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Subject: International Relations

  • In news: Senkaku Islands

    A local council in southern Japan voted to rename an area covering the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands — known by Taiwan and China as the Diaoyus — from “Tonoshiro” to “Tonoshiro Senkaku”.

    Try this:

    Q. Recently, Senkaku Island was in the news. Where is it located?

    a) South China Sea

    b) Indian Ocean

    c) East China sea

    d) Red sea

    Senkaku Island Dispute

    • The Japanese-administered island chain, formed by five islets and three barren rocks, covers an area of 7 square km.
    • It is located about 200km southwest of Japan’s Okinawa Island and a similar distance northeast of Taiwan.
    • Japan annexed the archipelago following China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war from 1894 to 1895.
    • Yet the islands were left out of the Treaty of San Francisco at the end of the second world war that returned to China most of the territories previously occupied by Japan.
    • Under the terms of Japan’s surrender, the island chain was controlled by the US until 1971, when it was returned to Japan along with Okinawa and other surrounding islands.

    Why are the Islands so coveted?

    • The region appears to have great promise as a future oil province of the world.
    • Japan and China are among the world’s top importers of fossil fuels.
    • Abundant fishing resources are found nearby, as can important shipping lanes used by Japan, South Korea and China for energy imports.
    • The islands have also become a focal point of the broader rivalry between the two countries.

  • Faults in our China policy

    This article tracks the faultline in India’s China policy that makes it an enduring tragedy. China never bought into India’s narratives of Asian unity and untied Asian front against the West. Instead, China cultivated its relations with the West and leveraged that for furthering its interests.

    Enduring tragedy: India’s China policy

    • That tragedy is rooted in persistent political fantasies.
    • Refusal to learn from past mistakes.
    • And the belief that the US and the West are at the source of India’s problems with China.
    • The problem predates independence.
    • Each generation has been reluctant to discard the illusions that India’s China policy has nurtured over the last century.

    Historical background

    •  Tagore went to China in 1924 with the ambition of developing a shared Asian spiritual civilisation.
    • He was accused by Chines of diverting Chins’s attention away from the imperatives of modernisation and, yes, westernisation.
    •  Jawaharlal Nehru approached China as a modernist and nationalist.
    • He met a delegation of Chinese nationalists at Brussels in 1927.
    • There he issued a ringing statement on defeating western imperialism and shaping a new Asian and global order.
    •  But in Second World War, Congress was unwilling to join hands with China in defeating Japanese imperialism.
    • Indian and Chinese nationalists could not come together for they were fighting different imperial powers.

    Relations after independence

    • As India’s first PM, Nehru campaigned against the western attempt to isolate China.
    • Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 was attended by both.
    • Within five years war broke out in 1962.
    • Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to China in February 1979 to re-engage Beijing.
    • Before he could head home, Beijing had launched a war against a fellow communist regime in Vietnam.
    • That was an end of hope for Asian solidarity.
    • Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 sought to normalise relations with China while continuing to negotiate on the boundary dispute.

    Other issues: Trade entanglement

    • Amid border dispute, other issues have taken a life of their own.
    • For example, the massive annual trade deficits.
    • India’s hope that economic cooperation will improve mutual trust will help resolve other issues was also dashed.
    • India’s massive trade deficit with China is now a little over half of its total trade deficit.
    • India is finding it hard to disentangle the deep economic dependence on imports from China.

    Story of political cooperation: From unipolar to bipolar world

    • As the Cold War ended, India began political cooperation with China on global issues.
    • It was hoped that such cooperation will provide the basis for better bilateral relations.
    • It could not have been more wrong.
    • P V Narasimha Rao and his successors joined China and Russia in promoting a “multipolar world” [remember the US dominance].
    • Delhi is now struggling to cope with the emergence of a “unipolar Asia” — with Beijing as its dominant centre.
    • China’s rapid rise has also paved the way for the potential emergence of a “bipolar world” dominated by Washington and Beijing.

    Engagement with West

    • China never worked with Indian on the ideas of building coalitions against the West.
    • While India never stopped arguing with the West, China developed a sustained engagement with the US, Europe and Japan.
    • Mao broke with Communist Russia to join forces with the US in the early 1970s.
    • Deng Xiaoping promoted massive economic cooperation with the US to transform China and lay the foundations for its rise.

