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Subject: External Sector

  • Trade-offs for growth revival: Why India’s policymakers need a new roadmap

    The article weighs in the policy options with the Indian policymakers to revive the India economy. This leads to the trilemma of managing the exchange rate, controlling the inflation and maintaining the capital account open all at the same time.

    A brief overview of 1991 economic reforms

    • The crisis in 1991 was centred on the balance-of-payments.
    • Allowing the Indian rupee to fall from an artificially high level  was a key part of the solution.
    • Since the reforms, the Indian rupee has steadily depreciated, roughly according to a market-determined equilibrium.
    • Extraordinarily high tariff barriers were reduced, allowing for welfare gains from greater international trade.
    • Reforms of the domestic economy that increased market orientation was, in some sense, opportunistically combined with these externally-oriented measures.

    What should be India’s foreign economic policy

    • In terms of connections to the rest of the world, however, it is less clear what the right policy mix should be.
    • We can think of three types of international flows: labour, goods and services, and capital.

    1) Internation flow of Indian labour

    • India has benefited from being able to send workers with a variety of skills to different types of economies: construction workers and nurses in the Persian Gulf, software engineers in the US, and so on.
    • Direct benefits came from large remittances back to India.
    • The pandemic and US immigration policy, have had some major impacts on this international connectivity, but new vaccines and a change in the US president are likely to reverse these shocks.
    • In any case, there is not much that Indian policymakers can do or need to do on this front.

    2) Trade in Goods and Service

    • India has been able to grow its exports, both in a variety of agricultural and manufactured commodities and in services, from software services to tourism.
    • It has been reasonably competitive in a range of goods and services.
    • It was only in the last few years, even before the pandemic, have Indian exports struggled to register growth.
    • Whereas the export powerhouses of East Asia consistently ran surpluses on the current account of the balance of payments, India has mostly run deficits, albeit manageable ones.

    3) Capital Flow: Area where policymakers have option

    • Current account deficits have to be covered somehow, though various forms of foreign capital.
    • Whereas economic theory and economic policymakers mostly agree on the benefits of international trade in goods and services there is less of a consensus on the benefits of international capital flows.
    • Capital flows can raise fears of instability if they are reversed, or make exports less competitive if they push up the value of the rupee. 
    • The country is a relatively attractive destination for foreign capital, both FDI and portfolio investment.
    • But, these flows can make Indian exports less competitive if the rupee appreciates too much, requiring domestic demand to do more of the work of absorbing increased output.

    Lesson from Japan

    • Right now, India is trying to build its manufacturing capacity by raising tariffs, in an old-style push for import substitution.
    • It is also providing direct incentives, such as the new scheme rewarding increases in production.
    • Arguably, this did work in Japan in the 1960s, but it is not clear if India is well-off enough to sustain that domestic strategy.
    • In addition, the lack of competitive discipline exporting can hinder the achievement of acceptable quality levels.

    Way forward

    • Capital controls to some extent can help mitigate the risk in this situation.
    • The Reserve Bank of India do more to keep the rupee at competitive levels, by accumulating foreign exchange reserves.

    Consider the question “In terms of links with the rest of the global economy, it is less clear what the right policy mix should be. Do you agree with the view that focus on simultaneously managing the exchange rate and domestic inflation while maintaining an open capital account would help in the revival of India’s economic growth

    Conclusion

    Lurking under the surface of these issues is the trilemma of being unable to simultaneously manage the exchange rate and domestic inflation while maintaining an open capital account, although foreign exchange reserves provide a way of softening the trade-offs. These are not new challenges, but they will need to be a focus for India’s policymakers as they seek renewed economic growth.

    Source:-

    https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/trade-offs-for-growth-revival-why-indias-policymakers-need-a-new-roadmap/2142900/

  • Premature membership of RCEP would not serve Indian interests

    The article analyses government’s decision to stay out of RCEP and factors responsible for it.

    What India chose not to join RCEP

    • By joining RCEP, India would have further risked a flood of cheap Chinese imports in sectors like electronics.
    • India had tried and failed to win substantial concessions in areas like work visas for its information technology-enabled services.
    • Two of India’s proposals—an RCEP business travel card and an RCEP service supplier card—failed to find favour with a majority of the bloc’s members.

