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Subject: Polity

  • [29th November 2025] The Hindu OpED: The impartiality of a nominated Governor

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Discuss the essential conditions for exercise of the legislative powers by the Governor. Discuss the legality of re-promulgation of ordinances by the Governor without placing them before the Legislature.

    Linkage: The question is directly linked to ongoing concerns of Governors delaying assent and re-promulgating ordinances, reflecting fears of an overstepping “interfering authority.” It tests whether the Governor today adheres to the Constitution’s vision of a neutral head bound by ministerial advice.

    Mentor’s Comment

    This article examines the debate on the ‘impartiality of a nominated Governor’, revived after the recent Supreme Court judgment on the powers of Governors. The discussion draws heavily from the Constituent Assembly debates, views of B.R. Ambedkar, and the political context surrounding gubernatorial discretion. For UPSC aspirants, this topic is crucial for understanding Centre-State relations, federal tensions, constitutional morality, and ongoing administrative bottlenecks.

    Introduction

    The Supreme Court’s recent judgment on the role of Governors, along with its advisory opinion on the 16th Presidential reference, has reopened a foundational debate: What was the intended role of a Governor in an independent India? The Constituent Assembly deliberated deeply on the Governor’s impartiality, limited discretion, and non-interfering nature. Contemporary frictions between Governors and elected State governments have made these debates sharply relevant again. The article traces the evolution, constitutional position, and recurring controversies around the Governor’s office.

    Why in the News 

    The Supreme Court’s latest judgment on gubernatorial powers has revived a long-standing constitutional controversy over whether Governors have exceeded their intended role. The ruling sharply contrasts past practice, where Governors often withheld assent or delayed Bills, exercising broad and ambiguous discretion. This is significant because Constituent Assembly debates categorically rejected any idea of a powerful, interfering Governor and saw him as a neutral constitutional head bound by ministerial advice. The issue has resurfaced as a major federal friction point, affecting State governance and raising concerns about constitutional morality.

    What was the Constituent Assembly’s vision of a Governor?

    1. Limited discretion: Members clarified that the Governor’s discretion should be minimal and specifically enumerated; not a general discretionary authority.
    2. Non-interfering role: Dr. Ambedkar emphasised that the Governor must not act as an agent of the Centre nor interfere with the elected State government.
    3. Neutral constitutional head: The Governor was designed to be above suspicion and must not be “remote-controlled,” especially in a parliamentary system.
    4. No overriding authority: Ambedkar rejected giving Governors overriding powers (e.g., veto over Bills or control over ministries).

    Why were doubts raised about the impartiality of a nominated Governor?

    1. Remote-control concerns: Members felt a nominated Governor could be influenced by the central government, undermining State autonomy.
    2. Fear of political bias: The Governor’s lack of electoral accountability created apprehensions regarding neutrality.
    3. Past colonial experience: Residual memories of Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935, who wielded significant discretionary powers, fuelled suspicion.

    How did the framers restrict discretionary powers?

    1. Specific limitation: Discretion only for narrow, enumerated matters such as selecting a Chief Minister when no clear majority exists.
    2. Bound by Cabinet advice: Governor must act on ministerial advice in all matters except those explicitly labelled as discretionary.
    3. No independent executive authority: Ambedkar insisted the Governor is not a parallel power centre.
    4. Rejection of 1935 model: The Assembly refused to revive the 1935 system that gave Governors sweeping independent powers.

    Why is the Bill-assent controversy central to this debate?

    1. Revival of 1935 practice: Members feared that powers like reserving Bills or withholding assent could allow Governors to obstruct State legislatures.
    2. Ambedkar’s key statement: “If you give him this power, he becomes exactly that”, a reminder that excessive discretion recreates colonial-style interference.
    3. Judicial scrutiny: Recent court rulings criticised Governors for delaying Bills, stating this undermines democratic functioning.
    4. Legislative consequences: When Governors withhold or delay assent, elected governments face administrative paralysis.

    What makes the present dispute constitutionally serious?

    1. Misinterpretation risk: Courts observed that vague phrases like “as soon as possible” allow Governors to delay decisions indefinitely.
    2. Threat to federal balance: Unchecked gubernatorial discretion shifts power from elected representatives to a nominated authority.
    3. Growing political tensions: Several States report prolonged delays in Bill assent, appointments, and emergency decisions.
    4. Return of the ‘interfering authority’: The trend contradicts the original constitutional vision and Ambedkar’s categorical warnings.

