No incidents at sea instrument: Article 10 fixes a separation distance and prescribes nothing about signalling, manoeuvring or harassment at close range. Eg. The United States and the Soviet Union addressed exactly these behaviours through the Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972, which India and Pakistan have no equivalent of.
      The Fix: Negotiate a dedicated incidents at sea agreement covering signalling procedure and prohibited manoeuvres, separate from the exercise notification framework.
    3. Dependence on the political climate: Each measure in this architecture survives only while the wider relationship permits it, and none carries a self executing renewal. Eg. The composite dialogue that carried most bilateral confidence building work has been suspended for extended periods after terror attacks.
      The Fix: Insulate the technical measures from the political dialogue by giving the military to military channels their own standing mandate.
    4. Silence on non-state and hybrid activity: The instruments of this period address regular forces and declared exercises, and say nothing about maritime infiltration, unattributed vessels or fishing fleet incidents. Eg. The 26 November 2008 Mumbai attackers reached the city by sea after hijacking a fishing trawler.
      The Fix: Extend the notification framework to a maritime incident register covering non-naval vessels operating in the other country’s declared zones.
    5. Asymmetry in the dispute settlement route: A breach produces a summons, and the agreement names no arbiter, no penalty and no suspension clause. Eg. India’s protest in the present case ends with the summons, whatever the outcome of the collision.
      The Fix: Provide for a joint review at the level of the two naval headquarters within a fixed period of any reported breach of Article 10.

    Conclusion

    The 1991 Agreement remains in force, and both navies continue to operate in the same international waters. India’s response has stopped at a summons, which is the whole of what the instrument provides. The gap the collision exposes is procedural rather than political: the two countries have a rule on separation at sea and no shared means of establishing what happened when it is broken. What to watch is whether the exchange of nuclear installation lists due on the next 1 January proceeds as usual, since that is the one measure of this architecture that has run unbroken and is the readiest indicator of whether the rest still holds.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Terrorist activities and mutual distrust have clouded India-Pakistan relations. To what extent the use of soft power like sports and cultural exchanges could help generate goodwill between the two countries? Discuss with suitable examples.”

More posts