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Subject: Agriculture

  • 1.5x Formula for crops MSP calculation

    Talks between farmer unions and the government failed to reach a resolution. The main bone of contention in these talks is the Minimum Support Price (MSP) for crops, which farmers fear the new laws will do away.

    Try this:

    Q.There is also a point of view that agriculture produce market committees (APMCs) set up under the state acts have not only impeded the development of agriculture but also have been the cause of food inflation in India. Critically examine. (CSM 2014)

    What is MSP?

    • The MSP assures the farmers of a fixed price for their crops, well above their production costs.
    • MSP, by contrast, is devoid of any legal backing. Access to it, unlike subsidised grains through the PDS, isn’t an entitlement for farmers.
    • They cannot demand it as a matter of right. It is only a government policy that is part of administrative decision-making.
    • The Centre currently fixes MSPs for 23 farm commodities based on the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) recommendations.

    Why in news yet again?

    • The Union Budget for 2018-19 had announced that MSP would be kept at levels of one and half times of the cost of production.
    • This year the govt. has increased the MSP for all mandated Kharif, Rabi and other commercial crops with a return of at least 50 per cent of the cost of production for the agricultural year 2018-19 and 2019-20.
    • This is the ambiguity from where this 1.5 times formula arrived at.

    How did the government fix the MSPs of crops before every planting season?

    • The CACP considered various factors while recommending the MSP for a commodity, including the cost of cultivation.
    • It also takes into account the supply and demand situation for the commodity; market price trends (domestic and global) and parity vis-à-vis other crops; and implications for consumers (inflation), environment (soil and water use) and terms of trade between agriculture and non-agriculture sectors.

    What changed with the 2018 budget?

    • The Budget for 2018-19 announced that MSPs would henceforth be fixed at 1.5 times of the production costs for crops as a “pre-determined principle”.
    • Simply put, the CACP’s job now was only to estimate production costs for a season and recommend the MSPs by applying the 1.5-times formula.

    How was this production cost arrived at?

    • The CACP projects three kinds of production cost for every crop, both at the state and all-India average levels.
    • ‘A2’ covers all paid-out costs directly incurred by the farmer — in cash and kind — on seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, hired labour, leased-in land, fuel, irrigation, etc.
    • ‘A2+FL’ includes A2 plus an imputed value of unpaid family labour.
    • ‘C2’ is a more comprehensive cost that factors in rentals and interest forgone on owned land and fixed capital assets, on top of A2+FL.

    Now try this PYQ:

    Q.The economic cost of food grains to the Food Corporation of India is Minimum Support Price and bonus (if any) paid to the farmers plus:

    (a) Transportation cost only

    (b) Interest cost only

    (c) Procurement incidentals and distribution cost

    (d) Procurement incidentals and charges for godowns

    Which production costs were taken in fixing the MSPs?

    • In 2018, then FM Arun Jaitley’s did not specify the cost on which the 1.5-times formula was to be computed.
    • But the CACP’s ‘Price Policy for Kharif Crops: The Marketing Season 2018-19’ report stated that its MSP recommendation was based on 1.5 times the A2+FL costs.

    What are the farmer’s demands?

    • Farm activists, however, had said that the 1.5-times MSP formula should have been applied on the C2 costs.
    • CACP considers A2+FL and C2 costs, both while recommending MSP. It reckons only A2+FL cost for return.
    • However, C2 costs are used by CACP primarily as benchmark reference costs (opportunity costs) to see if the MSPs recommended by them at least cover these costs in some of the major producing States.

  • The perils of deregulated imperfect agrimarkets

    The article examine issue of agriculture produce marketing. The passage of FPTC Act 2020 sought to address the challenges faced by the farmers. However, these are several issues the Act fails to resolve. These issues are discussed here.

    Why do farmers sell outside mandis?

    • Official data show that even for paddy and wheat, respectively, only 29% and 44% of the harvest is sold in a mandi.
    • In other words a large proportion of Indian harvest is not directly sold in a mandi.
    • Farmers are forced to sell outside the mandis for two reasons.

