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Subject: Economics

  • Sharp fall in oil prices is opportunity for India to increase stockpile

    This article highlights the opportunity that the sharp drop in the oil prices presents to India. It also highlights several issues with India’s strategic petroleum reserves and suggests ways to deal with them. We have covered an article from livemint on the same topic in the past week.

    Negative price in the international market for WTI crude oil

    • Oil prices continue to decline globally, with crude hitting multi-decade lows, as global demand evaporates.
    • Earlier last week, in unprecedented price action, the near-month contract for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) sweet crude oil dropped to -$37.63 a bbl.
    • A negative price has never before been registered for a major global crude oil benchmark.
    • The extreme price action is a signal that there is a global oil glut with few places to store oil.
    • Global oil markets have been severely disrupted.
    • While WTI does not feature in India’s basket, Brent Crude Oil, which does, is trading around $25 a barrel, the lowest in 18 years.

    Price of oil: The silver lining of the future recovery

    • Even as India suffers from a lockdown, a silver lining for future recovery and reconstruction is the price of oil.
    • Given India’s growth aspirations and lack of self-sustaining oil production, a sharp reduction in oil prices is a bonanza.
    • Normally, reduced oil prices would translate into surplus for the consumers and a fiscal bonus for the government through increased tax collections.
    • However, given that the demand for petrol has slumped, those gains will not accrue right away.
    • Opportunity for India: India should look at this as an opportunity to strengthen its energy security by buying oil and filling up our Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR).
    • Considering that India was the third-largest consumer of energy in the world, as well as the third-largest importer of oil in 2018, we are particularly vulnerable to oil price fluctuations.
    • The dramatic reduction in oil prices offers a once-in-a-generation opportunity for us to fill up our reserves in an extremely cost-effective way.

    India’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) Programme

    • Currently, we do maintain an emergency stockpile of oil reserves: Under the existing Strategic Petroleum Reserves programme, India claims to have 87 days of reserves.
    • Out of this, refiners maintain 65 days of oil storage and the rest of the reserves are held in underground salt caverns maintained by Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL).
    • The existing and planned capacity for the underground reserves is 10 and 12 days of import cover for crude oil respectively.

    Following point highlights the importance and various issues with India’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). SPR plays an important role in India’s energy security.  A question based on its role may be asked by the USPC “Assess the importance of Strategic Petroleum Reserves for India and what are the issues associated with that need to be improved?”

    Issues with the strategic reserves

    • First, capacity does not directly translate into utilisation, which is partly because oil is an expensive commodity most days of the year.
    • In 2019, the average closing price of a barrel of crude was $57.05.
    • In 2018, it was $64.90, and in 2017, U$50.84.
    • Of the existing 10 days of capacity, only about 50 per cent is utilised.
    • The second issue is with regard to the refinery holdings.
    • In India, the SPR arrangement between the oil refineries and the Union or state governments is not specified well, though most of the refineries that hold stock are publicly-owned companies.
    • In fact, a breakdown of which refineries hold SPR and in what form (crude or refined) or information about where they are located is not publicly available.

    Need for transparency in relation to SPR

    • The first step, therefore, should be to introduce transparency and accountability in relation to the SPR.
    • The procedures, protocols and facts about Indian SPR storage require greater public and parliamentary scrutiny, just like India’s other strategic reserves (for instance, foreign exchange).
    • For this, there should be timely and reliable dissemination of information.
    • Instead, it is now shrouded in secrecy.
    • The ambiguity surrounding mobilisation process: The lack of transparency around our SPR holdings is compounded by the ambiguity surrounding the mobilisation process.
    • SPR reserves are meant to be used in emergencies, where time is likely to be of the essence.
    • The SPR mobilisation process could be made more efficient by laying out designated roles for different agencies to avoid redundancies in times of crisis.
    • There should be role and process clarity regarding SPR mobilisation.
    • For instance, to begin with, there should be clarity on who (or which agency) can define an emergency and therefore order a mobilisation.

    Diversification of SPR

    • Further, in order to mitigate risks better, India should look to diversify its SPR holdings.
    • Diversification can be 1)Based on geographical location (storing oil either domestically or abroad), storage location (underground or overground) and 2) Product type (oil can be held in either crude or refined form).
    • Storage and transportation costs could be saved by diversifying geographically.
    • 3) Diversification could also be in the form of ownership — either publicly owned through ISPRL or by private oil companies, such as ADNOC of Abu Dhabi.
    • The private companies could fill up the SPR when prices are low and take advantage of price arbitrage.
    • This could achieve a degree of price stability and reduce the cost for India to buy such large quantities of oil.
    • The only requirement for this to work is to have a clear contract with the private companies about the mandatory minimum level of stock that they should preserve for use in emergency times.

    Storing oil abroad

    • With oil dirt-cheap, if we can purchase more than we can store in our existing facilities, why not go abroad for more storage space?
    • For instance, one option could be to operationalise, modernise, and add to the oil tanking facilities at Trincomalee in Sri Lanka.
    • Another opportunity would be to enter into a strategic partnership with Oman (Ras Markaz) for oil storage.
    • Partnership with Oman would also help India avoid the potential bottleneck of the straits of Hormuz.
    • Geopolitical risk factor: Since many of these places could potentially be vulnerable to geopolitical risks, only a small part of India’s overall SPR strategy should involve storing abroad.

    Conclusion

    Energy is and will remain vital to India’s aspirations for growth. The sharp fall in the price of oil presents an opportunity for the Union government to increase its SPR stockpile and achieve a degree of energy security.

  • The universal delivery of food and cash transfers by the state amid Covid-19

    This focus of this article is on the universal delivery of food and cash transfer amid corona pandemic. There are some estimates of the cost of universal cash transfer and food delivery in the article and suggestion to ensure universal delivery.

