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GS Paper: GS3-24.Various Security Forces and Agencies and their Mandate.

  • Common Uniforms at Higher Ranks of Army

    uniform

    Central Idea: A decision has been taken at the recent Army Commanders Conference to change the uniforms worn by senior Army officers.

    Changes in Uniform

    • All officers of the rank of Brigadier and above will now wear common uniform items.
    • The common uniform items include berets, badges of rank, belt buckle, and pattern of shoes.
    • Regimental lanyards and shoulder flashes will no longer be worn by officers of these higher ranks.
    • There will be no item of uniform that will identify them as belonging to a particular Regiment or Corps.

    Present Uniform Accoutrements

    • Officers from the rank of Lieutenant to General currently wear uniform accoutrements as per their regimental or corps affiliation.
    • Each Infantry Regiment and Corps has its own pattern of lanyard, badges of rank, buttons, and belt buckle as per regimental traditions.

    Reason for Change

    • Regimental service in the Army ends at the rank of Colonel for most officers who rise further.
    • Senior officers commanding troops of mixed regimental lineage should present themselves in a neutral uniform rather than a regimental one.

    Reversion to Past Practice

    • The Army is now reverting to the practice that was followed almost 40 years ago, when the changes towards wearing regimental affiliations took hold in the service.
    • Until about the mid-1980s, officers of the rank of Colonel and above had common uniform patterns and insignia.

    Tradition in Other Armies

    • In the British army, the uniform worn by officers of the rank of Colonel and above is referred to as the Staff uniform, to distinguish it from the Regimental uniform.
    • Among neighbouring countries, the Pakistan and Bangladesh armies follow the same pattern as the British army.

     

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  • The Maoist Insurgency: Challenges and The Way Forward

    Insurgency

    Central Idea

    • The recent ambush of the convoy in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district resulting in the deaths of 10 personnel of the District Reserve Guards (DRG) highlights that the Maoist insurgency remains a significant threat in India. The Home Minister has repeatedly given the impression that the end of the Maoist problem is near, but history has shown otherwise.

    What is mean by Insurgency?

    • Insurgency refers to a violent uprising against the established government or authority of a country, typically carried out by a group of individuals or an organization that seeks to challenge the existing political, economic, or social order.
    • It often involves armed conflict, sabotage, and other forms of violence aimed at destabilizing the government or seizing power.
    • The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to overthrow the existing government and establish a new political system that is more in line with the insurgents’ ideology or goals

    Rise of Insurgency India

    • The Communist Party of India (Marxist) split in 1967, with a section of the party rejecting the electoral path and advocating for armed struggle to overthrow the Indian state.
    • The Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal in 1967, where a group of peasants led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal revolted against the local landlords and police. The uprising was brutally crushed by the state, but it gave birth to the Naxalite movement.
    • The formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969, which became the political front of the Naxalite movement.
    • The formation of the People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh in 1980, which became one of the most active Naxalite groups in the country.
    • The merger of the People’s War Group with the Maoist Communist Centre in 2004, to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), which is the largest Naxalite group in India today.
    • The expansion of the Naxalite movement from West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh to other states, including Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, and Maharashtra, among others.
    • The violent attacks by Naxalites on the state and central police forces, government officials, politicians, and civilians, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives over the years.

    Facts for prelims

    District Reserve Guards (DRG)

    • District Reserve Guards (DRG) is a special unit of the police force in some Indian states, primarily in Chhattisgarh, that is trained and equipped to combat Naxalite and Maoist insurgency.
    • DRG personnel are typically drawn from local tribal communities and are familiar with the local terrain, which makes them effective in fighting the insurgency.
    • They are provided with specialized training in guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, and use of modern weaponry.
    • The DRG is often at the forefront of anti-Naxalite operations and is considered a vital component of the Indian government’s efforts to counter the Maoist insurgency in the country.

    What are the flaws in the anti-Naxal strategy?

