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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Cooperative security in Persian Gulf littoral and Implications for India

    This article analyses the security environment in the Gulf countries. Their common characteristic as being the oil producers and similarity in their social and security problems are also explained in detail in this article. And all this has implications for India. So, what are the implications? Read to know…

    Let’s look at the importance of countries surrounding Persian Gulf

    • The United Nations defines this body of water as the Persian Gulf.
    • The lands around it are shared by eight countries: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    • All are the members of the UN.
    • There is a commonality of interest among them in being major producers of crude oil and natural gas.
    • And thereby contribute critically to the global economy and to their own prosperity.
    • This has added to their geopolitical significance.
    • At the same time, turbulence has often characterised their inter se political relations.
    Arab Countries surrounding Persian Gulf

    Power play and security of the region

    • For eight decades prior to 1970, this body of water was a closely guarded British lake, administered in good measure by imperial civil servants from India.
    • When that era ended, regional players sought to assert themselves.
    • Imperatives of rivalry and cooperation became evident and, as a United States State Department report put it in 1973, ‘The upshot of all these cross currents is that the logic of Saudi-Iranian cooperation is being undercut by psychological, nationalistic, and prestige factors, which are likely to persist for a long time.’
    • The Nixon and the Carter Doctrines were the logical outcomes to ensure American hegemony.
    • An early effort for collective security, attempted in a conference in Muscat in 1975, was thwarted by Baathist Iraq.
    • The Iranian Revolution put an end to the Twin Pillar approach and disturbed the strategic balance.
    • The Iraq-Iran War enhanced U.S. interests and role.
    • Many moons and much bloodshed later, it was left to the Security Council through Resolution 598 (1987) to explore ‘measures to enhance the security and stability in the region’.

    Gulf regional security framework: Some questions

    • Any framework for stability and security thus needs to answer a set of questions:
    • Security for whom, by whom, against whom, for what purpose?
    • Is the requirement in local, regional or global terms?
    • Does it require an extra-regional agency?
    • Given the historical context, one recalls a Saudi scholar’s remark in the 1990s that ‘Gulf regional security was an external issue long before it was an issue among the Gulf States themselves.’

    What should be the ingredients of a  regional security framework?

    • The essential ingredients of such a framework would thus be to ensure: 1) conditions of peace and stability in individual littoral states; 2) freedom to all states of the Gulf littoral to exploit their hydrocarbon and other natural resources and export them; 3) freedom of commercial shipping in international waters of the Persian Gulf 4)freedom of access to, and outlet from, Gulf waters through the Strait of Hormuz; 5) prevention of conflict that may impinge on the freedom of trade and shipping and 6)prevention of emergence of conditions that may impinge on any of these considerations.
    • Could such a framework be self-sustaining or require external guarantees for its operational success?
    • If the latter, what should its parameters be?

    Misunderstanding the role great powers can play

    • Statesmen often confuse great power with total power and great responsibility with total responsibility.
    • The war in Iraq and its aftermath testify to it.
    • The U.S. effort to ‘contain’ the Iranian revolutionary forces, supplemented by the effort of the Arab states of the littoral (except Iraq)  GCC initially met with success in some functional fields and a lack of it in its wider objectives.

    The turbulent nature of US-Iran relations

    • In the meantime, geopolitical factors and conflicts elsewhere in the West Asian region — Yemen, Syria, Libya — aggravated global and regional relationships.
    • And it hampered a modus vivendi in U.S.-Iran relations that was to be premised on the multilateral agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme agreed to by western powers and the Obama Administration.
    • But it was disowned by U.S. President Donald Trump whose strident policies have taken the region to the brink of armed conflict.

    Perception of declining U.S. commitment to sub-regional security

    • Perceptions of declining U.S. commitment to sub-regional security have been articulated in recent months amid hints of changing priorities.
    • This is reported to have caused disquiet in some, perhaps all, members of the GCC, the hub of whose security concern remains pivoted on an Iranian threat (political and ideological rather than territorial).
    • And American insurance to deter it based on a convergence of interests in which oil, trade, arms purchases, etc have a role along with wider U.S. regional and global determinants.
    • It is evident that a common GCC threat perception has not evolved over time.
    • It has been hampered by the emergence of conflicting tactical and strategic interests and subjective considerations.
    • The current divisions within the organisation are therefore here to stay.
    • These have been aggravated by 1)the global economic crisis, 2) the immediate and longer term impact of COVID-19 on regional economies, 3) the problems in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 4) and the decline in oil prices.

    Let’s look at the emerging trends in the region

    • One credible assessment suggests that in the emerging shape of the region.
    • 1) Saudi Arabia is a fading power.
    • 2) UAE, Qatar and Iran are emerging as the new regional leaders.
    • 3) Oman and Iraq will have to struggle to retain their sovereign identities.
    • 4)The GCC is effectively ended, and OPEC is becoming irrelevant as oil policy moves to a tripartite global condominium.
    • None of this will necessarily happen overnight and external intervention could interfere in unexpected ways.
    • But it is fair to say that the Persian Gulf as we have known for at least three generations is in the midst of a fundamental transformation.

    Improvement relations between Arab states and Iran

    • With the Arab League entombed and the GCC on life-support system, the Arab states of this sub-region are left to individual devices to explore working arrangements with Iraq and Iran.
    • The imperatives for these are different but movement on both is discernible.
    • With Iran in particular and notwithstanding the animosities of the past, pragmatic approaches of recent months seem to bear fruit.
    • Oman has always kept its lines of communication with Iran open.
    • Kuwait and Qatar had done likewise but in a quieter vein.
    • And now the UAE has initiated pragmatic arrangements.
    • These could set the stage for a wider dialogue.
    • Both Iran and the GCC states would benefit from a formal commitment to an arrangement incorporating the six points listed above.
    • So would every outside nation that has trading and economic interests in the Gulf. This could be sanctified by a global convention.
    • Record shows that the alternative of exclusive security arrangements promotes armament drives, enhances insecurity and aggravates regional tensions.
    • It unavoidably opens the door for Great Power interference.