    Arguments in favour of India joining the RCEP

    •  First argument made is RCEP would have provided an excellent opportunity for Indian firms to get integrated with regional value chains.
    • However, merely joining a trade bloc does not automatically result in integration with global value chains.
    • The complex nature of global production networks requires a lot of economic and trade policy reforms on the domestic front.
    • Second important argument made is that India would lose an opportunity to access RCEP’s common market.
    • But this argument too doesn’t hold much water if Indian producers are not competitive.
    • Competitiveness is driven by factors both within and beyond the control of domestic industry.
    • So it would be an over-simplification to assume that Indian industry does not have the capability or appetite to be competitive.
    • Often, global competitiveness inside factory gates gets diluted by costs borne outside those gates.

    What past data suggests

    • India’s merchandise exports grew at an annual rate of more than 18% between 2000-01 and 2010-11, which was largely a pre-FTA period.
    • In this period, India activated only two FTAs—with Sri Lanka and Singapore.
    • India joined the FTAs in a big way from 2010 onwards.
    • It operationalized big trade agreements with the 10-nation Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, Korea, and separately with Malaysia.
    • However, despite these deals, India could realize annual merchandise export growth of only 2.5% between 2010-11 and 2019-20.
    • This disappointing performance shows that FTAs are not conducive for exports.

    Conclusion

    While RCEP may theoretically offer India new opportunities for exports and integration with pan-Asian production networks, we have a lot of work to do internally before we are in a position to make the most of free-trade deals.

  • Putting India-U.S. trade ties on new footing

    After tumultuous years of Trump administration in trade policies, the article examines the new possibilities under the next U.S. President in trade ties with India.

    Approach towards WTO and India

    • The new U.S. administration will have more constructive stance on multilateral issues in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
    • The Trump administration went out of its way in seriously undermining WTO institutions when the organisation was already in need of reform and new direction.
    • The Biden administration is less likely to engage in unilateral tariff increases and more likely to pursue remedies in the WTO.
    • In case of India, the Trump administration it pursued an aggressive approach to resolve market access concerns through threats to eliminate India’s benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences programme.
    • However, the follow-through was weak.
    • The administration was on the brink of concluding a historic bilateral trade deal, yet it lost focus.

    5 likely developements

    • 1) It is clear that Mr. Biden plans to focus on domestic concerns first.
    • There may be trade aspects to some of these efforts, but they may have limited early relevance for a future U.S.-India trade policy.
    • 2) Two, as it turns to trade policy, the Biden administration is not likely to place India among its top few priorities.
    • Among top priorities will include formulating its approach with China, such as finding alternatives to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to set new global standards that address China’s practices.
    • That said, India should be among the priorities at the next level down.
    • 3) The trade deal still pending with the Trump administration remains compelling.
    • There could be an early opportunity to conclude these negotiations and for the Biden administration to get credit.
    • A bilateral deal will not lead to serious consideration of FTA negotiations any time soon.
    • But this first trade agreement could pave the way for later additional small agreements.
    • 4) The existing Trade Policy Forum (TPF) met only once over the last four years.
    • It seems likely that the Biden administration will see the TPF’s value as a venue for more regular discussions on a range of trade issues.
    • 5) A reinvigorated TPF will present new opportunities for the two countries to take up a range of cutting-edge trade issues that will be critical in determining whether the U.S. and India can converge more over time or will drift further apart.
    • These include digital trade issues, intellectual property rights and approaches to nurturing innovation, better health sector alignment, and more regular regulatory work on science-based agricultural policies.

    Conclusion

    The future looks bright for U.S.-India trade under a Biden administration, but that does not mean it will be any easier. It will be critical for leadership on both sides to commit to strong efforts to put the trade relationship on a new footing, which will have to involve a ‘can-do’ attitude to solving problems.

    Back2Basics: Trade Policy Forum

    • It was established in 2005.
    • The Forum is part of the overall United States-India Economic Dialogue, replacing the Trade Policy Working Group pillar.
    • It  convenes on a regular basis.
    • The Forum provides an opportunity to work together to expand trade between the two countries.
    • The agenda could cover the following subjects: tariff and non-tariff trade barriers; foreign direct investment; subsidies; customs procedures; standards, testing, labeling and certification intellectual property rights protection; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; government procurement; and services.

