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GS Paper: GS3-24. Various Security Forces and Agencies and their Mandate.

  • [pib] Exercise EUNAVFOR

    Indian Navy is participating in the maiden IN – EUNAVFOR Joint Naval Exercise in the Gulf of Aden.

    Exercise EUNAVFOR

    • EUNAVFOR is a multilateral naval exercise comprising of Italian Navy, Spanish Navy, and French Navy.
    • Ships of the four navies will endeavor to enhance and hone their war-fighting skills and their ability as an integrated force to promote, peace, security, and stability in the maritime domain.
    • EUNAVFOR and the Indian Navy converge on multiple issues including counter-piracy operations and protection of vessels deployed under the charter of the World Food Programme (UN WFP).
    • Indian Navy and EUNAVFOR also have regular interaction through SHADE (Shared Awareness and De-confliction) meetings held annually in Bahrain.
    • This engagement showcases increased levels of synergy, coordination, and inter-operability between India and EUNAVFOR.
    • It also underscores the shared values as partner navies, in ensuring freedom of seas and commitment to an open, inclusive and rules-based international order.

    Mark the nations along the Gulf of Aden:

  • Synthetic biology and its implications for national security

    Against the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic, the article discusses the national security threat emanating from biological weapons.

    Synthetic biology

    • Synthetic biology is a revolutionary technology that can help us manipulate biological organisms and processes for human betterment, especially in treating diseases, by re-engineering cells.
    •  In 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense categorised synthetic biology as one of the six ‘disruptive basic research areas’.
    • Unlike the nuclear domain, the fields of biology or synthetic biology are not regulated internationally despite growing military interest in it.

    Risks involved

    • There is the possibility of deliberate misuse of synthetic biology.
    • There is a need to carefully review, especially in the wake of the pandemic, the biosecurity systems in place where such technologies are in use.
    • Accidental leaks of experimental pathogens are another concern.
    • There has been very little focus on threats emanating from biological sources as compared to the focus on nuclear weapons.
    • This is despite the fact that a well-orchestrated biological attack could have serious implications.
    • This was before synthetic biology came into play.
    • A well-planned attack using highly infectious pathogens synthetically engineered in a lab could be disastrous.
    • It would be difficult to pin responsibility on a specific actor if the incubation period is high,

    BTWC: An inadequate mechanism for regulation

    • Despite being the weapon of mass destruction (WMD) safety and security attention given to bio-weapons is not at par with nuclear and chemical weapons.
    • There is an international convention and an implementing body for both nuclear and chemical weapons.
    • However, for bio-weapons, all we have is the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 with no implementing body.
    • The BTWC does not have a verification clause, nor does it have clearly laid down rules and procedures to guide research in this field.
    • Article 1 of the BTWC bans bio-weapons but research for medical and bio-defence purposes are allowed.
    • While this is understandable, the problem is that there is a thin line between bio-defence research and bio-weapons research. 
    • An Ad Hoc Group set up in 1994 to negotiate a Protocol to enhance the transparency of treaty-relevant biological facilities and activities to help deter violations of the BTWC submitted a report at the Fifth BTWC Review Conference in 2001 but was not accepted by the member states.

    Concerns for India

    • India is at a uniquely disadvantaged position in this area given poor disease surveillance, insufficient coordination among various government departments dealing with biosecurity issues, and the pathetic state of the healthcare system.
    • India has multiple institutions dealing with biosafety and biosecurity threats but there is no coordination among them.
    • Given the rising risk of diseases of zoonotic origin, the traditional ministry-wise separation might not be useful.
    •  India, with its porous borders and ill-trained border control institutions, will remain vulnerable to pathogens or dangerous biological organisms.

    Way forward

    • Pandemics have also highlighted that the traditional distinction at the international institutional level between biological weapons (a field governed by the BTWC) and diseases (governed by BTWC) may not be useful anymore.
    • There needs to be more conversation between health specialists and bio-weapons/defence specialists.
    • The November 2021 BTWC review conference must take stock of the advances in the field, address the thinning line between biotechnology research and bio-weapons research, and consider international measures for monitoring and verification.

    Consider the question “How synthetic biology poses security challenges for India and the rest of the world? Suggest the measures to deal with this challenge.” 