    Ties with India and impact on its strategic interests

    • Locating the Persian Gulf littoral with reference to India is an exercise in geography and history.
    • The distance from Mumbai to Basra is 1,526 nautical miles and Bander Abbas and Dubai are in a radius of 1,000 nautical miles.
    • The bilateral relationship, economic and political, with the GCC has blossomed in recent years.
    • The governments are India-friendly and Indian-friendly and appreciate the benefits of a wide-ranging relationship.
    • This is well reflected in the bilateral trade of around $121 billion and remittances of $49 billion from a workforce of over nine million.
    • GCC suppliers account for around 34% of our crude imports and national oil companies in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi are partners in a $44 billion investment in the giant Ratnagiri oil refinery.
    • In addition, Saudi Aramco is reported to take a 20% stake in Reliance oil-to-chemicals business.
    • The current adverse impact of the pandemic on our economic relations with the GCC countries has now become a matter of concern.

    India’s relationship with Iran

    • The relationship with Iran, the complex at all times and more so recently on account of overt American pressure, has economic potential and geopolitical relevance on account of its actual or alleged role in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    • Iran also neighbours Turkey and some countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region.
    • Its size, politico-technological potential and economic resources, cannot be wished away, regionally and globally, but can be harnessed for wider good.

    Consider the question “Stability and security of the Persian Gulf region has wider consequences for Indians strategic concerns. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Indian interests would be best served if this stability is ensured through cooperative security since the alternative — of competitive security options — cannot ensure durable peace.

  • Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    As part of Mission SAGAR, INS Kesari has entered Port Victoria, Seychelles to providing assistance in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Try this question from CSP 2017:

    Q. Which of the following is geographically closest to Great Nicobar?

    (a) Sumatra

    (b) Borneo

    (c) Java

    (d) Sri Lanka

    Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    • SAGAR is a term coined by PM Modi in 2015 during his Mauritius visit with a focus on the blue economy.
    • It is a maritime initiative which gives priority to the Indian Ocean region for ensuring peace, stability and prosperity of India in the Indian Ocean region.
    • The goal is to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other`s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.
    • It is in line with the principles of the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

    Back2Basics: IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)

    • Established in 1997 in Ebene Cyber City, Mauritius.
    • First established as Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in Mauritius on March 1995 and formally launched in 1997 by the conclusion of a multilateral treaty known as the Charter of the IORA for Regional Cooperation.
    • It is based on the principles of Open Regionalism for strengthening Economic Cooperation particularly on Trade Facilitation and Investment, Promotion as well as Social Development of the region.

  • The China conundrum

    India-China border issue and the latest standoff in Ladakh has forced India to consider the lasting solution to the problem. This article explains China’s anti-India strategy. And options available with India in the face of aggression are also considered.

    LAC: the reason for frequent face-offs

    • The debate has persisted whether it was China’s National Highway 219 cutting across Aksai Chin or Nehru’s “forward policy” which constituted the actual reason for the Sino-Indian border-conflict of 1962.
    • After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on November 20, troops of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew 20 kms behind what China described as the “line of actual control” (LAC).
    • The LAC generally conformed to the British-negotiated McMahon Line.
    • In the west, the Chinese stuck to their 1959 claim-line in Ladakh, retaining physical control of the 14,700 sq km Aksai Chin.
    • The 1962 ceasefire line became the de facto Sino-Indian border.
    • But in a bizarre reality, both sides visualised their own version of the LAC, but neither marked it on the ground; nor were maps exchanged.
    • This has inevitably led to frequent face-offs.

    So, what were the steps taken the resolve the border issue after 1962?

    • Post-conflict, it is customary for belligerents to undertake early negotiations, in order to establish stable peace and eliminate the casus belli.
    • Strangely, in the Sino-Indian context, it took 25 years and a serious military confrontation in 1987 to trigger a dialogue.
    • The dialogue led the two countries to sign the first-ever Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) in 1993.
    • Indian diplomats claim that this has helped maintain “mutual and equal security”, while the bilateral relationship has progressed in other spheres.
    • And yet, the failure to negotiate a boundary settlement after 22 meetings of special representatives of the two countries cannot be seen as anything but a failure of statesmanship and diplomacy.

    Now, let’s analyse China’s anti-India strategy and how LAC and Pakistan problem fits into it

    • China’s post-civil war leadership had conceived an early vision of the country’s future.
    • Ambitious and realist in scope, this strategy visualised China attaining, in the fullness of time, great-power status and acquiring a nuclear-arsenal.
    • Since the vision saw no room for an Asian rival, neutralising India became a priority.
    • It was for this specific purpose, that Pakistan was enlisted in 1963 as a partner.
    • In China’s anti-India strategy, Pakistan has played an invaluable role by sustaining a “hot” border and holding out the threat of a two-front war.
    • In China’s grand-strategy, an undefined LAC has become a vital instrumentality to embarrass and keep India off-balance through periodic transgressions.
    • These pre-meditated “land-grabs”, blunt messages of intimidation and dominance, also constitute a political “pressure-point” for New Delhi.

    Possibility of escalation into shooting war

    • While Indian troops have, so far, shown courage and restraint in these ridiculous brawls with the PLA.
    • But there is no guarantee that in a future melee, a punch on the nose will not invite a bullet in response.
    • In such circumstances, rapid escalation into a “shooting-war” cannot be ruled out.
    • Thereafter, should either side face a major military set-back, resort to nuclear “first-use” would pose a serious temptation.

    What are the options available with India?

    • For reasons of national security as well as self-respect, India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to respond in kind.
    • Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are circumscribed by the asymmetry in comprehensive national power, resort must be sought in realpolitik.
    • According to theorist Kenneth Waltz, just as nature abhors a vacuum, international politics abhors an imbalance of power, and when faced with hegemonic threats, states must seek security in one of three options: 1) Increase their own strength, 2) ally with others to restore power-balance, 3) as a last resort, jump on the hegemon’s bandwagon.

