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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • The 5G Club ‘D10’

    Britain said that it was pushing the U.S. to form a club of 10 nations that could develop its own 5G technology and reduce dependence on Huawei.

    We can expect prelims question asking the purpose of the D10 group like-

    Q. The D10 Club recently seen in news is a- Environment NGO/ Group of Democracies/ etc.

    The D10 Club

    • The Britain is proposing a ‘D10’ club of democratic partners that groups the G7 nations with Australia and the Asian technology leaders South Korea and India.
    • It would include G7 countries – UK, US, Italy, Germany, France, Japan and Canada – plus Australia, South Korea and India.
    • It is aimed for channelling investments into existing telecommunication companies within the 10 member states.
    • The group aim to create alternative suppliers of 5G equipment and other technologies to avoid relying on China.

    Ruling out Huawei

    • Britain has allowed the Chinese global leader in 5G technology to build up to 35% of the infrastructure necessary to roll out its new speedy data network.
    • But their PM Boris Johnson was reported to have instructed officials to draw up plans to cut Huawei out of the network by 2023 as relations with China sour.

  • Anchoring the ties with Australia the virtual way

    India-Australia relations have been growing in depth and diversity. Though two countries have been collaborating in various areas there is still potential to be realised in many areas. This article discusses the India-Australia ties. The area in which the two countries are collaborating and scope to further it.

    Relations with much potential

    • Mr. Modi convened a virtual multilateral summit to bring South Asia together to face the pandemic, and he also spoke online with G-20 leaders on similar issues.
    • On June 4, India will have its first virtual bilateral summit with Australia.
    • The convergence of interests and values has been patently obvious.
    • But the time has also come to translate that potential into reality.

    So, let’s see how India and Australia are expanding the scope of cooperation

    • 1) The two countries have sought to reconstruct their increasingly turbulent regional geography in the Indo-Pacific and see the Quad (with Japan and the United States) as the most potent instrument to promote cooperation.
    • The Quad, not surprisingly has been causing apprehensions in Beijing.
    • 2) It is expected that the ‘Mutual Logistics Support Agreement’ will be signed during the summit.
    • That should enhance defence cooperation and ease the conduct of large-scale joint military exercises.
    • 3) Last April, Australia and India conducted AUSINDEX, their largest bilateral naval exercise.
    • And there are further developments on the anvil, including Australia’s permanent inclusion in the Malabar exercise with Japan.
    • 4) It may be prudent too for New Delhi and Canberra to elevate the ‘two plus two’ format for talks from the Secretary level to the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers.

    Now, let’s look at the cooperation in areas that matter to the lives of the people of the countries-

    1) Pandemic control through controlled adaptation:  Lesson from Australia

    • Australia is one of the few countries that has managed to combat COVID-19 so far through “controlled adaptation” by which the coronavirus has been suppressed to very low levels.
    • Two of the leaders of this great Australia-wide effort are Indian-born scientists.
    • There is much that the two Prime Ministers can share on this front.

    2) Collaboration in  health, safe food and supply chains

    • In terms of health and safe food as well the supply chains that facilitate their delivery, there are important lessons to be learnt.
    • One of Australia’s richest businessman and first patron of the Australia-India Leadership Dialogue recently described the promise of DTC-CPG (direct to consumer; consumer packaged goods) which could transform global supply chains.
    • Here too there is much room for collaboration and new thinking.

    3) Higher education

    • The recovery of Australia’s universities, most of which are publicly funded and many rank among the top in the world, is still in question.
    • But they are proving to be resilient and pioneers in distance and online learning.
    • Australian universities could well open earlier than most and emerge as a safer destination for quality education than their European or Ivy league counterparts.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with Australia have of late acquired a dept and diversity which is visible in their cooperation in diverse areas. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As India and Australia with shared values try to bring about fresh order in a turbulent world, the virtual summit, in this sense, could not have been better timed.

  • For a reset in India-Nepal relations

    Over the past few years, we have been  witness to the deteriorating India-Nepal relations. Reserves of goodwill which India had accumulated is fast depleting in Nepal. The latest issue over the map is a new addition to the decline in relations. This article stresses the need for political maturity to find the solution to the complex issue of the underlying problem.

    Need for the fundamental reset in relations between Indian and Nepal

    • The immediate provocation for the contention is the long-standing territorial issue surrounding Kalapani.
    • It is a patch of land near the India-Nepal border, close to the Lipulekh Pass on the India-China border.
    • However, the underlying reasons are far more complex.
    • Yet, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s exploitation of the matter, by raising the banner of Nepali nationalism and painting India as a hegemon, is part of a frequent pattern.
    • Which indicates that relations between the two countries need a fundamental reset.

    Let’s look at the historical background of the India-Nepal border

    • India inherited the boundary with Nepal, established between Nepal and the East India Company in the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816.
    • Kali river constituted the boundary, and the territory to its east was Nepal.
    • The dispute relates to the origin of Kali.
    • Near Garbyang village in Dharchula Tehsil of the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, there is a confluence of different streams coming from north-east from Kalapani and north-west from Limpiyadhura.
    • The early British survey maps identified the north-west stream, Kuti Yangti, from Limpiyadhura as the origin.
    • But after 1857 changed the alignment to Lipu Gad, and in 1879 to Pankha Gad, the north-east streams, thus defining the origin as just below Kalapani.
    • Nepal accepted the change and India inherited this boundary in 1947.