    Universal food and cash delivery is needed

    • The immediate need for universal food and cash delivery is by now obvious and urgent.
    • Across the country, there are reports of people — migrant workers, local workers, peasants, pastoralists, fisherpeople, vendors, ragpickers, and the destitute — facing extreme hardship, even starvation, because their livelihoods have been extinguished by the lockdown.
    • These have created further an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, as millions of households with depleted savings have no way to access food and other basic necessities over the coming weeks.
    • The threat of infection from COVID-19 makes even harder their coping mechanisms.
    • In these dire circumstances, it is essential for the state to directly provide the basic means of survival to anyone who needs it.
    • This must be in both cash and kind. Food access is the most important.
    • But because of the closure of economic activity and the absence of any livelihood opportunity, this must be combined with cash transfers to tide over this period and the immediate aftermath.
    • Food transfers must be provided for at least six months, and cash transfers for at least three months, though these can be extended depending on the period of lockdown.
    • Because of the severity of the crisis and the high probability of widespread hunger and descent into poverty, these transfers must be universal, made available to every person who needs them, without relying on exclusionary criteria, existing lists or biometric identification.

    The points mentioned below give us the ideal of food-grain stocks with India. And there are also the estimates of how much would be required if we decide to go for universal delivery of food. The data given below is important from Mains perspective.

    How much will be the cost of universal food delivery?

    • Consider first free universal provisioning of 10 kg of grain (wheat or rice) per person per month.
    • This is likely to be availed of by at most around 80 per cent of the population.
    • With an estimated population of 1.3 billion, providing this for six months would require 62.4 million tonnes of grain.
    • This is a maximal estimate — the actual requirement would be lower.
    • Stocks with the FCI: The FCI is currently holding 77 million tonnes of foodgrain stocks, compared to buffer stock norms of 24 million tonnes.
    • It is expected to procure another 40 million tonnes from the current rabi harvest.
    • It could easily release and allow the free distribution of foodgrain of 5 million tonnes and still have foodgrain stocks of 54.5 million tonnes, if the expected rabi procurement targets are met.
    • Cost of storing grains: Furthermore, it is costly for the FCI to store this grain. The current costs of storage are estimated to be Rs 5.60 per kilogramme per year or Rs 2.80 for six months.
    • This means that by releasing 4 million tonnes to feed the hungry of India over the next six months, the FCI would actually be saving Rs 17,472 crore, assuming that these idle stocks would have persisted.
    • But even if these were sold, the costs are the revenue that would have been earned.
    • This is difficult to estimate but by using Finance Minister’s estimates in Budget we get a (maximal) figure of Rs 1,17,000 crore.

    Cost of universal cash transfer

    • In addition, a proposed cash transfer of Rs 7,000 per month for three months to every household, assuming again that 80 per cent of households would receive this.
    • With five persons per household, this expenditure would be Rs 4,36,800 crore.
    • The two transfers together amount to Rs 5,53,800 crore, or around 9 per cent of currently estimated GDP.

    Financing the expenditure through fiscal deficit

    • This sum of Rs. 5,53,800 is not a forbidding sum.
    • A great part of the responsibility to make these resources available vests with the Union government.
    • But whatever taxes are introduced in a supplementary budget that has become unavoidable, the expenditure incurred has to be financed immediately through a fiscal deficit.
    • Given the massive deflationary pressures and a complete collapse of economic activity, there is a strong case for financing the additional public expenditure through deficit financing or borrowing directly from the RBI.
    • This is required both for coping with the pandemic and for softening the blow of the lockdown.

    Following two suggestions are important suggestions for the delivery of food and cash in case we don’t have reliable data.

    How to ensure universal delivery of food?

    • The question arises of how universal delivery of these food and cash transfers is to be ensured.
    • Existing lists are inadequate for the purpose because they significantly underestimate and exclude those who should be beneficiaries.
    • For example, at least 100 million people are excluded from access to food under the National Food Security Act based on the 2011 Census.
    • The most effective way of dealing with the food emergency is to provide food delivery at doorsteps or neighbourhood collection points to anyone who asks for it, with a simple marker such as the indelible ink used during elections to serve as the indicator of receipt.

    How to endure universal delivery of cash?

    • For cash transfers, the matter is more complicated.
    • In rural India, MGNREGA job cards and pensions cover most households and allow bank payments.
    • The urban poor include migrants, contract and casual workers mostly in small and medium enterprises, daily wagers, domestic workers, self-employed persons like street vendors, sex workers and ragpickers, and the destitute including homeless people.
    • But there is no comprehensive record of the urban poor because the state has instituted no effective mechanisms to secure labour rights or social security rights to most urban workers.
    • The urban poor build and service the city, surviving without rights and a hostile or indifferent state.
    • The legally-mandated registration of inter-state migrants and construction workers in practice excludes most because their employers with the connivance of the state don’t wish to be bound to secure their rights.
    • The humanitarian emergency created by the pandemic and lockdown entails universal cash transfers again to every adult who presents herself to designated officials in decentralised offices.
    • For those who have accessible bank accounts, the funds can be credited to these accounts.
    • For others, the Odisha system, whereby pensions are disbursed as cash in hand at pre-specified times, maybe a useful model to follow.
    • This also can be adopted with indelible ink as proof of receipt.

    Employment schemes after cash transfers

    • The income transfers must quickly give way to an expanded rural employment guarantee scheme, and a new urban employment programme.
    • These urban employment programs include caregiving and building water supply, sanitation and shelter for the urban poor.
    • Private hospitals also need to be nationalised at least for the duration of the pandemic.

    Conclusion

    The working and poor people should not be made to bear the burden of the pandemic. There is a need for a bold resolve, by central and state governments, to literally reach the last person, rural or urban, with the food and cash they require to survive with dignity.

     

     

  • East India will require heavy investment to tide over the post-Covid loss of livelihood

    The article discusses the issue of migrant labourers and the problems eastern states could face due to the return of labourers and the lack of employment opportunities in these states. The return of migrant labourers may lead to the mechanisation in the states where they worked. A relief-cum-stimulus package at least 5% of the GDP is suggested by the author.