    1) There are not enough mandis

    • The National Commission on Agriculture (NCA) had recommended that every Indian farmer should be able to reach a mandi in one hour by a cart.
    • Thus, the average area served by a mandi was to be reduced to 80 km2.
    • For this, the number of mandis was to increase to at least 41,000.
    • But there were only 6,630 mandis in 2019 with an average area served of 463 km2.
    • Using another set of criteria, a government committee in 2017 had recommended that India should have at least 10,130 mandis.
    • So, by all counts, India needs not less but more mandis.

    2) Transport cost

    • Most small and marginal farmers, do not find it economical to bear the transport costs to take their harvests to mandis.
    • Thus, they end up selling their harvest to a village trader even if at a lower price.
    • Even if private markets replace mandis, small and marginal farmers will continue to sell to traders in the village itself.
    • The situation will change only if economies of scale rise substantially at the farm-level.

    Why there is poor private investment in markets?

    • Already, 18 States have allowed the establishment of private markets outside the APMC; 19 States have allowed the direct purchase of agricultural produce from farmers; and 13 States have allowed the establishment of farmer’s markets outside the APMC.
    • Despite such legislative changes, no significant private investment has flowed in to establish private markets in these States.
    • The reason for poor private investment in markets is the presence of high transaction costs in produce collection and aggregation.
    • When private players try to take over the role of mandis and the village trader, they incur considerable costs in opening collection centres and for salaries, grading, storage and transport.
    • Corporate retail chains face additional costs in urban sales and storage, as well as the risk of perishability.
    • This is why many retail chains prefer purchasing from mandis rather than directly from farmers.

    Issue of mandi tax

    • Many commentaries treat taxes in mandis as wasteful. This assertion is not fully true for two reasons:
    • 1) Much of the mandi taxes are reinvested by APMCs to improve market infrastructure.
    • A fall in mandi taxes would reduce the surplus available with APMCs for such investment.
    • 2) In States such as Punjab, the government charges a market committee fee and a rural development fee.
    • The Punjab Mandi Board uses these revenues to construct rural roads, run medical and veterinary dispensaries, supply drinking wate etc.
    • Such rural investments will also be adversely affected if mandis are weakened.

    Weakening of MSP regime

    • Many policy signals point to a strategic design to weaken the MSPs.
    • 1) Rising input and labour costs necessitates a regular upward revision of MSPs to keep pace with costs of living.
    • However, MSPs are rising at a far slower rate over the past five to six years than in the past.
    • 2) The government has not yet agreed to fix MSPs at 50% above the C2 cost of production.
    • As a result, farmers continue to suffer a price loss of ₹200 to ₹500 per quintal in many crops.
    • 3) The Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) has been recommending to the government that open-ended procurement of food grains should end.
    • These policy stances have set alarm bells ringing among farmers.
    • The farmers Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh feel that if mandis weaken and private markets with no commitment to MSPs expand, they fear a gradual erosion of their entitlement to a remunerative price.

    Steps to be taken

    • 1) India needs an increase in the density of mandis, expansion of investment in mandi infrastructure and a spread of the MSP system to more regions and crops.
    • 2) This increase in density should happen hand-in-hand with a universalisation of the Public Distribution System.
    • 3) APMCs need internal reform to ease the entry of new players, reduce trader collusion and link them up with national e-trading platforms.
    • The introduction of unified national licences for traders and a single point levy of market fees are also steps in the right direction.

    Consider the question “The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, 2020 was passed with a view to address the challenges faced by the farmers in selling their produce. However, there are concerns with the provision of the Act and its efficacy to addresss these challenges. What are the issues with the Act? Suggest the measures to address these issues.” 

    Conclusion

    The government’s must try to allay the fears of farmers over the Farm Bills and it is never too late to rethink. Unconditional talks with farmers would be an appropriate starting point.

  • Cultivation of ‘Wild’ Arunachal Kiwi

    Recently, the ‘Wild’ Arunachal Kiwi has received organic certification by the Mission Organic Value Chain Development for the North East Region.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Among the agricultural commodities imported by India, which one of the following accounts for the highest imports in terms of value in the last five years?