    More past events dealing with the LIpulech pass

    • The Maoist revolution in China in 1949, followed by the takeover of Tibet, created deep misgivings in Nepal.
    • So, India was ‘invited’ by Nepal to set up 18 border posts along the Nepal-Tibet border.
    • The westernmost post was at Tinkar Pass, about 6 km further east of Lipulekh.
    • In 1953, India and China identified Lipulekh Pass for both pilgrims and border trade. After the 1962 war, pilgrimage through Lipulekh resumed in 1981, and border trade, in 1991.
    • In 1961, King Mahendra visited Beijing to sign the China-Nepal Boundary Treaty that defines the zero point in the west, just north of Tinkar Pass.
    • By 1969, India had withdrawn its border posts from Nepali territory.
    • The base camp for Lipulekh remained at Kalapani, less than 10 km west of Lipulekh.
    • In their respective maps, both countries showed Kalapani as the origin of Kali river and as part of their territory.
    • After 1979, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police has manned the Lipulekh Pass.

    So, when was the issue of the origin of Kali river raised?

    • After the 1996 Treaty of Mahakali -Kali river is also called Mahakali/Sarada further downstream-the issue of the origin of Kali river was first raised in 1997.
    • The matter was referred to the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee that had been set up in 1981 to re-identify and replace the old and damaged boundary pillars along the India-Nepal border.
    • The Committee clarified 98% of the boundary, leaving behind the unresolved issues of Kalapani and Susta when it was dissolved in 2008.
    • It was subsequently agreed that the matter would be discussed at the Foreign Secretary level.
    • Meanwhile, the project to convert the 80-km track from Ghatibagar to Lipulekh into a hardtop road began in 2009 without any objections from Nepal.

    Objections raised by Nepal to the new map released by India

    • The Survey of India issued a new political map (eighth edition) on November 2, 2019, to reflect the change in the status of Jammu and Kashmir as two Union Territories.
    • Nepal registered a protest though the map in no way had changed the boundary between India and Nepal.
    • However, on November 8, the ninth edition was issued.
    • The delineation remained identical but the name Kali river had been deleted.
    • Predictably, this led to stronger protests, with Nepal invoking Foreign Secretary-level talks to resolve issues.

    New map released by Nepal and issues with it

    • A new map of Nepal based on the older British survey reflecting Kali river originating from Limpiyadhura in the north-west of Garbyang was adopted by parliament and notified on May 20.
    • On May 22, a constitutional amendment proposal was tabled to include it in a relevant Schedule.
    • The new alignment adds 335 sq km to Nepali territory, territory that has never been reflected in a Nepali map for nearly 170 years.

    Following issue explains why there is need for rewriting the fundamental of India-Nepal relations

    1. Nepali nationalism is being equated to anti-Indianism

    • Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often spoken of the “neighbourhood first” policy.
    • But the relationship took a nosedive in 2015 when India first got blamed for interfering in the Constitution-drafting in Nepal.
    • And then for an “unofficial blockade” that generated widespread resentment against the country.
    • It reinforced the notion that Nepali nationalism and anti-Indianism were two sides of the same coin.

    2. China factor

    • In Nepali thinking, the China card has provided them the leverage to practise their version of non-alignment.
    • In the past, China maintained a link with the Palace and its concerns were primarily related to keeping tabs on the Tibetan refugee community.
    • With the abolition of the monarchy, China has shifted attention to the political parties as also to institutions like the Army and Armed Police Force.
    • Also, today’s China is pursuing a more assertive foreign policy and considers Nepal an important element in its growing South Asian footprint.

    3. India has ignored the changing political narrative for long

    • The reality is that India has ignored the changing political narrative in Nepal for far too long.
    • India remained content that its interests were safeguarded by quiet diplomacy even when Nepali leaders publicly adopted anti-Indian postures.
    • Long ignored by India, it has spawned distortions in Nepali history textbooks and led to long-term negative consequences.
    • For too long India has invoked a “special relationship”, based on shared culture, language and religion, to anchor its ties with Nepal.
    • Today, this term carries a negative connotation — that of a paternalistic India that is often insensitive and, worse still, a bully.
    • The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was sought by the Nepali authorities in 1949  is viewed as a sign of an unequal relationship, and an Indian imposition.
    • The purpose of the treaty was to continue the special links Nepal had with British India and it  provides for an open border and right to work for Nepali nationals
    • Yet, Nepali authorities have studiously avoided taking it up bilaterally even though Nepali leaders thunder against it in their domestic rhetoric.

    Consider the question, “Examine the issues that have been testing the old ties between India and Nepal.”

    Conclusion

    The urgent need today is to pause the rhetoric on territorial nationalism and lay the groundwork for a quiet dialogue where both sides need to display sensitivity as they explore the terms of a reset of the “special relationship”. A normal relationship where India can be a generous partner will be a better foundation for “neighbourhood first” in the 21st century.