  • India’s no to RCEP could still be a no

    The article examines the significance of the RCEP and India’s concerns over its provision. 

    Significance of RCEP

    • Last week, 15 East Asian countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest free trade agreement (FTA) ever.
    • In 2019, RCEP members accounted for about 30% of world output.
    • More importantly, about 44% of their total trade was intra-RCEP, which is a major incentive for the members of this agreement.
    • The deal could contribute to the strengthening of the regional value chains.

    Comparing RCEP with Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

    • The TPP included several regulatory issues including labour and environmental standards and “anti-corruption”.
    • All of these issues could raise regulatory barriers and severely impede trade flows.
    • In contrast, RCEP includes traditional market access issues, following the template provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
    • RCEP also includes issues like electronic commerce, investment facilitation that are currently being discussed by WTO members to “reform the multilateral trading system”.

    Would RCEP be able to realise trade and investment liberalisation?

    • In case of trade in goods, RCEP members have taken big strides towards lowering their tariffs.
    • However, commitments made by RCEP members for services trade liberalisation do look shallow in terms of the coverage of the sectors.
    • Movement of natural persons, an area in which India had had considerable interest, is considerably restricted.
    • The areas of investment and electronic commerce, in both of which India had expressed its reservations on the template adopted during RCEP negotiations, the outcomes are varied.
    • The text on investment rules shows that it is a work-in-progress.
    • The rules on dispute settlement procedures are yet to be written in.

    Will India’s concerns get addressed in near future?

    • The answer seems to be unambiguously in the negative on two counts.
    • 1) Two of the concerns India had raised, namely,  the deep cuts in tariffs on imports from China, and provisions relating to the investment chapter, have become even more significant over the past several months.
    • 2) India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan is primarily focused on strengthening domestic value chains, while RCEP, like any other FTA is solely focused on promoting regional value chains.

    Consider the question “What were India’s concerns about RCEP that resulted in India not signing it? ” 

    Conclusion

    This suggests that the prospects of India joining the RCEP in the near future appears bleak.

  • Faultlines in India’s economic liberalism

    The article counters the argument made by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar about the impact of economic liberalisation on India’s economy.

    Impact of liberalism on India

    • India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently disapproved of free trade and globalisation.
    • About FTA’s he said that “the effect of past trade agreements has been to de-industrialise some sectors.”
    • These observations were made days after countries of the Asia-Pacific region signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement.
    • He said that , “in the name of openness, we have allowed subsidi[s]ed products and unfair production advantages from abroad to prevail”

    Flaws in the argument

    •  There are several flaws in Mr. Jaishankar’s arguments.

    1) India cannot be the part of global value chain

    • India is now truly at the margins of the regional and global economy.
    • With trade multilateralism at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) remaining sluggish, FTAs are the gateways for international trade.
    • By not being part of any major FTA, India cannot be part of the global value chains.
    • India’s competitors such as the East Asian nations, by virtue of they being part of mega-FTAs, are in an advantageous position to be part of global value chains and attract foreign investment.

    2) Indian economy has bee relatively closed economy

    • India is surely a much more open economy than it was three decades ago, globally, India continues to remain relatively closed when compared to other major economies.
    • According to the WTO, India’s applied most favoured nation import tariffs are 13.8%, which is the highest for any major economy.
    • Likewise, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, on the import restrictiveness index, India figures in the ‘very restrictive’ category.
    • From 1995-2019, India has initiated anti-dumping measures 972 times (the highest in the world) trying to protect domestic industry.

    3) Economic survey accepts the benefits of FTAs

    • The External Affairs Minister is contradicting government’s economic survey presented earlier this year.
    • The survey concluded that India has benefitted overall from FTAs signed so far.
    • Blaming FTAs for deindustrialisation means ignoring real problem of the Indian industry — which is the lack of competitiveness and absence of structural reforms.

    4) India has been a major beneficiary of economic globalisation

    • It cannot be ignored that India has been one of the major beneficiaries of economic globalisation — a fact attested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
    • Post-1991, the Indian economy grew at a faster pace, ushering in an era of economic prosperity.
    • According to the economist Arvind Panagariya, poverty in rural and urban India, which stood at close to 40% in 2004-05, almost halved to about 20% by 2011-12.
    • This was due to India clocking an average economic growth rate of almost 8%.