    Will staying away from West lead to good relations with China

    • China has leveraged the deep relationship with the West to elevate itself in the international system.
    • Delhi continues to think that staying away from America is the answer for good relations with Beijing.
    • Beijing sees the world through the lens of power.
    • Delhi tends to resist that realist prism.
    • India has consistently misread China’s interests and ambitions.
    • The longer India takes to shed that strategic lassitude, the greater will be its China trouble.

    Facts that India needs to come to terms with

    • India must also recognise that China, like the great powers before it, wants to redeem its territorial claims.
    • China also has the ambition to bend the neighbourhood to its will, reshape the global order to suit its interests.
    • China has not hidden these goals and interests, but India has refused to see what is in plain sight.

    Consider the question “Acknowledging Beijing’s rise, scale of challenge it presents, are first steps in crafting a new China policy” Comment.

    Conclusion

    Acknowledging China’s dramatic rise and recognising the scale of the challenge it presents is essential for Delhi in crafting a new China policy.

  • Explained: In India-China, the Russia role

    Russia has emerged, all of a sudden, as a key diplomatic player amid the tension between India and China. It is set to host the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. In pursuit of a ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ with the US, India has compromised its ties with Russia. Discuss.

    Raksha Mantri stepping in at RIC

    • Tensions being at the peak, India will discuss supply and purchase of new defence systems — like the S-400 missile defence system — with the Russian top brass in the military and government.
    • India has made this decision to reach out to Russia not just out of choice, but also out of necessity.
    • Moscow has leverage and influence to shape and change Beijing’s hard stance on the border issue.

    Russia: A mediator for both

    • While India and China have been talking at each other — and not to each other — the outreach to Moscow is noteworthy.
    • It is widely known that Russia and China have grown their relationship in the past few years.
    • The Moscow-Beijing axis is crucial, especially since Washington has been at loggerheads with China in recent months and Russia much more calibrated, even in its response on the Covid-19 outbreak.

    Sino-Russian ties: A response to US

    • Russia and China have had a rocky start to their relationship after Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China.
    • When Mao made his first visit to Moscow after winning control of China, in 1949, he was made to wait for weeks for a meeting with the Soviet leader.
    • During the Cold War, China and the USSR were rivals after the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, competing for control of the worldwide Communist movement.
    • There was a serious possibility of a major war in the early 1960s and a brief border war took place in 1969.
    • This enmity began to reduce following Mao’s death in 1976, but relations were not very good until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

    India and Russia

    • India has a historical relationship with Russia, spanning over seven decades.
    • While the relationship has grown in some areas and atrophied in some others, the strongest pillar of the strategic partnership is of the defence basket.
    • Although New Delhi has consciously diversified its new purchases from other countries, the bulk of its defence equipment is from Russia.
    • Estimates say 60 to 70 per cent of India’s supplies are from Russia, and New Delhi needs a regular and reliable supply of spare parts from the Russian defence industry.
    • In fact, Prime Minister Modi has held informal summits with only two leaders — Xi and Putin.

    Russia position: then & now

    • During the Doklam crisis in 2017, Russian diplomats in Beijing were among the few briefed by the Chinese government.
    • While Russia’s position during the 1962 war was not particularly supportive of India, New Delhi takes comfort in Moscow’s support during the 1971 war.
    • On the events in Galwan, Moscow responded in a much-calibrated manner.
    • Kremlin has expressed its concerns over a clash between the military on the border between China and India but believes that the two countries could resolve this conflict themselves.

  • UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

    China will join a global pact to regulate arms sales that has been rejected by the United States.

    The New START, INF, Open Skies and now the ATT …. Be clear about the differences of these treaties. For example- to check if their inception was during cold war era etc.

    What is the Arms Trade Treaty?

    • The Arms Trade Treaty is a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons. It entered into force on 4th December 2014.
    • The ATT is an attempt to regulate the international trade of conventional weapons for the purpose of contributing to international and regional peace; reducing human suffering; and promoting co-operation, transparency, and responsible action by and among states.
    • 105 states have ratified the treaty, and a further 32 states have signed but not ratified it.
    • India has abstained from voting for this Treaty

    Highlights of the treaty

    ATT requires member countries to keep records of international transfers of weapons and to prohibit cross-border shipments that could be used in human rights violations or attacks on civilians. The treaty would ensure that no transfer is permitted if there is a substantial risk that it is likely to:

    • be used in serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, or acts of genocide or crimes against humanity;
    • facilitate terrorist attacks, a pattern of gender-based violence, violent crime, or organized crime;
    • violate UN Charter obligations, including UN arms embargoes;
    • be diverted from its stated recipient;
    • adversely affect regional security; or
    • seriously impair poverty reduction or socioeconomic development.

