GS Paper: GS3-24. Various Security Forces and Agencies and their Mandate.

The violent standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in Galwan Valley of Ladakh region has thrown the spotlight on high-altitude warfare and the challenges that troops face, particularly when advantageous positions on the heights are occupied by the other side.

In the clouds of war, one may recall the huge amount of casualties faced by the Indian Army compared to the Pakistani side (being at advantageous positions) during the Kargil War.

Try this question for mains:

Q. Discuss why high-altitude warfare is challenging. Also discuss about India’s preparedness for a long-term war.

How is high-altitude warfare fought?

• High-altitude warfare is fought keeping the terrain and weather in mind.
• The kind of infrastructure and training that the troops require for high-altitude warfare are key factors.
• The evolution of such warfare goes back a long way: European countries had mountain brigades in view of the kind of terrain prevalent in those countries.
• The harshness of the terrain calls for a specialised kind of training to prepare soldiers in terms of mindset and acclimatization.

How is India equipped in such warfare?

• Generally, India is considered a hub of mountain warfare skills since most of the country’s north and northeast requires such skills.
• Ladakh Scouts are considered the best in this kind of warfare.
• Mountain chop, a tactic involved in such warfare, evolved in India where the mountainous terrain is very difficult to scale.
• To begin with, the troops are imparted training in basic and advance training in mountaineering to make them equipped for mountain warfare.

Actual tactics involved

• The mindsets of the enemy sitting above are assessed. Taking stock of the entire situation, one needs to find out the easiest approaches.
• Especially when there are vertical cliffs, it is generally perceived that the enemy that has taken defensive positions will be less guarded from the side of difficult approaches.
• Basically, the most difficult approaches where the enemy is likely to give the least resistance need to be used efficiently.

What are the challenges involved in warfare in a high-altitude place like Galwan Valley?

• A big factor is who has taken defensive positions and who is sitting on higher ground.
• Once troops are sitting on high ground, it becomes very difficult to dislodge them from there.
• In a place like Galwan Valley, which is absolutely barren, there is not much hiding place.
• The soldier on high ground is absolutely stationary, which makes those on lower terrain easy targets; the enemy can pick them up one by one.
• Normally in mountain warfare, troops on lower ground use a combat ratio of 1:6, but in circumstances as in Galwan, it may go up to 1:10.

How to approach such situations?

• Generally, mountain warfare is fought using the period of darkness to reach the opposing army, engage and overpower them before the first light of day.
• In case troops do not have the capabilities, fitness or strategies to do so before dawn, then it is a lost cause.
• But without adequate trained troops who are well-versed with the terrain and are properly acclimatized, it is not an easy game.

What are the other challenges faced by soldiers in high altitudes?

• The first major factor is acclimatization since the oxygen supply reduces drastically.
• Next, the load-carrying capacity of individuals reduces drastically.
• Things move very slowly in the mountains and mobilization of troops consumes time.
• Thus, time and place need to be kept on top priority when deciding where the troops have to be stationed and how they have to be mobilized.

What are the logistical challenges in this kind of warfare?

• One major challenge is that weapons jam, particularly in high-altitude areas.
• When a soldier is at a height of 17,000 ft or above, it is very cold, and he needs to grease the weapons and clean the barrels at least once a week to ensure they function efficiently.
• But at the time of combat, this becomes difficult.
• Vehicles do not start when fuel jams. If the fuel is diesel, it won’t ignite unless it is mixed with thinners or other chemicals to make them thin enough to fire the engine.

Ensuring proper reinforcement

• In Galwan, which is an extremely tactical area and strategically important, reinforcement plays a vital role, particularly when the Indian troops are not in a position of advantage.
• For communication equipment, troops need to carry more batteries because they drain very quickly at high altitude.
• While a battery tends to last for 24 hours in the plains, it will drain in 1-2 hours in these severely cold areas.
• Transport animals such as mules need to be used to maintain adequate supplies, which is not an easy task. Weather constraints play a major factor.

Foundation Stone for a Missile Park “AGNEEPRASTHA” was recently laid at INS Kalinga, Vizag.

Caution: Agneeprastha is a missile park of the eastern naval command of the Indian Navy. It has nothing to do with the Agni missiles.

Missile Park ‘Agneeprastha’

• ‘Agneeprastha’ aims to capture glimpses of Missile History of INS Kalinga since 1981 till date.
• The Missile Park has been set up with a replica of missiles and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) that showcase the evolution of missiles handled by the unit.
• The exhibits have been created from scrap / obsolete inventory which have been reconditioned in-house.
• The main attraction is P-70 ‘Ametist’, an underwater launched anti-ship missile from the arsenal of the old ‘Chakra’ (Charlie-1 submarine) which was in service with IN during 1988-91.
• It will also provide a one-stop arena for motivation and stimulation of inquisitive minds regarding the missiles and related technologies, from school children to naval personnel and their families.

