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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • India & NATO

    India has jettisoned many of its foreing policy shibboleths of late, however, avoiding NATO is not one of them. The article suggests engaging NATO to be in sync with the changing geopolitics.

    Why India avoided engagement with NATO in the past

    • India’s real problem is not with NATO, but with Delhi’s difficulty in thinking strategically about Europe.
    • Through the colonial era, Calcutta and Delhi viewed Europe through British eyes.
    • After Independence, Delhi tended to see Europe through the Russian lens.
    • The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union demanded a fresh approach to Europe.
    • But Delhi could not devote the kind of strategic attention that Europe demanded.
    • The bureaucratisation of the engagement between Delhi and Brussels and the lack of high-level political interest prevented India from taking full advantage of a re-emerging Europe.
    • In the last few years, Delhi has begun to develop an independent European framework, but has some distance to go in consolidating it.

    Ending political neglect of Europe

    • India has certainly sought to end prolonged political neglect of Europe.
    • The deepening maritime partnership with France since 2018 is an example.
    • Joining the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019 is another.
    • India’s first summit with Nordic nations in 2018 was a recognition that Europe is not a monolith but a continent of sub-regions.
    • India’s engagement with Central Europe’s Visegrad Four also highlighted the fact that Europe is not monolith.

    Why India should engage NATO

    • During the Cold War, India’s refusal was premised on its non-alignment.
    • That argument had little justification once the Cold War ended during 1989-91.
    • An India-NATO dialogue would simply mean having regular contact with a military alliance, most of whose members are well-established partners of India.
    • If Delhi is eager to draw a reluctant Russia into discussions on the Indo-Pacific, it makes little sense in avoiding engagement with NATO.
    • If Delhi does military exercises with China and Pakistan — under the rubric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), why should talking to NATO be anathema?
    • To play any role in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and NATO need partners like India, Australia and Japan.
    • Delhi, in turn, knows that no single power can produce stability and security in the Indo-Pacific.
    • India’s enthusiasm for the Quad is a recognition of the need to build coalitions.
    • A sustained dialogue between India and NATO could facilitate productive exchanges in a range of areas, including terrorism, changing geopolitics; the evolving nature of military conflict, the role of emerging military technologies, and new military doctrines.
    • More broadly, an institutionalised engagement with NATO should make it easier for Delhi to deal with the military establishments of its 30 member states.
    • On a bilateral front, each of the members has much to offer in strengthening India’s national capabilities.

    What about Russia

    • Russia has not made a secret of its allergy to the Quad and Delhi’s growing closeness with Washington.
    • Putting NATO into that mix is unlikely to make much difference.
    • Delhi, in turn, can’t be happy with the deepening ties between Moscow and Beijing.
    • As mature states, India and Russia know they have to insulate their bilateral relationship from the larger structural trends buffeting the world today.
    • Meanwhile, both Russia and China have intensive bilateral engagement with Europe.

    Consider the question “India has to end its prolonged political neglect of Europe and engage a major European institution like NATO. In light of this, examine the factors restraining India’s engagement with the Europe.“

    Conclusion

    India’s continued reluctance to engage a major European institution like NATO will be a stunning case of strategic self-denial and we should avoid it.

  • US foreign policy has changed, India can’t bank on being its ‘ally’ anymore

    The article highlights the paradigm shift in the U.S. foreign policy in which the U.S. engages with a country on several parallel lines with little or no scope for a trade-off between them.

    Changes in the U.S. foreign policy

    •  US foreign policy is no longer based on old friend-or-foe classification under which transgressions by a “friend” or an “ally” were overlooked if the country was helpful to US self-interests.
    • Instead, the US foreign policy paradigm has shifted to one where a country’s position on an issue — trade, climate change, security, or human rights — is the categorising principle and not the country.
    • Put differently, engagement with countries will be done on issues with little or no trade-off among them.
    • Competition, cooperation, and confrontation can all characterise the US’s bilateral engagement depending on the specific issue.
    • For example, trade will involve competition while climate change and pandemics will necessitate cooperation.
    • Human rights and national security issues could be confrontational.