    1. Outsourcing operations to central armed police forces:
    • In most states, there is a tendency to outsource the operations against Naxals to the central armed police forces.
    • This strategy is flawed because unless the local police, who know the language and terrain, take the lead in anti-Naxal operations, the problem would linger.
    1. Imposed development paradigm:
    • The development paradigm pursued since independence has always been imposed on the tribal communities and has been insensitive to their needs and concerns. As a result, government plans have ended up in destroying their social organization, cultural identity, and resource base and generated multiple conflicts.
    • The tribals want schools and hospitals, but they neither need nor want capital-intensive plants or factories, which are inevitably accompanied by deforestation and displacement.
    1. Insensitivity towards tribal communities:
    • The development paradigm pursued since independence has always been imposed on the tribal communities and has been insensitive to their needs and concerns. As a result, government plans have ended up destroying their social organization, cultural identity, and resource base and generated multiple conflicts.
    1. Lack of an overall strategic plan:
    • There is no overall strategic plan against the Naxals. States have been carrying out anti-Naxal drives according to their individual understanding.
    • Territorial domination is essential, and security forces are able to achieve that, but that should be followed by the administrative apparatus establishing its network in the affected areas.
    1. Absence of peace talks:
    • The government should seriously think of applying the healing touch. If it can have peace talks with the Nagas and several other insurgent outfits in the Northeast, there is no reason why it should not take the initiative to have a dialogue with the Maoist leadership. This would not be seen as a sign of weakness on the contrary, it would be taken as a magnanimous gesture.

    The way ahead to address the Naxal insurgency in India

    • Multi-pronged approach: The government should adopt a multi-pronged approach to address the Naxal problem that includes development initiatives, security measures, and dialogue with the Naxal leadership.
    • Focus on development: The government should focus on development initiatives in Naxal-affected areas that are tailored to meet the needs of the local population. This includes building infrastructure like schools, hospitals, and roads, creating employment opportunities, and addressing land rights issues.
    • Empowering local police: The state police should be empowered to take the lead in anti-Naxal operations as they have a better understanding of the local language and terrain.
    • Humanitarian approach: The government should adopt a humanitarian approach in dealing with the problem. The use of excessive force should be avoided, and care should be taken to ensure that the local population is not adversely affected.
    • Dialogue with Naxal leadership: The government should initiate a dialogue with the Naxal leadership to address their grievances and concerns. This would help in building trust and confidence between the two sides and pave the way for a peaceful resolution of the problem.
    • Coordination among states: The states should coordinate their efforts to address the Naxal problem. The sharing of intelligence, resources, and best practices would go a long way in addressing the issue.
    • Strengthening of institutions: The government should strengthen institutions like the police, judiciary, and administrative machinery to ensure that they are better equipped to deal with the problem.
    • Long-term vision: A long-term vision should be adopted to address the Naxal problem. This requires sustained efforts over a period of time to ensure that the problem is effectively tackled.

    Conclusion

    • India’s Maoist insurgency problem is not one that can be solved by just law and order enforcement. It is crucial to address the underlying social and economic aspects of the problem. The government should acknowledge the flaws in its anti-Naxal strategy and undertake a comprehensive approach to solve the problem. It must ensure that the local police take the lead in anti-Naxal operations, and the development policies must be sensitive to the needs and concerns of the tribal communities. Initiating peace talks with the Maoist leadership could also go a long way in resolving the issue.

    Mains Question

    Q. The recent events of violent attacks on security forces highlights that the Maoist insurgency remains a significant threat in India. In light of this discuss what are the flaws in anti-Naxal strategy and what is needed to address the Naxal insurgency in India?

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    Also Read:

    Village Defence Guards (VDG): A sense of security and confidence

     

  • Golden Globe Race: Voyage of mad men

    golden globe

    Central Idea

    • Abhilash Tomy, a former Commander in the Indian Navy, has achieved the remarkable feat of completing a solo circumnavigation worldwide by finishing second at the Golden Globe Race (GGR), 2022.
    • He achieved this record under even more challenging circumstances than his previous record-breaking feat of going worldwide on a sailboat solo and unassisted back in 2013.

    golden globe

    What is Golden Globe Race?

    • The Golden Globe Race is a non-stop, solo, unassisted yacht race around the world which was held for the first time in 1968-69.
    • The race requires contestants to use boats designed to prescribed premodern specifications and rely entirely on sextants and paper charts.
    • Satellite phones are available for extremely restricted use, and the use of modern navigational gear is not allowed.
    • The sailing would be along a stipulated route, rounding the three great capes (Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, Cape Leeuwin in Western Australia, and Cape Horn in Chile).