    Conclusion

    Desire to make India a global destination for foreign investment is a pipe dream because it is naive to expect foreign investors to be gung-ho about investing in India if trade protectionism is the government’s official policy.

  • Export remain key to economic growth

    The article highlights the argument made by Arvind Panagaria about the primacy of export for the progress of the country in his new book India Unlimited: Reclaiming the Lost Glory.

    (more…)

  • Economic implications of India opting out of RCEP

    Even as India opted to stay out after walking out of discussions last year, the new trading bloc has made it clear that the door will remain open for India to return to the negotiating table.

    Must read:

    China-led RCEP takes off without India

    Try answering this also:

    Q.Signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement would have given more substance to India’s Act East policy. Analyse.

    Why did India walk out?

    • India decided to exit RCEP negotiations over “significant outstanding issues”.
    • Its decision was to safeguard the interests of industries like agriculture and dairy and to give an advantage to the country’s services sector.
    • The current structure of RCEP still does not address these issues and concerns.

    How far is China’s presence a factor?

    (1) Escalated tensions

    • Escalated tension with China is considered to be a major reason for India’s decision.
    • Major issues that were unresolved during RCEP negotiations were related to the exposure that India would have to China.

    (2) Surge in imports

    • This included India’s fears that there was “inadequate” protection against surges in imports.
    • It felt there could also be a possible circumvention of rules of origin— the criteria used to determine the national source of a product.
    • In the absence of this, other partner countries could dump their products by routing them through other countries that enjoyed lower tariffs.

    (3) Inability for countermeasures

    • India was unable to ensure countermeasures like an auto-trigger mechanism to raise tariffs on products when their imports crossed a certain threshold.
    • It also wanted RCEP to exclude most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligations from the investment, especially to countries with which it has border disputes.

    (4) No assurance of market access to India

    • RCEP also lacked clear assurance over market access issues in countries such as China and non-tariff barriers on Indian companies.
    • The agreement would have forced India to extend benefits given to other countries for sensitive sectors like defence to all RCEP members.

    (5) Trade balances paradox

    • India’s stance on the deal also comes as a result of learnings from unfavourable trade balances that it has with several RCEP members, with some of which it even has Free Trade Agreements.
    • India has trade deficits with 11 of the 15 RCEP countries, and some experts feel that India has been unable to leverage its existing FTAs with several RCEP members to increase exports.

    What can the decision cost India?

    • There are concerns that India’s decision would impact its bilateral trade ties with RCEP member nations, as they may be more inclined to focus on bolstering economic ties within the bloc.
    • The move could potentially leave India with less scope to tap the large market that RCEP presents —the size of the deal is mammoth, as the countries involved account for over 2 billion of the world’s population.
    • Given attempts by countries like Japan to get India back into the deal, there are also worries that India’s decision could impact the Australia-India-Japan network in the Indo-Pacific.

    What are India’s options now?

    • India, as an original negotiating participant of RCEP, has the option of joining the agreement without having to wait 18 months as stipulated for new members in the terms of the pact.
    • RCEP signatory states said they plan to commence negotiations with India once it submits a request of its intention to join and it may participate in meetings as an observer prior to its accession.
    • A possible alternative for India is to review its existing bilateral FTAs with some of these RCEP members as well as newer agreements with potential for Indian exports.
    • There is also a growing view that it would serve India’s interest to invest strongly in negotiating bilateral agreements with the US and the EU, both currently a work in progress.

    Conclusion

    • A country can never get into FTAs merely to provide its market to the partner countries.
    • When we accommodate our partner countries, our objective is also to increase the presence of our products in the markets of partners, and India hasn’t been able to achieve the latter objective.

  • Economic lessons from Vietnam and Bangladesh

    The article examines the emergence of Bangladesh and Vietnam as the major export hubs in the world and explains the lessons India could draw from it.

    Context

    • Bangladesh has become the second-largest apparel exporter after China.
    • Vietnam’s exports have grown by about 240% in the past eight years.