    Conclusion

    The ongoing friction between State governments and Governors signals a deeper constitutional challenge involving federalism, democratic accountability, and the limits of nominated authority. The Constituent Assembly clearly intended the Governor to be a neutral head bound by Cabinet advice, not an autonomous decision-maker. Reviving this original spirit is essential to restore the balance between the Centre and the States and uphold constitutional morality.

  • Mekedatu Balancing Reservoir Project

    Why in the news?

    • Karnataka has decided to submit a revised Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the Mekedatu balancing reservoir across the Cauvery River.
    • The Supreme Court termed Tamil Nadu’s challenge as “premature”, enabling the CWMA and CWC to examine the project.

    Location & River

    • Mekedatu is located in Ramanagara district, ~100 km from Bengaluru.
    • The project is proposed on the inter-State Cauvery river.
    • Karnataka = upper riparian; Tamil Nadu = lower riparian.

    Why Does Karnataka Want It?

    • Bengaluru water demand:
      • Present: 2,600 MLD
      • Supply: 2,100 MLD → shortage of 500 MLD
    • Population to reach 20 million in 6 years → demand may rise to 4,000 MLD.
    • Shivakumar argues Mekedatu will ensure regulated release to Tamil Nadu, even in poor rainfall years.

    Why Is Tamil Nadu Opposed?

    • Trust deficit due to the history of Cauvery disputes.
    • Concern: Karnataka may store more water and release it selectively.
    • TN argues the project violates the 2018 SC judgment and Cauvery Tribunal’s final award.

    Centre’s Position

    • 2019: Karnataka submitted DPR → CWC → CWMA.
    • MoEFCC (2019): Sought an “amicable solution” due to inter-State dispute.
    • 2024 (Feb): CWMA referred DPR back to CWC after deliberations.
    • Now: DPR to be examined afresh; CWMA/CWC can facilitate dialogue.

    Constitutional & Legal Angle

    • Inter-State Rivers: Union List Entry 56 – regulation and development of inter-State rivers.
    • River Boards Act, 1956 (not effectively implemented).
    • Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (CWDT): Award notified in February 2013.
    • Supreme Court Judgment (2018):
      • Reallocated shares;
      • Gave 4.75 TMC drinking water allocation to Bengaluru.

     

    Recently, linking of which of the following rivers was undertaken? (2016)

    (a) Cauvery and Tungabhadra 

    (b) Godavari and Krishna 

    (c) Mahanadi and Son 

    (d) Narmada and Tapti

  • Decoding personality rights in the age of AI

    Introduction

    Personality rights, traditionally rooted in privacy, dignity, and control over one’s identity—are facing unprecedented stress due to generative AI. Deepfake technologies, synthetic media, and AI-generated impersonation are creating new risks of deception, reputational harm, financial loss, and large-scale identity exploitation. Recent legal disputes involving celebrities highlight widening vulnerabilities and the absence of a robust legal framework in India.

    Why in the News? 

    Amitabh Bachchan and Aishwarya Rai recently approached the Delhi High Court seeking protection against AI-generated videos that imitated their identity, voice, and catchphrases. This marks a major turning point because AI deepfakes are now powerful enough to replicate personalities at scale and for commercial misuse, something never seen before. The case exposes how India lacks a unified personality-rights legislation even as misuse grows rapidly, contrasting sharply with the stricter frameworks in the US, EU, and China.

    Erosion of Personality Rights in the AI Era

    1. AI Deepfakes: Enable face swaps, voice clones, and synthetic content that manipulate identity and support misinformation, malice, extortion, and erosion of trust.
    2. Unchecked AI Use: Generates mass commodification of human identity, intensifying reputational and financial vulnerabilities.
    3. Technological Trigger: The rise of generative AI tools has amplified impersonation risks and blurred lines between authenticity and deception.

    How Does Indian Law Currently Address Personality Rights?

    1. Fragmented Framework: India relies on privacy principles, constitutional protection, and selective case law but lacks a dedicated statute.
    2. Judicial Protection:
      1. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy case (2017) upheld privacy as a fundamental right.
      2. Amitabh Bachchan v. Rajat Nagi (2022) recognised personality rights.
      3. Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India (2023) banned misuse of his catchphrase “jhakaas” and likeness for diluted brand value.
      4. Arijit Singh v. Golden Ventures LLP (2024) protected his voice from AI replication.
    3. Regulatory Limits: IT Act 2000 and Intermediary Guidelines 2021 address impersonation and deepfakes but lack enforcement clarity, especially for cross-border misuse.

    How Do Global Jurisdictions Handle Personality Rights?

