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Subject: International Relations

  • Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 and its significance

    The skirmishes between Indian and Chinese troops at Naku La in Sikkim that is considered settled may be Beijing’s way of attempting a new claim. Defence experts highlighted the historical Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 as proof of India’s ownership of the territory.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. China’s actions on dormant areas mask a hidden agenda of broader assertiveness in the entire Asia-Pacific. Comment.

    China creates a new flashpoint

    • Referring to a major scuffle that took place at Naku La in May, it was unusual for Chinese troops to open up a part of the LAC that has not been in contention before.

    Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890

    • Of the entire 3,488km Sino-Indian border, the only section on which both countries agree that there is no dispute is the 220km Sikkim-Tibet section of the boundary.
    • This is because under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, the Sikkim-Tibet border was agreed upon and in 1895 it was jointly demarcated on the ground.
    • Not only that but the new government of People’s Republic of China, which took power in 1949, confirmed this position in a formal note to the government of India on 26 December 1959.

    Chinese claims

    • Prior to Sikkim’s merger with India in 1975, the Chinese side accepted the Watershed based alignment of the International Border (IB).
    • The Sikkim – Tibet boundary has long formally been delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any dispute in practice.
    • The Chinese reiterate that, as per para (1) of the Convention of 1890, the tri-junction is at Mount Gipmochi.

    India’s stance

    • The geographic alignment of the features was so prominent that it could easily be identified and recognized.
    • Even analysing the available Google images of the past, the location of Naku La could be discerned by anyone as the watershed parting line in the area was very prominent. “
    • There exist no ambiguity with respect to the location of the pass, since geographic realities cannot be altered.

    How Sikkim came into the picture?

    • Earlier, Sikkim came into the limelight in 1965 during the India-Pakistan conflict, when the Chinese suddenly and without any provocation sent a strongly-worded threat.
    • Then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri neatly sidestepped the issue by stating that if the bunkers were on the Chinese side they were well within their rights to demolish them.
    • The point that the Chinese were trying to make was not military, but political, for they wanted to bolster the Pakistani spirit, which by then was rapidly losing steam.
    • As India stood firm with the backing of USSR and the US, nothing emerged from Chinese threats on the Sikkim-Tibet border.

    Series of activity since then

    • In 1967, the Chinese again activated the Sikkim-Tibet border and on 11 September, suddenly opened fire on an Indian patrol party near Nathu La pass. The main point was that India did not lose any position, nor did it yield any ground.
    • The next important episode was in 2003. When PM Vajpayee conceded during his visit to China in 2003 that “the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was a part of the PRC” with the expectation that China would recognize Sikkim as a part of India.
    • This did not materialize then but in the joint statement issued by premier Wen Jiabao and prime minister Manmohan Singh on 11 April 2005.
    • In part 13, the Chinese recognized “Sikkim State of the Republic of India”. Wen even handed over an official map of the People’s Republic of China to Singh, showing Sikkim as a part of India.

    Nothing new about the skirmishes over Sikkim

    • History would thus indicate that the present stand-off between India and China over the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is nothing new.
    • The latest episode after a road construction party entered Doklam area, despite Bhutanese attempts to dissuade them.

    Ignoring usual behaviour

    • The clearly orchestrated actions on an otherwise dormant area mask a hidden agenda.
    • The Chinese push at several points along the LAC and also the ongoing aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits are testimony to this.
    • The timeline of initiating this incident indicates a high level of pre-planning, possibly at senior levels of the PLA as well as the Chinese government.

    Way forward

    • There is no question of India bending to Chinese “demands”, for like in 1967, it must stand its ground firmly.
    • That would be a sufficient lesson for the Chinese that the Indian Army is no pushover and this is perhaps the only way to deal with China that likes to flaunt its economic and military prowess.

  • Expanding the G7

    There has been a call for expansion of G7 by the U.S. President. Against this backdrop, this article examines the historical background in which the group emerged. But a lot has changed since. So, it would be appropriate for G7 to adjust to the new reality. But what would be the focus of a new mechanism? What are the areas in which India would be interested? All such questions are answered in this article.

    Call for expansion of G7 and China’s objection

    • Recently, the U.S. President proposed the expansion of G7 to G10 or G11,  with the inclusion of India, South Korea, Australia and possibly Russia.
    • Elaborating this logic, the White House Director of Strategic Communications said the U.S. President wanted to include other countries, including the Five Eyes countries.
    • Five Eye is an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
    • The U.S. also stressed said the expanded group should talk about the future of China.
    • A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official immediately reacted, labelling it as “seeking a clique targeting China”.