    India’s decision-makers can start by posing this question to the military: “For how long do you have the wherewithal to sustain a combat against two adversaries simultaneously?” Depending on the response, they can consider the following 2 options.

    1. Alliance with the USA

    • Nehru, when faced with an aggressive China in 1962, asked support from the USA.
    •  Indira Gandhi in the run-up to the 1971 war with Pakistan asked support from the USSR.
    • Both had no qualms of jettisoning the shibboleth of “non-alignment” and seeking support from the USA and USSR respectively.
    • Today, India has greater freedom of action and many options to restore the balance of power vis-à-vis China.
    • Xi Jinping has opened multiple fronts — apart from the COVID-19 controversy — across the South China Sea, South East Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Asia.
    • Donald Trump is burning his bridges with China.
    • In the world of realpolitik, self-interest trumps all and India must find friends where it can.
    • Given China’s vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean and the real possibility of America losing its strategic foothold in Diego Garcia, India has a great deal to offer as a friend, partner or even an ally; with or without the Quad.

    2. Accommodation with China

    •  If ideological or other reasons preclude the building of a power-balancing alliance, coming to an honourable accommodation with China remains a pragmatic option.
    • Zhou Enlai’s proposal of 1960 — repeated by Deng Xiaoping in 1982 — is worth re-examining in the harsh light of reality.
    • The price of finding a modus vivendi [an arrangement or agreement allowing conflicting parties to coexist peacefully]for the Sino-Indian border dispute may be worth paying if it neutralises two adversaries at one stroke and buys lasting peace.

    Consider the question “In the harsh light of reality and faced with aggression from its neighbour, India has to ally with other powers to restore the balance of power. Examine.”

    Conclusion

    Neither option will be easy to “sell”. However, India cannot afford to continue with the current situation for long and must choose one of the options to end the to find the solution.

  • India should focus on Middle powers

    Let’s play a game. India and this country are both members of Commonwealth of nations. Cricket, English language and Nuclear relations is something common to both of us. In fact, India was this nation’s eighth-largest trading partner and fifth-largest export market in 2018-19. The Indian diaspora in this country is now third largest and fastest growing diaspora. Any guesses?

    What is a middle power?

    In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state that is not a great power nor a superpower, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition. The concept of the “middle power” dates back to the origins of the European state system.

    Plugging the big gap in India’s diplomatic tradition

    • India remains preoccupied with the perennial challenges in its neighbourhood, resulting in missing out on the opportunities for productive partnerships with the middle powers.
    • Thursday’s virtual summit between Prime Minister of India and the Australian premier, Scott Morrison, is an important part of Delhi’s current diplomatic effort to plug that big gap in India’s diplomatic tradition.

    Let’s see what opportunities Australia holds for India

    • Economic weight: With a GDP of more than US$1.4 trillion, Australia is the 13th largest economy in the world, following closely behind Russia which stands at $1.6 trillion.
    • Australia is rich in natural resources that India’s growing economy needs.
    • It also has huge reservoirs of strength in higher education, scientific and technological research.
    •  Its armed forces, hardened by international combat, are widely respected.
    • Canberra’s intelligence establishment is valued in many parts of the world.
    • Australia has deep economic, political and security connections with the ASEAN and a strategic partnership with one of the leading non-aligned nations, Indonesia.
    • Canberra has a little “sphere of influence” of its own — in the South Pacific (now under threat from Chinese penetration).
    • All these Australian strengths should be of interest and value to India.
    • Jawaharlal Nehru, believed Australia is a natural part of Asia and invited it to participate in the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947, a few months before independence.

    India’s nuclear test and it’s repercussions

    • A political dust-up between Delhi and Canberra in the wake of India’s nuclear tests in 1998 complicated the possibilities that the end of the Cold War opened up.
    • But since 2000, Canberra has taken consistent political initiative to advance ties with India by resolving the nuclear difference and expanding the template of engagement.

    Comparing India and China’s approach to Middle powers

    • A gap of nearly three decades between Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Australia in 1986 and Modi’s trip in 2014 only underlines how short-sighted India’s neglect of Australia has been.
    • It was exactly in these years that China transformed its relationship with Australia.
    • Delhi’s temptation to judge nations on the basis of their alignments with other powers stands in contrast to Beijing.
    • Beijing puts interests above ideology, promotes interdependence with a targeted middle power, turns it into political influence and tries to weaken its alignment with the rival powers.

    Growing India-Australia relations

    •  The Indian diaspora — now estimated at nearly 7,00,000— is the fastest growing in Australia and has become an unexpected positive factor in bilateral relations.
    • Common membership of many groupings like the G-20, East Asia Summit, IORA, and the Quad has increased the possibilities for diplomatic cooperation on regional and global issues.
    • Other host of emerging issues — from reforming the World Health Organisation to 5G technology and from strengthening the international solar alliance to building resilience against climate change and disasters — can lend to intensive bilateral political and institutional engagement.

    Geopolitics and Security cooperation

    • The geopolitical churn in the Indo-Pacific, growing Chinese assertiveness and the uncertain US political trajectory open space for security cooperation.
    • Over the last few years, defence engagement between the two countries has grown.
    • Defence engagement is likely to be capped by a military logistics support agreement to be unveiled at the summit.
    • For future, there is a need from both security establishments to develop strategic coordination in the various sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific littoral.

    Eastern Indian Ocean: top priority

    • The eastern Indian Ocean that lies between the shores of peninsular India and the west coast of Australia ought to be the top priority.
    • This is where Delhi and Canberra can initiate a full range of joint activities.
    • Joint activities should include maritime domain awareness, development of strategically located islands and marine scientific research.

    Seeking trilateral cooperation with Indonesia

    • The sea lines of communication between the Indian and Pacific oceans run through the Indonesian archipelago.
    • Given the shared political commitment to the Indo-Pacific idea between Delhi, Jakarta and Canberra and the growing pressures on them to secure their shared waters, Modi and Morrison must seek trilateral maritime and naval cooperation with Indonesia.