    Smart sanctions

    • A key instrument of foreign policy will be the now well-honed system of “smart” sanctions.
    • Sanctions in the past were directed at a country as a whole but such sanctions were counterproductive and created anti-US sentiment.
    • In its latest version, smart sanctions do not target countries, but specific individuals, firms, and institutions for a variety of alleged transgressions.
    • US businesses and individuals cannot transact with sanctioned entities.
    • The Magnitsky Accountability Act of 2012, for example, targeted those involved in the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky and others responsible for human rights abuses in Russia.
    • When this was found to be successful, an executive order, passed in 2017, extended the provisions in the Magnitsky Act, to all who are corrupt or violate human rights in the world.

    What does this mean for India

    • Unlike in the antiquated rational-actor paradigm where there are imagined trade-offs across issues, in the new framework the US engages with countries on parallel lines.
    • The engagement is multifaceted across trade, intellectual property rights, climate change, security, terrorism, and, importantly, human rights, with limited trade-off across them.
    • Whether cooperation, competition, or confrontation dominate the nature of the engagement will depend on the specifics not whether India is a friend or a foe.

    Conclusion

    This marks the shift in the U.S. foreign policy, if others, including India, do not adapt to this paradigm shift, then they will find engagement with the US starkly different and surprisingly difficult.

  • Pakistan allows import of cotton, sugar from India

    Partially reversing a two-year-old decision to suspend all trade with India, Pakistan recently announced that it would allow the import of cotton and sugar from across the border.

    Ever wonder why the neighbour next door suddenly wants to normalize all ties? Read this edition of ours:

    India-Pakistan trade relations

    • Trade between the subcontinental neighbours has always been linked to their political interactions, given their tumultuous relationship.
    • For instance, India’s exports to Pakistan dropped by around 16 per cent to $1.82 billion in the 2016-17 financial years from $2.17 billion in 2015-16.
    • This coincided with the rise in tensions between the two countries following the terrorist attacks in Uri in 2016 and the surgical strikes by India against Pakistan-based militants.

    How much is the volume of trade?

    • Trade between the two countries grew marginally in subsequent years despite continuing tensions.
    • India’s exports to Pakistan increased to nearly 6 per cent to $1.92 billion in 2017-18, and by around 7 per cent to $2.07 billion in 2018-19.
    • Imports from Pakistan, though much lower than India’s exports to the country, also increased by 7.5 per cent to $488.56 million in 2017-18 from $454.49 million in 2016-17.
    • Growth of imports from Pakistan slowed to around $494.87 million in 2018-19 — an increase of around 1 per cent — before political relations between the two countries took a turn for the worse in 2019.

    Why did Pakistan ban trade with India?

    • Pakistan’s decision to suspend bilateral trade with India in August 2019 was primarily a fallout of India’s decision to scrap Article 370.
    • Pakistan called the move “illegal”, and took this trade measure as a way of showing its dissatisfaction.
    • However, an underlying reason for suspending trade between the two countries was also the 200 per cent tariff imposed by New Delhi on Pakistani imports.
    • This was a move that India implemented earlier that year after revoking its status as a Most Favoured Nation following the suicide bomb attack on the CRPF in Pulwama.
    • Pakistan’s announcement, coupled with India’s decision to revoke its MFN status and hike duties on its goods, was considered by some experts to be one of the most drastic measures ever taken in diplomatic tensions.

    Why is Pakistan allowing cotton and sugar import now?

    • Textiles from Pakistan are its value-added export.
    • The proposal to lift the ban on cotton imports came in the backdrop of a shortfall in raw material for Pakistan’s textile sector, which has reportedly been facing issues due to a low domestic yield of cotton in the country.
    • On top of this, imports from other countries like the US and Brazil have reportedly been more expensive and takes longer to arrive in the country.

    Why only these two commodities?

    • Even when we had a very small positive list (of goods for trade with Pakistan), agricultural commodities were always there in the list.
    • Cotton has been one of Pakistan’s major imports from India. In 2018-19, Pakistan imported $550.33 million worth of cotton from India.
    • When coupled with $457.75 million worth of organic chemicals, these products made up around half of its total imports from India.
    • Where sugar is concerned, trade experts feel it is a result of a long-standing interdependence between India and Pakistan over such agricultural commodities and a potential shortage in domestic supply.
    • If finally approved, cotton and sugar would be the second and third commodities allowed for export from India after Islamabad lifted the ban on medicine and related raw material imports during the Covid-19 pandemic.

  • On Myanmar, India has to decide whether it is on the side of the future

    The article highlights the factors India needs to consider in formulating its response to the crisis in Myanmar.