    Should India care about China’s objection if invited to join?

    • China’s objection to an expanded G7 is no reason for India to stay away from it, if invited to join.
    • India has attended several G7 summits earlier too, as a special invitee for its outreach sessions.
    • India’s Prime Minister was guest invited to Biarritz, France to the G7 summit last year, along with other heads of government.

    The historical background of G7

    • The G7 emerged as a restricted club of the rich democracies in the early 1970s.
    • The quadrupling of oil prices just after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when  OPEC imposed an embargo against Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States, shocked their economies.
    • Although the French were spared the embargo, the chill winds of the OPEC action reverberated around the world.
    • So, French President invited the Finance Ministers of five of the most developed members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom, for an informal discussion on global issues.
    • This transformed into a G7 Summit of the heads of government from the following year with the inclusion of Canada in 1976.
    • And the European Commission/Community (later Union) joined as a non-enumerated member, a year later.
    • On the initiative of U.S. President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the G7 became the G8, with the Russian Federation joining the club in 1998.
    • This ended with Russia’s expulsion following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

    Declining share G7 and rising of E7 in world GDP

    • When constituted, the G7 countries accounted for close to two-thirds of global GDP.
    • According to the 2017 report of the accountancy firm, PwC, “The World in 2050”, they now account for less than a third of global GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis.
    • And less than half on market exchange rates (MER) basis.
    • The seven largest emerging economies (E7, or “Emerging 7”), comprising Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey, account for over a third of global GDP on purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.
    • And over a quarter on MER basis.

    Predictions for India

    • India’s economy is already the third largest in the world in PPP terms, even if way behind that of the U.S. and China.
    • By 2050, the PwC Report predicts, six of the seven of the world’s best performing economies will be China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia.
    • Two other E7 countries, Mexico and Turkey, also improve their position.
    • It projects that India’s GDP will increase to $17 trillion in 2030 and $42 trillion in 2050 in PPP terms, in second place after China, just ahead of the United States.
    • This is predicated on India overcoming the challenge of COVID-19, sustaining its reform process and ensuring adequate investments in infrastructure, institutions, governance, education and health.

    Limitations of G7

    • The success or otherwise of multilateral institutions are judged by the standard of whether or not they have successfully addressed the core global or regional challenges of the time.
    • The G7 failed to head off the economic downturn of 2007-08.
    • This failure led to the rise of the G20.
    • In the short span of its existence, the G20 has provided a degree of confidence, by promoting open markets, and stimulus, preventing a collapse of the global financial system.
    • The G7 also failed to address the contemporary issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, the challenge of the Daesh, and the crisis of state collapse in West Asia.
    • It had announced its members would phase out all fossil fuels and subsidies, but has not so far announced any plan of action to do so.
    • And their coal fired plants emit “twice more CO2 than those of the entire African continent”.

    Turmoil in West Asia and failure of Europe to act

    • Three of the G7 countries, France, Germany, and the U.K., were among the top 10 countries contributing volunteers to the ISIS.
    • West Asia is in a greater state of turmoil than at any point of time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
    • This turmoil has led to a migrants crisis.
    • Migrant crisis persuaded many countries in Europe to renege on their western liberal values, making the Mediterranean Sea a death trap for people fleeing against fear of persecution and threat to their lives.

    So, to deal with the unprecedented challenge, we need new institution

    • The global economy has stalled and COVID-19 will inevitably create widespread distress.
    • Nations need dexterity and resilience to cope with the current flux, as also a revival of multilateralism, for they have been seeking national solutions for problems that are unresolvable internally.
    • Existing international institutions have proven themselves unequal to these tasks.
    • A new mechanism might help in attenuating them.
    • It would be ideal to include in it the seven future leading economies, plus Germany, Japan, the U.K., France, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia.
    •  The 2005 ad hoc experiment by Prime Minister Tony Blair in bringing together the G7 and the BRICS countries was a one-off.

    What should be the focus of this new institution?

    • A new international mechanism will have value only if it focuses on key global issues.
    • A related aspect is how to push for observing international law and preventing the retreat from liberal values on which public goods are predicated.
    • Global public health and the revival of growth and trade in a sustainable way -that also reduces the inequalities among and within nations- would pose a huge challenge.

