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Subject: International Stories of Key Importance

  • The vaccine patent row

    What is the vaccine patent row about?

    • Medicines and other inventions are covered by patents which provide legal protection against being copied, and vaccines are no exception.
    • Patents give makers the rights to their discoveries as well as the means to make more money from them – which is an incentive to encourage innovation.
    • But these are not normal times.
    • Last autumn, developing nations led by India and South Africa proposed to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that the patents on vaccinations and other Covid-related items should be waived.
    • They argued that, given the extreme nature of the pandemic, the recipe for the life-saving jabs should be made widely available so they could be produced locally in bulk by other manufacturers.

    What’s the problem?

    • The proposals were met with immediate criticism from pharmaceutical companies and Western nations including the EU, UK and the US.
    • The obvious objection to lifting patents is that it could erode revenue and deter innovation.

    So, does this just come down to money?

    • The key argument from vaccine producers and their home countries is that waiving patents alone wouldn’t solve much. It would, they say, be like handing out a recipe without the ingredients or instructions.
    • The patent covers the bare bones of the blue print but not the precise production process. That’s crucial here. Vaccines of the mRNA type – such as Pfizer and Moderna – are a new breed and only a small number of people understand how to make them.
    • BioNTech, the German company which partnered with Pfizer, have said that developing the manufacturing process took a decade and validating production sites can take up to a year. The availability of the raw materials needed has also been an issue.
    • Industry bodies fear that without access to all the know-how and parts, a waiver could result in quality, safety and efficacy issues and possibly even counterfeits. They point out that Moderna has already said it would not prosecute those found to be infringing their patent – but no one has yet.

    What’s the alternative?

    • The EU says it is ready to talk, but it previously said the best short-term fix would be supply chain improvements and pushing richer countries to export more jabs.
    • The UK says it is one of the biggest donors to Covax, which is masterminding the rollout of vaccines to many poorer countries. It also favours voluntary licensing – such as collaborations between the Serum Institute of India and Oxford-AstraZeneca. It wants the WTO, which oversees the rules on global trade, to support more partnerships.
    • The WTO system allows for this licensing arrangement to go even further. Governments can impose compulsory licenses on vaccine makers, compelling them to share their know-how and overseeing the production process along the way. But those pharmaceutical companies would have to be compensated for doing so.

    Why did the US change its mind?

    The announcement came after the US Trade Representative Katharine Tai held meetings with the big vaccine makers in an effort to supercharge vaccine production.

    What happens next?

    • Now the discussions will continue at the WTO where decisions are made by consensus.
    • Without the backing of other key nations, the proposals may stall. But they may pave the way to a compromise that could boost production.
    • The key question is when – and by how much.

    Support grows for IP waiver

    • Attention is now turning to those richer nations, notably in the European Union — and France was the first to voice its support.
    • France joined the United States in supporting an easing of patent and other protections on COVID-19 vaccines that could help poorer countries get more doses and speed the end of the pandemic.
    • Russian President Vladimir Putin also said he supported the idea of a waiver on patent protections for coronavirus vaccines.

     

  • The Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) formally launched

    Tackling the supply chain disruption through SCRI

    • The Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) was formally launched on Tuesday by the Trade Ministers of India, Japan and Australia.
    • The three sides agreed that the pandemic revealed supply chain vulnerabilities globally and in the region and noted the importance of risk management and continuity plans in order to avoid supply chain disruptions.
    • Some of the joint measures they are considering include supporting the enhanced utilisation of digital technology and trade and investment diversification, which is seen as being aimed at reducing their reliance on China.

    How China reacted

    • China’s Foreign Ministry on Wednesday described the move as ‘unrealistic’.
    • The formation and development of global industrial and supply chains are determined by market forces and companies choices, it said.
    • It also said that the artificial industrial ‘transfer’ is an unrealistic approach that goes against the economic laws and can neither solve domestic problems nor do anything good to the stability of the global industrial and supply chains, or to the stable recovery of the world economy.
  • Iran, U.S. warships engage in a tense encounter

    What happened

    • An American warship fired warning shots when vessels of Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guard came too close to a patrol in the Persian Gulf.
    • Footage released on April 27 by the Navy showed a ship commanded by the Guard cut in front of the USCGC Monomoy.
    • The incidents at sea almost always involve the Revolutionary Guard, which reports only to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

    Context of the nuclear deal

    • Some analysts believe the incidents are meant in part to squeeze President Hassan Rouhani’s administration after the 2015 nuclear deal.
    • The incident comes as Iran negotiates with world powers in Vienna over Tehran and Washington returning to the 2015 nuclear deal.
    • It also follows a series of incidents across the Mideast attributed to a shadow war between Iran and Israel, which includes attacks on regional shipping and sabotage at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.
  • An unquiet neighbourhood

    The article highlights the inherent difficulty in finding a solution to the two conflicts raging on in India’s neigbourhood.