    Conclusion

    Covid-19 should serve as a wake-up call to give BTWC more teeth in dealing with the bio-weapons with a suitable institutional mechanism.

  • [pib] Seven Indian Navy Ships Deployed for Op Samudra Setu II

    Operation Samudra Setu II

    • In support of the nation’s fight against Covid-19 and as part of operation ‘Samudra Setu II’,  seven Indian Naval ships have been deployed for shipment of liquid medical oxygen-filled cryogenic containers and associated medical equipment from various countries.
    • Indian Navy also has the surge capability, to deploy more ships when the need arises to further nation’s fight against COVID-19.
    • It is pertinent that the ships are combat ready and capable of meeting any contingency in keeping with the attributes of versatility of sea power.

    Operation Samudra Setu I

    • It may be recalled that Operation Samudra Setu was launched last year by the Navy and around 4000 Indian citizens stranded in neighbouring countries, amidst COVID 19 outbreak, were successfully repatriated back to India.
  • [pib] DRDO conducts maiden trial of Python-5 Air to Air Missile

    Tejas adds Python-5 in its capacity

    • Tejas, India’s indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, added the 5th generation Python-5 Air-to-Air Missile (AAM) in its air-to-air weapons capability on April 27, 2021.
    • Trials were also aimed to validate enhanced capability of already integrated Derby Beyond Visual Range (BVR) AAM on Tejas.
    • The test firing at Goa completed a series of missile trials to validate its performance under extremely challenging scenarios.
    • The trials met all their planned objectives.
    • The missiles were fired from Tejas aircraft of Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) flown by Indian Air Force (IAF) Test pilots.
    • The successful conduct was made possible with years of hard work by the team of scientists, engineers and technicians from ADA and HAL-ARDC along with admirable support from CEMILAC, DG-AQA, IAF PMT, NPO (LCA Navy) and INS HANSA.
  • India third highest military spender in 2020: SIPRI

    What the SIPRI database says

    • India was the third largest military spender in the world in 2020, behind only the US and China.
    • The US accounted for 39 per cent of the money spent on military globally, China accounted for 13 per cent, and India accounted for 3.7 per cent of the globe’s share.
    • The US spent a total of $778 billion in 2020, China spent $252 billion and India’s military expenditure was $72.9 billion.
    • The United States’ military spending was 3.7 per cent of its GDP while the corresponding numbers for China and India were 1.7 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively.
    • The other top spenders included Russia with $61.7 billion, the UK at $59.2 billion, Saudi Arabia at $57.5 billion, followed by Germany and France at just under $53 billion each.

    Increase in spending in the year of pandemic

    •  SIPRI said that the total “global military expenditure rose to $1981 billion last year, an increase of 2.6 per cent in real terms from 2019.
    • 2.6 per cent increase in world military spending came in a year” when the global GDP shrank by 4.4 per cent largely due to the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic.
    • Military spending as a share of GDP—the military burden—reached a global average of 2.4 per cent in 2020, which is the biggest year-on-year rise in the military burden since the global financial and economic crisis in 2009.
  • Politics, geography and demography shape Naxal movement

    The article explains the issues with the two common themes adopted for explaining the Naxal movement in India.

    Two approaches to explain Naxal movement

    1) Root cause and alienation approach

    • The recent attack in and around Tekulagudem village in Sukma district demonstrates the threat posed by Maoists.
    • The post-incident analysis of such setbacks comes in two flavours.
    • The most popular theory amongst our intelligentsia and media is the root cause and alienation approach. 
    • This approach states that it is the failure of the Indian state to provide economic development and social justice to the tribals living in these areas that has fuelled the Naxal movement and sustained it for five decades.
    • As a prescription, a development-centric approach and negotiations are suggested as the way forward.

    Issues with root cause and alienation approach

    • There are several problems with this approach.
    • First, it ignores the ideological foundations of the movement, specifically its rejection of India’s Constitution and democracy.
    • Second, it fails to see that social and economic deprivation is not unique to the jungles of Chhattisgarh.
    • Third, it doesn’t account for the possibility that while alienation and deprivation may help in igniting the spark of revolution, once lit the flames draw oxygen from many sources.
    • Fourth, the role of external forces in fomenting and sustaining this movement is deliberately underplayed.
    • Fifth, the grubby ground reality of the praxis of revolution is conveniently swept under the carpet.
    • The organised extortion racket from all economic stakeholders in the Naxal-affected areas by our alienated revolutionaries seldom gets talked about.
    • Sixth, the extensive ideological, financial and logistical ecosystem that provides sustenance to these revolutionaries in the jungle is seldom acknowledged.