    What should be India’s priority in new institution?

    • India would be vitally interested in three: 1) international trade, 2) climate change, 3) the COVID-19 crisis.
    • Second order priorities for India would be cross-cutting issues such as counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation.
    • An immediate concern is to ensure effective implementation of the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention .
    • And the prevention of any possible cheating by its state parties by the possible creation of new microorganisms or viruses by using recombinant technologies.
    • On regional issues, establishing a modus vivendi with Iran would be important to ensure that it does not acquire nuclear weapons and is able to contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan, the Gulf and West Asia.
    • The end state in Afghanistan would also be of interest to India.
    • And also the reduction of tensions in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea.

    Consider the question “There has been a clamour for expanding G7 and India is being considered as one of the prospective candidates in the expanded group. In light of this examine the challenges and opportunities for India if it gets entry into the expanded group.”

    Conclusion

    The decaying influence in geopolitics and declining share in the world GDP calls for the formation of the new institution. IF and when that institution comes into being India should try to address its immediate concern with the help of new mechanism based on values.

  • Strategic importance of Daulat Beg Oldie, Ladakh

    In the reporting on the LAC stand-off, the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road has often appeared in news.

    Practice questions for mains:

    Q. Discuss how India’s all-weather border infrastructure has created new festering points for the Sino-Indian border skirmished.

    Daulat Beg Oldie

    • DBO is the northernmost corner of Indian Territory in Ladakh, in the area better known in Army parlance as Sub-Sector North.
    • DBO has the world’s highest airstrip, originally built during the 1962 war but abandoned until 2008 when the Indian Air Force (IAF) revived it as one of its many Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) along the LAC.

    The DSDBO Road

    • DSDBO is an all-weather 255-km long road 255-km long built by India over nearly 20 years.
    • Running almost parallel to the LAC, the DSDBO road, meandering through elevations ranging between 13,000 ft and 16,000 ft, took India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) almost two decades to construct.
    • Its strategic importance is that it connects Leh to DBO, virtually at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region from Ladakh.

    A trigger for PLA incursions

    • Of the possible triggers cited for the PLA targeting of Indian Territory along the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the construction of DSDBO all-weather road is possibly the most consequential.
    • The Chinese build-up along the Galwan River valley region overlooks and hence poses a direct threat to the DSDBO road.

    Significance of DSDBO Road

    • The DSDBO highway provides the Indian military access to the section of the Tibet-Xinjaing highway that passes through Aksai Chin.
    • The road runs almost parallel to the LAC at Aksai Chin, the eastern ear of erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir state that China occupied in the 1950s, leading to the 1962 war in which India came off worse.
    • The DSDBO’s emergence seemingly panicked China, evidenced by the 2013 intrusion by the PLA into the nearby Depsang Plains, lasting nearly three weeks.
    • DBO itself is less than 10 km west of the LAC at Aksai Chin. A military outpost was created in DBO in reaction to China’s occupation of Aksai Chin.
    • It is at present manned by a combination of the Army’s Ladakh Scouts and the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

    Other strategic considerations

    • To the west of DBO is the region where China abuts Pakistan in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, once a part of the erstwhile Kashmir principality.
    • This is also the critical region where China is currently constructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), to which India has objected.
    • As well, this is the region where Pakistan ceded over 5,180 sq km of PoK to China in 1963 under a Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement, contested by India.

    Also read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/burning-issue-india-china-skirmish-in-ladakh/

     

  • LAC row: China reaches accord with India

    China said that it had “reached an agreement” with India on the ongoing tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a day after India announced troops from both sides had begun a “partial disengagement” from some of the stand-off points.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. “Early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries”. Discuss in light of the ongoing border skirmishes between India and China.

    Read the complete story here:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

    Troops moving back

    • Partial deinduction has happened from some points in Galwan and Hot Springs areas.
    • Chinese side removed some of the tents and some troops and vehicles have been moved back, and the Indian side to has reciprocated.
    • At some points in the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops have moved back 2-3 km. However, there is no change in the ground situation at Pangong Tso.