    Implications of Myanmar issue for India

    • India, because of its proximity to Myanmar, its geopolitical role, and its interests, will inevitably be drawn into the train of events.
    • The most immediate challenge is, of course, dealing with the refugee crisis that this coup occasions.
    • The rich and powerful nations have not pulled their weight in crafting an adequate multilateral response.
    • Myanmar’s other neighbours, and especially ASEAN countries, are also unlikely to intervene.
    • The principle of non-refoulement has to be the cornerstone of any civilised state’s response to a politically induced humanitarian disaster.
    • It is not clear where India stands on this.

    Factors India should consider in its Myanmar policy

    1) Protestors are widespread

    • The protests for democracy are widespread, involve young people, and are driven by a genuine opposition to military rule.
    • India has to decide whether it is on the side of the future. 

    2) Concerns of Northeastern states

    • Northeastern states like Manipur and Mizoram which will immediately bear the costs of helping refugees are calling for a more generous and imaginative policy.
    • The concerns of the Northeast states have often been historically sidelined in India’s handling of the “trijunction”.
    • This was partly because of counterinsurgency fears, and partly because of suspicion of political forces in the Northeast.
    • But ignoring accommodative sentiments in the Northeast, would be to potentially signal their marginality in shaping India’s calculations.

    3) Reputation for humanitarian concern

    • The counterinsurgency and subversion fears have to be intelligently handled.
    • Relying only on cooperation with the Myanmar military, without support for the local population, we will once again be setting ourselves up for long-term problems.
    • A broadbased reputation for humanitarian concerns and the welfare of people is a strategic asset, not a liability in the long term.
    • India should also now have the confidence that it can both politically and militarily handle any risks that occasionally arise in the context of doing the decent thing.
    • But by closing down its borders, it is not sending a signal of strength but one of weakness.

    4) Geopolitical factors

    • With every major power, from Russia to China now seeing Myanmar in terms of geopolitical terms, the stakes for India are going to be high.
    • But its military seems more repressive, and its elites, including Aung San Suu Kyi, have been more conservative in harnessing democratic and progressive impulses.
    • So under such circumstances, it will be tempting for India to deeply engage with the military.
    • There is also a great deal of exaggeration about Myanmar’s economic importance to India.
    • Certainly, connectivity and trade with Myanmar provide momentum for India’s eastward interests.
    • But the benefits from engagement with Myanmar are not so great that India cannot put them aside to act on a modicum of principle.

    Way forward

    • Presumably, India wants to be a key interlocutor in two contexts.
    • It wants to be a key player in shaping a global response to the crisis.
    • And it wants to have some role in helping with a settlement towards a less repressive transition within Myanmar.
    • But for both of those roles, it is important that India has widespread credibility with the different groups and movements inside Myanmar.

    Conclusion

    India needs to consider these factors before deciding its response to the situation developing in Myanmar.

  • Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process (HoA-IP)

    External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has attended the Heart of Asia Conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

    The 9th Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process (HoA-IP) ministerial conference is part of the Istanbul Process – a regional initiative on security and cooperation for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan – that was launched on November 2, 2011, in Turkey.

    Note the participating countries from the logo itself.

    Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process

    • The Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process (HoA-IP) is an initiative of Afghanistan and Turkey, which was officially launched at a conference hosted by Turkey in Istanbul on 2 November 2011.
    • Since then, Afghanistan supported by fourteen participating countries and supporting countries beyond the region as well as 12 Regional and International Organizations is leading and coordinating this Process.

    Goals of the Process

    • The HoA-IP aims at promoting and strengthening peace, security, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and in the region.
    • The HoA-IP has become one of the most interactive voluntary state-groupings in the HoA Region.
    • It brings Afghanistan’s immediate and extended neighbours as well as international supporters together through the following focus areas:
    1. Political Consultations
    2. Implementation of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
    3. Cooperation with Regional Organizations

    Note: India too, has held the Ministerial Conferences of HoA-IP back on 4 December 2016 at Amritsar.

  • The Afghan Endgame and the US

    As the May 1 deadline for pulling out all American troops from Afghanistan nears, US President Joe Biden faces some difficult decisions.

    Key tasks for the US before they exit

    • The U.S. could abide by the promise made in the U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in February 2020 to withdraw the last of the around 2,500 American Marines stationed in Afghanistan.
    • However, Mr Biden has said it would be tough given the levels of violence there.
    • The US could negotiate with the Taliban for an extension of the agreement, offering other incentives like the release of more prisoners and the delisting of sanctioned Taliban terrorists.
    • The other option is to scrap the 2020 agreement and back the Ashraf Ghani government to continue towards a negotiated settlement, even as US troops remain in Afghanistan to stabilize the security situation.