    2) Leadership issue

    • According to this view, our tactical failures against the Maoists are entirely due to the poor quality of leadership provided by the Indian Police Service.
    • The when, where, how of a setback simply don’t matter.
    • When in doubt, identify the first IPS officer in the chain of command and hoist him on the petard of tactical incompetence.
    • This view completely ignores the many successes of IPS leadership in counterinsurgency operations in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and most recently in Odisha.
    • Even in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir, where the Indian Army provides the backbone of the counterinsurgency grid, the police forces of the respective states and their IPS leadership play a crucial role in gathering intelligence and in executing operations.
    • So, the failures and setbacks in the Naxal areas of Chhattisgarh need to be placed in perspective.

    Way forward

    • The fact that the Indian state has adopted a broad policy of economic development, military restraint and gradual attrition and rejected indiscriminate violence in the Naxal theatre is the democratically prudent and morally just course of action.
    • This hasn’t dissuaded Maoist sympathisers from gaining international attention through relentless propaganda against our security forces.
    • However, such attacks also help in exposing their true nature and hardening public resolve against them.
    •  \We have enough examples of successful, police led CI Ops in our country.
    • Why we are not able to replicate these successes in Chhattisgarh is a matter of larger political issues, well beyond the narrow scope of operational tactics and individual lapses of police leadership.
    • Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas, make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.

    Consider the question “What are the factors that make Naxal movement a persistent threat to India’s internal security? ” 

    Conclusion

    Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas, make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.

  • Maoist Attack in Sukma

    The article deals with the counterinsurgency strategies to deal with the issues of left wing extremism in India

    Threat of left-wing extremism

    • The killing of 22 security personnel by Maoists serves as a grim reminder that left-wing insurgency continues to be one of the biggest internal security threats for the country.
    • In the past few years, Maoist violence seemed to have been on a downward spiral.
    • The figures associated with the key indicators of violence like the number of incidents also support the contention that “insurgency is on the downward spiral”.
    • But the attack should thus serve as a wake-up call to those who had begun to get complacent about the Maoist threat.

    Approach in counterinsurgency strategy

    • One school believes that given the Maoist insurgency posturing itself as a “people’s war”, the mandate is for a people-centric approach of “winning hearts and minds”.
    • Others argues that an enemy-centric approach predicated on kinetic operations is best suited for the Maoist insurgency, where the fear of the population seceding from India is remote.
    • The success of the erstwhile state of Andhra Pradesh in curbing the Maoist problem is often attributed to this enemy-centric approach.
    • However, there is robust scholarly work available that shows that the Andhra government based its counterintelligence strategy on a judicious mix of the enemy-centric and population-centric approaches.
    •  Andhra Pradesh had successfully implemented short-gestation-period developmental works in the Maoist-affected rural areas.
    • Moreover, the erstwhile state is also the first state to have a comprehensive surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy.
    • After the 2014 guidelines of the central government were brought out, many states have crafted attractive surrender and rehabilitation policies.
    • Another important question is whether the government should keep the option of talking to Maoists open.
    • The willingness to talk to rebel groups seems to incentivise insurgents and may demonstrate that violence pays.
    • But bringing an end to civil war invariably involves negotiating with the enemy.

    Way forward

    • Indian counterinsurgency has to work with a dual objective of defeating the insurgents militarily and fully quell the insurgent impulses.
    • This will need institutional overhauls.
    • In the last decade or so, insurgency-affected states have started to raise special forces on the lines of Greyhounds.
    • These forces are being given rigorous training in “counter-guerrilla” tactics and jungle warfare.
    •  Besides, the jungles around the interstate borders have always been the preferred hiding spaces for the Maoists.
    •  States must do more to synergise their efforts by launching coordinated operations, thereby denying Maoists any space for manoeuvrability.
    • These efforts need to be supplemented by well-crafted development schemes.
    • It is also important to segregate the population from the insurgents both operationally and ideologically.
    • The conflict over the distribution of resources can be mended with economic development.
    • But the bigger challenge would be to create a system where the tribal population feels that the government is representative, not repressive.
    • Opening negotiation channels and policies like surrender and rehabilitation can give such a representative sense to the rebels.