    De-escalation begins

    • India and China held Major general-level talks to discuss further de-escalation at several standoff points in Eastern Ladakh including Patrolling Point (PP) 14, following a broad accord reached on Saturday in talks held at the Corps Commander-level.
    • As per the agreement, a series of ground-level talks would be held over the next 10 days, with four other points of conflict identified at PP15, PP17, Chushul and the north bank of Pangong Lake.
    • The Chinese Foreign Ministry said both sides had agreed to handle the situation “properly” and “in line with the agreement” to ease the situation.
    • However, it did not provide specific details on some of the stand-off points, such as Pangong Lake, where Chinese troops are still present on India’s side of the LAC.

    No final solution yet

    • At present, the two sides are taking actions in line with the agreement to ameliorate the border situation.
    • Government officials said a partial disengagement had happened at some points in the Galwan area and at Hot Springs, but there was no change at Pangong Lake.
    • Chinese state-run media has revealed that the ongoing dispute will not escalate into a conflict.
    • But it added due to the complexity of the situation, the military stand-off could continue for a little longer.

    Way forward

    • The military-level talks showed that both sides do not want to escalate tensions further.
    • It showed that China and India remain determined to peacefully resolve border issues.
    • However, the ongoing stand-off is not likely to end immediately, as concrete issues must still be resolved.

  • Complexity of India-Nepal relations

    This article helps us understand Nepal’s perspective of the India-Nepal border dispute. Though the issue dates back to India’s independence, it came to dominate the political landscape in Nepal since 1990s. But there is no solution in sight. So, what makes the issue complex? Read to know…

    What the border dispute between two countries is about?

    • The inauguration of the “new road to Mansarovar” on May 8 by India’s defence minister has strained the relations between Nepal and India.
    • Nepal claims that a section of the road passes through the territory of Nepal and links with the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China through the Lipu Lekh pass in Nepal.
    • The 1816 Sugauli Treaty between Nepal and British India placed all the territories east of the Kali (Mahakali) river, including Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipu Lekh at the northwestern front of Nepal, on its side.
    • The borders of Nepal, India and China intersect in this area.
    • Given the situation in 1961, Nepal and China fixed pillar number one at Tinker pass with the understanding that pillar number zero (the tri-junction of Nepal, India, and China) would be fixed later.
    • Lipu Lekh pass is 4 km northwest and Limpiyadhura 53 km west of Tinker pass.

    No progress on the solution of the issue

    • The dispute over the Kalapani area has spanned the last seven decades.
    • Both Nepal and India have recognised it as an outstanding border issue requiring an optimal resolution.
    • When in August 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Nepal in 17 years, Nepal’s Prime Minister Sushil Koirala raised this issue again.
    • The two prime ministers agreed to resolve the issue on a priority basis and directed their foreign secretaries “to work on the outstanding boundary issues including Kalapani and Susta”.
    •  There was virtually no progress on the ground.

    Nepal’s objection to India-China agreement

    •  In May 2015, Prime Minister Modi visited China, and the two countries agreed to “enhance border areas cooperation”.
    • The May 2015 agreement is a broad one compared to the 1954 India-China agreement “on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India”, which mentions Lipu Lekh pass as one of the six passes “through which traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel”.
    • Nepal protested against the inclusion of its territory, Lipu Lekh, in the joint statement without its consent and demanded that the two countries make necessary corrections to reflect the ground realities.
    • The protest was ignored.

    Growing nationalism and distrust let to the deterioration of relations

    • The tone of Nepal-India relations appears to be dominated by frustrations of the past and traditional attitudes more than the opportunities of the future.
    • The widening gap in understanding each other’s concerns has helped feed Nepali nationalism and create a dense cloud of distrust and suspicion between the two countries.
    • The gap widened after India chose to impose an economic blockade in response to Nepal’s sovereign decision to promulgate a democratic constitution.
    • The current ruling Communist Party of Nepal made people’s anger over the blockade its campaign plank during the 2017 general election.

    What makes the border issues complex and difficult to solve?

    • Complexity of the issue stems from the fact that the political leadership handles only a small part of this very important bilateral relationship.
    • India as a big neighbour is rarely seen grasping the psychological dimensions of the relationship.
    • Officials handling these multifaceted relations may momentarily influence the atmospherics but they rarely touch the core of these relations, let alone reorient or transform them in the rapidly changing context.
    • This is manifest in the deferring of substantive conversations on the outstanding boundary issue for decades.
    • The foreign secretary level mechanism has not met even once to discuss the border issue since its formation.
    • There are over three dozen bilateral mechanisms between Nepal and India to engage at various levels.
    • The meetings of these mechanisms are rarely regular.