    Three other natural partners to expand cooperation

    • Besides Indonesia, three other powers present themselves as natural partners for India and Australia — Japan, France and Britain.
    • Tokyo has close ties with both Delhi and Canberra.
    • Their current trilateral dialogue can be expanded from the diplomatic level to practical maritime cooperation on the ground.
    • France is a resident power with territories in the Western Indian Ocean and the South Pacific.
    • Paris and Canberra are eager to develop a trilateral arrangement with Delhi that will supplement the bilateral cooperation among the three nations.

    Engagement between India & EPDA

    • There is the less discussed role of Britain, which wants to return to the oriental seas.
    • In the east, Britain continues to lead the so-called Five Power Defence Arrangement set up back in 1971, after Britain pulled back most of its forces from the East of Suez.
    • The FPDA brings together the armed forces of the UK, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand.
    • Modi and Morrison must explore the possibilities for engagement between India and the FPDA.

    Try a question:

    India and Australia nuclear deal was a major breakthrough in the bilateral relation. But this bilateral partnership has so much more potential in other areas. Critically examine.

    Conclusion

    It is only by building a series of overlapping bilateral and minilateral platforms for regional security cooperation that Delhi and Canberra can limit the dangers of the growing geopolitical imbalance in the Indo-Pacific.

  • Dilemma for Delhi in Ladakh standoff

    Though the rest of the world is preoccupied with Covid pandemic, China is busy in raising tension over border issues with its neighbour-India. What explains such actions by China? And timing selected by China has also puzzled many. India, on its part, faces a dilemma. This article dissects the various issues related to the standoff and explains the options available with India to deal with the Chinese intimidation.

    Why the latest transgression by PLA is unprecedented?

    • There are around 400 transgressions/faceoffs each year on an average along the LAC.
    • But the recent spate of territorial transgressions by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is unprecedented in its scope and manner.
    • Even as independent accounts point out that Chinese troops are yet to withdraw from the transgressed territories and restore status quo ante.
    • Those territories are traditionally considered by both sides to be on the Indian side of the LAC.
    • Chinese officials have gone ahead and stated that the “Situation in China-India border is overall stable & controllable”.

    What this move by China signals?

    • The Indian government is left with two basic choices: 1) accept territorial loss as a fait accompli or 2)  force or negotiate a reversal to status quo ante, unless of course the PLA unilaterally withdraws.
    • Either way, China’s growing territorial aggression on the LAC signals the end of Beijing’s peaceful rise and its traditional desire to maintain regional status quo with India.
    • China under its President, Xi Jinping, unequivocally seeks to demonstrate that it is the preponderant power in the region. 

    Let’s analyse the aggression

    • While the timing could be explained by the global political distraction caused by COVID-19.
    • And also the international pressure on China (including by India) to come clean on the origins of the novel coronavirus could have played the role.
    • But the proximate causes could be several. Consider the following-

    1. Statement by India on Aksai Chin

    • For one, New Delhi’s terse statements about Aksai Chin following the Jammu and Kashmir reorganisation in August last year had not gone down well with Beijing.
    • While not many in India believe that New Delhi was serious about getting back Aksai Chin from Chinese control, Beijing may have viewed it as India upping the ante.
    • More pertinently, in a clear departure from the past, New Delhi has been carrying out the construction of infrastructural projects along the LAC — a long overdue activity — which is something that seems to have made China uneasy.

    2. Broader context of long-term geopolitical world view

    • The Chinese angle to the J&K conundrum deserves more attention here.
    • The aggression must also be viewed in the broader context of a long-term geopolitical world view China has for the region. Consider the following in this regard-
    • 1) China’s China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connectivity to Pakistan through the Karakoram and New Delhi’s criticism of it.
    • 2) The reported presence of PLA troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).
    • 3) India’s new-found activism on Aksai Chin.
    • 4) The PLA’s incursions into areas in eastern Ladakh.

    3. Strategic goals

    • It is equally important to appreciate the larger Chinese strategic calculations behind its recent spate of aggressions.
    • Having given up its traditional slogan of ‘peaceful rise’, China, under Mr. Xi, is beginning to assert itself as the next superpower.
    • Over the years, Beijing has perhaps realised that India is not keen on toeing the Chinese line in the region.
    • So this is Beijing sending a message to New Delhi to fall in line.
    • A message that will not go unnoticed in the smaller capitals around China — from Colombo to Kathmandu to Hanoi.

    4. Political message

    • Given that China is currently engaged in what many analysts are describing as a new cold war with the United States, in the middle of a crackdown in Hong Kong along with fighting COVID-19 at home, one would not have expected the Chinese leadership to open another front.
    • And yet, by opening a limited military front with India on the LAC, China is signalling the U.S. that it can handle pressure.
    •  And telling India that it has the political and military wherewithal to put pressure on New Delhi notwithstanding its other preoccupations.

    Why limited scope confrontation is cost-effective and preferred option by China?

    • China’s limited scope military expeditions on the long-contested border is cost effective for the PLA.
    • This is because the ever-growing conventional military superiority that it enjoys with India.
    • Moreover, because limited fights or smaller land grabs may not provoke an all-out confrontation or nuclear use.
    • The side with conventional superiority and more border infrastructure would likely carry the day.

    India’s China dilemma

    • Picking a direct fight with India which might lead to an undesirable military escalation with India does not suit Beijing’s interests.
    • But carrying out minor military expeditions with the objective of inflicting small-scale military defeats on India is precisely what would suit the Chinese political and military leadership.
    • They are cost effective, less escalatory, and the message gets conveyed.
    • More so, India’s military response would depend a great deal on how far the regime in New Delhi is willing to acknowledge such territorial losses due to domestic political constraints.
    • If New Delhi acknowledges loss of territory, it would have to regain it, but doing so vis-à-vis a conventionally superior power would not be easy.
    • Put differently, growing conventional imbalance and domestic political calculations could prompt New Delhi to overlook minor territorial losses on the LAC.
    • But let us be clear: the more New Delhi overlooks them, the more Beijing would be tempted to repeat them.
    • These considerations lie at the heart of India’s China dilemma.

    How India could respond?