    What is the US likely to do?

    • The US exit plan is still underway and that no decision on the length of stay or troop numbers have been made to this point, cleared the US Secy of Defence.
    • No U.S. troops have been targeted by Taliban militants in the past year, but violence against Afghan civilians, particularly women, journalists, students and activists has gone up manifold despite the peace agreement.
    • More than 3,000 civilians were killed in 2020.
    • The US has shown some impatience with the Ghani government as well, believing that it is dragging its feet on intra-Afghan negotiations that began last year in Doha but have stalled for the moment.

    Plans for Ashraf Ghani

    • A US plan proposes that Mr Ghani step up negotiations with the Taliban for “power-sharing”, discuss principles of future governance and step aside eventually for a “more inclusive” or interim government. The
    • The tone of the letter seems to make it clear that the US is not in favour of completely scrapping the 2020 agreement.
    • Therefore, it is most likely to pursue the option of negotiating for an extension of the agreement, according to experts, as it builds other dialogue platforms.

    Try this question from our AWE Initiative:

    What is President Ghani’s plan?

    • Ghani has proposed his own peace plan.
    • It would involve a full ceasefire, inviting the Taliban to participate in early elections in Afghanistan, and then for Mr Ghani to hand over power to the elected government.
    • He also said no regional talks could be successful if they did not include India, which is a development partner and a stakeholder.

    Where does India stand?

    • India’s position has been to back an “Afghan-owned, Afghan-led, Afghan-controlled” peace process, backing the elected government in Kabul, and it has not yet held talks with the Taliban directly.
    • As a result, its option remains to stand with the Ghani government and support the constitution that guarantees a democratic process and rights of women and minorities, over any plans the Taliban might have if they come to power.
    • At the same time, India has not foreclosed on the option of talking to the Taliban if it does join the government in Afghanistan.
    • India too has made it clear that it seeks to be an integral part of the process, as the outcomes will have a deep impact on India’s security matrix as well.

  • Teesta Water Sharing Deal

    PM while on his tour of Bangladesh assured his best to ink the long-awaited deal over the Teesta and other common rivers. On at least two occasions—2011 and 2017—Bangladesh and India came close to signing a deal on the Teesta.

    Teesta River

    • Teesta River is a 315 km long river that rises in the eastern Himalayas, flows through the Indian states of Sikkim and West Bengal through Bangladesh and enters the Bay of Bengal.
    • It is a tributary of the Brahmaputra (known as Jamuna in Bangladesh), flowing through India and Bangladesh.
    • It originates in the Himalayas near Chunthang, Sikkim and flows to the south through West Bengal before entering Bangladesh.
    • Originally, it continued southward to empty directly into the Padma River but around 1787 the river changed its course to flow eastward to join the Jamuna river.
    • The Teesta Barrage dam helps to provide irrigation for the plains between the upper Padma and the Jamuna.

    What is the dispute about?

    • The point of contention between India and Bangladesh is mainly the lean season flow in the Teesta draining into Bangladesh.
    • The river covers nearly the entire floodplains of Sikkim while draining 2,800 sq km of Bangladesh, governing the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
    • For West Bengal, Teesta is equally important, considered the lifeline of half-a-dozen districts in North Bengal.
    • Bangladesh has sought an “equitable” distribution of Teesta waters from India, on the lines of the Ganga Water Treaty of 1996, but to no avail.
    • The failure to ink a deal had its fallout on the country’s politics, putting the ruling party of PM Sheikh Hasina in a spot.

    The hydrological linkages between India and Bangladesh are a product of geography and a matter of shared history. Discuss this statement in line with the Teesta water sharing dispute.

    The deal

    • Following a half-hearted deal in 1983, when a nearly equal division of water was proposed, the countries hit a roadblock. The transient agreement could not be implemented.
    • Talks resumed after the Awami League returned to power in 2008 and the former Indian PM Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka in 2011.
    • In 2015, PM Modi’s visit to Dhaka generated more ebullient lines: deliberations were underway involving all the stakeholders to conclude the agreement as soon as possible.