  • India-China confrontation: Not a standalone event

    The recent India-China standoff in Ladakh points to a larger picture of the Chinese agenda of regional dominance. The US-China tension has proved to be the backdrop against which the Ladakh standoff is playing out. This article suggests that this standoff is not a standalone event. It could well be a trigger for domino effect.

    What the intensification of tension between India-China suggests?

    1) China is feeling threatened

    • An authoritarian regime whose legitimacy rests primarily on its economic performance is faced with a situation where growth is expected to plummet.
    • It is a sign that Beijing is increasingly feeling beleaguered.
    • In response, it has embarked on a strategy of brinkmanship with several goals in mind.
    • External adventurism, when cloaked in the garb of ultra-nationalism, can shore up a regime’s legitimacy at home.

    2) It could be a move to divert the attention of the world

    • Simultaneously, it can act as a diversionary measure to escape international criticism for Beijing’s attempt to cover up the spread of the coronavirus.
    • Many countries hold China responsible for the huge cost in human lives and suffering as well as the unprecedented economic distress.
    • In the face of such criticism, the Chinese regime is increasingly using jingoistic jargon to build up domestic support.
    • President Xi Jinping’s recent speech to the PLA is an outstanding example of this strategy.
    • He exhorted the Chinese armed forces to “prepare for war” in order to “resolutely safeguard national sovereignty” and “the overall strategic stability of the country”.
    • This is a sign that the Communist Party of China (CPC) feels increasingly threatened both domestically and externally.

    Let’s look at the deterioration of the US-China relations

    • China’s relations with the U.S. have been going downhill almost since the beginning of the Donald Trump presidency.
    • Washington has periodically imposed economic sanctions on China and Beijing has retaliated in kind.
    • Trade talks have faltered because of growing protectionist sentiments in the U.S. and Chinese inability to adequately respond to them.
    • The chipping away at Hong Kong’s autonomous status by Beijing and the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has led to severe criticism by the U.S. administration and in the Congress.
    • Differences over the issue of Taiwan have added to tensions, with China viewing the U.S. as the primary impediment preventing Taiwan’s integration.
    • The Trump administration has significantly increased support to Taiwan with arms sales that have added to China’s concern.

    U.S.-China rivalry in South-China Sea

    • Above all, the U.S.-China rivalry in the South China Sea acts as the potential flashpoint that may well lead to a shooting war.
    • So far, it has been careful that these moves do not trigger a serious confrontation with the U.S.
    • Washington has a strong interest in preventing China from asserting control over the South China Sea as maintaining free access to this waterway is important to it for economic reasons.
    • It also has defence treaty obligations to the Philippines, which has vigorously contested Chinese territorial claims.
    • Further, China’s control of the South China Sea would be a major step toward replacing the U.S. as the foremost power in the Indo-Pacific region.

    India-China relation questions have been the leitmotif in the UPSC papers. Just the theme of the question changes. Consider 2017 question “China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as a tool to develop potential military power status in Asia. In light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbour.”

    Conclusion

    Increased Chinese adventurism could result in an escalation of U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea. If that happens, the India-China face-off in Ladakh could become part of a much larger “great game”, with the U.S. trying to preserve the status quo and China attempting to change it to further its objective of regional dominance at the U.S.’s expense. The current India-China crisis should, therefore, be seen in its proper context and not as an isolated event.

  • India-Pak cooperation against Locusts Attack

    As another locust swarm comes from Pakistan, the spotlight is again on the India-Pakistan dynamic that has come into play.

    Do you know?

    The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) believes locusts have decimated close to 70,000 hectares of crops in Kenya, 30,000 hectares in Ethiopia and 42,000 hectares of crops in the state of Rajasthan.
    Just so you can perhaps assess the kind of damage we are talking about here. A large swarm can eat as much as about 35,000 people in one day 😀 !

    What are Locusts?

    • The desert locust (Schistocerca gregaria) is a short-horned grasshopper that is innocuous while it is in a “solitary phase” and moving about independently.
    • These winged insects differ from normal hoppers and become dangerous only when their populations build up rapidly and the close physical contact in crowded conditions triggers behavioural changes.
    • They, then, enter the “gregarious phase”, by grouping into bands and forming swarms that can travel great distances (up to 150 km daily), while eating up every bit of vegetation on the way.
    • If not controlled at the right time, these insect swarms can threaten the food security of countries.

    India reaches out to Pak

    • The Ministry of External Affairs said that it has reached out to Pakistan for cooperation, and is awaiting their response.
    • Despite the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, cooperation on the locust warning system has survived the wars, terrorist attacks, and political turmoil.

    History of outbreaks in India

    • Records suggest that since the beginning of the 19th century, there have been at least eight “outbreaks” in India from 1812 to 1889, and a ninth in 1896-1897.
    • According to the history of the Locust Warning Office published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), there were “serious invasions” of locusts in India every few years during the 1900s.
    • A “five-year invasion” from 1926 to 1931 is estimated to have damaged crops worth Rs 2 crore (about $100 million at today’s prices).
    • The princely states and provinces had their own structures to deal with this, but there was no coordination.