    Tale of two conflicts in neighbourhood

    • Efforts to end two major conflicts in India’s neighbourhood have become intense.
    • To the west, a peace summit on Afghanistan, seeking to end decades of conflict there, was also scheduled to take place in Istanbul over the weekend.
    • To the east, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has produced a diplomatic opening with Myanmar’s military leadership.
    • Afghan conflict go back to the late 1970s; since then we have seen different phases of the conflict.
    • Although the crisis in Myanmar appears recent, the tension between civil-military relations is not new.
    • Back in 1988, the army annulled the huge mandate won by Aung San Suu Kyi and unleashed massive repression.

    3 Common Themes in the effort at peace and reconciliation

    1) Ending violence

    • The first is about ending violence.
    • In Afghanistan it has been near impossible to get a resurgent Taliban to agree to stop its attacks on government forces or the civilian population.
    • The ASEAN initiative in Myanmar calls for an immediate cessation of violence and utmost restraint from all sides.
    • The opposition demanding restoration of democracy might find this rather ironic, since it is the army that is employing violence and has shown scant restraint.

    2) Dialogue among all parties

    • The second theme in the ASEAN initiative — “constructive dialogue among all parties” to “seek a peaceful solution” — is also common to all peace processes.
    • The Taliban found all kinds of excuses to delay a dialogue with the Kabul government that it always saw as illegitimate. So far, it has avoided one.
    • In Myanmar, the army might be ready to engage the opposition in a prolonged dialogue and defuse international pressure; but it will be hard for the victims of the coup to accept a dialogue on the army’s terms.

    3) Third-party mediator

    • The Afghan conflict has long been internationalised.
    • All major powers, including regional actors and neighbours, have acquired stakes in the way the Afghan conflict is resolved.
    •  This unfortunately makes the construction of an internal settlement that much harder.
    • In Myanmar, the ASEAN has set the ball rolling by agreeing that a special envoy will be traveling to the region and will engage with all parties to the conflict.

    Cost-benefit in diplomacy

    • The US is hoping that the Taliban will moderate some of its hardline positions given its need for significant international economic assistance for reconstruction, political legitimacy.
    • In Myanmar, too, the international community will hope the military would want to avoid the risks of political isolation and economic punishment.
    • But how the Taliban and the Myanmar army calculate these costs and benefits could be very different.
    • Both have long experience of surviving external pressure and enduring sanctions.

    Conclusion

    Few civil wars have seen the kind of massive external effort to change the internal dynamics as in Afghanistan; but to no avail. In Myanmar, it is not clear how far the international community might go. The prospects for positive change in Afghanistan and Myanmar, then, do not look too bright in the near term.

  • What the US’s recognition of killings of Armenians as genocide mean

    What is genocide

    • According to Article II of the UN Convention on Genocide of December 1948, genocide has been described as carrying out acts intended “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”.

    Why Armenians were targeted

    • In a way, the Armenians were victims of the great power contests of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
    • The resentment started building up after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 in which the Turks lost territories.
    • In the Treaty of Berlin, big powers dictated terms to the Ottomans, including putting pressure on Sultan Abdülhamid II to initiate reforms “in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds.”
    • The Sultan saw this as a sign of strengthening ties between the Armenians and other rival countries, especially Russia.
    • Post the treaty, there were a series of attacks on Armenians by Turkish and Kurdish militias.
    • In 1908, the Young Turks wrested control from the Sultan and promised to restore imperial glory.
    • Under the Turks, the empire became more and “Turkik” and persecution against the ethnic minorities picked up.
    • In October 1914, Turkey joined the First World War on the side of Germany.
    • In the Caucasus, they fought the Russians, their primary geopolitical rival.
    • But the Ottomans suffered a catastrophic defeat in the Battle of Sarikamish by the Russians in January 1915.
    • The Turks blamed the defeat on Armenian “treachery”.