    China’s agenda at ATT

    • Beijing saying it is committed to efforts to “enhance peace and stability” in the world.
    • It comes after the US announced plans last year to pull the United States out of the agreement which entered into force in 2014.
    • The US Senate never ratified the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty after former president Barack Obama endorsed it, and Trump has said he would revoke his predecessor’s signature.

    Why has India abstained?

    • From the beginning of the ATT process, India has maintained that such a treaty should make a real impact on illicit trafficking in conventional arms and their illicit use especially by terrorists and other unauthorized and unlawful non-state actors.
    • India has also stressed consistently that the ATT should ensure a balance of obligations between exporting and importing states.
    • However, the ATT is weak on terrorism and non-state actors (undoubtedly Pakistan) and these concerns find no mention in the specific prohibitions of the Treaty.
    • Further, India cannot accept that the Treaty is used as an instrument in the hands of exporting states to take unilateral force majeure measures against importing states parties without consequences.

    Also read:

    U.S. set to exit the ‘Open Skies Treaty’ Copy

  • What is lacking in our China policy

    While formulating our response to China’s aggressive policies in Ladakh, we should first understand their objectives. This article explains these objective and suggests the steps to deal with China’s policies.

    Statements on Aksai Chin and Pakistan

    • Statements over Aksai Chin and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) by India have painted the image of India as a revanchist power in utter disregard of the country’s capabilities.
    • These statements also gave the impression that India precludes any attempt at changing the status quo on either front.
    • Though these statements were justifiable in terms of India’s legal rights to these territories, were ill-timed.

    How these statements were perceived by China

    • They were made when Beijing was feeling alarmed at the Indian government’s decision to separate Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir.
    • The move augmented its perception that it was a prelude to India’s attempt to change the status quo in Aksai Chin.
    • India’s assertion of its claims on PoK that in China’s perception threatened the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

    China’s 4 strategic objectives

    1. India and China are not equals

    • China wants India to understand that it is not in the same league as China.
    • China resorts to periodic assaults across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) if India tries to assume a position of equality.

    2. Keep India away from interfering in Indo-Pacific

    • China wants India not to actively oppose Chinese designs to dominate the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Also, China wants Indias to refrain from aligning with the U.S. and its allies — Japan and Australia, in particular — in an attempt to contain China.

    3. Keeping India preoccupied with problems

    • China’s strategy also includes keeping India preoccupied with problems in its immediate neighbourhood.
    • So with these problems, India cannot act as an alternative pole of power to China in the broader Asian region.

    4. Supporting Pakistan to neutralise India

    • As part of the last objective, China supports  Pakistan economically and militarily, including the sharing of nuclear weapons designs.
    • China uses Pakistan to neutralise India’s conventional power superiority vis-à-vis that country.

    An understanding of these objectives is essential to fashioning a realistic Indian response to China’s aggressive policies in Ladakh and elsewhere along the LAC.

    But, what about Pakistan?

    • Pakistan is at best an irritant for India. (so, focus on China)
    • Pakistan can be managed with the use of diplomatic tools, international opprobrium, and superior military force.
    • In fact, the Pakistani challenge to India has become magnified because of its nexus with China.

    What India should do?

    • India’s main strategic goal should be the adoption of carefully calculated policies that neutralise China’s diplomatic and military clout in the Asia-Pacific region.
    • While doing so, India should not appear as a surrogate for other powers.
    • And India should also ensure that in making alliances it in not sacrificing the autonomy of decision-making in foreign policy. 

    Consider the question “Understanding of China’s objective is essential to formulate a realistic response to its aggressive policies in Ladakh.” Comment.

    Conclusion

    Understanding the greater threat posed by China vis-a-vis Pakistan should be the basis of India’s policy towards China.

  • Why China trade ban is bad idea

    After the Galwan Valley skirmish, the popular idea resonating in Indian streets is that Indians should boycott Chinese goods and thus “teach China a lesson”.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s quest for self-reliance is still a distant dream. Critically comment in light of the popular sentiment against the Chinese imports in India.