    Consider the question “The India-Nepal border dispute looks minor, but allowing it to fester is likely to sow the seeds of immense competition and intense rivalry in the sensitive Himalayan frontier with far-reaching geopolitical implications. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Geography, history, and economy make Nepal and India natural partners, sharing vital interest in each other’s freedom, integrity, dignity, security and progress. People-to-people relations are unique strengths of bilateral relations. India, for it’s part and in the spirit of its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy, must start a solution-oriented dialogue and find the solution to the dispute.

  • Pay attention to their objectives in dealing with China and Pakistan

    While their interests overlap, Pakistan and China diverge when it comes to their objective in Kashmir. Both want to keep the pressure on India to avoid it from changing the status quo. Extending this line of argument, the author in this article suggest that India should separate the policy response to China from Pakistan, as they differ in their objectives.

    Coordinated efforts to corner India?

    • Latest news on the Ladakh front suggests that Chinese and Indian forces have begun to disengage in select areas.
    • But this does not detract from the reality that in the past few weeks Beijing and Islamabad are making coordinated efforts to challenge India’s presence in the Kashmir-Ladakh region.
    • There is stepped-up activity on Pakistan’s part to infiltrate terrorists into the Valley.
    • China has undertaken provocative measures on the Ladakh front to assert control over disputed areas around the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

    Let’s see how Pakistan and China’s interests overlap

    • In Pakistan’s case the intensification in its terrorist activities is related in part to the dilution of Article 370. 
    • Dilution of Article 370 helps India de-link Ladakh from the Kashmir problem.
    • For China, the division of Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir allows India a freer hand in contesting China’s claims in the region.
    • Increasing road-building activity on India’s part close to the LAC augments this perception.
    • In addition, Ladakh borders China’s most restive provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet.
    • Ladakh is also contiguous to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Chinese have invested hugely under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.
    • External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s remark last year that India expects to have “physical jurisdiction over (POK) one day” has alarmed Beijing which sees any such Indian move as threatening the CPEC project.
    • These factors demonstrate the overlapping interests that Beijing and Islamabad have regarding India in this region.

    The above factors explain why Pakistan and China would want India to be so preoccupied with taking defensive measures in Kashmir and Ladakh as to have little time and energy left to attempt to alter the status quo in POK or in Aksai Chin.

    But there are major differences in Pakistani and Chinese objectives regarding India

    • These differences are related to their divergent perceptions of their disputes and their different force equations with India.
    • For China, Ladakh is primarily a territorial dispute with strategic ramifications.
    • China also believes it is superior to the Indian militarily and, therefore, can afford to push India around within limits as it has been attempting to do in the recent confrontation.
    • For Pakistan, its territorial claim on Kashmir is based on an immutable ideological conviction that it is the unfinished business of partition and as a Muslim-majority state is destined to become a part of Pakistan.
    • Islamabad also realises that it is the weaker power in conventional terms and therefore has to use unconventional means, primarily terrorist infiltration, to achieve its objective of changing the status quo in Kashmir.
    • China is a satiated power in Ladakh having occupied Aksai Chin and wants to keep up the pressure on New Delhi to prevent the latter from trying to change the situation on the ground.

    Way forward-Pay attention to objectives while negotiating

    • China’s primary concern with regard to Kashmir is to prevent any Indian move from threatening the CPEC project.
    • It does not challenge the status quo in Kashmir.
    • Pakistan, on the other hand, is committed to changing the status quo in Kashmir at all cost.
    • It has been trying to do so since Partition not only through clandestine infiltration but also by engaging in conventional warfare.
    • Therefore, while it is possible to negotiate the territorial dispute with China on a give-and-take basis.
    • Doing the same is not possible in the case of Pakistan which considers Kashmir a zero-sum game.
    • India should, therefore, distinguish the different objectives on the part of Beijing and Islamabad and tailor its responses accordingly without conflating the two threats to its security.

    Consider the question “Policy response of India in dealing with Pakistan and China should consider differences in their objectives in relation to Kashmir. And clubbing them together just because of their tactical overlap should be avoided. Elaborate.”

    Conclusion

    Lumping the twin threats posed by Pakistan and China together because of a tactical overlap between them makes it difficult to choose policy options rationally. So, the policy response must understand the difference in their objectives and avoid clubbing them together.