    How the killings took place

    • As the War was still waging, the Ottomans feared that Armenians in eastern Anatolia would join the Russians if they advanced into Ottoman territories.
    • First, Armenians in the Ottoman Army were executed.
    • On April 24, the Ottoman government arrested about 250 Armenian intellectuals and community leaders. Most of them were later executed.
    • The Ottoman government passed legislation to deport anyone who is a security risk.
    • Then they moved Armenians, including children, en masse to the Syrian Desert. That was a march of death.
    • Before the First World War broke out in 1914, there were 2 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
    • According to a study by the University of Minnesota’s Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, in 1922, four years after the War, the Armenian population in the region was about 387,800.
    • This has led historians to believe that up to 1.5 million Armenians were killed during the course of the War.

    What is Turkey’s response

    • Turkey has acknowledged that atrocities were committed against Armenians, but denies it was a genocide which comes with legal implications.
    • Turkey also challenges the estimates that 1.5 million were killed.
    • The Turkish Foreign Ministry has issued a strong statement to Mr. Biden’s announcement saying it doesn’t not have “a scholarly and legal basis, nor is it supported by any evidence”.
    • Turkey has called on the U.S. President to correct the mistake of recognition as genocide.
  • The great Afghan microcosm

    The article highlights how players at 3 levels: global, regional and local level influence Afghan dynamics.

    Role of global powers in Afghanistan

    1) What the US exit from Afghanistan mean

    • The exit of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan underlines the end of the unipolar moment in international affairs.
    • Ending US military involvement, however, does not necessarily make Washington marginal to the future evolution of Afghanistan.
    • The US remains the most significant global power even after the end of the unipolar moment.
    • Its ability to weigh in on multiple issues is considerable.
    • President Joe Biden is under some pressure at home not to be seen as abandoning Afghanistan.
    • Nor can the US President ignore the dangers of Afghanistan re-emerging as a breeding ground for international terrorism.
    • The US will figure prominently in any Taliban strategy to win international diplomatic recognition and political legitimacy.
    • It will also need Western economic assistance for stabilising the war-torn country.

    2) Russia’s role in Afghanistan

    • Russia is determined to play an important role in the future of Afghanistan.
    • As a member of the UNSC, the joint leader of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation with China, and a major source of weapons, Russian clout is real.
    • Above all, Putin brings plenty of political will to compensate for Moscow’s loss of superpower status as we have seen across the world, from Venezuela to Myanmar and Mozambique to Syria.

    3) How China will benefit from the US withdrawal

    • If the US is a distant power, China is Afghanistan’s neighbour.
    • Unlike Russia, China can deliver massive economic resources to Afghanistan under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative.
    • China’s expanding relations with the different nations of the Gulf and Central Asia and a deep partnership with Pakistan lends much potential depth to Beijing’s role in Afghanistan.
    • Both Kabul and the Taliban have seen China as a valuable partner in the pursuit of their divergent interests.
    • Beijing has often talked of extending the China Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan.
    • However, China is vulnerable to the extremist politics of the region that fan the flames of religious and ethnic separatism in its Xinjiang province.

    Regional powers influencing Afghan dynamics

    • One of the biggest concern about the Afghan future is the kind of influence Islamic radicals might regain in the country under Taliban rule and its consequences for the subcontinent, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
    • Pakistan and Iran, which share long physical borders, have had the greatest natural influence on land-locked Afghanistan.
    • When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the only countries other than Pakistan to recognise the government-run by its leader, Mullah Omar.
    • They have taken a back seat in the current round of Afghan diplomacy, but would certainly return to the centre stage sooner than later.
    • Meanwhile, bold Qatar and ambitious Turkey have injected themselves into the Afghan jousting.

    Influence of local actors

    • The local actors in Afghanistan have agency of their own.
    • All of them know how to manipulate external powers for their own ends in Afghanistan.
    • The image of the Taliban as a creature of the Pakistan army is misleading, the Taliban is quite capable of making independent deals with the rest of the world.
    • The Taliban’s opponents, too, are likely to fight for their interests and will seek out external partners.

    Consider the question “Discarding old hesitations and building new geopolitical coalitions will be critical for a successful Indian engagement with the Afghan microcosm. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    Several contentions unfolding in and around Afghanistan promise to reorder the region again. Delhi needs much strategic activism to secure its interests and promote regional stability in this flux.