    (a) Spices

    (b) Fresh fruits

    (c) Pulses

    (d) Vegetable oils

    Arunachal Kiwi

    • The kiwifruit (Actinidia deliciosa Chev.) is a deciduous fruiting vine native to Yangtze River valley of south and central China.
    • In Arunachal Pradesh, a domesticated variety of kiwi was introduced as a commercial fruit only in 2000.
    • The Ziro Valley specifically located at 1,500-2,000 metres above sea level is the most ideal for kiwi.
    • It is also called “China’s miracle fruit” and “Horticulture wonder of New Zealand”.

    Benefits of certification

    • Certification helps producers and handlers; they receive premium prices for the products and have access to fast-growing, local, regional and international markets.

    Organic certification in India

    • An agricultural practise/product is considered organic when there are no chemical fertilizers or pesticides involved in its cultivation process.
    • Such certifications in India can be obtained after a strict scientific assessment done by the regulatory body, Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA).

  • Farmers’ protest

    Farmers all across the Punjab and Haryana have marched to New Delhi over the new legislations.

     Major cause of Farmers’ protest

    • Much of the opposition really is just to one of the three laws. It is the Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation)  Act and its provisions that are seen as weakening the APMC mandis.
    • Even in that one — the act — there are only some contentious provisions, which, although key, can still leave doors open for negotiation.

    A fight for privilege

    • Farmers, if anything, would gain from removal of stocking restrictions on the trade, as it potentially translates into unlimited buying and demand for their produce.

    The contentious one: FPTC Act

    • The FPTC Act is a bone of contention. It permits sale and purchase of farm produce outside the premises of APMC mandis.
    • Such trades (including on electronic platforms) shall attract no market fee, cess or levy “under any State APMC Act or any other State law”.
    • An issue here is the very right of the Centre to enact legislation on agricultural marketing.
    • Article 246 of the Constitution places “agriculture” and “markets and fairs” in the State List.
    • But entry 42 of the Union List empowers the Centre to regulate “inter-State trade and commerce”.

    An example of Central hegemony

    • While trade and commerce “within the State” is under entry 26 of the State List, it is subject to the provisions of entry 33 of the Concurrent List.
    • Under this, the Centre can make laws that would prevail over those enacted by the states.
    • Entry 33 of the Concurrent List covers trade and commerce in “foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils”, fodder, cotton and jute.
    • The Centre, in other words, can very pass any law that removes all impediments to both inter- and intra-state trade in farm produce, while also overriding the existing state APMC Acts. The FPTC Act does precisely that.

    Farmers question

    • Some experts make a distinction between agricultural “marketing” and “trade”.
    • Agriculture per se would deal with everything that a farmer does — right from field preparation and cultivation to also sale of his/her own produce.
    • The act of primary sale at a mandi by the farmer is as much “agriculture” as production in the field.
    • “Trade” begins only after the produce has been “marketed” by the farmer.

    The centre’s overriding logic behind

    • Going by this interpretation, the Centre is within its rights to frame laws that promote barrier-free trade of farm produce (inter- as well as intra-state) and do not allow stockholding or export restrictions.
    • But these can be only after the farmer has sold.
    • Regulation of first sale of agricultural produce is a “marketing” responsibility of the states, not the Centre.

    What do farmers’ want?

    • Farmers would want no restrictions on the movement, stocking and export of their produce.
    • For example, Maharashtra’s onion growers have vehemently opposed the Centre’s resort to ban on exports and imposition of stock limits whenever retail prices have tended to go up.
    • But these restrictions relate to “trade”.
    • When it comes to “marketing” — especially dismantling of the monopoly of APMCs — farmers, especially in Punjab and Haryana, aren’t very convinced about the “freedom of choice to sell to anyone and anywhere” argument.

    Where lies the major issue?

    • Much of government procurement at minimum support prices (MSP) — of paddy, wheat and increasingly pulses, cotton, groundnut and mustard — happens in APMC mandis. 
    •  In a scenario where more and more trading moves out of the APMCs, these regulated market yards will lose revenues.
    • They may not formally shut, but it would become like BSNL versus Jio.
    • And if the government stops buying, farmers will be left with only the big corporates to sell to.

