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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • India and the great power triangle of Russia, China and US

    Relations between Russia, China and the US have not always been the same. The changes in triangular dynamic offers lessons for India. The article deals with this issue.

    India’s changing relations with great powers

    • The recent visit of Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to Delhi and Islamabad is among multiple signs of India’s changing relations with the great powers.
    •  At the same time, Delhi’s growing strategic partnerships with the US and Europe have begun to end India’s prolonged alienation from the West.
    • Also, New Delhi’s own relative weight in the international system continues to increase and give greater breadth and depth to India’s foreign policy.

    Shifts in triangular relations between Russia, China and America

    1) Russia-China relations

    • The leaders of Russia and China — Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong — signed a formal treaty of alliance in 1950.
    •  Russia invested massively in the economic modernisation of China, and also gave it the technology to become a nuclear weapon power.
    • However, by the 1960s, their relations soured and two were arguing about ideology and a lot else.
    • The Sino-Soviet split had consequences way beyond their bilateral relations.
    • None of them more important than the efforts by both Moscow and Beijing to woo Washington.
    • The break-up between Russia and China also opened space for Delhi against Beijing after the 1962 war in the Himalayas.
    • Under intense American pressure on Russia in the 1980s, Moscow sought to normalise ties with Beijing.
    • Stepping back to the 1960s and 1970s, China strongly objected to Delhi’s partnership with Moscow.

    2) Russia-US relations

    • Russia, which today resents India’s growing strategic warmth with the US, has its own long history of collaboration with Washington.
    • Moscow and Washington laid the foundations for nuclear arms control and sought to develop a new framework for shared global leadership.
    • But Delhi was especially concerned about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty system, with all its constraints on India’s atomic options, that Moscow and Washington constructed in the late 1960s.

    3) US-China relations

    • Despite fighting Korean War with the US in the early 1950s, China normalised relations with the U.S. in 1971 to counter the perceived threat from Russia.
    • Deng Xiaoping, refused to extend the 1950 security treaty with Russia that expired in 1980.
    • China turned instead, towards building a solid economic partnership with the US and the West that helped accelerate China’s rise as a great power.

    Lessons for India

    • The twists and turns in the triangular dynamic between America, Russia and China noted above should remind us that Moscow and Beijing are not going to be “best friends forever”.
    • India has no reason to rule out important changes in the way the US, Russia and China relate to each other in the near and medium-term.
    • In the last few years, India has finally overcome its historic hesitations in partnering with the US.
    • India has also intensified its efforts to engage European powers, especially France.
    • Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s visit to India later this month promises a fresh start in India’s difficult postcolonial ties with Britain.
    • India is also expanding its ties with Asian middle powers like Japan, Korea and Australia.
    • Despite the current differences over Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific, India and Russia have no reason to throw away their mutually beneficial bilateral partnership.
    • The current troubles with China seem to be an unfortunate exception to the upswing in India’s bilateral ties with global actors.

    Consider the question “What are the lessons India can draw from the  twists and turns in the triangular dynamic between America, Russia and China.”

    Conclusion

    India has successfully managed the past flux in the great power politics; it is even better positioned today to deal with potential changes among the great powers.

  • Explaining Pakistan’s flip-flop on trade with India

    The article highlights the key takeaways from Pakistan’s vacillations on resuming the trade ties even in the face of impending economic crisis.

    U-turn on resuming trade

    • On March 31, Pakistan announced the decision to import cotton, yarn, and sugar from India.
    • However, it took a U-turn on that announcement about resuming trade ties.
    • This highlights the internal differences and the emphasis on politics over economy and trade.
    • It also signifies Pakistan cabinet’s grandstanding, linking the normalisation of ties with India to Jammu and Kashmir.

    3 takeaways from the decision

    1) Immediate economic needs

    • Pakistan’s decision was to import only three items from India, namely cotton, yarn and sugar.
    • It was based on Pakistan’s immediate economic needs and not designed as a political confidence-building measure to normalise relations with India.
    • For the textile and sugar industries in Pakistan, importing from India is imperative, practical and is the most economic.
    • This is because cotton and sugarcane production declined there by 6.9% and 0.4%, respectively.
    •  By early 2019, the sugar prices started increasing, and in 2020, there was a crisis due to shortage and cost.
    • Importing sugar from India would be cheaper for the consumer market in Pakistan.