    There are several reasons why the #Boycott_China is an ill-advised move:

    A. Trade deficits are not necessarily bad

    • Trade deficits/surpluses are just accounting exercises and having a trade deficit against a country doesn’t make the domestic economy weaker or worse off.
    • Example: If one looks at the top 25 countries with whom India trades, it has a trade surplus with the US, the UK and the Netherlands. But this does not make Indian economy better than them.

    What does this deficit indicate?

    • Both Indian consumers and Chinese producers are gainer through trading.
    • One gets the market other cheap price. Thus, both are better off than what they would have been without trade.

    So, having a trade deficit is good?

    • Of course, running persistent trade deficits across all countries raises two main issues.
    • One, availability of foreign exchange reserves to “buy” the imports.
    • Today, India has more than $500 billion of forex — good enough to cover imports for 12 months.
    • Two, lack of domestic capacity to produce in the most efficient manner.

    B. Will hurt the Indian poor the most

    • This is because poor are more price-sensitive.
    • For instance, if Chinese TVs were replaced by either costlier Indian TVs or less efficient ones, unlike poor, richer Indians may buy the costlier option.
    • Similarly, the Chinese products that are in India are already paid for. By banning their sale or avoiding them, Indians will be hurting fellow Indian retailers.
    • Again, this would hit poorest retailers more due to inability to cope with the unexpected losses.

    C. Will punish Indian producers and exporters

    • Several businesses in India import intermediate goods and raw materials, which, in turn, are used to create final goods — both for the domestic Indian market as well as the global market (as Indian exports).
    • An overwhelming proportion of Chinese imports are in the form of intermediate goods such as electrical machinery, nuclear reactors, fertilizers, optical and photographic measuring equipment organic chemicals etc.
    • Such imports are used to produce final goods which are then either sold in India or exported.
    • A blanket ban on Chinese imports will hurt all these businesses at a time when they are already struggling to survive, apart from hitting India’s ability to produce finished goods.

    D. Will barely hurt China

    • While China accounts for 5% of India’s exports and 14% of India’s imports — in US$ value terms — India’s imports from China are just 3% of China’s total exports.
    • More importantly, China’s imports from India are less than 1% of its total imports.
    • The point is that if India and China stop trading then — on the face of it — China would lose only 3% of its exports and less than 1% of its imports.
    • However, India will lose 5% of its exports and 14% of its imports.

    Issues

    • On the whole, it is much easier for China to replace India than for India to replace China.
    • Ban can also seize Chinese funding to many Indian businesses (the start-ups with billion-dollar valuations).
    • In short term, replacing Chinese products with Japan or Germany, will only increase our total trade deficit.
    • If on the other hand, we decide to use Indian products, that too would cost us more — albeit just internally.

    E. India will lose policy credibility

    • It has also been suggested that India should renege on existing contracts with China.
    • This can be detrimental for India’s effort to attract foreign investment.
    • As one of the first things an investor — especially foreign — tracks is the policy credibility and certainty.
    • If policies can be changed overnight or if the government itself reneges on contracts, investor will either not invest or demand higher returns for the increased risk.

    F. Raising tariffs is mutually assured destruction

    • Many argue that India should just slap higher import duties on Chinese goods or apply prohibitive tariffs on final goods.
    • By doing this, firstly India would be violating rules of the World Trade Organization.
    • Secondly, it would make China and many others to reciprocate in the same way.

    Equating border dispute with trade is no panacea

    • The first thing to understand is that turning a border dispute into a trade war is unlikely to solve the border dispute.
    • Worse, given India and China’s position in both global trade as well as relative to each other, this trade war will hurt India far more than China.
    • Thirdly, these measures will be most poorly timed since the Indian economy is already at its weakest point ever — facing a sharp GDP contraction.

    Way forward

    • In long term, under the banner of self reliance, India must develop its domestic capabilities and acquire a higher share of global trade by raising its competitiveness.
    • But no country is completely self-sufficient and that is why trade is such a fantastic idea.
    • It allows countries to specialize in what they can do most efficiently and export that good while importing whatever some other country does more efficiently.
    • Need of hour is well thought and balanced approach.

  • Postscript to a tragedy at Galwan

    The article suggests the approach that India should adopt in its policy toward China. Long term view of the situation is crucial. But some short term steps is also necessary.