    • Yet, there are limits to China’s LAC adventurism.
    • 1) There are several places along the several thousand kilometre long LAC where the PLA is militarily weak, the Indian Army has the upper hand.
    • And, therefore, a tit-for-tat military campaign could be undertaken by New Delhi.
    • 2)  While China enjoys continental superiority over India, maritime domain is China’s weak spot, in particular Beijing’s commercial and energy interest to which the maritime space is crucial.
    • 3) Finally, and most importantly, would Beijing want to seriously damage the close to $100 billion trade with India with its military adventurism on the LAC?

    Way forward

    • In any case, for India, the age of pussyfooting around Chinese intimidation strategies is over.
    • The time has come to checkmate Beijing’s military aggression even as we maintain a robust economic relationship with our eastern neighbour.
    • It is also a reminder for us to get more serious about finalising a border agreement with China.
    • The bigger the power differential between India and China, the more concessions Beijing would demand from New Delhi to settle the dispute.

    Consider the question-“There have been growing instances of PLA aggression on India-China border. Examine the multiple objectives China’s actions seek to achieve. What are the options available with India to deal with situation?

    Conclusion

    There is little doubt that China is our neighbour and that we have to live next to the larger and more powerful China. However, India should not accept Beijing’s attempts at land grabs, or military intimidation. That China is a rising superpower located next door to us is a reality, but how we deal with that reality is a choice we must make as a nation.

  • Multilateralism in the new cold war

    The world is going through turmoil. The new world that will emerge will be different from what we have known. This provides India with some unique opportunities. This article explains the changes that are taking place and gives the outline of the changing order. So, how can India set and shape the global response? And what should be the principles on which the new multilateralism should be based? Read to know…

    Opportunity for India to set the global response

    • As chair of the Executive Board of the World Health Assembly – India can set the global response in terms of multilateralism, not just medical issues.
    • How can India set a global response in terms of multilateralism? Consider the following- a rare alignment of stars for agenda-setting.
    • 1) In September, the United Nations General Assembly will discuss the theme, “The Future We Want”.
    • 2) In 2021, India joins the UN Security Council (non-permanent seat).
    • 3) And chairs the BRICS Summit in 2021.
    • 4) Also hosts the G-20 in 2022.
    • New principles for international system: At the online summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, in May, Prime Minister Modi called for new principles for the international system.
    • His new globalisation model based on humanity, fairness and equality has wide support in a more equal world as, for the first time since 1950, everyone is experiencing the same (virus) threat.

    Changing global context

    • China is losing influence and the dynamics in its relations with the United States.
    • And Asia again is emerging as the centre of global prosperity.
    • The global governance, economy, scientific research and society are all in need of being re-invented.
    • India should use this opportunity to recover our global thought leadership.

    The US-China powerplay and its consequences for multilateralism

    • The clash between China and the U.S. at the just concluded World Health Assembly in May marks the end of the multilateralism of the past 70 years.
    • The donor-recipient relationship between developed and developing countries has ended with China’s pledge of $2-billion.
    • The agenda-setting role of the G7 over UN institutions and global rules has also been effectively challenged by WHO ignoring the reform diktat of the U.S. leading to its withdrawal, and characterisation of the G7 as “outdated”.
    • The U.S. has also implicitly rejected the G20 and UN Security Council, for an expanded G7 “to discuss the future of China”.
    • Important shift in the UN: After World War II, the newly independent states were not consulted when the U.S. imposed global institutions fostering trade, capital and technology dependence.
    • This was done ignoring the socio-economic development of these countries.
    • But social and economic rights have emerged to be as important as political and procedural rights.
    • Against this backdrop, China’s President Xi Jinping deftly endorsed the UN Resolution on equitable access to any new vaccine.

    Emergence of Asia and China: Challenges for the US and the West

    • The U.S. faces an uphill task in seeking to lead a new multidimensional institution in the face of China’s re-emergence.
    • The re-emergence of China is based on technology, innovation and trade balancing U.S. military superiority.
    • At the same time, there is a clear trend of declining global trust in free-market liberalism, central to western civilisation.
    • With the West experiencing a shock comparable to the one experienced by Asia, 200 years ago, the superiority of western civilisation is also under question.
    • The novel coronavirus pandemic has accelerated the shift of global wealth to Asia suggesting an inclusive global order based on principles drawn from ancient Asian civilisations.
    • Colonised Asia played no role in shaping the Industrial Revolution.
    • But, the Digital Revolution will be shaped by different values.
    • It is really this clash that multilateralism has now to resolve.

    World is questioning both U.S. and China’s exceptionalism

    • China has come out with alternative governance mechanisms to the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization with its all-encompassing Belt and Road Initiative.
    • The U.S., European Union and Japan are re-evaluating globalisation as it pertains to China and the U.S. is unabashedly “America First”.
    • The world is questioning both U.S. and China’s exceptionalism.
    • For India, the strategic issue is neither adjustment to China’s power nor deference to U.S. leadership.

    Opportune moment for India to propose new multilateralism

    • The global vacuum, shift in relative power and its own potential, provides India the capacity to articulate a benign multilateralism.
    • It should include in its fold NAM-Plus that resonates with large parts of the world and brings both BRICS and the G7 into the tent.
    • This new multilateralism should rely on outcomes, not rules, ‘security’ downplayed for ‘comparable levels of wellbeing’ and a new P-5 that is not based on the G7.

    India in a important role

    • China, through an opinion piece by its Ambassador in India, has suggested writing “together a new chapter” with “a shared future for mankind”.
    • The U.S. wants a security partnership to contain China.
    • And the Association of Southeast Asian Nations trade bloc — with the U.S. walking out of the negotiations — is keen India joins to balance China.
    • With a new template. India does not have to choose.

    Three principles the new system should be based on-

    1. Peaceful coexistence

      • First, the Asian Century should be defined in terms of peaceful co-existence, freezing post-colonial sovereignty.
      • Non-interference in the internal affairs of others is a key lesson from the decline of the U.S. and the rise of China.
      • National security now relies on technological superiority in artificial intelligence (AI), cyber and space, and not expensive capital equipment, as India’s military has acknowledged.
      • Instead of massive arms imports, we should use the savings to enhance endogenous capacity.
      • And mould the global digital economy between state-centric (China), firm-centric (the U.S.) and public-centric (India) systems.

