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Subject: International Relations

  • Why India should consider the next US administration’s approach to China

    Though it is the election held in the US for the election of the US President, it is closely followed throughout the world given the dominant position of that country in the world and impact of the US Presidents decision on the world. This article analyses the implications for India in both the scenarios re-election of Trump or Joe Biden winning the election.

    Implications for India

    • Broader foreign policy decisions will have significant implications for India.
    • Particularly consequential will be how a second Trump administration or a Biden administration perceive and approach China and, relatedly, the question of America’s role in the world.
    • The outcome will depend on the choices that the next American president makes on key personnel and policies.

    Analysing Trump administration’s approach to China from India’s perspective

    • The Trump administration’s more hawkish view of China broadly converges with Indian concerns about a rising China’s actions and intentions.
    • And it has facilitated the Trump administration to assign India an important role in its strategic framework, including through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept.
    • This has laid the basis for defence and security cooperation, helped to manage differences with Delhi on trade, Russia, Iran, and human rights, and vocal American support for India in the ongoing crisis with China.
    • Unlike India’s subtler approach to highlighting Beijing’s malign behaviour, the administration’s more explicit one has put a global spotlight on Chinese assertiveness.
    • However, there are aspects of President Trump’s China approach that have caused concerns in Delhi.
    • There has been concern about Trump striking a deal with Chinese leader Xi Jinping since summit in April 2017.
    • The administration subsequently pivoted to competition with China that summer.
    • Concerns have also been raised due to neglect in the Trump administration of developments related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Huawei/ZTE.
    • The other aspects of Trump’s China approach that have given Delhi pause are its ideological dimensions, as well as responses like tariffs that have hurt India too.
    • On the similar lines American withdrawal from international institutions and agreements that has served to benefit Beijing.
    • The China prism has had its limits — it has not, for instance, resulted in concessions to India on trade and immigration.

    What would be Joe Biden’s to approach towards China and implications for India

    • And there is recognition among most Democrats that the US-China relationship today is different from what it was in 2009, 2012 or 2016.
    • An Obama administration China hand noted that opinion in the US on approach to China has “moved from balancing co-operation and competition, to competition and confrontation”.
    • But what a Biden administration sees as the terms of strategic competition with China and how it might choose to blend in cooperation will have implications for India.
    • Its outcome will depend in part on the president’s views, who holds key foreign and economic policy positions, as well as Beijing’s approach.
    • India will closely watch how Biden might respond to any overtures from Beijing.
    • It will particularly worry about any signs that Washington would be willing to limit competition or criticism in return for Chinese cooperation on certain administration priorities.
    • More broadly, it will look at whether Biden administration’s Asia policy derives from its China policy or vice versa.
    • Other aspects of Biden’s preferred approach might suit India, for instance:
    • 1) acting collectively with allies and partners rather than unilaterally,
    • 2) Not imposing tariffs that hit allies and partners along with China,
    • 3) Recommitting to international organisations in ways that could blunt Chinese influence.
    • India might also broadly approve of — and could benefit from — the 3Ds of a Biden foreign policy: Domestic (renewal), deterrence, and democracy.
    •  If a Biden administration sees engagement with China on climate change, global health security and non-proliferation as a priority that will complicate the Indian government’s options and require adjustments.
    • Moreover, with either Trump or Biden, foreign economic policy choices and budgetary ones for example, spending at home versus abroad will have crucial implications for India.

    Conclusion

    India will need to consider what America’s choice on November 3 will mean for American power and purpose — because assessments of that could determine how Beijing decides to act in the region and globally.

  • Importance of maritime domain for India and role of Quad in it

    While highlighting the importance of navy for India, the article examines the need to define the role and relation between the Quad and Malabar.

    The salience of navy for India

    • It took confrontation in the Himalayas to bring focus on India’s maritime domain clearly indicates that the salience of maritime power is not yet understood in India.
    • On its northern and western fronts, India faces a formidable challenge and can at best hope for stalemate due to two factors :
    • 1) Economic, military and technological asymmetry between China and India.
    • 2) Active China-Pakistan nexus.
    • Attention has, therefore, been focused on the maritime domain, where it is believed that India may have some cards to play.
    •  While preparing to fight its own battles with determination, it is time for India to seek external balancing (read Quad) — best done via the maritime domain.