    His return to GGR

    • After several injuries, in 2021, Tomy began to look for sponsors and boats to participate in GGR-2022.
    • He announced his participation in the race on the Bayanat in March 2022, sponsored by a UAE-based company in the field of geospatial artificial intelligence.
    • However, just three weeks before the race, the boat collided with a ship and required massive repairs.

    Significance of his achievement

    • Only three of the 11 contestants of GGR-2022 lasted the course of the race, with Kirsten Neuschafer becoming the first woman to win a solo around-the-world yacht race.
    • Tomy’s boat was the most ‘repaired’ boat in the race and it was all carried out by the sailor fighting unimaginable sea conditions and lack of sleep.
    • In the end, Tomy became the first Asian to complete the 30,000-mile GGR by finishing second after Neuschafer.

     

     

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  • Why have Maoists repeatedly attack in Chhattisgarh?

    mao

    Central idea: Ten security personnel returning from a counter-insurgency operation and a civilian driver were killed by Maoists, in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada.

    Why discuss this?

    • Media seems to be confused with the terms and uses Maoists and Naxalities quite inter-changeably for Left Wing Extremism (LWE).

    Current LWE situation in the country

    • According to the MHA, Maoist violence in the country has gone down by 77% since 2010.
    • The number of resultant deaths (security forces + civilians) has come down by 90% from the all-time high of 1,005 in 2010 to 98 in 2022.
    • Chhattisgarh accounted for more than a third of all Maoist-related violence in this period.

    Naxalites vs. Maoists

    Naxalism

    Maoism
    Originated as a rebellion against marginalisation of the poor forest dwellers and gradually against the lack of development and poverty at the local level in rural parts of eastern India Originated in China as a form of communist theory derived from the teachings of Chinese political leader Mao Zedong
    Began with an armed peasant uprising in Naxalbari village of Darjeeling district in West Bengal in 1967 Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was formed in West Bengal around 1966
    Originated from the split that took place in the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1967 A section of communist rebels retained a distinct identity after the Naxalbari uprising
    Spread to lesser developed areas like Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh Initially kept a low profile, shot into prominence in Bihar in mid-1980s when they killed 54 Rajputs in Dalelchak-Bhagaura village of Aurangabad
    CPI-ML has been fighting elections in several states across India Do not support elections
    Focuses on mass organizations Relies mainly on armed struggle
    May have an armed wing, but not their sole reliance Existence depends on their armed militia

    Why have the Maoists carried out this attack in Chhattisgarh now?

    • Anti-state ops: The Maoists have carried out this attack as part of their strategy of heightened military activity and more attacks on security forces.
    • Revenge: CRPF conducts Tactical Counter Offensive Campaigns (TCOCs) from Feb to June yearly as monsoon makes offensive operations in the jungles difficult from July.

    Why Chhattisgarh?

    • Dense forests: The absence of roads in the interiors of Chhattisgarh has stymied the operations of security forces.
    • Asylum for the offenders: Police of neighbouring states had pushed Maoists from their states to Chhattisgarh, making it a concentrated zone of Maoist influence.
    • Lack of governance: The minimal presence of the administration in the interiors of South Bastar has ensured that Maoists continue to have influence in the region and enjoy local support through a mix of fear and goodwill.

    Also read:

    [Sansad TV] Mudda Aapka: Victory over Left-Wing Extremism

     

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  • India’s Fighter Jet Conundrum

    india

    Central idea: The article discusses the challenges faced by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in modernizing its fighter jet fleet due to unending delays in procurement and limited resources.

    Why discuss this?

    • Against the sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons, the IAF has only 31 squadrons today.
    • And this number is expected to remain the same or even decrease by 2029.
    • The IAF representative informed the Parliamentary standing committee that the shortfall may not be accomplished anytime soon.

    Indian Air Force (IAF): A quick backgrounder

    • The IAF was established in 1932, and it played an important role in India’s defence during World War II and later in the 1947-48 Kashmir War.
    • It underwent modernization in the 1960s and 70s with the induction of new aircraft and weapons systems.
    • Since then, the IAF has grown to become one of the largest air forces in the world, with a significant role to play in India’s defence and security.