    2. New principles of trade

    • A global community at comparable levels of well-being requires new principles for trade, for example, rejecting the 25-year-old trade rule creating intellectual property monopolies.
    • Global public goods should include public health, crop research, renewable energy and batteries, even AI as its value comes from shared data.
    • We have the scientific capacity to support these platforms as part of foreign policy.

    3.  Civilisational values

    • Ancient civilisational values provide the conceptual underpinning, restructuring both the economic order and societal behaviour for equitable sustainable development.
    • Which is what a climate change impacted world, especially Africa, is seeking.

    Consider the question-“The global order is going through serious churn, and it provides India with an opportunity to shape the new multilateralism based on humanity, fairness and equality. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    In the new cold war, defined by technology and trade not territory, non-alignment is an uncertain option; India should craft a global triumvirate.

  • Depsang Plain near LAC

    Reports of a heavy Chinese presence at Depsang, an area at a crucial dip (called the Bulge) on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have increased the recent tensions between Indian and Chinese troops.

    For the Depsang Plain, a prelim based question is hardly possible. However one must know all the fronts of border disputes from mains perspective.

    Depsang Plain

    • The “Depsang Plain” is one of the few places in the Western Sector where light armour (vehicles) would have ease of manoeuvre, so any Chinese buildup there is a cause for concern.
    • India controls the western portion of the plains as part of Ladakh, whereas the eastern portion is part of the Aksai Chin region, which is controlled by China and claimed by India.
    • The buildup invokes memories of both the 1962 war, when Chinese troops had occupied all of the Depsang plains.
    • More recently in April 2013, the PLA crossed the LAC and pitched tents on the Indian side for three weeks, before they agreed to pull out.

    Also read:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

  • Fortifying the African outreach: Contrast in the approach adopted by China and India

    As both India and China try and vie for increasing the influence in the African continent, the difference in the approach they adopted become evident. Both countries have been providing assistance in Africa amid the COVID pandemic. This article analyses the difference in the approach of the two countries.

    Impact of covid pandemic in Africa

    • Although African countries moved quickly to curb the initial spread, they are still woefully ill-equipped to cope with a public health emergency.
    • They are facing shortages of masks, ventilators, and even basic necessities such as soap and water.
    • Such conditions have meant that Africa’s cycle of chronic external aid dependence continues.
    • Africa needs medical protective equipment and gear to support its front line public health workers.
    • India and China have increased their outreach to Africa through medical assistance.
    • Their efforts are directed to fill a part of the growing African need at a time when not many others have stepped in to help.

    China’s donation diplomacy in Africa

    • China, being Africa’s largest trading partner, was quick to signal its intent to help Africa cope with the pandemic.
    • It despatched medical protective equipment, testing kits, ventilators, and medical masks to several African countries.
    • The primary motive of such donations has been to raise Beijing’s profile as a leading provider of humanitarian assistance and “public goods” in the global public health sector.
    • China’s billionaire philanthropy was also in full display when tech founder Jack Ma donated three rounds of anti-coronavirus supplies.
    • Chinese embassies across Africa have taken the lead by coordinating both public and private donations to local stakeholders.
    • However, the sub-optimal quality of China’s medical supplies and its deputing of medical experts have been a major cause for concern.

    Let’s understand the objectives of China’s donation diplomacy

    • Beijing’s ‘donation diplomacy’ in Africa aims to achieve three immediate objectives:
    • 1) Shift the focus away from talking about the origins of the virus in Wuhan.
    • 2) Build goodwill overseas.
    • 3) Establish an image makeover.
    • For the most part, it succeeded in achieving these ends until China faced widespread backlash over the ill-treatment of African nationals in Guangzhou city.
    • The issue quickly grew into a full-blown political crisis for Beijing.

    Let’s analyse the depth of China’s political influence in Africa

    • For the most part, China has been successful in controlling the Guangzhou narrative due to the depth of its political influence in Africa.
    • It is no secret that China relies heavily on diplomatic support and cooperation from African countries on key issues in multilateral fora.
    • For example, Beijing used African support for securing a win for Chinese candidates as the head of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and in the World Health Organization (WHO).
    • On Africa’s part, the problem lies in the deep disjuncture and credibility gap between Africa’s governing class, the people, the media and civil society.
    • Even when criticisms have been levelled against Chinese indiscretions, it has hardly ever surfaced at the elite level.
    • Overall, China’s donation diplomacy towards Africa during COVID-19 has received mixed reactions, but Beijing’s advantage lies in its economic heft and political influence in Africa.

    Understanding India’s diplomacy in Africa: Responsible and reliable global stakeholder

    • For India, the pandemic presents an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to shoulder more responsibility.
    • The fact that even with limited resources, India can fight the virus at home while reaching out to developing countries in need is testament to India’s status as a responsible and reliable global stakeholder.
    • Nowhere has India’s developmental outreach been more evident than in Africa with the continent occupying a central place in Indian government’s foreign and economic policy in the last six years.
    • Africa has been the focus of India’s development assistance and also diplomatic outreach, as evident in plans to open 18 new embassies.
    • These efforts have been supplemented by an improved record of Indian project implementation in Africa.