  • India-China border crisis: It is not about the U.S.

    India’s growing closeness to the U.S. could be the reason for China’s aggression along India’s border. This is the explanation we often come across. But is it really the case?. This article probes the same question. Example of China’s dispute with Indonesia and Philippine help us analyse the U.S. angle to Indo-China border dispute. So, what is the conclusion?

    An easy explanation to India-China border crisis

    • Why has China precipitated a fresh military crisis with India in eastern Ladakh?
    • Among the many explanations making the rounds in Delhi, there is always the easy and attractive one — it’s all about America.
    • Delhi has incurred Beijing’s wrath by moving closer to Washington, goes the argument.
    • India’s renewed enthusiasm for the US-led Quad, it is said, is encouraging China to teach a lesson to Delhi.

    But does this explanation applies to the other countries as well? Look at Indonesia

    • No!
    • This theory does not hold up in relation to other countries having problems with China.
    • Let us turn to the South China Sea, where China is on a bold and ambitious drive to expand its control over the disputed waters.
    • Let us start with gathering tensions over the territorial dispute between Beijing and Jakarta.
    • Over the last year and more, Jakarta is coping with a Chinese challenge in its waters off its Natuna Islands.
    • The Natuna are nearly 1,500 km from the Chinese mainland.
    • The Natuna themselves lie outside Beijing’s nine-dash line that claims nearly 80 per cent of the South China Sea.
    • The dispute is over the exclusive economic zone that the islands confer on Indonesia.
    • China says it has historic rights to these waters and has been dispatching its fishing fleet into these waters.

    Maybe China sees a problem with Jakarta-Washington relations: Let’s analyse

    • Jakarta did not support the US approach to the Indo-Pacific.
    • and went to great lengths to develop a concept of its own and get it endorsed by the ASEAN.
    • Indonesia is not a member of the much-maligned Quad.
    • Its foreign policy is wedded to non-alignment.
    • And as the host of the historic Bandung Conference in 1955, Indonesia is a founding member and champion of Non-aligned Movement.

    Now, let’s consider second example: Philippines

    • The story of the Philippines — one of the oldest military allies of the US in Asia — nicely complements the non-aligned Indonesia’s troubles with China.
    • When he came to power in 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte decided to distance the Philippines from the US and embraced China.
    • He had a hope of finding a reasonable settlement to the substantive maritime territorial dispute with Beijing.
    • In February this year, Manila announced the decision to terminate the agreement that lets American troops operate in the Philippines.
    • But last week, the Philippines “suspended” the decision to terminate military cooperation with the US.
    • The reason: The PLA’s relentless military pressure on the South China Sea islands claimed by Manila and including them in a new Chinese administrative district.

    So, what the two examples suggest?

    • Neither Jakarta that is scrupulously non-aligned nor Manila that was ready to break its alliance with the US has been spared from Beijing’s current muscular approach to China’s territorial disputes.
    • China has long-standing claims, right or wrong, on the territories of its neighbours.
    • The other is the dramatic shift in the regional power balance in favour of China.
    • Unlike in the past, China now has the military power to make good its claims and alter the territorial status quo, if only in bits and pieces.
    • This is what China is doing in the South China Sea.
    • And the situation may not be any different in Ladakh.

    Consider the question “The shift in the regional power balance and not the growing Indo-U.S. relations explains the assertive nature of China in India-China border issues. Elaborate.”

    Conclusion

    The real challenge for Delhi in managing its expansive territorial dispute with Beijing, then, is to redress the growing power imbalance with China. The rest is detail.

  • Cooperative security in Persian Gulf littoral and Implications for India

    This article analyses the security environment in the Gulf countries. Their common characteristic as being the oil producers and similarity in their social and security problems are also explained in detail in this article. And all this has implications for India. So, what are the implications? Read to know…

    Let’s look at the importance of countries surrounding Persian Gulf

    • The United Nations defines this body of water as the Persian Gulf.
    • The lands around it are shared by eight countries: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    • All are the members of the UN.
    • There is a commonality of interest among them in being major producers of crude oil and natural gas.
    • And thereby contribute critically to the global economy and to their own prosperity.
    • This has added to their geopolitical significance.
    • At the same time, turbulence has often characterised their inter se political relations.
    Arab Countries surrounding Persian Gulf