    IMF’s projections for the economy

    • The IMF’s projections for GDP growth for this year seem to be either in the negative or below 2 per cent for almost all major countries of the G-20 group.
    • India could do a little better compared to the other BRICS nations, but its growth will most likely be below 2 per cent.
    • This, of course, is under an optimistic scenario.
    • Many experts reckon that India could also go into negative GDP growth this year if it does not reboot the economy properly and in time.

    The problem of collapse in demand

    • The Centre and the Reserve Bank of India are trying to remove all roadblocks so that factories and farms can resume operations.
    • The focus is largely on the supply side — how to ease restrictions and how to increase liquidity in the system for resuming production.
    • It may not take too long as the real problem is the collapse in demand.
    • And that demand may not pick up easily as the virus is likely to stay with us for quite some time.
    • We could have lockdowns again if there is a surge in infection.
    • This will surely limit our travel and restrict our shopping for non-essentials.
    • However, there is one demand that can easily revive — that of food.

    Why food demand matters?

    • The NSSO survey of consumption expenditures for 2011-12 revealed that about 45 per cent of the total expenditure of an Indian household is on food.
    • For the poor, the NSSO reckoned, this figure was about 60 per cent.
    • We do not have information about the consumption patterns in 2020, guess is that about 35-40 per cent of the expenditure of an Indian household is on food and for a poor household, this figure is around 50 per cent.
    • Herein, lies the scope to reboot the economy.

    Labour shortage and mechanisation

    • The sudden announcement of the nationwide lockdown gave labours no time to go back to their families.
    • They lost their jobs and incomes and having spent whatever little savings they had, these workers have been reduced to penury.
    • The Centre and states, despite their best efforts, have not managed to address the problem of hunger of these workers.
    • Even civil society has not managed to bridge the gap.
    • The migrant labourers may well have lost their trust in the state, and once the lockdown is lifted, most of them are likely to rush back to their families in villages.
    • And, it could be some time before they are back in the cities — that is, if they return at all.
    • So, farms and factories, especially the MSMEs in the relatively developed states of western, southern and north-western India are likely to face labour shortages for many months, perhaps years.
    • This could lead to more mechanisation of farms and factories in these states.
    • In Punjab, for example, most of the wheat harvesting is already done by combined harvesters.
    • Now even paddy harvesting could be done by mechanised harvesters.

    The double challenge for states which are home to migrants

    • However, eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, and Odisha, from where much of the migrant labour comes, will face a double challenge.
    • Their agriculture, with tiny farm holdings, is already saddled with a large labour force — this comprises 45 to 55 per cent of the total labour force of these states.
    • Non-farm income from wages and salaries, through migrant labour, was an important source of income for households in these states.
    • This is now severely hit. In all probability, the per capita rural incomes of these states could shrink, at least in the short run.
    • This could lead to poverty and increase hunger and malnutrition.
    • How does one then reboot the economy and also address hunger and malnutrition?

    The lockdown and the subsequent plight of the migrant labourers brought to the fore uneven development in the country. The points mentioned below suggest the ways to address this problem. A question based on this issue could be asked by the UPSC, for ex- “The issue of migrant labourers amid Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the uneven development in the country. In this context, state the reasons which led to the uneven development of various regions of the country. Suggest ways to address the problem”.

    The requirement of a special investment package for eastern states

    • A special investment package — like the Marshall Plan of USA in 1948 — for the eastern belt of India is required.
    • Investment should be used to build better infrastructure, agri-markets and godowns, rural housing, primary health centres, schools and enhances people’s skills.
    • The package will go a long way to revive the economy and augment the incomes of the migrant workers.
    • Rising incomes will generate more demand for food as well as manufactured products, giving a fillip to the growth engines of agriculture as well as the MSME sector.
    • Building better supply chains for food directly from farm-to-fork, led by the private sector, will enhance the export competitiveness of agriculture.
    • It will also ensure a higher share of farmers in the consumers’ rupee.
    • Long-term demand-driven growth: Such broad-based development in a relatively underdeveloped region of the country will lay the foundations of a long-term, demand-driven, growth of the industry in India.
    • The all India relief package of Rs 1.7 lakh crore announced by the central government earlier, which is about 0.8 per cent of the country’s GDP, is too small to reboot the economy.

    Conclusion

    If India has to bounce back quickly, it needs a much bigger relief cum stimulus package — certainly not below 5 per cent of GDP. And, it should focus more on the eastern belt, where the issue is that of survival.

    Back2Basics: Marshall Plan, 1948

    • The Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program, was a U.S. program providing aid to Western Europe following the devastation of World War II.
    • It was enacted in 1948 and provided more than $15 billion to help finance rebuilding efforts on the continent.
    • The brainchild of U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, for whom it was named, it was crafted as a four-year plan to reconstruct cities, industries and infrastructure heavily damaged during the war and to remove trade barriers between European neighbours – as well as foster commerce between those countries and the United States.

  • Lockdown with a human face: Immediate focus should be on alleviating hardships of poor, vulnerable groups

    The article deals with the policy response to the crisis. Reducing the pain inflicted on the poor and vulnerable section should be the priority. The size and nature of the stimulus package is also discussed in the article.

    The dilemma of lives Vs. livelihood

    • As the coronavirus spreads, severe dilemmas haunt policymakers.
    • Testing of lockdown? Even the scientific community is confused and does not seem to know whether the South Korean model of more intensive testing is preferable to the European model of a complete lockdown.
    • The economic crisis that we are facing today is very different from any crisis that we have encountered recently.
    • This is the first economic crisis in recent memory to have been triggered by a non-economic factor — a pandemic.
    • A lockdown essentially amounts to limited economic activity and this results in throwing temporary workers and daily wage earners out of employment.
    • Migrant labour falls in this category.
    • According to the 2011 census, the number of migrant workers under the category, “migrants for work/employment” was 41.42 million.
    • This number must have grown substantially by now.
    • The impact of the lockdown has fallen very heavily on the poor and vulnerable groups.
    • We need to bear this in mind while evolving the strategy to combat the virus.