    Prelude to 1962 War

    • Revolt in Tibet and granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959 can be seen as start of tensions in relations.
    •  In October 1959, there was a face-off between Indian and Chinese troops at Kongka La.
    • With the conflict in 1962,  there was very little room for a reasoned, negotiated settlement on the boundary question between the two countries.

    2020 is not same as 1959 for both India and China

    • Both nations have grown immensely in strength and stature on the world stage – even military wise.
    • Their relations have substance and a diversity of content in a manner absent in the 1950s – like the economic relations.
    • Hence, there is a need to not blame each other and find solutions instead of descent towards a full-blown conflict with China.

    Weighing the options carefully

    • India at present is struggling at multiple fronts:
    • 1) COVID-19 crisis demands the full attention of the government.
    • 2) Economy is stagnant and needs recovery.
    • 3) Tensions on other fronts – Pakistan persist and Nepal dispute in the Lipulekh/Kalapani area.
    • Thus, the call by warmongers should be evaluated, that too critically.

    Evolving comprehensive China policy

    • Strong political direction, mature deliberation and coherence are keys to handling the situation.
    • Army’s role can involve tactical adjustments and manoeuvres to deter the Chinese.
    • But comprehensive China strategy should be left to those tasked with national security policy.
    • Chinese transgressions in Sikkim and Ladakh can provide learning lessons for our future strategy.
    • A complete strategy would involve military, diplomatic and political levels.

    Future plan of action – Defence

    • India should take the initiative on a timely and early clarification of the LAC.
    • Identify areas of conflict and mark such areas as demilitarized by both sides through joint agreement.
    • At the same time, India must stand resolute and firm in the defence of territory in all four sectors of the border.
    • Contacts between the two militaries — joint exercises and exchanges of visits of senior Commanders — should be scaled down for short term future.
    • Diplomatic channels must continue to be open and should not be restricted in any way as they are essential in the current situation.
    • A border settlement is part of long term strategy.

    Future of business, trade and investment between two countries

    • Indian businesses in China and Chinese business operations in India can expect tougher future.
    • The scenario on trade and investments could encounter similar obstacles.
    • Areas of on national security, as in the cyber field and in telecommunications (5G) should take necessary reduction in import of Chinese items.

     India should strengthen alliances

    • The events in Galwan Valley should be a wake-up call to re invent it’s South and east Asia policy.
    • This is an opportunity for India to align its interests much more strongly with the U.S. as a principal strategic partner.
    • India should also infuse more energy into its relations with Japan, Australia, and the ASEAN.
    • The time has also come for India to reconsider its stand on joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
    • To disengage from economic involvement with China, and build the capacities and capabilities it needs in manufacturing, and in supply chains networks closer home, India has to think in the long terms.

    Consider the question “The context of changing relations with China has forced India to reconsider the depth of its engagement with other countries. In light of this examine the changes India’s foreign policy adopt in dealing with other countries.”

    Conclusion

    Galwan incident is a wake up call for us. In every aspect, engagement with China needs a re look. And that also includes an increased level of engagement in South Asian neighborhood.

  • Why Ladakh matters to India and China?

    This article from IE discusses this cold, dry, high altitude territory with its extremely scarce vegetation that makes it a point of disagreement between India and China.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s boundary disputes with its neighbourhood are the legacy of its colonial past. Analyse.

    Ladakh: The Cold Desert of India

    • Ladakh is the highest plateau in India with much of it being over 3,000 m.
    • It extends from the Himalayan to the Kunlun Ranges and includes the upper Indus River valley.
    • The importance of Ladakh is rooted in complicated historical processes that led to the territory becoming part of the state of J&K, and China’s interest in it post the occupation of Tibet in 1950.

    Beginning of the Chinese claim

    • In July 1958, an official monthly magazine in China published a map of the country that would in the next few months become a bone of contention between India and its East Asian neighbour.
    • The map in question showed large parts of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and the Himalayan territory of Ladakh as part of China.
    • Soon after ‘China pictorial’ came out with the new Chinese map, the leaders of both countries began writing to each other frequently regarding Ladakh.
    • The exchange of letters between Jawaharlal Nehru and his Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was followed by the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
    • The war also led to the formation of the loosely demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) running through Ladakh.