External dependence for defence equipment could turn out to be the chink in the armour of any country, literally. As one of the major importer of defence equipment, India has been struggling to wean itself away from this vulnerability. This article discusses the recent changes announced by the finance minister in defence procurement and manufacturing policy. So, what are the changes and how will these changes benefit us? Read to know more…

Promoting self-reliance: Addressing strategic and national security concern

• Recently the Finance Minister announced measures to promote self-reliance in defence production.
• This address long-standing strategic and national security concerns about the extent of India’s external dependence for its defence-preparedness.
• For most of the past decade, India had the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest arms importer.
• India accounted for about 12% of global arms imports.
• Saudi Arabia jumped to first place in 2018 and 2019, but India still takes over 9% of global imports.
• This external dependence for weapons, spares and, in some cases, even ammunition creates vulnerabilities during military crises.
• COVID-19 has, once again, focused minds on the impact of supply chain disruptions on both civil and defence sectors.
• With its security environment, its great power ambitions and its technological capacities, India should have a robust defence manufacturing capacity.
• New Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) 2020 are under formulation.
• We now have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) tasked with promoting indigenous equipment in the armed forces.

Following are some of the moves declared by the government and their significance for the country

1. Encouraging  private manufacturers

• The decision i) to notify a list of weapons systems for sourcing entirely from Indian manufacturers, ii) the promise to progressively expand this list iii) a separate Budget provision for domestic capital procurement- will encourage our private defence manufacturers.
• The research capacities, technological skills and quality commitment of our private defence manufacturer are often better appreciated by foreign clients for whom they are subcontractors.
• There is a range of platforms and subsystems, developed in India and qualified in trials, some of which face hurdles to their induction by our armed forces because of foreign competition.
• These include missile systems such as Akash and Nag, the Light Combat Aircraft and the Light Combat Helicopter, artillery guns, radars, electronic warfare systems and armoured vehicles.

2. Time-bound procurement

• The government has promised i) a time-bound defence procurement process, ii) overhauling trial and testing procedures iii) establishing a professional project management unit.
• To understand the significance of the above measures consider the fact below-
• Over the past five years, the Indian government has approved over 200 defence acquisition proposals, valued at over ₹4 trillion.
• But most are still in relatively early stages of processing.
• Of course, this delay now provides the opportunity to re-examine them and to prioritise those with indigenous research and development.
• The CDS could also examine them from a tri-service angle, to avoid redundancy of capacities across the services.

3. Corporatisation of Ordnance Factory Board

• Over the decades, our ordnance factories have been the backbone of indigenous supplies to our armed forces.
• Their structure, work culture and product range now need to be responsive to technology and quality demands of modern armed forces.
• Corporatisation, including public listing of some units, ensures a more efficient interface of the manufacturer with the designer and end-user.
• The factories would be better integrated into the larger defence manufacturing ecosystem.

4. Realistic specifications of desired weapon platforms

• Our defence planners will frame “realistic” specifications for their desired weapons platforms.
• These specifications should be based on the requirements of India’s defence strategy, rather than on aspirational considerations which, the Finance Minister said, may lead to a single foreign vendor.
• It is also imperative that when we import weapon systems, we should plan for the ammunitions and spares for them to be eventually manufactured in India.
• This will ensure that we are not driven to seek urgent replenishments from abroad during crises.
• The same goes for repair, maintenance and overhaul facilities and, at the next level, the upgrade of weapons platforms.

5. FDI limit increased to 74% by automatic route

• The liberalisation of foreign direct investment in defence manufacturing, raising the limit under the automatic route to 74%, should open the door to more joint ventures of foreign and Indian companies for defence manufacturing in India.
• It would also sustain domestic industrial activity in the research, design and manufacture of systems and sub-systems.
• Our companies would now get the opportunity to directly contribute to Indian defence manufacturing.

Way forward

• The development of a thriving indigenous defence industry needs an overhaul of existing regulations and practices.
• A long-term integrated perspective plan of the requirements of the armed forces should give industry a clear picture of future requirements.
• DPP 2020 should incorporate guidelines to promote forward-looking strategic partnerships between Indian and foreign companies.
• This partnership should be with a view to achieving indigenisation over a period of time for even sophisticated platforms.
• Cost evaluation has to evolve from mechanical application of the L1 (lowest financial bid) principle to prioritising indigenous content.
• The definition of indigenisation itself needs to privilege technology over value or volume.
• Investment, Indian or foreign, will be viable only if the door to defence exports is opened, with a transparent policy.
• To give private industry a level playing field for developing defence technologies, conflicts of interest, created by the role of our Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) as the government’s sole adviser, developer and evaluator of technologies have to be addressed.

Consider the question, “India has been aspiring to reduce its external dependence for defence equipment but has not succeeded in doing so. Examine the challenges in the way of self-sufficiency in this area. How effective will be the recent policy changes made in meeting the goal?”

Conclusion

The government has rightly clarified that self-reliance would not be taken to overzealous extremes. The thrust for indigenous research and development will coexist with the import of cutting-edge military technologies to obviate near-term defence vulnerabilities. Of the key components of any major reform — money, method and mindset — mindset is the most critical and the most intractable. It takes a crisis to change it.