    Expenditure during the pandemic

    • First, medical and healthcare expenditure, which includes the money spent on extension of hospital facilities, employment of additional medical and healthcare workers, costs of testing on a much wider scale and the purchase of accessories like personal protection equipment, ventilators and testing kits.
    • The expenditure under this category is a “must” and there can be no compromise on it.
    • The length of the battle will decide the cost.
    • Second, the expenditure involved in taking care of the people thrown out of employment, and other vulnerable sections of the population.
    • Third, stimulation expenditure aimed at restarting the economy. Here, the financial system presided over by the RBI will play an important role. But the government also has a role.

    Two issues to consider while deciding on the lockdown

    • The “life” versus “livelihood” dilemma pertains to the lockdown policy.
    • A tight lockdown over an extended period may save lives by curtailing the progress of the virus.
    • But at the same time, it places several segments of society under severe hardship.
    • With the lack of economic activity, many will go hungry.
    • In this context, the government must look at two issues.
    • First, it must consider to the extent to which the lockdown can be relaxed while keeping in mind the priority of restricting the spread of the virus.
    • The government has recently announced some relaxations.
    • This is a welcome step. However, it must keep this concern under continuous consideration. It must explore other options on the medical front as well.
    • For example, will more testing make it possible to reduce restrictions?
    • Second, if the lockdown is a “compulsion”, we need to pay adequate attention to the plight of people who have been affected adversely.
    • The government had earlier announced certain measures to help some segments of society.
    • With the lockdown being extended, it is necessary to raise the levels of relief, and also cover segments of society not covered earlier — migrant labour, for example.

    The following points about the stimulus package are appearing repeatedly in most of the article on economic damage to the economy. They are also relevant from the UPSC perspective. A question based on it,  like “What steps were taken by the government to revive the Indian economy in the aftermath of the corona crisis?” can be asked.

    What should be the nature of the stimulus package?

    • There is much talk about a “stimulation package” to revive the economy.
    • The financial system will have to lead the charge.
    • Additional expenditure: Expectations regarding additional expenditures by the government vary from 2 per cent of the GDP to 5 per cent of the GDP.
    • Normal sources of financing will not be adequate to meet this order of expenditure.
    • Many analysts felt that the figure of 3.5 per cent of the GDP as the fiscal deficit, indicated in the budget for 2020-21, would be exceeded.
    • The pandemic will necessitate an increase in expenditure.
    • Moreover, with the decline in economic activity, revenues will also go down.
    • The revenue projections were made on the assumption that the nominal income growth would be 10 per cent.
    • But this is unlikely to be achieved. The nominal income growth is likely to be 7 per cent, at best.
    • Given the increase in expenditures and the slowdown in revenue collection, the borrowing programme will exceed significantly over what was indicated in the budget.
    • The monetisation of debt is inevitable and it will have its own consequences.
    • Provisions for states: The brunt of the expenditures will be borne by the state governments and therefore, the Centre must allocate additional resources to them.
    • They may also be allowed additional borrowing above 3 per cent of the state domestic product.

    What will be the overall growth rate for India?

    • In the first quarter of 2020-21, the GDP growth rate will be negative.
    • Agricultural performance during the year could be the same as in 2019-20 as the rainfall is expected to be normal.
    • The developed world may go through a recession over the year.
    • Thus the external sector may not be of much help.
    • It is quite possible for the economy to have a V-type recovery from the second quarter of 2020-21.
    • On that assumption, the overall growth rate for the year can be 3 per cent. This is an optimistic estimate.

    Conclusion

    To return to the present, the focus of the government has to be two-fold. It must act vigorously to contain the virus, explore the possible alternatives to complete lockdown. Second, it must take all actions to provide adequate help to the poor and the needy including the migrant workers. Lockdown, as necessary, must be with a human face.

     

  • What is “Direct” Monetization of Deficit?

    With the economy stalled, there isn’t enough money in the market for the government to borrow. Can it ask the RBI to print more money? How does this process work, and what are the arguments against it? Let us see:

    Discuss the scope and feasiblity of “Direct” Monetization by the government for Deficit Financing as an option of the last resort.

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    What is “direct” monetisation of the deficit?

    • Imagine a scenario where the government deals with the RBI directly — bypassing the financial system — and asks it to print new currency in return for new bonds that the government gives to the RBI.
    • Now, the government would have the cash to spend and alleviate the stress in the economy — via DBT to the poor or starting social and capital expenditure etc.
    • In lieu of printing this cash, which is a liability for the RBI (recall that every currency note has the RBI Governor promising to pay the bearer the designated sum of rupees), it gets government bonds.
    • Such bonds are an asset for the RBI since such bonds carry the government’s promise to pay back the designated sum at a specified date.
    • And since the government is not expected to default, the RBI is sorted on its balance sheet even as the government can carry on rebooting the economy.

    What triggers a demand for direct monetization?

    1) Decline of Demand

    • With a nationwide lockdown, incomes have fallen and so have consumption levels.
    • In other words, the demand for consumer goods and services (say a haircut) in the economy has gone down.
    • What can be done to boost demand? People need to have money. But, of course, who will give them money.
    • From the highest-ranking CEOs to stranded workers, incomes have taken a huge hit, if not completely dried up.

    2) Moving ahead for a fiscal deficit

    • For its part, the RBI has been trying to boost the liquidity in the financial system. It has bought government bonds from the financial system and left it with money.
    • Most banks, however, are unwilling to extend new loans as they are risk-averse. Moreover, this process could take time.
    • The government’s finances were already overextended going into this crisis, with its fiscal deficit way over the permissible limit.
    • On top of that, if the government was to provide some kind of a bailout or relief package, it would have to borrow a huge amount. The fiscal deficit will go through the roof.