  • A multipolarity, scripted by the middle powers

    Four middle powers: India, Japan, China and Turkey anchor the world to multipolarity. The article deals with this issue.

    New cold war

    • In respect of three crucial relationships, namely China, Russia and Iran, Mr. Biden is following in the footsteps of his predecessor.
    • Mr. Biden has also extended his firm backing for the “Indo-Pacific” and the associated alignment — the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad for short.
    • The U.S. continues to view China as its principal adversary on the world stage and that it will use the Quad to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific.
    • The U.S.’s hostility for Russia goes back to the latter’s war with Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea in 2014, followed by allegations of Russian cyber-interference in the U.S. presidential elections of 2016.
    • U.S. animosity has encouraged China and Russia to solidify their relations.
    • The two countries have agreed to harmonise their visions under the Eurasian Economic Union sponsored by Russia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    • This idea has now been subsumed under the ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ to which both are committed.
    • Thus, the new Cold War is now being reflected in a new geopolitical binary — the Indo-Pacific versus Eurasia.

    How middle powers can play an important role

    • Four nations, Japan, Iran, Turkey and India, which, as “middle powers”, have the capacity to project power regionally, build alliances, and support (or disrupt) the strategies
    • But all four seems to be already aligned.
    • Japan and India are part of the Quad and have substantial security ties with the U.S.
    • Iran has found strategic comfort with the Sino-Russian alliance.
    • Turkey, a NATO member, has found its interests better-served by Russia and China rather than the U.S. and its European allies.
    • So, why the uncertainty? The main reason is that, despite the allure, the four nations are not yet prepared to join immutable alliances.

    Why the middle powers are reluctant to join alliances

    1) India’s China concerns

    • India has been expanding defence ties with the U.S. since 2016, by massive defence purchases and agreements on inter-operability and intelligence-sharing and frequent military exercises, as also the elevation of the Quad to ministerial level.
    • This might have signalled to China that India was now irreversibly in the U.S. camp.
    • But China has a point: while the Quad has made India a valuable partner for the U.S. in the west Pacific, neither the U.S. nor the Quad can address the challenges it faces at its 3,500-kilometre land border with China. 
    • Moreover, the U.S.’s intrusive approach on human rights issues ensures that India will need to manage its ties with China largely through its own efforts while retaining Russia as its defence partner.

    2) Sino-Japan relations

    • Japan has an ongoing territorial dispute with China relating to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
    • But there is more to Sino-Japanese relations: in 2019, 24% of Japanese imports came from China, while 19% of its exports went to China, affirming the adage.

    3) Why Iran is reluctant

    • The crippling sanctions on Iran and the frequent threats of regime change make it a natural ally of the Sino-Russian axis.
    • However, its strategic culture eschews long-term security alignments.

    4) Why Turkey is reluctant to join

    • Turkey is steady distancing from its western partners and increasing geopolitical, military and economic alignment with Russia and China.
    • But Turkey still wishes to keep its ties with the U.S. intact and retain the freedom to make choices.
    • Its “New Asia” initiative involves the strengthening of east-west logistical and economic connectivity backed by western powers and China.

    Consider the question “What are the factors India need to consider as it deepens its involvement in the Quad?” 

    Conclusion

    As the clouds of the new Cold War gathers over the world, these four nations could find salvation in “strategic autonomy” — defined by flexible partnerships, with freedom to shape alliances to suit specific interests at different times.

  • Why the Indo-Pacific has assumed significance for Europe after the pandemic

    The article highlights Asia’s growing significance in the wake of the pandemic. This is underscored by Europe’s meaningful engagement with Asia which is based on an understanding of the region’s geopolitical and economic significance.

    Asia’s rise

    • The pandemic has upended many certainties. But it has reinforced one major trend in global politics: The rise of Asia.
    • The region’s rise has created three Asias.
    • First, there is the familiar Asia of businessopen, dynamic, interconnected.
    • Second, an Asia of geopolitics, with ever-starker nationalisms, territorial conflicts, arms races and Sino-American rivalry.
    • Lastly, we have an Asia of global challenges.
    • These three Asias are also marked by 3 dynamics:
    • 1) Geopolitical rivalries that threaten free trade.
    • 2) The fight against the pandemic is mutating into a systemic competition between democracy and authoritarianism.
    • 3) And frenzied economic growth is fuelling climate change.