    The Locust Warning Organization (LWO)

    • After the 1926-32 “invasion”, the British Indian government-sponsored a research scheme, starting in 1931, which led to the permanent Locust Warning Organization (LWO) in 1939.
    • It had its headquarters in New Delhi and a substation in Karachi.
    • In 1941, a conference of princely states in desert areas and provinces affected by locusts was held.
    • Its role was expanded in 1942, and in 1946 a bureaucratic structure was put in place.

    Beginning of cooperation

    • Iran too suffered locust attacks, in 1876, and in 1926-1932.
    • Apparently the first case of collaboration between countries in the region occurred in 1942 when a delegation from India helped with locust control work in southwest Persia.
    • Over the next two years, Indian help was also provided to Oman and Persia.
    • This was followed by the first conference within the region on Desert Locust, which was held in Tehran in 1945 and involved Iran, India, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
    • A second conference took place in 1950 also in Tehran with Pakistan participating.

    Bringing in Pakistan

    • In the 1950s, India and Iran cooperated and Pakistan provided two aircraft for locust surveys in Saudi Arabia.
    • Following another attack during 1958-61, a decision was taken to group Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India together and the FAO Desert Locust commission was formed in 1964.
    • The commission held annual sessions skipped in 1965 and 1999 but held in 1971.
    • Even in the last six years when the relationship between India and Pakistan has deteriorated, it has been held in 2014, 2016 and 2018.
    • The meetings are attended by locust control experts, with no diplomats.

    India and Pakistan

    • In 1977, the two countries began to meet on the border.
    • From 1991 to 2003, special border surveys took place during the summer, undertaken by locust control officers in their respective countries.
    • Joint border meetings have taken place every year since 2005 till 2019, except in 2011. This has been despite every diplomatic strain; including the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
    • Arrangements are made in advance and protocols are followed for crossing the border.
    • While politics and diplomacy is kept out of the technical discussions, locust control authorities feel that one of the more difficult challenges faced by the commission is that of “insecurity and sensitivities” in the region.

    Also read:

    Risk of Early Locusts Attacks: A new concern

    Try this:

    Q. Time and again normal ocean cycles got more pronounced or disrupted, resulting in all kinds of unintended consequences, like an ever-increasing domino effect of locust attacks in Asia and the Indian Sub Continent. We need to understand these links if we are to plan effectively for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Discuss. (250W)

  • Analysing three-pronged strategy of China in Ladakh

    The article gives an in-depth analysis of the current border dispute between India and China in Ladakh. But the present dispute follows the pattern. China has been encroaching and gaining control over the disputed territory since the 1980s. And this dispute also fits into that pattern.

    China acting strategically in Ladakh

    • While India has pursued its core national interests in J&K, China’s response was strategic — a shift that may have a lasting imprint on geopolitics.
    • We have been harping on the “differing perception” theory of the LAC for decades.
    • But in reality China has been gaining control over a massive “disputed territory” in Eastern Ladakh since the 1980s.

    Major Chinese encroachment events

    • The Chinese first made encroachments into the 45-km long Skakjung pastureland in Demchok-Kuyul sector.
    • This resulted in local Changpas of Chushul, Tsaga, Nidar, Nyoma, Mud, Dungti, Kuyul, Loma villages gradually losing their winter grazing.
    • Ladakh’s earlier border lay at Kegu Naro — a day-long march from Dumchele.
    • Starting from the loss of Nagtsang in 1984, followed by Nakung (1991) and Lungma-Serding (1992), the last bit of Skakjung was lost in 2008.
    • The PLA followed the nomadic Rebo routes for patrolling in contrast to Indian authorities restricting Rebo movements that led to the massive shrinking of pastureland and border defence.
    • By the 2000s, the PLA’s focus shifted to desolate, inhospitable Chip Chap which remains inaccessible until end-March.
    • After mid-May, water streams impede vehicles moving across Shyok, Galwan, and Chang-Chenmo rivers leaving only a month and a half for effective patrolling by the Indian side.
    • No human beings inhabit here, a 1962 war site, an entry point into Ladakh for the Uyghurs and Tibetans.
    • Local Ladakhi personnel manned the posts here, but patrolling in the 972 sq km Trig Height area has been lax.
    • Easier accessibility allowed the PLA to intrude into Chip Chap with impunity during July-August — its regulars usually spent a few hours before crossing back.
    • But, during the 21-day Depsang stand-off in 2013, when Burtse became a flashpoint, the PLA set up remote camps 18-19 km inside Indian territory.
    • Chinese soldiers virtually prevented Indian troops from getting access to Rakinala near Daulat Beg-Olde (DBO) where the IAF reactivated the world’s highest landing strips in 2008.
    2008 Daulat Beg Oldi Stand-off
    • This plus the reopening of Fukche and Nyoma airbases perhaps provoked the PLA’s intrusion in Depsang.

    So, what is the current stand-off about?