    What could be negotiated?

    • If the protesting farmer union leaders were to sit down at the negotiating table, the government can possibly get them to agree to drop the demand on repealing all the three laws.
    • Their problem is essentially about the FPTC Act and its provisions that they see as weakening the APMC mandis.
    • These may be just fears, but they aren’t small.
    • From the government’s standpoint, the elephant in the room would be if the farmers insist on an additional demand: Making MSP a legal right.
    • This  would be still impossible to meet, even if the three farm laws were to be put on hold.

     

  • Power sector reforms: UK lessons for India

    Reforms in power sector in the UK were extensive and offers some important lessons for India. This article elaborates on the issue of reforms the challenges in introducing such reforms in India.

    Background of the power sector reforms in UK

    • After living with vertically integrated utilities till 1989, they unbundled.
    • Unbundling created markets both at generation and retail end.
    • Today, they are back to a situation where 70% of the power generated is sold outside the wholesale market.
    • The Electricity Act, 1989, which paved the way for the appointment of a regulator and thereafter, leading to unbundling, both vertical and horizontal.
    • Twelve distribution utilities were set up (called RECs) along with three-generation companies and also a national wires company (called NGC).
    • All of them were privatised barring Nuclear Electricity.
    • Retail competition was introduced in 1990 and was extended to all consumers in 1998.
    • A wholesale market was set up for generators.
    • The next major step was to fragment the generators because the regulator felt that they were colluding.
    • NETA in 2001 was primarily a tie-up between gencos and their consumers with long-term power purchase agreements.
    • The Energy Act, 2012, was enacted, which envisaged further changes.

    Issues with Power sector reform in India

    • The Electricity Act, 2003 is a very cautious and timid exercise compared to what has been done in the UK.
    • Through the Act, we have merely unbundled and ring-fenced our utilities so that there is transparency in the accounts; this itself took us several years.
    • There has been no attempt to create a wholesale market or a full-fledged retail market where the consumer chooses the supplier.
    • Large consumers, having loads in excess of 1 MW, however, have the option of open-access where they can opt to receive supply from some other entity, instead of his incumbent utility.
    • The road to open access though has been bumpy, and discoms have opposed it tooth and nail.
    • Besides what was possible in the UK may not be possible in India.
    • The UK did not have a regime of cross-subsidies where the commercial and industrial sectors subsidise agriculture and low-end domestic consumers and also did not have high commercial loss levels.
    • Moreover, in the UK, all consumers were metered, unlike India.
    • There is yet another factor: ‘Power’ falls in the Concurrent List.
    • The Centre and states rarely see eye-to-eye on several issues concerning the sector, especially on matters relating to distribution.
    • Consequently, any major change does not get accepted.

    Issues in introducing reform in India

    • The CERC floated a discussion paper in December 2018 about the creation of a wholesale market in India.
    • This amounts to retrofitting, and retrofitting in an existing architecture has its limitations.
    • But the issue is whether India should attempt creating a wholesale market or for that matter a full-fledged retail market in India, especially after the experience of the UK.
    • The UK is almost back to the era of vertically integrated utilities, and consumers barely switch their retailer.

    Way forward

    • We need to privatise our distribution sector by creating joint ventures with the government.
    • the government will have to undertake initial hand-holding till such time commercial losses are wiped out.
    • This is the model which was followed in the case of Delhi and has proven successful.
    • Commercial losses have come down from 50% to single-digit figures within a span of 10 to 12 years.
    • Once we reach that stage, we can think of creating a full-fledged retail market where a consumer can choose her supplier.

    Consider the question “Despite several reforms in the power sector, India still lacks full-fledged retail. What are the challenges in the creation of such a market. Suggest the ways to deal with the challenges.”

    Conclusion

    The Indian consumer is only interested in good quality power supply at a reasonable price. We only need to take policy measures so that the incumbent utilities can provide this, since, this will be the least costly path.

