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Subject: International Relations

  • Confusion on what the Quad is and its future

    The article analyses the basics of India’s foreign policy and its implications for the Quad.

    Context

    • There is confusion on what the Quad is and its future in India’s international relations.
    • Sustaining that confusion is the proposition that India is abandoning non-alignment in favour of a military alliance with the US in order to counter the China threat.

    4 Question on Quad’s future and India’s role

    1) What is the nature of alliance?

    • Alliances involve written commitments to come to the defence of the other against a third party.
    • Working of alliance varies according to the distribution of power within the members of an alliance and the changing nature of the external threat.
    • Alliances come in multiple shapes and forms — they could be bilateral or multilateral, formal or informal and for the long-term or near term.
    • Alliances feature in India’s ancient strategic wisdom and contemporary domestic politics in India.
    • Yet, when it comes to India’s foreign policy, alliances are seen as a taboo.
    • Part of the problem is that India’s image of alliances is frozen in the moment when India became independent.
    • After the Second World War, a newly independent India did not want to be tied down by alliances of the Cold War.
    • That notion is seen as central to Indian worldview.

    2) Does India forge alliances?

    • Contrary to conventional wisdom, India has experimented with alliances of different kinds.
    • During the First World War, some nationalists aligned with Imperial Germany to set up the first Indian government-in-exile in Kabul.
    • In the Second World War, Subhas Chandra Bose joined forces with Imperial Japan to set up a provisional government.
    • Policy of non-alignment among the great powers also did not rule out alliances in a different context.
    • For example, when Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim turned to Delhi for protection amidst Maoist China’s advance into Tibet during 1949-50, Nehru signed security treaties with them.
    • India turned to the US for military support to cope with the Chinese aggression in 1962.
    • Indira Gandhi signed a security cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1971 to cope with the crisis in East Pakistan.
    • Then, as now, there was much anxiety in Delhi about India abandoning non-alignment.
    • India does do alliances but the question is when, under what conditions and on what terms.

    3)  Is the US offering India an alliance against China?

    • The current political discourse in Washington is hostile to alliance-making.
    • President Donald Trump does not miss an opportunity to trash US alliances.
    • In any case, formal commitments do not always translate into reality during times of war.
    • Even within the long-standing US military alliances with Japan and the Philippines, there is much legal quibbling over what exactly is the US’s obligation against, say, Chinese aggression.
    • In case of the Quad, it is quite clear that Washington is not offering a military alliance, nor is Delhi asking for one.
    • Because it knows India has to fight its own wars.
    • Both countries, however, are interested in building issue-based coalitions in pursuit of shared interests.

    4) Instrumental nature of alliance

    • Agreements for security cooperation are made in a specific context and against a particular threat.
    • When those circumstances change, security treaties are not worth the paper they are written.
    • Consider India’s security treaties with Nepal, Bangladesh and Russia.
    • The 1950 Treaty was designed to protect Nepal against the Chinese threat.
    • Now, Nepali communists have long argued that the Treaty is a symbol of Indian hegemony.
    • India’s 1972 security treaty with Bangladesh did not survive the 1975 assassination of the nation’s founder, Mujibur Rahman.
    • India’s own enthusiasm for the 1971 treaty with Moscow waned within a decade.
    • Today Beijing is Moscow’s strongest international partner, a reality that has a bearing on India’s strategic partnership with Russia.

    What India can learn from China about alliances

    • Mao aligned with the Soviet Union after in 1949 and fought the Korean War against the US during 1950-53.
    • He broke from Russia in the early 1960s and moved closer to the US in the 1970s.
    • Mao, who denounced US alliances in Asia, was happy to justify them if they were directed at Russia.
    • He also welcomed Washington’s alliance with Tokyo as a useful means to prevent the return of Japanese nationalism and militarism.
    • Having benefited from the partnership with the US, China is trying to push America out of Asia and establish its own regional primacy.
    • Delhi could learn from Beijing in not letting the theological debates about alliances cloud its judgements about the extraordinary economic and security challenges India confronts today.