    • Despite topographical challenges, the BRO has lately fast-tracked the 260 km long Shayok-DBO road construction.
    • That road construction probably triggered the PLA intrusion in early May sparking the current Galwan stand-off.
    • Towards the south at Pangong Tso, forces had physical scuffles over area-denial for patrolling at Sirijap on May 5-6 and on May 11.
    • The situation remains tense at Sirijap’s cliff spurs and also at the Tso, where troops are chasing each other in high-speed patrol boats.
    • Clearly, intrusions are part of China’s never-ending effort to push Indian troops westward of the Indus and Shyok rivers and reach the 1960 claimed line.

    Details of the disputed border in Ladakh

    • Out of the 857 sq km long border in Ladakh only 368 sq km is the International Border, and the rest of the 489 sq km is the LAC.
    • The two traditional disputed points included Trig Heights and Demchok.
    • At eight points, the two sides have differing perceptions.
    • But lately, China has raised two fresh dispute points at Pangong Tso 83 sq km and at Chumur where it claims 80 sq km.
    • The old dispute sites were at the end point of Pangong Tso and at Chushul — the 1962 battle-site.

    Three-pronged strategy

    • 1) The Sirijap range on the northern bank of the lake remains most contested, from which several cliff spurs jut out — the “finger series” 1 to 8.
    • India’s LAC claim line is at Finger-8, but the actual position is only up to Finger-4.
    • The Chinese are asserting further west to claim 83 sq km here.
    • The PLA has built a 4.5 km long road to prevent patrolling by Indian troops.
    • The PLA’s road network from here extends to Huangyangtan base located near National Highway G219.
    • 2) Further south in Demchok, China claims some 150 sq km.
    • The PLA has built massive infrastructure on its side, moved armoured troops into Charding Nalla since 2009.
    • Tibetan nomads pitch tents on Hemis Monastery’s land throughout 2018-2019.
    • 3)In Chumur, China claims 80 sq km and probably wants a straight border from PT-4925 to PT-5318 to bring Tible Mane (stupa) area under its control.
    • For India, holding of Chumur is critical for the safety of the Manali-Leh route.
    • PLA demanded removal of India’s fortified positions in Burtse (2013) and Demchok and Chumur (2014) for its retreat.

    What could be the implications for India?

    • Overall, the pattern shows the PLA’s desperate design to snatch the lake at Lukung through a three-pronged strategy of attacking from Sirijap in the north, Chuchul in the south and through the lake water from middle.
    • This is the key chokepoint from where the Chinese can cut off Indian access to the entire flank of Chip Chap plains, Aksai Chin in the east and Shayok Valley to the north.
    •  Which means that Indian control is pushed to the west of the Shyok river and south of the Indus river, forcing India to accept both rivers as natural boundaries.
    • And once China gets control of the southern side of the Karakoram it can easily approach Siachen Glacier from the Depsang corridor.
    • And meet at Tashkurgan junction from where the CPEC crosses into Gilgit-Baltistan.
    • That would be disastrous for Indian defence, leaving the strategic Nubra vulnerable, possibly impacting even India’s hold over Siachen.
    • China’s access to Changla-pass through Lukung and Tangtse would threaten the entire Indus Valley.
    • It is quite possible that China is eyeing the waters of the Shyok, Galwan and Chang-Chenmo rivers, to divert them to the arid Aksai Chin and its Ali region.

    Consider the question “What could be the strategic and security implications of China’s claim in Pangong Tso region for India?”

    Conclusion

    India should resist the Chinese design which could have disastrous consequences for India’s defence and strategic interests. This should involve diplomatic channels rather than skirmishes on the borders.

  • Looking beyond Taliban: Focus on the Pashtun Question

    The US-Taliban peace deal signals growing heft of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute nearly 42 per cent population of Afghanistan and the Taliban is essentially a Pashtun formation. Also,  remember Pakistan: just like the kid who is always up to something. The ethnic fragmentation and Pakistan’s meddling is a recipe for perpetual conflict zone in the region.

    The question of India’s engagement with Taliban

    • Taliban’s effective control of territory in Afghanistan expanded in recent years.
    • This led to the question of India’s direct dialogue with the Taliban gain some relevance.
    • It has acquired some immediacy after the US announced plans for a significant draw down of its forces from Afghanistan and signed a peace deal with the Taliban earlier this year.
    • Also, recently the US Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, called on India to open a political conversation with the Taliban.
    • The interest was further amplified by a signal from the Taliban that it is eager for a productive relationship with India.

    So, what should India do?

    • Those calling for direct engagement with the Taliban say that Delhi can’t ignore such an important force in Afghan politics.
    • Opponents say there is no reason for Delhi to join the international stampede to embrace the Taliban.
    • If and when the Taliban becomes a peaceful entity and joins the quest for a political settlement with Kabul, they argue, Delhi should have no objection to direct talks.
    • So, opening a dialogue with the Taliban is a tactical issue focused on when, how and on what terms.

    Pashtun question and India’s enduring interest in Afghanistan

    • The Taliban remains an important sub-set of the larger and more strategic Pashtun question.
    • The Pashtun question holds the key to India’s enduring interest in Afghanistan: Promoting a peaceful, independent and a sovereign Afghanistan that is not a subaltern to the Pakistan army.