    Trade ties and cooperation amid pandemic

    • India’s role as ‘the pharmacy of the world’, as the supplier of low-cost, generic medicines is widely acknowledged.
    • Pharmaceutical products along with refined petroleum products account for 40% of India’s total exports to African markets.
    • India is sending consignments of essential medicines, including hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) and paracetamol, to 25 African countries in addition to doctors and paramedics at a total cost of around ₹600 million ($7.9 million) on a commercial and grant basis.
    • The initial beneficiaries were the African Indian Ocean island nations of Mauritius, the Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar under India’s ‘Mission Sagar’.
    • While transportation and logistics remain a concern, most of the consignments have already reached various African states.
    • A timely initiative has been the e-ITEC COVID-19 management strategies training webinars exclusively aimed at training health-care professionals from Africa and the SAARC nations and sharing of best practices by Indian health experts.
    • Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius, and Namibia have been beneficiaries.
    • Across Africa, there is a keen interest to understand the developments and best practices in India because the two share similar socioeconomic and developmental challenges.
    • There is also growing interest in research and development in drugs and vaccines.
    • A few African countries such as Mauritius are pushing for health-care partnerships in traditional medicines and Ayurveda for boosting immunity.
    • The Indian community, especially in East African countries, has also been playing a crucial role in helping spread awareness.
    • Prominent Indian businessmen and companies in Nigeria and Kenya have donated money to the respective national emergency response funds.
    • Country-specific chapters of gurdwaras and temples have fed thousands of families by setting up community kitchens, helplines for seniors and distributing disinfectants and sanitisers.

    The contrast between approaches adopted by India and China

    • Both India and China, through their respective health and donation diplomacy, are vying to carve a space and position for themselves as reliable partners of Africa in its time of need.
    • Burnishing their credentials as humanitarian champions is the name of the game.
    • But there are significant differences in the approaches.
    • For China, three aspects are critical:
    • 1) Money, political influence and elite level wealth creation.
    • 2) Strong state-to-state relations as opposed to people-to-people ties.
    • 3) Hard-infrastructure projects and resource extraction.
    • India’s approach, on the other hand, is one that focuses on building local capacities and an equal partnership with Africans and not merely with African elites concerned.

    Consider the question “Both India and China have been playing an active role in the African continent and vying for the outreach there. But there is a fundamental difference in their approach. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As these two powers rise in Africa, their two distinct models will come under even greater scrutiny. And both New Delhi and Beijing might find that they need to adapt to the rising aspirations of the African continent.

  • Time to revisit the special relationship with Nepal

    A new map released by Nepal delivered a blow to the India-Nepal relations. But this is hardly the first time this has happened. The article clears some cobwebs about Nepal’s foreign policy. First, it throws light on the past trend set by Nepal. And drawing on the past experience, it suggests the changes India should adopt in new framework to deal with Nepal.

    Nepal’s new map: Yet another knock on India-Nepal relations

    • As the parliament in Nepal gets ready to approve a new map that will include parts of Indian territory in Uttarakhand, Delhi is bracing for yet another knock to a bilateral relationship.
    • Many in the Indian strategic community believe that the train wreck was avoidable.
    • But others view the collision between Delhi and Kathmandu as both inevitable and imminent.
    • Even if the territorial issue had been finessed, something else would have triggered the breakdown.

    Bigger fissures in relation

    • A closer look suggests that the territorial dispute is merely a symptom of the structural changes.
    • These structural changes are unfolding in the external and internal context of the bilateral relationship.
    • The question, then, is not what Delhi could have done to prevent the current crisis.
    • It should be about looking ahead to build more sustainable ties with Kathmandu.

    2 factors India must consider and depart from

    • Any new framework for engaging Kathmandu must involve two important departures from the past in Delhi.
    • 1) First is coming to terms with Nepal’s natural politics of balance.
    • 2) The other is the recognition that Delhi’s much-vaunted “special relationship” with Kathmandu is part of the problem.

    Let’s look at the history of Nepal’s geopolitics

    • The founder of the modern Nepali state, Prithvi Narayan Shah, described Nepal as a “yam between two rocks”.
    • He was pointing to the essence of Nepal’s geographic condition between the dominant power in the Gangetic plains on the one hand and Tibet and the Qing empire on the other.
    • Contrary to the conventional wisdom in India, China has long been part of Kathmandu’s international relations.
    • As the East India Company gained ground at the turn of the 19th century, Nepal’s rulers made continuous offers to Beijing to act as China’s frontline against Calcutta’s expansion into the Himalayas.
    • Kathmandu also sought to build a coalition of Indian princes to counter the Company.
    • Even after it lost the first Anglo-Nepal war in 1816, Kathmandu kept up a continuous play between Calcutta and Beijing.
    • As the scales tilted in the Company’s favour after the First Opium War (1839-42), Nepal’s rulers warmed up to Calcutta.
    • When the 1857 Mutiny shook the Company, Kathmandu backed it and regained some of the territories it lost when the Raj replaced the Company.
    • As the fortunes of the Raj rose, Kathmandu rulers enjoyed the benefits of being Calcutta’s protectorate.
    • India inherited this framework but has found it impossible to sustain.

    Why the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) lost its appeal?

    • The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship gave the illusion of continuity in Nepal’s protectorate relationship with the Raj and its successor, independent India.
    • That illusion was continuously chipped away amid the rise of mass politics in Nepal, growing Nepali nationalism, and Kathmandu’s acquisition of an international personality.
    • The 1950 Treaty, which proclaims an “everlasting friendship” between the two nations, has become the symbol of Indian hegemony in Nepal.
    • In a paradox, its security value for India has long been hollowed out.
    • It is a political millstone around India’s neck that Delhi is unwilling to shed for the fear of losing the “special relationship”.
    • Delhi has been trapped into a perennial political play among Kathmandu’s different factions and responding to Nepal’s China card.

    Weakening of “special relationship”: Essence of Nepal’s foreign policy

    • Once the Chinese Communist Party consolidated its power in Tibet and offered assurances to Nepal, Kathmandu’s balancing impulses were back in play.
    • At the risk of oversimplification, Nepal’s foreign policy since the 1950s has, in essence, been about weakening the “special relationship” with India and building more cooperation with China.
    • Kathmandu has used different labels to package its desire for greater room for manoeuvre between its two giant neighbours — non-alignment, diversification, “zone of peace”, equidistance, and a Himalayan bridge between India and China.
    • The stronger China has become, the wider have Kathmandu’s options with India become.