    Power play and security of the region

    • For eight decades prior to 1970, this body of water was a closely guarded British lake, administered in good measure by imperial civil servants from India.
    • When that era ended, regional players sought to assert themselves.
    • Imperatives of rivalry and cooperation became evident and, as a United States State Department report put it in 1973, ‘The upshot of all these cross currents is that the logic of Saudi-Iranian cooperation is being undercut by psychological, nationalistic, and prestige factors, which are likely to persist for a long time.’
    • The Nixon and the Carter Doctrines were the logical outcomes to ensure American hegemony.
    • An early effort for collective security, attempted in a conference in Muscat in 1975, was thwarted by Baathist Iraq.
    • The Iranian Revolution put an end to the Twin Pillar approach and disturbed the strategic balance.
    • The Iraq-Iran War enhanced U.S. interests and role.
    • Many moons and much bloodshed later, it was left to the Security Council through Resolution 598 (1987) to explore ‘measures to enhance the security and stability in the region’.

    Gulf regional security framework: Some questions

    • Any framework for stability and security thus needs to answer a set of questions:
    • Security for whom, by whom, against whom, for what purpose?
    • Is the requirement in local, regional or global terms?
    • Does it require an extra-regional agency?
    • Given the historical context, one recalls a Saudi scholar’s remark in the 1990s that ‘Gulf regional security was an external issue long before it was an issue among the Gulf States themselves.’

    What should be the ingredients of a  regional security framework?

    • The essential ingredients of such a framework would thus be to ensure: 1) conditions of peace and stability in individual littoral states; 2) freedom to all states of the Gulf littoral to exploit their hydrocarbon and other natural resources and export them; 3) freedom of commercial shipping in international waters of the Persian Gulf 4)freedom of access to, and outlet from, Gulf waters through the Strait of Hormuz; 5) prevention of conflict that may impinge on the freedom of trade and shipping and 6)prevention of emergence of conditions that may impinge on any of these considerations.
    • Could such a framework be self-sustaining or require external guarantees for its operational success?
    • If the latter, what should its parameters be?

    Misunderstanding the role great powers can play

    • Statesmen often confuse great power with total power and great responsibility with total responsibility.
    • The war in Iraq and its aftermath testify to it.
    • The U.S. effort to ‘contain’ the Iranian revolutionary forces, supplemented by the effort of the Arab states of the littoral (except Iraq)  GCC initially met with success in some functional fields and a lack of it in its wider objectives.

    The turbulent nature of US-Iran relations

    • In the meantime, geopolitical factors and conflicts elsewhere in the West Asian region — Yemen, Syria, Libya — aggravated global and regional relationships.
    • And it hampered a modus vivendi in U.S.-Iran relations that was to be premised on the multilateral agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme agreed to by western powers and the Obama Administration.
    • But it was disowned by U.S. President Donald Trump whose strident policies have taken the region to the brink of armed conflict.

    Perception of declining U.S. commitment to sub-regional security

    • Perceptions of declining U.S. commitment to sub-regional security have been articulated in recent months amid hints of changing priorities.
    • This is reported to have caused disquiet in some, perhaps all, members of the GCC, the hub of whose security concern remains pivoted on an Iranian threat (political and ideological rather than territorial).
    • And American insurance to deter it based on a convergence of interests in which oil, trade, arms purchases, etc have a role along with wider U.S. regional and global determinants.
    • It is evident that a common GCC threat perception has not evolved over time.
    • It has been hampered by the emergence of conflicting tactical and strategic interests and subjective considerations.
    • The current divisions within the organisation are therefore here to stay.
    • These have been aggravated by 1)the global economic crisis, 2) the immediate and longer term impact of COVID-19 on regional economies, 3) the problems in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 4) and the decline in oil prices.

    Let’s look at the emerging trends in the region

    • One credible assessment suggests that in the emerging shape of the region.
    • 1) Saudi Arabia is a fading power.
    • 2) UAE, Qatar and Iran are emerging as the new regional leaders.
    • 3) Oman and Iraq will have to struggle to retain their sovereign identities.
    • 4)The GCC is effectively ended, and OPEC is becoming irrelevant as oil policy moves to a tripartite global condominium.
    • None of this will necessarily happen overnight and external intervention could interfere in unexpected ways.
    • But it is fair to say that the Persian Gulf as we have known for at least three generations is in the midst of a fundamental transformation.