    2 Basic issues that will define the Pashtun question

    1. Forming unity among multiple ethnic groups

    • First is the problem of reconciling the interests of multiple ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
    • The Pashtuns constitute nearly 42 per cent of the population.
    • The sizeable Afghan minorities include 27 per cent Tajiks, 9 per cent each of Hazaras and Uzbeks.
    • Irrespective of the nature of the regimes in Kabul over the last four decades— constructing a stable internal balance has been hard.
    • That problem will acquire a new intensity as the Taliban stakes claim for a dominant role in Kabul.

    But has the Taliban learnt to live in peace with the minorities?

    • The Taliban, an essentially Pashtun formation, had brutally crushed the minorities during its brief rule in the late 1990s.
    • There are some indications that the Taliban is now reaching out to the minorities but it is some distance away from winning their trust.

    2. Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan

    • The problem of constructing internal balance in Afghanistan has been complicated by Pakistan’s meddling.
    • Pakistan would like to have the kind of hegemony that the British Raj exercised over Afghanistan.
    • Neither can Pakistan replicate that dominance nor are the Afghans willing concede it to the Pakistan army.

    What about the Pashtun minority in Pakistan?

    • There are more than twice as many Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.
    • The Pashtun population is estimated to be around 15 million in Afghanistan and 35 million in Pakistan.
    • And as mentioned above, the Taliban is essentially Pashtun formation.
    • Although Pashtun separatism has long ceased to be a force in Pakistan, Islamabad finds the Pashtun question re-emerge in a different form.
    • Pakistan can’t really bet that the Taliban will not put Pashtun nationalism above the interests of the Pakistani state.
    • The Taliban, for example, has never endorsed the Durand Line as the legitimate border with Pakistan.
    • It is by no means clear if Pakistan’s construction of the Taliban as a conservative religious force has obliterated the group’s ethnic character.
    • Sufferings of Pakistani Pashtun People: Islamabad’s quest for control over Afghanistan over the last four decades has heaped extraordinary suffering on the Pashtun people on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line.
    • As the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement seeks a peaceful redressal of its demands for basic human rights, Pakistan has unleashed massive repression.

    India’s importance in Afghanistan

    • That the Taliban wants to talk to India and Pakistan brands Pashtun leaders as Indian agents only underlines Delhi’s enduring salience in Afghanistan.

    Consider the question “After the US-Taliban peace deal, India is forced with a difficult prospect of opening the dialogue with the Taliban. Examine the implications of the return of Taliban in Afghanistan for India. What is your opinion on India starting the dialogue with Afghanistan?”

    Conclusion

    Pakistan’s expansive military and political investments in Afghanistan have not really resolved Islamabad’s security challenges on its western frontier. If an Afghan triumph eludes Pakistan, Delhi can’t escape the complex geopolitics of the Pashtun lands.

  • Importance of the Pangong Tso Lake

    (Note: No higher resolution is available for the image)

    The recent incidents at the Pangong Tso lake area between Indian and Chinese soldiers on the LAC involve a picturesque lake, mountains, helicopters, fighter jets, boats, eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, fisticuffs and injuries.

    Apart from the geo-physical significance of the Pangong Tso for prelims, other general information should be necessarily known to aspirants, particularly for Personality Tests.

    The Pangong Tso Lake

    • Pangong Tso Lake in eastern Ladakh has often been in the news, most famously during the Doklam standoff, when a video of the scuffle between Indian and Chinese soldiers.
    • In the Ladakhi language, Pangong means extensive concavity, and Tso is a lake in Tibetan.
    • Pangong Tso is a long narrow, deep, endorheic (landlocked) lake situated at a height of more than 14,000 ft in the Ladakh Himalayas.
    • The western end of Tso lies 54 km to the southeast of Leh. The 135 km-long lake sprawls over 604 sq km in the shape of a boomerang and is 6 km wide at its broadest point.
    • The brackish water lake freezes over in winter and becomes ideal for ice skating and polo.
    • The legendary 19th century Dogra general Zorawar Singh is said to have trained his soldiers and horses on the frozen Pangong lake before invading Tibet.

    Tactical significance of the lake

    • By itself, the lake does not have major tactical significance.
    • But it lies in the path of the Chushul approach, one of the main approaches that China can use for an offensive into Indian Territory.
    • Indian assessments show that a major Chinese offensive if it comes, will flow across both the north and south of the lake.
    • During the 1962 war, this was where China launched its main offensive — the Indian Army fought heroically at Rezang La, the mountain pass on the southeastern approach to Chushul valley, where the Ahir Company of 13 Kumaon led by Maj. Shaitan Singh made its last stand.
    • Not far away, to the north of the lake, is the Army’s Dhan Singh Thapa post, named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded the country’s highest gallantry award, the Param Vir Chakra.
    • Major Thapa and his platoon were manning Sirijap-1 outpost which was essential for the defence of Chushul airfield.