    Analysing Vietnam’s success

    • An open trade policy, a less inexpensive workforce, and generous incentives to foreign firms contributed to Vietnam’s success.
    • Vietnam’s open trade policy through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) means trading partners do not charge import duties on products made in Vietnam.
    • Vietnam’s domestic market is open to the partners’ products.
    • Vietnam has agreed to change its domestic laws to make the country attractive to investors.
    • Over a decade or so, large brands such as Samsung, Canon, Foxconn, H&M, Nike, Adidas, and IKEA have flocked to Vietnam to manufacture their products.

    What explains Bangladesh’s success?

    • In Bangladesh, large export of apparels to the EU and the U.S. make the most of the country’s export story.
    • The EU allows the import of apparel and other products from least developed countries (LDCs) like Bangladesh duty-free.
    • India, as a good neighbour, accepts all Bangladesh products duty-free (except alcohol and tobacco).
    • Bangladesh may not have this facility in four to seven years as its per capita income rises and it loses the LDC status.
    • Bangladesh is working smartly to diversify its export basket.

    Lessons for India

    • The key learning from Bangladesh is the need to support large firms for a quick turnover.
    • Yet, most of Vietnam’s exports happen in five sectors, in contrast, India’s exports are more diversified.
    • The Economic Complexity Index (ECI), which ranks a country based on how diversified and complex its manufacturing export basket is, illustrates this point.
    • The ECI rank for China is 32, India 43, Vietnam 79, and Bangladesh 127.
    • India, unlike Vietnam, has a developed domestic and capital market.
    • To further promote manufacturing and investment, India could set up sectoral industrial zones with pre-approved factory spaces.
    • There should be no need to search for land or obtain many approvals.

    India should pursue organic growth

    • Most of Vietnam’s electronics exports are just the final assembly of goods produced elsewhere.
    • In such cases, national exports look large, but the net dollar gain is small. China also faces this issue.
    • Country’s Export to GDP ratio (EGR) indicates its export capacity.
    • Vietnam’s EGR is 107%, such high dependence on exports brings dollars but also makes a country vulnerable to global economic uncertainty. 
    • The U.S.’s EGR is 11.7%, Japan’s is 18.5%, India’s is 18.7%. Even for China, with all its trade problems, the EGR is 18.4%.
    • Most such countries, including India, follow an open trade policy, sign balanced FTAs, restrict unfair imports, and have a healthy mix of domestic champions and MNCs.
    • While export remains a priority, it is not pursued at the expense of other sectors of the economy.
    • The focus is on organic economic growth through innovation and competitiveness.

    Consider the question “While export is essential for the growth of the country, over-dependence on it and its promotion at the expense of the other sectors could do more harm to the economy than good. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    With reforms promoting innovation and lowering the cost of doing business, India is poised to attract the best investments and integrate further with the global economy without increasing its dependence on export.

  • Forex Reserves hit a record high

    India’s foreign exchange reserves touched a lifetime high of $555.12 billion, according to RBI data.

    Aspirants must make a note here:

    1. Authority managing FOREX in India
    2. Components of FOREX
    3. IMF’s SDRs
    4. Emergency use of FOREX

    What are Forex Reserves?

    • Reserve Bank of India Act and the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 set the legal provisions for governing the foreign exchange reserves.
    • RBI accumulates foreign currency reserves by purchasing from authorized dealers in open market operations.
    • The Forex reserves of India consist of below four categories:
    1. Foreign Currency Assets
    2. Gold
    3. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
    4. Reserve Tranche Position
    • The IMF says official Forex reserves are held in support of a range of objectives like supporting and maintaining confidence in the policies for monetary and exchange rate management including the capacity to intervene in support of the national or union currency.
    • It will also limit external vulnerability by maintaining foreign currency liquidity to absorb shocks during times of crisis or when access to borrowing is curtailed.

    Where are India’s forex reserves kept?