 

 

 

 

The BSF came into being in the wake of the 1965 India-Pakistan war. So, its ‘innate’ tasks involves both wartime and peacetime roles. This article is written by a retired IPS officer who has been ADG of BSF.  Our aim is to provide you with on-ground experience of issues in this security force. Focus of the article is on the preparedness of the BSF for its wartime role. From the exam perspective, focus on issues and possible solutions.

Role of BSF

• Officially, its role is defined in expansive terms like ‘security of the border of India and matters connected therewith’.
• The tasks of BSF are divided into peacetime and wartime.
• 1) The peacetime tasks include preventing smuggling and any other illegal activity, and unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India, etc.
• 2) The wartime tasks of the BSF include holding ground in less threatened sectors, etc.

Unpreparedness in wartime role

• The BSF, in terms of its defences, equipment, weaponry and training, is not at all prepared for its wartime role.
• This means that in the eventuality of any military assault, our ‘first line of defence’ would simply crumble.
• Falling back on army’s mobilizations for a counterattack may take up to several days.
• Retreat and loss of territory in this period is a possible scenario.
• The report titled ‘Border Security: Capacity Building and Institutions’ of the department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, submitted to the Rajya Sabha on April 11, 2017:
• Does not talk about the wartime role of the BSF even once.
• It talks only of its peacetime role including fencing, floodlights and roads along the borders, development of integrated check posts, and construction of strategic roads.

The fallacy of infantry attack

• The founders of the BSF, including the committee of secretaries, had a wrong presumption that the assault on the ‘first line of defence’ will be by the enemy’s ‘exposed’ infantry.
• This assault, they imagined, would be repulsed by BSF soldiers wielding similar arms.
• But that presumption is a folly.
•  Now, as a rule of thumb, infantry assault, whether supported by armour or not, or even a purely armour assault on any position is preceded by as heavy and as accurate artillery bombardment as possible.
• If the attacking nation could afford it, such as the US during the 1991 Gulf War the bombardment could be aerial also.

Unprepared to withstand shelling

• Our ‘first line of defence’ does not have any defensive structures or fortifications that could withstand artillery bombardment even for a minute.
• According to photographs available in the public domain, most BSF observation posts on the international border are ramshackle structures of tin sheets and sandbags erected on small mounds of earth.
• Adding to that, the mounds are in full view of the enemy and their locations are known to them to the last centimetre.

 Uninspiring weaponry

• The photographs of the 105 mm Indian Field Gun and their staple, the 7.62 mm medium machine gun are available in public domain.
• The 105 mm Indian Field Guns have been placed under the operational command of the army, and BSF would not be able to use them when the enemy makes first contact with them.
• That leaves them with their 51 mm and 81 mm mortars.
• The 51mm mortar, with just 109 grams of explosive per shell and a maximum range of  850 m is as good as useless in a war.
• The 81 mm mortar bomb with an explosive charge of 750 grams has a maximum range of 6000 m.
• The enemy artillery would in any case be firing from way beyond that range, thereby making effective retaliation through mortars impossible.
• Even when enemy IFV/APC or armour would come closer and in range, the smooth-bore 81 mm mortar is inherently not accurate enough to hit a moving vehicle. (smoothness of bore reduces accuracy)
• Even the NATO rifled 120 mm mortars have a CEP (circular error probable) of 136 m.
• As for the 7.62 mm medium machinegun, it is an anti-personnel weapon with the armour penetration of the M80 bullet being just 3 mm at 500m.
• That makes it useless against even lightly armoured vehicles.
• This means that the BSF outposts will not be able to deliver any effective fire at all on an enemy assault.

IPS leadership issue

• Since the BSF’s inception, the force’s Indian Police Service (IPS) leadership has not focused on the wartime role of the BSF.
• The IPS officers in top positions in the BSF lack knowledge of military science that could enable them to appreciate and address the wartime role.

Way forward

•  The only defence feasible against artillery bombardment is to go sub-surface—in the form of deep concrete dugouts and fire trenches.
• Then we also need elaborate anti-tank ditches.
• To deliver effective fire on enemy armoured and lightly armoured vehicles, and infantry operating under their protection, the BSF needs weapons which carry enough explosive payloads to tackle armour, both light and heavy.
• Portability, manoeuvrability and accuracy are important considerations in the ‘first line of defence’ attacking armour.
• A veritable battery of ATGMs and cheaper yet accurate options like the 80 mm Breda Folgore RCL are available.
• Using them effectively would require defensive fighting positions interconnected by communication trenches.
• Research needs to be done to mount weapons like the Shipunov 2A42 30 mm autocannon on platforms faster than the BMP-2.
• Similarly, MMGs/GPMGs need mobile platforms like Humvees to increase their survivability as well as effectivity.

Consider the question “The BSF, which is often hailed as India’s ‘first line of defence’ has tasked with wartime and peacetime roles. Though it is quite adept in peacetime role, its wartime preparedness needs an overhaul. Comment.”

Conclusion

These issues with the BSF could result in a  situation where there is every possibility of rout and retreat in the early days of the war. This issue needs to be urgently addressed by the government.