    Connectivity in the region

    • Over the years, the Chinese have built motorable roads along their banks of the Pangong Tso.
    • At the People’s Liberation Army’s Huangyangtan base at Minningzhen, southwest of Yinchuan, the capital of China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, stands a massive to-scale model of this disputed area in Aksai Chin.
    • It points to the importance accorded by the Chinese to the area.
    • Even during peacetime, the difference in perception over where the LAC lies on the northern bank of the lake makes this contested terrain.
    • In 1999, when the Army unit from the area was moved to Kargil for Operation Vijay, China took the opportunity to build 5 km of a road inside Indian Territory along the lake’s bank.
    • From one of these roads, Chinese positions physically overlook Indian positions on the northern tip of the Pangong Tso Lake.

    Fingers in the lake

    • The barren mountains on the lake’s northern bank, called the Chang Chenmo, jut forward in major spurs, which the Army calls “fingers”.
    • India claims that the LAC is coterminous with Finger 8, but it physically controls area only up to Finger 4.
    • Chinese border posts are at Finger 8, while it believes that the LAC passes through Finger 2.
    • Around six years ago, the Chinese had attempted a permanent construction at Finger 4 which was demolished after Indians strongly objected to it.
    • Chinese use light vehicles on the road to patrol up to Finger 2, which has a turning point for their vehicles.
    • If they are confronted and stopped by an Indian patrol in between, asking them to return, it leads to confusion, as the vehicles can’t turn back.
    • The Chinese have now stopped the Indian soldiers moving beyond Finger 2. This is an eyeball-to-eyeball situation which is still developing.

    Confrontation on the water

    • On the water, the Chinese had a major advantage until a few years ago — their superior boats could literally run circles around the Indian boats.
    • But India purchased better Tampa boats some eight years ago, leading to a quicker and more aggressive response.
    • Although there are well-established drills for disengagement of patrol boats of both sides, the confrontations on the waters have led to tense situations in the past few years.
    • The Chinese have moved in more boats — called the LX series — in the lake after the tensions which rose in the area from last month.
    • The drill for the boats is agreed upon by the two sides, as per the Standard Operating Procedure.

    Out of bounds for tourists

    • Indian tourists are only allowed up to Spangmik village, around 7 km into the lake. This is where a famous movie climax was shot.
    • In fact, tourists were not allowed at all at Pangong Tso until 1999, and even today, you need to obtain an Inner Line Permit from the office of the Deputy Commissioner at Leh.

  • India Nepal Border issue: Colonial legacy or the Dragon’s Power Play

    India – Nepal relations are having its “see saw swing” moment. At one end, lies the 1950 treaty of peace and friendship, close people to people relations and India’s aid during 2015 earthquake. But on the other end lies the economic blockade and Madhesi protest. Another entry to the later side is the Border issue.

    • The inauguration of road from Dharchula to Lipu Lekh was done with great fanfare, at least on the Indian side.
    • The metalled road is a BIG relief for pilgrims and traders on the traditional route for the Kailash-Mansarovar yatra, who otherwise were stuck for days in the arduous walk.

    So, where is the issue?

    The issue lies in Nepal’s charge claiming that the stretch passes though Nepalese territory. This was displayed by some politicized moves like-

    • Intemperate remarks by Nepal’s PM in the Nepalese Parliament.
    • Manner (airdropped to the location by helicopters) and timing(why now?) of the Deployment of armed police at Chharung, close to Kalapani, in its Sudoor Paschim.
    • Finally, Nepalese government has raised the stakes further by authorizing a new map extending its territory across an area sensitive for India’s defence.

    The very beginning: The Sugauli Treaty

    • Before the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli, the Nepalese kingdom stretched from the Sutlej river in the west to the Teesta river in the East.
    • Nepal lost the Anglo-Nepalese War and with the signing of Sugauli Treaty was brought down to its present territories.

    The Sugauli Treaty stated that “[t]he Rajah of Nipal [Nepal] hereby cedes to the Honourable [the] East India Company in perpetuity all the under-mentioned territories”, including “the whole of the lowlands between the Rivers Kali and Rapti.” It elaborated further that “[t]he Rajah of Nipal [Nepal] renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connection with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants there of.”

    • The present controversy arose with Nepalese contest that the tributary that joins the Mahakali river at Kalapani is not the Kali river. Nepal now contends that the Kali river lies further west to the Lipu Lekh pass.
    • But here’s the catch!
    • The British used the Lipu Lekh pass for trade with Tibet and China.
    • Even Survey of India maps since the 1870s shows the area of Lipu Lekh down to Kalapani as part of British India.
    • Even though the areas of Nepalgunj and Kapilvastu were restituted to Nepal as a reward for the military help rendered by Jung Bahadur Rana in quelling the 1857 uprising. The British did not return any part of Garhwal or Kumaon, including the Kalapani area, to Nepal.
    • Infact, both the Rana rulers of Nepal and the Nepalese Kings accepted the boundary and did not raise any objection with the government of India after India’s Independence.
    • True that India did not existed in 1816 when the Treaty of Sugauli was concluded.
    • But many borders of the world and India are colonial legacy, which we have to work out.