    3) No money in the market

    • There isn’t enough money in the market for the government to borrow.
    • Moreover, as the government borrows more from the market, it pushes up the interest rate.
    • Hence, the govt. is left with the only solution — the “direct” monetisation of government deficit.

    How is DM different form OMOs?

    • Direct monetization is different from the “indirect” monetizing that RBI does when it conducts the so-called Open Market Operations (OMOs) and/ or purchases bonds in the secondary market.

    Global examples

    • Other countries are doing it to counter the economic crisis related to COVID-19.
    • In the UK on April 9, the Bank of England extended direct monetisation facility to the UK government even though the Governor of the Bank opposed the move till the last moment.

    Has India ever done this in the past?

    • Yes, until 1997, the RBI “automatically” monetized the government’s deficit.
    • In 1994, Manmohan Singh (former RBI Governor and then Finance Minister) and C Rangarajan, then RBI Governor, decided to end this facility by 1997.
    • Now, though, even Rangarajan believes that India would have to resort to monetising the deficit.

    Issues with Direct monetisation

    • Direct monetisation of the deficit is a highly contested issue.
    • Another former RBI Governor D Subbarao has said that there is no question that India must borrow and spend more in this crisis.
    • He regarded this as a moral and a political imperative.

    Issues: Inflationary practice

    • Ideally, this tool provides an opportunity for the government to boost overall demand at the time when private demand has fallen — like it has today.
    • But if governments do not exit soon enough, this tool also sows the seeds for another crisis. Here’s how:
    • Government expenditure using this new money boosts incomes and raises private demand in the economy. Thus, it fuels inflation.
    • A little increase in inflation is healthy as it encourages business activity. But if the government doesn’t stop in time, more and more money floods the market and creates high inflation.

    To what level should government debt be ideally limited?

    • While no ideal level of debt is set in stone, most economists believe developing economies like India should not have debt higher than 80%-90% of the GDP. At present, it is around 70% of GDP in India.
    • It should commit to a pre-determined amount of additional borrowing and to reversing the action once the crisis is over.
    • Only such explicitly affirmed fiscal restraint can retain market confidence in an emerging economy.
    • The other argument against direct monetizing is that governments are considered inefficient and corrupt in their spending choices — for example, whom to bail out and to what extent.

  •  Indian Debt market, that never was

    India’s bond market suffers from several issues. This article discusses such issues, and also highlights the recent positive trends seen in the debt market owing to several steps taken by the government.

    The Indian debt market, primarily of the fixed-income variety, can be broadly classified into:

    • 1. Money Market
    • Where the borrowing is for a tenor of less than a year.
    • Different types of money market instruments: Inter-Bank Term Money, repo transactions, Certificate of Deposits, Commercial Papers, T-Bills, etc. are some of the money market instruments.
    • Through these instruments, short term requirement of funds is met by banks, institutions and the state and central governments.
    • 2. Bank and Corporate Deposits
    • Bank fixed deposits (FDs) have been popular and widely subscribed to, as the feeling of no-default-risk.
    • Corporate deposits are FDs issued by a company (non-bank).
    • 3. Government Securities
    • G-Secs are sovereign-rated debt papers, issued by the government with a face value of a fixed denomination.
    • 4. Corporate & PSU Bond Market
    • Corporate bonds are issued by public sector undertakings (PSUs) and private firms.
    • These bonds are issued for a wide tenor between 1 year – 15 years.
    • These bonds carry a different risk profile and hence will have associated rating.

    Debt market plays a significant role in the economy of a country. But India’s debt market suffers from shallowness. Some of the steps taken by the government to improve the situation have been showing positive trends. In the light of this development, the UPSC can frame a direct question, for ex. “What are the factors responsible for the shallowness of the debt market in India? Suggest ways to increase the depth of the debt market in India.”

    What are the problems of India’s debt market?

    • Wholesale market: The Indian debt market is largely a wholesale market.
    • It is a wholesale market in a sense that a majority of institutional investors comprises of mainly banks, financial institutions, mutual funds, EPFO, insurance companies and corporates.
    • The concentration of these large players has resulted in the debt markets being fairly skewed, evolving into a wholesale & bilaterally-priced trades.
    • Lack of retail sell and transparency: It also lacks the retailness and the contractual transparency that the Indian capital markets have been able to build in the past 2 decades.
    • Skewed towards G-secs: Structurally, the debt market remains firmly skewed towards government securities (G-secs).
    • Also, the largest investor group in the G-secs market are the banks, due to their regulatory requirement to invest in SLR.
    • Low and unstable trading in the corporate bond market: The Indian corporate bond market has low & unstable trading volumes.
    • Sadly, the corporate bond market remains largely about top-rated financial and public sector issuances.
    • The domestic debt managers have forgotten that the logic of the business of finance is “to price the risk”.

    Regulation and comparison with other countries

    • RBI regulates money markets & G-secs.
    • SEBI regulates the Corporate debt market & bond markets.
    • The domestic debt market in India amounts to about 67% of GDP.
    • The size of India’s corporate bond market is a mere 16% of GDP — compared with 46% in Malaysia, and 73% in South Korea.

    The recent positive trend in the debt market

    • In the past few years, the domestic corporate bond market had seen increasing volumes, largely due to financial investments going into it, including retail participation.
    • Also, the banks had ceded space to NBFCs over past many years.
    • This is because banks found it easier to buy securitisation pools to achieve their PSL targets rather than develop competencies that NBFCs had built-in serving affinity groups, in smaller cities & towns.
    • And post the ILFS crisis, the markets have started shunning non-banks again.
    • Policy initiative by the government: The various policy initiatives undertaken in the last few years would take time to fructify and to stabilise.
    • These include the IBC, SEBI’s bond market policies, RBI’s large borrower framework for enhancing credit supply.
    • Some of these have already seen changes/addendums to the original draft, with the intent being to course-correct, for the stability of the markets.