    • The RBI Act, 1934 provides the overarching legal framework for the deployment of reserves in different foreign currency assets and gold within the broad parameters of currencies, instruments, issuers and counterparties.
    • As much as 64 per cent of the foreign currency reserves is held in the securities like Treasury bills of foreign countries, mainly the US.
    • 28 per cent is deposited in foreign central banks and 7.4 per cent is also deposited in commercial banks abroad.
    • In value terms, the share of gold in the total foreign exchange reserves increased from about 6.14 per cent as at end-September 2019 to about 6.40 per cent as at end-March 2020.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. Gold tranche(Reserve tranche) refers to (CSP 2020)-

    (a) A loan system of World bank

    (b) One of the operations of a central bank

    (c) A credit system of WTO granted to its members

    (d) A credit system granted by IMF to its members

    Rising above the 1991 crisis

    • Unlike in 1991, when India had to pledge its gold reserves to stave off a major financial crisis, the country can now depend on its soaring Forex reserves to tackle any crisis on the economic front.
    • The level of Forex reserves has steadily increased by 8,400 per cent from $5.8 billion as of March 1991 to the current level.

  • Feasibility of Export Driven Growth for India

    To aim for achieving high growth rate by focusing only on the domestic consumption and domestic demand could result in failure. The article argues for the focus on export to achieve the objective of growth.

    Domestic-demand led growth and its limitations

    • The debate in India has focused on domestic-demand led growth.
    • But there is no known model of domestic demand/consumption-led growth, anywhere that has delivered quick, sustained, and high rates of economic growth for developing countries.
    • India’s GDP growth of over 6 per cent after 1991 was associated with real export growth of about 11 per cent.
    • Moreover, domestic-demand led growth requires more public spending, tax cuts, private investment, and/or financial sector reforms: which is not feasible in the present context due to pandemic.
    • Consumption growth will be limited by the fact that household debt has grown rapidly in the last few years.
    • Consumption now can grow only if incomes grow.
    • Government spending could be a short run option, but COVID has limited that possibility.

    Why India should not follow advanced countries’ fiscal policies

    • India’s interest rates are not at zero and are unlikely to be so because of persistent inflation.
    • India’s borrowing is still considered risky which is reflected in ratings.
    • The favourable interest rate-growth differential that supports expansionary policy in the advanced countries is absent in India.
    • India may well have scope for expansionary fiscal policy in the short run but not as a medium run growth strategy.

    Why India should focus on export

    • Given all the above factors, India does not have the luxury of abandoning export orientation because the alternatives are so limited.
    • India’s market is too small to sustain any kind of serious import substitution strategy.
    • Small size of the market makes it difficult to offer investors the domestic market as bait and incentivising them to export.
    • India’s big, unexploited opportunities are in unskilled labour exports.
    • India is vastly under-exporting relative to its labour force.
    • Because China’s wages are rising as it has become richer, it has vacated about $140 billion in exports in unskilled-labour intensive sectors.
    • Post-COVID, the move of investors away from China will probably accelerate to hedge against supply chain disruptions.
    • India did not take advantage of the first China opportunity, now, a second opportunity stemming from geo-politics should be seized by India.
    • As India contemplates atmanirbharta, two deeper advantages of export orientation are always worth remembering.
    • 1) Foreign demand will always be bigger than domestic demand for any country.
    • 2) If domestic producers are competitive internationally, they will be competitive domestically and domestic consumers and firms will also benefit.

    Why openness of ecnonomy is important

    • Exploiting this opportunity in unskilled exports requires more not less openness.
    • To be internationally competitive, many parts and components have to be imported from so many different sources.
    • One indicator is the foreign or import contribution to exports.
    • China and Vietnam at the time of their export boom in textiles and clothing suggests that exports were highly dependent on imports (between 40 and 45 per cent).
    • In contrast, India’s import share is about 16 per cent.
    • Achieving Chinese and Vietnamese levels of success will therefore require greater imports and openness.

     Way forward

    • Export success will require genuine easing of costs of trading and doing business in India.
    • In the case of clothing, a key policy change in India will be to eliminate tariffs on all inputs. 
    • It will also require signing free trade agreements with Europe that still impose high duties on India’s clothing export, while Bangladeshi and Vietnamese exports which enjoy preferential access to world markets.

    Consider the question “As India contemplates atmanirbharta, we should not forget that export dynamism is essential for the rapid and sustained high economic growth. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    In sum, resisting the misleading allure of the domestic market, India should zealously boost export performance and deploy all means to achieve that. Pursuing rapid export growth in manufacturing and services should be an obsession with self-evident justification.