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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • The Quad’s importance to India’s strategic autonomy

    India is a member of both the Quad and the BRICS. Is not it the contradiction? The article answers this question and maps the transformation of India’s relation with the U.S. over the years.

    Is India’s participation in BRICS and Quad contradictory?

    • Global Times, the Chinese newspaper last week speculating on the implications of the historic Quad summit for the BRICS.
    • In calling the Quad a “negative asset” for the BRICS the Global Times was highlighting what it sees as a contradiction in India’s participation in both the forums.
    • The paper argues that India has worsened “India-China and India-Russia relations” and halted progress “in the development of BRICS and SCO”.
    • Global Times warns that if India continues to get closer to Washington, India “will eventually lose its strategic autonomy”.

    Understanding India’s strategic autonomy

    • “Strategic autonomy” is the framework that guided Delhi’s international relations since the Cold War.
    • In the early 1990s, strategic autonomy was about creating space for India against the overweening American power.
    • Why the space was needed? It was mainly because of the U.S. stance on two important aspects: Kashmir issue and nuclear program.
    • President Bill Clinton had questioned the legitimacy of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India and declared the US’s intent to resolve Delhi’s Kashmir dispute with Pakistan.
    • Washington insisted that rolling back India’s nuclear and missile programmes was a major objective of US foreign policy.
    • All that changed over the last three decades.

    8 elements of  transformation of India’s relations with the U.S and China

    • A rising China has emerged as the biggest challenge to India and the US is increasingly an important part of the answer.
    • A few elements stand out.
    • First, China has become more assertive on the contested boundary, therefore, the support from the US and its Asian allies has been valuable.
    • Second, on the Kashmir question, China raises the issue at the UNSC while the US is helping India to block China’s moves.
    • Third, on cross-border terrorism, the US puts pressure on Pakistan and China protects Rawalpindi.
    • Fourth, the US has facilitated India’s integration with the global nuclear order while Beijing blocks Delhi’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
    • Fifth, the US backs India’s permanent membership of the UNSC, China does not.
    • Sixth, India now sees the trade with China hollowing out India’s manufacturing capability.
    • Its objective on diversifying its economy away from China is shared by the US and the Quad partners.
    • Seventh, India opposes China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a project that undermines India’s territorial sovereignty and regional primacy.
    • India is working with Quad partners to offer alternatives to the BRI.
    • Finally, India sees China’s rising military profile in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean as a problem and is working with Washington to redress the unfolding imbalance in India’s neighbourhood.

    India’s approach to BRICS and SCO

    • The BRICS was part of India’s strategy in the unipolar moment that dawned at the end of the Cold War.
    • India’s current enthusiasm for the Quad is about limiting the dangers of a unipolar Asia dominated by China.
    • But India will continue to attach some value — diplomatic if not strategic — to a forum like the BRICS.
    • After all, the BRICS forum provides a useful channel of communication between Delhi and Beijing at a very difficult moment in the evolution of their bilateral relations.
    • The BRICS is also about India’s enduring partnerships with Russia, Brazil, and South Africa.
    • India also values its ties with the Central Asian states in the SCO.
    • The BRICS could certainly become a productive forum someday — when Delhi and Beijing mitigate their multiple contentions.

    Consider the question “A rising China has emerged as the biggest challenge to India and the US is increasingly an important part of the answer. Examine the elements that support this underlying transformation of India’s relationship with the two countries.”

    Conclusion

    No amount of words in a BRICS declaration can hide the sharpening contradictions between India and China today. The absence of joint statements did not mask the growing strategic congruence among the Quad nations in recent years.

  • Explained: The Cairn Tax Dispute

    In December 2020, a three-member tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Netherlands ruled against India in its long-running tax dispute with the U.K.-based oil and gas company Cairn Energy.