    Conclusion

    The infructuous obsession with non-alignment diverts Delhi’s policy attention away from the urgent task of rapidly expanding India’s national capabilities in partnership with like-minded partners.

  • Conference on Disarmament (CD)

    India has supported the holding of negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It reiterated its commitment to the disarmament of nuclear weapons in a step-by-step non-discriminatory process.

    List out various factors which are preventing the nuclear disarmaments amongst the nations.

    About the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

    • The CD is a multilateral disarmament forum established by the international community to negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements based at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
    • The Conference meets annually in three separate sessions in Geneva.
    • The Conference was first established in 1979 as the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community.
    • It was renamed the Conference on Disarmament in 1984.

    Recent developments from India

    • India has not revised its key principles regarding the weapons in its arsenal.
    • Raksha Mantri has earlier hinted at a possibility of changing the No First Use (NFU) principle by declaring that ‘circumstances’ will determine the “No First Use” stance.

    India stands committed

    • India believes that nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework.
    • India remains convinced of the need for meaningful dialogue among all states possessing nuclear weapons, for building trust and confidence.
    • India also remains committed to negotiations regarding a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the CD on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator or CD/1299 which dates to March 24, 1995.

    B2BASICS

    India’s No first use doctrine

    For India, Nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of war and their sole purpose is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by India’s adversaries. India has nit only established itself as a responsible nuclear state, but guided the world about how to be a responsible nuclear state through No first use policy.

    Features of India’s nuclear doctrine:

    1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.
    2. A “No First Use” policy i.e. nuclear weapons to be used only in case of any nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
    3. Non use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
    4. Nuclear retaliatory attacks to be authorised only by civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
    5. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
    6. India may retaliate with nuclear weapons to retaliate against attack  with biological or chemical weapons.
    7. Strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies.
    8. A commitment to goal of nuclear weapon free world.

  • Quad

    The article discusses the future course of action for the Quad and issues it faces in the present circumstances.

    Evolution of the Quad

    • In 2007, the Quad (the United States, Japan, India, and Australia) was an idea whose time had not yet come.
    • The global financial crisis was yet to happen as America continued to enjoy its ‘unipolar moment’.
    • The American still expected China to become a ‘responsible stake-holder’.
    • America required Chinese goodwill in handling issues with North Korea and Iran, and the War on Terror.
    • Japan and Australia were riding the China Boom to prosperity.
    • If India was ambivalent at the time, it was because this mirrored the uncertainties of others.

    China’s reaction and naval expansion

    • When the idea of Quad was barely on the table; the Chinese, labelled it as an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
    • The real reason for China’s hyperreaction was out of concern that such a grouping would “out” China’s plans for naval expansion by focusing on the Indo-Pacific maritime space.
    • Once the idea of Quad 1.0 had died down, China advanced a new claim — the Nine-Dash Line — in the South China Sea.
    • It undertook the rapid kind of warship building activity
    • It built its first overseas base in Djibouti.
    • It started systematically to explore the surface and sub-surface environment in the Indian Ocean beyond the Malacca Straits.
    • China’s dismissal of the Arbitral Award in the dispute with the Philippines on the South China Sea and its militarization of the islands has given a second chance to the Quad.

    Quad: A plurilateral mechanism

    • The Quad nations need to better explain that the Indo-Pacific Vision is an overarching framework being discussed in a transparent manner.
    • They should also explain that the objective of Indo-Pacific vision is of advancing everyone’s economic and security interests.
    • The Quad is a plurilateral mechanism between countries that share interest on specific matters.
    • In 2016, China itself established a Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.
    • The Quad is no exception.

    Way forward

    • The forthcoming Ministerial Quad meeting will be an opportunity to define the idea and chart a future path.
    • Needless provocation of China should be avoided.
    • Other countries might be invited to join in the future.
    • An outreach to the Indian Ocean littoral states is especially important since there are reports from some quarters suggesting that India is seeking to deny access to some extra-regional countries through the Indian Ocean.