    Way forward

    • It makes no sense for Delhi to hanker after a “special relationship” that a large section of Kathmandu does not want.
    • If Delhi wants a normal and good neighbourly relationship with Kathmandu, it should put all major bilateral issues on the table for renegotiation.
    • Such issues should include the 1950 treaty, national treatment to Nepali citizens in India, trade and transit arrangements, the open border and visa-free travel.
    • Delhi should make it a priority to begin talks with Nepal on revising, replacing, or simply discarding the 1950 treaty.
    • It should negotiate a new set of mutually satisfactory arrangements.
    • India had conducted a similar exercise with Bhutan to replace the 1949 treaty during 2006-07.
    • The issues and political context are certainly more complicated in the case of Nepal.
    • It is better that Delhi bites the bullet and makes a fresh beginning with Kathmandu rather than let the relationship deteriorate.
    • No bilateral relationship between nations can be built on sentiment — whether it is based on faith, ideology or inheritance.
    • Only those rooted in shared interests will endure.
    • Rather than object to Kathmandu’s China ties, Delhi must focus on how to advance India’s relations with Nepal.
    • It should bet that the logic of Nepal’s economic geography, its pursuit of enlightened self-interest, and Kathmandu’s natural balancing politics, will continue to provide a strong framework for India’s future engagement with Nepal.

    Conclusion

    Discarding the appearances of the “special relationship” might, in fact, make it easier for Delhi to construct a more durable and interest-based partnership with Kathmandu that is rooted in realism and has strong popular support on both sides.

  • A phantom called the Line of Actual Control with China

    Yet again, India and China are engaged in a standoff on the border. But why the issues persist even after four agreements with a view to solve the boundary problem? This article explains the problem in wording of the agreement. And also explains the lack of intent from China’s part.

    Four agreements: vision of progress or strategic illusion?

    •  At the heart of India’s and China’s continued inability to make meaningful progress on the boundary issue are four agreements.
    • Those agreements were signed in September 1993, November 1996, April 2005 and October 2013 — between the two countries.
    • Ironically, India and China keep referring to these agreements as the bedrock of the vision of progress on the boundary question.
    • Unfortunately, these are deeply flawed agreements.
    • And also make the quest for settlement of the boundary question at best a strategic illusion and at worst a cynical diplomatic parlour trick.

    Let’s look into LAC provision in 1993 and 1996 agreements

    • According to the 1993 agreement, “pending an ultimate solution”, “the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides… No activities of either side shall overstep the LAC”.
    • Further, both the 1993 and the 1996 agreement—on confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC— say they “will reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the LAC.”
    • This was to apply to major categories of armaments and cover various other aspects as well, including air intrusions “within ten kilometres along the LAC”.

    Okay, but where is the LAC?

    • The specification of this phantom LAC as the starting point and the central focus has made several key stipulations and articles of the four agreements effectively inoperable for more than a quarter of a century.
    • In fact, many of the articles have no bearing on the ground reality.
    • Article XII of the 1996 agreement, for instance, says, “This agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.”
    • It is not clear if and when that happened.
    • Nowhere in the 1993 agreement is there the provision to recognise the existing lines of deployment of the respective armies, as they were in 1993.
    • The agreement does not reflect any attempt to have each side recognise the other’s line of deployment of troops at the time it was signed.
    • That would have been the logical starting point.
    • If both armies are to respect the LAC, where is the line?
    • The ambiguity over the LAC has brought a prolonged sense of unease and uncertainty and thus exponentially contributed to the military build-up in those areas.
    • The absence of a definition of this line allows ever new and surreptitious advances on the ground.

    What could have been done?

    • Had the 1993 agreement begun the exercise with the phrase “pending an ultimate solution, each side shall strictly respect and observe the line of existing control/deployment” instead of the “LAC”, it would have been more possible to keep the peace.
    • In such a case there would have been two existing lines of control on the map — one for the physical deployment of the Chinese troops and the other for the physical deployment of the Indian troops.
    • This would have rendered the areas between the two lines no man’s land, and would have ensured that the two armies were frozen in their positions.

    The issue of two LAC in the eastern and western sector

    • The LAC is two hypothetical lines in the following two sectors-
    • 1) In the eastern sector, where the Chinese have not accepted the loosely defined McMahon line which follows the principle of watershed.
    • 2) The western sector, which is witnessing another episodic stand-off.
    • The first is what Indian troops consider the extent to which they can dominate through patrols, which is well beyond the point where they are actually deployed and present.
    • The second is what the Chinese think they effectively control, which is well south of the line they were positioned at in 1993.

    Why map exchange didn’t happen for the western sector?

    • It is in this theatre of the militarily absurd that we should look at the outcome of the attempted exchange of maps in the western sector.
    • It is the sector where this round of confrontation continues between India and China.
    • This came after the exchange of maps in the middle sector.
    • In the middle sector, divergences were the least, i.e., the existing line and the Chinese and Indian idea of the LAC were more or less the same (in 2002).
    • The Foreign Secretary India and the head of the Chinese delegation, met in New Delhi in 2003 for sharing the map of the western sector.
    • It had been agreed that both sides would exchange maps to an agreed scale on each side’s perceptions of the location of the LAC in the western sector.
    • The idea was to superimpose the maps to see where the perceptions converged and, crucially, where they diverged.
    • Due to the contentious nature of the sector, it would provide a starting point, not the end point, to discuss how to reconcile divergences presumed to be significant, given Chinese military behaviour on the ground there.
    • Each side handed over its map to the other.
    • But, head of the Chinese delegation gave it a long, hard look, and wordlessly returned it.
    • They provided no reason for their action.
    • The meeting effectively ended there.

    Consider the question “Examine the reasons for the persistent nature of the India-China border issue.”

    Conclusion

    By disregarding the map, China is not bound in any way by New Delhi’s perception of the LAC, and therefore does not have to limit liberty of action. This was evident then and is especially evident now. Because the nature of the terrain, deployment, and infrastructure and connectivity asymmetries in the border areas continue to be so starkly in China’s favour that it is clear that the Chinese are in no hurry to settle the boundary question. They see that the cost to India in keeping this question open suits them more than settling the issue.