    PCA Ruling against India

    • The tribunal ordered India to pay about $1.4 billion to the company.
    • Following this, Cairn Energy has successfully moved courts in five countries, including the US and the UK to recognise its claim as per the arbitration award.
    • The Netherlands, France, and Canada are the other three countries.
    • Such recognition by courts opens the door for Cairn Energy to seize assets of the Indian government in these jurisdictions by way of enforcing its claim, in case the latter doesn’t pay its dues.

    What is the dispute about?

    • The dispute started in early 2014 when Indian tax authorities started questioning Cairn Energy requesting information on the group’s reorganization in the financial year 2006-07.

    Issue over the tax due

    • This escalated, and by 2015, the authorities had sent the company a draft assessment order, assessing in the process that there was a principal tax amount of $1.6 billion that was due.
    • The year in reference, 2006-07, was one in which big corporate changes and developments took place in Cairn Energy.

    Basis of the tax demand: Sale of Shares

    • It was the year in which it not only undertook a corporate reorganization but also floated an Indian subsidiary, Cairn India, which in early 2007 got listed on the Indian Stock Market.
    • Through the corporate reorganization process, Cairn Energy had transferred all of its India assets, which were until then held by nine subsidiaries in various countries, to the newly-formed Cairn India.
    • But the tax authorities claimed that in the process of this reorganization, Cairn Energy had made capital gains worth ₹24,500 crores.
    • This, the department asserted, was the basis of the tax demand.

    Is this case similar to Vodafone’s battle with the government?

    • The Vodafone case in 2007 was triggered by Hong Kong’s Hutchinson Telecommunications’ sale of its stake in India’s Hutchinson Essar to Vodafone based out of the Netherlands.
    • The Hong Kong firm made a capital gain on this, which the Indian tax authorities deemed fit to tax.
    • They held that Vodafone should have withheld the tax, and therefore imposed liability on it.
    • The Supreme Court quashed the taxman’s demand that the sale of shares, in this case, would amount to transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Indian Income Tax Act”.

    What governs the Sale of Shares?

    • In the Union Budget of 2012, the Income Tax Act, 1961 was amended to make sure that even if a transfer of shares takes place outside India, such a transfer can be taxed.
    • This was done when the value of those shares is based on assets in India. And this was applied retrospectively.

    Cairn won over Retrospection

    • The action against Cairn Energy was based on this move.
    • India lost its arbitration case against Vodafone as well, with the government being asked to fork out around ₹80 crores.

    What happened after the tax claims in the Cairn Energy dispute?

    • After receiving a draft assessment order from the tax authorities, Cairn UK Holdings Ltd. appealed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
    • The tribunal, while providing the company relief from back-dated interest demands, however, upheld the main tax demand.
    • The company had initiated proceedings of arbitration under the U.K.-India bilateral investment treaty.
    • But during this time, the government sold Cairn’s almost 5% holding and seized dividends totalling ₹1,140 crore due to it from those shareholdings and set off a ₹1,590-crore tax refund against the demand.

    What was the main argument of Cairn Energy during the arbitration?

    • The claimants, Cairn Energy and Cairn UK Holdings argued that till the amendment was made to tax retrospectively in 2012, there was no tax on indirect transfers.
    • Indirect transfers here meant transfer by a non-resident of shares in non-Indian companies which indirectly held assets in India.
    • The application of the 2012 amendments, they alleged, constituted “manifest breaches” of the U.K.-India bilateral investment treaty.

    What was India’s defence during the arbitration?

    • India’s counter to the main charge of Cairn Energy was that its 2006 transactions were taxable irrespective of the 2012 amendments.
    • It argued that “Indian law has long permitted taxation where a transaction has a strong economic nexus with India”.
    • It said even if it is retrospective, it is “valid and binding applying the longstanding constitutional, legislative and legal framework in which the claimants have invested”.

    What did the arbitration tribunal rule?

    • The tribunal said the tax demand violated the U.K.-India bilateral investment treaty.
    • The tribunal said India “failed to accord Cairn Energy’s investments fair and equitable treatment” under the bilateral protection pact it had with the United Kingdom.
    • It also ordered India to compensate Cairn Energy and its subsidiary for “the total harm suffered” as a result of the breaches of the treaty.