    Roll over of debt papers in India

    • We have seen liquidity problems in our markets every few years.
    • The concept of “roll-over” of debt paper was usual as our markets did not build long term papers.
    • With the ILFS slowdown, it was easy for name-calling on “ALM mismatch” concept.
    • Not much had been anyways done before and later to address the availability of debt to reduce the Asset-to-Liability mismatches.
    • Also, we have played it safe so far by even lending for large infra projects with shorter paper and hoped to roll it over at the end of the debt term.

    Conclusion

    This is the time that our regulators need to work along with the various governments, especially the states, for smoother ironing of fiscal hiccups and use this to redress any structural glitches. It’s time that there is actual intent to deepen the domestic debt market and to listen to the industry about their requirements.

    Back2Basics: What is ASM?

    • Banks’ primary source of funds is deposits, which typically have short- to medium-term maturities.
    • They need to be paid back to the investor in 3-5 years.
    • In contrast, banks usually provide loans for a longer period to borrowers.
    • Home loans, for instance, can have a tenure of up to 20 years.
    • Providing such loans from much shorter maturity funds is called an asset-liability mismatch.
    • It creates risks for banks that need to be managed.
    • The most serious consequences of asset-liability mismatch are interest rate risk and liquidity risk.
    • Because deposits are of shorter maturity they are repriced faster than loans.
    • Every time a deposit matures and is rebooked if the interest rates have moved up the bank will have to pay a higher rate on them.
    • But the loans cannot be repriced that easily. Because of this faster adjusting of deposits to interest rates asset-liability mismatch affects net interest margin or the spread banks earn.

    Priority Sector Lending (PSL)

    • Priority Sector Lending is an important role given by the (RBI) to the banks for providing a specified portion of the bank lending to few specific sectors like agriculture and allied activities, micro and small enterprises, poor people for housing, students for education and other low-income groups and weaker sections etc.

    Roll over of debt

    • When debt becomes due there is a need to either repay the principal or alternatively, to enter into a new agreement.
    • Structurally, funds from the second debt are used to repay the first debt.
    • Then you repay the second debt as required. Quite often these new terms will be agreed with the initial lender.
    • In essence, you’re ‘rolling’ the repayment obligation from one period into the next.
    • This all leads to rollover risk, which is the risk you that you won’t be able to find anyone willing to lend the value of the outstanding debt and/or offer a comparable rate as the first principle repayment obligation approaches.
    • This may be due to either movement in the borrowers perceived credit status and/or changes to the broader credit environment.
    • This was a key theme during the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008.
    • The reasons for refinancing may include the above, but also other themes such as debt consolidation (which doesn’t directly imply a change to the debt term).

  • The deal raises several concerns for privacy, net-neutrality and consumer welfare

    Facebook’s decision to acquire a 9.99 per cent stake in the parent company of Reliance Jio could have several implications. It could impact retail stores which we are trying hard to protect by restricting FDI in retail. Second, it could have implications for net neutrality. Third, it would have implications for data privacy.

    Implications for the country’s retail landscape

    • Recently, Reliance Industries and Facebook announced that the California-based social media giant will acquire a 9.99 per cent stake in Jio Platforms limited, the holding company of Reliance Jio, for $5.7 billion (Rs 43,574 crore).
    • At its core, the idea is to create an ecosystem around JioMart, enabling customers to access the local Kirana stores using WhatsApp, combining both offline and online retail.
    • This ability to connect millions of local businesses with end consumers, and provide them a seamless online transaction experience could radically alter the country’s retail landscape.
    • Both firms have stressed on the new opportunities for businesses of all sizes, and especially for the millions of small businesses across the country.
    • With the ongoing lockdown in the country only reaffirming the importance of the local Kirana store — major online delivery channels have struggled to reach consumers during this period — integration is bound to be an enticing proposition.

    Opportunities for cross-selling

    • A scaling up of this model will also provide opportunities for cross-selling — significantly increasing the upside for firms and increasing the valuation of its retail arms.
    • At present, though, the reach of WhatsApp Pay is limited — just over a million Indians are reported to currently have access to the pay feature.
    • But this sort of model is popular in other Asian economies such as China, Korea and Japan where apps like WeChat have a wide range of product offerings, which induces consumer stickiness.
    • This arrangement also allows Jio to greatly expand its product offering to its more than 370 million-odd subscriber base.
    • The deal may also open up the entire WhatsApp consumer base of around 400 million — to Reliance, including those on other telecom platforms such as Airtel and Vodafone.

    The following concern could arise from the deal and the UPSC can frame a question based on these concern, like ” Recently a global IT giant acquired a significant stake in an Indian telecom giant. Discuss the various issues which could arise from coming together of such dominant players.”

    What are the concerns in such deals?

    • Implications for consumer welfare: Given the dominant market position of the players, concerns over the market structure and its implications for consumer welfare are bound to arise.
    • Questions over net neutrality: The tie-up also raises questions on net neutrality with the possibility of preferential treatment being granted.
    • Data privacy issue: Third, given the data privacy issues highlighted in the past by the Cambridge Analytica episode, for instance, there are apprehensions over the enormous amounts of data that will be collected by these entities.
    • This concern gains significance especially when India still does not have a personal data protection law.

    Conclusion

    Whenever two dominant players of respective fields come together, it gives rise to concern. The government must keep watch on the implications and how such a deal plays out in the future. If the concerns raised turn out to come true, maybe India should come out with the antitrust law of its own.

     

  • Don’t waste the oil crisis

    This article discusses the factors that contributed to oil prices falling below zero, and where the prices are headed in the near future. There are suggestions for India to make the most of this oil crisis. In the last week, we covered the same topic but its focus was on increasing the storage capacity. This article also covers the geopolitical implications of oil prices remaining low for long.

    What negative price of the benchmark US crude WTI mean?