    Source:-

    https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/power-reforms-uk-lessons-for-india/2127560/

  • What is NAFED?

    The central cooperative NAFED will soon begin importing onions in a bid to tame soaring prices before the festive season.

    UPSC can frame statements based MCQ over the functions of NAFED.

    NAFED

    • National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd (NAFED) is an apex organization of marketing cooperatives for agricultural produce in India.
    • It was founded on 2 October 1958 to promote the trade of agricultural produce and forest resources across the nation.
    • It is registered under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act.
    • NAFED is now one of the largest procurement as well as marketing agencies for agricultural products in India.
    • With its headquarters in New Delhi, NAFED has four regional offices at Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata, apart from 28 zonal offices in capitals of states and important cities.

    Functions of the NAFED

    • To facilitate, coordinate and promote the marketing and trading activities of the cooperative institutions, partners and associates in agricultural, other commodities, articles and goods
    • To undertake purchase, sale and supply of agricultural, marketing and processing requisites, such as manure, seeds, fertilizer, agricultural implements and machinery etc.
    • To act as a warehouseman under the Warehousing Act and own and construct its own godowns and cold storages
    • To act as agent of any Government agency or cooperative institution, for the purchase, sale, storage and distribution of agricultural, horticultural, forest and animal husbandry produce, wool, agricultural requisites and other consumer goods
    • To act as an insurance agent and to undertake all such work which is incidental to the same
    • To collaborate with any international agency or a foreign body for the development of cooperative marketing, processing and other activities for mutual advantage in India or abroad

    Now try this PYQ:

    Q.In, India, markets in agricultural products are regulated under the:

    (a) Essential Commodities Act, 1955

    (b) Agricultural Produce Market Committee Act enacted by States.

    (c) Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) Act, 1937

    (d) Food Products Order, 1956 and Meat and Food Products Order, 1973

  • Allaying the fears of farmers over MSP regime

    Question of MSP regime while arguing in favour of recently passed agri bills has made the farmers apprehensive of the purpose of the bill. The article argues for allaying the fears of the farmers and explains the salience of the MSP.

    Flawed argument over MSP

    • The recently enacted farm bills have triggered debate on the desirability of the MSP regime.
    • But, the bills do not facilitate a policy to do away with Minimum Support Prices (MSPs).
    • The bills allow free entry to agents who wish to set up markets — whether they be private individuals, producer collectives or cooperatives.
    • This means that the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and other associated agencies can procure in the traditional mandis, or in a new market established under this law — or in their own backyard.
    • So, the argument that if the mandis cease to exist, the procurement will also cease is, in fact, flawed.
    • Supporters of the bills have quoted the Shanta Kumar committee’s figures to argue that MSPs are anyway irrelevant for most of the farmers in the country.
    • This linkage of the farm bills with the MSP only adds to the apprehension that farmers have about the bills.

    Significance of MSP

    • It is true that the procurement has remained confined to only a few crops.
    • But the benefits to the farmers even beyond Punjab and Haryana are certainly not negligible.
    • It is true that only a small fraction benefits directly from the procurement.
    • But one cannot ignore the indirect benefit of this to all foodgrain producers in the country.
    • As the procurement significantly exceeds the PDS requirement, this creates additional demand in the foodgrain market, pushing up the prices.
    • This has been a great help for all the grain producers in the country, especially when the international prices have remained low for a long time now.
    • The RBI’s annual report of 2017-18 on impact of MSP on the food prices conclusively shows that MSP is a leading factor influencing the output prices of the farm produce in the entire country.
    • The issue of MSP is all the more important for rain-fed agriculturists, being deprived of irrigation, they don’t derive benefit from subsidies on electricity and fertiliser as their use is limited.
    • So, at the moment, the only state support these farmers (primarily cotton and pulse producers) have is that of MSPs.

    Conclusion

    The debate on whom and how the state should support is an issue that should be addressed independently of the farm acts. Presenting these acts as an alternative to MSPs will not persuade farmers.