    India’s way ahead

    • It has been reported in the media that India will appeal against the tribunal’s decision.
    • If enforcement proceedings are initiated, India is confident of addressing them and will strongly defend its interests.

    Back2Basics: Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)

    • It is an intergovernmental organization located in The Hague, Netherlands.
    • It is not a court in the traditional sense but provides services of arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes that arise out of international agreements between member states, international organizations or private parties.
    • The cases span a range of legal issues involving territorial and maritime boundaries, sovereignty, human rights, international investment, and international and regional trade.
    • The PCA is constituted through two separate multilateral conventions with a combined membership of 122 states.
    • The organization is not a United Nations agency, but the PCA is an official United Nations Observer.

  • Biden’s Afghanistan Peace Plan

    The Joe Biden administration has proposed a new peace plan to the Afghan government and the Taliban, seeking to bring violence to a halt and form an interim government.

    What is Biden’s proposal?

    • The US has asked the Afghan President to show “urgent leadership in the coming weeks”.

    The proposal included many elements.

    • It has proposed an UN-led conference of representatives of Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India and the US to discuss a unified approach to support peace in Afghanistan.
    • It urges both sides including the Taliban to reach a consensus on Afghanistan’s future constitutional and governing arrangements.
    • It asks to find a road map to a new “inclusive government”; and agree on the terms of a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire”.

    Why the US is making this peace push?

    • The US has pointed out that accelerating the peace process is the best way to advance the shared interests of the US and the Afghan government.
    • According to the agreement the U.S. signed with the Taliban in February 2020, American troops – currently some 2,500 troops are in Afghanistan – are set to vacate by May 1.
    • The Taliban and the Afghan government started peace talks in Doha in September last year but reached no breakthrough.
    • The Biden administration is concerned about the slow pace of the talks.

    Why is the US delaying troops withdrawal?

    • The US assessment is that if American troops are pulled out of Afghanistan, the Taliban would make quick gains.
    • So, the Biden administration’s believes that the Taliban are on the ascent.
    • It hopes that the best way to prevent a complete Taliban takeover is a regional peace process and an interim unity government.
    • The Taliban are yet to respond to America’s proposal.

    What is the Afghan government’s stand?

    • The Ghani administration has consistently been critical of the US’s direct outreach to the Taliban.
    • The Trump administration held direct talks with the Taliban, excluding the government.
    • Later, Washington put pressure on Kabul to release Taliban prisoners as part of an agreement it reached with the insurgents.
    • Even when the Doha talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government were underway, Mr Ghani made it clear that he, as elected President, is the only legitimate representative of the Afghan people.
    • He resisted making concessions to the Taliban.

    India’s position in the process

    • Since the Afghan peace process began two years ago, India’s role in it has been peripheral at best.
    • Our EAM has iterated India’s long-held support for an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled” peace process.

    What lies ahead

    • While the Afghan government’s opposition to sharing power with the Taliban is well known, it is not clear whether Mr Ghani could continue to resist American pressure.
    • And if the Biden administration decides to stick to the Taliban deal and withdraw troops by May, Mr Ghani would be in a tougher spot.
    • The people of Afghanistan do not have any good options. If Ghani rejects the American offer, the war will continue forever.
    • The Taliban have already taken over much of the country’s hinterlands and are breathing down the neck of its cities.
    • Either way, the Taliban are set to make gains.

  • Why does the deepening Indo-US friendship puzzle so many?

    The India-US ties have advanced by leaps and bounds. Yet, there is a persistent underestimation of India’s capacity to rework its great power relations. The article deals with this issue.