    Conclusion

    A positive agenda built around collective action in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, monitoring shipping for search and rescue or anti-piracy operations, infrastructure assistance to climatically vulnerable states, connectivity initiatives and similar activities, will re-assure the littoral States that the Quad will be a factor for regional benefit, and a far cry from Chinese allegations that it is some sort of a military alliance.

  • What’s behind the Armenia-Azerbaijan clashes?

    Fresh clashes erupted on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, threatening to push the countries back to war 26 years after a ceasefire was reached.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Turkey is located between-

    (a) The Black Sea and Caspian Sea

    (b) The Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea

    (c) Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea

    (d) Gulf of Aqaba and the Dead Sea

    The conflict

    • The largely mountainous and forested Nagorno-Karabakh, home for some 150,000 people, is at the centre of the conflict.
    • Nagorno-Karabakh is located within Azerbaijan but is populated, mostly, by those of Armenian ethnicity (and mostly Christian compared to the Shia Muslim majority Azerbaijan).
    • The conflict can be traced back to the pre-Soviet era when the region was at the meeting point of Ottoman, Russian and the Persian empires.

    A legacy of soviet era

    • Once Azerbaijan and Armenia became Soviet Republics in 1921, Moscow gave Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan but offered autonomy to the contested region.
    • In the 1980s, when the Soviet power was receding, separatist currents picked up in Nagorno-Karabakh.
    • In 1988, the national assembly voted to dissolve the region’s autonomous status and join Armenia.
    • But Baku suppressed such calls, which led to a military conflict.
    • When Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the clashes led to an open war in which tens of thousands of people were killed.
    • The war lasted till 1994 when both sides reached a ceasefire (they are yet to sign a peace treaty and the border is not clearly demarcated).

    Issue over control

    • By that time, Armenia had taken control of Nagorno-Karabakh and handed it to Armenian rebels. The rebels have declared independence, but have not won recognition from any country.
    • The region is still treated as a part of Azerbaijan by the international community, and Baku wants to take it back.

    What is the strategic significance of the region?

    • The energy-rich Azerbaijan has built several gas and oil pipelines across the Caucasus (the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea) to Turkey and Europe.
    • This includes the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (with a capacity of transporting 1.2 billion barrels a day), the Western Route Export oil pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline.
    • Some of these pipelines pass close to the conflict zone (within 16 km of the border). In an open war between the two countries, the pipelines could be targeted, which would impact energy supplies.

    What’s Turkey’s role?

    • Turkey has historically supported Azerbaijan and has had a troublesome relationship with Armenia.
    • In the 1990s, during the war, Turkey closed its border with Armenia and it has no diplomatic relations with the country.
    • The main point of contention between the two was Ankara’s refusal to recognise the 1915 Armenian genocide in which the Ottomans killed some 1.5 million Armenians.
    • On the other end, the Azeris and Turks share strong cultural and historical links. Azerbaijanis are a Turkic ethnic group and their language is from the Turkic family.

    Where does Russia stand?

    • Moscow sees the Caucasus and Central Asian region as its backyard. But the current clashes put President Vladimir Putin in a difficult spot.
    • Russia enjoys good ties with both Azerbaijan and Armenia and supplies weapons to both.
    • But Armenia is more dependent on Russia than the energy-rich, ambitious Azerbaijan. Russia also has a military base in Armenia.
    • But Moscow, at least publicly, is trying to strike a balance between the two. Like in the 1990s, its best interest would be in mediating a ceasefire between the warring sides.

  • Challenges India faces in managing relations in neighbourhood

    The article analyses the inherent challenges India faces in managing good relations with its neighbours.

    Duality challenge

    • Even for the Britishers, it was an unceasing struggle to sustain its primacy in the region.
    • The notion of regional primacy certainly persisted in the Nehru era.
    • Primacy was hard to sustain after Independence even within the immediate neighbourhood.

    Five reasons stand out

    1) Partition of the subcontinent

    • The problems generated by the great division of the Subcontinent on religious lines continue to animate the region.
    • Partition created the challenges of settling boundaries, sharing river-waters, protecting the rights of minorities, and easing the flow of goods and people.
    • The burden of the Subcontinent’s history is not easily discarded.