    Issues from the Indian side

    • It remains an unfinished project and one of the key stakeholders — West Bengal CM is yet to endorse the deal.
    • Her objection is connected to “global warming. Many of the glaciers on the Teesta basin have retreated.
    • The importance of the flow and the seasonal variation of this river is felt during the lean season (from October to April/May) as the average flow is about 500 million cubic metres (MCM) per month.
    • The CM opposed an arrangement in 2011, by which India would get 42.5% and Bangladesh 37.5% of the water during the lean season, and the plan was shelved.

    Why does it matter?

    • India witnessed a surge in the insurgency in the northeast during the rule of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) from 2001 to 2005.
    • Bangladesh allegedly sheltered insurgents engaged in anti-India activities, and nearly all the Home Ministry-level talks ended without agreement, and India had to increase the security budget for the northeast.
    • In a couple of years of assuming office in 2008, the Awami League targeted insurgent camps and handed over the rebels to India.
    • As India’s security establishment heaved a sigh of relief, the relationship improved on multiple fronts.

  • Enhancing the Indo-Bangladesh cooperation

    The article highlights the areas of cooperations and issues between the India and Bangladesh as it celebrates the golden jubilee of its independence from Pakistan.

    New era of cooperation

    • In the last decade, India-Bangladesh relations have warmed up, entering a new era of cooperation.
    • These ties have moved beyond historical and cultural ties to become more assimilated in the areas of trade, connectivity, energy, and defence.
    • Bangladesh and India have achieved the rare feat of solving their border issues peacefully by ratifying the historic Land Boundary Agreement in 2015.
    • The Bangladesh government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has uprooted anti-India insurgency elements from its borders.

    Bilateral trade and tourism

    • Bangladesh today is India’s biggest trading partner in South Asia with exports to Bangladesh in FY 2018-19 at $9.21 billion and imports at $1.04 billion.
    • India has offered duty free access to multiple Bangladeshi products.
    • While India has given duty-free access to a number of Bangladeshi goods, its physical enormity precludes circumstances that could have Bangladesh enhance the quantum of exports.
    • Trade could be more balanced if non-tariff barriers from the Indian side could be removed.
    • Bangladeshis make up a large portion of tourists in India with one in every five tourists being a Bangladeshi.
    • Bangladesh accounts for more than 35% of India’s international medical patients and contributes more than 50% of India’s revenue from medical tourism.

    Cooperation on development

    • India extended three lines of credit to Bangladesh in recent years amounting to $8 billion for the construction of roads, railways, bridges, and ports.
    • However, in eight years until 2019, only 51% of the first $800 million line of credit has been utilised.
    • Barely any amount from the next two lines of credit worth $6.5 billion has been mobilised.
    • This has been mostly due to red-tapism from India’s end, and slow project implementation on Bangladesh’s end.

    Connectivity

    • Connectivity between the two countries has greatly improved.
    • A direct bus service between Kolkata and Agartala runs a route distance of 500 km, as compared to the 1,650 km if it ran through the Chicken’s Neck to remain within India.
    • There are three passenger and freight railway services running between the two countries, with two more routes on their way to be restored.
    • The inauguration of the Chilahati-Haldibari railway link has been a significant move in enhancing connectivity between the countries.
    • Recently, a 1.9 kilometre long bridge, the Maitri Setu, was inaugurated connecting Sabroom in India with Ramgarh in Bangladesh.
    • Bangladesh allows the shipment of goods from its various ports.
    • This allows landlocked Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura to access open water routes through the Chattogram and Mongla ports.

    Issues

    • Despite the remarkable progress, the unresolved Teesta water sharing issue looms large.
    • While smuggling needs to be dealt with firmly, it is not acceptable for Bangladeshis that rather than apprehending people trying to make an illegal entry into India, the BSF has been shooting them.
    • Indian government’s proposal to implement the National Register of Citizens across the whole of India reflects poorly on India-Bangladesh relations.

    Way forward

    • India-Bangladesh relations have been gaining positive momentum over the last decade.
    • As the larger country, the onus is on India to be generous enough to let the water flow and ensure that people are not killed on the border for cattle.