    Expanding partnership

    • India-US relations have been on a steady upward trajectory over the last three decades.
    • This partnership withstood significant political transitions in both countries and managed to overcome many difficult barriers.
    • The US is now India’s most comprehensive partner.
    • The Russia relationship is long on defence but short on commerce.
    • India’s commercial ties with China are large, but tilted heavily in Beijing’s favour.
    • Collective Europe is big on commerce but small on security cooperation.
    • The US has a sizeable presence in both economic and security dimensions and the political common ground with India has steadily expanded.

    So, why persistent doubt in India about the US partnership

    • One part of it is the ingrained ideological bias in the dominant foreign policy elite.
    • Delhi’s stilted debate on the US is, unfortunately, reinforced by the sad absence of investment in institutional capabilities to study American politics, economics and international relations.

    Issues with our assessment of relations with India

    • There is an enduring reluctance of India’s foreign policy community to either acknowledge or accept the unfolding transformation of India’s ties with the US.
    • There is also continuing underestimation of India’s capacity to rework its great power relations to meet India’s changing interests and circumstances.
    • It was widely held that the Indo-Pacific and the Quad will become footnotes in Biden’s foreign policy.
    • This in turn was based on the bet that Biden is likely to embrace China rather than confront it in the manner that Trump did.
    • All these assumptions turned out to be inaccurate.
    • Concern for democracy and human rights has always been part of US foreign policy ideology.
    • But no state, not even a revolutionary one, can run its foreign policy on a single-point agenda. 

    Underestimating India’s agency to shape the partnership

    • Even as it continuously misjudged the US, the Indian foreign policy elite has not appreciated India’s agency to shape the relationship with America.
    • The conviction that Delhi is perennially under US pressure to accept policies harmful for itself further distorts the discourse in the media and among the chattering classes.
    • The evidence from the 1990s — one of India’s most vulnerable moments after Independence — should have corrected this misperception.
    • The traditional discourse finds it hard to come to terms with the twin factors shaping India’s new approach.
    • One is the significant increase in India’s material capabilities.
    • India’s aggregate GDP increased ten-fold between 1990 ($270 billion) and 2020 (about $2,700 billion).
    • Equally important is the new political will in Delhi.

    Consider the question “There is a continuing underestimation of Delhi’s capacity to rework its great power relations with the US to meet India’s changing interests and circumstances. Critically examine.” 

    Conclusion

    The new India no longer wrings its hands in dealing with the US; it relishes the large room for strategic bargaining with America. Even more important, Delhi is no longer a reluctant partner to Washington.

  • [pib] Maitri Setu between India and Bangladesh

    PM will inaugurate ‘Maitri Setu’ between India and Bangladesh tomorrow.

    Maitri Setu

    • The bridge ‘Maitri Setu’ has been built over the Feni River which flows between the Indian boundary in Tripura State and Bangladesh.
    • The 1.9 Km long bridge joins Sabroom in India with Ramgarh in Bangladesh.
    • The construction was taken up by the National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. Recently, which of the following States has explored the possibility of constructing an artificial inland port to be connected to the sea by a long navigational channel?

    (a) Andhra Pradesh

    (b) Chhattisgarh

    (c) Karnataka

    (d) Rajasthan

    Significance of the bridge

    • With this inauguration, Tripura is set to become the ‘Gateway of North East’ with access to Chittagong Port of Bangladesh, which is just 80 kms from Sabroom.
    • The name ‘Maitri Setu’ symbolizes growing bilateral relations and friendly ties between India and Bangladesh.

    About Feni River

    • Feni is a river in southeastern Bangladesh and Tripura.
    • It is a trans-boundary river with an ongoing dispute about water rights.
    • It originates in the South Tripura district and flows through Sabroom town and then enters Bangladesh.
    • The question of sharing the waters of the river between India and Pakistan was first discussed in 1958.

    Other associated projects

    Sabroom Check Post

    • PM will lay the foundation stone for setting up an Integrated Check Post at Sabroom.
    • It will help ease the movement of goods and passengers between the two countries provide new market opportunities for products of North-East states and assist the seamless movement of passengers to and from India and Bangladesh.
    • The project is being taken up by the Land Ports Authority of India.