    1. United States
      1. Right of Publicity: Treated as transferable property.
      2. Tennessee’s ELVIS Act (2024) bans unauthorized AI voice cloning and deepfake performances.
      3. Character.AI Cases: Highlight how AI models create digital personas that blur reality.
      4. First Amendment Constraints: Free speech limits over-regulation.
    2. European Union
      1. GDPR: Provides dignity-based protection over personal and biometric data.
      2. EU AI Act (2024): Classifies deepfakes as high risk, mandates transparency and labelling.
    3. China
      1. Internet Court Rulings (2024): AI-generated synthetic voices must not deceive consumers.
      2. AI-related cases treat voice actors and media workers as harmed individuals needing redress.

    Why Does India Need a Comprehensive Personality-Rights Law?

    1. Legal Vacuum: No dedicated statute addressing AI impersonation, deepfakes, monetisation of likeness, and cross-border exploitation.
    2. AI Platforms’ Liability: Lack of clear obligations for watermarking, transparency, and algorithmic accountability.
    3. Global Pressure: AI’s transnational nature demands compliance with international standards.
    4. Growing Harm: Cases of identity theft, synthetic celebrity endorsements, and psychological impact from digital cloning are rising.

    What Should India’s Legal Framework Include?

    1. Explicit Definition: Clear categorisation of personality rights, covering image, voice, likeness, name, gestures, and distinctive traits.
    2. Platform Accountability: Mandatory watermarking, AI content labelling, and traceability.
    3. Consent Architecture: Requirement of explicit consent for any AI-generated replication.
    4. Civil and Criminal Remedies: Compensation mechanisms and penalties for willful impersonation.
    5. Cross-Border Enforcement: Harmonisation with EU, US, and global regulatory practices.
    6. Ethical AI Standards: Transparency norms, audit trails, and safeguards against dataset misuse.

    Conclusion

    AI has radically transformed the nature of identity and personhood, challenging traditional legal doctrines surrounding privacy and personality rights. India must move from fragmented protections to a comprehensive, future-ready framework that secures individual autonomy while supporting responsible AI innovation. Without such reform, the risks of impersonation, exploitation, and identity erosion will only multiply.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] Right to privacy is intrinsic to life and personal liberty and is inherently protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. Explain.

    Linkage: This question directly links to personality rights and AI deepfakes, as both derive from the privacy-autonomy framework under Article 21. It is relevant because the erosion of digital identity through AI impersonation tests the very constitutional protection the Puttaswamy judgment established.

  • [25th November 2025] Hindu OpED Bridging India’s numeracy gap

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2020] National Education Policy 2020 is in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goal-4 (2030). It intends to restructure and reorient education system in India. Critically examine the statement.
    Linkage: NEP 2020 aligns with SDG-4 by focusing on equitable, high-quality education and foundational learning. However, implementation gaps and weak learning outcomes, especially in numeracy, limit its SDG-4 impact so far.
    Mentor’s Comment
    India’s learning crisis has silently shifted from illiteracy to numeracy failure. While the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 and NIPUN Bharat Mission strengthened foundational literacy, recent evidence shows that numeracy continues to stagnate sharply, closing the doors of higher education for millions. This article decodes why numeracy outcomes matter for economic, cognitive, and social mobility, and what a multi-pronged policy roadmap must look like.
    INTRODUCTION
    NEP 2020 identifies Foundational Literacy and Numeracy (FLN) as the cornerstone of future learning, and NIPUN Bharat translated this into classroom action. While literacy outcomes have shown improvement, numeracy remains stubbornly low, particularly in conceptual understanding and real-life application. India is now at a point where foundational literacy success must be expanded to higher-order mathematical learning.
    WHY IN THE NEWS 
    The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2024 shows that while 48.7% of Class 5 students read fluently, only 30.7% can solve a basic division problem, marking an 18% performance gap between literacy and numeracy. No State reports higher numeracy than literacy, highlighting a national trend of mathematics stagnation. Also, nearly 70% of Class 8 students and more than 50% of Class 5 students remain unable to perform basic division, despite classroom-based math instruction. The gap between school learning and real-life mathematical use is widening, closing higher-education opportunities as teens fail to cross the Class 10 board exam numeracy threshold.
    Where does India’s numeracy gap originate?
    1. Hierarchical nature of mathematics: partial understanding in lower grades (e.g., place value) blocks higher concepts such as addition and decimals.
    2. Cumulative error effect: once gaps form, students rarely recover, unlike in language.
    3. Traditional syllabus-driven pedagogy: focuses on advancement, not mastery; students progress without clearing conceptual blocks.
    Why does classroom learning not translate into real-world mathematical ability?
    1. High classroom performance, low life applicability: Evidence from the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab: students who excel in assessments fail to apply math in real-life situations.
    2. Real-world tasks do not transfer to classroom problems: Children able to handle money or shop-related calculations cannot solve textbook problems.
    3. Mismatch in learning environment: Schooling moves faster than the pace of conceptual consolidation.
    What are the consequences of India’s numeracy stagnation?
    1. Academic roadblocks: students struggle in science and mathematics subjects that dominate board exams.
    2. Early exit from education: adolescents leave school before Class 10 due to fear of mathematics.
    3. Reduced human capital formation: failure to master numeracy blocks access to high-skill employment and technical careers.
    Why does Foundational Literacy and Numeracy (FLN) need expansion beyond early grades?
    1. Persistent learning gaps after Grade 3: 70% of Class 5 and more than 50% of Class 8 students cannot divide.
    2. COVID-19 widened numeracy deficits: most Class 3 students reached upper-primary without core math skills.
    3. Transferable higher-grade pedagogy required: FLN-style teaching must be extended to older students.
    What does an effective multi-pronged response look like?
    1. Strengthening middle-grade support: extend FLN interventions to Class 8 to prevent permanent numeracy loss.
    2. Teaching math through everyday life: bills, ratios, fractions, percentages, and measurements.
    3. Child-friendly activity-based pedagogy: aligned with real literacy levels rather than grade-based syllabus.
    4. Embedding numeracy across subjects: problem-solving in science, geography, social sciences.
    CONCLUSION
    India has cracked foundational literacy but not foundational numeracy. The nation stands at a turning point where classroom success must evolve into real-life mathematical competence, ensuring that students not only pass but thrive academically and economically. Extending FLN-style pedagogy to middle-grade stages remains the most urgent policy priority.