    Evolution of the IAF

    Key Events
    Pre-Independence Phase – Small organization with only six officers and 19 airmen

    – Played a crucial role in World War II and the 1947-48 Kashmir War
    1947-1962 Phase – Expansion and modernization of the IAF

    – Acquisition of new aircraft and weapons systems
    1962-1980 Phase – Involvement in the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars

    – Modernization with the induction of new aircraft and missiles
    1980-Present Phase – Further modernization with the acquisition of new aircraft, missiles, and weapons systems

    – Focus on enhancing operational readiness

     

    Current Status of the IAF

    • Large workforce: The IAF has around 1,500 aircraft and 140,000 personnel, making it one of the largest air forces in the world.
    • Fleet details: The IAF has a sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons, but the current strength stands at 31 squadrons.
    • Victorious wars: It has played an essential role in various conflicts, including the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars and the Kargil conflict in 1999.
    • HADR operation: It has also been involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, such as the 2004 tsunami and the 2013 Uttarakhand floods.

    Challenges faced

    The IAF faces multiple challenges in the 21st century.

    • Decommissioning aircraft: By the end of the decade, many of the Jaguars, Mirage-2000s, and Mig-29s will begin going out, which is why the decision on Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) is essential to arrest this drawdown.
    • Arsenal shortages: The IAF faces a shortage of fighter aircraft, which is a significant concern given the current geopolitical environment.
    • Selective modernization: One of the critical issues is modernization, which includes the upgrading of its aircraft and weapons systems.
    • Diverse threat: The IAF also needs to ensure operational readiness to address the changing nature of warfare, which involves non-state actors, asymmetrical warfare, and cyber threats.
    • Logistic fallouts: Furthermore, the IAF needs to improve its logistics and infrastructure to support its operations effectively.
    • Maintenance challenges: There is a slow synergy with vendors for ‘long-term spares and repair contracts’.

    Opportunities for the IAF

    There are several opportunities for the IAF to enhance its capabilities in the modern era.

    • Modernization: The acquisition of new aircraft, weapons systems, and technologies can significantly enhance the IAF’s combat capabilities.
    • Joint cooperation: Additionally, the IAF can improve its international cooperation with other air forces to gain experience and enhance its interoperability.
    • UAV induction: The IAF can also explore the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat roles.
    • Indigenization: The IAF is emphasizing the need for indigenization of its fighter jet production via LCA and Fifth Gen fighter aircraft program.

    Challenges in fleet modernisation

    • Procurement delay: The IAF faces significant challenges in modernizing its fleet due to delays in procurement and limited resources.
    • R&D, Infra bottlenecks: Implementing indigenization is a complex process that involves significant investment in research and development, infrastructure, and human capital.
    • Others: Other challenges include a lack of skilled labour, limited funding, and the need for technology transfer from foreign partners.

    Way forward

    • The IAF needs to prioritize the acquisition of MRFA, focus on increasing the availability rates of the Su-30, and invest in its own industry to achieve self-reliance in the long term.
    • Effective collaboration between industry, government, and the armed forces is crucial for the success of indigenization efforts in the defence sector.

     

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  • Exercise INIOCHOS-23

    iniochos

    The Indian Air Force (IAF) will be participating in a multi-national air exercise called Exercise INIOCHOS-23, which will be hosted by the Greece Air Force.

    Ex. INIOCHOS-23

    • Exercise INIOCHOS-23 will be conducted at the Andravida Air Base in Greece.
    • The IAF will be participating with four Su-30 MKI and two C-17 aircraft.
    • The objective of the exercise is to enhance international cooperation, synergy, and interoperability among the participating Air Forces, as stated by the IAF in a statement.

    Strategic significance

    • The exercise will be conducted in a realistic combat scenario involving multiple types of air and surface assets
    • This will provide valuable insight into each other’s best practices and enable the participating contingents to interact professionally.

     

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  • In news: Pralay Ballistic Missile

    pralay

    India is going to buy 250 more Pralay ballistic missiles for the services to strengthen them on the northern borders, further boosting the firepower of the defence forces.

    Pralay Ballistic Missile

    • Pralay is a tactical missile developed from India’s K-series of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
    • It has a range of 150-500 km and can carry warheads weighing between 350 to 700 kg.
    • The missile is a canisters road-mobile system, which enhances its mobility and allows for quick preparation and launch of the missile.
    • Pralay has the ability to perform manoeuvres in flight and follows a quasi-ballistic trajectory to maintain high speed, making it difficult for enemy missile defence systems to intercept.