    • The collapse in the price of WTI reflected a technical peculiarity of futures trading.
    • Paper traders would normally have had two options- 1) To let their contract expire and take physical delivery 2) To pass on the contract to someone else.
    • The US was running out of crude oil storage capacity and traders knew they could not “risk” taking delivery.
    • There was no physical space to hold the product.
    • So their only option was to sell the contract.
    • On the last day before the contracts expired, the traders in desperation “paid” to offload their risk.
    • There was no physical transaction of oil.
    • The current future price is back in positive territory.

    The world running out of oil storage capacity

    • The world and not just the US was fast running out of storage capacity.
    • Production in excess of demand: This was because oil production was way in excess of demand.
    • The latter had crashed by almost 30 million barrels a day or mbd (the equivalent of OPEC’s entire production) because of the COVID-induced lockdown of transportation and industry.
    • The price of the other crude benchmarks had also dropped but not the same extent — the North Sea Brent fell, for instance, to $15/bbl, a level not seen since 1999.
    • The reason was that unlike the WTI, which is traded in the US and therefore dependent on US inland storage capacity, the other crudes have access to seaborne storage (oil tankers).
    • This latter capacity is, however, fast filling up and the price of these crudes may also hit historic lows.

    So, where the oil prices are headed?

    • Oil prices will be volatile downwards until demand picks up and/or supply is further cut.
    • Demand will depend on the curve of post-COVID economic recovery.
    • Supply will rest on the outcome of further discussions amongst OPEC, Russia and, ironically, the US.
    • OPEC and Russia had earlier this month agreed to cut production by 10 mbd.
    • But clearly, this is not enough and further cutbacks have to be agreed on.
    • Whatever the scenario for economic recovery or supply constraints, there is a slim likelihood of crude oil prices reaching the average price levels of 2019 ($64) over the next 12 months or so.
    • More likely, they will be volatile downwards with $50 as the ceiling and with no floor.
    • This “low for longer” price outlook raises two issues for India’s policy-makers.

    As India depends on imports for over 80% of its oil requirements, oil prices have wide implications for the financial health of India. Safe oil supply lines are essential for its energy security. Both these points are important from the UPSC point of view. Following two points deal with these two factors.

    Two issues that India’s policy-makers need to consider-

    1. Disruption of oil supply lines and problems of diaspora

    • Every oil producer with no exception will face a budgetary crisis.
    • Some, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait will finance their social and economic commitments by cutting costs, increasing debt and drawing down on their sovereign reserves.
    • Others like Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela, who have no such cushion and whose credit ratings are junk, will confront deepening political and social crises.
    • Economic plan: India should build into its economic plans the possibility that its traditional oil supply routes could get disrupted.
    • And that its diaspora, whose remittances are of significance, could face disproportionate hardship as these economies retrench.

    India has the largest diaspora in the world and sends as much as $80 billion back home as remittances. So, any impact on diaspora in oil economies has implication for India from this perspective as well.

    2. Empower the oil traders and remove bureaucratic control

    • On the day prices hit negative territory, it is unclear whether the trading experts in our oil PSUs had the flexibility to even contemplate “buying” the WTI futures contract for June, taking delivery, shipping it to India and storing it someplace.
    • It is also not clear whether they had the authority to lock in low prices through forward contracts.
    • Storage capacity and WTI quality mismatch: There is a shortage of storage capacity in India and a mismatch between the quality of WTI and the requirements of our refineries.
    • India cannot leverage the current market conditions of low and volatile oil prices to our national advantage unless we empower the traders and leave them unencumbered from bureaucratic control.
    • Most importantly, protect them from the three Cs ( CVC, CBI and CAG) in case their trade goes awry.

    Conclusion

    This oil market crisis could be made to work to our advantage. We must not waste this opportunity. There is a need to remove the bureaucratic hurdles in our PSUs, increasing storage capacity and sound financial planning by the government to make the most of this oil crisis.

    Back2Basics: What is WTI  and Brent crude benchmark?

    • West Texas Intermediate (WTI), also known as Texas light sweet, is a grade of crude oil used as a benchmark in oil pricing.
    • This grade is described as light crude oil because of its relatively low density, and sweet because of its low sulfur content.

    Brent Crude

    • Brent Crude is a trading classification of sweet light crude oil that serves as one of the two main benchmark prices for purchases of oil worldwide.
    • This grade is described as light because of its relatively low density, and sweet because of its low sulphur content.

    Futures contract

    • In finance, a futures contract is a standardized legal agreement to buy or sell something at a predetermined price at a specified time in the future, between parties not known to each other.
    • The asset transacted is usually a commodity or financial instrument.

  • What is Operation Twist?

    The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has announced simultaneous purchase and sale of government bonds in a bid to soften long-term yields under its Operation Twist.

    Operation Twist

    • Operation Twist is a move taken by U.S. Federal Reserve in 2011-12 to make long-term borrowing cheaper.
    • It first appeared in 1961 as a way to strengthen the U.S. dollar and stimulate cash flow into the economy.
    • It is the name given to a Federal Reserve monetary policy operation that involves the purchase and sale of bonds.
    • The operation describes a form of monetary policy where the bank buys and sells short-term and long-term bonds depending on their objective.

    Its genesis

    • The name “Operation Twist” was given by the mainstream media due to the visual effect that the monetary policy action was expected to have on the shape of the yield curve.
    • If we visualize a linear upward sloping yield curve, this monetary action effectively “twists” the ends of the yield curve, hence, the name Operation Twist.
    • To put another way, the yield curve twists when short-term yields go up and long-term interest rates drop at the same time.

     Back2Basics: Open Market Operations

    • Open market operations are the sale and purchase of government securities and treasury bills by RBI or the central bank of the country.
    • The objective of OMO is to regulate the money supply in the economy.
    • When the RBI wants to increase the money supply in the economy, it purchases the government securities from the market and it sells government securities to suck out liquidity from the system.
    • OMO is one of the tools that RBI uses to smoothen the liquidity conditions through the year and minimise its impact on the interest rate and inflation rate levels.