    2) Politics first

    • The second takeaway is the supremacy of politics over trade and economy, even if the latter is beneficial to the importing country.
    • The interests of its own business community and its export potential have become secondary.
    • However, Pakistan need not be singled out; this is a curse in South Asia, where politics play supreme over trade and economy.
    • The meagre percentage of intra-South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) trade and the failure of SAARC engaging in bilateral or regional trade would underline the above.

    3) Emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir issue

    • The third takeaway is the emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan to make any meaningful start in bilateral relations.
    • This goes against what it has been telling the rest of the world that India should begin a dialogue with Pakistan.
    • There were also reports that Pakistan agreeing to re-establish the ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) was a part of this new strategy.

    Consider the question: “Trade is unlikely to triumph over politics in South Asia; especially in India-Pakistan relations. This is a curse in South Asia, where politics play supreme over trade and economy.” Critically Examine.

    Conclusion

    Pakistan has been saying that the onus is on India to normalise the process. Perhaps, it is India’s turn to tell Islamabad that it is willing, but without any preconditions, and start with trade.

  • Freedom of Navigation Operations

    The US Navy has had “asserted navigational rights and freedoms approximately 130 nautical miles west of Lakshadweep Islands, inside India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), without requesting India’s prior consent, consistent with international law”.

    Try this question:

    Q.What do you mean by Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)? What are its legal backings?  Discuss its significance.

    Freedom of Navigation Operations

    • FONOPs are closely linked to the concept of freedom of navigation, and in particular to the enforcement of relevant international law and customs regarding freedom of navigation.
    • It involves passage conducted by the US Navy through waters claimed by coastal nations as their exclusive territory.
    • It is carried under the US policy of exercising and asserting its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms around the world”.
    • It says these “assertions communicate that the US does not acquiesce to the excessive maritime claims of other nations, and thus prevents those claims from becoming accepted in international law”.

    Significance of FONOPs

    • FONOPs are a method of enforcing UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and avoiding these negative outcomes by reinforcing freedom of navigation through practice.
    • It is exercised by sailing through all areas of the sea permitted under UNCLOS, and particularly those areas that states have attempted to close off to free navigation as defined under UNCLOS.

    What about EEZs?

    • An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    • It is an area of the sea in which a sovereign state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind.
    • It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles from the coast of the state in question.
    • It is also referred to as a maritime continental margin and, in colloquial usage, may include the continental shelf.
    • The term does not include either the territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.
    • The difference between the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone is that the first confers full sovereignty over the waters, whereas the second is merely a “sovereign right” which refers to the coastal state’s rights below the surface of the sea.
    • The surface waters, as can be seen on the map, are international waters.

    Is FONOP violative of India’s EEZ?

    • As per India’s Territorial Waters Act, 1976, the EEZ of India “is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial waters, and the limit of such zone is two hundred nautical miles from the baseline”.
    • India’s “limit of the territorial waters is the line every point of which is at a distance of twelve nautical miles from the nearest point of the appropriate baseline”.
    • Under the 1976 law, “all foreign ships (other than warships including submarines and other underwater vehicles) shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters”.

    Back2Basics: UNCLOS

    • The Law of the Sea Treaty formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It entered into force in 1994.
    • The convention establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing the oceans and replaces previous U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea
    • The convention defines the distance of 12 nautical miles from the baseline as Territorial Sea limit and a distance of 200 nautical miles distance as Exclusive Economic Zone limit.

  • India & NATO

    India has jettisoned many of its foreing policy shibboleths of late, however, avoiding NATO is not one of them. The article suggests engaging NATO to be in sync with the changing geopolitics.

    Why India avoided engagement with NATO in the past

    • India’s real problem is not with NATO, but with Delhi’s difficulty in thinking strategically about Europe.
    • Through the colonial era, Calcutta and Delhi viewed Europe through British eyes.
    • After Independence, Delhi tended to see Europe through the Russian lens.
    • The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union demanded a fresh approach to Europe.
    • But Delhi could not devote the kind of strategic attention that Europe demanded.
    • The bureaucratisation of the engagement between Delhi and Brussels and the lack of high-level political interest prevented India from taking full advantage of a re-emerging Europe.
    • In the last few years, Delhi has begun to develop an independent European framework, but has some distance to go in consolidating it.