    Classification

    • The Indian Defence Ministry has classified Pralay as a “conventional Surface-to-Surface missile”.
    • This distinguishes it from the Agni series of missiles, which have the capability to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

    Testing and launch

    • The missile was launched on a quasi-ballistic trajectory in one of the two tests, which enhances its effectiveness against enemy missile defence systems.
    • Satellite imagery of the test shows that Pralay is a canisterised road-mobile system, which adds to its mobility and flexibility in responding to evolving threats.

     

  • Exercise Cope India 23

    The Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters, including Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Rafale, SU-30MKI, and Jaguars, are set to participate in bilateral air Exercise Cope India 23 with US Air Force (USAF) F-15 fighters and B-1B long-range bombers.

    Exercise Cope India

    • Cope India began in 2004 as a fighter training exercise held at Air Station Gwalior.
    • The exercise has evolved to incorporate subject matter expert exchanges, air mobility training, airdrop training and large-force exercises, in addition to fighter-training exercises.
    • The exercise was last held in 2009.
    • The exercise showcases US and India’s efforts and commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

    Highlights of the 2023 version

    • The exercise will be conducted in two phases, with the first phase practicing the air-mobility component involving transport aircraft of both countries.
    • The IAF element will include the Su-30MKI, Rafale, Tejas, and Jaguar fighter aircraft, while Japan is taking part in the exercise as an observer.
    • The second phase of the exercise will witness the participation of B-1B bombers of USAF, and F-15 fighter aircraft of the USAF will join the exercise subsequently, according to an IAF statement.
    • The exercise will be supported by aerial refuellers, Airborne Warning and Control System, and Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft of the IAF.

     

  • AFSPA Further Lifted Form Northeast: Positive Development

    Central Idea

    • The Centre’s decision to lift the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 from more police station limits in Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland is a positive development that sends a message of hope to the region. While insurgency has necessitated the imposition of AFSPA in the past, the prevalence of violence in the region has been on the decline, and the government’s peace negotiations with rebel groups have borne fruit.

    What is Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, (AFSPA )1958?

    • Armed Forces Special Powers Act, to put it simply, gives armed forces the power to maintain public order in disturbed areas.
    • AFSPA gives armed forces the authority use force or even open fire after giving due warning if they feel a person is in contravention of the law.
    • The Act further provides that if reasonable suspicion exists, the armed forces can also arrest a person without a warrant; enter or search premises without a warrant; and ban the possession of firearms.

    What are the Special Powers?

    • Power to use force: including opening fire, even to the extent of causing death if prohibitory orders banning assembly of five or more persons or carrying arms and weapons, etc are in force in the disturbed area;
    • Power to destroy structures: used as hide-outs, training camps, or as a place from which attacks are or likely to be launched, etc;
    • Power to arrest: Without warrant and to use force for the purpose;
    • Power to enter and search premises: without a warrant to make arrest or recovery of hostages, arms and ammunition and stolen property etc.

    Reason for the decision

    • Improved security: The decision was taken due to a significant improvement in the security situation in Northeast India.
    • Decrease in Violence: The prevalence of insurgencies in almost all states in the Northeast may arguably have necessitated the imposition of AFSPA in the past. Statistics suggest that violence in the region has been on the decline. The MHA cited a reduction of 76% in extremist incidents, 90% decrease in deaths of security personnel and a 97% decrease in civilian deaths since 2014.
    • Negotiations with Rebel Groups: The government has negotiated peace with rebel groups in the region, including NSCN-IM, Ulfa, Bodo, and Dimasa groups, with some success.
    • Peace accords: The Mizo rebels, who signed a peace accord in 1986, joined electoral politics and won office. The Tripura government successfully negotiated with the insurgency and got AFSPA removed in 2015. The government must continue to engage with rebel groups to maintain peace in the region.

    Conclusion

    • The Centre’s decision to withdraw AFSPA in an incremental manner is a positive development for the region, and the government must continue to reduce its dependence on AFSPA to impose its writ. The Northeast’s stability is critical, especially with unrest in Myanmar, and the government must make judicious choices to balance regional and ethnic identity assertion with nationalism.
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  • AFSPA further reduced in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland: MHA

    afspa

     

    Central idea: Home Minister recently announced the decision to reduce the Disturbed Areas under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in Nagaland, Assam, and Manipur.