    The Integration of Ladakh into India

    • Historically and culturally the state was intrinsically linked to neighbouring Tibet.
    • Language and religion linked Ladakh and Tibet; politically too, they shared a common history.
    • Ladakh was part of the Tibetan empire which broke up after the assassination of King Langdarma in 742 CE.
    • Up until the Dogra invasion of 1834, Ladakh was an independent Himalayan state, much the same way as Bhutan and Sikkim.
    • As the Sikhs acquired Kashmir in 1819, Emperor Ranjit Singh turned his ambition towards Ladakh.
    • But it was Gulab Singh, the Dogra feudatory of the Sikhs in Jammu, who went ahead with the task of integrating Ladakh into Jammu and Kashmir.

    British interests in Ladakh

    • The British East India Company, which was by now steadily establishing itself in India, had lacked interest in Ladakh initially.
    • However, it did show enthusiasm for the Dogra invasion of the area, with the hope that as a consequence, a large portion of Tibetan trade would be diverted to its holdings.
    • The state of J&K was essentially a British creation, formed as a buffer zone where they could meet the Russians.

    The Sino-Sikh War

    • In May 1841, Tibet under the Qing dynasty of China invaded Ladakh with the hope of adding it to the imperial Chinese dominions, leading to the Sino-Sikh war.
    • However, the Sino-Tibetan army was defeated, and the Treaty of Chushul was signed that agreed on no further transgressions or interference in the other country’s frontiers.
    • After the first Anglo-Sikh war of 1845-46, the state of J&K, including Ladakh, was taken out of the Sikh empire and brought under British suzerainty.

    Chinese interest in Ladakh after the occupation of Tibet in 1950

    • The annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 sparked a newfound interest in Ladakh, and particularly so after the 1959 Tibetan uprising that erupted in Lhasa with Dalai Lama’s political asylum in India.
    • In attempting to crush the Tibetan revolt while at the same time denying its existence, the Chinese have used methods which have brought China and India into sharp conflict.
    • To begin with, the road that the Chinese built across Ladakh in 1956-57 was important for the maintenance of their control over Tibet.
    • The building of the road through Ladakh upset Nehru’s government. The diplomatic negotiations failed, and the war of 1962 followed.

    Why conflict has flared up again?

    • There are two layers to this. First, up to 2013, India’s infrastructural development in that area was minimal.
    • From 2013, India started pushing for infrastructure projects there and by 2015; it became a major defence priority.
    • The second layer is the August 5, 2019 decision (to remove the special status of J&K and downgrade the state into two Union Territories).
    • From the Chinese point of view, they would have assumed that if India makes Ladakh a Union Territory, they would be reasserting its control over the entire state.
    • Moreover, it is also important to note that over time, Xinjiang which is part of Aksai Chin, has become very important to China for their internal reasons.

    The dispute

    • The British legacy of the map of the territory continued to remain the ground upon which India laid its claim on the area.
    • India insisted that the border was, for the most part, recognised and assured by treaty and tradition; the Chinese argued it had never really been delimited.
    • The claims of both governments rested in part on the legacy of imperialism; British imperialism (for India), and Chinese imperialism (over Tibet) for China.

  • India gets re-elected as Non-permanent Member of UNSC

    India gets re-elected as Non-permanent Members of UNSC with 184 out of the 192 valid votes polled in its favour.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. United Nations is in need of structural reforms suiting to the needs of present times. Discuss.

    What are ‘non-permanent seats’ at the UNSC?

    • The UNSC is composed of 15 members: five permanent members — China, France, Russian Federation, the US, and the UK — and 10 non-permanent members who are elected by the General Assembly.
    • The non-permanent members are elected for two-year terms — so every year, the General Assembly elects five non-permanent members out of the total 10.
    • Even if a country is a “clean slate” candidate and has been endorsed by its group, it still needs to secure the votes of two-thirds of the members present and voting at the General Assembly session — which is a minimum of 129 votes, if all 193 member states participate.