    Evolution of Malabar Exercise

    • Above is the backdrop against which one must see the progressive evolution of Exercise “Malabar”,
    • At beginning, it was a bilateral event involving just the Indian and US navies.
    • It became tri-lateral with the inclusion of Japan in 2015.
    • And now it has transformed into a four-cornered naval drill that will also include Australia.
    • Apart from its geo-political significance for the Indo-Pacific, this development poses two conundrums.
    • Firstly, given the same composition, what is the distinction, now, between “Malabar” and the “Quad”?
    • Secondly, does Malabar 2020 mark the release of Australia from China’s thralldom?

    Defining the roles and relation betwee Malabar and Quad

    • The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad has its roots in the Core Group of four senior diplomats representing the US, India, Japan and Australia.
    • The group was formed to coordinate relief efforts after the Great Asian Tsunami of December 26, 2004.
    • The present Quad has obviously retained this tradition and its members have neither created a charter nor invested it with any substance.
    • The Quad is 16 years old now, and Malabar 28.
    • Both have served a useful purpose, and a reappraisal of the roles and relationship of the Quad-Malabar concepts is, therefore, overdue.
    • Since it is India which faces a “clear and present danger”, it should boldly take the initiative to do so.

    Need for the Indo-Pacific Concord

    •  In order to rein in China’s hegemonic urges, there is need for affected nations to come together to show their solidarity and determination in a common cause.
    • In this context, there is need to create a broad-based “Indo-Pacific Concord”, of like-minded regional democracies.
    • This should be an organisation with a maritime security charter, which has no offensive or provocative connotations.
    • Using the Quad and Malabar templates, a shore-based secretariat can be established in a central location like Port Blair, in the Andaman Islands, which would schedule and conduct periodic multinational naval exercises.
    • The exercises could be structured to hone the skills of participating navies in specialisations like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, countering non-traditional threats, undertaking search-and-rescue operations and establishing networked maritime domain awareness.
    • The Concord could also designate forces to uphold maritime security or “good order at sea”.

    What Australia joining Quad means

    •  The prospect of Australia belatedly joining the Quad is expected to reinforce the Quad and enhance its credibility.
    • But there are reasons for India to be circumspect it.
    • Memories are still alive of its past political ambivalence towards India, its criticism of our naval expansion and its vociferous condemnation of the 1998 nuclear tests.
    • Nor should one overlook Beijing’s recent influence on Australia’s foreign policy.
    • This influence on Australia’s foreing policy caused it to flip-flop over the sale of uranium to India as well as its peremptory withdrawal from the Quad in 2008.

    Implications of singing of BECA with the U.S.

    • India signing the BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) with the US last of the four “foundational agreements” would enhance interoperability between the respective militaries.
    • However, there is need to pay heed to two valid concerns:
    • 1) Regarding the possible compromise of information impinging on India’s security.
    • 2) Whether these agreements will barter away the last vestiges of India’s strategic autonomy.

    Consider the question “The changing geopolitical equations has necessitated the formation of Indo-Pacific Concord by the democracies of the region.” In light of this, elaborate on India’s role in Quad and its implications for the region”

    Conclusion

    Indians, given our history, should never lose sight of the truism in international relations, that it is the unerring pursuit of national interests that guides the actions and policies of every nation.

  • Looking back at India’s journey at the UN

    The article examines India’s journey at the UN as it enters it 75year. It also analyses the challenges India faced at the UN and tracks India’s transformation from being an outlier to the high table.

    Three phases of India’s presence at the UN

    • Seven and a half decades of India at the UN may be viewed with reference to roughly three distinct phases.

    First phase: From independence to 1989

    • The first phase lasted until the end of Cold War in 1989.
    • During this phase, India had learnt to explore and enhance its diplomatic influence in easing armed conflicts in Asia and Africa by disentangling them from the superpower rivalry.
    • India also leaned that the UN could not be relied upon to impartially resolve vital security disputes such as Jammu and Kashmir.
    • India strove to utilise the UN only to focus on common causes such as anti-colonialism, anti-racism, nuclear disarmament, environment conservation and equitable economic development.
    • India seemed to claim the moral high ground by proposing, in 1988 three-phase plan to eliminate nuclear weapons from the surface of earth.
    • But it resisted attempts by neighbouring countries to raise bilateral problems.
    • Defeat in 1962 war against China meant a definitive redesign of the country’s diplomatic style to privilege bilateral contacts over the third party role by the UN.