    Ending political neglect of Europe

    • India has certainly sought to end prolonged political neglect of Europe.
    • The deepening maritime partnership with France since 2018 is an example.
    • Joining the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019 is another.
    • India’s first summit with Nordic nations in 2018 was a recognition that Europe is not a monolith but a continent of sub-regions.
    • India’s engagement with Central Europe’s Visegrad Four also highlighted the fact that Europe is not monolith.

    Why India should engage NATO

    • During the Cold War, India’s refusal was premised on its non-alignment.
    • That argument had little justification once the Cold War ended during 1989-91.
    • An India-NATO dialogue would simply mean having regular contact with a military alliance, most of whose members are well-established partners of India.
    • If Delhi is eager to draw a reluctant Russia into discussions on the Indo-Pacific, it makes little sense in avoiding engagement with NATO.
    • If Delhi does military exercises with China and Pakistan — under the rubric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), why should talking to NATO be anathema?
    • To play any role in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and NATO need partners like India, Australia and Japan.
    • Delhi, in turn, knows that no single power can produce stability and security in the Indo-Pacific.
    • India’s enthusiasm for the Quad is a recognition of the need to build coalitions.
    • A sustained dialogue between India and NATO could facilitate productive exchanges in a range of areas, including terrorism, changing geopolitics; the evolving nature of military conflict, the role of emerging military technologies, and new military doctrines.
    • More broadly, an institutionalised engagement with NATO should make it easier for Delhi to deal with the military establishments of its 30 member states.
    • On a bilateral front, each of the members has much to offer in strengthening India’s national capabilities.

    What about Russia

    • Russia has not made a secret of its allergy to the Quad and Delhi’s growing closeness with Washington.
    • Putting NATO into that mix is unlikely to make much difference.
    • Delhi, in turn, can’t be happy with the deepening ties between Moscow and Beijing.
    • As mature states, India and Russia know they have to insulate their bilateral relationship from the larger structural trends buffeting the world today.
    • Meanwhile, both Russia and China have intensive bilateral engagement with Europe.

    Consider the question “India has to end its prolonged political neglect of Europe and engage a major European institution like NATO. In light of this, examine the factors restraining India’s engagement with the Europe.“

    Conclusion

    India’s continued reluctance to engage a major European institution like NATO will be a stunning case of strategic self-denial and we should avoid it.

  • US foreign policy has changed, India can’t bank on being its ‘ally’ anymore

    The article highlights the paradigm shift in the U.S. foreign policy in which the U.S. engages with a country on several parallel lines with little or no scope for a trade-off between them.

    Changes in the U.S. foreign policy

    •  US foreign policy is no longer based on old friend-or-foe classification under which transgressions by a “friend” or an “ally” were overlooked if the country was helpful to US self-interests.
    • Instead, the US foreign policy paradigm has shifted to one where a country’s position on an issue — trade, climate change, security, or human rights — is the categorising principle and not the country.
    • Put differently, engagement with countries will be done on issues with little or no trade-off among them.
    • Competition, cooperation, and confrontation can all characterise the US’s bilateral engagement depending on the specific issue.
    • For example, trade will involve competition while climate change and pandemics will necessitate cooperation.
    • Human rights and national security issues could be confrontational.

    Smart sanctions

    • A key instrument of foreign policy will be the now well-honed system of “smart” sanctions.
    • Sanctions in the past were directed at a country as a whole but such sanctions were counterproductive and created anti-US sentiment.
    • In its latest version, smart sanctions do not target countries, but specific individuals, firms, and institutions for a variety of alleged transgressions.
    • US businesses and individuals cannot transact with sanctioned entities.
    • The Magnitsky Accountability Act of 2012, for example, targeted those involved in the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky and others responsible for human rights abuses in Russia.
    • When this was found to be successful, an executive order, passed in 2017, extended the provisions in the Magnitsky Act, to all who are corrupt or violate human rights in the world.

    What does this mean for India

    • Unlike in the antiquated rational-actor paradigm where there are imagined trade-offs across issues, in the new framework the US engages with countries on parallel lines.
    • The engagement is multifaceted across trade, intellectual property rights, climate change, security, terrorism, and, importantly, human rights, with limited trade-off across them.
    • Whether cooperation, competition, or confrontation dominate the nature of the engagement will depend on the specifics not whether India is a friend or a foe.

    Conclusion

    This marks the shift in the U.S. foreign policy, if others, including India, do not adapt to this paradigm shift, then they will find engagement with the US starkly different and surprisingly difficult.