  • Ceasefire between India and Pakistan.

     

    Why it is different from the past

    • The February ceasefire has triggered widespread speculation about its durability, significance and implication for bilateral relations in general.
    • This agreement is different from the routine ceasefire assurances that the two sides made till January 2021.
    • What makes the February 2021 ceasefire different is its two distinct features:
    • First, this was a joint statement by the two DGsMO.
    • Second, unlike the previous declarations, the recent agreement mentions a specific date, i.e., the night of February 24-25, to begin the ceasefire.
    • The agreement is also path-breaking from a conflict management point of view.
    • The ceasefire is also significant because this helps India to defuse an ugly two-front situation and a feeling of being boxed in by an inimical Pakistan and an aggressive China.

    Historical background of ceasefires with Pakistan

    • The Karachi agreement of 1949, which ended the first war between newly formed India and Pakistan, was the first ceasefire agreement between the two countries that created the India Pakistan boundary in Kashmir called the Ceasefire Line or CFL.
    • The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was mandated to monitor the ceasefire along the CFL.
    • Following the India-Pakistan war of 1971, the Suchetgarh Agreement of 1972 delineated the ‘line of control’ in Jammu and Kashmir thereby renaming the CFL as the LoC.
    • The 2003 agreement between the DGsMO, communicated through a telephone call between them, was a reiteration of the December 1971 war termination ceasefire.

    Rules and norms required

    • A ceasefire requires a clearly articulated and mutually-agreed-upon set of rules and norms for effective observance along with an intent to observe them. 
    • The February ceasefire is an expression of such an intent, but without the rules and norms to enforce it.
    • The Simla Agreement or the Suchetgarh Agreement do not have those rules either.
    • The Karachi Agreement, on the other hand, has clearly laid down provisions on how to manage the CFL which, of course, was overtaken by the LoC.
    • Therefore, armed forces deployed on either side of the LoC in Kashmir often have to resort to Karachi Agreement to observe the ceasefire.
    • Now that the two DGsMO have declared a joint ceasefire, the next logical step is to arrive at a set of rules to govern that ceasefire.
    • An unwritten ceasefire, experiences from conflict zones around the world show, tend to break down easily and trigger tensions in other domains.

    Role of back channels

    • What is also significant to note about the ceasefire agreement between the two DGsMO is that this was preceded by weeks.
    • Interestingly, the 2003 ceasefire was also preceded by discreet parleys between the heads of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India.
    • The 2003 CFA led to a sustained period of back channel talks on Kashmir which, by mid 2007, had almost finalised a deal to resolve the Kashmir conflict.
    • Ane key reason why the CFA held at least till 2008 was because there were parallel talks, along with holding fire on the LoC, on other outstanding bilateral issues, principally Kashmir.

    Conclusion

    While whether the 2021 CFA would prompt talks in other areas is unclear as of now, the possibility of piecemeal agreements to create durable stability bilaterally unless followed by progress in other domains remains to be seen.

  • Recalibrating relations with EU

    With India about to lose preferential access to the EU, there is a need to deepen the trade and investment ties with the region. The article deals with this issue.

    Export potential to the EU

    • India has an untapped export potential of $39.9 billion in the EU and Western Europe.
    • India benefits from tariff preferences under the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for several of these products.
    • In fact, India is among the major beneficiaries of the EU’s GSP, accounting for nearly 37% of India’s merchandise exports.

    India losing EU-GSP benefits: Product graduadion

    • Product graduation applies when average imports of a product from a beneficiary country exceed 17.5% of EU-GSP imports of the same product from all beneficiary countries over three years.
    • There are several products where India has export potential in the EU, but these have “graduated” or are at the brink of “graduation” under EU GSP.
    • India’s exports of products such as textiles, inorganic and organic chemicals, gems and jewellery, iron, steel and their articles, base metals and automotives are already out of the ambit of EU-GSP benefits.
    •  In apparel, India’s exports to the EU were valued at $7 billion in 2019, of which nearly 94% was under EU-GSP, indicative of the impact that the graduation may have on apparel exports.
    • Bangladesh’s apparel exports would continue to receive tariff benefits in the EU under Everything but Arms Initiative.
    • Another competitor, Vietnam, concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU in 2019.