  • What will mean for Chandigarh if it is brought under Article 240

    Introduction
    Chandigarh is a Union Territory that also serves as the shared capital of Punjab and Haryana. The Governor of Punjab currently holds additional charge as the Administrator of Chandigarh. The proposal to place Chandigarh under Article 240 of the Constitution may allow the Centre to appoint an independent Administrator and frame regulations for Chandigarh without relying on state mechanisms. The move carries political, administrative, and federal ramifications, especially for Punjab and Haryana.
    Why in the news? 
    Bringing Chandigarh under Article 240 could give the Centre sweeping legislative and administrative powers over the Union Territory, including the ability to repeal or amend laws applicable to Chandigarh through Parliament or Presidential regulations. This marks a sharp departure from the existing model, where Punjab’s Governor also administers Chandigarh. The move could influence bureaucratic control, fiscal provisions, and power distribution among Punjab, Haryana, and the Centre, making the stakes exceptionally high.
    What is Article 240?
    • Empowers the President to make regulations for the peace, progress and good government of certain Union Territories.
    • Regulations issued under Article 240 have the force of Parliamentary law, making them equivalent to an Act of Parliament.
    • Allows amendment or repeal of existing laws in a UT, giving the Union direct legislative authority.
    • Applies to UTs without a legislative assembly: Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu.
    • Applies to Puducherry only when its Assembly is dissolved or suspended, enabling temporary Central control.
    • Enables the Centre to bypass State governments in UT governance, creating a more unitary administrative model.
    Chandigarh’s current administrative arrangement
    1. Shared capital system: Chandigarh serves as the capital of both Punjab and Haryana.
    2. Additional charge: The Governor of Punjab functions as the Administrator of Chandigarh.
    3. UT governance limitations: Chandigarh lacks its own Legislative Assembly.
    What Article 240 enables
    1. Sweeping Central authority: The President can make regulations for peace, progress, and good government for UTs.
    2. Regulatory override: Any law applicable to Chandigarh can be repealed or amended via Parliamentary legislation.
    3. Direct central rule template: Similar model followed in Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, Puducherry (when its Assembly is dissolved/suspended).
    Implications if Chandigarh is brought under Article 240
    1. Independent Administrator: No additional charge by Punjab Governor; Centre appoints directly.
    2. Bureaucratic restructuring: Large administrative staff of Punjab and Haryana currently posted in Chandigarh may face institutional and coordination changes.
    3. Legislative possibilities: May enable eventual Legislative Assembly for Chandigarh in the future.
    4. Greater Central oversight: Budgetary and policy matters would fall more firmly under Union control.
    5. Concerns raised: Critics fear this would give excessive control to the Centre.
    Arguments that the move benefits Chandigarh
    1. Clear autonomy: Reduced administrative overlap from two states.
    2. Institutional accountability: A dedicated Administrator creates faster decision-making.
    3. Long-term governance clarity: Removes ambiguity caused by shared capital model.
    Previous administrative attempts
    1. 1984 attempt: Proposal to appoint an independent Administrator linked to counter-terror coordination; Punjab was under President’s Rule.
    2. 2016 attempt: Opposition arose due to the practice of Punjab Governor holding Administrator’s charge.
    Conclusion
    Placing Chandigarh under Article 240 reflects a significant recalibration of Centre-State dynamics. While the move promises administrative clarity and efficiency, it raises questions of federal balance and the political stakes of Punjab and Haryana. The issue remains a critical case-study in Indian federalism, constitutional design, and UT governance.
    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2024] What changes has the Union Government recently introduced in the domain of Centre-State relations? Suggest measures to be adopted to build the trust between the Centre and the States and for strengthening federalism.
    Linkage: The question reflects the recent shift in Centre-State power balance through greater Union control in administrative, fiscal and institutional domains. It links directly with debates like Chandigarh under Article 240, Governor-State tensions, GST Council dynamics and UT re-organisation, core themes of Indian federalism in GS-II.