  • Give reforms a chance

    Agri-bill passed by the Parliament resulted in the protest from farmers from several states. The bills have also been challenged on the legal footing as well. This article explains how the bills will benefit the farmers and also examines the legal basis used for their passage.

    States trying to nullify the agri bills passed by Parliament

    • Parliament has passed three bills on agriculture reform. This has evoked protests, largely in Punjab and Haryana.
    • Taking recourse to Article 254 of the Constitution, the Punjab government has passed its own bills to nullify some provisions of the central acts.
    • Similar action by the Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan governments seems to be on the anvil.

    Legal justification for Parliament passing the laws related to agriculture

    • The Constitution has placed agriculture on the state list.
    • Various petitions have also been filed in the Supreme Court claiming that the central laws infringe upon the jurisdiction of state governments.
    • However, it is the Centre which decides and announces support prices for major crops for the entire country.
    • It also decides issues such as bank loan waivers.
    • International agreements and multilateral trade in agricultural products also fall in the Union government’s domain.
    • Agricultural and dairy products, in fact, had a prominent role in India not joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
    • Entry 33 in the concurrent list limits the power of states in agriculture, by empowering both governments to legislate on production, trade and supply of a range of agricultural foodstuffs and raw material.

    Use of Article 254 to bypass Central law

    • The Punjab bill has set in motion the process of states taking refuge under Article 254 to pass their own pieces of legislation.
    • All state bills that seek to nullify central acts have to be approved by the President after they have received the consent of the governor of the state.

    Way forward

    • Reformist chief ministers and astute policy planners should grab this opportunity and encourage investment in private infrastructure to create supply chains and give the farmer the benefit of demand-led prices.
    • They should also take appropriate action to create institutional mechanisms, such as farmer producer organisations or aggregators, to ensure greater farmer participation.

    Conclusion

    It would be in the interests of the farming community and state governments to give the much-delayed reform measures a fair chance by giving them access to competitive purchases, affording better prices.

  • Reform land ceiling laws

    Land ceiling laws, enacted to deal with the problems of a bygone era, remains unchanged even in most of the States. This has given rise to different problems. The article suggests the relaxation of the ceiling acts to deal with the problem of land degradation and water depletion.

    Background of the ceiling laws

    •  India implemented land ceiling laws to deal with the ‘zamindars’ and impose landowning limits based on total production value of land—irrigated, grove, orchard, dry, etc.
    • Landholdings were scrutinised at individual and family level, and large farms were discouraged.
    • For most states, the ceiling ratio of dry-to-irrigated land is 3:1.

    Issues with the ceiling laws

    • In 2020, State land laws remain unchanged, trapping farm families in a negative ownership trap.
    • As with each generation, the average landholding of individuals reduces.
    • Dropping farm incomes, higher inputs costs, low sale price, soil degradation and water depletion erode production and farm value.
    • A progressive farmer hits production saturation due to limited land.
    • Contract farming has been no consolation either.
    • The result is that the Indian farm size is very small, 86% under two hectares, and is decreasing as the average size of operational holding has declined to 1.08 hectares in 2015-16 versus 1.15 in 2010-11 (Agricultural Census 2015-16).
    • The government is reticent on the Economic Survey’s recommendations to increase land ceiling limits.
    • Recently, Karnataka rescinded land limit reforms.

    How to deal with soil degradation and water depletion

    • 30% of India’s land is degraded, bad agri-practices threaten soil health, and water-guzzling crops like paddy, sugarcane, etc, have resulted in a water crisis in many places.
    • States must study soil conservation program of the US, which paid farmers subsidies for soil conservation or allowing land to be fallow.
    • States should incentivise farmers for agro-ecological plantations and agro-forestry by relaxing land ceiling limits for them.
    • State Acts may include organic plantations under exempt categories similar to tea/rubber plantations.
    • Native biodiversity based mixed orchards, from mahua to moringa, can be encouraged and exempted by state governments.
    • Policy change will have benefits—soil and water rejuvenation, increase in farmers’ incomes and new products for the free market.
    • The return of organic matter and biodiversity will sustain farmland productivity.
    • Plus APEDA predicts a $50 billion organic export 2030, but the cherry would be additional carbon credits.
    • If 10% of arable land converts to organic grove land, India will mitigate climate change and pollution.
    • Each hectare with 0.01% humus can store 80,000 litres of water. We need a central policy to bolster this drive.
    • Farmers may take over waste or degraded land, beyond land ceiling limits, and restore land as a carbon sink and produce more nutrition per acre.
    • As farmers will care for these lands, the government’s financial burden to restore wastelands will lessen.