    The path to peace

    • The Nepal-India Technical Level Joint Boundary Working Group was set up in 1981 to resolve boundary issues, to demarcate the international border, and to manage boundary pillars.
    • By 2007, the group completed the preparation of 182 strip maps, signed by the surveyors of the two sides, covering almost 98% of the boundary, all except the two disputed areas of Kalapani and Susta.
    • Not able to solve the border issues in these disputed areas has left us hanging.

    India has successfully resolved far more intractable border issues with Bangladesh.

    • The land boundary settlement required an exchange of territories, including the transfer of population, and a constitutional amendment to give effect to the 1974 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement.
    • The maritime boundary issue with Bangladesh involved going to the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration. Despite knowing well that if the Court applied the principle of equity, India would lose up to four-fifths of the disputed area. India lost but the government of India accepted the ruling.
    • Compared to what was accomplished between India and Bangladesh, the India-Nepal border issues appear more easily solvable.

    Respecting out Ties

    • India Nepal ties are unique.
    • Historical link between the nations.
    • Spirit of maintaining India’s close and friendly bilateral relations with Nepal.
    • The people-to-people relationship between India and Nepal is unmatched.

    What lies ahead?

    • This matter can be best handled bilaterally, through quiet diplomacy.
    • The Official Spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, Anurag Srivastava, has said recently that India and Nepal have an established mechanism to deal with all boundary matters.
    • He has affirmed that India is committed to resolving outstanding boundary issues through diplomatic dialogue.
    • The remaining issues concerning the boundary i.e Kalapani and Susta are not difficult to resolve unless they are caught up in domestic or international concerns.
    • The next steps should be approval of the strip maps by the respective governments (that of the Nepalese Government is still awaited), the resolution of the differences of opinion over Kalapani and Susta, and speeding up the erection of damaged or missing border pillars.

    Consider the question “India-Nepal ties are unique. Both countries have many things in common. Yet, recent developments over the border dispute threaten to snap these ties. Examine the border issue between the two countries. What is India’s stand on the issue? Suggest ways to resolve the issue.”

    Conclusion

    The more the trouble festers, those who stand to gain by deteriorating India-Nepal relations will benefit. There is need for the two countries to lower the temperature and defuse the issue. They must invest time and effort to find a solution. Raking up public controversy can only be counterproductive to the relationship.

  • How China is seeking more control on Hong Kong?

    China has started pushing for an “improvement” in the Basic Law — the mini-constitution that defines ties between Hong Kong and Beijing — signalling a fundamental change in the way the highly autonomous city-state is run. The Chinese parliament is debating a controversial national security law for Hong Kong.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. Democracy and authoritarianism cannot co-exist in the same country. Comment in context to the situation generated in Taiwan. How is the situation different from the withdrawl of special category status of Jammu and Kashmir.

    Chinese authoritarian grip on Hong Kong

    Hong Kong’s ‘Basic Law’

    • Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China.
    • It has observed a “one country, two systems” policy since Britain returned sovereignty to China on July 1, 1997, which has allowed it certain freedoms, the rest of China does not have.
    • It is governed by a mini-constitution called the Basic Law — which affirms the principle of “one country, two systems”.
    • The constitutional document is a product of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.
    • Under this, China promised to honour Hong Kong’s liberal policies, the system of governance, an independent judiciary, and individual freedoms for a period of 50 years from 1997.

    Uproar in Hong Kong

    • China accuses that the Hong Kong SAR has not acted out its constitutional duty for national security in line with China’s Constitution and the Basic Law.
    • Since the handover, Hong Kong residents have time and again taken to the streets to protect their Basic Law freedoms, with the first major pro-democracy protest taking place in 2003.
    • In 2014, over one lakh city residents took part in the ‘Umbrella Revolution’ to protest against China’s denial of democratic reforms.

    Impact of the 2019 protests

    • The largest protests since the 1997 handover took place last year in 2019 when for months tens of thousands of Hong Kongers agitated against a proposed extradition law.
    • The protest continued with pro-democracy marches even after the legislation was withdrawn.
    • These protests were seen as an affront by mainland China, which under President Xi Jinping has increasingly adopted a more hardline approach to foreign policy and internal security issues in recent years.

    Rise of Taiwanese aspirations

    • The Hong Kong unrest is also believed to have left its mark on Taiwan, another prickly issue for Beijing which considers the island state as its own.
    • In this year’s presidential election, Taiwanese voters brought to power the Democratic Progressive Party, which openly opposes joining China.

    The National Security Law

    • Under Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong has to enact a national security law “to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Chinese government.
    • When the Hong Kong government first tried to enact the law in 2003, the issue became a rallying point for the city-wide protests which occurred that year.
    • Since then, the government has steered clear of introducing the legislation again.
    • Beijing could now make the law applicable to Hong Kong by another route — by inserting the legislation in Annex III of the Basic Law.
    • The Chinese parliament is expected to vote on a resolution that will make way for the new law, which could be promulgated in Hong Kong.

    What could happen if such a law takes effect?

    • The new law would ban seditious activities that target mainland Chinese rule, as well as punish external interference in Hong Kong affairs.
    • Many expect a revival of the protests that rocked the city last year.
    • China, on the other hand, has sought support and understanding of India and other countries for its controversial decision as a precautionary measure.