  • What does the SC’s advisory opinion imply?

    INTRODUCTION

    The advisory opinion of the Supreme Court was sought to address concerns raised by delays in assent to Bills passed by State Assemblies and the earlier judicial attempt to impose fixed timelines on Governors. The reference involved 14 constitutional questions focused on the interpretation of Articles 200 and 201 and the Court’s jurisdiction to intervene. The new opinion aims to clarify the contours of discretionary powers while protecting legislative authority under the Constitution.

    WHY IN THE NEWS

    The Supreme Court has issued a landmark advisory opinion on a Presidential reference under Article 143, reversing the April 2025 ruling that introduced the concept of “deemed assent” and mandated a three-month timeline for Governors and the President to act on Bills. The Court has clarified that while Governors ordinarily act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, their powers under Articles 200 and 201 are discretionary, without any judicially enforceable time limits. This ruling has reshaped the dynamics between constitutional heads and elected State governments, impacting legislative functioning and federal balance.

    What triggered the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion

    1. Presidential reference origin: Resulted from the two-judge bench judgment in State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025).
    2. Three-month timeline mandate: The earlier ruling specified that Governors and the President must act on Bills within three months.
    3. Deemed assent invocation: The bench used Article 142 to grant deemed assent for Tamil Nadu Bills pending with the Governor.
    4. Government concern: The Union Government sought clarity on whether Bills become justiciable before enactment and whether courts can prescribe time limits.
    5. Magnitude of reference: A total of 14 constitutional questions were raised relating to Articles 200 and 201 and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.

    What were the key takeaways from the Supreme Court’s opinion?

    1. Three constitutional choices under Article 200: The Governor may assent, return the Bill for reconsideration, or reserve it for the President’s consideration.
    2. Discretion of Governor: The Governor exercises discretion in choosing among the three options and is not necessarily bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers.
    3. Non-justiciability before enactment: Courts cannot compel Governors to act before a Bill becomes law due to absence of constitutionally prescribed timelines.
    4. Autonomy of President under Article 201: The President’s powers operate independently and cannot be substituted by judicial directives.
    5. Absence of deemed assent: The Constitution does not provide for deemed assent; judicial power under Article 142 cannot be used to invent such a mechanism.

    Does this opinion contradict earlier judicial interpretations?