    Reason for the decision

    • Improved security: The decision was taken due to a significant improvement in the security situation in Northeast India.
    • Decrease in Violence: The prevalence of insurgencies in almost all states in the Northeast may arguably have necessitated the imposition of AFSPA in the past. Statistics suggest that violence in the region has been on the decline. The MHA cited a reduction of 76% in extremist incidents, 90% decrease in deaths of security personnel and a 97% decrease in civilian deaths since 2014.
    • Negotiations with Rebel Groups: The government has negotiated peace with rebel groups in the region, including NSCN-IM, Ulfa, Bodo, and Dimasa groups, with some success.
    • Peace accords: The Mizo rebels, who signed a peace accord in 1986, joined electoral politics and won office. The Tripura government successfully negotiated with the insurgency and got AFSPA removed in 2015. The government must continue to engage with rebel groups to maintain peace in the region.

    What is Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958?

    • Armed Forces Special Powers Act, to put it simply, gives armed forces the power to maintain public order in “disturbed areas.”
    • AFSPA gives armed forces the authority use force or even open fire after giving due warning if they feel a person is in contravention of the law.
    • The Act further provides that if “reasonable suspicion exists”, the armed forces can also arrest a person without a warrant; enter or search premises without a warrant; and ban the possession of firearms.

    A Backgrounder

    • The AFSPA, 1958 came into force in the context of insurgency in the North-eastern States decades ago.
    • It provides “special power” to the Armed Forces applies to the Army, the Air Force and the Central Paramilitary forces etc.
    • It has been long contested debate whether the “special powers” granted under AFSPA gives total immunity to the armed forces for any action taken by them.

    What are the Special Powers?

    • Power to use force: including opening fire, even to the extent of causing death if prohibitory orders banning assembly of five or more persons or carrying arms and weapons, etc are in force in the disturbed area;
    • Power to destroy structures: used as hide-outs, training camps, or as a place from which attacks are or likely to be launched, etc;
    • Power to arrest: without warrant and to use force for the purpose;
    • Power to enter and search premises: without a warrant to make arrest or recovery of hostages, arms and ammunition and stolen property etc.

    Who can declare/notify such areas?

    • The Central Government or the Governor of the State or administrator of the Union Territory can declare the whole or part of the State or Union Territory as a disturbed area.

    Issues with AFSPA

    • Power to kill: Section 4 of the Act granted officers the authority to “take any action” even to the extent to cause the death.
    • Misconduct by Armed Forces: The issue of violation of human rights by actions of armed forces came under the consideration of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (popularly known as Justice Verma Committee) set up in 2012. It observed that- in conflict zones, legal protection for women was neglected.
    • Autocracy: The reality is that there is no evidence of any action being taken against any officer of the armed forces or paramilitary forces for their excesses.

    Recommendations to repeal AFSPA

    • Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy Commission: The 2004 Committee headed by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, the content of which has never officially been revealed by the Government, recommended that AFSPA be repealed.
    • ARC II: The Administrative Reforms Commission in its 5th Report on ‘Public Order’ had also recommended that AFSPA be repealed.

    Voices for repeal

    • Human rights violations: The repeal of AFSPA is necessary not just for restoring constitutional sanity, but also as a way of acknowledging the dark history of our conduct in Nagaland.
    • Need for ensuring individual dignity: The political incorporation of Nagaland (and all other areas where this law applies) will be set back if the guarantees of the individual dignity of the Indian Constitution are not extended.
    • Not state of exception: We often describe AFSPA in terms of a “state of exception”. But this theoretical term is misleading. How can a law that has been in virtually continuous existence since 1958 be described as an “exception”.
    • Lack of human empathy: At the heart of AFSPA is a profound mutilation of human empathy.

    Conclusion

    • To bring in lasting peace in the North East, the government needs to avoid the trap of watered-down peace accords.
    • While the move to withdraw AFSPA is welcome, it needs to be gradually erased.
    • For that, changes in the ground situation would be crucial. Mere smoke signals or drum-beating can never do the job.

     

     

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