    Second phase: 1990s

    • The 1990s were the most difficult decade for India in the UN.
    • The 1990s were marked by the sudden end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the unrivalled power.
    • Besides, the uncertain political climate along with the balance of payments crisis constrained the country’s capability to be active in various bodies, especially in the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly.
    • There was a change in India’s foreign policy: At the UN as India showed pragmatism in enabling the toughest terms on Iraq even after Gulf War or in reversing position on Zionism as racism.
    • At the same time, growing militancy in Kashmir in the early 1990s helped Pakistan to internationalise the dispute with accusations about gross human rights violations by India.
    • India to seek favours from Iran and China in the Human Rights Commission to checkmate Pakistan.
    • The violation of the sovereignty principle by NATO intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999 without the authorisation of the UNSC deeply disturbed India.
    • At the same time call for an end to aerial attacks on Yugoslavia did not garner much support in the UNSC.
    • India’s diplomatic difficulties was exposed when it suffered a defeat in the hands of Japan in the 1996 contest for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC.
    • India resolutely stood against indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995.
    • India strongly rejected the backdoor introduction for adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
    • It is against this background that India surprised the world in 1998 with its Pokhran nuclear weapon tests, ignoring the likely adverse reaction from the nuclear club.

    Third phase: Rise in influence in 21st century

    • The impressive economic performance in the first decade of the 21st century due to economic liberalisation and globalisation policies, helped a great deal in strengthening profile.
    • This is only aided by its reliable and substantial troop contributions to several peacekeeping operations in African conflict theatres.
    • India has emerged as a responsible stakeholder in non-traditional security issue areas such as the spread of small and light weapons, the threat of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and the impact of climate change.
    • India has scaled up its contributions to development and humanitarian agencies, while India’s share to the UN assessed budget has registered a hike from 0.34% to 0.83%.
    • India’s successful electoral contests for various prestigious slots in the UNSC, the Human Rights Council, the World Court, and functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council indicates its growing popularity

    Major unsuccessful initiatives by India

    • Two major initiatives India has heavily invested in are stuck:
    • 1) The draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism it drafted and revised with the hope of helping consensus.
    • It encountered reservations on provisions regarding definition of terrorist and the convention’s application to state armed forces.
    • 2) Second is the question of equitable expansion of the UNSC to enable India to attain permanent membership along with other claimants from Asia, Africa and Latin America.
    • The move has been stuck for more than 25 years because of a lack of unity among the regional formations.
    • It also includes opposition from some 30 middle powers such as Italy and Pakistan which fear losing out to regional rivals in the event of an addition of permanent seats.
    •  The only realistic possibility seems to settle for a compromise, i.e. a new category of members elected for a longer duration than the present non-permanent members without veto power.

    Priorities at the UNSC as a non-permanent member

    • India’s future role will depend on its ability to deal  economic slowdown and a troubled relationship with China.
    • This is pertinent as India will soon begin its two-year term as a non-permanent UNSC member (January 1, 2021).
    • Its areas of priority will continue to be the upholding of Charter principles, act against those who support, finance and sponsor terrorists, besides striving for securing due say to the troop contributing countries in the management of peace operations.
    • It is reasonable to assume (based on earlier patterns) that India will work for and join in consensus on key questions wherever possible.
    • But it may opt to abstain along with other members including one or two permanent members.

    Consider the question “Elaborate on the transformation in India’s role at UN. What are the challenges India may face as a non-permanent member of the UNSC” 

    Conclusion

    As a non-permanent UNSC member now, India needs to uphold the Charter principles in the backdrop of a turbulent world.

  • In news: International Labour Organization

    After 35 years, India has assumed the Chairmanship of the Governing Body of International Labour Organization (ILO).

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.The Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE), a UN mechanism to assist countries transition towards a greener and more inclusive economies, emerged at:

    (a) The Earth Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Johannesburg

    (b) The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 2012, Rio de Janeiro

    (c) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2015, Paris

    (d) The World Sustainable Development Summit 2016, New Delhi

    About the International Labour Organization

    • The ILO is a UN agency whose mandate is to advance social and economic justice through setting international labour standards.
    • Founded in 1919 under the League of Nations, it is the first and oldest specialised agency of the UN.
    • The ILO has 187 member states: 186 out of 193 UN member states plus the Cook Islands.
    • The ILO’s international labour standards are broadly aimed at ensuring accessible, productive, and sustainable work worldwide in conditions of freedom, equity, security and dignity.