    1. Earlier judicial logic: Decisions in Shamsher Singh (1974) and Nabam Rebia (2016) held that Governors act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
    2. Present reinterpretation: The Court has held that Article 200 functions fall within discretionary power despite the general rule of acting on ministerial advice.
    3. Shift in constitutional balance: The new interpretation expands discretionary authority when dealing with State legislation.
    What about time limits for Governors and the President?
    1. Punchhi Commission recommendation (2010): Suggested that the Governor should decide on assent within six months.
    2. Precedent in K.M. Singh case (2020): The Court had earlier prescribed a three-month limit for the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions; however, no such limit exists for Governors.
    3. Current ruling: The Supreme Court held that no enforceable time limit applies because the Constitution does not prescribe one.
    4. Implication: The possibility of prolonged delays in assent continues to exist, which may contribute to legislative gridlock.
    What concerns emerge from the current interpretation
    1. Democratic risk: Legislative functioning may be hindered when Bills remain pending without a time frame for disposal.
    2. Centre-State tension: Expanded discretion may tilt the institutional balance toward appointed constitutional heads over elected State governments.
    3. Potential politicisation: Use of gubernatorial office could intensify where State and Union Governments are politically opposed.
    Way Forward
    1. Introduce timelines: Fix a statutory/constitutional time limit for assent to Bills.
    2. Record reasons: Make reservation of Bills and delays explainable in writing.
    3. Structured coordination: Establish periodic Raj Bhavan-State Government consultation mechanism.
    4. Federal ethics: Encourage Governors to follow constitutional neutrality over political alignment.
    5. Legislative reporting: Present pendency reports of Bills before the State Legislature annually.
    6. Capacity building: Train Raj Bhavan staff on constitutional conventions and cooperative federalism.
    CONCLUSION
    The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion carefully aligns with constitutional text by overturning “deemed assent” and reaffirming discretion under Articles 200 and 201. However, it leaves unresolved the core challenge of prolonged delays in gubernatorial action on Bills passed by elected Assemblies. While the opinion respects constitutional separation of powers and prevents judicial overreach, it simultaneously highlights the need for clearer institutional safeguards to protect democratic accountability and cooperative federalism.
    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2022] Discuss the essential conditions for exercise of the legislative powers by the Governor. Discuss the legality of re-promulgation of ordinances by the Governor without placing them before the Legislature.
    Linkage: This PYQ connects directly to current debates on Governors’ discretionary powers, assent to Bills, and constitutional limits on ordinance-making. It is highly relevant after the Supreme Court’s recent advisory opinion on Articles 200 and 201, which redefines executive-legislature balance and safeguards federalism.

  • Justice Surya Kant Sworn in as the 53rd Chief Justice of India (CJI)

    Why in the News?

    Justice Surya Kant took oath as the 53rd Chief Justice of India (CJI) on November 24, 2025, administered by President Droupadi Murmu at Rashtrapati Bhavan.

    About Justice Surya Kant

    • Born: 10 February 1962, Hisar, Haryana.
    • Youngest Advocate General of Haryana (appointed 2000).
    • Judge, Punjab & Haryana High Court (2004).
    • Chief Justice, Himachal Pradesh High Court (2018).
    • Appointed to Supreme Court: 24 May 2019 (along with Justice B.R. Gavai).

    Tenure

    • Will serve until 2 February 2027 — a little over one year.

    Major Priorities as the 53rd CJI

    • Reduce pendency of 90,000+ cases in the Supreme Court to a “manageable number.”
    • Address growing trend:
      • Litigants bypassing High Courts and approaching SC directly.
      • Repeated “miscellaneous applications” causing prolonged litigation

    Major Cases Involving Justice Surya Kant

    • Abrogation of Article 370 (J&K’s special status removed).
    • Electoral Bonds Case – Bench struck down the scheme as unconstitutional.
    • Pegasus spyware case.
    • Suspension of sedition law deliberations.
    • Granted conditional interim bail to Ashish Mishra (Lakhimpur Kheri incident).

    Procedure for Selection of the Chief Justice of India (CJI)

    Constitutional Basis

    • Article 124(2) of the Constitution deals with the appointment of Supreme Court judges (including the CJI). The CJI is appointed by the President of India.

    Seniority Convention

    • By long-standing constitutional convention, the most senior judge of the Supreme Court is appointed as the next CJI.
    • Seniority = date of appointment to the Supreme Court Bench.

    Role of the Collegium

    When the CJI’s post is falling vacant:

    • The outgoing CJI recommends the name of the senior-most SC judge to the Government of India.
    • This recommendation is part of the Collegium system, but only the CJI’s advice is required, not the full Collegium.

    Role of the Law Ministry

    • The Ministry of Law & Justice processes the recommendation.
    • Sends it to the Prime Minister, who advises the President.

    Appointment by the President

    • The President formally appoints the recommended judge as the Chief Justice of India.
    • Appointment is notified in the Gazette.

    Oath of Office

    • The President administers the oath of office to the new CJI at Rashtrapati Bhavan.
    • Oath is under Article 124(6).

    Tenure

    • The CJI holds office until the age of 65.

    Q. With reference to Indian Judiciary, consider the following statements:

    1. Any retired judge of the Supreme Court of India can be called back to sit and act as a Supreme Court judge by the Chief Justice of India with the prior permission of the President of India.

    2. A High Court in India has the power to review its own judgement as the Supreme Court does.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? 

    [A] 1 only 

    [B] 2 only 

    [C] Both 1 and 2 

    [D] Neither 1 nor 2

  • How can State PSCs be reformed

    Introduction

    Public Service Commissions are constitutional institutions meant to ensure merit-based appointments insulated from political pressures. A century after the Montagu–Chelmsford report envisaged them, State PSCs face credibility challenges due to recruitment irregularities and systemic inefficiencies that affect millions of aspirants.