  • Pakistan allows import of cotton, sugar from India

    Partially reversing a two-year-old decision to suspend all trade with India, Pakistan recently announced that it would allow the import of cotton and sugar from across the border.

    Ever wonder why the neighbour next door suddenly wants to normalize all ties? Read this edition of ours:

    India-Pakistan trade relations

    • Trade between the subcontinental neighbours has always been linked to their political interactions, given their tumultuous relationship.
    • For instance, India’s exports to Pakistan dropped by around 16 per cent to $1.82 billion in the 2016-17 financial years from $2.17 billion in 2015-16.
    • This coincided with the rise in tensions between the two countries following the terrorist attacks in Uri in 2016 and the surgical strikes by India against Pakistan-based militants.

    How much is the volume of trade?

    • Trade between the two countries grew marginally in subsequent years despite continuing tensions.
    • India’s exports to Pakistan increased to nearly 6 per cent to $1.92 billion in 2017-18, and by around 7 per cent to $2.07 billion in 2018-19.
    • Imports from Pakistan, though much lower than India’s exports to the country, also increased by 7.5 per cent to $488.56 million in 2017-18 from $454.49 million in 2016-17.
    • Growth of imports from Pakistan slowed to around $494.87 million in 2018-19 — an increase of around 1 per cent — before political relations between the two countries took a turn for the worse in 2019.

    Why did Pakistan ban trade with India?

    • Pakistan’s decision to suspend bilateral trade with India in August 2019 was primarily a fallout of India’s decision to scrap Article 370.
    • Pakistan called the move “illegal”, and took this trade measure as a way of showing its dissatisfaction.
    • However, an underlying reason for suspending trade between the two countries was also the 200 per cent tariff imposed by New Delhi on Pakistani imports.
    • This was a move that India implemented earlier that year after revoking its status as a Most Favoured Nation following the suicide bomb attack on the CRPF in Pulwama.
    • Pakistan’s announcement, coupled with India’s decision to revoke its MFN status and hike duties on its goods, was considered by some experts to be one of the most drastic measures ever taken in diplomatic tensions.

    Why is Pakistan allowing cotton and sugar import now?

    • Textiles from Pakistan are its value-added export.
    • The proposal to lift the ban on cotton imports came in the backdrop of a shortfall in raw material for Pakistan’s textile sector, which has reportedly been facing issues due to a low domestic yield of cotton in the country.
    • On top of this, imports from other countries like the US and Brazil have reportedly been more expensive and takes longer to arrive in the country.

    Why only these two commodities?

    • Even when we had a very small positive list (of goods for trade with Pakistan), agricultural commodities were always there in the list.
    • Cotton has been one of Pakistan’s major imports from India. In 2018-19, Pakistan imported $550.33 million worth of cotton from India.
    • When coupled with $457.75 million worth of organic chemicals, these products made up around half of its total imports from India.
    • Where sugar is concerned, trade experts feel it is a result of a long-standing interdependence between India and Pakistan over such agricultural commodities and a potential shortage in domestic supply.
    • If finally approved, cotton and sugar would be the second and third commodities allowed for export from India after Islamabad lifted the ban on medicine and related raw material imports during the Covid-19 pandemic.

  • On Myanmar, India has to decide whether it is on the side of the future

    The article highlights the factors India needs to consider in formulating its response to the crisis in Myanmar.

    Implications of Myanmar issue for India

    • India, because of its proximity to Myanmar, its geopolitical role, and its interests, will inevitably be drawn into the train of events.
    • The most immediate challenge is, of course, dealing with the refugee crisis that this coup occasions.
    • The rich and powerful nations have not pulled their weight in crafting an adequate multilateral response.
    • Myanmar’s other neighbours, and especially ASEAN countries, are also unlikely to intervene.
    • The principle of non-refoulement has to be the cornerstone of any civilised state’s response to a politically induced humanitarian disaster.
    • It is not clear where India stands on this.

    Factors India should consider in its Myanmar policy

    1) Protestors are widespread

    • The protests for democracy are widespread, involve young people, and are driven by a genuine opposition to military rule.
    • India has to decide whether it is on the side of the future. 