    About its Governing Body

    • The Governing body is the apex executive body of the ILO which decides policies, programmes, agenda, budget and elects the Director-General.
    • It meets three times a year, in March, June and November.

    Significance for India

    • India will be presiding over the upcoming meeting of the Governing Body to be held in November 2020.
    • India would have the opportunity to interact with the senior officials and social partners of the member states.
    • It will also provide a platform to apprise participants of the transformational initiatives taken by the Government in removing the rigidities of the labour market.

  • US Secretary of state Visit to India

    Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo makes his way to India next week, exactly a week before the election. This article discusses the various aspects that could form the part of the discussion.

    Difference in U.S’s and India’s position on Quad

    • He has stated that meeting in India “would include discussions about how free nations can work together to thwart threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party”.
    • Just a few weeks ago, at the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting, U.S. Secretary of State had called for collaboration to protect people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption, and coercion.
    •  In contrast, India has maintained that its membership of the Quad is aligned to its Indo-Pacific policy, and by no means directed against any country.
    • While Chines aggression is changing India’s priorities, any shift in India’s position on the Quad at the U.S.’s prompting must also benefit India.

    What should be the part of U.S.-India collaboration

    • It is critical to study just how India hopes to collaborate with the U.S. on the challenge that Beijing poses on each of India’s three fronts: at the LAC, in the maritime sphere, and in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region surrounding India.
    • On the maritime sphere, discussions will include strengthening ties in the Indo-Pacific, enhancing joint military exercises like the ‘Malabar’ and completing the last of the “foundational agreements” with the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA).
    • In Male, the U.S. has announced a defence agreement that will pave the way for a strategic dialogue.
    • And unlike in the past, India has not objected this agreement with Male for entering in its area of influence in the Indian Ocean Region, as it will allow the U.S. to counter Chinese influence there.
    • With Sri Lanka the U.S. is in discussions on infrastructure projects, and progress on its “Millenium Challenge Corporation” (MCC) offer of a five-year aid grant of about $480 million.
    • At a time when India is delaying Sri Lanka’s requests for debt relief, given its own economic constraints, the U.S. aid offer will be seen as one way of staving off China’s inroads into Sri Lanka.
    • Most important will be how the U.S. and India can collaborate on dealing with India’s most immediate, continental challenge from China: at the LAC.
    • Apart from enhancing and expediting U.S. defence sales to India, there is must the U.S. could promise to India.
    • The U.S. must also commit to keeping the pressure on Pakistan on terrorism, despite the U.S. need for Pakistan’s assistance in Afghan-Taliban talks.
    • A firm U.S. statement in this regard may also disperse the pressure the Indian military faces in planning for a “two-front” conflict with China.

    Resolving other key issues with the U.S.

    • Resolution of Trade issues, an area the Trump administration has been particularly tough, and restoration of India’s Generalised System of Preferences status for exporters should also be priority.
    • The government could press for more cooperation on 5G technology sharing, or an assurance that its S-400 missile system purchase from Russia will receive an exemption from CAATSA sanctions.

    Conclusion

    By inviting Secretary of State this close to the U.S. elections, New Delhi has taken a calculated and bold gamble, however, our leaders must drive a harder bargain to consolidate the pay-offs from the visit.

    Back2Basics: What is CAATSA?

    • The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is a U.S. federal law that imposes economic sanctions on Iran, Russia and North Korea.
    • The bill came into effect on August 2, 2017, with the intention of countering perceived aggressions against the U.S. government by foreign powers.
    • It accomplishes this goal by preventing U.S. companies from doing business with sanctioned entities.

  • What is Blue Dot Network?

    A group of US Senators has written to India asking to join the Blue Dot Network.

    Try this MCQ:

    Q.The Blue Dot Network recently seen in news is a global alliance for:

    a) Beaches Certification

    b) Infrastructure development

    c) 5G connectivity

    d) Patents regulation

    The Blue Dot Network

    • Blue Dot is a US-led collaboration with Australia and Japan that supports private-sector-led infrastructure financing opportunities in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    • It was formally announced on 4 November 2019 at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in Bangkok, Thailand on the sidelines of the 35th ASEAN Summit.
    • It is led by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia.
    • It is expected to serve as a global evaluation and certification system for roads, ports and bridges with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

    Fundamental difference between BRI and Blue Dot

    • While the former involves direct financing, giving countries in need immediate short-term relief, the latter is not a direct financing initiative and therefore may not be what some developing countries need.
    • The question is whether Blue Dot offering first-world solutions to third-world countries.
    • Secondly, Blue Dot will require coordination among multiple stakeholders when it comes to grading projects.
    • Given the past experience of Quad, the countries involved in it are still struggling to put a viable bloc. Therefore, it remains to be seen how Blue Dot fares in the long run.