    Consider the question “Land degradation threatens India’s future if not dealt with in time. In light of this, examine the reasons for soil degradation and suggest the ways to deal with it” 

    Conclusion

    As a nation, we have a choice to steer the bigger farms towards agro-ecology or allow industrial farms to take over rural India. The government needs to bring out a fourth Ordinance to free the land for healing the Earth.

    Source:-

    https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/reform-land-ceiling-laws-incentivise-farmers-for-agro-ecological-plantations-and-agro-forestry/2113635/

     

     

  • Politics and economics of farm bills

    Reforms in agriculture have been overdue. But the passage of farm bills by the Parliament has evoked opposition from several stakeholders. However, the passage of bills by the Punjab Assembly is the first from any State Assembly. The article explains how politics dominates agriculture reforms and its implications for economic growth.

    States trying the negate the farm bill passed by Parliament

    • By passing its farm bills, Punjab has become the first state to legislate to negate impact of legislation enacted by Parliament last month.
    • Other states like Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh, could follow suit soon.
    • Notwithstanding whether President Ram Nath Kovind gives his assent to the state bills that undermine the central ones, the important issue is to determine how much of this conflict is about economics aimed at helping farmers and how much sheer politics.

    Issues with Punjab’s farm bills

    • Punjab’s farm bills prohibit private players from buying wheat and paddy below the MSP even outside the APMC markets.
    • It doesn’t apply to other crops, say maize, cotton, pulses and oilseeds that are under the ambit of the central MSP system.
    • The point is that this pertains only to wheat and paddy.
    • The bill could even have been extended to milk and vegetables by declaring local MSPs for them, but it didn’t do that.
    • Because the state government knows full well that it will create a fiasco in agri-markets, which might boomerang on it politically.
    • Law for wheat and paddy will not help farmers as the Centre already buys more than 95 per cent of Punjab’s wheat and paddy at MSP through the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and state procurement agencies.

    Economic roots of politics over MSP: Lessons from the past

    • Demand that MSP be made a legal instrument (rather than indicative) actually exhibit deep distrust of the private sector and markets.
    • In1972 government announced that the wholesale trade in wheat and rice (paddy) will be taken over by the government as traders were being unscrupulous in not giving farmers their due MSP and manipulating prices.
    • The first marketing season of the government takeover of wholesale wheat trade, in 1973-74, saw a major fiasco.
    • Market arrivals dropped, and wheat prices shot up by more than 50 per cent. It was a bitter lesson.

    Long overdue reforms in agriculture

    • Economic reforms in 1991 took some time to yield results, but, by the 2000s, India was taking 7 per cent.
    • But even the 1991 economic reforms bypassed agriculture marketing reforms.
    • It was only in 2003, a model act on agri-marketing was circulated to the states.
    • But that model act did not go far enough.
    • From 2004 to 2014 government did not pursue any major agri-marketing reforms.
    • In food government enacted the National Food Security Act in 2013, giving 5 kg wheat or rice to 67 per cent of the population at Rs 2/kg and Rs 3/kg.
    • A high-level committee (HLC) under Shanta Kumar was formed in 2014 to restructure the grain management system.
    • The committee suggested major changes, including cash transfers in the public distribution system, and overhauling the FCI’s operations and free markets to make the system more efficient.
    • But the government could not undertake bold reforms, except some marginal tinkering of labour rules in the FCI.

    Conclusion

    The COVID-19 crisis opened a window of opportunity to reform the agri-marketing system. The government grabbed it — this is somewhat akin to the crisis of 1991 leading to de-licensing of industry. Patience and professionalism will bring rich rewards in due course, not noisy politics.