    Improvement relations between Arab states and Iran

    • With the Arab League entombed and the GCC on life-support system, the Arab states of this sub-region are left to individual devices to explore working arrangements with Iraq and Iran.
    • The imperatives for these are different but movement on both is discernible.
    • With Iran in particular and notwithstanding the animosities of the past, pragmatic approaches of recent months seem to bear fruit.
    • Oman has always kept its lines of communication with Iran open.
    • Kuwait and Qatar had done likewise but in a quieter vein.
    • And now the UAE has initiated pragmatic arrangements.
    • These could set the stage for a wider dialogue.
    • Both Iran and the GCC states would benefit from a formal commitment to an arrangement incorporating the six points listed above.
    • So would every outside nation that has trading and economic interests in the Gulf. This could be sanctified by a global convention.
    • Record shows that the alternative of exclusive security arrangements promotes armament drives, enhances insecurity and aggravates regional tensions.
    • It unavoidably opens the door for Great Power interference.

    Ties with India and impact on its strategic interests

    • Locating the Persian Gulf littoral with reference to India is an exercise in geography and history.
    • The distance from Mumbai to Basra is 1,526 nautical miles and Bander Abbas and Dubai are in a radius of 1,000 nautical miles.
    • The bilateral relationship, economic and political, with the GCC has blossomed in recent years.
    • The governments are India-friendly and Indian-friendly and appreciate the benefits of a wide-ranging relationship.
    • This is well reflected in the bilateral trade of around $121 billion and remittances of $49 billion from a workforce of over nine million.
    • GCC suppliers account for around 34% of our crude imports and national oil companies in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi are partners in a $44 billion investment in the giant Ratnagiri oil refinery.
    • In addition, Saudi Aramco is reported to take a 20% stake in Reliance oil-to-chemicals business.
    • The current adverse impact of the pandemic on our economic relations with the GCC countries has now become a matter of concern.

    India’s relationship with Iran

    • The relationship with Iran, the complex at all times and more so recently on account of overt American pressure, has economic potential and geopolitical relevance on account of its actual or alleged role in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    • Iran also neighbours Turkey and some countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region.
    • Its size, politico-technological potential and economic resources, cannot be wished away, regionally and globally, but can be harnessed for wider good.

    Consider the question “Stability and security of the Persian Gulf region has wider consequences for Indians strategic concerns. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Indian interests would be best served if this stability is ensured through cooperative security since the alternative — of competitive security options — cannot ensure durable peace.

  • Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC)

    Senior lawmakers from eight democracies including the US have united to counter Communist China. They have launched the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC).

    Points to ponder:

    The world is growing conscious against China after its coronavirus adventure. IPAC is the first step towards the institutionalization of the Anti-China consciousness!

    What should be India’s stance here?

    IPAC

    • IPAC is a new cross-parliamentary alliance to help counter what the threat posed by China’s growing influence on global trade, security and human rights.
    • The participating nations include the US, Germany, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, as well as members of the European parliament.
    • It is an international cross-party group of legislators working towards reform on how democratic countries approach China.
    • Comprised of legislators from eight democracies it will be led by a group of co-chairs who are senior politicians drawn from a representative cross-section of the world’s major political parties.
    • The group aims to “construct appropriate and coordinated responses, and to help craft a proactive and strategic approach on issues related to China.”

  • Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    As part of Mission SAGAR, INS Kesari has entered Port Victoria, Seychelles to providing assistance in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Try this question from CSP 2017:

    Q. Which of the following is geographically closest to Great Nicobar?

    (a) Sumatra

    (b) Borneo

    (c) Java

    (d) Sri Lanka

    Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    • SAGAR is a term coined by PM Modi in 2015 during his Mauritius visit with a focus on the blue economy.
    • It is a maritime initiative which gives priority to the Indian Ocean region for ensuring peace, stability and prosperity of India in the Indian Ocean region.
    • The goal is to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other`s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.
    • It is in line with the principles of the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

    Back2Basics: IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)

    • Established in 1997 in Ebene Cyber City, Mauritius.
    • First established as Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in Mauritius on March 1995 and formally launched in 1997 by the conclusion of a multilateral treaty known as the Charter of the IORA for Regional Cooperation.
    • It is based on the principles of Open Regionalism for strengthening Economic Cooperation particularly on Trade Facilitation and Investment, Promotion as well as Social Development of the region.