    2) Unification of China

    • The unification of China amidst the Partition of India had profoundly transformed the geopolitical condition of India.
    • Beyond the bilateral territorial dispute in the Himalayas, the emergence of a large and purposeful state on India’s frontiers was going to be a problem given the ease with which it could constrain Delhi within the Subcontinent.

    3) India’s choice in favour of de-globalisation

    • Independent India’s conscious choice in favour of de-globalisation led to a steady dissipation of commercial connectivity with the neighbours.
    •  India’s economic reorientation since the 1990s and the rediscovery of regionalism did open possibilities for reconnecting with its neighbours.
    • Delhi today is acutely aware of the need to revive regional connectivity.
    • There is much progress in recent years — note, for example, the recent launch of a ferry service to the Maldives or the reopening of inland waterways with Bangladesh.
    • Integrating India’s regional economic and foreign policy remains a major challenge-Consider the recent fiasco of onion exports to Bangladesh.

    4) Rise of political agency in the neighbourhood

    • India ignores the rise of political agency among neighbourhood elites and mass politics that they need to manage.
    • Their imperatives don’t always coincide with those of Delhi.
    • It is unlikely that Delhi can completely insure itself against the intra-elite conflicts in the neighbourhood.

    5) Influence of domestic politics on foreign policy

    • Can India persistently champion Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka without incurring any costs with the Sinhala majority?
    • But asking that question takes us to India’s own domestic politics.
    • Can Delhi ignore sentiments in India’s Tamil Nadu in making its Sri Lanka policy?
    • Indian Prime Minister did not attend the Colombo Commonwealth Summit in 2013 because of the Tamil minority issue.
    • The Teesta Waters agreement was not concluded due to political reasons.

    Ways forward

    • Timely responses to problems.
    • Preventing small issues from becoming big.
    • Aligning Delhi’s regional economic policy with India’s natural geographic advantages .
    • These are some important elements of any successful management of India’s perennial neighbourhood challenges.

    Conclusion

    There are no easy answers to the regional difficulties that trouble all governments in Delhi. The source of the problem lies in the deeply interconnected nature of South Asian societies administered by multiple sovereigns.

  • UN and the retreat from multilateralism

    As the U.N. enters into 75th year of its existence, it faces several challenges. The article discusses such challenges.

    Challenges to the multilateralism

    1) Withdrawal of the main stakeholders: U.S. and the U.K.

    • The U.S. is withdrawing from multilateralism and so it the U.K.
    • Brexit has shown that nationalism remains strong in Europe.
    • Nevertheless, the most important development is the position of the U.S.
    • The U.S., which created the international system as we know today, is no longer willing to be its “guarantor of last resort”.
    • U.S. President Donald Trump stressed “America First” and suggested that others too should put their countries first.

    2) China’s reluctance

    • China has stepped in to take advantage of the West’s retreat from multilateralism.
    • But China is not embracing the idea of multilateralism.
    • China’s Belt and Road Initiative consists of a series of bilateral credit agreements with recipient countries with no mechanism for multilateral consultation or oversight.
    • The European Union’s and U.S.’s sanctions against Russia have driven it closer to China.
    • Work of the UN Security Council has been affected by the lack of consensus between its permanent members.

    3) Turkey’s interventions

    • Turkey has intervened in Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean, which is a breach of international law.
    • The last was a reference to Turkey sending a drilling ship in Greek and Cypriot exclusive economic zones.
    • Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a detailed reference to the Jammu and Kashmir issue.
    • As Turkey has assumed the position of UN General Assembly President, statement and its actions matters.

    4) Paucity of resources

    • Over 40 UN political missions and peacekeeping operations engage 95,000 troops, police, and civil personnel. it suffers from a paucity of resources.
    • The UN peacekeeping budget, a little over $8 billion, is a small fraction of the $1.9 trillion military expenditure governments made in 2019.
    •  Most of the humanitarian assistance, developmental work, and budgets of the specialised agencies are based on voluntary contributions.
    • There are calls for increasing public-private partnerships. This is not a satisfactory arrangement.
    • The UN provides ‘public goods’ in terms of peace and development often in remote parts of the world.
    • There may not be enough appetite on the part of corporations. The UN remains an inter-governmental body.

    5) Climate action

    • President Trump mentioned that China’s emissions are nearly twice of those of the U.S.
    • Despite its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the U.S. has reduced its carbon emissions by more than any country in the world.
    • President Xi said that after peaking emissions by 2030, China will achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.
    • President Macron said that he was determined to see the EU agree on a target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.

    Consider the question “As the world is facing the retreat from multilateralism, what are the challenges facing the U.N. in the current global order?”

    Conclusion

    What does the UN bring to the developing countries? It gives them greater political space. We need to support reform not only to expand the permanent members’ category of the Security Council but also to revitalise the role of the General Assembly. The retreat from multilateralism would undermine the UN’s capacity to face diverse challenges.

  • Gilgit-Baltistan: The land of peaks, streams and disputes

    Seven decades after it took control of the region, Pakistan is moving to grant full statehood to Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), which appears as the northernmost part of the country in its official map.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. If you travel through the Himalayas, you are likely to see which of the following plants naturally growing there?

    1. Oak
    2. Rhododendron
    3. Sandalwood

    Select the correct option using the code given below:

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

    Pak occupation of GB

    • During the first Indo-Pak war of October 1947, Pakistan occupied 78,114 sq km of the land of Jammu and Kashmir, including the ‘Northern Areas’.
    • The Northern Areas is the other name of Gilgit-Baltistan that Pakistan has used for administrative reasons because it was a disputed territory.
    • This November, Pakistan will pave the way for fuller political rights for the roughly 1.2 million residents of the region, which will become the fifth State of Pakistan after Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

    GB through history

    • One of the most mountainous regions in the world that is rich with mines of gold, emerald and strategically important minerals, GB is known for its extraordinary scenic beauty, diversity and ancient communities and languages.
    • The political nature of Gilgit-Baltistan has been directionless from the beginning.
    • Pakistan initially governed the region directly from the central authority after it was separated from ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ on April 28, 1949.
    • On March 2, 1963, Pakistan gave away 5,180 sq km of the region to China, despite local protests.
    • Under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the name of the region was changed to the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA).
    • Pakistan passed the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order in 2009, which granted “self-rule” to the ‘Northern Areas’.

    Sense of alienation

    • GB is largely an underdeveloped region.
    • One of the main reasons for the rebellion in the region in 1947 was the sense of alienation that the population felt towards the Dogra rulers of Srinagar, who operated under the protection of the British government.

    It’s geographical features

    • It’s home to K-2, the second tallest mountain in the world.
    • Tourism remains restricted by many factors, including military hostility, though the region has some of the ancient Buddhist sculptures and rock edicts.
    • It is also home to an old Shia community, which often finds itself subjected to persecution in Pakistan’s urban centres.
    • At present, a Governor and an elected Chief Minister rule the region, which is divided into Gilgit, Skardu, Diamer, Astore, Ghanche, Ghizer and Hunza-Nagar.

    Indian protest

    • Following Pakistan’s announcement of holding the legislative election in Gilgit-Baltistan, India reiterated its territorial sovereignty over the region.
    • India has consistently opposed Pakistan’s activities in Gilgit-Baltistan. It also opposed the announcement of the commencement of the Diamer-Bhasha dam in July this year.
    • There have been local and international concerns as reports suggest priceless Buddhist heritage will be lost once the dam is built.
    • India has objected to the use of Gilgit-Baltistan to build and operate the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

    GB resists

    • Gilgit-Baltistan in recent years has witnessed sporadic protests against Islamabad.
    • The protests were fuelled by the loss of land and livelihood of the locals to mega projects that are being championed by Pakistan and its international partners like China.
    • There is a growing feeling that full statehood will help the locals fight their battles inside Pakistan on an equal basis.
    • On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling that Pakistan, under pressure from China, is firming up its control over Gilgit-Baltistan, eventually creating conditions for the declaration of the LoC as the International Border.

    China’s vested interest

    • Gilgit-Baltistan is important for China as it is the gateway for the CPEC.
    • Significantly, the ongoing stand-off with China at the LAC in Eastern Ladakh has a Gilgit-Baltistan connection.
    • The Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road of India is viewed as a tactical roadway to access the Karakoram Pass, which provides China crucial access to Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan.
    • Full statehood for the region may give Pakistan a political and legal upper hand and strengthen China’s position in the region.

  • India needs a China plan

    The article discusses the issue of dealing with China in the aftermath of clashes on the border.

    Understanding the importance of Tibet

    • Tibet is the roof of the world, with vast mineral and natural resources.
    • The mighty rivers that emanate from its expansive glaciers — such as the Brahmaputra, the Yangtse, the Yellow river, the Mekong, the Salween and the Indus — together with thousands of their tributaries have nurtured civilisations in peripheral countries for centuries.
    • The Kailash Mansarovar is centered in this region.
    • In an act of naked aggression, China occupied Tibet in 1959.
    • A buffer was eliminated, and the de facto boundary of China became contiguous to that of India.
    • That boundary was deliberately left undemarcated to enable further expansion.

    Understanding China’s stand

    • China has land borders with 14 neighbours covering an estimated 22,100 kilometres.
    • Post-independence, and as its economic status increased, so did its military muscle.
    • China embarked on claims based on perceived imbalances of treaties forced on countries when they were weak.
    • Some of these have since been resolved after bloody clashes such as with Russia and Vietnam, while others have been resolved using a combination of lucrative offers.
    • Russia accepted half of China’s claim, Kazakhstan was given lucrative economic deals, Kyrgyzstan retained 70% of the land, ceding just 30%, and so on.

    Way forward

    • The road ahead will have to be evolved and based on a study of the manner in which China has negotiated its boundary disputes with 12 of its neighbours.
    • Under the prevailing circumstances, it has become imperative to form a group of experts.
    • This group will plan and prepare, short-, medium- and long-term goals to achieve them within a suggested time frame.

     Conclusion

    Let us play down the rhetoric and adopt a pragmatic approach. It can no longer be a part-time issue to be addressed only when a crisis occurs. The crisis is upon us now.

  • What are Abraham Accords?

    The White House has marked the formal normalization of Israel’s ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain has created a significant inflexion point in regional history and geopolitics.

    Try this question:

    Q. What are Abraham Accords? Discuss how the Israel-Gulf synergy could impact India’s relations with Israel.

    What are Abraham Accords?

    • The Israel–UAE normalization agreement is officially called the Abraham Accords Peace Agreement.
    • It was initially agreed to in a joint statement by the United States, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on August 13, 2020.
    • The UAE thus became the third Arab country, after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, to agree to formally normalize its relationship with Israel as well as the first Persian Gulf country to do so.
    • Concurrently, Israel agreed to suspend plans for annexing parts of the West Bank. The agreement normalized what had long been informal but robust foreign relations between the two countries.

    New friendships

    • Externally, Israel, the UAE and Bahrain share the common threat perception of Iran.
    • Internally, while all three have their respective hotheads opposing this reconciliation, these seem manageable.
    • They are relatively more modern societies which share the overarching and immediate priority of post-pandemic economic resuscitation.
    • They have lost no time to set up logistics such as Internet connectivity and direct flights to pave the way for more active economic engagement.
    • If these sinews evolve, other moderate Arab countries are likely to join the Israel fan club.

    India and the Gulf

    • Now India has stronger, multifaceted and growing socioeconomic engagements with Israel and the Gulf countries.
    • With over eight million Indian diasporas in the Gulf remitting annually nearly $50 billion, annual merchandise trade of over $150 billion.
    • It sources nearly two-thirds of India’s hydrocarbon imports, major investments, etc. Hence it is natural to ask how the new regional dynamic would affect India.