    Sharing of seats

    • These 10 seats are distributed among the regions of the world: five seats for African and Asian countries; one for Eastern European countries; two for Latin American and Caribbean countries; and two for Western European and Other Countries.
    • Of the five seats for Africa and Asia, three are for Africa and two for Asia.
    • Also, there is an informal understanding between the two groups to reserve one seat for an Arab country.
    • The Africa and Asia Pacific group takes turns every two years to put up an Arab candidate.
    • Elections for terms beginning in even-numbered years select two African members, and one each within Eastern Europe, the Asia Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
    • Terms beginning in odd-numbered years consist of two West European and Other members, and one each from the Asia Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

    Current members as on today

    • The current non-permanent members of the Security Council are Belgium, Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia, and South Africa, all of whose terms end this year; and Estonia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, and Vietnam, whose terms end in 2021.
    • India begins its term at the beginning of 2021 and will hold the position until the end of 2022.

    Has India been in the UNSC earlier?

    • India’s term on the 15-member Council will be it’s eighth.
    • India has earlier been a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-92 and 2011-12.
    • For the 2011-12 terms, India won 187 of 190 votes after Kazakhstan stood down from its candidacy.
    • Unlike Africa, which has formalized a system of rotation of its three seats, the Asia Pacific grouping has often seen contests for seats. In 2018, there was a contest between the Maldives and Indonesia.
    • On the occasions when there is a contest, the elections for non-permanent seats can go on for several rounds.
    • Back in 1975, there was a contest between India and Pakistan, which went into eight rounds, with Pakistan finally winning the seat. And in 1996, India lost a contest to Japan.

    Significance

    • Terming India’s winning of a non-permanent seat of the UN Security Council one of its best performances” ever, the Union government said.
    • The strong support by almost the entire U.N. membership demonstrates the goodwill that India enjoys in the U.N. and the confidence that the international community has reposed in India.
    • India’s EAM gave India’s overall objective during its forthcoming UNSC tenure as an acronym ‘NORMS’ — New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System.
    • NORMS includes the push for expanding the UNSC permanent membership.

    Back2Basics: United Nations Security Council

    • The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.
    • Its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action through Security Council resolutions.
    • It is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions to member states.
    • The Security Council consists of fifteen members. Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the United States—serve as the body’s five permanent members.
    • These permanent members can veto any substantive Security Council resolution, including those on the admission of new member states or candidates for Secretary-General.
    • The Security Council also has 10 non-permanent members, elected on a regional basis to serve two-year terms. The body’s presidency rotates monthly among its members.

  • History, the standoff, and policy worth rereading

    In the changing circumstances, there is a need for recalibration of foreign policy when dealing with China. This article draws on a policy approach adopted by Nehru and suggests 4 areas to focus on while devising the foreign policy.

    India must pay attention to “five fingers”

    • The deadly clashes at Galwan and the ongoing standoff between India and China on the ridges or “fingers” around the Pangong Tso are a metaphor for the wider conflict between the two countries.
    • The metaphor refers to all the areas that Chinese strategy refers to as the “five fingers of the Tibetan palm”.
    • According to the construct, attributed to Mao and cited in the 1950s by Chinese officials, Xizang (Tibet) was China’s right palm, and it was its responsibility to “liberate” the fingers.
    • Fiver fingers are defined as Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, or Arunachal Pradesh).
    • Sixty years ago, India began to set about ensuring that quite the reverse ensued, and all five fingers were more closely attached to India, not China.
    • As the government of India grapples with its next steps at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it must cast a similarly grand strategy, to renew its compact with each of those areas today.

    Chines propaganda before 1962 War

    • In the 1950s, even after India and China signed the Panchsheel agreement in 1954.
    • And before the 1962 China-India war, the Nehru government had begun to worry about some of China’s proclamations.
    • Especially after the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, China began to demand “self-determination in Kashmir”, wrote former Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul in his memoirs.
    •  More importantly, school textbooks there began to depict the “five fingers” as a part of China.

    India’s three-pronged foreign policy form past

    •  India’s defeat in the 1962 war has been studied in great detail, what is perhaps not so well understood is the three-pronged foreign policy New Delhi set into motion at the time, that provided an effective counter to Mao’s five finger policy over the course of the century.

    Following are the 3 elements that also formed the part of past policy, with the addition of Jammu and Kashmir status change.