    European strategy for Indo-Pacific

    • Germany together with France and the Netherlands, have commenced work on a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
    • The strategy seeks cooperation with all countries of the region: For open economies and free trade; for the fight against pandemics and climate change; and for an inclusive, rules-based order.
    • Such a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific must take all three Asias into account.
    • Europe is a key trading, technology and investment partner for many countries of the region.
    •  The EU recently concluded groundbreaking free trade agreements with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam that set environmental and social standards.
    • In late 2020, the countries of East and Southeast Asia signed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, encompassing one-third of the global economy.
    • It is time for the EU to swiftly conclude the ongoing negotiations on trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand – and to move forward with negotiations with Indonesia and India.

    Reducing dependencies

    • Following the above policies, Europe will also reduce dependency and following the principle of diversification.
    • Together with its Indo-Pacific partners, Europe can set standards for new technologies, human-centred digitisation and sustainable connectivity. 
    • In this endeavour, Europe can draw on its innovative and economic strength as well as its regulatory power.
    • At the EU-India Summit in May, the launch of a connectivity partnership with India will further connect India’s and Europe’s digital economies.

    Rising tensions and rules-based Indo-Pacific

    • Meanwhile, tensions are rising in the Asia of geopolitics.
    • New cold wars or even hot conflicts in the Indo-Pacific would be an economic and political nightmare.
    • Europe must, therefore, take a firmer stand against polarisation and more strongly advocate an inclusive, rules-based Indo-Pacific.
    • The strategic partnership concluded between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last December connects us with like-minded middle powers.

    Asia of geopolitical challenges

    • Containing geopolitical rivalries in Asia is also a precondition for shaping the future with the Asia of global challenges.
    •  As the biggest emitters of CO2, the US, China, India and the EU will only win the fight against climate change together.
    • The Leaders Summit on Climate that will be hosted by the US next week sets the stage for cooperation.
    • Europe and the countries of the Indo-Pacific need each other also in the fight against the virus.
    • The EU is by far the biggest supporter of the international vaccine platform COVAX, and India as a leading producer of vaccines is the most important COVAX supplier.
    • We will all benefit from this as, without the worldwide vaccination rollout, mutations will keep on setting us back in the fight against the pandemic.
    • Europe will continue to stand up for human rights and democracy in the Indo-Pacific.
    • This was demonstrated with sanctions against those responsible for human rights violations in Xinjiang — and also against Myanmar’s generals.

    Conclusion

    Europe is ready for a new partnership — a partnership founded on seeking dialogue with the open Asia of business, taming geopolitical rivalry in Asia together and coming up with responses to the world of tomorrow with the Asia of global challenges. This must be the objective of European policy — for and with the Indo-Pacific

  • India’s refugee Policy & Issues with it

    The article highlights the issue of the lack of refugee protection framework in India and suggests enacting domestic law to deal with the issue. 

    India’s record on refugee protection

    • India, for the most part, has had a stellar record on the issue of refugee protection.
    • But this moral tradition has come under great stress of late.
    • New Delhi has been one of the largest recipients of refugees in the world in spite of not being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

    Confusion in policies for immigrants and refugees

    • Much of the debate in India is about illegal immigrants, not refugees, the two categories tend to get bunched together.
    • Our policies towards illegal immigrants and refugees is confused is because as per Indian law, both categories of people are viewed as one and the same and are covered under the Foreigners Act, 1946.
    • The act offers a simple definition of a foreigner — “foreigner” means “a person who is not a citizen of India”.
    • There are fundamental differences between illegal immigrants and refugees, but India is legally ill-equipped to deal with them separately due to a lack of legal provisions.
    • Also, India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the key legal documents pertaining to refugee protection.

    How absence of policy framework creates problems

    • The absence of legal framework for refugees leads to policy ambiguity whereby India’s refugee policy is guided primarily by ad hocism and ‘political utility’.
    • At the same time, the absence of a legal framework increases the possibility of the domestic politicisation of refugee protection and complicates its geopolitical faultlines.
    • The absence of a clearly laid down refugee protection law also opens the door for geopolitical considerations while deciding to admit refugees or not.
    • For example, India’s decision in the recent case of admitting Myanmarese refugees fleeing to India was influence by the possibility of irking the Generals in Naypyitaw.
    • However, hypothetically speaking, if New Delhi had domestic legislation regarding refugees it could have tempered the expectations of the junta to return the fleeing Myanmarese.