  • Recent amendments to FDI policy – a boon or a bane?

    This article deals with the recent changes made by the government in the FDI policy. The major change was that the government approval route was made mandatory for investment coming from certain countries. There are certain ambiguities and issues with the latest changes.These are discussed here.

    What changes were made in the FDI policy?

    • Government approval route for investment: Investment is permitted through government route only in the following cases-
    • 1) An entity situated in a country which shares a land border with India.
    • 2) Where the owner of investment into India is situated in or is a citizen of any such country.
    • Further, any transfer of ownership of any existing or future foreign direct investment (FDI) in an entity in India (indirectly or indirectly) resulting in the beneficial ownership falling within the purview of the above restrictions, would require the government’s approval.

    Ambiguities arising due to press note

    • There appear to be certain ambiguities arising from the press note and the amendments to the Rules.
    • The usage of the term “FDI” in the press note and the relevant amendments to Rule 6(a) of the Rules, seem to suggest that the restrictions are on investments that are structured as FDI.
    • FDI is defined under the Rules to mean investment through equity instruments by a person resident outside India in an unlisted Indian company, or in 10% or more of the post issue paid-up equity capital on a fully diluted basis of a listed Indian company
    • The restriction doesn’t seem to be on investments by an FPI registered with SEBI.
    • FPI is permitted to invest in listed or to be listed Indian companies’ securities, in the manner set out in Schedule II of the Rules.
    • Also not on investments under the FVCI route.
    • Investment through FVCI is an investment in the securities of Indian companies operating in certain specific sectors, in the manner set out in Schedule VII of the Rules.
    • It is also unclear if “foreign investments” in LLPs, not being FDI, would also be subject to these restrictions.
    • This ambiguity is further amplified by the subject line of the press note, which reads “curbing opportunistic takeovers/acquisitions of Indian companies”, without making any reference to LLPs.
    • And the amendments to Rule 6(a) of the Rules, which only pertain to investments in equity instruments of an Indian company under Schedule I of the Rules.

    The points mentioned here add to our understanding of FDI and issues with it. A question based on the issue can be asked, for ex-“What are the reasons for a steady decline in FDI in India? To what extent FDI poilcy is responsible for this?”

    Difficulties in seeking government approval

    • The requirement of seeking government approval may also pose operational difficulties for many entities.
    • For instance, the approval requirement seems to be applicable in all cases of further investments irrespective of the threshold.
    • It applies whether or not such investments are in the form of rights issue (where all or almost all existing shareholders also participate) or preferential allotments.
    • Which results in causing some amount of hardship for entities to raise further capital, especially where entities already have existing investments from investors situated in countries like China.
    • The amendments to the Rules also do not attempt to clarify the applicability of the approval requirements where there is no change in the shareholding percentage of the investor pursuant to a follow-on investment.
    • Another aspect which is important, is the usage of the terms “directly or indirectly” in the context of transfer/ divestment of beneficial ownership of existing FDI, to entities in/ citizens of a country which shares a land border with India.
    • This may require global acquisitions of entities in other jurisdictions which have subsidiaries/ investee companies in India, by a person in one of India’s neighbouring countries, to be subject to the approval requirements, thereby impacting timelines for closing.

    No restrictions on external commercial borrowings (ECB)

    • There are presently no such commensurate restrictions under the ECB regulations.
    • Therefore, an eligible borrower could avail ECB from a recognised lender.
    • That includes a foreign equity holder in one of India’s neighbouring countries which are FATF compliant for any immediate funding requirements.
    • Any conversion of the ECB or any part thereof, into shares of the Indian company, would be subject to the restrictions and approval requirements under the FDI policy and the Rules.

    Conclusion

    The government/RBI should provide necessary clarifications on these issues and ambiguities at the earliest. With there being no sunset clause presently contemplated on the applicability of these restrictions, only time will tell if the amendments to the Rules are a boon to the economy and a step in the right direction, or otherwise.

    Back2Basics: What is ‘Rights issue’

    • Cash-strapped companies can turn to rights issues to raise money when they really need it.
    • In these rights offerings, companies grant shareholders the right, but not the obligation, to buy new shares at a discount to the current trading price.
    • A rights issue is an invitation to existing shareholders to purchase additional new shares in the company.
    • This type of issue gives existing shareholders securities called rights.
    • With the rights, the shareholder can purchase new shares at a discount to the market price on a stated future date.
    • The company is giving shareholders a chance to increase their exposure to the stock at a discount price.
    • Until the date at which the new shares can be purchased, shareholders may trade the rights on the market the same way that they would trade ordinary shares.
    • The rights issued to a shareholder have value, thus compensating current shareholders for the future dilution of their existing shares’ value.
    • Dilution occurs because a rights offering spreads a company’s net profit over a larger number of shares.
    • Thus, the company’s earnings per share, or EPS, decreases as the allocated earnings result in share dilution.

    What is the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)?

    • LLPs are a flexible legal and tax entity that allows partners to benefit from economies of scale by working together while also reducing their liability for the actions of other partners.
    • In a general partnership, all partners share liability for any issue that may arise.
    • The LLP is a formal structure that requires a written partnership agreement and usually comes with annual reporting requirements depending on your legal jurisdiction.

    What is the FVCI route of investment?

    • Foreign Venture Capital Investor’ (FVCI) means an investor incorporated and established outside India and registered with Securities and Exchange Board of India under Securities and Exchange Board of India (Foreign Venture Capital Investors) Regulations, 2000.
    • The amount of consideration for all investment by an FVCI has to be received/made through inward remittance from abroad through banking channels or out of funds held in a foreign currency account and/ or a Special Non-Resident Rupee (SNRR) account maintained by the FVCI with an AD bank in India.
    • The foreign currency account and SNRR account shall be used only and exclusively for transactions under the relevant Schedule.