    Why in the news?

    At the 2025 National Conference of Chairpersons of State Public Service Commissions hosted by Telangana PSC, members acknowledged recruitment controversies and demanded urgent reforms. Aspirant protests in Hyderabad highlighted how even minor delays disrupt youth livelihood prospects. Persistent exam cancellations and unclear syllabi have deepened mistrust despite PSCs’ constitutional mandate of meritocracy.

    Historical evolution of State PSCs :

    1. Montagu-Chelmsford Report :
      1. Recommended statutory recruitment bodies for welfare-oriented administration.
      2. Laid conceptual foundation for PSCs in India.
    2. First Public Service Commission (1926) :
      1. Set up for the Government of India before Independence.
      2. Marked beginning of institutionalised merit-based recruitment.
    3. Constitutionalisation through Article 315:
      1. Provided for separate Public Service Commissions for Union and States.
      2. Ensured autonomy and continuity post-Independence.

    Constitutional structure and organisation :

    1. Appointment and tenure of members: Governor appoints chairperson and members with fixed tenure and protected service conditions.
    2. Constitutional independence: PSCs function autonomously and discharge duties without executive interference.
    3. Role of UPSC in relation to State PSCs: UPSC may advise State PSCs on service matters when requested.
    4. Role of Ministry of Personnel: Helps maintain coherence in administrative policies across States.

    Present functioning and examination framework :

    1. Syllabus review mechanism: Periodic syllabus updates mandated to align with evolving administrative requirements.
    2. Question paper setting and evaluation: PSC sets papers, evaluates answer scripts and prepares selection lists.
    3. Cut-offs and result publication: Merit lists released after evaluation; criteria finalised by the PSC.

    Current challenges and bottlenecks

    1. Irregular recruitment cycles: Long gaps between notification and appointments disrupt careers and spark protests.
    2. Lack of transparency: Limited disclosure on answer keys and evaluation has lowered institutional credibility.
    3. Paper leaks and cancellations: Allegations of malpractice lead to cancellation, delays and erosion of public trust.
    4. Outdated syllabus issues: Poor syllabus revisions fail to reflect new governance themes and legal developments.
    5. Inconsistent standards across States: Divergent evaluation standards hinder mobility and generate inequality.

    Proposed reforms and restructuring measures:

    1. Revised manpower planning: Systematic vacancy forecasting to prevent examination delays.
    2. Fixed examination calendar: Annual, predictable and uniform recruitment schedule across States.
    3. Transparent evaluation policy: Mandatory disclosure of answer keys, normalisation criteria and cut-off logic.
    4. Academic and administrative alignment: Regular syllabus revision to match governance and administrative reality.
    5. Professional expertise induction: Inclusion of subject experts to improve paper quality and evaluation fairness.

    Conclusion

    State PSCs were created to provide equal opportunity in public employment. However, recruitment delays, unclear syllabi and opacity have damaged public trust. Ensuring predictability, transparency and institutional professionalism is essential to protect youth aspirations and restore confidence in constitutional recruitment bodies.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations too are covered under the Act?

    Linkage: The Act directly links to the PSC crisis by targeting leaks, exam fraud and loss of trust in public recruitment. It sets a future-ready template for PSC reforms through transparency, deterrence and integrity in examinations.

  • Presidential Reference on Governors & State Bills (2025)

     Why in the news?
     Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai, on November 23, 2025, clarified the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion in the 2025 Presidential Reference regarding timelines for Governors and the President in granting assent to State Bills.

    What is a Presidential Reference?

    • Made under Article 143 of the Constitution.
    • The President can seek the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court on questions of law or matters of public importance.
    • Not binding, but carries high persuasive value.
    • Cannot overrule an existing judgment, but can clarify the law.

    CJI Gavai emphasised that the advisory opinion is not a judicial review judgment.

    Background: 

    Tamil Nadu Governor Case (April 8 Judgment) The April 8, 2025 Supreme Court judgment held:
    • Governors/President must act on pending Bills within 3 months,
    • Or else the Bill would be “deemed to have received assent”.

    This introduced a judicially created timeline not explicitly present in the Constitution. This triggered the Presidential Reference seeking clarity.

    Supreme Court’s Advisory Opinion (November 20, 2025)

    A five-judge Bench led by CJI Gavai issued the following clarifications:

    a) No Mandatory Timeline: The Constitution does not prescribe specific timelines for Governors or the President. Judiciary cannot read timelines into the Constitution.

    b) “Reasonable Period” Standard: Governors and President must act within a “reasonable period”. However, the Court did not define what constitutes “reasonable”.

    c) No Endless Delay: Governors cannot sit indefinitely on Bills. Courts may exercise limited judicial review in extreme delay cases.

    d) Context Matters: Routine Bills → 1 month may be reasonable. Bills related to internal/external emergency → may require more time.