    Need to deepen trade and investment ties

    • In light of the declining preferential access and the plausible erosion of competitiveness in the EU market, there is clearly a need to deepen trade and investment ties with the region.
    • Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement, which commenced in 2007, is yet to materialise due to lack of concurrence in areas like automotives and dairy and marine products.
    • Therefore, a thorough assessment of the benefits from FTA for domestic producers is warranted, with due consideration to the impact on sensitive sectors, and possibility of inclusion of safeguards such as sunset clause on concessions for some items.
    • Further, there should also be provisions for aspects such as investment and non-tariff measures (NTMs).
    • India also needs to negotiate on investment-related aspects with the EU to foster stronger value chains, especially in technology-intensive sectors in which the EU has a comparative advantage.
    • As far as NTMs are concerned, India faces as many as 414 NTMs in the EU, in a wide array of sectors. FTAs have some institutional arrangements for NTMs.

    Consider the question “Forging stronger ties with the EU could pave way for the greater cooperation and stronger trade ties. Elucidate.” 

    Conclusion

    Post-Brexit EU finds itself in the midst of a growing need for recalibrating ties with its partner countries. Forging stronger ties with the region through a mutually beneficial agreement could help strengthen Indian manufacturing and revitalise the flailing exports.

  • India, Japan back in another Sri Lanka port project

    Sri Lanka has confirmed that it will develop the West Container Terminal (WCT) at the Colombo Port along with India and Japan.

    Q.The threat of Chinese presence in South Asia can be tackled more effectively if India changes course in its dealings with its neighbours and becomes more sensitive to their concerns. Critically analyse.

     Why in news?

    • The decision comes a month after the Rajapaksa government ejected the two partners from a 2019 tripartite agreement to jointly develop the East Container Terminal (ECT), citing resistance to “foreign involvement”.
    • Neither India nor Japan has officially commented on the offer, or on the said private investment from the countries.

    An alternative to ECT

    • SL has offered India and Japan the WCT as an alternative, allowing higher stakes.
    • In the ECT project agreed upon earlier, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) was to hold a majority 51%, but in the WCT proposal, India and Japan will be accorded an 85% stake.
    • The nearby Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT), where China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited holds 85%.
    • This makes it a strategically desirable spot for India, whose concerns over China’s presence in Sri Lanka are well known.

    Issues with a new project

    • The WCT is adjacent to the China-run CICT and just a couple of kilometres away from the China-backed Port City being built on reclaimed land.
    • The West Container Terminal, however, has to be built from scratch, requiring a much higher investment.
    • The return on investment has not been envisaged yet.

    Why is Colombo so generous this time?

    • Colombo’s alternative offer also comes at a time when Sri Lanka is seeking support at the ongoing UN Human Right Council session, where a resolution on the country’s rights record will soon be put to vote.

  • India, Pak, China must build on de-escalation

    Three power, India, Pakistan and China need to take a new look at the factors underlying their relationship with each other. The article deals with this issue.

    Hope for regional politics to turn a new leaf

    • The announcement by India and Pakistan of strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing along the Line of Control is a welcome step.
    • It is premature to conclude what all this will amount to in the long term.
    • But if all three powers, China, Pakistan and India, can draw the appropriate lessons in humility, there is hope for regional politics to turn over a new leaf.