    The Israel-GCC synergy

    • With defence and security cooperation as a strong impetus, both sides are ready to realize the full potential of their economic complementarity.
    • The UAE and Bahrain can become the entrepôts to Israeli exports of goods and services to diverse geographies.
    • Israel has niche strengths in defence, security and surveillance equipment, arid farming, solar power, horticultural products, high-tech, gem and jewellery, and pharmaceuticals.
    • Tourism, real estate and financial service sectors on both sides have suffered due to the pandemic and hope for a positive spin-off from the peer-to-peer interactions.
    • Further, Israel has the potential to supply skilled and semi-skilled manpower to the GCC states, particularly from the Sephardim and Mizrahim ethnicities, many of whom speak Arabic.
    • Even the Israeli Arabs may find career opportunities to bridge the cultural divide. Israel is known as the start-up nation and its stakeholders could easily fit in the various duty-free incubators in the UAE.

    Implications of the new trinity

    • Geopolitically, India has welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel, calling both its strategic partners.
    • In general, the Israel-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) breakthrough widens the moderate constituency for peaceful resolution of the Palestine dispute, easing India’s diplomatic balancing act.
    • However, nothing in West Asia is monochromatic: The Israel-GCC ties may provoke new polarization between the Jihadi fringe and the mainstream.
    • The possibility of the southern Gulf becoming the new arena of the proxy war between Iran and Israel cannot be ruled out, particularly in Shia pockets.
    • India would have to be on its guard to monitor and even pre-empt any threat to its interests in the Gulf.

    Way forward

    • Israeli foray into the Gulf has the potential to disrupt the existing politico-economic architecture India has carefully built with the GCC states.
    • India has acquired a large and rewarding regional footprint, particularly as the preferred source of manpower, food products, pharmaceuticals, gem and jewellery, light engineering items, etc.
    • Indians are also the biggest stakeholders in Dubai’s real estate, tourism and Free Economic Zones.
    • In the evolving scenario, there may be scope for a profitable trilateral synergy, but India cannot take its preponderance as a given.

  • Difficulties faced by India and Russia in following convergent policies

    The article analyses the challenges in the India-Russia relations against the background of changing global order.

    Context

    • India decided to pull out of Russia’s Kavkaz 2020 military exercises, where it was scheduled to participate alongside other Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member states.

    Russia’s role in India-China dispute

    • The ongoing conflict between two prominent members, and both close partners of Russia, has given rise to concerns about its impact on India-Russia ties.
    • Moscow has been playing a quiet diplomatic role during the recent border clashes without actively taking sides.
    • Recent visits by India’s Defence Minister to Russia saw detailed discussions around furthering the India-Russia defence relationship alongside the promise to accelerate certain supplies based on New Delhi’s requirements.
    • The September visit coincided with the biannual Indo-Russian naval exercises, INDRA.

    India-Russia relations

    • India and Russia have spent the past few years strengthening their partnership, particularly since the 2018 Sochi informal summit.
    • From substantive defence engagement to regional questions in Central Asia, Afghanistan and West Asia, a conversation with Moscow remains an important element of Indian foreign policy.
    • India and Russia are pragmatic players looking at maximising their strategic manoeuvrability,
    • Both recognise the value of having a diversified portfolio of ties. .
    • India on its part has sought to include Russia in its vision of the Indo-Pacific that does not see the region as ‘a strategy or as a club of limited members’.
    • Reports indicate that a proposal for a India-Russia-Japan trilateral is being explored.

    Multilateral forums and Challenges in India-Russia relation

    • The multilateral forums are important as they foster continued India-Russia cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels.
    •  Increasingly divergent foreign policies of its members pose challenges of agenda-setting and overall scope.
    • At this moment of flux, countries such as India and Russia are keeping all their options open.
    • We live in a ‘curious world’ where one cannot view engagement with different parties as a ‘zero-sum game’.
    • Worsening India-China ties or a burgeoning China-Russia relationship does not automatically mean a breakdown of the India-Russia strategic partnership.
    •  It is the combination of a changing regional order, closer Russia-China ties and India’s alignment with the United States and other like-minded countries to manage Beijing’s rise that has the potential to create hurdles for India-Russia cooperation in the Asia.

    Consider the question “Despite difficulties in pursuing convergent policies, India-China relations retains its relevance. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Although the evolving global order makes it difficult for India and Russia to pursue fully convergent policies, it does not preclude the bilateral relationship from retaining its relevance.