    Consider the question “As Bangladesh celebrates the golden jubilee of its independence, it is also time for celebrating the enduring Indo-Bangladesh ties despite hiccups that have sometimes disturbed the waters. In light of this, examine the areas of cooperation and issues between the two countries.“

    Conclusion

    To make the recent gains irreversible, both countries need to continue working on the three Cs — cooperation, collaboration, and consolidation

    Source:

    https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/remove-the-wedges-in-india-bangladesh-ties/article34163863.ece

    https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-bangladesh-relations-narendra-modi-visit-7245361/

  • Traffic jam in the Suez Canal

    A massive cargo ship has turned sideways in Egypt’s Suez Canal, blocking traffic in a crucial East-West waterway for global shipping.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Between India and East Asia, the navigation time and distance can be greatly reduced by which of the following?

    1. Deepening the Malacca straits between Malaysia and Indonesia.
    2. Opening a new canal across the Kra isthmus between the Gulf of Siam and Andaman sea.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

    Suez Canal

    • The Suez Canal is an artificial sea-level waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea through the Isthmus of Suez; and dividing Africa and Asia.
    • Constructed by the Suez Canal Company between 1859 and 1869, it officially opened on 17 November 1869.
    • The canal was earlier controlled by British and French interests in its initial years but was nationalized in 1956 by Egypt’s then leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.
    • It extends from the northern terminus of Port Said to the southern terminus of Port Tewfik at the city of Suez.
    • Its length is 193.30 km including its northern and southern access channels.

    Its significance

    • The Suez Canal provides a crucial link for oil, natural gas and cargo being shipping from East to West.
    • It provides a major shortcut for ships moving between Europe and Asia, who before its construction had to sail around Africa to complete the same journey.
    • Around 10 % of the world’s trade flows through the waterway and it remains one of Egypt’s top foreign currency earners.
    • As per a report, the canal is a major source of income for Egypt’s economy, with the African country earning $5.61 billion in revenues from it last year.

  • Recalibrating India-Taiwan ties

    25 years of friendship

    • India and Taiwan are celebrating 25 years of their partnership.
    • Mutual efforts between Delhi and Taipei have enabled a range of bilateral agreements covering agriculture, investment, customs cooperation, civil aviation, industrial cooperation and other areas.
    • This growing relationship indicates that the time has come to recalibrate India-Taiwan relations.

    Recalibrating relationship

    1) Creating political framework

    • Both partners have increasingly deepened mutual respect underpinned by openness, with democracy and diversity as the key principles for collective growth.
    • To make this relationship more meaningful, both sides can create a group of empowered persons or a task force to chart out a road map in a given time frame.

    2) Cooperation in healthcare

    • Taiwan’s handling of the pandemic and its support to many other countries underlines the need to deepen healthcare cooperation.
    • India and Taiwan already collaborate in the area of traditional medicine.
    • The time is ripe to expand cooperation in the field of healthcare.

    3) Bio-friendly technologies

    • Stubble burning and an associated decline in air quality has become a challenge for Indian government.
    • Taiwan could be a valuable partner in dealing with this challenge through its bio-friendly technologies.
    • Such technologies convert agricultural waste into value-added and environmentally beneficial renewable energy or biochemicals.
    • This will be a win-win situation as it will help in dealing with air pollution and also enhance farmers’ income.
    • Further, New Delhi and Taipei can also undertake joint research and development initiatives in the field of organic farming.

    4) Cultural exchange

    • India and Taiwan need to deepen people-to-people connect.
    • Cultural exchange is the cornerstone of any civilisational exchange.
    • However, Taiwanese tourists in India are a very small number.
    • The Buddhist pilgrimage tour needs better connectivity and visibility, in addition to showcasing incredible India’s diversity. .
    • With the Taiwan Tourism Bureau partnering with Mumbai Metro, Taiwan is trying to raise awareness about the country and increase the inflow of Indian tourists.

    5) Deepening economic ties

    • India’s huge market provides Taiwan with investment opportunities.
    • The signing of a bilateral trade agreement in 2018 was an important milestone.
    • Taiwan’s reputation as the world leader in semiconductor and electronics complements India’s leadership in ITES (Information Technology-Enabled Services).
    • This convergence of interests will help create new opportunities.
    • Despite the huge potential, Taiwan investments have been paltry in India.
    • Taiwanese firms find the regulatory and labour regime daunting.

    Consider the question “Though mutual efforts between Delhi and Taipei have enabled a range of bilateral agreements, the time has come to recalibrate India-Taiwan relations” In light of this, discuss the ways in which the two countries can deepen bilateral relations and increase cooperation.

    Conclusion

    The two countries have much to cooperate and build the relationship on. What is needed is the political will to recalibrate the relationship.