    Key Constitutional Provisions Involved

    Article 200 – Governor’s options on State Bills
    1. Give assent
    2. Withhold assent
    3. Return the Bill (if not a Money Bill)
    4. Reserve the Bill for President’s consideration
    Article 201 – President’s powers over reserved Bills
    • Grant or withhold assent
    • No fixed timeline prescribed
    Article 143 – Presidential Reference
    • Supreme Court gives advisory opinion

    Why is this Important for UPSC Prelims?

    This case clarifies the separation of powers, federalism, and the role of constitutional authorities.

    Prelims often tests:

    • Powers of Governor
    • Assent procedures for Bills
    • Nature of advisory jurisdiction
    • Limits of judicial interpretation

    Other Key Statements by CJI Gavai (Factual Highlights)

    a) Advisory Opinion vs Judgment: Advisory opinion cannot overturn a judgment.

    b) Judiciary–Executive Relations: CJI rejected the idea that “friction” is necessary between judiciary and government.

    c) Judicial Independence: A judge’s independence is not measured by ruling against the government.

    d) High Court Judge Transfers: Transfers made for administrative reasons and sometimes due to complaints after verification.

    e) Personal Note: CJI forgave a lawyer who threw an object at him: “It’s how I was brought up.”

    Which of the following are the discretionary powers given to the Governor of a State? (PYQ 2014)

    1. Sending a report to the President of India for imposing the President’s rule 

    2. Appointing the Ministers 

    3. Reserving certain bills passed by the State Legislature for consideration of the President of India 

    4. Making the rules to conduct the business of the State Government 

    Select the correct answer using the code given below: 

    (a) 1 and 2 only 

    (b) 1 and 3 only 

    (c) 2, 3 and 4 only 

    (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4

  • Search on for five declared foreigners by Assam tribunal

    Why In The News?

    Police in Assam’s Sonitpur district are searching for five people declared non-citizens by a Foreigners’ Tribunal after they repeatedly failed to appear for hearings, prompting the tribunal to issue an ex-parte order.

    1) About Foreigners Tribunal (FT):

    • Legal Basis: Quasi-judicial bodies established under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, issued under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946.
    • Purpose: Allows State authorities to refer cases of individuals suspected to be foreigners for determination.
    • Composition: Headed by members drawn from judges, advocates, or civil servants with judicial experience.
    • Powers: Possesses civil court powers-summoning individuals, examining on oath, and requiring document production.

    2) Are Foreigners Tribunals Only for Assam?

    • Nationwide Applicability: The 1964 Order applies across all of India, but FTs currently operate only in Assam.
    • Other States: Suspected illegal immigrants are dealt with by local courts under the Foreigners Act, 1946.
    • 2019 Amendment: Earlier only the Centre could set up FTs; after the amendment, states also have the power to establish them.

    3) Foreigners Tribunal – Functioning:

    • Notice Period: Tribunal must issue a notice to the suspected foreigner within 10 days of receiving a reference.
    • Response Time: The individual gets 10 days to reply, and another 10 days to submit supporting evidence.
    • Time for Disposal: Tribunal must dispose of cases within 60 days.
    • Outcome: If unable to prove citizenship, the person may be sent to a detention centre (transit camp) for future deportation.

    4) Immigration and Foreigners Order, 2025:

    • Replaces: Supersedes the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964 under the new Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025.
    • New Powers:
      • FTs can now issue arrest warrants and detain individuals unable to prove citizenship-previously done through executive orders.
      • Warrants may be issued if a suspect fails to appear.
    • Expanded Judicial Authority: FTs now possess powers of:
      • A civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
      • A judicial magistrate (First Class) under Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
    • Key Powers Include:
      • Summoning and enforcing attendance.
      • Examining persons on oath.
      • Requiring discovery and production of documents.
      • Issuing commissions for witness examination.
      • Directing personal appearance.
      • Issuing arrest warrants for non-appearance.
    Ex-Parte Order:

    An ex parte decree is issued when a defendant fails to appear despite receiving summons, allowing the court to hear only the plaintiff’s case and pass a decision in the defendant’s absence.

     

    [UPSC 2009] Consider the following statements :

    1. Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was set up during the Prime Ministership of Lal Bahadur Shastri.

    2. The Members for CAT are drawn from both judicial and administrative streams.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

    Options: (a) 1 only (b) 2 only* (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2