  • Opportunities for India in Bangladesh’s economic success

    Bangladesh is expected to cross India in terms per capita income. This speaks volumes about the achievements of Bangladesh when contrasted with Pakistan. At the same time, it has several implications for the region. The elaborates on such implications.

    What other countries can learn from Bangladesh

    • The International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook published recently predicts that Bangladesh’s per capita GDP will overtake that of India this year.
    • The projected difference is rather small — $1,888 to $1,877 — and unlikely to last beyond this year.
    • International development institutions are convinced that the rest of the subcontinent and developing countries around the world can learn much from Dhaka’s experience — the so-called “Bangladesh model”.

    5 Implications for the region

    1) Rising global interest in the subcontinent

    • Rapid and sustained economic growth in Bangladesh has begun to alter the world’s perception of the subcontinent.
    • India and Pakistan dominated the region and other countries were considered small.
    • But Bangladesh was far from being small, demographically it’s  the eighth-largest nation in the world.
    • The economic rise of Bangladesh is changing some of that.

    2) Changing economic weights of Bangladesh and Pakistan

    • This year, Bangladesh’s GDP is expected to reach about $320 billion.
    • The IMF did not have the 2020 numbers from Pakistan to report but in 2019, Pakistan’s economy was at $275 billion.
    • The IMF suggests that Pakistan’s economy will contract further this year.
    • Bangladesh has controlled its population growth and Pakistan has not.
    • Dhaka has a grip over its inflation and Islamabad does not.
    • There is no question that Pakistan’s negative geopolitical weight in the world will endure.
    • But Bangladesh’s growing economic muscle will help Dhaka steadily accumulate geopolitical salience in the years ahead.

    3) Accelerate regional integration

    • Bangladesh’s economic growth can accelerate regional integration in the eastern subcontinent.
    • The region’s prospects for a collective economic advance are rather dim.
    • Due to Pakistan’s opposition to economic cooperation with India and its support for cross-border terror, the main regional forum for the subcontinent, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc), is dormant.
    • Instead of merely praying for the revival of Saarc, Delhi could usefully focus on the BBIN.
    • BBIN is sub-regional forum among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal, activated in the middle of last decade — has not advanced fast enough.
    • It is time for Delhi and Dhaka to take a fresh look at the forum and find ways to widen the scope and pace of BBIN activity.
    • Meanwhile, there is growing interest in Bhutan and Nepal for economic integration with Bangladesh.

    4) Increasing importance of Bangladesh in geopolitics of Indo-Pacific

    • The economic success of Bangladesh is drawing attention from a range of countries in East Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
    • The US, which traditionally focused on India and Pakistan, has woken up to the possibilities in Bangladesh.
    • Bangladesh does not want to get into the fight between Beijing and Washington, but the great power wooing of Dhaka is bound to intensify in the new geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

    5) Development of India’s eastern and north-eastern states could accelerate

    • Bangladesh’s economy is now one-and-a-half times as large as that of West Bengal; better integration between the two would provide a huge boost for eastern India.
    • Also, connectivity between India’s landlocked Northeast and Bangladesh would provide a boost to the development of north-eastern states.
    • Delhi and Dhaka are eager to promote greater cooperation, but there has been little political enthusiasm in Kolkata.
    • In Assam, the issue of migration continues to impose major political constraints.

    Way forward

    • Parliamentary approval of the boundary settlement in 2015, despite the opposition, was a step in the right direction from India.
    • So was the acceptance of the 2014 international arbitration award on the maritime boundary dispute between India and Bangladesh.
    • But the positive dynamic surrounding the bilateral relationship acquired a negative tone in the second amidst the poisonous rhetoric in India around the Citizenship Amendment Act.
    • There is much room for course correction in Delhi and to shift the focus from legacy issues to future possibilities.

    Conclusion

    Both the countries need to jointly develop and pursue with Dhaka an ambitious framework for shared prosperity.

  • Opportunity for India to push for reforms at the UN

    The article analyses the changing geopolitical context against the background of the pandemic. China has been facing some challenges at the UN of late. Multilateralism faces an unprecedented crisis. This context provides an opportunity for India to push for reforms in international institutions. 

    China facing difficulty in elections to UN bodies

    • Recently, India besting China in the elections for a seat on the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).
    • Soon after the CSW vote, it lost another election, this time to tiny Samoa for a seat on the UN Statistical Commission.
    • And a couple of days ago, it just about managed to get elected to the UN High Rights Council, coming fourth out of five contestants for four vacancies.
    • Earlier, China’s candidate had lost to a Singaporean in the race for DG World Intellectual Property Organization.

    China’s strengths

    • Taking advantage of its position as a member of the P-5 and as a huge aid giver, China made itself invincible in UN elections.
    • It won among others, the top positions at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

    Historical background on China’s rise at the UN

    • World War II saw strong U.S.-China collaboration against the Japanese, including U.S. operations conducted from India.
    • Their bilateral ties saw the U.S. include the Chinese in a group of the most important countries for ensuring world peace post- World War II, along with the U.S., the USSR and the U.K.
    • This enlarged into the P-5, with France being added by the UK at the San Francisco conference held in 1945 where the UN charter was finalised.
    • The pure multilateralism of the League of Nations was thus infused with a multipolarity, with the U.S. as the sheet anchor.

    Challenges to multilateralism and the need for reform in the international institutions

    • Multilateralism is under stress due to COVID-19 pandemic and a certain disenchantment with globalisation.
    • At the root is the rise of China and its challenge to U.S. global hegemony.
    • But in the current scenario multilateralism backed by strong multipolarity in the need of the hour.
    • This demands institutional reform in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and at the Bretton Woods Institutions.
    • In this context, it is good that recently India, Germany, Japan and Brazil (G-4) have sought to refocus the UN on UNSC reform.
    • As proponents of reform, they must remain focused and determined even if these changes do not happen easily or come soon.
    • This is also the way forward for India which is not yet in the front row.

    Way forward

    • Earlier in the year, India was elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for a two-year term.
    • India will also host the BRICS Summit next year and G-20 Summit in 2022.
    • These are openings for India in collaborating the world in critical areas that require global cooperation especially climate change, pandemics and counter-terrorism.
    • India also needs to invest in the UN with increased financial contributions in line with its share of the world economy and by placing its people in key multilateral positions.

    Consider the question “The UN, which came into existence in different time fails to take into account the realities of the changing world. In light of this, examine the basis of India’s claim to a permanent seat at the UN. What are the challenges to India’s claim.”

    Conclusion

    Against the backdrop of pandemic and subsequent pushback against China at the UN, it is also an opportune moment for India and a Reformed Multilateralism.

  • What is New START Treaty?

    Russian President Mr Putin has proposed a one-year extension without conditions of the last major nuclear arms reduction accord, the New START Treaty between Russia and the U.S.

    The New START, INF and the Open Skies …. Be clear about the differences of these treaties. For example- to check if their inception was during cold war era etc.

    New START Treaty

    • The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) pact limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers and is due to expire in 2021 unless renewed.
    • The treaty limits the US and Russia to a maximum of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, well below Cold War caps.
    • It was signed in 2010 by former US President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
    • It is one of the key controls on superpower deployment of nuclear weapons.
    • If it falls, it will be the second nuclear weapons treaty to collapse under the leadership of US President Donald Trump.
    • In February, US withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), accusing Moscow of violating the agreement.

    Also read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/us-confirms-pull-out-from-inf-treaty/

  • Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)

    Russian Navy along with CSTO members has begun military exercises in the central waters of the Caspian Sea north of the Azerbaijani capital Baku.

    Try this MCQ:

    Q.The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) sometimes seen in news is an alliance led by:

     

    (a) Russia (b) USA (c) India (d) European Union

    Collective Security Treaty Organization

    • CSTO is an intergovernmental military alliance that was signed on 15 May 1992.
    • In 1992, six post-Soviet states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States—Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—signed the Collective Security Treaty
    • This is also referred to as the “Tashkent Pact” or “Tashkent Treaty”.
    • Three other post-Soviet states—Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia—signed the next year and the treaty took effect in 1994.
    • Five years later, six of the nine—all but Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan—agreed to renew the treaty for five more years, and in 2002 those six agreed to create the CSTO as a military alliance.