    2) Concerns of Northeastern states

    • Northeastern states like Manipur and Mizoram which will immediately bear the costs of helping refugees are calling for a more generous and imaginative policy.
    • The concerns of the Northeast states have often been historically sidelined in India’s handling of the “trijunction”.
    • This was partly because of counterinsurgency fears, and partly because of suspicion of political forces in the Northeast.
    • But ignoring accommodative sentiments in the Northeast, would be to potentially signal their marginality in shaping India’s calculations.

    3) Reputation for humanitarian concern

    • The counterinsurgency and subversion fears have to be intelligently handled.
    • Relying only on cooperation with the Myanmar military, without support for the local population, we will once again be setting ourselves up for long-term problems.
    • A broadbased reputation for humanitarian concerns and the welfare of people is a strategic asset, not a liability in the long term.
    • India should also now have the confidence that it can both politically and militarily handle any risks that occasionally arise in the context of doing the decent thing.
    • But by closing down its borders, it is not sending a signal of strength but one of weakness.

    4) Geopolitical factors

    • With every major power, from Russia to China now seeing Myanmar in terms of geopolitical terms, the stakes for India are going to be high.
    • But its military seems more repressive, and its elites, including Aung San Suu Kyi, have been more conservative in harnessing democratic and progressive impulses.
    • So under such circumstances, it will be tempting for India to deeply engage with the military.
    • There is also a great deal of exaggeration about Myanmar’s economic importance to India.
    • Certainly, connectivity and trade with Myanmar provide momentum for India’s eastward interests.
    • But the benefits from engagement with Myanmar are not so great that India cannot put them aside to act on a modicum of principle.

    Way forward

    • Presumably, India wants to be a key interlocutor in two contexts.
    • It wants to be a key player in shaping a global response to the crisis.
    • And it wants to have some role in helping with a settlement towards a less repressive transition within Myanmar.
    • But for both of those roles, it is important that India has widespread credibility with the different groups and movements inside Myanmar.

    Conclusion

    India needs to consider these factors before deciding its response to the situation developing in Myanmar.

  • Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process (HoA-IP)

    External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has attended the Heart of Asia Conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

    The 9th Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process (HoA-IP) ministerial conference is part of the Istanbul Process – a regional initiative on security and cooperation for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan – that was launched on November 2, 2011, in Turkey.

    Note the participating countries from the logo itself.

    Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process

    • The Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process (HoA-IP) is an initiative of Afghanistan and Turkey, which was officially launched at a conference hosted by Turkey in Istanbul on 2 November 2011.
    • Since then, Afghanistan supported by fourteen participating countries and supporting countries beyond the region as well as 12 Regional and International Organizations is leading and coordinating this Process.

    Goals of the Process

    • The HoA-IP aims at promoting and strengthening peace, security, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and in the region.
    • The HoA-IP has become one of the most interactive voluntary state-groupings in the HoA Region.
    • It brings Afghanistan’s immediate and extended neighbours as well as international supporters together through the following focus areas:
    1. Political Consultations
    2. Implementation of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
    3. Cooperation with Regional Organizations

    Note: India too, has held the Ministerial Conferences of HoA-IP back on 4 December 2016 at Amritsar.

  • The Afghan Endgame and the US

    As the May 1 deadline for pulling out all American troops from Afghanistan nears, US President Joe Biden faces some difficult decisions.

    Key tasks for the US before they exit

    • The U.S. could abide by the promise made in the U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in February 2020 to withdraw the last of the around 2,500 American Marines stationed in Afghanistan.
    • However, Mr Biden has said it would be tough given the levels of violence there.
    • The US could negotiate with the Taliban for an extension of the agreement, offering other incentives like the release of more prisoners and the delisting of sanctioned Taliban terrorists.
    • The other option is to scrap the 2020 agreement and back the Ashraf Ghani government to continue towards a negotiated settlement, even as US troops remain in Afghanistan to stabilize the security situation.

    What is the US likely to do?

    • The US exit plan is still underway and that no decision on the length of stay or troop numbers have been made to this point, cleared the US Secy of Defence.
    • No U.S. troops have been targeted by Taliban militants in the past year, but violence against Afghan civilians, particularly women, journalists, students and activists has gone up manifold despite the peace agreement.
    • More than 3,000 civilians were killed in 2020.
    • The US has shown some impatience with the Ghani government as well, believing that it is dragging its feet on intra-Afghan negotiations that began last year in Doha but have stalled for the moment.