    1. Focus on border infrastructure and governance

    • The first was a push for building border infrastructure and governance.
    • In the mid-1950s the government piloted a project to build the Indian Frontier Administrative Services (IFAS) for overseeing NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) and other areas along the India-China frontier.
    • The Foreign secretary was the Chair of the IFAS selection board.
    • And many who enlisted in the cadre overlapped between the Indian Foreign Service, the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service, and rotated between postings in the most remote tribal areas and embassies in the region.
    • A special desk was created in the Ministry of External Affairs for officers who would tour all the regions from NEFA to Ladakh in order to make suggestions for the rapid development of these areas.
    • While India’s border infrastructure is only now catching up with the infrastructure China built in the course of the next few decades, its base was made during the brief period the IFAS existed, before it was wound up in 1968.
    • An idea before its time, the IFAS’s role has since been transferred to the Indian Army and the Border Roads Organisation (BRO).

    Idea worth revisiting: IFAS

    • IFAS is an idea worth revisiting, especially as areas along the frontier continue to complain of neglect and a lack of focus from the Centre.
    • In 2019, the Chief Ministers of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram called for the resurrection of the IFAS.

    2. Outreach and treaties

    • The second prong were a series of treaties that were signed around that time with neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan.
    •  And the consolidation of control, militarily and administratively, of other territories that acceded to India, including Ladakh as a part of Jammu and Kashmir (1947), and NEFA (1951).
    • In 1950, India signed a treaty with Sikkim that made it a “protectorate”.
    • By 1975 the Indira Gandhi Government had annexed Sikkim and made it the 22nd State of India.
    • Each of these treaties built unique relationships with New Delhi, tying countries such as Nepal and Bhutan in ways that were seen as a “win-win” for both sides at the time.

    Treaties outliving their utility

    • Over time, the treaties have outlived their utility.
    • And the benefits of unique ties with Nepal and Bhutan, including open borders and ease of movement, jobs and education for their youth as well as India’s influential support on the world stage, have waned in public memory.

    What explains difference in Nepal and Bhutan for India

    • One of the reasons that China has been able to make inroads into Nepal and not with Bhutan, is that the government renegotiated its 1949 Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with Bhutan.
    • The India-Bhutan 1949 Treaty was replaced with the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007.
    • 2007 treaty dropped an article that had committed Bhutan “to beguided” by India on its external affairs policy.
    • This has held India and Bhutan ties in good stead thus far, even during the Doklam stand-off between India and China in 2017 in the face of severe pressure from China.
    • However, despite years of requests from Kathmandu, New Delhi has dragged its feet on reviewing its 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal.
    • and on accepting a report the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) on Nepal-India relations has produced that recommends a new treaty.
    • New treaties may not, in themselves reduce India’s security threat from China in its neighbourhood.
    • But they create space for a more mutually responsive diplomacy that is necessary to nurture special relationships.

    3. Tibet strategy: India must chart a more prominent role

    • For the third prong, India’s policy towards the “palm” or Tibet, itself should be looked at more closely as well.
    • While New Delhi’s decision to shelter the Dalai Lama and lakhs of his followers since 1959 is a policy that is lauded.
    • But it does not change the need for New Delhi to look into the future of its relationship, both with the Tibetan refugee community in India, which has lived here in limbo for decades, as well as with its future leadership.
    • At present, the Dalai Lama has the loyalty of Tibetans worldwide, but in the future, the question over who will take up the political leadership of the community looms large.
    • The Karmapa Lama, who lived in India after his flight from China in 2000, and was groomed as a possible political successor, has now taken the citizenship of another country and lives mostly in the United States.
    • Meanwhile, China will, without doubt, try to force its own choice on the community as well.
    • Given that it is home to so many Tibetans, India must chart a more prominent role in this discourse.

    4. Introspection of reorganisation in Jammu and Kashmir

    • Finally, it is necessary to introspect on how India’s own reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 has changed the security matrix and threat parameters for India, and its neighbours.
    • While Pakistan’s extreme reaction to the move was expected, China’s reaction was perhaps not studied enough.
    • Beijing issued a statement decrying the impact on Jammu and Kashmir, and another one specifically on Ladakh.
    • In the statement, China called it an attempt to “undermine China’s territorial sovereignty by unilaterally changing its domestic law”.
    • And warned that the move was “unacceptable and will not come into force”.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with China has always had to factor in the border dispute. But the incidents in recent necessitated a relook at the foreign policy towards China.” In light of this, examine the factors that must form the basis of foreign policy.

    Conclusion

    The impact of the new map of Jammu and Kashmir on ties with Nepal as well, is no coincidence. There is proof enough that now more than ever, as the government readies its hand on dealing with China, it must not lose sight of every finger in play.