    Why India has not signed convention and protocol on refugee protection

    • The definition of refugees in the 1951 convention only pertains to the violation of civil and political rights, but not economic rights, of individuals.
    • If the violation of economic rights were to be included in the definition of a refugee, it would clearly pose a major burden on the developed world.
    • This argument, if used in the South Asian context, could be a problematic proposition for India too.
    • India also need to argue that the North is violating the convention in both letter and spirit, and make its accession conditional on the Western States rolling back the non-entrée (no entry) regime.
    • The non-entrée regime is constituted by a range of legal and administrative measures that include visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, interdictions, third safe-country rule, restrictive interpretations of the definition of ‘refugee’, withdrawal of social welfare benefits to asylum seekers, and widespread practices of detention.”
    • In other words, India must use its exemplary, though less than perfect, history of refugee protection to begin a global conversation on the issue.

    Way forward

    • What other options do we have to respond to the refugee situation we are faced with?
    • The answer perhaps lies in a new domestic law aimed at refugees.
    • The CAA, however, is not the answer to this problem primarily because of its deeply discriminatory nature.
    • What is perhaps equally important is that such a domestic refugee law should allow for temporary shelter and work permit for refugees.
    • India must also make a distinction between temporary migrant workers, illegal immigrants and refugees and deal with each of them differently through proper legal and institutional mechanisms.

    Consider the question “What are the reasons for India’s not singing 1951 Refugee Convention? What are the options India can explore for refugee protection? 

    Conclusion

    Our traditional practice of managing these issues with ambiguity and political expediency has become deeply counterproductive: It neither protects the refugees nor helps stop illegal immigration into the country.

  • Jordan Crisis and its significance for the Arab Region

    The royal household in Jordan has recently seen intense drama, with the King’s popular half-brother and former crown prince was placed under de facto house arrest.

    Study the map; especially, the Israel-Jordan border and Dead Sea.

    Signs of a Coup

    • Jordanian government statements have has stated that there had been an attempted coup to destabilize the country, mentioning unnamed “foreign entities” involved in the plot.
    • The events have thus put a spotlight on Jordan’s unique position as one of the most stable countries in the Arab world, and given rise to questions about who could stand to benefit from the alleged coup.

    Jordan’s stability matters

    • Jordan, which this year celebrates 100 years since its creation after World War I, has for decades remained stable in a part of the world that is prone to conflict and political uncertainty.
    • For its allies in the West and in the Gulf, Jordan is a strategic partner which can be relied upon for furthering political objectives in the region, which includes war-torn Syria and Iraq as well as conflict-prone Israel and Palestine.
    • The support of Jordanian intelligence has proven critically important in the fight against terrorism.
    • Though impoverished, the country of about a crore people has served as a haven for refugees in the conflict-ridden region.

    The asylum giver

    • After the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, Jordan received waves of refugees, to the point that about half of Jordan’s population today is made up of Palestinians.
    • It has also welcomed refugees after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and currently hosts over 10 lakh from Syria, where a protracted civil war is going on.
    • Jordan is also considered important to any future peace deal between Israel and Palestine.

    How does Jordan get along with regional powers?

    (1) West

    • Traditionally, Jordan has maintained close relations with the US, and the fellow Sunni Muslim powers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which together stand against Shia Iran.
    • It also has diplomatic relations with Israel, and the two countries have been bound by a peace treaty since 1994.

    (2) Within Gulf

    • In recent years, however, Jordan’s relations with the Saudis and UAE have seen ups and downs.
    • It has been particularly since the rise of their respective crown prince’s Mohammed bin Salman (known by initials MBS) and Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).
    • One of the points of friction was Saudi-UAE’s blockade of Qatar in 2017.
    • It caused further consternation in Saudi and Emirati circles by maintaining strong ties with Turkey.

    (3) Ties with Israel

    • Jordan’s role as the region’s interlocutor has also diminished since last year, after the UAE normalized relations with Israel.

    What have the powers said of the alleged coup?

    • Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have expressed full support for King Abdullah. The US has called the ruler a “key partner”.
    • To drive home the point, Saudi Arabia sent its foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, to Jordan’s capital Amman to express complete solidarity with Jordan’s King and his government.
    • Saudi and the UAE have little to gain by destabilizing Jordan, a country that has long served as a dependable ally.