    Consider the question “Discuss the causes of left wing extremism in India. Suggest the way forward to deal with the issue.”

    Conclusion

    The government needs to follow these policies to end the challenge of left wing extremism from India.

  • A holistic review of internal security challenge and response to them is needed

    The article highlights the issues facing India’s internal security architecture and suggests the restructuring of roles and capacity building to address the challenge.

    Recent setback to internal security (IS) capability

    • The COMBING OPERATION by local and central police forces in the Tekulguda region of Bastar went terribly wrong and resulted in the death of 22 security personnel.
    • This tragic incident is a major and embarrassing setback to the IS (internal security) capability of India at many levels and highlights the challenge that LWE (left-wing extremism) continues to pose. 

    Strategic inadequacies

    • India has been dealing with three variants of the internal security challenge for decades.
    • These three are: 1) a proxy war and terrorism in Kashmir 2) sub-national separatist movements in the Northeast. 3) the Naxal-Maoist insurgency ( LWE) in the Red Corridor.
    • And these challenges have warranted different responses.
    • The first two strands have been reasonably contained.
    • LWE and the current Maoist movement has its genesis in poor governance, lack of development in the tribal belt and an oppressive/exploitative hierarchy of the state and society.
    •  In November 2005, then PM Manmohan Singh described the LWE challenge as the most serious security threat to India and exhorted the professionals to evolve appropriate responses.

    Need for restructuring

    • One of the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) report was the restructuring of the role and the tasks of the para-military forces particularly with reference to command and control and leadership functions.
    • This critical component of restructuring the leadership of the central police forces (in this case the CRPF and BSF) has not been addressed, much less redressed.
    • By training, the police officer is expected to be a competent Superintendent and to maintain law and order.
    • This is not the skill-set that is relevant when an officer has to “command” and lead his men into insurgency operations.
    • In the current scenario, barring a few exceptions, many of the senior police officers (IPS cadre) who are introduced into the central police forces at senior ranks have little or no platoon/battalion experience. 

    Consider the question “What are the factors making Left Wing Extremism such a persistent internal security problem for India? Suggest the measure to improve the internal security architecture in India.”

    Conclusion

    The political leadership of the country needs to act and complete the task of restructuring and capacity building to address India’s internal security challenge.

  • Exercise ‘Shantir Ogroshena’

    Indian Army team comprising officers, junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and soldiers from the Dogra regiment will participate in the multilateral exercise ‘Shantir Ogroshena’ (front runner of peace).

    The name very much suggests that the exercise is hosted by Bangladesh. But one must note, it’s a multilateral exercise.

    Shantir Ogroshena

    • Indian Army will participate in Multinational Military Exercise namely SHANTIR OGROSHENA -2021 in Bangladesh.
    • The nine days exercise will start on the 4th of this month to commemorate the birth centenary of Bangladesh Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and mark glorious 50 years of liberation.
    • The theme of the exercise is ‘Robust Peace Keeping Operations’. Military observers from the US, UK, Turkey, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Singapore will also be in attendance throughout the exercise.
    • Military observers from the USA, UK, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Singapore will also be in attendance throughout the exercise.
  • Joint Logistics Node (JLN)

    As part of measures to boost tri-service integration and resource optimisation, Chief of Defence Staff General has operationalised the third joint logistics node (JLN) in Mumbai.

    Must read:

    Explained: How to unify defence resources

    Joint Logistics Node (JLN)

    • The Joint Operations Division (JOD) under the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff pursued and enabled the establishment of the JLNs.
    • JLNs provide integrated logistics cover to the armed forces for their small arms ammunition, rations, fuel, general stores, civil hired transport, aviation clothing, spares and also engineering support to synergise their operational efforts.
    • The initiative would accrue advantages in terms of saving of manpower, economize utilization of resources, besides financial savings.
    • It is a very important first step in the direction of logistics integration of our three Services.
    • The government has operationalised the establishment of the JLNs in Mumbai, Guwahati and Port Blair.