    Plans for Ashraf Ghani

    • A US plan proposes that Mr Ghani step up negotiations with the Taliban for “power-sharing”, discuss principles of future governance and step aside eventually for a “more inclusive” or interim government. The
    • The tone of the letter seems to make it clear that the US is not in favour of completely scrapping the 2020 agreement.
    • Therefore, it is most likely to pursue the option of negotiating for an extension of the agreement, according to experts, as it builds other dialogue platforms.

    Try this question from our AWE Initiative:

    What is President Ghani’s plan?

    • Ghani has proposed his own peace plan.
    • It would involve a full ceasefire, inviting the Taliban to participate in early elections in Afghanistan, and then for Mr Ghani to hand over power to the elected government.
    • He also said no regional talks could be successful if they did not include India, which is a development partner and a stakeholder.

    Where does India stand?

    • India’s position has been to back an “Afghan-owned, Afghan-led, Afghan-controlled” peace process, backing the elected government in Kabul, and it has not yet held talks with the Taliban directly.
    • As a result, its option remains to stand with the Ghani government and support the constitution that guarantees a democratic process and rights of women and minorities, over any plans the Taliban might have if they come to power.
    • At the same time, India has not foreclosed on the option of talking to the Taliban if it does join the government in Afghanistan.
    • India too has made it clear that it seeks to be an integral part of the process, as the outcomes will have a deep impact on India’s security matrix as well.

  • Teesta Water Sharing Deal

    PM while on his tour of Bangladesh assured his best to ink the long-awaited deal over the Teesta and other common rivers. On at least two occasions—2011 and 2017—Bangladesh and India came close to signing a deal on the Teesta.

    Teesta River

    • Teesta River is a 315 km long river that rises in the eastern Himalayas, flows through the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal through Bangladesh and enters the Bay of Bengal.
    • It is a tributary of the Brahmaputra (known as Jamuna in Bangladesh), flowing through India and Bangladesh.
    • It originates in the Himalayas near Chunthang, Sikkim and flows to the south through West Bengal before entering Bangladesh.
    • Originally, it continued southward to empty directly into the Padma River but around 1787 the river changed its course to flow eastward to join the Jamuna river.
    • The Teesta Barrage dam helps to provide irrigation for the plains between the upper Padma and the Jamuna.

    What is the dispute about?

    • The point of contention between India and Bangladesh is mainly the lean season flow in the Teesta draining into Bangladesh.
    • The river covers nearly the entire floodplains of Sikkim while draining 2,800 sq km of Bangladesh, governing the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
    • For West Bengal, Teesta is equally important, considered the lifeline of half-a-dozen districts in North Bengal.
    • Bangladesh has sought an “equitable” distribution of Teesta waters from India, on the lines of the Ganga Water Treaty of 1996, but to no avail.
    • The failure to ink a deal had its fallout on the country’s politics, putting the ruling party of PM Sheikh Hasina in a spot.

    The hydrological linkages between India and Bangladesh are a product of geography and a matter of shared history. Discuss this statement in line with the Teesta water sharing dispute.

    The deal

    • Following a half-hearted deal in 1983, when a nearly equal division of water was proposed, the countries hit a roadblock. The transient agreement could not be implemented.
    • Talks resumed after the Awami League returned to power in 2008 and the former Indian PM Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka in 2011.
    • In 2015, PM Modi’s visit to Dhaka generated more ebullient lines: deliberations were underway involving all the stakeholders to conclude the agreement as soon as possible.

    Issues from the Indian side

    • It remains an unfinished project and one of the key stakeholders — West Bengal CM is yet to endorse the deal.
    • Her objection is connected to “global warming. Many of the glaciers on the Teesta basin have retreated.
    • The importance of the flow and the seasonal variation of this river is felt during the lean season (from October to April/May) as the average flow is about 500 million cubic metres (MCM) per month.
    • The CM opposed an arrangement in 2011, by which India would get 42.5% and Bangladesh 37.5% of the water during the lean season, and the plan was shelved.

    Why does it matter?

    • India witnessed a surge in the insurgency in the northeast during the rule of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) from 2001 to 2005.
    • Bangladesh allegedly sheltered insurgents engaged in anti-India activities, and nearly all the Home Ministry-level talks ended without agreement, and India had to increase the security budget for the northeast.
    • In a couple of years of assuming office in 2008, the Awami League targeted insurgent camps and handed over the rebels to India.
    • As India’s security establishment heaved a sigh of relief, the relationship improved on multiple fronts.