    Lessons for India

    • First, the belligerent use of foreign policy in domestic politics has unintended effects on your international standing.
    • In 2019, the official rhetoric was promising India retaking PoK and putting more military pressure on Pakistan.
    • In contrast, the discourse on foreign policy since the Chinese pressure on the LAC has been one of marked sobriety scaling back all expectations of a flippant militarism.
    • Second, the standoff with China has brought home some stark realities. We can speculate on Chinese motives.
    •  The LAC standoff considerably released the pressure on Pakistan.
    • We were reminded that the LAC and LoC can be linked; that the zone around Kashmir was a trilateral and not a bilateral contest, and that India will need significant resources to deal with China.
    • In the matter of the CAA the talk of evicting Bangladeshis has been starkly checkmated by the need to placate Bangladesh, which is vital to our strategic interests.

    Lessons for Pakistan

    • First, India now has enough weight in the international system that any attempts to internationalise Kashmir are a non-starter.
    • Second, the revocation of Article 370 did not unleash the kinds of fissures and cycle of violence within the Valley that Pakistan might have been hoping to exploit.
    • Third, the pandemic is a great opportunity for Pakistan to recognise that opening up to the South Asian region is in its interest in the long term than acting on the coattails of China.

    Lessons for China

    • India may not have, in a literal sense, restored the status quo ante on the LAC, the fact of the matter is that it has stood up with enough firmness to send the signal that it will not be a pushover.
    • India signalled a resolve that Chinese military and economic hegemony can be resisted.
    • China cannot wish away considerable Indian power.
    • In fact, by concentrating India’s mind on the China challenge, it may have unwittingly done India a favour.

    Way forward

    • So this moment can be a constructive one if everyone understands the one lesson in world politics: There are diminishing returns to belligerence.
    • With Pakistan, India should seize the moment and build on the de-escalation.
    • The pandemic offers an opportunity for greater economic cooperation.
    • Political establishments of both countries will have to think of what is a win-win political narrative they can legitimately offer their citizens.

    Consider the question “If all three powers, China, Pakistan and India, can draw the appropriate lessons in humility, there is hope for regional politics to turn over a new leaf. Comment.“

    Conclusion

    The region will be better off with a humility that tries to align them, rather than a hubris that exults in unilateral triumphalism.

  • Sri Lanka at the UN Rights Council

    Sri Lanka is facing another UNHRC resolution for its war crimes that took place during the military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

    UNHRC report on Sri Lanka

    • The report warned that Sri Lanka’s failure to address human rights violations and war crimes committed in the past had put the country on a “dangerous path”.
    • It rose that this could lead to a “recurrence” of policies and practices that gave rise to the earlier situation.
    • It flagged the accelerating militarization of civilian governmental functions, a reversal of important constitutional safeguards, political obstruction of accountability, intimidation of civil society, and the use of anti-terrorism laws.
    • The shrinking space for independent media and civil society and human rights organisations are also themes in the report.

    Try this question:

    Q.The triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan is an emerging threat in the Indian Ocean Region. Discuss.

    The Resolution 30/1

    • The resolution 30/1 launched in 2015 deals with promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka.
    • It extended an opportunity to make good on its promises for justice and offered extensive support to accomplish that objective.

    Sri Lanka’s intention

    • It is more than Sri Lanka has failed to – and doesn’t intend to — take the necessary, decisive, and sustainable steps necessary to achieve domestic justice and reconciliation.
    • Sri Lanka has officially sought India’s help to muster support against the resolution, which it has described as “unwanted interference by powerful countries”.

    Where India comes in

    • The UNHRC is scheduled to hold an “interactive” session on Sri Lanka where the report was to be discussed, and member countries were to make statements. India is expected to make a statement too.
    • Country-specific resolutions against Sri Lanka have regularly come up at the UNHRC in the last decade.
    • New Delhi voted against Sri Lanka in 2012 and abstained in 2014. It was spared the dilemma in 2015 when Sri Lanka joined resolution 30/1.
    • With elections coming up in Tamil Nadu, and PM declaring on a recent visit that he was the first Indian leader to visit Jaffna, Sri Lanka has begun reading the tea leaves.
    • Whichever way it goes, the resolution is likely to resonate in India-Sri Lanka Relations and for India internally, in the run-up to the Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu.