Subject: International Relations

Quad as new feature of Indo-Pacific

• Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercises marks the emergence of the Quad as a new feature of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
• The question is India’s ability to take full advantage of the possibilities after the US elections to construct a wide range of new international coalitions.
• Likely changes could envelop a range of old institutions like the Five Eyes and the G-7 grouping that coordinates Western policies on global economic management.
• We could also see the creation of a new League of Democracies that will addres issues like including the defence of shared values, commerce, corruption, taxation, climate change and digital governance.

Phases of India’s international aspiration

• The consolidation of the Quad reflects the political will in Delhi to break free from old shibboleths and respond to security imperatives.
• The post-Quad era opens a new phase in which India, for the first time, can help shape global institutions.
• First phase: Idealism was the hallmark of India’s internationalism in the 1950s, the harsh politics of the Cold War quickly dampened it.
• Second phase: In the 1970s, India embraced the radical agenda of a New International Economic Order, as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. The results were meagre.
• Third phase began with the end of the Cold War.
• And as India’s own economic model collapsed, India had to focus on economic reform and prevent the world from intruding too much into its internal affairs.
• The fear of the US activism on Kashmir and nuclear issues saw Delhi turn to Russia and China in search of a “multipolar world” that could constrain American power.
• The BRICS forum with Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa became emblematic of this strategy.
• Delhi also figured out that it was not possible for BRICS to constrain Beijing, since China was so much bigger than the other four members put together.
• Fourth phase in India’s multilateralism is marked by three features — the relative rise in Delhi’s international standing, the breakdown of the great power consensus on economic globalisation, and the breakout of the US-China rivalry.

Efforts to tackle China

• The Trump administration has already sought to imagine the Quad’s possibilities beyond the defence domain.
• The invitation to India to join a Five Eyes meeting came amidst the bipartisan calls in the US Congress for the expansion of the forum and the inclusion of India.
• The “Quad Plus” dialogue has variously drawn in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam for consultations with the Quad members on coordinating the responses to the pandemic.
• India is also engaged with Japan and Australia in developing resilient supply chains to reduce the reliance on China.
• President Trump has proposed the expansion of G-7 grouping to include Australia, India, Russia and South Korea.
• The last few months has seen the Trump administration promote a “Clean Network” that eliminates untrustworthy vendors from telecom systems, digital apps, trans-oceanic cables and cloud infrastructure.
• Clean Network is now a broader effort to build secure technology ecosystems among like-minded countries.
• Britain is said to be developing plans to convene a coalition of 10 democracies, including India, that can contribute to the construction of secure 5G networks and reduce the current dependence on China.
• France and Canada have invited India to join the Global Partnership on artificial intelligence that now includes 15 countries.
• The objective is to promote responsible development of AI that is consistent with shared democratic values.

Conclusion

Delhi’s participation in the sweeping rearrangement of the global structures will have major consequences for India’s economic prosperity and technological future. Unlike in the past, Delhi now has the resources, leverage and political will to make a difference to the global order

The growing pace of India-US bilateral engagement has raised hopes in several quarters. However, there are several issues that must be considered and need to avoid excessive optimism. 

Timing of 2+2 dialogue

• The India-US 2+2 third meeting was held in Delhi only a week before the US presidential elections.
• The government felt that it was important to seal the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) without delay.
• Other reason could be government’s assessment that there is bipartisan support in the US for higher and positive bilateral ties.

Need for caution in India’s approach

• In India-US ties, the leading outside consideration is China.
• A Biden presidency, should that be the choice of the American people, would seek to ensure that China’s rise is not at the cost of the US’s global pre-eminence.
• However, the strategy and methods it employs would be different from that of its predecessor.
• Further, even a Trump 2 administration, with the election done, may change course in its China approach.
• Hence, caution and prudence are good diplomatic watchwords.
• It is good that the agreements for a full defence engagement with the US are in place.
• But it is one matter to have them done and an entirely different one insofar as the nature and intensity of cooperation.
• So, India’s tradition of relying on its own strengths in matters of national security should not be eroded in the hope that an outside power would provide useful inputs.

Alliance Vs. Partnership

• India-US ties are in the framework of a partnership, not an alliance.
• The partnership may not be based on opposition to an outside element, the alliance almost always is.
• Alliances also demand a much higher price than partnerships, through loss of autonomy if the ally is a bigger power.

Excessive enthusiasm on Quad may be premature

• The 2+2 joint statement does not name China but its thrust is clear.
• The Quad is based on a commonality of concerns on account of China’s actions.
• India’s decision to go along with a more purposive group, including through its maritime exercises, is in keeping with its interests.
• The real direction that the Quad will take has to await the US’s overall China strategy over the next few years.
• Excessive enthusiasm on the Quad front may, therefore, be premature.

Way forward

• India has to change the nature of its economic and commercial ties with China.
• Thus, the joint statement’s reference on the need to “enhance supply chain resilience and to seek alternatives to the current paradigm” was timely, though here, again, the future US approach is not entirely certain.
• The areas where the bilateral partnership has the potential of evolving most positively for India relate to health, education and science and technology.
• There should not be any reluctance in developing ties in defence industries, too, but it cannot be forgotten that no country will part with any of its critical technologies.
• But there cannot be a substitute for developing indigenous capacity for India’s needs for weapon systems.

Conclusion

India-US ties will move positively forward but there will be imponderables ahead, principally arising out of US strategies towards China. But, a close embrace of another country is always problematic.

The article draws parallels in the past in India and China’s engagement with West Asia and contrasts it with the present approach adopted by China in dealing with the region.

Strategic autonomy

• According to a former Foreign Secretary of India, Vijay Gokhale, the ideation of ‘strategic autonomy’ is much different from the Nehruvian era thinking of ‘non-alignment’.
• Speaking in January 2019, Mr. Gokhale said: “The alignment is issue based, and not ideological.”

India’s engagement with West Asia

• Pre-dating 2020, India’s outreach to West Asia sharpened since 2014.
•  Oil-rich Gulf states looked at India as investment alternative away from the West to deepen their own strategic depth.
• India also doubled down on its relations with the likes of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, giving open economic and political preference to the larger Gulf region.
• While engagements with Israel moved steadily forward, Iran lagged behind, constrained by U.S. sanctions, which in turn significantly slowed the pace of India-Iran engagements.

China’s engagement with West Asia

• China’s overtures have been steadily more adventurous as it realises two major shifts that have taken place in West Asia.
• First, the thinking in the Gulf that the American security safety net is not absolute.
• Second, the Gulf economies such as Saudi Arabia, even though trying to shift away from petro dollar, will still need growing markets to sell oil to in the coming decade as they reform their economic systems.
• The obvious two markets here are China and India.

Similarity in India and China’s approach to West Asia

• Both India and China employed similar versions of ‘non-alignment’ thinking is in West Asia based on equitable engagement with the three poles of power in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.
• Both countries did it without getting involved into the region’s multi-layered conflicts and political fissures.
• However, deteriorating U.S.-China ties, the COVID-19 pandemic that started in China, followed by the Ladakh crisis, is forcing a drastic change in the geopolitical playbooks of the two Asian giants, and, by association, global security architectures as well.

Changing approach of China

•  A report in September shone a light on a $400 billion, 25-year understanding between Iran and China, with Beijing taking advantage of abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal.
• China is no longer happy with a passive role in West Asia, and through concepts such as “negative peace” and “peace through development”.
• In concert with tools such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is now ready to offer an alternative model for “investment and influence”.
•  It remains to be seen, however, how China balances itself between the poles of power while backing one so aggressively.

Stability of the region and opportunity for India

• From India’s perspective, the overt outreach to the Gulf and the ensuing announcements of multi-billion-dollar investments on Indian shores by entities from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is only New Delhi recognising the economic realities of the region. 
• Despite entanglements in the Yemen war and general tensions between the Gulf states and Iran, the likes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and so on have maintained relatively strong and stable economic progression.
• Israel’s recent peace accords with the UAE and Bahrain add much further weight towards a more stable Gulf region — the caveats withstanding that the operationalisation of the accords is smooth and long-lasting.

Consider the question “Despite turbulence in the region, India’s engagement with West Asia has always been characterised by non-alignment and ethos of equitable engagement. In light of this, elaborate on India’s approach to the region and region’s importance for India.”

Conclusion

While in the recent past, the Indo-Pacific, with the development of the Quad, has taken centre stage, other geographies such as West Asia have also started to showcase bolder examples of New Delhi and Beijing’s metamorphosing approaches towards the international arena.

Changing geopolitical factors have accelerated further the deepening of India-US ties. The article analyses the current circumstances and evolution of the bilateral relations.

Background against which 2+2 dialogue taking place

• The 2+2 dialogue between India and the United States in Delhi this week marks an important moment in bilateral relations.
• The 2+2 dialogue comes just three weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad — or the Quadrilateral Security Framework — met in Tokyo.
• It also takes place amidst a profound structural shift in great power politics as well as turbulence in the international economic order intensified by the coronavirus pandemic.
• The dialogue follows India’s first-ever participation in a meeting of the exclusive Five Eyes grouping that facilitates intelligence-sharing among the US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand.
• A few days ago, Delhi announced the much-awaited expansion of the annual Malabar exercises to include Australia.

Background of the past engagements

• Signing the historic civil nuclear initiative ended India’s prolonged atomic isolation in the world laid the outline of a broader framework for security cooperation.
• Due to the deep divisions within the national security establishment, the leadership and some political constraints faced by the government, the coalition broke up.
•  The focus was on keeping visible distance from the US in the name of non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and the quest for a multipolar world.
• The relationship survived those years, thanks to the US’s perseverance.

3 Factors responsible for rapid progress in the US-India ties

1) Chines aggression on northern border

• The huge military crisis on the northern borders with China that is well into the sixth month is the first factor.
• In the past, India avoided closer security ties with the US in deference to Beijing’s sensitivities.
• In contrast, the government now has refused to pay heed to Chinese sensitivities over its policy on security cooperation with the US.

2) Disruption caused by the corona pandemic

• The coronavirus has sharpened the US debate on the dangers of excessive economic interdependence on China.
• Meanwhile, India has begun to reduce its commercial ties to Beijing in response to the PLA’s Ladakh aggression.
• This has created the conditions for a new conversation between India and the US on rearranging global supply chains away from China.
• So, the Quad Plus conversations have drawn in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam with a view to rearrange the global supply chain.

3) Focus on critical technologies

• Third factor is critical technologies like artificial intelligence that promise to transform most aspects of modern life — including security, political economy and social order.
• Delhi and Washington are now focused on finding ways to collaborate on the critical technologies of the 21st century and work with their partners in setting new global rules for managing them.

Conclusion

As the regional and global order faces multiple transitions, the incentives for Delhi and Washington to sustain and advance India-US partnership are stronger than ever before and will continue into the next administration.